THE SOVIET WEAPONS INDUSTRY: AN OVERVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T01363R000200310005-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 6, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: September 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of ~~
Intelligence
The Soviet Weapons Industry:
An Overview
DI 86-10016
September 1986
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The Soviet Weapons Industry:
An Overview
Summary Over the last two decades, the Soviet Union has delivered weapons to its
military at a level unequaled anywhere in the world. Over 50,000 tanks,
80,000 light armored vehicles, 9,600 strategic ballistic missiles, 50,000
aircraft, 650,000 surface-to-air missiles, and 270 submarines have been
procured since 1965.
In the process, the Soviets have built the largest weapons industry in the
world. Roughly 50 major design bureaus control the development of 150 to
200 weapons at any one time. Weapons are assembled in about 150 major
production complexes scattered throughout the Soviet Union. Designers
and producers are supported by thousands of organizations in Soviet
academia and industry.
Since the 1920s, the entire complex has been operated in a way that
exploits the priority given to defense and the advantages of a command
economy, and minimizes the impact of Soviet technical weaknesses. Soviet
weapons acquisition has been characterized by:
? Centralized management by party and government organizations, dem-
onstrating continuity and stability in personnel and programs.
? Final leadership authorization of weapon programs and their funding
early in the acquisition process.
? Relatively simple, low-risk weapon designs, emphasizing standard com-
ponents and existing technologies.
? Easily manufactured systems, which can be fabricated by a technologi-
cally unsophisticated industrial base with semiskilled or unskilled labor
operating general purpose conventional machine tools and equipment.
? Long production runs yielding large numbers of weapons.
? Weapon advances that emphasize incremental upgrades instead of the
development of completely new systems or subsystems.
Developments in the economy, technology, and the foreign threat are
inducing the Soviets to modify these strategies. The slower growth of the
Soviet economy in the past decade and harsh constraints on the availability
of key resources have led the Soviet leaders to stress efficiency more than
in the past. At the same time, dramatic improvements in Western weapons
and advances in their own and foreign military research and development
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(R&D) have led them to seek greater advances in weapon performance and
capabilities. Changes are under way in the Soviet defense industrial
establishment that respond to these new conditions:
? In resource allocation. The Soviets appear to be evaluating more
carefully the priority accorded the defense industries. Defense will
continue to have a high priority, but the increasing costs and complexities
of producing advanced weapons are inducing them to seek more cost-
effective ways to meet military requirements. In addition, writings and
statements indicate the Soviets recognize that their long-term defense
needs require more balanced development in Soviet industry, services,
and the technology base.
? In weapon development. The Soviets are shifting from well proven to
more advanced technologies and from simple to more complex weapon
designs. They will continue to rely on traditional, proven approaches to
develop most of their weapons. But in several areas-such as strategic
defense-they will find it more and more difficult to meet new threats by
relying on those strategies. Development cycles for some systems may
lengthen as a consequence, particularly in the test phase.
? In production. The Soviets are manufacturing advanced weapons in
smaller quantities and at lower rates. Improved weapon performance and
greater multimission capabilities, along with greater production problems
and the higher procurement and maintenance costs of new weapons, are
encouraging the Soviets in some cases to reduce the numbers produced.
The danger of obsolescence from a more rapidly changing threat and
military technology base will further encourage shorter production runs.
Retrofit programs, which enhance and prolong the combat worthiness of
older systems, are probably intended to partly compensate for this.
? In the industrial base. The high-technology support sector of the
weapons industry-radioelectronics, telecommunications, specialty mate-
rials, and advanced production equipment-will generally continue to
grow more rapidly than weapon and equipment producers. Throughout
the defense industries, the Soviets are using incentives and investment
policy to encourage the renovation and modernization of established
facilities instead of new plant construction.
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? In administration. Small-scale changes in planning and management are
being implemented. The Soviets are modifying industrial organization
and revising plan targets, prices, and incentives to encourage innovation
and quality over quantity. They will not undermine the central planning
system by providing managers with real autonomy, however, and the
defense industries will continue to be the most thoroughly scrutinized
part of the Soviet economy.
? In seeking help from abroad. The Soviets are stressing and supporting
the buildup of the scientific-technical base of their East European allies
and will seek more imports of technology and equipment from them.
They will also continue to rely heavily on acquisition of Western
technology.
Changes in the Soviet armed forces in the 1990s will drive-and be driven
by-changes in the weapons industry. Alterations in doctrine, force
structure, logistic organization, maintenance requirements, and manpower
utilization are likely to accompany the evolution in the products of the
defense industries. In some cases, the long-term impact of increasingly
sophisticated weapons may be a reduction in total numbers maintained in
active inventories. Overall force effectiveness is likely to increase, nonethe-
less, as the mobility, survivability, and lethality of new weapons improve.
Certain aspects of the weapons industry are unique in the Soviet economy,
but many of its problems confront the civilian sector as well. Although the
defense industrial ministries have never been completely insulated from
civilian industry-an indispensable supplier of materials, components, and
subassemblies-the lines between the two sectors have become increasingly
blurred as weapons have grown in complexity. Since the last years of the
Brezhnev era, the Soviets have been implementing policies to speed the
modernization of both the civilian and defense industries.
The Soviet defense industries face considerable challenges in their mission
to produce sufficient quantities of highly advanced weapons for the forces
of the next decade. Nevertheless, expansion in high-technology industries,
advances in precision machining and other fabrication technologies, and
continued aggressive exploitation of Western technology will allow the
Soviets to overcome some of the difficulties with which their domestic
R&D base is currently struggling. Moreover, the Soviets' speed in intro-
ducing generic equivalents of Western technologies into their own systems
and their ability to surge ahead along a narrow front of military
technologies will help them remain competitive in deployed military
capabilities.
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In any event, the Soviet weapons industry will remain a potent force in the
1990s. It has been a vital ingredient in Soviet military power, which has
been the primary instrument of the Soviet leadership in achieving national
security, political leverage, and prestige throughout the world. The weap-
ons industry will continue to be at the forefront of Soviet technology and
industrial prowess, and it will absorb a large share of the best Soviet
resources. Its leaders will continue to wield considerable influence on
Soviet policy. And-because of growing economic constraints and the
potential of advancing military technology-its performance is likely to be
an even greater determinant of Soviet military power than is the case
today.
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Summary
iii
The Complex: Scope and Achievements
1
High Levels of Production
4
Changing Conditions
4
Planning and Management
11
Strong Centralized Management
11
Continuity and Stability
13
Priority Claims on Resources
13
Early, One-Time Authorization of Programs
15
Planners Plan Too Little, Not Too Much
16
Design and Development
19
Designers Play Key Role
19
Design Process Minimizes Development Risk
19
Advancing Through Modular Upgrades
22
Western Technology Cuts Time and Costs
23
Design Simplicity Assures Producibility
23
Western Technologies Forcing Change
24
Stalinist Legacies
29
Aging Factories
29
Problems With New Technologies
31
Imports of Western Manufacturing Technology
33
Prospects
37
The Search for a New Production Strategy
37
Changes in the Military
38
Changes in the Economy To Increase Defense Potential
39
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Figure 1
Key Soviet Industrial Ministries That Support the Military
Ministry of the Aviation Industry
Responsibilities:
Aircraft, aerodynamic missiles,
spacecraft, air-to-air missiles,
defensive missiles (tactical and
strategic), tactical air-to-surface
missiles, and antisubmarine
warfare missiles.
Ministry of the Defense Industry
Responsibilities:
Conventional ground force
weapons, mobile solid-propellant
ballistic missiles, optical systems,
antitank guided missiles, tactical
surface-to-air missiles, lasers, and
ASW missiles.
Ministry of General Machine
Building
Responsibilities:
Liquid- and solid-propellant
ballistic missiles, including
submarine launched; SLBM fire-
control systems; space launch
vehicles, spacecraft, and surface-
to-surface cruise missiles.
Ministry of Medium Machine
Building
Responsibilities:
Nuclear weapons and high-
energy lasers.
Yefim Pavlovich Slavskiy,
Minister
Apollon Sergeyevich Systsov,
Minister
Ministry of the Communications
Equipment Industry
Responsibilities:
Communications equipment,
radar components, electronic
warfare equipment, military
computers, and facsimile
equipment.
Pavel Vasil'yevich Finogenov,
Minister
Ministry of the Electronics
Industry
Responsibilities:
Electronic parts, components,
subassemblies, and computers.
91*1%w All,
Vladislav Grigoryevich Kolesnikov, Vyacheslav Vasil'yevich Bakhirev,
Minister Minister
Oleg Dmitriyevich Baklanov,
Minister
Ministry of Machine Building
Responsibilities:
Conventional ordnance munitions,
fuzing, and solid propellants.
Ministry of the Radio Industry
Responsibilities:
Radars, communications
equipment, special-purpose
computers, guidance and control
systems, and lasers.
Erlen Kirikovich Pervyshin,
Minister
Ministry of the Shipbuilding
Industry
Responsibilities:
Naval vessels and weaponry,
submarine detection systems,
naval acoustic systems, and
radars.
Igor Sergeyevich Belousov,
Minister
Petr Stepanovich Pleshakov,
Minister
Automotive Trucks, armored personnel carriers, and heavy equipment transporters.
Heavy and Transport Armored vehicles, diesel engines, and generators.
Machine Building
Electrical Equipment Industry Batteries, electrical components, communications equipment, radar
components, and biological/chemical warfare detectors.
Instrument Making, Automation Computers and instrumentation control systems.
Equipment, and Control Systems
Power Machine Building Generators.
Chemical Industry Fuels, fiberglass components for rocket motors, and propellants.
Tractor and Agriculture Tanks and tracked vehicles.
Machine Building
Petroleum Refining and Tires, rubbers, fuels, and lubricants.
Petrochemical Industry
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The Soviet Weapons Industry:
An Overview
The Complex: Scope
and Achievements
The Soviets have consistently accorded high priority
to national defense, and this has fueled their develop-
ment of the world's largest military-industrial base.
This base has grown continually since World War II
as the Soviets have produced a steady stream of new
and upgraded weapons in large quantities. Their
commitment-which has not varied substantially with
the international climate-led them by the early
1970s to devote greater resources to armaments pro-
duction than any other country.
Nine defense industrial ministries (see figure 1) cur-
rently oversee thousands of weapon and weapon com-
ponent plants and at least 450 military research and
development (R&D) organizations throughout the
USSR. Roughly 50 major design bureaus oversee the
development of 150 to 200 major weapon systems, a
level of effort sustained for at least the past three
decades. About 150 major plants assemble these
weapons, and the plants have steadily expanded
throughout the postwar era. These designers and
producers are supported by a network of facilities that
extends throughout Soviet academia and industry.
The facilities are managed by government and mili-
tary organizations that strictly control the allocation
of resources and the pace of activity.
As is the case in most Soviet industry, defense
industrial production is largely concentrated in the
more populated and developed areas of the western
USSR Management of the defense
industries-including the nine ministries and the rele-
vant party and government organizations-is based in
Moscow. Research and development facilities are
principally located in Moscow and Leningrad, also the
sites of the most prestigious facilities of Soviet higher
education and science. The geographic concentration
of the defense industries both reflects and intensifies
the firm direction of the Soviet military-industrial
complex from the center.
Since the implementation of the First Five-Year Plan
(1928-32), the Soviet leadership has lavished resources
on the military-industrial complex. While millions
starved in the early 1930s-because of forced collec-
tivization and a crash industrialization policy-
aircraft, guns, and tanks were beginning to roll off
newly constructed production lines. This emphasis on
defense continues to this day, with the USSR in the
awkward position of having achieved superpower
status and yet having per capita consumption statis-
tics equivalent to those of a less developed country.
When Brezhnev came to power in 1964, he initiated
an across-the-board modernization and buildup of
both strategic and conventional forces. CIA estimates
that Soviet defense expenditures over the next de-
cade-and the subset of those expenditures devoted to
procurement-grew at a real average annual rate of
about 5 percent.' This growth reflected increasing
resource commitments to all of the military services
and missions.
In the mid-1970s there was a change in the rate of
growth of Soviet defense spending. CIA estimates
that total defense spending-which includes expendi-
tures for research and development, procurement of
weapons and combat equipment, manpower, construc-
tion, and operations and maintenance-increased by
an average of about 2 percent annually from the mid-
1970s until at least 1984. This slowdown in growth
was primarily the result of a leveling off-at a very
high level-in procurement spending.
' Procurement includes weapons and equipment produced for the
Soviet armed forces but not those produced as prototypes or for
export. We use the term "production" when referring to all of the
military output of the defense industries.
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Figure 2
Despite the slowdown in the annual growth rate in
spending for weapons procurement, the share of Sovi-
et resources committed to such procurement is ex-
tremely high by international standards. The USSR
devotes appreciably higher shares of the output of
almost every industry to military procurement than
does the United States. Soviet weapons procurement
absorbs about 7 to 8 percent of the Soviet gross
national product and about a third of the 'output of the
important machine-building sector.
The commitment over time to developing the defense
industries is reflected in the persistent growth of
weapon production facilities. Defense production ca-
pacity has doubled since 1965. The industries that
produce missiles and aircraft expanded most rapidly.
Military R&D facilities have grown similarly. Facili-
ties devoted to R&D for subsystems and components
(radars, communications systems, and computers, for
example) expanded more rapidly than those used for
final weapons development. This difference reflects
the increasing complexity of Soviet military
equipment.
The growth at many defense industry facilities is the
result of the traditional Soviet practice of building
new, facilities alongside older facilities, which continue
producing and maintaining older systems and furnish-
ing spare parts. This practice is partially the result of
ineffective incentives to economize on construction,
but it has often been necessary because of the unsuit-
ability of older facilities for housing modern produc-
tion-line tooling. Buildings constructed since the early
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STAT
Table 1
Selected Civilian Use Goods
Produced by the Soviet Defense Industries
Aviation Industry Cameras, vacuum cleaners, alarm
clocks, baby carriages, aluminum
kitchen utensils, snowmobiles, pas-
senger aircraft
Communications Equip- Tape recorders, televisions, inter-
ment Industry coms, facsimile equipment
Defense Industry Fishing equipment, cameras, mo-
torcycles, lasers, industrial and sci-
entific optical equipment
Electronics Industry Consumer radios, television sets,
computers, telephone equipment,
lasers
General Machine Building Television sets
Machine Building Bicycles, refrigerators, electric ra-
zors, samovars, drills
Telephone equipment, televisions,
radios, tape recorders, computers
Shipbuilding Industry Pleasure craft (sail and power),
commercial ships of all types, drill-
ing platforms, irrigation equipment
1970s, however, are being designed as large, open-
spaced structures of modular components. Their add-
ed structural strength and flexibility will provide the
more vibration-free environment required for a great-
er variety of precision equipment, and they should
allow production lines to be rearranged, upgraded, or
replaced periodically as requirements change. This
will lessen the future requirements for new
construction.
The Soviet commitment to the defense industries is
also manifested in the priority accorded them. The
defense industries receive the highest quality raw
materials and are given preferential access to the
transportation and distribution networks for deliver-
ing materials. They also have access to the best
machinery and labor.
Although the leadership has bestowed priority on the
defense industries with respect to resources and per-
sonnel, it has endeavored to ensure that there are
civilian spinoffs in return. At the 24th CPSU Con-
gress in 1971, Brezhnev stressed that the defense
industries were working for the economy as a whole.
He noted that 42 percent of the output of the defense
industries was devoted to civilian goods (some West-
ern analysts maintain he was referring to just one
ministry, the Ministry of the Defense Industry). More
recently, General Secretary Gorbachev called upon
the defense industries to share some of their manage-
ment expertise with the rest of the economy, and in
June 1986 the CPSU Central Committee ordered
three defense industrial ministries to improve the
quality and timeliness of their consumer goods pro-
duction. In any case, the industry's support to the
Soviet economy is extensive-defense industry enter-
prises produce many civilian products, ranging from
refrigerators and baby carriages to electronics, trac-
tors, and railroad cars. Table 1 illustrate
the scope of such production.
STAT
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The Soviet Demand for Weapons
The Soviet policy of maintaining a huge standing
army creates a constant and heavy burden on the
defense industries to produce the required weapons.
The Soviets have over 210 Ground Forces divisions.
Of these, approximately 40 percent are considered
"ready divisions'-that is, they could be mobilized
and prepared for combat in a short period of time.
Rather than modernizing all units, the Soviets gener-
ally concentrate on upgrading equipment holdings of
their frontline divisions in Eastern Europe and the
western USSR. As of 1986, their Ground Forces
inventory included approximately:
? 53,000 tanks.
? 55,000 armored troop carriers.
? 34,000 pieces of tube artillery.
? 6,300 tactical surface-to-surface multiple rocket
launchers.
? 1,600 tactical surface-to-surface missile launchers.
? 4,300 major surface-to-air missile launchers.
The other Soviet military services also maintain huge
inventories of arms and equipment. The Air Forces
have some 10,000 fixed-wing aircraft and 4,000
helicopters. The Soviet Navy is second in tonnage
only to the US Navy and has almost 300 principal
surface combatants, over 380 submarines, and about
1,000 patrol and auxiliary craft.
The Soviet Air Defense Forces (PVO) and Strategic
Rocket Forces (SRF) are also well equipped. The
PVO has about 9,500 surface-to-air missile launchers
devoted to territorial air defense. The inventory of the
SRF includes launchers for approximately 1,400
ICBMs and more than 400 intermediate-range ballis-
tic missiles (IRBMs) and 112 medium-range ballistic
missiles (MRBMs).
The impressive size of the Soviet weapons industry is
primarily due to the large force requirements of the
Soviet military. Only the People's Republic of China
has more men under arms, and, in number of weapon
systems, the United States leads the Soviet Union in
only a few types of military equipment, such as
aircraft carriers. Maintaining the combat effective-
ness of the Soviet forces demands massive procure-
ment of regularly upgraded and improved weapon
systems (see inset on the Soviet demand for weapons).
One of the most striking trends in Soviet weaponry is
the escalating cost of new systems (see figure 4).
Incorporation of more advanced technologies and
modernization of the manufacturing base have com-
bined to make new systems far more expensive than
their predecessors. As a result, although total num-
bers produced in many categories of weapon systems
have declined (see figure 5), total spending on defense
procurement has not.
Changing Conditions
Despite the plateau in military procurement, the
Soviet weapons industry is producing enough equip-
ment to modernize Soviet forces and at the same time
reap substantial benefits-both financial and politi-
cal-from the export of military hardware (see inset
on page 8). Capital investment in the defense indus-
tries has continued at high levels, and the number of
weapons currently in development is at least as high
as ever. For the last decade or so, however, the Soviets
have become increasingly concerned about the ability
of their military-industrial complex to compete in a
high-technology arms competition with the West. A
number of factors are causing them to closely exam-
ine their weapons industry and to seek changes in its
operation and output.
Soviet writings on major trends in US and NATO
force developments have shown concern about many
programs in both the strategic and conventional areas
that are viewed as having the potential to erode
Moscow's hard-won military gains. Programs that
might be considered especially threatening in the late
1980s and early 1990s are the Trident D-5 subma-
rine-launched ballistic missile system; the B-1 bomb-
er; air-, sea-, and ground-launched cruise missiles;
and the Pershing II missile. Others are improved
"real-time" reconnaissance systems; antisubmarine
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Figure 4
Estimated Production Costs of Selected Soviet Weaponsa
Fighter Aircraft With Comparable Missions
(Fishbed C/E=100)
Fishbed C/E Fishbed D/E Flogger B Fulcrum
(IOC 1961) (IOC 1964) (IOC 1973) (IOC 1983)
a The indexes displayed above reflect 1982 dollars, not actual Soviet
expenditures. They are based on estimates of what it would cost to produce
these Soviet systems in a US factory using US wage rates, material costs,
and equipment operating factors.
warfare systems; and a variety of improved tactical
systems, including "smart" munitions, particularly
antitank guided munitions, Assault Breaker weapons,
the M 1 Abrams and Leopard 2 tanks, and advanced
antiradiation missiles. In addition, the Soviets un-
doubtedly perceive serious longer term threats associ-
ated with such Western systems as improved maneu-
verable reentry vehicles (MaRVs), directed-energy
laser weapons, stealth aircraft, aerodynamic missiles,
and technologies associated with strategic defense.
Advances in Soviet R&D, along with aggressive ac-
quisition of foreign technologies, are providing new
opportunities for Soviet weapon designers. Yet the
technologies required to build advanced systems are in
areas where Soviet R&D and production capabilities
are weakest-electronics (including microelectronics),
advanced high-speed computers, and sophisticated
design and manufacturing systems. The latter
include:
? Computer-aided design (CAD) systems, which allow
designers to develop, record, display, and alter the
Strategic Liquid-Propellant Ballistic Missiles
(SS-7 = 100)
0 SS-7 SS-9 SS-18 SS-18
MOD2 MOD3 MOD4
design of a part or assembly at a computer terminal,
then command a plotter to produce the engineering
drawings.
? Management information systems-computerized
systems for processing orders, scheduling produc-
tion, and inventory control.
? Industrial robots, which move materials, parts,
tools, or specialized devices through variable pro-
gramed motions.
? Numerically controlled (NC) and computer numeri-
cally controlled (CNC) machine tools, which per-
form various functions along different axes, receiv-
ing instructions from paper tape, punch cards, or
magnetic tape (NC tools) or from computers (CNC
tools).
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Figure 5
Estimated Production of Selected Soviet Weapons, 1966-858
Soviet aviation plants currently produce 10 aircraft, and five helicopter models are also
fighter aircraft models, including the MIG-31 being produced. Several aircraft models are
Foxhound, SU-27 Flanker, MIG-29 Fulcrum, produced for export as well.
and SU-25 Frogfoot. One intermediate-range and
two strategic bombers, seven models of transport
Strategic missile production has been limited in Two SLBMs, the SS-N-20
the 1980s as the Soviet defense industries pre- for the Typhoon nuclear-powered submarine and
pare to produce new models to modernize the the SS-N-23 for the Delta IV nuclear-powered
Tanks are the principal offensive component of
the Ground Forces. Tank costs increased
primarily because of the production of large
numbers of T-64s, T-72s, and T-80s in basic,
improved, and export versions and the growing
cost of their increasingly advanced subsystems
and components.
submarine, are currently in series production,
and other SLBMs are in development.
STAT
STAT
STAT
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Figure 5 (Continued)
The Soviets have traditionally manufactured large weapons), 203 mm, and 240 mm (a mortar).
numbers of artillery systems. Recently, increas- Other towed and self-propelled systems are
ing numbers of self-propelled systems have being developed and tested.
been introduced to increase the mobility and
firepower of artillery units. Their gun calibers
include 122 millimeters (mm), 152 mm (two
Although the number of major surface and destroyers with improved warfighting
combatants produced is declining, the trend capabilities. They have also begun outfitting
toward larger ships with increased endurance, the first unit of a new class of carrier,
greater weapon loads, and more sophisticated probably nuclear powered, for conventional
weapons and equipment continues. The Soviets takeoff and landing aircraft.
are modernizing their surface fleet through the
construction of several classes of large cruisers
Over the last few years the types of submarines
produced have increased at an unprecedented
rate. Although production has declined, there
has been rapid growth in the diversity of nu-
clear-powered general purpose units, such as
the Akula and Sierra classes.
a For each weapon category, the graph shows our
estimates, in index form, of the changes in the
quantities of new units produced in each five-year
period. The figures do not include conversions or
refitted and modified older systems.The figures cover
all weapons in the selected categories produced by the
Soviet defense industries, not just those procured by
the Soviet military.
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Soviet Arms Production for Export
For the past two decades, arms transfers have been
the USSR's primary means of promoting its interests
in the Third World. Initially designed to strengthen
the Soviet Union's political and military position,
this program also became, in the mid-1970s, a key
factor in improving its foreign trade position. Al-
though the USSR does sell some newer model sys-
tems, their largest sales are of older weapons, which
are relatively inexpensive and simple, and thus com-
patible with the resources, tactics, and support capa-
bilities of Third World military services.
The concentration on older models for export has
influenced the organization and scheduling of weap-
ons production. Although most weapons for export
are manufactured concurrently with those for Soviet
forces, the Soviets have often dedicated entire pro-
duction lines and runs to export variants. Producing
for export on a dedicated line facilitates scheduling
and eliminates the need for frequent changes in
equipment, tooling, and material supply to accommo-
date any differences in the design of an export
variant. Export production occasionally continues
after domestic needs have been satisfied, extending
the production run and thus increasing the benefits of
having mastered the design and production process.
Staying competitive in Third World markets, howev-
er, is complicating the export business for the Soviet
weapons industry. Many countries are demanding
state-of-the-art weapon systems, requiring Soviet
plants to produce them concurrently for Soviet and
foreign military services. Exporting more sophisticat-
ed weapons also means establishing a more complex
training and logistic support pipeline. Some countries
are purchasing licenses to produce Soviet weapons,
obligating Soviet plants to transfer and install equip-
ment and tooling, train indigenous managers and
laborers, and provide ongoing material support and
technical consultation. Soviet industry has had little
experience in nurturing Third World defense indus-
trial development. How far the Soviets will move in
providing a broader array of arms transfer services is
unclear.
? Flexible manufacturing systems-integrated sys-
tems of several CNC machine tools and robots that
perform machining and transfer functions.
Most of these are already commonly used in the
design and manufacture of Western weapons.
The changing economic environment is also challeng-
ing the way in which the Soviet weapons industry has
traditionally operated. Additions to the Soviet labor
force are dwindling, and the areas within the USSR
where population growth continues at a high rate are
not those in which most industry is located.
Soviet economic growth has also slowed-at least in
part because of large expenditures on arms procure-
ment-while the defense industries' needs for materi-
al resources are increasing. Continued high levels of
military procurement, coupled with unexpectedly slow
growth in the output of the machine-building, energy,
metallurgy, and chemical sectors, almost certainly
contributed to industrial bottlenecks in the late
1970s.2 Even though they are shielded by the priority
accorded them, weapon producers cannot be fully
insulated from the general economic environment.
Modern weaponry-which requires large inputs of
new technology-must compete with increasing de-
mands by other economic sectors for more modern
technology.
Resumption of military procurement growth at or
near the rates of the early 1970s would exacerbate
these bottlenecks, further constraining Soviet econom-
ic growth. It would also reduce growth of investment
and consumption by diverting resources away from
the manufacture of producer and consumer durables.
Limiting investment, in turn, would result in a slower
accumulation and replacement of capital stock, thus
hampering Gorbachev's industrial modernization pro-
gram and curbing overall economic growth. Slower
consumption growth would affect worker morale,
hindering the leadership's efforts to spur labor
productivity.
' Bottlenecks arise when the demand for a product exceeds supply
and output cannot or does not expand sufficiently to close the gap.
Because some consuming industries receive less of the commodity
than desired, they produce less of their products, creating new
bottlenecks. Thus the effect of the original bottleneck cascades
throughout the economy.
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Figure 6
Changing Conditions Affecting the Soviet Weapons Industry
Traditional
weapons
acquisition
strategies
Increasingly sophisticated
military threat
Worsening economic
environment
New
weapons
acquisition
strategies
Simple,
rugged
weapons
Product technology Process technology
Mastering production To achieve: Installing and To achieve:
of such advanced assimilating such
components and advanced design
subsystems as: and manufacturing
equipment as:
Signals processing Improved target differentiation Advanced machine Fabrication of complex parts
and identification. tools to consistently high tolerances;
more rapid changeover from one
machine part to another.
Advanced optical and Enhanced target acquisition Robots Highly effective repetitive
infrared equipment and tracking; reduced operations, speedier production,
vulnerability to detection. and uniformly high product
quality. Freeing of laborers from
hazardous tasks.
Nonmetal structural Greater strength and lower Computer-aided design Rapid change in product designs
materials weight, leading to increased systems and documentation, timesavings,
speed, maneuverability, range, and a wider range of options.
or payload.
Directed energy Ability to attack targets at long Computer-based Precise and responsive control
ranges instantly. management bf supply and production
information systems scheduling and performance.
Advanced electronic Improved command, control, Computer-to- Rapid exchange and update of
components communications, intelligence, computer data links management, design, and
target detection, and fire control; production information.
and electronic warfare capabilities
for military systems of all kinds.
High-speed Near-real-time reconnaissance; Microelectronics Control, data storage, and
computers improved command, control, transfer functions for all the
and communications; improved equipment listed above as well
target acquisition and fire as for numerous other business
control. and manufacturing operations.
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More
advanced
weaponry
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The Soviets' success in equipping their forces lies in
their ability to make long-range, coherent plans; to
command and focus resources on the most important
programs; and to ensure continued commitment to
programs under way. The Soviets have developed a
system of planning and management designed to
enhance the performance of their planned economy in
satisfying the military's requirements for weapons and
equipment. However, Soviet military-industrial man-
agers operate in the same central planning environ-
ment as their civilian counterparts and are thus
subject to many of the same problems.
Government management of the defense industries is
centralized in the USSR Council of Ministers. Most
of this management is performed by the Council's
Military-Industrial Commission (VPK), which coordi-
nates and controls all military-related research, de-
sign, development, testing, and production activities,
and serves as a primary orchestrator for defense
industrial acquisition and assimilation of foreign tech-
nologies. The State Planning Committee (Gosplan)
serves as the central coordinating body for assigning
production targets and allocating resources to the
defense industries. Other key state committees are:
Planning for and management of the Soviet weapons
industry is the shared responsibility of the party and
the government (see figure 7):
? The party draws up basic policy guidelines and
monitors their fulfillment.
? The government, through its various ministries,
state committees, and commissions, runs the econo-
my and its defense-related industrial activities.
? The Soviet Ministry of Defense (MOD), as part of
the government, generates requirements for the
defense industries and is the consumer of their
products.
High-level representatives of the party and govern-
ment, including the military, serve on the Defense
Council-usually presided over by the CPSU General
Secretary-and advise the Politburo on major defense
policy issues.
The party is involved in planning and management
through the national planning process, by which
priorities are set and resources allocated, and through
its monitoring apparatus, headed by a party secretary
with responsibility for defense matters. This party
secretary oversees the Central Committee's Defense
Industries Department and its counterparts at the
local level. The nature and extent of the party's role in
supervising the work of the defense industries has
varied over time with different people in key positions.
? The State Committee for Science and Technology
(GKNT), which plans and implements scientific-
technical policy for the entire Soviet economy. It
determines the basic directions for the development
of science and technology and works with the VPK
to oversee foreign technology acquisition.
? The State Committee for Material-Technical Sup-
ply, which distributes supplies to Soviet industrial
plants. It implements Soviet defense priorities by
rationing goods in short supply to competing users.
? The State Committee for Standards, which sets
technical specifications and quality standards for
goods produced by Soviet industry.
Each of the nine defense industrial ministries oversees
the work of design bureaus, R&D facilities, and
production enterprises. Enterprises are frequently
combined into production associations, which may
also include experimental facilities and R&D units. In
some cases an intermediate layer of management-a
main directorate or all-union industrial association-
has direct responsibility for specific functional areas
within the ministries, but most of these have been
abolished in an effort to trim the bureaucracy.
The Ministry of Defense exerts considerable influence
on the planning and management of the defense
industries. As the primary customer, the MOD is
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Figure 7
Soviet Bureaucracy for Weapons Acquisition
Secretariat Secretary for
- defense matters
Central Defense Industry
Committee - Department
Policy guidance
Council of
Ministers
Ministry of
Defense
Service Deputy Minister
Commanders in of Defense for
Chief (CinCs) Armaments
Military-Industrial 11 State Planning
Commission Committee
I 1
% Defense industrial Ae'
ministries
r -Technical control-
Deputy CinCs Main directorates
for armaments responsible for
armaments
Test ranges Research institutes Military Defense industry
representatives facilities
r - ~
I 1
I 1
L - Quality control - J
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involved in all stages of the arms acquisition process,
from generating requirements to overseeing the man-
ufacture and acceptance of new weapons. Through
the General Staff and the deputy minister of defense
for armaments-whose main armaments directorates
provide tens of thousands of on-site military represen-
tatives at weapons-related facilities-the MOD wields
a vigorous monitoring apparatus (see inset). This
direct association of consumer with industry provides
the quality control and feedback lacking in the civil-
ian economy and is a principal reason for the better
performance of Soviet defense industries.'
The long tenure of managers in the Soviet defense
industries has lent stability to the administrative
apparatus, provided a continuity of approach, and
helped to ensure that lessons learned from past experi-
ence are passed along. Although age is taking its toll
among long-term defense industrial chieftains, conti-
nuity has been maintained by replacing them with
their deputies of many years.
One result of this practice has been the development
of a network of experienced senior planners and
managers who have all worked with one another and
who know each other's patterns of operation. The late
Minister of Defense Ustinov appears to have been the
center of this network. Men whose careers were
associated with his today occupy leading positions
throughout the Soviet defense industrial management
hierarchy. In recent years this network has been
spreading throughout the civilian sector as well. Ap-
parently in an effort to share the experience and
managerial talent of defense industry administrators,
the Soviet leadership has transferred many of them to
positions of responsibility throughout the government
and party (see figure 8).
' In an attempt to ensure a similar high standard of quality control
in the civilian sector, in July 1986 the Soviet leadership created a
network of inspectors, subordinate to the USSR State Committee
for Standards, to monitor output quality in civilian industries. It is
too early to judge what impact this will have.
The Main Armaments Directorates
and the System of Military Representatives
The Ministry of Defense has a number of main
armaments directorates, subordinate to the deputy
minister for armaments. They supervise a network of
military representatives, who monitor all aspects of
the military acquisition cycle and ensure that techni-
cal specifications and delivery deadlines are met.
These main directorates station military officers and
civilian technicians at thousands of plants and insti-
tutes-virtually every location where military items
are designed, developed, produced, or delivered.
Through the military representative system, a vast
amount of industrial data flows between the Defense
Ministry and the defense industries-giving the mili-
tary a clear advantage over nondefense ministries in
the competition for scarce resources. Bridging the gap
between customer and producer, military representa-
tives create in the defense industries a responsiveness
that is often lacking in the nonmilitary sector. The
system thus allows the military to avoid some of the
bottlenecks that plague civilian production.
The military's requirements for weapons production
are detailed in a five-year defense plan, a subset of the
five-year plan for the economy as a whole. This
military plan covers such activities as training, logis-
tics, and military assistance and spells out the need
for new weaponry and research. Long-term forecasts
are incorporated into perspective plans for 15 years or
longer.
Resources devoted to the military are shielded from
diversion to other claimants by the mechanics of the
planning system. The sheer magnitude of economic
and technical data tends to prevent Gosplan from
conducting "zero-based" reevaluations of programs
and activities. Gross target figures probably are not
the product of detailed calculations of defense and
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Figure 8
The Network That Ustinov Built
Nikolay I. Ryzhkov
CPSU Politburo member and
Chairman of the USSR
Council of Ministers
Director of Uralmash Heavy
Machine-Building Plant, which
produces artillery, 1950s to 1970;
general director of Uralmash
Production Association, 1971-75;
First Deputy Minister of Heavy
and Transport Machine Building,
1975-79; First Deputy Chairman,
Gosplan, 1979-85; Politburo member
and CPSU secretary, 1985.
Ivan S. Silayev
Deputy Chairman of the USSR
Council of Ministers and
Chairman of the Council's
Machine-Building Bureau
Foreman, department chief
deputy chief engineer, chief
engineer, and factory director,
1954- 74; Deputy Minister and
First Deputy Minister of the
Aviation Industry, 1974-80;
Minister of the Machine Tool
and Tool-Building Industry, 1980-81;
Minister of the Aviation Industry,
1981-85.
Dmitriy F. Ustinov (1909-85)
People's Commissar,
Minister of Armaments, 1941-53;
Minister of the Defense Industry,
1953-57; Deputy Chairman of the
USSR Council of Ministers and
possibly Chairman, VPK,
1957-63; First Deputy Chairman
of the Council of Ministers and
Chairman of the All-Union
Council of the People's Economy,
1963-65; CPSU secretary for
defense matters, 1965-76;
Minister of Defense, 1976-84.
Yuriy D. Maslyukov
Deputy Chairman of the USSR
Council of Ministers and
Chairman, VPK
Various positions, including chief
engineer, branch of the lzhevsk
Machine-Building Plant, 1962-74;
chief of a main directorate,
member of the collegium, and
Deputy Minister of the Defense
Industry, 1974-82; First Deputy
Chairman, Gosplan, 1982-85.
Anatoliy A. Reut
First Deputy Chairman, Gosplan
and member of the USSR
Council of Ministers
Director of Minsk Ordzhonikidze
Computer Works until 1975; First
Deputy Minister of the Radio
Industry, 1975-83; Chairman of
Belorussian Gosplan and Deputy
Chairman of the Belorussian
Council of Ministers, 1983-84.
Syrgey A. Afanas'yev
Minister of Heavy and
Transport Machine Building
In the Ministry of Armaments in
1940s; Minister of General
Machine Building, 1965-83.
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civilian needs, but percentage adjustments to previous
aggregate figures. Moreover, Gosplan tries to mini-
mize changes in the assignments of existing resources
to maintain predictability in planning key military
and civilian projects. Participation in the planning
process by the VPK-which is staffed primarily with
defense industry and military officials-further pro-
tects military-industrial interests.
In addition, the extreme secrecy accorded national
security planning helps prevent other sectors from
laying claim to defense production resources. This
secrecy allows defense industry managers to make
claims on resources without having to justify their
requests openly. On the negative side, however, the
secrecy inhibits the free flow of ideas between the
defense and civilian sectors of the Soviet economy.
Publication of scholarly work is difficult, discouraging
many talented scientists and engineers from working
in the defense sector.
The same mechanisms that protect military interests
probably-in the short run-also make it difficult to
change the level of military output, at least in peace-
time. Dramatic changes in output require correspond-
ing changes in capital investment, materials alloca-
tion, and labor assignments. Furthermore, because
defense production is so closely tied to the rest of
industry, major changes are not possible without
greatly disrupting patterns in the rest of the economy.
The momentum engendered by the planning system
makes it necessary for top leaders to intervene when
entirely new programs or directions are sought. This
occurred frequently under Stalin, who, for example,
singlehandedly decreed the need for a Soviet blue-
water navy and forced through a crash shipbuilding
program on the eve of World War II. Such leadership
pushes have been effective in engineering wholesale
changes in resource allocations to new projects. The
momentum of the planning system is such that the
required resources often do not flow rationally, how-
ever, but rather appear in a "spasm" in which more
resources are allocated at one time than can be
fruitfully absorbed.
Early, One-Time Authorization
of Programs
The Soviet weapon development process proceeds in
an orderly progression from requirements formulation
up to serial production. The entire procurement plan-
ning process is supervised and coordinated by the
deputy minister of defense for armaments, Army
General Vitaliy Shabanov (see inset). Because of the
centralized nature of this system, Soviet defense
industrial managers are assigned military require-
ments relatively unbuffeted by interservice rivalry.
The system's momentum facilitates smooth programs,
but makes it more difficult to terminate or redirect a
program in response to changing threats or technol-
ogies (see inset on the MIG-25).
Weapon programs are authorized by a joint decree of
the Central Committee and Council of Ministers.
Formal approval may be a function of the Politburo.
The decree-signed by both the CPSU General Sec-
retary and the Chairman of the Council of Minis-
ters-allows Soviet leaders to select weapon systems
they want to develop and quickly commit resources to
them. It has no direct counterpart in terms of author-
ity in the United States, but it has the effect of
combining in one decision the Department of Defense
approval of a program, a presidential decision autho-
rizing top priority, and multiyear funding of the
program by Congress. This one-time authorization
contrasts dramatically with the US practice of review-
ing major weapon programs each year and adjusting
their funding throughout the R&D and deployment
cycles.
Coordinated operational and technical requirements
are levied on the appropriate Soviet defense industrial
ministry. Within that ministry, a design bureau is
assigned on the basis of its technical specialization
and availability. When the military and the chief
designer agree on the basic system to be developed,
the designer formulates the program plan, identifying
prospective subcontractor participation, program
schedules, and certain capital expenditure costs (see
figure 9 for a comparison of the major milestones in
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Vitaliy Shabanov
Deputy Defense Minister Vitaliy Shabanov came to
his post without a career military background. After
serving in World War II, he worked in the Scientific
Research Institute of the Air Force; testing aviation
equipment. From 1949 until the early 1970s he was
with the Ministry of the Radio Industry, rising to be
general director of a scientific production association
(1972-74), then deputy minister. The first identifica-
tion of his shift to the Defense Ministry came in a
1978 article in Krasnaya zvezda, and he was first
publicly acknowledged as having responsibility for
armaments in 1980.
the US and Soviet weapons procurement cycles). The
VPK oversees the preparation of decision documents
detailing participants, schedules, and specific costs;
disagreements are ironed out before the documents go
to the Politburo and Council of Ministers for endorse-
ment. Contracts are concluded between the main
armaments directorate responsible for the type of
weapon system involved (representing the military
customer) and the lead design bureau. Funding, mate-
rials allocations, and general production targets are.
then fed into the next five-year plan, with the designa-
tion of precise delivery dates left for annual plans.
As deputy minister of defense for armaments, Sha-
banov is the central authority in the Ministry of
Defense for supplying the armed forces with arma-
ments and related equipment. He coordinates their
planning, development, production, testing, supply,
storage, and repair. To carry out this mission, he
oversees a number of main armaments directorates
for different types of weapon systems or components.
He also works with the deputy commanders in chief
for armaments of the various services to formulate
technical requirements for new weaponry.
As the focal point for arms procurement, Shabanov
helps the Minister of Defense to:
? Conserve resources through the coordination of
programs.
? Coordinate military doctrine and armaments
technology.
? Standardize weapons and equipment across services
and throughout the Warsaw Pact.
? Raise the level of technical knowledge and combat
readiness in the armed forces through training and
propaganda.
? Assess the potential military threat to the USSR
posed by foreign weapon systems.
Planners Plan Too Little,
Not Too Much
Ironically, a major problem of the Soviet centrally
planned system is its inability to plan enough. The
system lacks the technological entrepreneurs who in
the West respond to new market opportunities without
being directed-the self-generating "Silicon Valley"
microelectronics industrialists. It relies instead on its
planners' having sufficient vision and forethought to
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Countering an Outdated Threat:
The MIG-25
The Soviet MIG-25 Foxbat was designed to counter
the US B-70 supersonic, high-altitude bomber. The
B-70 program was canceled in the early 1960s, but
the Soviets had already begun to develop the MIG-25
and eventually produced hundreds. Although this
fighter-interceptor can be effective in several mis-
sions, its original design was optimized to counter
anticipate the demands of the future. Moreover,
development by decree tends to focus planning activi-
ty on the weapon systems themselves and frequently
leads to neglect of support industries. This neglect
often means that development of materials and pro-
cessing technologies lags development of system
technologies.
The deficiency of detailed plans-for the use of labor,
materials, and new technology, for example-leads to
problems in production as well. Standard indicators,
such as percentage of plan fulfillment or actual output
levels, are used to judge performance. Incentives for
managers and workers are based upon the achieve-
ment of assigned targets.
Such simplistic criteria have caused distortions and
inefficiencies in Soviet industry as managers seek to
maintain output (and thus protect their incentives) at
the expense of quality, investment in new technology,
and labor efficiency. Managers-including those in
the defense industries-regularly inflate man-hour,
material, and overhead costs in order to build reserves
to be secretly retained for use in the event of unfore-
seen circumstances. "Storming" to meet production
threats like that posed by the B-70. The primary
reason for the production of so many MIG-25s-after
the B-70's demise and the change in US tactics to
emphasize low-altitude, subsonic penetration-was
probably the momentum engendered by the Soviet
weapons authorization process.
targets-a practice in which as much as half of a
plant's output is produced in the last 10 days of each
month-requires extra shifts, raises labor costs, and
often degrades the quality of output.
The Soviets have recognized their planning and per-
formance inadequacies for decades and have periodi-
cally experimented with various reforms. A major
decree issued in 1979, for instance, has sparked
numerous leadership measures to improve planning
and management. Financial levers are increasingly
used, and success indicators for enterprises have been
modified to emphasize efficient use of labor, timely
and complete fulfillment of contracts, and production
of high-quality goods. Major revisions of agricultural
and industrial wholesale prices have been implement-
ed to encourage the introduction of modern produc-
tion technologies, and efforts have been made to
reward managers for increased productivity. How-
ever, according to a stream of editorials and leader-
ship statements-highlighted by publicly expressed
concern with economic reforms-success in solving
planning and management problems has thus far been
limited, and the search for better forms of planning
and management continues.
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STAT
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The rapid advance of world military technologies over
the past decade has greatly complicated the demands
placed on Soviet weapon designers. The designers
must create weaponry sophisticated enough to per-
form multiple missions and otherwise exhibit greater
capabilities than older weapons, while keeping in
mind the limitations of the production base from
which the systems must flow.
Soviet weapons have historically reflected a commit-
ment to functional designs that can be readily manu-
factured in labor-intensive factories and readily main-
tained in the field with a minimum of technical skill.
Designers have not faced the competitive pressures
that drive Western designers to press the state of the
art. Rather, they have been required to adhere to
industry standards, use off-the-shelf components, and
employ the preferred design and manufacturing meth-
ods detailed in official design handbooks. This ap-
proach is intended to ensure producibility, maintain-
ability, and ease of operation.
One reason for the success of Soviet weapon programs
has been a low-risk development style. The Soviet
emphasis on strict adherence to design and develop-
ment schedules encourages technological conserva-
tism on the part of designers once a decision has been
made to proceed with the development of a weapon,
thus ensuring a high probability of development suc-
cess. This practice carries the potential for obsoles-
cence in the resulting weapon systems, which the
leadership tries to offset with almost routine approval
of subsequent improvement programs.
Soviet weapon designers are charged with broad
responsibilities for weapon development programs.
Their key role derives from Stalin's approach to
developing successful weapon systems-identify an
innovative engineer with a strong "can do" attitude,
grant him broad authority, and give him the necessary
resources. With this authority, of course, went ac-
countability, and more than a few designers in Stalin's
time found themselves disgraced or imprisoned as a
result of failures. Designers who succeeded during
World War II in developing modern weapons from
the impoverished technological base carved out em-
pires that still bear their names (see inset). Their
successes brought fame, professional honors, elite
status, and, in some cases, high political rank.
This approach continues. Key weapon designers-
designated general designers in the case of major
systems and chief designers for other systems and
major subsystems-and their bureaus are still given
broad authority. Their responsibilities and those of
subordinate organizations (subcontractors) are spelled
out in party-government decrees authorizing weapon
programs, and they are held legally accountable for
fulfillment of the decrees. The Soviet system relies on
the weapon designer to cope with a science and
technology base that, in many areas, is inferior to that
of the West; to create advanced weapon capabilities
using comparatively inefficient production technol-
ogies; and to manipulate the bureaucracy in order to
get the job done.
Another reason for the success of Soviet weapon
programs has been the continuity of personnel in the
key development organizations. In contrast to acquisi-
tion in the United States, where program managers
and other key personnel change frequently, individ-
uals and organizations assigned to a program in the
USSR normally stay with it from inception to comple-
tion. Moreover, the organizations responsible for the
initial version of a weapon are usually responsible for
all follow-on versions.
Design Process Minimizes
Development Risk
On the basis of long-range forecasts of anticipated
threats, military planners-in concert with design
centers and research institutes-project the weapon
technologies required to meet such threats. The Sovi-
ets commonly develop series of successor weapons
(each new variant using applications of recently prov-
en technology) to incrementally satisfy the military's
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Key Soviet Weapon Designers
Mikhail Mil (1909-70): Father of the Modern Soviet Helicopter Industry
Mikhail Mil graduated from the Novocherkassk Aviation Institute in 1931 and
subsequently worked in research on helicopter aerodynamics. In 1947 Stalin
ordered him to become the chief designer of a newly created experimental design
bureau for helicopters. Along with his colleagues Aleksandr Yakovlev and
Nikolay Kamov, Mil helped create the nucleus. of the modern Soviet helicopter in-
dustry. Under his leadership, the bureau developed a greater variety of helicopters
than either the Kamov or Yakovlev design bureaus, and Mil helicopters soon
accounted for the largest part of Soviet helicopter production. Mil was highly
effective in mobilizing resources to meet program deadlines. He is said to have
coined this guidance for subordinates: make it simple, make it reliable, make it
rugged, and make it work.
Petr Grushin (1906- ): "Uncle SAM"
Petr Grushin and his design bureau have been responsible for the design and
development of radar-guided missiles for many of the Soviet land-based and
naval surface-to-air missile systems. A member of the USSR Academy of
Sciences and one of only a few designers to have held full membership on the
CPSU Central Committee, Grushin has enjoyed a great deal of political and
scientific clout. Such influence is important for crossing ministerial lines to
coordinate production of complete SAM systems.
Vladimir Chelomey (1914-84): Missile Designer
Vladimir Chelomeyfirst designed jet engines, but he is better known as a designer
of missiles. His first notable successes were cruise missiles. Capitalizing on the
US-Soviet missile race and on the problems other Soviet designers were experi-
encing in meeting its challenges, Chelomey expanded his interests in the mid-
1950s to include ballistic missiles and satellites. He is credited with the design of
the SS-11 ICBM and its follow-on, the SS-19. He also developed the Proton
family of space launch vehicles and a series of satellites. Chelomey's success
sprang from a combination of designing genius, managerial talent, and marriage
to Khrushchev's daughter.
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Expediting the Application of New Technologies:
Organizational Measures
The use of new technologies in the economy in general
and in weapons development in particular has been
retarded by (among other factors) the bureaucratic
separation of the research institutes from the design
bureaus. The Soviets have recognized this problem
and created new organizational arrangements de-
signed to combat it.
One such organization is the scientific production
association (NPO), first officially proposed by a 1973
decree. NPOs incorporate research institutes, design
bureaus, and prototype production facilities. These
associations have had mixed results. Their creation
has been a slow process-since 1973, for example,
only 250 NPOs have been formed. The weapons
industry has been a leader informing associations: in
the Ministry of the Electronics Industry, for instance,
NPO Pozitron in Leningrad is a stellar example.
Another success is to be found in the defense-related
Ministry of the Electrical Equipment Industry, where
NPOs are said to have reduced by one-third to one-
half the time required for the research production
cycle.
The creation beginning in 1985 of intersectoral sci-
ence and technology complexes (MNTKs) is a more
recent attempt to expedite the assimilation of the
results of research into production. MNTKs are large
associations of geographically diverse R&D estab-
lishments and experimental production plants orga-
nized for the purpose of working out key critical
technologies. They are intended to break down bu-
reaucratic barriers by coordinating and directing the
work of organizations formally subordinate to differ-
ent ministries. At least 17 MNTKs have been created
so far, and their areas of concentration include
robotics, fiber optics, welding and metallurgy, and
personal computers.
The Machine-Building Bureau of the USSR Council
of Ministers is yet another organization recently
created to break down bureaucratic barriers and
hasten the application of new technologies in
industry. Headed by the former Minister of the
Aviation Industry, this bureau was created to im-
prove the work of the 11 civilian machine-building
ministries. Its operation will probably be patterned
after the Military-Industrial Commission, which co-
ordinates the efforts of the defense industries and
centrally supervises all weapon programs. The cre-
ation of the bureau reflects the Soviet belief in the
importance of the civilian machinery sector in supply-
ing the increasingly advanced manufacturing equip-
ment on which the success of all industry, both
military and civilian, depends.
long-range requirements. Although this design philos-
ophy frequently results in follow-on programs, it slows
overall technological progress. Weapons development
in the USSR results more from a requirements "pull"
than a technology "push."
Emerging technologies are proven in applied research,
a process usually distinct from the development of
actual weapons. Success in applied research may
enable the designer to include a new technology-or
an adaptation of an existing technology-in new
weapon systems with little risk of failure. For exam-
ple, even the development of a new weapon that
incorporated a major technological advance-the
SS-17 MOD 1, the first ICBM capable of carrying
multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles
(MIRVs}-need not have involved much risk. MIRV
technology had been worked out in applied research
for several years before its introduction into that
system.
Thus, by the time Soviet weapon programs are for-
mally authorized, all of the key technologies necessary
to meet the proposed performance specifications and
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program obligations are generally well understood, if
not in hand. Bonuses are keyed to successful program
completion, and penalties can be levied for failure to
achieve the stated goals. This emphasis on schedules
gives the integrating designer and subcontractors a
strong incentive to include in the weapon's develop-
ment only those devices, components, or materials
known to be producible or adaptable within the given
time constraints. The designer must be confident that
the chosen technology levels do not present any
insurmountable design or production problems. The
result is a de facto technology freeze on major system
components before the weapon is developed.
Because of the emphasis on incorporating only trusted
technologies in new weapons, Soviet designers are
inclined to employ entire subsystems from previous
generations of weapons. This practice allows the
Soviets to continue using older equipment efficiently,
because the parts for newer systems can be used in
older systems as well. Fewer types of weapon compo-
nents and spares need to be kept in inventories for
maintenance and repair.
A classic demonstration of design inheritance is the
V-2 diesel tank engine, which was adapted from a
1920s-design aircraft engine and used with various
modifications in the T-34, T-54, T-55, T-62, and T-72
tanks over a 40-year period. The Soviets developed the
V-2 from the M-34 gasoline, air-cooled V-12 aircraft
engine-an engine similar to the American Curtis
and the French Hispano-Suiza V-12s of the 1920s.
The engine was modified for liquid cooling and was
used in the first T-34 tanks in about 1938, and it has
powered most of the tanks the Soviets have produced
since. A scaled-down V-12 was also used in the
PT-76, an amphibious light tank. It is simple to
produce and compatible with many vehicle systems,
and its many variants use many common parts.
Advancing Through
Modular Upgrades
The Soviets commonly offset some of the drawbacks
of the early technology freeze with subsequent im-
provement programs, using approaches and technol-
ogies that became available during the previous pro-
gram. As a result, major design bureaus are often
simultaneously working on new and modernized
weapon systems in different stages of development.
This process-which requires the commitment and
occasionally the direct participation of the Soviet
leadership-discourages designers from promoting
unduly risky approaches to solving technical
problems.
The Soviets pursue a three-track approach to stave off
the technological obsolescence that could result from
the early freeze:
? They frequently introduce modular upgrades for
fielded systems. Such upgrades minimize design
changes and are typically limited to one or a few
components. (Some of the alterations can be done by
military repair bases in the field.)
? They modernize systems more thoroughly by im-
proving one or several major subsystems, such as
missile guidance or avionics.
? Their most ambitious option is to introduce major
modernizations or entirely new systems.
A good example of a system incorporating all these
options is the T-64 tank. The initial variant of the
T-64 featured several new tank components and
subsystems, including the engine, turret, and trans-
mission. The T-64A was equipped with a new 125-
millimeter (mm) gun system, but it probably did not
require a major change in manufacturing technology.
The much-improved T-64B incorporated a new laser
fire-control system and is capable of firing both
antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) and 125-mm am-
munition. The fire-control system probably required
advanced electro-optics similar to those found in
modern Soviet ATGMs.
In addition to allowing the incorporation of new
technologies more quickly than if a new weapon
system were started from scratch, modular upgrading
helps hold down the cost growth involved in continual-
ly developing new systems. Manufacture is also easier,
as modernized systems can frequently be produced on
the same production lines that produced their prede-
cessors. Finally, modular upgrades, because they do
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not call for major changes in resources or supplier
networks, enhance the continuity of centralized plan-
ning and are thus easier for Soviet planners to cope
with.
Western Technology Cuts
Time and Costs
Soviet planners use Western technologies as a yard-
stick to evaluate their own capabilities. They also try
to take advantage of basic research undertaken by
Western engineers and, with some important excep-
tions, pursue technologies already proven in the West.
The Soviets have a well-organized national program
for the overt and clandestine acquisition and assimila-
tion of Western-primarily US-technology. Key re-
search institutes and primary design bureaus make
long-range forecasts of critical technologies that they
anticipate will be required in future weapon develop-
ments. A VPK-led commission gathers, edits, and
assigns collection requirements for the acquisition of
Western technology through legal and illegal means.
Technologies and engineering know-how acquired
from the West have allowed the Soviets to strengthen
their capabilities significantly in many areas basic to
the development of modern military systems, particu-
larly in the fields of microelectronics and computers.
Soviet military projects using Western technology and
hardware design concepts span all areas, including
strategic offensive missiles, aircraft, conventional
ground and naval forces, air defense, and reconnais-
sance. Incorporating the results of Western technol-
ogy instead of relying wholly on indigenous R&D
capabilities yields significant savings in program costs
and allows earlier development of weapon systems.
Western products enable the Soviets to demonstrate
technology feasibility earlier and thus begin develop-
ment of the operational systems earlier. Technology
acquisitions also free indigenous R&D resources for
other uses.
After they acquire foreign technologies, the Soviets
usually take five to 10 years to field weapon systems
incorporating them. Minor technical adjustments re-
sulting from technology acquisitions have been made
in ongoing programs, although this is more likely to
occur if the program has not reached the prototype-
production stage and if the acquired technologies do
not require fundamental redesign of the system or its
major elements. Because the Soviet procurement sys-
tem tends to rely more on incremental improvement
programs than the US system does, the Soviets can
field upgraded weapons more quickly.
Design Simplicity Assures
Producibility
Western analysts have often characterized Soviet
weapon systems as "simple, rugged, and easy to
maintain." Rigorous design specifications-such as
mirror-like finishes and tight tolerances-are called
for only where necessary for performance. Circuit
designs are simple by US standards, and materials
that are costly and difficult to machine are avoided
where possible (some Soviet submarines, discussed in
the inset, are important exceptions). Soviet designers
have also developed a knack for keeping parts to a
minimum. For example, the R-1I engine, which
powers the widely deployed Fishbed MIG-21, con-
tains many fewer parts than the roughly comparable
J-79 engine, which powers the US F-4 (see inset).
What appears to be crude, however, often conceals
very potent combat capabilities. The "simple, rugged
design" of Soviet weapons has not interfered with
their combat effectiveness in the hands of well-trained
troops.
The simplicity (relative to Western standards) chosen
by Soviet designers has entailed trade-offs. Design
simplicity increases reliability and reduces develop-
ment and production costs. It has allowed the produc-
tion of capable weapons by a labor-intensive industrial
base without substantial investment in new manufac-
turing methods. The choice of a simple design, how-
ever, has frequently resulted in a less sophisticated
weapon, often restricted in application to a single
military mission.
Simplicity also poses trade-offs in terms of mainte-
nance (see inset comparing Soviet and US aircraft
maintenance). Most Soviet subsystems have a shorter
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Titanium Submarines: The Alfa-Class
The Alfa-class nuclear powered attack submarine is
an example of the Soviets' infrequent use of expensive
materials. The Alfa-class is constructed of titanium,
which endows it with a lower magnetic signature and
service life than those in the West, resulting in a
greater burden of maintenance, component replace-
ment, and repair. Thus, in Soviet logistics a large
number of spare systems are in the maintenance
pipeline at all times, and large numbers of technicians
have to be available to do the frequent routine
maintenance tasks. They perform only the simplest of
maintenance tasks in the field; weapons and weapon
components are returned frequently to the factory or
major maintenance depots for repair and overhaul.
Despite the seeming inefficiency of this practice, it
probably reflects a policy chosen by the Soviets
because of the low skill level of their conscript force.
The simpler maintenance demands on troops are also
attractive to Soviet clients in the Third World, where
technical skills are at a premium.
deeper diving capabilities than the Soviets' steel-
hulled submarines. Because of these advantages, the
Soviets are also building other high-technology sub-
marines that have pressure hulls made of titanium.
Western Technologies
Forcing Change
Although it has served the Soviets well for decades,
the traditional Soviet design strategy does not appear
well suited for some key challenges of the modern
technological environment. A greater commitment to
developing and manufacturing more complex weapon
systems will probably become necessary as the Soviets
strive to counter many of the new capabilities of
Western armaments. In addition, the mission flexibili-
ty and lower total procurement levels made possible
by advanced, multipurpose systems appear to be the
most rational solutions to soaring weapon costs-
despite the higher per-unit price tags.
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Simplicity: The R-11 Engine
The Soviet R-11-300 rotor assembly (left photo,
foreground) performs essentially the same work as
that of the US J-79 (in back). The right photo
shows the R-11-300 compressor components.
A clear example of Soviet success in designing simple
but adequate systems is the R-11-300 jet engine,
which has been produced in great numbers for the
MIG-21 Fishbed fighter aircraft. The Soviet R-11-
300 engine is roughly comparable to the US J-79
engine, which powers the F-4 Phantom. The R-1 1-300
is simpler (with 2,500 parts versus 22,500 in the J-79)
and would cost about one-third as much as the J-79
if it were manufactured in the United States.
Design simplicity resulted, in part, from a lack of
redundancy, the use offastening techniques-such as
spot welding-that would not be acceptable in the
United States, the use of an efficient compressor
design, and reliance on the framework of the aircraft
for some of the structural rigidity required. The
R-11-300's service life is much shorter than that of
the J-79, and it is first overhauled after 300 hours of
operation in contrast to 1,500 hours for the J-79. The
R-11-300 does not have the same performance char-
acteristics-such as a constant idle speed regardless
of ambient conditions-as US engines, permitting
much simpler engine controls.
Another important factor contributing to the lower
cost of the R-11-300 is the use of relatively crude
tolerances and finishes where these will not impair its
functioning. Except for a very few parts, the entire R-
11-300 engine could have been manufactured with
production technology available in the United States
in the 1930s.
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The Trade-offs of Advanced Weaponry:
The T-55 Versus the T-80
The sophisticated T-80 achieves much better
performance:
? The T-80 is faster-its diesel or turbine engine
(almost 1,000 horsepower) allows this 40-odd-
metric-ton tank road speeds of over 70 kilometers/
hour. The T-55's diesel engine (580 horsepower)
will only let the 36-metric-ton tank go 50
kilometers/hour.
? The T-80 has greater firepower-its armament
includes a 125-mm smoothbore gun capable of
firing both projectiles and antitank guided missiles.
The T-55 has a 100-mm rifled main gun system
that fires only projectiles.
? The T-80 is more accurate-it contains an ad-
vancedfire-control system, including an improved
laser rangefinder and probably a full solution bal-
listic computer. The T-55's fire-control system is
relatively simple.
? The T-80 has greater mobility-it probably fea-
tures a new, improved suspension that greatly en-
hances cross-country mobility. The T-55 has a
Christie suspension, which gives it a choppy ride,
diminishing its firing-on-the-move capability.
? Development of the T-80 took substantially longer
than that of the T-55.
? Production of the T-80 required substantial invest-
ment. The Soviets erected a major new production
facility and established a broad network of compo-
nent suppliers.
? CIA estimates the T-80 costs about three times as
much as the T-55.
? The T-80 and its complex subsystems require an
extensive support structure. The T-55 can be main-
tained by crewmen with limited mechanical training
and repaired to a greater extent in the field.
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A change in design strategy appears to be under way
but is proving to be painful and slow. Translating new
technologies into capabilities more quickly, for in-
stance, means altering the traditional practice of
perfecting them in applied research first. Because of
this, some new weapons are proving difficult to assim-
ilate into production. In the field, the operation and
maintenance of extremely sensitive electronics and
other advanced systems are being entrusted to a force
of largely unskilled conscripts. Nonetheless, the ap-
pearance in the 1970s of several new, more complex
systems designed to accomplish multiple missions-
such as the SU-27 interceptor and the SA-10 multial-
titude surface-to-air missile-illustrates the evolution
in procurement policy already under way.
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By any measure, since World War II the Soviet
weapons industry has churned out impressive quanti-
ties of weapons and equipment. Production since 1965
has included more than 50,000 tanks, 50,000 aircraft,
80,000 light armored vehicles, 650,000 surface-to-air
missiles, 270 submarines, and large quantities of other
equipment-making the Soviets the largest producers
of weaponry in the world. The Soviets have tradition-
ally emphasized numbers rather than sophisticated
designs. They have relied on the extensive growth of
the economy to continually expand weapon produc-
tion, giving priority to weapon producers in the alloca-
tion of scarce resources.
The slower growth of the Soviet economy in the past
decade, however, has led the Soviet leaders to stress
efficiency even more than in the past. At the same
time, dramatic improvements in Western weapons
have led them to stress greater advances in weapons
technology. To meet both these requirements, in the
1970s the Soviets stepped up the modernization of
their production base, devoting a great deal of atten-
tion to the introduction of the latest machine tools and
other advanced manufacturing equipment.
The Soviet industrial base for armaments production
was created in the late 1920s and 1930s. Its develop-
ment was a primary objective of the First and Second
Five-Year Plans, and it continues to bear features
typical of the Stalinist industrialization. Institutional
continuities-such as a centralized and unified execu-
tive structure, long-term ties between cooperating
enterprises, and plants producing the same product
line for over half a century-assist Soviet industry in
manufacturing weapon systems rapidly and in large
numbers.
Production is usually concentrated in large plants,
some of which are parts of multipurpose facilities.
Soviet production facilities are generally much larger
than those producing similar items in the United
States, mainly because the Soviets frequently colocate
plants producing components for the same system.
Similarly, support industries are frequently colocated
with final assembly facilities. This arrangement,
known as vertical integration, has been employed over
the decades as a hedge against the inefficiency of the
Soviet transportation and supply network and the
vagaries of central planning.
Labor has traditionally been treated in the Soviet
economy as an inexhaustible commodity, particularly
in the extremely labor-intensive machine-building sec-
tor. Large numbers of unskilled or semiskilled work-
ers are employed to operate such relatively simple
tools as lathes, milling machines, and boring and
broaching equipment. This is partially the result of
the Soviet policy of full employment, which has the
added benefit of ensuring a high state of readiness to
expand production in case of war.
The traditional view that the labor supply is inex-
haustible has led to relatively inefficient use of labor.
This inefficiency is aggravated by the weakness of
incentives to economize on labor and by indifferent
labor discipline-poor attendance, high rates of alco-
holism, and theft from the shop floor. As the number
of youths joining the Soviet work force dwindles,
however, the Soviet leadership is seeking to increase
labor productivity by experimenting with new forms
of shop-floor labor organization and embarking on
discipline campaigns.
Visitors to Soviet production plants have noted out-
dated manufacturing equipment, some from the
World War II period. Soviet managers typically do
not replace equipment until it is worn out, rather than
when it becomes obsolete, as is more typical in the
West, and they sequester and stockpile replacement
equipment. Even when new equipment is installed,
plant managers tend to keep the older equipment as a
backup. These practices dilute the effectiveness of
capital investment, especially reducing its impact on
productivity.
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Figure 10. This cartoon from Krokodil (June 1984) illustrates the
problems of poor labor discipline and absenteeism in Soviet
industry. Addressing the queue of white-collar workers waiting
during the workday to buy tickets for that evening's entertainment,
the manager says, "As long as we've got the whole department
here, I suggest we begin our meeting on labor discipline."
Managers resist adopting new equipment because it
disrupts operations. Assimilating new equipment
causes downtime, which the central planners do not
always allow for by lowering the plant's production
targets for the period involved. Soviet enterprise
managers reportedly also do not trust new equipment
to work well. A new production process makes them
dependent on outside experts and on new suppliers of
components and services, such as software support.
Plant managers do not willingly put themselves at the
mercy of outsiders-especially from other minis-
tries-and outsiders do not particularly care whether
the equipment functions as planned in a given plant.
Managers are loath to replace old (but operating)
equipment lest their capacity to produce be lost
completely.
Another factor limiting the willingness of managers to
modernize is the relatively narrow selection of tech-
nologies and equipment from which they have to
choose. For example, although the USSR produces
more conventional and numerically controlled ma-
chine tools than any other country, many of them are
general purpose machine tools that are relatively easy
Krokodil, 1984 0
Figure 11. A cartoon in Krokodil (July 1984) satirizes Soviet use
of new manufacturing technology.
to produce in large quantities rather than special-
purpose and complex types. This practice yields econ-
omies of scale that lower production costs, but it
sacrifices diversity in the machine tools available for
plant use.
The industrialization drive of the late. 1920s and early
1930s and the Stalinist system combined to create a
mosaic of industrial technologies. The scarcity of
capital led Soviet authorities to ration it; and even
today, in many Soviet plants, state-of-the-art equip-
ment works in tandem with primitive, labor-intensive
operations. An individual plant tends to develop
unique production processes as its managers grab
equipment whenever and wherever they can get it,
and as the relative lack of competitive pressure en-
ables plants to operate at widely varying levels of
efficiency. Variations among industries tend to im-
pede the diffusion of new technologies, as managers
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may find that advanced equipment developed else-
where is technically incompatible with their
operations.
These considerations, along with the differences in
their R&D capabilities, have led the Soviets to ap-
proach basic manufacturing operations in a way
different from that of US industry. For example,
Soviet manufacturers seek to minimize the use of
machining in the production of weapons to a greater
extent than their US counterparts (see inset on com-
parative Soviet and US aircraft manufacturing prac-
tices). They attempt to use net-shape-forming tech-
niques (casting, forging, powder metallurgy, and
extrusion), which-although more labor intensive and
time consuming than machining in the United
States-eliminate the need for complex manufactur-
ing machinery. The USSR has managed to stay
abreast of the West in net-shape forming, and in some
processes-such as titanium casting-it has surpassed
the West.
The Soviets also rely more on welding than on the
mechanical fastening techniques preferred in the
West. In the aircraft industry, for example, US
manufacturers prefer fasteners such as rivets because
they tend to provide greater structural integrity than
welds and because repair is less labor intensive.
(Repair of welded systems requires cutting and re-
welding.) The power of Soviet weapon designers is
illustrated by their ability to make individual choices
in matters of this kind. For joining fighter aircraft
components, for instance, the late designer Pavel
Sukhoy generally preferred rivetting, while the late
Artem Mikoyan preferred welding.
The Soviet leadership, recognizing that the production
of more advanced weapons would place increased
demands on the manufacturing base, accelerated ef-
forts to modernize defense plants in the early 1970s.
In many plants the Soviets have installed new types of
equipment and are emphasizing the development and
use of labor-saving automated machinery and robots.
Other measures include the revision of incentives for
managers to promote recapitalization; the use of
systems planning; expanded training and employment
of specialists in such fields as machinery automation;
and construction of new types of facilities to house
modern, integrated manufacturing lines.
Substantial improvement in the average level of man-
ufacturing technology appears to have taken place
throughout most of the defense industries. The high
rate of expansion of defense industry facilities-which
in the Soviet Union is usually accompanied by the
installation of new manufacturing equipment-sug-
gests that increasingly advanced equipment is being
employed in many production lines. Soviet literature
describes efforts to economize on labor with automat-
ed equipment in such labor-intensive production oper-
ations as shipbuilding.
Despite these advances, the weapons industry has
been hampered by lags in support industries, particu-
larly those producing machine tools and computers.
The real revolution in Western manufacturing tech-
nology-the marriage of precision machine tools and
microelectronics-has not fully reached the Soviet
civilian or defense industries. The gains in recent
years in Western manufacturing productivity that
have resulted from the introduction of computer-
controlled production processes and computer-aided
automation of specialized equipment, therefore, have
not been matched in the Soviet Union. Manufacturing
equipment in some weapons industries-such as the
aviation industry-now reaches technological obsoles-
cence in an average of less than 10 years. Such rapid
changes in technology particularly challenge the Sovi-
ets, who keep many conventional machine tools in
production long past their obsolescence.
Deficiencies in computers and microelectronics have
been a key obstacle for the Soviets in the introduction
of new industrial technologies. Although the Soviets
have been active and innovative in microelectronics
theory since World War II, they apparently did not
fully recognize the potential of microelectronics until
1961, when Khrushchev began a crash effort to
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STAT
energize this Soviet industry. He established the
Zelenograd Science City near Moscow, where he
collected the scientists and research efforts then under
way in the Soviet Union. Zelenograd continues to be
the focal point for the development of microelectronic
components in the USSR and is the major research
center for the Ministry of the Electronics Industry.
The measured success the Soviets have enjoyed thus
far in developing mainframe computers has resulted
largely from copying Western-especially US-de-
velopments. Even this has not come easily: Soviet
engineers took longer to copy the IBM System/360
than IBM took to develop it in the first place.
Since the early 1960s the Soviets have devoted consid-
erable resources to the development of manufacturing
technologies, but they have not been able to keep pace
with the West (figure 12 illustrates the estimated US
lead in several critical areas). Several factors have
hampered Soviet development:
? Excessive compartmentation due to secrecy.
? Lack of innovation-promoting incentives.
? A late start in the use of computer-aided design and
development equipment to create microelectronics.
? An underdeveloped network of software, service,
and components support.
? A bureaucratic managerial structure that impedes
rather than facilitates scientific-industrial interac-
tion and cooperation.
Imports of Western
Manufacturing Technology
Deficiencies in many of the manufacturing technol-
ogies necessary to modernize their armaments plants
and other plants have prompted the Soviets to empha-
size legal and illegal acquisitions (see table 2). They
legally imported more than $4 billion worth of West-
ern machine tools over the past decade. Three-fourths
of these imports were conventional machine tools.
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Flexible Manufacturing Systems
Five machining centers form a flexible manufacturing system
called Talka-500 at the Ivanovo Machine Tool Building
Association.
The typical flexible manufacturing system (FMS) is
built around metal-cutting machine tools. It often
consists of a group of machining centers-multipur-
pose machine tools that can drill, mill, tap, and bore
afxed workpiece and that have automatic tool-
changing and -loading features-which are linked by
a centralized computer system. A material-handling
system under control of the central computer-con-
sisting of robots, pallets, conveyors, or carts-moves
parts between machining centers. Advanced systems
may also be tied in with automatic storage of parts, a
computerized design system, and computerized infor-
mation on inventory and output. In its most advanced
stage, a flexible manufacturing system requires no
human intervention except for maintenance and pro-
gramingfor new products.
The productivity gains and cost savings from these
new systems are great. A flexible manufacturing
system reduces the time parts have to spend waiting
to go on a machine, increases machine utilization,
allows fabrication of complex parts to consistently
high tolerances, and permits a more rapid changeover
from one machined part to another. Robots, carts, or
other forms of transport reduce the required labor
force. The linkage of computer-aided design systems
with the process machinery in an FMS permits rapid
change in product designs and documentation, thus
saving time and increasing production options. The
ability of an FMS to produce a variety of different
items simply by changing the central computer pro-
gram, for example, or transferring new designs imme-
diately for programing is unmatched by any other
form of automation. When these systems also incor-
porate computer-based management and information
systems, they further increase productivity through
precise and responsive control of supply and produc-
tion scheduling.
Most flexible manufacturing systems are used in low-
to-medium-volume production, such as production of
machine tools, construction equipment, aircrglt, com-
puters, and specialized electronic components. If
production volume is high, less flexible automated
machinery dedicated to making a single part-such
as a transfer line used to make automobile engine
cylinder blocks-is more cost effective.
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Soviet Experience With Automated Systems of Control
An ASU center at the Zil' Automotive Plant, which.produces
trucks for the Soviet military.
Since the early 1970s the Soviet leadership has
placed a high priority on the development of auto-
mated control systems (ASUs) at all levels of the
economy as a means of. facilitating planning and
increasing industrial productivity without having to
resort to more fundamental economic reform. ASU is
a generic term used by the Soviets to refer to
computer-based data-processing systems that have
applications ranging from simple automated book-
keeping to the more complex tasks of collecting,
processing, and distributing economic data. ASUs
have applications at all levels of the economy, from
the national, ministerial, and regional levels down to
the enterprise and plant.floor, where technical process
control is a key component of industrial automation.
Enterprise and plant floor computerization are wide-
ly used in Western industry.
ASUs have been neither as pervasive nor as effective
in the USSR as the leadership has hoped, however.
Their introduction and operation have been hindered
by:
? Deficiencies in computer software development.
? Supply bottlenecks, particularly in peripherals.
? The resistance of plant managers, who distrust the
new systems and are unenthusiastic about comput-
erized audit-trails.
? Insufficient training for users.
? The gap between designers and users of ASU
systems and software.
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Table 2
Selected Soviet Acquisitions of
Military Production Technology
From the West
Documents on KEVLAR-49 fiber for missiles Missile development/production
Complete set of manufacturing equipment for printed circuit Copied for 11 assembly lines for strategic missile, armor, electro-
boards optics, and radar production
DTS-70 printed circuit board testing system Military microelectronics production
Fiberglass manufacturing technology High-pressure air tanks for submarines
Technical documents on tests of cold-rolled steel Improved structural protection of warships
High-accuracy, three-dimension coordinate measuring machine Copied for several industries
Some were needed to supplement domestic production
(automated lathes), some to raise levels of precision
and productivity (US gearcutting machinery), and
some because the Soviets had no domestic counter-
parts (closed-loop, multiaxis numerically controlled
machine tools). The Soviets also buy a substantial
volume of these products from Eastern Europe, even
though they are less advanced than those purchased
from the West.
Although the Soviets reap substantial benefits from
imported technology, they frequently have problems
assimilating it into production. These difficulties are
sometimes greater when the technology is illegally
acquired, because in those cases Soviet engineers
usually cannot benefit from foreign training and
technical assistance. Modern critical technologies and
equipment are generally more difficult to transfer-
and much more difficult to duplicate by reverse
engineering-than those that contributed to early
Soviet industrial development. All these problems
apply with a vengeance to sectors like computers and
microelectronics, where the Soviets are experiencing
severe deficiencies.
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In the decade ahead the Soviet weapons industry will
face the challenge of meeting increasingly complex
military requirements at an acceptable cost to the
Soviet leadership. Many of the problems it faces, and
their solutions, are unique to the defense industries.
Nevertheless, they will have repercussions throughout
the Soviet military and economy.
access to the trough by "rubberstamping" its re-
quests for material and manpower and then dividing
the remainder among other claimants. In addition,
Soviet writings and statements indicate recognition
in party, government, and military leadership circles
that long-term Soviet defense needs will require
balanced development among industry, services, and
the technology base.
The Search for a New
Production Strategy
As the preceding chapters have indicated, the Soviet
defense industries have traditionally followed a simple
strategy, capitalizing on the high priority given to
defense, taking advantage of inherent Soviet
strengths, and seeking to negate Soviet weaknesses.
The Soviet people have shouldered a high defense
burden, churning out very large quantities of weapons
at the sacrifice of more rapid economic growth and
higher standards of living. The military's requirement
for large quantities of weapons has both enabled and
encouraged the defense industries to emphasize sim-
plicity, producibility, and ease of maintenance, there-
by mitigating the handicaps of a relatively low-skilled
industrial and military labor pool and a technological-
ly stunted industrial base.
Since the late 1960s, changes have taken place-
strains in the domestic economy, expanding military
technology frontiers, and improving foreign military
capabilities-that are undermining the effectiveness
of the traditional strategy. To cope with the new
conditions, the Soviet leadership is changing its weap-
on acquisition policies and the infrastructure and
operating practices of the defense industries. The
following changes appear to be under way:
? In resource allocation, a more sophisticated evalua-
tion of the priority accorded the defense industries.
Defense will continue to have a high priority, but
the increasing costs and complexity of producing
advanced weapons are inducing leaders and plan-
ners to seek more cost-effective ways to meet mili-
tary requirements. They are less likely than before
to give their relatively insular weapons industry first
? In weapons development, a shift from highly conser-
vative to more advanced applications of technology
and from simple to more complex weapon designs
where necessary to achieve desired weapon capabili-
ties and performance. Opportunities for using alter-
native designs in place of sophisticated technology
will diminish, although the Soviets will continue to
rely on traditional approaches in most cases. Weap-
on designers will have to adapt to the new capabili-
ties provided by computer-aided design and manu-
facture, which are already an essential part of the
weapon design process in the West.
? In production, the manufacture of advanced weap-
ons in smaller quantities and at lower rates. Im-
proved performance and more multipurpose weap-
ons-along with higher unit procurement costs,
greater production problems, and more costly opera-
tional and maintenance requirements for modern
manufacturing equipment-are likely to discourage
the Soviets from manufacturing many advanced
weapons at past rates. Along with these factors, the
danger of obsolescence (given today's rapidly chang-
ing threat and military technology base) will further
encourage them to have shorter production runs.
For the same reasons, the Soviets may begin to
produce fewer types of weapons. The Soviets have
also embarked on retrofit programs, designed to
ensure the combat worthiness of their older systems,
as in the case of older tanks and fighter aircraft
intended for export or deployment in areas away
from the frontline.
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? In the industrial base, more rapid growth in the
high-technology support sectors of the weapons
industry-radioelectronics, telecommunications,
specialty materials, and advanced production
equipment-than in weapon and equipment produc-
ers. Throughout the defense industries, the Soviets
will press for renovating and modernizing estab-
lished facilities instead of constructing new plants.
They are experimenting with incentives to persuade
plant managers that renovation is in their best
interests, and they are redirecting investment to
increase the availability of equipment for retooling.
? In administration, small-scale changes in planning
and management practices. The Soviets have begun
to revise plan targets, prices, and incentives to
encourage innovation and favor quality over quanti-
ty. However, they are unlikely to undermine the
central planning system by letting managers have
real autonomy. And defense industries will continue
to be the most thoroughly scrutinized part of the
Soviet economy, subject to management by decree.
? In seeking help from abroad, an emphasis on the
buildup of the scientific-technical base of the East
European allies and a greater reliance on them to
.fill some of the USSR's high-technology needs. The
Soviets will continue, however, to rely heavily on
imports of technology and equipment from the West
as well.
Other changes we expect to see include greater atten-
tion to quality control and an emphasis on reeducating
the work force. These will become increasingly impor-
tant as weapon systems incorporate more complex
devices, components, and subassemblies. Increasing
demands will be levied on the military and industry to
find, train, and retrain sufficient numbers of engi-
neers particularly knowledgeable about production
technology.
Changes in the Military
Changes in the Soviet armed forces in the 1990s will
drive-and be driven by-the changes in weapons
technology and the Soviet strategy for weapons acqui=
sition. Alterations in doctrine, force structure, logistic
organization, maintenance requirements, and man-
power use are likely to ensue.
The advent of new weaponry embodying advanced
technologies-in both Soviet and enemy forces-will
probably lead to some adjustments in Soviet military
doctrine. The Soviets will probably intensify their
efforts to develop tactical and organizational concepts
that exploit the combat effectiveness of a force com-
bining fewer but more capable new systems with large
numbers of older systems. Overall force effectiveness
will increase as the mobility, survivability, and lethal-
ity of weapons improve.
Force structure may also change in some instances to
accommodate different numbers and missions of new
weapons. In a few cases, the long-term impact of
acquiring increasingly sophisticated weapons may be
a reduction in total numbers maintained in active
inventories. Weapons also may be employed in an
entirely different fashion. For example, where large
numbers of conventional weapons were controlled at
lower command echelons, smaller numbers of more
capable weapons could be controlled by higher eche-
lons to accomplish the same missions.
Logistic support will have to be revamped to fit the
force of the future. Increasingly complex weapons
probably will require a larger support establishment
as well as changes in the traditional Soviet mainte-
nance philosophy. The weapons industry will be re-
quired to deliver considerably larger quantities of
maintenance spares to military depots, and troops
may begin to take more responsibility for diagnostic
work. For example, the use of more complex and
costly components for high-performance gas turbine
and turbofan engines-which operate at higher tem-
peratures-will compel the Soviets to increase the
skills of those who will maintain them.
The new weaponry's greater requirements for skilled
operators and maintenance crews will test the creativ-
ity of military manpower and training authorities.
The recent extension of military recruitment for some
job categories to include women is one sign that they
are aware of this problem. Requirements for longer
training times and more advanced skills could lead the
Soviets to increase the period of service for conscripts
serving in highly technical specialties.
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Finally, the higher costs of weapons will probably lead
the military to cut costs elsewhere. We have already
seen signs that the military is being asked to econo-
mize wherever possible and that it is trying to comply.
The introduction of new forms of work organization,
more careful use of supplies, and better accounting
and internal planning procedures are all designed to
cut the fat from military expenditures in the face of
growing procurement costs.
Changes in the Economy
To Increase Defense Potential
In some ways the defense industries are unique in the
Soviet economy, but many of their problems confront
the civilian sector as well. Although the defense
industrial ministries have had special status, they
have never been completely insulated from civilian
industry-an indispensable supplier of materials,
components, and subassemblies-and the lines be-
tween the two sectors have become increasingly
blurred as Soviet weapons have grown in complexity.
Despite the secrecy that shields the weapons industry
from public view, the recognition by Soviet leaders of
the increasing interdependence of the two sectors is
leading to increasing interministerial alliances.
Advancing weapon technologies have led the weapons
industry to depend increasingly on Soviet academies
of sciences and higher educational organizations for
R&D developments. Civilian organizations are em-
phasizing applied research and are undertaking sub-
stantial R&D for the military. Civilian industries are
supplying more of the materials, components, and
production equipment needed for developing and
manufacturing armaments, and defense industries are
producing more for the consumer.
In the last years of the Brezhnev era, the Soviets
began to map out a strategy to speed the moderniza-
tion of both the civilian and the defense industries.
The focus has been on a "high-technology revolution"
and a revitalization of the entire industrial base. The
leadership under Gorbachev has moved to reinforce
the place of its science and technology policy as the
linchpin of its economic strategy. Indeed, the leveling
off of procurement spending in the last half of the
1970s may at least partially reflect efforts by the
leadership to invest more heavily in the renovation of
the industrial base to meet the challenges of the
future.
A search for organizational forms more conducive to
the development of new ideas is under way-particu-
larly a search for ways to improve the movement of
the results of the research lab into the plant. Media
debates rage over the proper form of industrial orga-
nization, with suggestions ranging from greater cen-
tralization to the abolition of ministries. Experiments
in different places and on different scales abound.
The Soviets are also trying to create better incentives
for emphasizing quality over quantity. They have
recently lowered production targets for managers who
introduce new manufacturing technology into their
enterprises. Within the plant, they are experimenting
with team labor, worker involvement in norm-setting,
and other methods of encouraging personnel to feel
they have a stake in an enterprise's success. Educa-
tional reforms have been enacted to enhance the
technical background of young people about to enter
the work force. Computer education, while not yet
widespread, is receiving a great deal of leadership
attention.
Reforms are also being implemented to ensure more
comprehensive and balanced plans for the future.
Enterprises are experimenting with rolling five-year
plans (plans in which the old year is dropped and
another is added annually, rather than complete new
documents every fifth year). The national leadership
has duplicated in the science and technology area the
long-term planning used for the military. The 20-year
plan for development from 1986 to 2005 and the
Comprehensive Program for Science and Technology
to the Year 2000 of the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance-the Bloc economic organization-are in-
tended to provide Soviet science with long-range
forecasting such as has been devoted to defense for
decades.
Finally, after nearly 20 years of unprecedented stabil-
ity, the bureaucratic elite that oversees the Soviet
economy is undergoing significant change. General
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Secretary Andropov initiated the process of rejuvenat-
ing both party and government bureaucracies with
new faces, and it is continuing under Gorbachev.
Many of the new managers are better educated and
more familiar with the requirements of high technol-
ogy than their predecessors-and have been strong
public advocates of industrial efficiency and modern-
ization. Furthermore, the Soviet leadership is tapping
managers from the weapons industry to serve
throughout the economy, hoping to spread their man-
agerial talents.
Despite all the reforms under way, the Soviet defense
industries face a great many challenges in their
mission to produce enough highly advanced weapons
for the forces of the next decade. They are already
experiencing problems with several advanced systems.
Expansion in high-technology-related industries, ad-
vances in precision machining and other fabrication
technologies, and continued aggressive exploitation of
Western technology suggest that the Soviets will
overcome some of the difficulties with which they are
currently struggling. Nevertheless, the underlying
major deficiencies-particularly the lack of support
service industries, inflexible plans, bureaucratic ineffi-
ciencies, and excessive secrecy-are likely to persist.
Successful reform will depend in large part on Gorba-
chev's ability to stimulate innovation and increase
productivity throughout the economy. All indus-
tries-including the defense industries-confront
managerial inertia, weak and inconsistent incentives,
and inadequate planning. Moreover, tension between
current and future military requirements will influ-
ence the outcome.
Several factors will help the weapons industry satisfy
future military requirements. Because the West fre-
quently encounters a lag between technological ad-
vances and improvements in military capabilities,
Soviet designers often succeed in incorporating gener-
ic equivalents of Western technologies (sometimes
stolen) into their own systems as quickly as, or more
quickly than, their Western counterparts. Also, the
Soviets are likely to continue to be able to surge ahead
along a narrow front of military technologies because
their centrally planned system allows them to place
more emphasis on those areas than the West does.
Finally, where the Soviet military experiences short-
comings in weapon capabilities, it will continue to
compensate with large numbers of weapons with
complementary strategies and tactics.
In any event, the weapons industry will continue to be
a vital ingredient in Soviet military power, which has
been the primary instrument of the leadership in
achieving national security, political leverage, and
prestige throughout the world. The weapons industry
will be at the forefront of Soviet technology and
industrial prowess and will absorb a large share of the
best resources. Its leaders will continue to wield
considerable influence on Soviet policy. And-with
the combination of growing economic constraints and
the increasing potential and challenges afforded by
advancing military technology-the performance of
the weapons industry is likely to be an even greater
determinant of Soviet military power than it is today.
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