NATIONAL TACTICAL INTERFACE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M00596A000300140001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 2, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 2000
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/02 : CIA-RDP80M00596A000300140001-8
ducted -to exercise the national systems
A f damental problem stems from optimiz
sys ems for specific national and tactic
gen rally do not offer timely response,
ass ed availability for tactical needs
att ck conditions. The latter on the o
inc ude features which are marginally us
for normal. peacetime operation. This pr
unless a higher priority and preference
are given to systems which feature adapt
suc a choice usually entails added cost
tra s- and post-attack. In the came of
men s across the spectrum of operating c
of he most cost-effective performance i
tur environment. However, such a str
demknd to develop two parallel and redu
national and one for tactical purposes,
rig , the failure to meet tactical requi
actical applications.
iuestion 4 applies.
ng the design of
1 needs. The fors+er
ccessibility, and
ender trans- and post-
her hand by necessity
ful or unnecessary
blew won't be solved
n system selectiop
bility to require-
nditions--peace,
ndividual systems,
and some compromise
the normal unper-
tegy offsets the
ant systems, one for
r, an even greater
ements at all.
All of the identified issues apply. The institutional issue
is probably the most difficult with which
to cope:t has i
roots in the national/tactical distincti
n. The issues are
basically abstract rather than concrete,
Baling with percep
dos of ownership, control, and depends
ility, but they are
nonetheless real and critical factors in
the decision proces
Under such
of c mmand and control under combat conditions. tions, it is probable that a limited
number of closely
focu ed systems with precisely known caps
ilities and assure
res naiveness are most useful to the tactical forces.
exch nges and of fori4s are under way in EU
This is a serious problem. Progress has
national intelligenge cells. All of then
cumbersome and ill-quited to a fully effe
control system. Eventually, major change
parties and the policy problems are resol
trap ferring and prr~cessing data which ca
acti n is to proceed with setting up US s
and ontrol structuge. For the present,
will be required to ensure an operational
ts
-
s
d
peen made by lateral
OM to establish smlti--
arrangements are
tive command and
in disclosure policy
y ready NATO command
he most important
stems for acquisitione
be extended to other
ed.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/02 : CIA-RDP80M00596A000300140001-8
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/02 : CIA-RDP80M00596A000300140001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/02 : CIA-RDP80M00596A000300140001-8