LETTER TO (SANITIZED) FROM ROBERT M. GATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90G01359R000200020014-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 2, 2011
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: September 18, 1985
• Content Type: LETTER

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18 September 1985
Mr. Arnold Beichman
P.O. Box 37
Naramata, British Columbia
Canada
Dear Arnold:
Secretary Weinberger is releasing the enclosed
paper this morning. Thousands of copies will be
circulated to US defense contractors, foreign
governments and other interested parties.
While the organization that prepared the
document is not identified, you may find the
graphics and style familiar. Because we think
this is such an important problem, I wanted to
be sure that you received a copy promptly.
I hope you find it useful.
Sincerely,
Enclosure:
As Stated
Robert M. Gates
DDI/RMGates/de/5151
DISTRIBUTION:
0 - Addressee (mailed to: c/o Professor Kerry Kartchner
1 - DDI Registry Naval Post Graduate School
1 - DDI Chrono Monterey, California 93943-5100
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Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence
DDI #04586-85
18 September 1985
Mr. W. Bruce Weinrod
Director of Foreign Policy
and Defense Studies
The Heritage Foundation
Washington, D.C. 20002
Secretary Weinberger is releasing the enclosed
paper this morning. Thousands'of copies will be
circulated to US defense contractors, foreign
governments and other interested parties.
While the organization that prepared the
document is not identified, you may find the
graphics and style familiar. Because we think
this is such an important problem, I wanted to
be sure that you received a copy promptly.
I hope you find it useful.
Enjoyed our lunch and look forward to
remaining in touch.
Si ely,
Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Enclosure:
As Stated
DDI/RMGates/de/5151
DISTRIBUTION:
0 - Addressee
1 - DDI Registry
1 - DDI Chrono
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Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence
Mr. David Sullivan
Legislative Assistant
c/o Senator James McClure
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
DDI #04585-85
18 September 1985
Secretary Weinberger is releasing the enclosed
paper this morning. Thousands of copies will be
circulated to US defense contractors, foreign
governments and other interested parties.
While the organization that prepared the
document is not identified, you may find the
graphics and style familiar. Because we think
this is such an important problem, I wanted to
be sure that you received a copy promptly.
I hope you find it useful.
I appreciated the clippings you sent (and
your note).
Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Enclosure:
As Stated
DDI/RMGates/de/5151
DISTRIBUTION:
0 - Addressee (delivered after lunch)
1 - OLL
1 - DDI Registry
1 - DDI Chrono
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Soviet Acquisition of
Militarily Significant
Western Technology:
An Update
September 1985
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Soviet Acquisition of Militarily Significant
Western Technology: An Update
In recent years, the United States Government has learned of a massive, well-
organized campaign by the Soviet Union to acquire Western technology illegally
and legally for its weapons and military equipment projects. Each year Moscow
receives thousands of pieces of Western equipment and many tens of thousands of
unclassified, classified, and proprietary documents as part of this campaign.
Virtually every Soviet military research project-well over 4,000 each year in the
late 1970s and over 5,000 in the early 1980s-benefits from these technical
documents and hardware. The assimilation of Western technology is so broad that
the United States and other Western nations are thus subsidizing the Soviet
military buildup.
Western products and technology secrets are being systematically acquired by
intricately organized, highly effective collection programs specifically targeted to
improve Soviet military weapon systems. The Soviet intelligence services-the
KGB, the GRU, and their surrogates among the East European services-and
Soviet trade and scientific organizations are actively involved in obtaining this
technology. Targets include defense contractors, manufacturers, foreign trading
firms, academic institutions, and electronic data bases. Only recently has the full
extent of illegal Soviet technology collection efforts become known.
The purpose of this paper is to reveal in detail the structure of these Soviet
programs, and to give examples of Soviet requirements and successes. Understand-
ing the Soviet effort is a critical first step in protecting Western technology and
preventing it from being turned against the West.
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Introduction
1
Overview of Two Soviet Programs
2
The VPK Program: Raising the Technical Levels of Weapons
4
and Manufacturing Equipment
Successes and Benefits
6
VPK Collectors and Sources
1 1
The KGB
16
The GRU
16
Selected Sources
17
US Defense Contractors
17
Commercial Data Bases
17
Scientific Conferences
19
Ministry of Foreign Trade
20
Overt and Academic-Related Collectors
21
The Trade Diversion Program: Building and Expanding Industries
24
Computers and Microelectronics
24
Participants in the Second Program
25
Use of Diverters-for-Hire
26
Other Diversion Methods
27
Prospects for Stemming Losses
28
Several Hundred Examples of Soviet Military Equipment and
31
Weapons Benefiting From Western Technology and Products
1. Key Organizations Involved in Managing Military Research
3
and Manufacturing and the Acquisition of Western Technology
2. Examples of VPK Requirements, Mid-1970s-Early 1980s
5
3. Rank Ordering of Soviet Industries by VPK
7
Requirements Fulfilled, by Rubles Saved, and by
Hardware Received, 1976-80
4. Technical and Time Benefits to Thousands of Soviet Military
I I
Research Projects From Western Technology
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5. Ruble Savings From Only a Part of Soviet Western Technology 12
Acquisitions
6. Rank Ordering of Industries by Soviet Military Research Projects 13
Benefiting From Western Technology, Early 1980s
7. Soviet Military Requirements Satisfied by Principal 14
Collection Agencies in the Overall VPK Program, Late 1970s and
Early 1980s
8. Most Significant Acquisitions Satisfied by Principal 15
Collection Agencies, Late 1970s and Early 1980s
9. Selected US Universities Identified by the Soviets as Sources 22
of Needed Applied Technology
10. Soviet Needs for Applied Science and Technology From 23
Selected US Universities Compared With Number of Visiting
Soviet Bloc Scientists, Early 1980s
H. Soviet Acquisitions of More Than 2,500 Pieces of Western
Microelectronics Manufacturing Equipment, Early 1970s-Early
1980s
1. Summary of Results of the VPK Program, Late 1970s and 6
Early 1980s
2. Selected Worldwide Soviet Acquisitions, Military Applications, and 9
Collectors of Western Documents, Military Hardware, and
Dual-Use Products
3. Rank Ordering of Top 100 US Defense Contractors of 1983 18
Compared With Their Rank Ordering by Approximate Frequency
of Soviet Identification for Needed Technology, Selected Periods in
Late 1970s and Early 1980s
4. Selected Successful Soviet Bloc Espionage Operations Against US 20
and Other Western Defense Contractor Targets
5. Examples of Dual-Use Equipment and Technology Likely To Be 29
Targeted by the Soviets
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Soviet Acquisition of
Militarily Significant
Western Technology:
An Update
Overcoming considerable technological inferiority
over the past several decades, the Soviets have built
the largest military industrial manufacturing base in
the world and a massive research establishment to
complement it. Their objective is to achieve military-
technical capabilities that are at least equal, if not
superior, to those of the West.
Their resource commitment is enormous by any mea-
sure: it has enabled them in recent years to narrow the
Western lead in nearly all key technological areas,
particularly microelectronics. In materials, explosive,
and sensor technologies applicable to deployed tacti-
cal forces such as tanks, artillery, and antitank and
surface-to-air missiles the Soviets' technology level is
roughly equal to or slightly better than that of the
West. They are the world's leaders in a few significant
fields, such as chemical warfare and in some areas of
laser research for future "star wars" applications.
Nevertheless, in spite of the several decades of mas-
sive investment in indigenous research and develop-
ment, the prospects are small that the Soviets can
reduce their dependence on a large variety of Western
products and technology in this decade and the next
without allowing the technological gap to widen. The
main reasons for this continuing need are endemic to
the Soviet system: the lack of adequate incentives,
inflexible bureaucratic structures, excessive secrecy,
and insularity from the West. Even if there were some
major Soviet economic or managerial reforms, no real
lessening of the Soviet dependence on Western inno-
vation is anticipated as long as the USSR perceives
the need for military-technological parity with the
West, or the need for superiority.
Soviets, however, because of new technological leader-
ship that the West has supplied them. Their depen-
dence is essentially for innovation-where they will
continue to look to the West-not for maintaining
adequacy, which they have achieved in nearly all
important military technologies. But today's adequa-
cv will be tomorrow's obsolescence if tech nology fails
to keep pace.
In May 1982 the US Congress was given a report '
identifying a massive and global Soviet program to
acquire Western militarily significant technology.'
That report described the Soviets' successes in supple-
menting their military research and manufacturing
capabilities and in narrowing the technology gap with
the West, thereby eroding the technological superior-
ity on which US and Allied security depends.
The identification of this Soviet program led the West
to undertake greater efforts in counterintelligence and
export control. Since then, it has become even more
evident that the magnitude of the Soviets' collection
effort and their ability to assimilate collected equip-
ment and technology are far greater than was previ-
ously believed.
This update of the 1982 report defines the scope of the
Soviet effort. It outlines how the Soviets go about
acquiring Western technology and identifies examples
of specific technologies they seek. It highlights details
and statistics of Soviet successes-much more detail
than could be revealed previously. This information
was obtained directly by the United States and Allied
countries. Understanding the Soviet effort is critical
in designing ways to protect Western technology from
being acquired and used against Western security
interests.
The impact of this dependence could be even more
important in the 1990s than it is today. The USSR
has been compelled to follow Western direction in
technological change, and thus far it has been able to
do this satisfactorily because of a mature technologi-
cal base. The next decade is less certain for the
'Soviet Acquisition of Western Technology, April 1982. Exhibit
No. 1. Hearings Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investiga-
tions of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States
Senate, Ninety-Seventh Congress, Second Session, 4, 5, 6, 11, and
12 May 1982.
Western technology (hardware, documents, and know-how) in-
cludes that of Japan as well as other Free World countries.
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A basic question is why do Soviet weapon designers
and Soviet manufacturers need to copy design con-
cepts embodied in Western equipment and associated
documents? In general, Soviet weapons have histori-
cally reflected a commitment to functional designs
that can be easily manufactured in labor-intensive
factories and readily maintained in the field with a
minimum of technical skill. There has always been a
struggle between Soviet design simplicity and techni-
cal complexity. Soviet weapon designers have not had
to face the competitive pressures that drive Western
designers to press the state of the art.
Building on a mature research sector and on lessons
learned from past performances of weapons in battle,
the Soviets are placing more of a premium on techni-
cally complex systems. Western system and equip-
ment characteristics increasingly are used as yard-
sticks against which Soviet technical capabilities are
judged. Every major civilian or military project is
compared with the best Western technology before it
is approved for development. Once in development,
Soviet standards mandate the comparison of the
quality and technical level of hardware, at different
design stages, with foreign counterparts.
With their access to many details of Western weapons
and dual-use equipment designs and concepts, Soviet
designers are, in effect, competing with Western de-
signers. That competition, supported and encouraged
by the Soviet leadership, is probably pressuring the
military research establishment to pay increasing
attention to technically complex systems. Counter-
vailing pressures for design simplicity are being ap-
plied hr the manufacturing sector, which is less
responsive in adapting to technological change. All of
these forces indicate continuing Soviet programs to
acquire Western military and dual-use hardware and
technical data.
Since 1982 it has become clearer that the Soviets have
two programs to acquire Western hardware and
documents:
? First, Moscow has a program to raise the technical
levels of weapons and military equipment as well as
to improve the technical levels of manufacturing
processes. This program is managed by the most
powerful organization in defense production-the
Military Industrial Commission (VPK) of the Pre-
sidium of the Council of Ministers (figure 1). Main-
ly, although not exclusively, through intelligence
channels, the VPK seeks one-of-a-kind military and
dual-use hardware, blueprints, product samples, and
test equipment to improve the technical levels and
performance of Soviet weapons, military equipment,
and defense manufacturing equipment and reduce
any dependency on advanced Western products.
This is done in large part by exploiting and adapting
design concepts embodied in acquired equipment
and associated documents.
? Second, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Soviet
intelligence services administer a trade diversion
program to acquire relatively large numbers of dual-
use manufacturing and test equipment for direct use
in production lines. This program seeks export
controlled microelectronics, computer, communica-
tions, machining, robotics, diagnostic, and other
equipment to increase the throughput of weapon-
producing industries.
These two programs, which apparently are adminis-
tered separately, are the hub of the Soviet effort.
The VPK program is principally, but not exclusively,
an industrial security and counterintelligence concern
for the West. It involves espionage by hostile intelli-
gence officers, overt collection by Bloc officials, ac-
quisition by scientific exchange program participants,
and illegal trade-related activity. The trade diversion
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Figure 1
Key Organizations Involved in Managing Military Research and
Manufacturing and the Acquisition of Western Technology
( __I Military policy. research. manufacturing, and
the principal reyuestcrs of Western technology
11 Collectors of Western technology
Chief' Intelligence
Directorate (GRU)
Military Industrial
Commission (VPK)
Key defense
manufacturing
ministries
Aviation Industry
Machine Building
Defense Industry
General Machine
Building
Communications
Equipment Industry
Radio Industry
Medium Machine
Building
Shipbuilding Industry
Electronics Industry
Chemical Industry
Electrical Equipment
Industry
Petroleum Refining
and Petrochemical
Industry
Committee for
State Security (KGB)
East European
intelligence services
The Military Industrial Commission (VPK) coordinates the devel-
opment of all Soviet weapons as well as the Soviet national-level
program to acquire Western technology. The VPK is the most
powerful organization in the defense-research establishment, com-
prising the top executives of the key defense manufacturing minis-
tries (industries). Requests for Western documents and one-of-a-
kind hardware from military equipment designers in each of the 12
industries shown above are called requirements (see figure 2).
To satisfy these requirements, the VPK controls a national
State Committee for
Science and
Technology (GKNT)
Ministry of
Foreign Trade
Other defense
manufacturing
ministries
State Committee for
Foreign Economic
Relations (GKES)
fund, amounting to some half a billion rubles each year (roughly
$1.4 billion in 1980 purchase power equivalents). Once approved by
the VPK, requirements are selectively levied among the KGB, the
GRU, and at least four other national-level collection agencies, as
well as surrogates among the East European intelligence services.
The State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT)
acts as a collector and as the central processor for the national-level
program. It also monitors the absorption and assimilation of
Western technology by the defense industries.
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program principally involves export control and inter-
national compliance issues. Characteristics of these
programs overlap, further complicating the design of
adequate countermeasures:
? Both programs sometimes seek the same products.
? Soviet industrial ministries request technology and
equipment through both programs.
? The collection channels overlap and in some cases
the same Soviet individuals (intelligence officers and
others) are involved in each program.
The VPK Program: Raising the Technical Levels of
Weapons and Manufacturing Equipment
The VPK includes the top executives of most of the
key Soviet defense manufacturing ministries shown in
figure 1. Full VPK membership is given to the
Ministers of Aviation, Machine Building (projectiles
and explosives), Defense Industry (armor and electro-
optics), General Machine Building (strategic missiles
and space), Communications Equipment, Radio (ra-
dars and large-scale computers), Medium Machine
Building (nuclear weapons and high-energy lasers),
Shipbuilding, and Electronics. It is a small but power-
ful group, responsible for centrally overseeing the
research, development, and production of all Soviet
weapon systems. It coordinates developments between
its chief customer, the Ministry of Defense, and the
key suppliers, the defense-industrial ministries. As the
expediter for weapons development projects, it is the
principal Soviet military instrument for eliminating
or circumventing the inefficiencies characteristic of
the Soviet economic system.
As part of its responsibility to enforce schedules and
to ensure that technical and performance specifica-
tions are met, the VPK translates requests for West-
ern hardware and documents, principally by the de-
sign bureaus of 12 industries (figure 1), into lists of
collection requirements. In the late 1970s alone about
one-half billion rubles (roughly $1.4 billion in 1980
purchase power equivalents) each year was reserved
for purchases of one-of-a-kind Western hardware and
documents.
Three examples of specific requirements from the
VPK lists are shown in figure 2. The first deals with
the IBM 370 computer, used by the Soviets as the
model for production of their own version, "Ryad,"
which is a copy of the IBM 370 architecture and
functions. The second deals with a cruise missile
computer. The VPK apparently assigned it a high
priority because of major efforts under way at that
time to develop long-range strategic cruise missiles,
which require large-capacity digital memories for
onboard navigation. The Soviets historically have had
reliability and other problems in developing such
computers. The third example is a US Fairchild
Instrument Corporation/Xincom semiconductor
memory tester. It is a good example of the one-of-a-
kind dual-use product requested and acquired through
the VPK program. Design concepts embodied in the
hardware and associated documentation of the tester
were copied to develop a Soviet counterpart. The
original tester also could be used to help copy or
reverse-engineer Western integrated circuits.
Requirements for documents alone can command
amounts as considerable as hardware; examples in-
clude over 50,000 rubles (roughly $140,000 in 1980
purchase power equivalents) for documents on the US
shuttle orbiter control system and over 50,000 rubles
for high-energy laser developments. Over 200,000
rubles ($560,000) was approved for acquiring selected
research documents on US antimissile defense
concepts.
Each year the VPK publishes a report based on the
evaluation of the individual ministries. It includes
aggregate statistics on numbers of technical docu-
ments and samples (hardware) obtained, gross ruble
savings, and the numbers and priority of requirements
satisfied. This report is sent to the Chairman of the
Presidium of the Council of Ministers and to the
Central Committee of the Communist Party. Copies
also are sent to headquarters elements of the collec-
tion organizations.
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Figure 2
Examples of VPK Requirements, Mid 1970s - Early 1980s
Requester (responsible for producing mainframe computers)
Desired technology
1.
2.
Ministry of the Radio Industry
Technical documentation on IBM 370 computer models 145, 158, 168
and operating system data, not earlier than 1974. Information about
new IBM projects.
Organization charged with collection
3. KGB
Origin or location of technology
4.
US: Documents from the IBM firm.
Joint requirement. Priority code A-I indicates technology needed for
1.
Ministries of Aviation, Communications Equipment, and Electronics
potential solutions of a problem in producing it future weapon system
Industries, A-I, Most Critical
2
onents and programing devices for cruise missile
Electronic com
Desired technology
Mutxinum funds allocated for collection of this item
.
3.
p
digital computer memory. Samples and documents desired.
170,000 rubles
Organization charged with collection
4. KGB
Code B-I indicates suhswntiaf reduction in time and expenditure
in production of new weapons
Mayimum funds aillocated for collection of this item
A nonintelligence organization also charged with assisting collection
The mid-1970s VPK requirement shown above targets IBM equip-
merit for Soviet military research and development. The Soviets
copied the architecture of the IBM 360 and 370 systems to develop
their Ryad series of computers. The late 1970s requirement is a
very high priority for three reasons: it is identified as "most
critical': it is needed to solve problems in producing a_future
weapon system: and three ministries would benefit technically,
economically, and jointly from its acquisition. The early 1980s
requirement, for a Fairchild/Xincom semiconductor memory test
system, is a perfect example of the one-of-a-kind dual-use product
2. Xincom monitoring and metering equipment for static and
functional testing of semiconductor memory units. Sample
and documents desired.
- 3. 4,500,000 rubles
- 4. Ministry of Foreign Trade, KGB
(sample) and associated documentation requested for copying as
well as for volume purchases for direct use in production lines. This
tester was in fact acquired, and design concepts were copied, saving
several hundred man-years of Soviet developmental effort.
Soviet requirement data also include the firms and sometimes
the names of persons who have the desired hardware and docu-
ments. Some 3,000 to 5,000 new, amended, and reapproved require-
ments for hardware, documents, or both are now issued by the
Soviets each year.
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Table 1
Summary of Results of the VPK Program,
Late 1970s and Early 1980s
? An average of over 5,000 Soviet military equipment and weapon
system research projects per year in the early 1980s benefited
from Western hardware and technical documents. Over half of
these projects were in the electronics and the armor and electro-
optics industries.
? Innovation, new concepts, new directions, higher technical levels
of research, accelerated development of more advanced weapons,
and the avoidance of major pitfalls are some of the key benefits to
Soviet military scientific research projects.
? About 60 percent of that portion of document and hardware
acquisitions considered to be the most significant to the Soviets
was of US origin, although not necessarily collected in the United
States.
? About 70 percent of the documents and hardware acquired in the
10th and so far in the I Ith Five-Year Plans, which were judged
by the Soviets to be the most significant to their military research
projects, probably were export controlled, embargoed, classified,
or under some control by Western governments.
? In the early 1980s more than 3,500 requirements were levied each
year for specific Western hardware, documents, or both, with
roughly one-third satisfied each year; the other two-thirds still
targeted.
? Some half a billion rubles are maintained each year for potential
collections against these requirements (roughly $1.4 billion in
1980 purchase power equivalents).
? During the 10th Five-Year Plan (1976-80), over 3,500 require-
ments were fully satisfied worldwide roughly 60 to 70 percent of
these being fulfilled by the Soviet intelligence services (the KGB
and the GRU) and surrogates among the East European intelli-
gence services. Requirements fully satisfied during the 11th Five-
Year Plan will exceed 5,000.
? Of the 3,500 satisfied requirements approximately 5 to 10 percent
were judged by the Soviets as the most significant to military
research projects. The Soviet intelligence services and surrogates
among the East European services fulfilled about 90 percent of
these most significant requirements each year.
? About half of all VPK requirements fulfilled in the 10th Five-
Year Plan (1976-80) and thus far in the 11th Five-Year Plan
(1981-85) were for two industries: electronics and communica-
tions equipment.
Successes and Benefits
The VPK program is a Soviet success story (table 1).
Over 3,500 specific collection requirements for hard-
ware and documents were satisfied for the 12 industri-
al ministries for just the 10th Five-Year Plan (1976-
80). About 50 percent of more than 30,000 pieces of
Western one-of-a-kind military and dual-use hard-
ware and about 20 percent of over 400,000 technical
documents collected worldwide in response to these
requirements were used to improve the technical
performance of very large numbers of Soviet military
equipment and weapon systems. The benefits and
distribution by industry of the fulfilled requirements
are shown in figure 3.
? About 50 percent of the 6,000 to 10,000 pieces of hardware
acquired annually and 20 percent of the 100,000 documents
acquired annually are used by the Soviets in transferring Western
technology into their military research projects.
? In the late 1970s about 700 embargoed dual-use manufacturing,
diagnostic instrumentation, and other dual-use products were
acquired each year for copying embodied designs, reverse-
engineering, and probably for selected direct use as key equip-
ment in Soviet military production lines.
? From 1976 to 1980 the greatest savings in research project costs,
almost one-half billion rubles (the 1980 dollar cost of equivalent
research activity would be $800 million), were realized by two
ministries the Ministry of the Defense Industry (armor and
electro-optics) and the Ministry of the Aviation Industry. The
Soviet manpower equivalence of these savings alone translates
roughly into over 100,000 man-years of scientific research. These
savings, however, may be biased. The ruble figures probably
reflect operating costs salaries, bonuses, and sometimes savings
in elimination of, for example, test range activity, but not capital
costs. Although Soviet managers generally tend to inflate savings
to enhance their role, the savings estimated in the VPK program
appear to be conservative.
According to the Soviets, about one-third of the VPK
requirements are totally or partially fulfilled annually,
strongly suggesting that Western industrial security,
counterintelligence, export controls, and other efforts
do have an effect. But each year the number of VPK
requirements grows by about 15 percent. This is a
strong indication that the expanding Soviet military
industrial program continues to rely on Western
technical solutions and advances. It also indicates
increased collection success and user expectation.
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Figure 3
Rank Ordering of Soviet Industries by VPK Requirements Fulfilled,
by Rubles Saved, and by Hardware Received, 1976-80
Rank by requirements
fulfilled
Idectronics
Communications
Aviation
Radar and computers
Chemical
Shipbuilding
Nuclear industry and
lasers
Projectiles and
explosives
Petroleum and
petrochemicals
About 50 percent of the VPK requirements that were fulfilled
during the 10th Five-Year Plan for Western hardware and docu-
ments were satisfied on behalf of two defense industries-electron-
ics and communications. These are key areas where the Soviets'
need for militarily significant technology and the West's need for
better controls are greatest.
The four industries receiving the most Western military
hardware and dual-use products were electronics (over 6,000 pieces
of equipment, a large percentage involving microelectronics), chem-
ical (almost 4,000 pieces), petroleum/petrochemicals (over 1,500),
and communications (over 1,500), ranked in that order,
800
The top four industries saving the most rubles in research
project development costs in terms of manpower and other re-
sources were the armor and electro-optics industry (almost 20
percent of the 1.4 billion rubles saved in research project costs) and
the aviation, communications, and electronics industries. These four
industries consistently appear to be the Soviet leaders in requesting,
absorbing, and generally getting the most use out of Western
hardware and documents. In some cases, such as in the armor area,
the Soviets are using Western technology not to catch up, but to
enhance a capability that already is equal to or better than that of
the West.
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Five Years Gained in Developing the Next Generation principally in four ways. Ranked by priority, the VPK
of Fire- Control Radars for Soviet Fighter Aircraft program:
The Soviets estimated that by using documentation
on the US F-18 fighter their aviation and radar
industries saved some five years of development time
and 35 million rubles (the 1980 dollar cost of equiva-
lent research activity would be $55 million) in project
manpower and other developmental costs. The man-
power portion of these savings probably represents
over a thousand man-years of scientific research
effort and one of the most successful individual
exploitations ever of Western technology.
The documentation on the F-18 fire-control radar
served as the technical basis for new lookdown/shoot-
down engagement radars for the latest generation of
Soviet. fighters. US methods of component design,
fast-Fourier-transform algorithms, terrain mapping
functions, and real-time resolution-enhancement
techniques were cited as key elements incorporated
into the Soviet counterpart.
? Redirected Soviet technical approaches in about a
hundred projects each year for ongoing weapon
systems and key military equipment, or resulted in
the improvement of the weapons manufacturing
processes.
? Initiated several hundred new short-term and long-
term research projects each year on technical topics
that had not been under consideration.
? Raised the technical levels of several thousand
developmental projects each year involving military
equipment, manufacturing, or design procedures.
? Eliminated or shortened phases of more than a
thousand military research projects each year. This
contributed to a substantial reduction-in a number
of cases, two to three years in time needed to
produce more technically advanced weapons and
military equipment.
Moreover, F-18 and F-14 documentation served as
the impetus for two long-term research projects to
design from scratch a new radar-guided air-to-air
missile system. The documentation also was instru-
mental in formulating concrete specifications to de-
velop new Soviet airborne radar countermeasures
equipment against the F-18 and F-14.
Significant acquisitions of Western technology in-
clude documents on fire-control radars for the F-14,
F-15, and F-18 and documents on US ballistic missile
defense concepts (table 2). In terms of broad defense
programs, Soviet strategic missiles, air defense, tacti-
cal forces, and weapons manufacturing capabilities
have benefited the most from the VPK program. The
annex has several hundred examples of specific Soviet
weapons and military equipment benefiting from
Western technology.
Western technology collected each year in the late
1970s and early 1980s aided Soviet military industries
The benefits vary from project to project. Western
technology has assisted the Soviets in reducing their
weapon acquisition cycle by up to two years for
research projects in an advanced status. Acquisition of
Western documents, for example, helped the Soviets
cut by two years the time spent on researching a new
generation of fuzes for munitions with a large kill
radius and for self-aiming aviation cluster munitions.
For projects in an earlier stage of research, the cycle
can be reduced as much as five years. This considera-
bly shrinks overall research time, reduces the amount
of resources devoted to weapon system research, and
allows diversion of those resources to other Soviet
military research projects.
A wide range of Soviet data demonstrates that bene-
fits to military research projects have increased signif-
icantly from the late 1970s to the early 1980s (figure
4) and have applied to thousands of research projects
in all key defense industries. Measured in rubles, the
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Table 2
Selected Worldwide Soviet Acquisitions,
Military Applications, and Collectors of
Western Documents, Military Hardware,
and Dual-Use Products
Western Technology Acquired
Strategic Missiles
Documents on Cruise Missiles Using Radar
Cruise Missile Guidance
KGB, GRU
Terrain Maps
Documents on Heat Shielding Material for
Ballistic Missile Warheads
KGB, GRU
Reentry Vehicles
Documents on Ballistic Missile Defense Concepts
Future Ballistic Missile Defense
KGB, GRU
Air Defense
F-14, F-15, F- 18 Documents on Fire-Control
Radars
US Phoenix Missile Documents
Semiactive Air-to-Air Missile
KGB
Infrared Radiometer
Reduced Infrared Signature Aircraft
KGB
Fiber-Optics Systems
Aircraft and Missile Onboard Communication
GRU
Systems
New Air-to-Air Missile
GRU
General Purpose Naval And Antisubmarine Warfare
Aircraft Carrier Steam Catapult Design
Aircraft Launching System for New Aircraft
GRU
Documents
Carrier
IS MK 48 Torpedo Documents
Antisubmarine Torpedo
GRU
Gamma Radiation Radiometer
Nuclear Submarine Wake-Detection Trailing
GRU
System
Acoustic Spectrum Analyzer
Submarine Quieting
GRU
Powerful Acoustical Vibrator
Submarine and Ship Sonars
GKNT, GKES, Academy of
Sciences
Space and Antisatellite Weapons
Documents on Systems and Heat Shielding of the
US Space Shuttle
Transit Naval Navigation Hardware
First-Generation Space-Based Naval
Radionavigation System
Digital Signal Processing for Counterpart
Others
Satellite System
high-Energy Chemical Laser Documents
Space-Based Laser Weapon
KGB
System 101 Processing Equipment
Digital Processing and Video for Space-Based
Others
Reconnaissance; Missile, Bomb, and Remotely
Piloted Vehicle Command Guidance
Tactical Forces
International Radar Conference Documents
Synthetic Aperture Radar for Aircraft Detection
GRU
Ground Support Equipment for US TOW Anti-
Countermeasure System
GRU
tank Guided Missile
US Copperhead Laser-Guided Artillery
Documents
Laser-Guided Missile Documents
Portable Antiaircraft System
KGB
Infrared Imaging Subsystem Designs
Fire-Control System of Future Tank
KGB
Millimeter Radar Documents
Antitank Missile
GRU
Pressure Measuring Instruments and Documents
Advanced Modeling for New Artillery Projectiles
KGB, GRE
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Table 2
Selected Worldwide Soviet Acquisitions,
Military Applications, and Collectors of
Western Documents, Military Hardware,
and Dual-Use Products (continued)
Western Technology Acquired
Manufacturing and Technology
Kevlar 49 Fiber Documents for Missiles
Improved Missile Development
KGB, GRU
Complete Set of Manufacturing Equipment for
Copied for I I Production Assembly Lines for
Ministry of Foreign Trade
Printed Circuit Boards
Strategic Missile, Armor and Electro-Optics, and
Radar Industries
DTS-70 Printed Circuit Board Testing System
Military Microelectronic Production System
KGB
Fiberglass Manufacturing Technology
High-Pressure Airtanks for Submarines
KGB, GRU, Ministry of
Foreign Trade
Computer Disk Memory Systems
Military Ryad Series Disk Drives
KGB
Bubble Memory Technology
Tactical Missile Onboard Memories
Others
Technical Documents on Tests of
Improved Structural Protection of Warships
KGB
Cold-Rolled Steel
High-Accuracy Three-Dimension Coordinate
Ministry of Foreign Trade,
Measuring Machine
GKNT. GKES, Academy of
Sciences
savings doubled between 1976 and 1980 (figure 5) and
still are expanding in the 1 1 th Five-Year Plan. The
statistics on benefits also point to a massive diffusion
of' Western technology into Soviet military equipment
and weapons. Figure 6 shows how the more than
5,000 military research projects benefiting in the
early I980s were distributed by industry. According
to these rough indicators, the electronics, armor and
electro-optics, and aviation industries are benefiting
the most from Western technology.
Overall, the acquisition of Western technology per-
mits the Soviets to field more sophisticated, versatile,
and effective weapons. The basic time for fielding
these advanced Soviet weapons, though, remains
about the same. It also provides new military capabili-
ties and allows additional resources to be used for the
development of additional advanced weapons con-
cepts. The acquisitions also serve to lighten somewhat
the burden of continuing growth in Soviet research
and defense spending.
Soviet copying and reverse-engineering of Western
military and dual-use equipment are major character-
istics of the VPK program. Indeed, the majority of
VPK requirements for "technology" appears to be for
hardware only. In the late I 970s alone, the Soviets
acquired about 700 embargoed one-of-a-kind dual-use
products each year principally in the area of manufac-
turing, inspection, instrumentation and test equip-
ment, including key microelectronics production and
test equipment. These products were used for making
Soviet counterparts or possibly were for use as key
manufacturing or test equipment that completed pro-
cess lines. Examples included computer-controlled
integrated circuit testers, aircraft engine vibration
control systems, and narrow-band analyzers for sub-
marine quieting.
These practices indicate Soviet deficiencies are in the
design, testing, and integration of technologically
advanced military systems, not in basic research and
applied science. They fall short in the engineering of a
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Figure 4
Technical and Time Benefits to Thousands of Soviet Military
Research Projects From Western Technology
lire 1970s
Inal-occr 4.000 Project, whose technical
approaches were redirected
I'inlect, whose research
st.ige. were eliminated or
shy rimed
New research
projects ,tarred
Project, wh,e technical
level, were raised
The benefits to the Soviet military research establishment from
acquisitions of Western technology are far greater than previously
believed. Virtually every Soviet long- and short-term research
project for military systems-well over 4,000 in the late 1970s and
well over 5,000 in the early 1980s--is benefiting from the docu-
ments and hardware of at least a dozen Western countries. (See
figure 6 for a breakout of how these projects were distributed by
industry.)
device, technologically advanced by Western stan-
dards, into a useful piece of militarily applicable
hardware producible in large quantities.
The profile of the VPK program (as well as the trade
diversion program) can be used to better define
militarily critical technologies as well as better ways
to counter Western losses. Both appear principally
aimed at acquiring products and technical data. Both
show that protecting dual-use products is just as
important as protecting the related design know-how.
Equipment sales divorced from the transfer of know-
how do have long-term significance for the Soviets.
The evidence indicates that equipment transfers, both
large batch acquisitions and individual samples used
I'arly 1980,
Total= over 5,000
Projects in the VPK program are divided into the four major
categories shown above. Projects with redirected technical ap-
proaches and new projects represent the most significant benefits
through adoption of innovations and new directions for military
systems. Major pitfalls are thus avoided. Projects whose technical
levels were raised and those whose stages were eliminated or
shortened represent improvements in the military state of the art of
the Soviet Union and an acceleration in the time when more
advanced subsystems are ready for new and future weapons.
for copying embodied design concepts and for reverse-
engineering, generally outstrip acquisitions of "tech
nology" in quantity and are of more immediate value
to the Soviets.
VPK Collectors and Sources
Analysis of reliable data indicates that in the VPK
program the Soviet Bloc intelligence services (the
Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB), the Chief
Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General Stall
(GRU), and their surrogates among the East Europe-
an intelligence services) are the collectors most often
tasked and the most successful.
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Figure 5
Ruble Savings From Only a Part of Soviet
Western Technology Acquisitions
\t Ic,t t I4 l,illiom nihle, in "mn'_ on elected
hmler(' during the loth I ive)car Plan
The above savings generally are conservative estimates by the
Soviets resulting from the elimination of stages of military research
and design projects, the reduction in time to carry them out, and
the adoption of new technical approaches. The savings are not
cumulative. That is, a 20-million-ruble annual saving from the
acquisition of US and other Western fiberglass plastics production
technology used in manufacturing high-pressure air tanks for
submarines was counted for one year only, the year of acquisition.
Roughly 400 million rubles ($640 million) were saved in 1980
for only a portion of the Western technology acquired. Most of
these savings were in long-term military research projects for
weapons of the late I980s and early I990s. They therefore were
most likely given in terms of manpower savings. By this measure
several tens of thousands of Soviet man-years of scientific research
effort were saved in 1980.
During the late 1970s and early 1980s the Soviet
intelligence services acquired, through their own ef-
forts and those of the surrogate East Europeans,
about 60 to 70 percent of all materials collected in the
overall VPK program each year (figure 7). More
important, these intelligence services were involved in
collecting worldwide about 90 percent of the informa-
tion judged by Moscow as most significant and used
Soviet collectors have easily acquired many types of
Western integrated circuits (1Cs) for reverse engineer-
ing. Indeed, most Soviet ICs can be traced to a
Western original. One of the best examples is their
KR580IK80A microprocessor, which is a modified
version of the Intel Corporation 8080A 8-bit micro-
processor used in many US military systems. In this
case, the Soviets even copied the equivalent US part
number to avoid confusion (note the KR5 80 IK 80A
versus the US 8080A).
Furthermore, the evidence clearly shows that Soviet
ICs known as LOGIKA-2 and series 133/155 were
directly copied from the Texas Instruments
5400/7400 family. These ICs have been used in
Soviet strategic and tactical military systems since
the mid-1970s to provide important qualitative im-
provements. The more advanced Western fabrication
equipment acquired by the Soviets in recent years has
been used to produce copies of sophisticated Western
ICs for their latest generation of weapons. If the
Soviets succeed in acquiring the next generation of
materials, equipment, and parts, their military capa-
bilities will continue to improve in the area that is the
major strength of the West quality.
The USSR's practice of reverse-engineering, however,
may soon run into problems. As US and Japanese ICs
become more complex, reverse-engineering will re-
quire: (a) tracking hundreds of thousands of connec-
tions; (b) understanding how they all fit together; and
(c) mastering the complex processing steps used in
production. Thus, copying such circuits will require
not only much more sophisticated Western equipment
but also much more time to duplicate each circuit,
causing their overall microelectronics gap with the
West to widen.
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Figure 6
Rank Ordering of Industries by Soviet Military Research Projects
Benefiting From Western Technology, Early 1980s
Electronic,
Armor and clccirn-optics
As lotion
Missile, and pitce
Pr i1c iIcs and explosive,
Rndar, and conipuier I
I Irctrie rI cyuipntent
tihiphmlding C
Nuclrn industrc
and li crs
I'ctmlcuni and
Ix oochcmical,
l he assimilation of Western technology into Soviet industries
conducting military research is considerable. The greatest benefi-
ciaries were the electronics and armor and electro-optics industries,
which accounted for over 50 percent (equaling thousands) of all
military research projects benefiting from Western technology in
the early 1980s.
E Projects whose technical levels
were raised
n Projects whose research stages
were eliminated or shortened
L_ -i Project whose technical approaches
were redirected plus new research
projects started
The general distribution points out the rather broad effect that
Western documents and hardware have just on raising the technical
levels of Soviet military research. This is particularly true for the
top three industries, where advanced technology and innovative
design concepts play a significant role in weapon developments.
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Figure 7
Soviet Military Requirements Satisfied by Principal Collection Agencies in
the Overall VPK Program, Late 1970s and Early 1980s
Minntn oI
' reien I r,R1e
The distribution shows that the KGB and the GRU (and their
surrogates among the East European intelligence services) were the
main collectors in the overall VPK program. They were involved in
satisfying roughly 60 to 70 percent of all VPK requirements
completely fulfilled during the late 1970s and early 1980s. (Per-
centages do not add to 100 because several agencies contributed to
fulfilling some of the same requirements.)
Although not evident from the above data, both the KGB and
the GRU significantly increased their efforts in the early 1980s
in many hundreds of military research projects (figure
8). Both the KGB and the GRU levy some of the VPK
requirements on surrogates among the East European
counterpart services. The KGB probably owes a high-
er percentage of its collection to these East European
civilian intelligence services than does the GRU to its
East European counterparts. All use human assets
worldwide.
I Yeurlc averugc in lute 1970,
Yearly average in early 1951k
because the average number of requirements fulfilled so far in the
early I980s (11th Five-Year Plan) increased about 50 percent over
the late 1970s.
The State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT)
and associated collectors surprisingly were the third main collecting
entity, satisfying a relatively large percentage. Figure 8 shows,
however, that they were credited with satisfying about 5 percent of
a selected subset of acquisitions, those judged by the Soviets to be
the most significant to their military research projects.
Coordination with the East European services is con-
ducted through the liaison functions at both KGB and
GRU headquarters as well as through KGB and GRU
advisers in the various Warsaw Pact intelligence
services. Since the mid-to-late 1970s the surrogates
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Figure S
Most Significant Acquisitions Satisfied by Principal Collection
Agencies. Late 1970s and I'.arly 1980s
I'~c KI~R and (II