AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000800220001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 28, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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n => Intelligence
Afghanistan Situation Report
June 1983
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Some progress was made on secondary issues at the Geneva talks,
but the parties failed to define the timing or manner of Soviet
troop withdrawals.
A Soviet expert on Afghanistan has grown pessimistic over
prospects for an early Soviet withdrawal. 0
IN BRIEF
2
PERSPECTIVE
BABRAK' S SUCCESSORS
4
There is no clear successor to President Babrak Karmal, and, were
he to leave office, whoever replaced him would probably be no
more effective than Babrak has been.
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near Eastern and South
Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments
on the issues raised in the publication should be directed
Publication Note
Unless major developments warrant otherwise, we will publish only the
cable version and not the hard-copy Afghanistan Situation Report next
week. The next hard copy report will appear on 12 July.
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Although some progress was made on secondary issues at the UN-
sponsored talks on Afghanistan, the parties failed to define the
timing or manner of Soviet troop withdrawals.
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Yuri Gankovsky, a Soviet academic expert on Afghanistan and
Pakistan, has grown pessimistic since December over prospects for
an early Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Gankovsky recently
told US Embassy officers in Moscow that a Finland-like status
would once have satisfied Moscow, but the best Afghanistan can
expect now is a Mongolian solution. Gankovsky said the USSR
would stay a long time to protect the Afghan regime--at least as
long as it took to pacify Soviet Central Asia in the 1920s and
1930s. ~~
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-- The Moscow radio commentator who reported on "Soviet invaders"
several times last month in English-language broadcasts on
Afghanistan has been-interned in a psychiatric asylum in
Tashkent, Moscow radio 'officials told Western reporters.
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There is no clear successor to President Babrak Karmal, and, were he
to leave office, whoever replaced him would probably be no more
effective in reducing the level of insurgency, implementing government
programs, or healing the deep rift in the ruling party. The reason for
his departure would be of major importance in determining which of the
many possible candidates would be his successor.
Babrak's failure to deal effectively with the many problems the
government and the party face has sparked periodic rumors that he will
be replaced.
we have tried to identify those individuals who, because of
their influence in the government and party, their ties to the Soviets,
and other qualifications, would be the most likely to replace Babrak.
Afghan press coverage of party and government leaders gives no
indication that any individual is being built up as a successor; other
reporting indicates no one with a clear edge. The strengths and
weaknesses of the possible candidates reported by these sources indicate
that those who would be leading contenders under some scenarios would
have little chance under others.
The Soviets and the Afghan Communists would probably try to make the
succession appear as orderly and legal as possible. Babrak holds two
offices--Chairman of the quasi-legislative Revolutionary Council (by
virtue of which he is chief of state) and General Secretary of the
People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. Ostensibly the Revolutionary
Council would elect a new chairman from among its members, and the
party's Central Committee would choose a new general secretary. In fact,
of course, the choice would be made by the Soviets or by Afghan
Communists under close Soviet supervision.~~
If Babrak Dies
If Babrak were to die or become physically unable to continue in
office, the Soviets would probably try to minimize the effect on the
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government and the party by quickly installing a member of Babrak's
Parcham faction.
If the Afghans follow Soviet practice, Babrak would be replaced by
someone in the party Secretariat. Noor Ahmed Noor is the second most
powerful Parchamist in that group. Noor is also a Pushtun, the ethnic
group that has always ruled Afghanistan, and some Afghans say he is much
more competent than Babrak.
The PDPA is not a mature Communist party, however, and it is possible
it would not follow Soviet practices, and other Parchamists might make a
successful bid for Babrak's job. Among the possibilities are:
-- Prime Minister Keshtmand. he, too, is
among the more capable of the Afghan Communists. His major
disadvantage is that he is a Hazara, the ethnic group with the
lowest socioeconomic status in Afghanistan.
-- Former Defense Minister Mohammad Rafi. He is the leading
military figure among the Parchamists and could be selected in
hopes of increasing military backing for the regime. The fact
that the Soviets have already replaced him as defense
minister, however, argues against his selection.
-- Mahmoud Baryalai. Babrak's brother is in the Secretariat
and has been given some important domestic and foreign policy
tasks, but he is only a candidate member of the Politburo, and
his selection might be opposed by more senior party members.
-- Dr. Najibullah. The KHAD chief is clearly a rising star,
but some party members might fear that once on top he would be
no less ruthless than former President Amin in dealing with
opponents in the party. Moreover, although he is a full
Politburo member, he is not in .the Secretariat.
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If the Soviets Try To Find a More Popular Leader
If the Soviets removed Babrak to install a leader more likely
to unite the Afghan Communists or win greater popular support,
Defense Minister Abdul Qader and Politburo member Mohammed Saleh
Ziray would be among the leading candidates. Qader, who is not
tied closely to either faction tends to favor the Parchamists but
might be acceptable to many Khalqis--especially in the military.
Ziray, although an important Khalqi, has been able to work with
the Parchamists. Ziray has not been closely associated publicly
with unpopular government programs, and
Qader is regarded by many Afghans as more of a nationalist
and less subservient to the Soviets than are most party members.
Several other figures might also be considered, such as Commerce
Minister Mohammad Khan Jalalar, a non-Communist, and Foreign
Minister Shah Mohammad Dost, a technician who has had no role in
unpopular domestic programs.
The Soviets are probably aware that, at best, only marginal
improvement would result from installing one of these men. Most
Afghans would regard them as Soviet puppets. They are less
objectionable than Babrak only because they so far have not dealt
with many of the issues that face a president. The odds are
against anyone accomplishing much through the inefficient and
often secretly disloyal Afghan civil service. Moreover, the
rivalry in the People's Democratic Party is so bitter that no one
is likely to be able to reconcile the Khalq and Parcham factions.
If the Communists Are Replaced by a Coalition
The Soviets could form a coalition government either as part
of a peace settlement or to try to win over part of the
resistance. Such a government would lack credibility if headed
by a Communist, so Moscow would presumably try to install a non-
communist with whom it had been able to work in the past and. who
believed that Kabul must have good relations with Moscow. Rumors
in Kabul and among Afghans abroad have included among the
candidates former Prime Minister Yusuf, former King Zahir Shah,
and his son-in-law Prince Abdul Wali.
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Public and private statements by these men and others who
would give the coalition credibility make it doubtful that they
would agree to serve without major Soviet concessions, including
troop withdrawal. Some less well known figures--such as former
Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Sattar Shalizi, who has kept up
contacts with both sides--might be more easily induced to serve,
but most Afghans would probably consider them as having sold out
to the Russians.
If the Soviets Side with Khalqis
The Khalq faction may still be the larger faction in the
People's Democratic Party, and sources in the Afghan military
report it is far stronger than the Parcham faction in the officer
corps. Although the Soviets have favored the Parcham faction,
they have tried to maintain good relations with both factions
and have rotected the Khalqis from a wholesale Parchamist purge.
If the Soviets were to decide to back the Khalqis, Interior
Minister Gulabzoi, Communications Minister Mohammad Aslam
Watanjar, Politburo member Ghulam Dastigir Panjshiri, and Ziray
would be among the candidates to replace Babrak. Ziray would be
chosen if the Soviets follow their own practice and select the
most senior Khalqi party official. Ziray is in the party
Secretariat and has demonstrated a willingness to work with the
Parchamists.
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