INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM THE FOOD SITIUATION IN EAST PAKISTAN

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• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 18, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: July 1, 1971
• Content Type: IM

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
The Food Situation In East Pakistan
Confidential
ER IM 71-151
July 1971
Copy No. 63
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
OROUP I
C%CLUDCD YIIOM AUTOMATIC
OOWNOIIAUINO AND
DPT I.ANYI-ICATION
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
July 1971
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
THE FOOD SITUATION IN EAST PAKISTAN
Introduction
1. The civil war that broke out in East Pakistan on 25 March is
only the latest in a series of disasters that have rocked that province during
the past year. Eye-witness observers who have recently toured the region
have agreed unanimously that food shortages are virtually inevitable by late
summer and that the possibility of famine cannot be ruled out.
2. This memorandum evaluates the civil war's impact on East
Pakistan's food production and the disruptions that have occurred to normal
food movements both within the province and from the outside world.
It also appraises the likely food situation and consequent import
requirements in East Pakistan during the next year.
Discussion
3. Even under normal conditions, East Pakistan has not been
self-sufficient in foodgrains for more than a decade. Population growth has
outpaced rice production - the mainstay of the province's diet -- and
imports averaging one million tons of foodgrains have been required annually
(see Table 1). Most of the imports consisted of wheat provided by the
United States under PL 480 auspices. Imports were sufficient to maintain
per capita foodgrain consumption at approximately the 1960 level.
4. Severe flooding in August 1970 and the subsequent devastating
cyclone in November reduced the province's rice prospects from an expected
12.3 million tons in fiscal year (FY) 1971 (1 July 1970-30 June 1971)
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and coordinated within the Directorate of Intelligence.
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East Pakistan: Foodgrain Production,
Imports, and Availability a/
Million Metric Tons
Year
Production
Imports
Availability
1961
9.73
0.59
10.32
1962
9.68
0.69
10.37
1963
8.93
1.33
10.26
1964
10.67
0.93
11.60
1965
10.55
0.63
11.18
1966
10.56
0.79
11.35
1967
9.66
0.89
10.55
1968
11.25
1.01
12.26
1969
11.34
1.03
12.37
1970
12.01
1.51
13.52
1971
c/
11.10
1.20
12.30
a. Fiscal years ending 30 June.
b. Including shipments from West Pakistan.
c. Preliminary.
to 11.0 million tons. jj There were indications in early 1971, however,
that more extensive use of high-yielding variety (HYV) seeds and increased
acreage for the born crop 21 harvested in the spring would raise production
to 11.5 million tons. This would still leave a larger shortfall than in the
previous year, so that more imports would be needed.
5. In early 1971, Islamabad already had arranged to import 2.2
million tons of foodgrains to close the expected food gap and indicated
that it would require 500,000 tons more. By late March and before the
hostilities, about 1.1 million tons already had arrived, including most of
the 400,000 tons expected from West Pakistan. The United States had
arranged under PL 480 to ship almost 1 million tons, of which almost
400,000 tons had b:-en delivered by late March.
25X1
fall, aman in the winter, and boro in the spring. They represent about 25%,
60%, and 15%, respectively, of annual rice output.
free rice crops are harvested annually in East Pakistan -- aus in the
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6. Storage facilities, docks, and the distribution system are adequate
under normal conditions to handle large inflows from abroad as well as
shipments from surplus to deficit districts within the province.
Government-owned storage depots have a capacity of about 700,000 tons
and service primarily the major urban areas. Much larger stocks are held
by private traders and by farmers for their own use. Stocks are normally
at their highest level in the spring, drawn down during the monsoon months,
and replenished in the winter. East Pakistan's two major ports -- Chittagong
and Chalna - have a combined normal capacity for offloading foodgrains
of more than 200,000 tons per month. The deltaic terrain favors water
transport for internal shipments of foodgrains, although the railroads
normally handle the distribution of more than half of the foodgrains
received from abroad (see Figure 1).
7. On the eve of the civil war, Pakistani and international relief
agencies were still rebuilding housing and dikes in the cyclone-devastated
coastal area. In large areas, food stocks and crops had been completely
destroyed and the population was subsisting on imported foodgrain
distributed through a government system of ration shops. Government
officials and local leaders, however, were quite apprehensive about the next
eight months because it had not been possible to replace the cattle, which
are used as draft animals, lost during the cyclone, with the result that
substantial acreage would remain untilled. Furthermore, it had not been
possible to stockpile sufficient quantities of foodgrains at strategic points
in the area because warehouses were destroyed. Foodgrain distribution was
hampered by a shortage of boats, a large number of which were destroyed
in the cyclone.
Impact of the Civil War
8. The civil war has had a devastating effect on East Pakistan's food
situation by reducing economic activity in the countryside and at the major
ports and by disrupting the internal distribution system. As a result, crop
prospects have deteriorated, purchasing power has declined, and food stocks
are falling. Islamabad has taken only nominal action to avert a food crisis.
The mass refugee exodus into India -- over 7 million in late July - has
further complicated the situation, reducing the number of mouths to feed
while at the same time leaving land untilled. J
9. Western observers who toured East Pakistan's countryside in
recent weeks found a pervasive atmosphere of fear, extensive burning of
villages, and widespread neglect of rice cultivation. Planting of the aus and
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East Pakistan Transportation Network
NEPAL
Qhittagong?\
~ 1
at3 Cox's Bazar
as so
MILES
BHUTAN
L \ A rn,U Auli '
Ch Ina, ' Barisa, (? i s
f / Chalna Pori 5 <
Figure 1
BURMA
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aman crops - accounting for 85% of total annual production - was under
way in the period April-July. The full impact of this neglect will not be
known until the harvests in September and December. It seems almost
certain, however, that the harvest will be abnormally low. Yields are likely
to drop sharply because farmers have not had normal access to fertilizer
and pesticides. Economic activity in the countryside has also been curtailed
by the virtual halt in public works projects, which has deprived perhaps
2 million rural wage workers of their usual incomes.
10. Distribution, rather than production, is the more immediate
problem insofar as food shortages and possible famine are concerned. Only
12 of East Pakistan's 19 districts are either self-sufficient in foodgrains or
produce a surplus, and the remainder are dependent at least in part on
outside supplies (see Figure 2). Normally the internal transport network,
the public distribution network, and private traders assure that foodgrains
move from the surplus districts and - in the case of imports - from the
ports.
11. The World Bank representatives, who toured East Pakistan in
June, characterized the foodgrain distribution system as "completely
wrecked." Rail and motor traffic have been disrupted by the hostilities,
and water traffic has been limited by a shortage of boats, which were
destroyed or confiscated by the military in large numbers. Foodgrain
movement from the ports to the interior has been reduced to a trickle
as important rail links were destroyed in the fighting and many, including
those from the ports, have not operated since early April. The army has
given priority to repairing blown bridges and other damage, but rail lines
are easily sabotaged by guerrilla bands, especially the vital link between
Chittagong and Dacca which runs within one mile of the Indian border.
While most damaged railroad bridges have undergone some makeshift repair,
more adequate repairs cannot be made until after the monsoon ends in
September. Furthermore, complete destruction of railroad signalling
equipment has slowed daylight operations and totally eliminated night
traffic, and restoration is many months off. Road traffic, even in relatively
secure areas, is still constrained because a large number of bridges and
culverts were destroyed and trucks are still largely in military hands.
12. The lack of adequate internal transport has delayed the
normalization of foodgrain imports, as port storage facilities are not capable
of handling the increased volume. Port operations at Chittagong and at
Chalna were disrupted by heavy fighting in late March, and ships then en
route to East Pakistan with foodgrains generally were diverted to Karachi
in the West Wing. Subsequently, although port facilities were largely
undamaged, labor shortages and the movement of army supplies held
non-military dock activities well below capacity. Foodgrain imports were
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Figure 2
MYMENSINGH
r ANGAIL-/--,--,,"
DACCA
DACCA?
FARIDPUR
a /f\.
East Pakistan Food Situation
District boundary
Surplus district
Deficit district
J,
COMILLAk
NQAKHAj CHITTAGONG
BARIS
BAY OF
F3CNCAL
6
511666 7-71
\ FIRT~[AGOPG
Cyclone Area
NOT NfCf.6SAIIII.Y Au 74.1111 -,CONFIDENTIAL
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resumed in May, but offloading has been well below normal, as the following
tabulation indicates:
Port
May
1971
June
1971
Monthly
Average
(FY 1970)
Chittagong
45,000
37,000
90,000
Chalna
11,900
31,000
54,000
13. In mid-July, storage facilities at both ports were full, and there
was little foodgrain movement to the interior to relieve the congestion.
At Chittagong, a new bulk storage silo capable of holding 110,000 metric
tons was being tested, but moisture seepage will limit its utilization to about
one-half of capacity for several months. Warehouses in Chittagong are storing
foodgrains up to 50% above capacity, which seriously increases risks of
spoilage. Foodgrains are reportedly even being stored in vacant office
buildings.
14. Although the drawdown of government foodgrain stocks
nationwide since March was about normal for those months, the geographic
distribution of the remaining stocks is extremely abnormal. By 1 June, total
stocks had declined to 450,000 tons, compared with 780,000 tons on
1 March (see Table 2). However, most of the stocks were being held at
their points of origin in normally surplus districts or at the ports because
of the breakdown of the internal distribution system (see Table 3). On
the basis of data from central storage depots, which account for most of
the stocks, it is estimated that the decline 'a government stocks through
June and early July further distorted t;ie distribution picture as drawdowns
continued in deficit districts while port supplies increased.
15. The current status of private foodgrain stocks is extremely
difficult to determine. Private stocks were abnormally low in March because
of the poor aman harvest the previous winter. The subsequent boro harvest
in March did not add significantly to stocks because of its relati,.r.ly small
size. Therefore, with the normal drawdown from spring peaks augmented
by that destroyed in widespread village burnings by the army, private stocks
are probably also very low.
16. The food situation is most critical in the area hit by the cyclone.
Bhola reported only a six-day foodgrain supply in mid-June. In the more
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East Pakistan: Government
Stock Position in Foodgrains
1971
Thousand Metric Tons
Stocks as of 1 March
In depots
In ships, ports, or in
transit
Total
Inflows, 1 March to 1 June
Ship arrivals
85
Less ship diversions
-40
Net inflow
Outflows, 1 March to 1 June
March offtake
150
April offtake
75
May offtake
100
Looted or destroyed
50
375
Stocks as of 1 June
In depots
360
In ships, ports, or in
transit
90
450
remote areas, people were eating roots in mid-May. A late May sweet potato
crop slightly alleviated the situation, but this was less than one-third of
normal and relief was short-lived. The situation was made worse by the
influx of refugees fleeing from the army, which has report dly doubled
the population in some parts of the cyclone region. However, earlier fears
of mass starvation have been allayed so far. The lack of a large army presence
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East Pakistan: Government
Foodgrain Stocks, by District
15 June 1971
Stocks
100
Normal food-deficit districts
23
Dacca
7
Faridpur
3
Mymensingh a/
6
Comilla
4
Noakhali
1
Pabna
2
Normal food-surplus districts
77
Kushtia
1
Barisal
8
Raj shahi
2
Bogra
4
Rangpur
2
Dinajpur
4
Jessore
2
Khulna
18
Sylhet
2
Chittagong
33
Chittagong Hill
Tracts
1
a. Including Tangail.
.b. Including PatuakhaZi.
has spared the area from much of the violence with the result that local
government is still functioning and some relief distributions are being
resumed, although often in reduced allotments because of very low stock
levels. However, starvation has only barely been avoided and could result
from a small additional disruption of the distribution system. Getting food
into the cyclone area is a problem even in normal times because large areas
are isolated by seas and flooded rivers, and the summer is a season of storms
and rough waters.
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17. Islamabad belatedly alerted Western aid donors to the increase
in its food import requirements but has done littlk, to improve foodgrain
movement within East Pakistan. For almost two months after the conflict
started, the military barred foreigners from East Pakistan and accepted no
outside relief offers because the situation had been "normalized." By May,
however, all doubt about East Pakistan's plight had been removed by the
vast refugee outflow to India. On 17 May, after many offers of assistance
had been made by the world community, Pakistan informed the United
Nations that international relief officials could resume their work in the
cyclone area on 1 June. In addition, it requested 2.1 million tons of
foodgrains for FY 1972 as well as 30 coastal ships to carry it to the interior.
Most countries refused the request for ships because of the possibility of
their use in military operations. In an effort to alleviate the transport
bottleneck and yet discourage further boat confiscations by the military,
the United States has granted $3 million with the stipulation that it be
used to charter foreign coastal vessels with foreign crews. In mid-July,
President Yahya Khan appointed a Bengali with cabinet rank to oversee
the relief and rehabilitation effort and replaced the ineffective food
coordinator with a naval officer.
18. The military government, preoccupied with establishing law and
order, has insisted that present food stocks are sufficient. East Pakistan's
military governor, Tikka Khan, assured the World Bank mission in June
that he is giving top priority to moving foodgrains, but the Bank
representatives believe that the problems are larger than Tikka Khan thinks
and that he is not fully informed of the true situation. The military has
been trying to restore the internal transportation network to facilitate the
army's movements, but their efforts have been frustrated by guerrilla
sabotage.
19. There has been no sense of urgency within the government with
respect to the cyclone area,
the main bottleneck in implementing relief programs is the provincial
government, which has been afraid to do anything without the military's
permission and reluctant to even approach the governor with a request.
However, both the military and provincial governments have pushed some
relief programs in the area to cater to what they regard as a "strange forei
n
g
interest." Various Bengali officials have been appointed to relief committees,
but so far their accomplishments have been small because no one wants
to take responsibility for making decisions.
10
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Prospects
20. The US Consulate in Dacca has estimated that 2.4 million tons
of foodgrains whi have to be imported during FY 1972 to maintain per
capita consumption at even "normal" levels, which many experts consider
inadequate. These requirements are based on a projected foodgrain
production estimate of 9.7 million tons in FY 1972 as compared with 11.1
million tons in the previous year and imply a reduction of 400,000 tons
in carry over stocks for FY 1973. Experts at the Consulate anticipate a
decline in each of the three annual harvests, as the following tabulation
indicates:
Fiscal Total
Year Aus Aman Boro Production
1970 3.0 7.1 1.9 12.0
1971 2.9 6.0 2.2 a/ 11.1 a/
1972 b/ 2.5 5.7 1.5 9.7
a. Preliminary.
b. Projected.
These production estimates assume favorable weather, and the decline could
be greater if floods or drought occur. The projected declines reflect
anticipated shortages of fertilizer and pesticides as well as shortfalls in
irrigation projects, resulting from the government's inability to administer
agricultural programs effectively while the military has priority over
resources.
21. Under normal circumstances, humanitarian considerations most
likely would assure that sufficient foodgrains arrived at East Pakistan's ports.
Unless drastic measures are taken to restore the internal distribution systems, DOA WAVER
however, deliveries may be delayed. Experts from the US Department of APPLIED
Agriculture and USAID who investigated the province's transport problems
for three weeks in June reported that widespread food shortages can be
averted only if foodgrain distribution has top priority and the military
diverts trucks. boats, and railcars to civilian use in order to meet the
emergency.
22. The unprecedented magnitude of the required imports - over
twice the normal level - will exceed the ports' offloading capacity unless
all present facilities are mobilized under ideal conditions to handle
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foodgrains. The largest amount handled previously was 1.5 million tons in
FY 1970. But even if the needed gra,!.n could be offloaded, the US experts
cited above maintain that only 1.6 million tons can be handled by the
internal transport system over the next 12 months unless drastic
improvements are made.
23. The cooperation and active participation of the army in
distributing foodgrains to deficit areas will be essential. Not only does the
army control most of the province's limited transport resources, but also
its presence may be necessary to avoid saboiage by the Mukti Foul
(Liberation Army), which reportedly has threatened to disrupt foodgrain
distribution efforts.
Conclusions
24. Widesprad hunger is almost inevitable within the next month or
two, especially in the food-deficit districts. Mass starvation, however, is
unlikely in this time period because private emergency and seed stocks could
be eaten and the flow of refugees to India could increase. Indeed, hunger
has been a contributing factor in the current refugee flow to India. By
mid-July, neither the central government in Islamabad nor the provincial
government in Dacca had taken any serious steps to accelerate the movement
of foodgrains. A food "czar" was appointed in July to oversee the problem,
but the military retained ultimate control over the transport system, and
there were no indications that the military governor intended to divert his
resources to such civil activities as food shipments.
25. East Pakistan's foodg-aiA distribution system has virtually
collapsed as a result of the civil war's disruption of the transport system.
Although province-wide stocks may be adequate for about two months,
the stocks are located principally in surplus areas and the normal flow of
foodgrains from surplus to deficit areas has been interrupted.
26. In September the aus harvest should ease the food ?:ituation
temporarily, but mostly in the surplus districts where the crop is
concentrated, so that continuing transport disruptions will translate into
shortages in deficit districts. Therefore, severe food shortage will probably
recur in late 1971 before the aman crop is harvested in December.
27. Import requirements of 2.4 million tons are anticipated through
June 1972, but imports of that magnitude actually exceed port capabilities
unless emergency measures are taken. In any event, foodgraiu imports will
rot at the ports unless the transport system is restored to normal. If
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transport can be rehabilitated, rural violence reduced, and massive imports
are forthcoming, the food situation could approach normal in early 1972.
If, however, guerrilla activities and army retaliations continue to disrupt
transport and rice production, famine will be a continuing threat in East
Pakistan.
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