TERRORISM REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
Directorate of
MASYER ALE Cm
Review
Terrorism
1 March 1984
25X1
tltt~
i et
GI TR 84-005
1 March 1984
copy, 484
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
Secret
Terrorism
Review) 25X1
1 Perspective-Prospects for Palestinian Terrorism
OGI
5 Highlights
9 France: Developing a Policy on International Terrorism
EURA
13 Sudan: The Southern Dissident Problem Worsens
OCR
OGI
OGI
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
2bAl
25X1
25X1
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Deputy
Chief, Instability and Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues, 25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
Secret
Review
Perspective Prospects for Palestinian Terrorism
Palestinian terrorism, in the near future at least, will depend on the degree.of sup-
port or acquiescence of Arab host states. The PLO's ability to act autonomously
has all but disappeared since the 1982 Israeli incursion into Lebanon. PLO
fighters-even the putative terrorists-are now constrained by, and answerable to
their Arab hosts. Radical PLO groups and the renegade Black June Organization
(BJO) are currently relying on support from Damascus and operating in line with
overall Syrian interests. Iran and Libya are also attempting to exert some
influence on these groups. Although PLO 25X1
Chief Yasir Arafat may resort to international terrorism if his political initiatives
fail, the PLO as a whole continues to refrain from such acts. We believe that a re-
turn to international terrorism by the PLO may only become a real factor if the
survival of the PLO as an organization or Arafat's continued leadership depends
on it. 25X1
The PLO
The constituent groups of the PLO continued to adhere to Arafat's decade-long
ban on international terrorism last year, although they carried out terrorist attacks
against Jewish interests both in Israel and the occupied territories. Arafat's
conviction that PLO involvement in international terrorism would undermine
political efforts to establish a Palestinian homeland prevailed at the meeting of the
Palestinian National Council in February 1983 against contrary views expressed
by the leaders of most other PLO groups (specifically the PFLP, DFLP, PFLP-
GC, PSF, and as-Sa'iqa).
The Fatah mutiny in the spring of 1983 resulted in a de facto split within the PLO,
with many of the extremists from other PLO groups aligning themselves with the
dissidents. Though the larger radical PLO groups like the PFLP and the DFLP
have publicly declared their support for Arafat, this support is tenuous, F 25X1
indicating that their leaders have been 25X1
considering setting up a rival organization to the PLO. 25X1
Though Arafat has not thus far agreed to a resumption of international terrorist
attacks, he would probably do so if he felt that the survival of the PLOas an orga-
nization or his continuation as its leader was contingent on it. In the meantime,
however, Arafat has been taking steps to isolate hardline rejectionists in order to
keep them from impeding his political maneuvers.
1 Secret
GI TR 84-005
1 March 1984
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
Renegade Palestinian Groups
Abu Nidal's Black June Organization was the most active Palestinian terrorist
group last year. In addition to assassinating PLO moderate Issam Sartawi in
Portugal and attacking Jordanian officials and facilities in Amman, India, Greece,
Italy, and Spain, the group also claimed credit for an explosion aboard a Gulf Air
carrier in Abu Dhabi.'
Until last fall, Abu Nidal and some of his group lived in Baghdad, while the rest of
the group lived in-and operated from-Damascus. Then the Iraqi Government
discontinued all aid to the group and expelled its remnants from the country,
forcing them to depend solely on Syria for both material support and a safehaven.
This situation is undoubtedly uncomfortable for Abu Nidal, who has maintained
operational independence in the past by obtaining support from rival patrons. He
has therefore been shopping around for ways to offset the group's dependence on
Syrian aid. Abu- Nidal has had some success extorting
Since moving to Syria, BJO members have had increasing contact with the Iranian
Government through the Iranian Ambassador in Damascus. Possibly as a means of
soliciting or earning Iranian support, the BJO attempted to mount a number of op-
erations against US interests in the Middle East last fall (none of them successful),
including the planting of a car bomb near the US Embassy in Amman.
the BJO may now be cooperating with
both Basque separatists and elements of the PFLP-GC in planning attacks against
US military bases in Spain. We have not seen any corroborated evidence yet that
Iran has agreed to support the group; we doubt the Iranian Government either
needs or wants to get seriously involved with a secular group like Abu Nidal's~
Black June has increased its operational capability over the past year through its
contacts with radical PLO groups, especially the PFLP-GC. These contacts were
probably encouraged and brokered by Syria the
BJO has also cooperated with the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Ar-
menia (ASALA) in terrorist attacks in the Middle East.
Abu Nidal ardently rejects any negotiated Palestinian peace settlement and is
likely to continue targeting any players who are involved in or support such
negotiations. We have no reason to expect any near-term change in either the
nature of the targeting or the frequency of the terrorist attacks by the Abu Nidal
Group. Its current posture and activities are consistent with the views and goals
both of its own leaders and of its patrons, most notably the Syrians.
' Credit for some of the attacks that we believe were carried out by the Abu Nidal Group was claimed
by the previously unknown Revolutionary Brigades or Arab Revolutionary Movement. This may be the
latest name adooted idal Group, which has changed its name several times in the past.
Secret 2
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
Secret
The Iraqi-based 15 May Organization, which carried out a bombing campaign
against Pan American carriers in 1982, was relatively quiet in 1983. Western and
moderate Arab pressure on Iraq to stop its support for international terrorism
probably resulted in Saddam Husayn forbidding the group to continue targeting
US interests.
State-Supported Terrorism
The dispersal of the Palestinians that began in 1982 and the present de facto split
within the PLO has resulted in radical states like Syria, Iran, and Libya wielding
increased influence not only over the radical elements in the PLO but over the
PLO as a whole. Syria, for example, has traditionally used both as-Sa'iqa and the
PFLP-GC to maintain a voice in the PLO. Since the Palestinian withdrawal from
Beirut and the Fatah rebellion in the Bekaa, Syrian influence over other elements
has grown as well.
25X1
25X1
Syria has increased the terrorist capabilities of radical Palestinians by promoting
collaboration between radical PLO groups, such as the PFLP-GC and as-Sa'iqa,
and the non-PLO Black June Organization. 25X1
it was at Syrian behest that a group of BJO terrorists, carrying 25X1
PFLP-GC identification cards, entered the Bekaa in April 1983 to assassinate
moderate PLO leaders. Furthermore, we believe it is no coincidence that Black
June's current terrorist campaign against Jordanian interests, which Abu Nidal
has asserted is being carried out because of Amman's refusal to release imprisoned
BJO members, is also serving Assad's desire to discourage Jordan from playing a
role in any Palestinian settlement. 25X1
Syria has also helped Iran to play a bigger role in the Palestinian arena. Iran
shares Syria's desire to counteract Western influence in Lebanon and prevent the
establishment there of a government friendly to Israel. Damascus, therefore,
allows the presence of Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Syrian-controlled areas of
The PLO radicals have been accepting financial and material aid from Libya, but
Libya's attempts over the past year to get them to form an independent, anti-Ara-
fat bloc have not met with success. Among the probable reasons for this are the
relatively low opinion the Palestinians have of the mercurial and unreliable
Qadhafi, and the fact that, unlike Syria, Libya does not control territory from
which the Palestinians want to operate against Israel.
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
Secret
Highlights
Kuwait: Continuing Threat From Daiwa.
indicate a continuing danger to Kuwaiti officials and their families, as the trial of
the suspects in the bombing in December progresses slowly.
probably also face an increased threat from this group' as it tries to disrupt the
trial.
France: Concern for Troops and Diplomats in Lebanon. With the withdrawal of
the other Multinational Force contingents from Beirut, the French are concerned
about the danger of terrorists concentrating on French interests. Security meas-
ures have been beefed up in Lebanon and at French embassies throughout the
Middle East. We believe the French do face increased danger from pro-Iranian
terrorists; on 22 February one French soldier was killed and two wounded when
three mortar rounds struck a French MNF position in Beirut. Terrorist elements
may have been responsible
Secret
GI TR 84-005
1 March 1984
25X1
25X1
25X1
LZDAI
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
International: Establishment of PFLP Cells.
the radical Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) is being
reorganized to provide for a greater emphasis on "military operations." PFLP
leader, George Habbash, has reportedly ordered PFLP cells-possibly to be
responsible for these operations-to be established within existing PLO offices in
the United States, Bulgaria, Jordan, and Spain.
Significant Developments Colombia: ELN Plans Government Destabilization. A National Liberation Army
(ELN) document reportedly captured during the January raid on an ELN people's
jail details the group's strategy for destabilizing the Colombian Government.
According to the plan, the ELN hopes to challenge the political and military
strength of the 19th of April Movement (M-19) and the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) by late 1985 or early 1986. The document also
mentions plans to assassinate government officials. It is highly unlikely that the
ELN will be able to put its strategy into effect, but the existence of the plan does
much to explain the recent increase in ELN activites.
Brazil: Montonero Leader Arrested. On 13 February Brazilian authorities arrest-
ed the leader of Argentina's Montonero terrorist organization, Mario Firmenich.
Argentina has requested his extradition, underscoring President Alfonsin's prom-
ise to bring justice to both leftist guerrillas and senior military officers responsible
for the violence during the 1970's counterinsurgency campaign. Firmenich has a
Brazilian son-an issue that might hamper the extradition process
France: Iparretarrak Increases Activity. After announcing to French authorities a
"toughening" of its stance, the French Basque Nationalist Movement Iparretarak
has claimed-credit for the attempted derailment of a Paris-Madrid train-carrying
110 passengers-on 18 February. Even though the group claims to have given
advanced warning of the attack, the attempted sabotage represents a radicaliza-
tion of the group, which has previously said it would not attack civilians. Its
previous actions have been minor bombings-aimed at causing property damage-
and bank robberies.
Italy: Assassination of MFO Director General Leamon R. Hunt. The Red
Brigades for the Combatant Communist Party have claimed responsibility for the
15 February assassination in Rome of Leamon R. Hunt, US civilian head of the
Multinational Force and Observers, the Rome-based peacekeeping force for the
Sinai Desert. The previously unknown "Armed Lebanese Revolutionary Brigades"
claimed responsibility in Beirut, underscoring the possibility of Middle Eastern
2.5X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
Secret
France:
Developing a Policy
on International Terrorism
France has traditionally been tolerant of the activities
of political exiles based on French soil, even when'
these activities have included involvement in interna-
tional terrorism. The reasons for this high level of
tolerance range from the idealistic to the egoistic.
France's own tradition of revolutionary democracy
has inclined most Frenchmen to be sympathetic to
those who profess the same ideals, particularly when
they have been perceived as the victims of political
oppression. On a less idealistic plane, the French
appear to have calculated that their willingness to
offer asylum to political exiles of all stripes would
shield France itself from terrorist attacks
Until recent years, French assumptions had seemed
justified. France had been only infrequently a victim
of international terrorist violence. This relative immu-
nity permitted France to avoid the necessity of devel-
oping stringent and clearcut policies regarding inter-
national terrorism.
France's equivocal positions have occasionally put.it
at odds with its neighbors. While denying that they
harbor terrorists, the French have seldom drawn a.
distinction between terrorist actions and "political"
actions. In addition, France has traditionally refused
to extradite accused terrorists unless they have com-
mitted a crime in France.
Tradition and the Socialist Position
Francois Mitterrand's Socialist government has been
very sensitive to the French traditions of civil liberties
and political asylum. During his campaign, Mitter-
rand promised to strengthen French civil liberties and
to extend the full benefits of French laws to resident
foreigners.
Mitterrand followed through in the early months of
his term. Among other initiatives, his government
ended the death penalty, abolished a special state
security court, and restricted the power of the police
to make spot identity checks. The government hoped'
these steps would defuse political tensions and lead to
a decrease in terrorist incidents in France.
Unfortunately, the reforms were followed by new
levels of violence. According to press reports, in the
first five months of. 1982, 21 terrorist. attacks in
France killed 15 people and injured more than 100.
Mitterrand's Response.
As a result, Mitterrand came under public pressure to
deal with the problem. In response, in 1982 Mitter-. 25X1
rand announced the creation of a secretary of state for
public security, tighter, border controls, centralized
computer information centers, more careful security
of diplomatic baggage, and an increase in antiterrorist
security forces. Mitterrand wanted to rely on adminis-
trative measures and tighter enforcement rather-than
risk pushing for politically sensitive legal reforms: 25X1
25X1
The general outlines of French policy remained un-
changed, and these steps were not enough to enable
the government to master. the threat of terrorism. -In
fact, policy toward terrorism. has taken on an increas-
ingly reactive character. Situations involving Basque
and Armenian terrorists in particular have severely 25X1
tested Mitterrand's policies.
The Basque Problem
France's traditional position on Basque terrorism has
been that the problem is a Spanish one. The French
have been reluctant to admit that'Spanish Basques
taking refuge in southern France would use French
bases to launch attacks in Spain. Spanish pressure on 25X1
the French yielded little or no'response. According to
Secret
GI TR 84-005
1 March 1984
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
the US Embassy in Paris, part of the French reluc-
tance to crack down on Spanish Basques stemmed
from fear that this could lead to a rise in French
Basque terrorism.'
According to the US Embassy in Paris, the Mitter-
rand government's moderate changes in its policy on
Basque terrorism during January 1984-including
stepped-up arrests and increased cooperation with the
Spanish Government-were made for four reasons:
? The arrival of a Socialist government in Spain and
an evolution of Spanish policy away from traditional
rightwing connections and human rights abuses.
? Prime Minister Gonzalez's strong pressure on Mit-
terrand and the desire of Mitterrand to help Gonza-
lez deal with a major threat to democracy in Spain.
? A desire to end attacks on French soil on suspect
Basque terrorists by a shadowy organization be-
lieved connected with the Spanish police.
? The successful Spanish effort to convince Panama
to accept some Basques expelled from France. This
achievement permitted the French to avoid at least
technically a violation of the tradition of political
asylum.
further arrests and expulsions to Latin
America are possible, but general French policy on
extradition will remain unchanged.
The Mitterrand government has apparently tried to
mark a course of action which will avoid completely
antagonizing either the Spanish Government or the
exile Basque community in France. As a result, it
risks satisfying neither group. For the moment, how-
ever, Madrid probably is pleased by any indication
that Paris is prepared to take a harder line with
Basque terrorists
The Armenian Problem
The French have been more unwilling to deal with the
Armenian group ASALA. This is an issue with strong
domestic political overtones because of widespread
French sympathy for the Armenians. France has
publicly recognized the historic grievances of the
Armenians against Turkey, in particular their charges
of Turkish responsibility for a genocidal massacre of
Armenians in 1915. The Mitterrand government is
therefore unwilling to take strong action against
ASALA and risk upsetting the large Armenian com-
munity and the influential number of pro-Armenian
sympathizers in France. Because of this reluctance,
the Mitterrand government finds itself at odds with
the Turkish Government.
Turkey and various pro-Turkish groups have repeat-
edly accused France of making a special deal with the
Armenians. According to the US Embassy in Paris, in
January Turkish officials in France stated their belief
that the French arranged to condemn the genocide
officially in return for an Armenian agreement not to
commit terrorist acts in France.
Relations between the governments of France and
Turkey have grown even more tense in recent months
as a result of the recent trial and conviction in France
of four ASALA members for the 1981 takeover of the
Turkish Consulate General in Paris in which one
Turkish official was killed, one wounded, and the rest
of the staff held hostage for 15 hours under threat of
death. The four were sentenced to seven years-a
sentence the Turkish Government feels is too light.
The Turkish press asserted that-the French Govern-
ment rejected statements from the Turkish MFA
criticizing the trial and sentences and claiming that
France had failed to carry out its duty in the struggle
against terrorism
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
Secret
Recent French willingness to cooperate with Spain on
Basque terrorism may raise Turkish expectations for
cooperation on the Armenian issue. This belief could
perversely add to the strain between the two govern-
ments.
Meanwhile, Mitterrand also seems unable to please
the Armenians with his policy on this issue. In a
French press interview in late November, Monte
Melkonian, a spokesman for the ASALA Revolution-
ary Movement splinter group, warned that there is no
reason that France would be exempt from terrorist
attacks. According to Melkonian, everything depends
on changing French policy toward Turkey.
Outlook
Mitterrand's attempts to appease both foreign exile
communities and governments have failed to satisfy
either group. It remains to be seen whether the
French public feels Mitterrand's policies are an ade-
quate solution to the problem. We believe that terror-
ist groups will continue their activities, thus eventual-
ly forcing him to consider tougher positions on
terrorism.
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
Secret
Sudan: The Southern Dissident
Problem Worsens[ 7
The southern Sudanese dissidents are displaying in-
creasing strength and effectiveness in their battle
against the Nimeiri government. Terrorist attacks and
kidnapings by the dissidents in recent months have
forced foreign firms engaged in key development
projects in southern Sudan to suspend operations. If
the dissidents continue their successful hit-and-run
tactics, their prospects for prolonging the insurgency
and thus perhaps winning concessions from the gov-
ernment are good.
During November 1983 dissidents kidnaped two em-
ployees of Chevron Oil and took hostage nine employ-
ees of Companie de Construction International
(CCI)-the French company responsible for the con-
struction of the Jonglei Canal, which is designed to
remove water from the marshy south and increase the
Nile's flow to the north and Egypt. As a consequence
CCI suspended work on the canal. In February 1984
southern dissidents launched four attacks against the
same companies. On 2 February Chevron's Rub Kona
camp was attacked; three third-country nationals
were killed and seven wounded-including one Amer-
ican-causing Chevron to join CCI in suspending
operations. On 6 February a CCI truck hit a mine,
killing an undetermined number of people, and on 10
February the dissidents killed one CCI employee and
took six hostage. In the worst attack, a CCI-owned
steamer evacuating people from southern Sudan was
hit by rebels-possibly as a target of opportunity-
on 14 February, reportedly killing hundreds of
passengers.
The southern dissidents have several areas of dis-
agreement with the Nimeiri government. The rebels
view Chevron's oil exploration and the Jonglei Canal
project as exploiting southern resources to line north-
ern pockets. In a letter to the western companies one
of the dissident groups-the Sudanese People's Liber-
ation Movement (SPLM)-requested these companies
stop operations, withdraw their staffs, and refrain
from any dealings with the Sudanese Government. In
addition, most southerners view. President Nimeiri's
decision last spring to divide the semiautonomous
southern region into three provinces as an abrogation
of the 1972 Addis Ababa Accords-which ended the
17-year civil war by granting the south special region-
al status. Moreover, the Christian/animist south re-
acted strongly against Nimeiri's imposition on the
entire country of Sharia (Islamic) law in September,
believing it to be a challenge to its regional and
cultural identity. Col. John.Garang, the most promi-
nent rebel leader, has claimed that the rebels will end
their terrorist activities if the government agrees to
restore special status to the south, drop Sharia law,
and cancel the Sudanese-Egyptian integration agree-
ment concluded in October 1982, which they fear will
result in economic exploitation by Egypt.
The government identifies the southern dissidents by
the generic term Anya Nya II (Anya Nya was the
name used by the rebels in the civil war). The
Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), the
armed wing of the SPLM, has only claimed responsi-
bility for the attacks on the CCI camps; we are not
sure it is responsible for all the recent terrorism.
Garang, a dissident in the civil war who subsequently
served in the Sudanese armed forces, appears to have
a major leadership role in both the SPLM and the
SPLA. 1arang
has approximately 3,000 followers in Gamela, Ethio-
pia. Another rebel leader, Samuel Gaitut, has about
2,000 followers scattered throughout the Bahr El
Ghazal and upper Nile provinces of Sudan. There
may also be other bands not part of the SPLM or
Gaitut's following who are operating inde endently in
the south. the dissi-
dents, largely deserters from the regular military, are
reasonably well trained, disciplined, and equipped. In
addition to the weapons they took with them when
Secret
GI TR 84-005
1 March 1984
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
they deserted, they probably are receiving weapons
and ammunition from Libya and are permitted to
operate from bases in Ethiopia. The dissidents have
shown themselves capable of protracted military oper-
ations, possess and are familiar with heavy mortars
and landmines, and are capable of sustained and
accurate antiaircraft machinegun fire. The dissidents
are probably not Communists or pro-Marxists even
though the government tries to paint them as such._
some Sudanese
officials believe that the Sudanese People's Armed
Forces (SPAF) cannot prevent dissident terrorist acts.
The SPAF is poorly trained, lacks sufficient equip-
ment and spare parts, and suffers from poor morale.
As evidenced by the failure of the personnel at the
army camp near the CCI compound to protect that
company's employees, the SPAF appears unable to
provide essential security.
Thus far the rebels have been highly successful in
attacking key economic targets and forcing both
Chevron and CCI to suspend their operations. If the
dissidents continue their successful hit-and-run tac-
tics, their prospects for prolonging the insurgency are
good. Nimeiri will have further problems if the rebels
decide to extend terrorism to the northern cities,
bringing the southern problem to the northerners'
doorstep and possibly forcing them, through destabli-
zation and fear, to make concessions
Nimeiri may have to accept the fact that a military
solution is not feasible. Egypt is reluctant to support a
military campaign in the south and even rapproche-
ment with Ethiopia might not guarantee that any aid
to the dissidents would be cut off. Nimeiri, however,
has shown little enthusiasm for pursuing a political
settlement. Any attempt at a settlement would have to
address such key southern concerns as a unified
regional government, the removal of corrupt southern
governors, increased social services, cancellation of
Sharia law, and a guaranteed portion of profits from
development projects assigned to the south.
Some southern politicians have expressed optimism
that an agreement is still possible because the dissi-
dents' demands that Khartoum improve conditions in
the south are still moderate. Moreover, Nimeiri still is
widely perceived as the only northern leader with the
stature to resolve north-south problems. If, however,
the dissidents' military and terrorist operations con-
tinue to take a heavy toll, the rebels could decide to
escalate their demands possibly including calls for
secession or Nimeiri's removal. Nimeiri is a survivor
who has repeatedly demonstrated his political skills,
but the economic and political concessions that he
could make to the southerners, given Sudan's econom-
ic situation, are probably insufficient to end their
resistance to northern domination.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
Secret
The Hakim Brothers:
Leaders of the
Da'wa Party of Iraq
The Da'wa Party of Iraq, the country's largest Shia
dissident group, is funded principally by Iran and
advocates the violent overthrow of the Ba'thist regime
of President Saddam Husayn. The party may also be
cooperating with Tehran's campaign against the Unit-
ed States and against the moderate Arab states who
are Iraq's chief financial backers.
he Da'wa is led by the three
Hakim brothers: Mahdi `Abd al-Muhsin, Muhammad
Baqr, and `Abd al-'Aziz. Scions of a respected reli-
gious family with a long history of opposition to Iraqi
governments (their father, the late Ayatollah Mushin
al-Hakim, founded Da'wa's predecessor, the Fatima
Society, in the early 1960s), the Hakims claim they
are not Da'wa members, although each leads a wing
of the party. During the past two years the group has
been responsible for bomb attacks in Baghdad against
a radio and television station, Iraqi Air Force Head-
quarters, the Ministry of Planning, and the Iraqi
News Agency, and it has carried out several assassi-
nation attempts against senior Iraqi Government offi-
cials. The 13 Iraqis accused of bombing the US
Embassy in Kuwait in December 1983 are also mem-
bers of the Da'wa Party
The primary goal of the Hakim brothers is to over-
throw Saddam Husayn, and to achieve that aim they
have moved beyond their involvement with Da'wa to
participate in other antiregime organizations. All
three are members of the Supreme Council of the
Islamic Revolution in Iraq, a group based and funded
in Tehran.
lat least the two elder
Hakims-Mahdi an Muhammad-differ ideologi-
cally and hold disparate views on what the political
framework should be for a future government in Iraq.
Those differences are reflected in each brother's
affiliation with other groups and in the activities they
carry out. Despite their differences, the brothers
maintain contact with each other and closely coordi-
nate their individual Da'wa responsibilities.
25X1
25X1
The middle brother, Muhammad (who is probably in
his late thirties), resides in Tehran. We believe that he 25X1
has the most influence and power within the Da'wa.
most of the 25X1
Iranian funding for the party goes directly to Muham-
mad, thus increasing his power within the movement
and Iran's influence over the Da'wa. In addition to
being the contact point between the Iranian Govern-
ment and the Da'wa, Muhammad is the party's
principal spokesman and leader of Iraqi exiles in Iran.
he is the leader of the 25X1
Iraqi pposition League of Religious Scholars and of
the Iraqi Revolutionary Council, organizations com- 25X1
posed of exiled Iraqi religious figures who plan to 25X1
overthrow Saddam Husayn. 7_X1
with `Abd al-'Aziz he heads the 25X1
Islamic Iraqi army, which recruits volunteers from
the ranks of Iraqi prisoners of war and deserters to
fight with Iranian forces against the Ba'thist regime.
Secret
GI TR 84-005
1 March 1984
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
A hojat-ol-Eslam (one rank below an ayatollah), Mu-
hammad is greatly influenced by the fundamentalist
doctrine of Iran's Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. He
has said he believes that the Iraqi people desire an
Iranian-style religious state and has dedicated himself
to leading an Islamic revolution in his own country.
Khomeini
chose Muhammad to head an Iraqi Islamic republic
should Iran defeat Iraq in the ongoing war between
the two nations.
lideological differences have
developed between Muhammad and Khomeini, result-
ing in a decrease of Iranian support for the Da'wa.
We have seen no evidence to date, however, that
Muhammad's prominence in the Da'wa has been
seriously eroded.
The eldest brother, Mahdi (who is about 40), is based
in London. From that city he directs the secular wing
of the party, which is composed of nonleftist Iraqis
living in the West. We believe he also acts as Da'wa's
liaison with non-Shia opposition groups inside and
outside Iraq. He is committed to the establishment of
a freely elected secular government
Mahdi believes that the
Iraqi populace would not support an Islamic state. He
is convinced that a successful post-Ba'thist govern-
ment would have to include Iraq's various religious
and ethnic factions. Mahdi publishes antigovernment
propaganda and solicits funds for Da'wa activities. He
serves as the party's liaison with the Governments of
Libya and Syria and obtains aid from those countries.
in the 1960s Mahdi worked with Savak, the Shah's
security organization, and that in the early 1970s he
received a stipend from the Shah. We believe he
endorses a coalition of all opposition groups against
Saddam Husayn. F_ I
Mahdi's political orientation alienates him from the
Iranians-Da'wa's major benefactors-and his opera-
tion in London is too far from Iraq to allow him to
have much access to Da'wa's power base or to be the
party's paramount actor. Although he is unhappy with
the extremism of the Khomeini government
he has refrained from public-
ly criticizing the ayatollah because he does not want
to jeopardize the assistance both he and Muhammad
get from Khomeini.
Abd al-'Aziz, who is about 27, dominates Da'wa's
terrorist activities. As leader of the Mujahedin, the
military wing of the movement, he moves freely inside
Iran and northern Iraq. As mentioned above, he is
also coleader with Muhammad of the Islamic Iraqi
Army. he has an excellent
understanding of guerrilla tactics and plans the many
acts of terrorism that the Mujahedin execute in Iraq.
he also works closely with
`Abd al-'Aziz does not ap ear to influence the move-
ment's political direction.
in his brothers' ideological disagreements he sides
with neither. Nor does he, as far as we can discern,
espouse an ideology of his own. He is loyal to both
Mahdi and Muhammad and closely coordinates his
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
. Secret
Special Feature-
Iran: Spreading
Islam and Terrorism
Increasing Iranian Terrorist Activities
Prior to participating in an aborted coup attempt
against the Bahraini Government in December 1981,
the regime in Tehran was preoccupied with its own
internal power struggle and the war with Iraq. Aside
from the seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran in
1979, Iran is believed to have been involved in at least
three terrorist incidents during the period between the
1979 revolution and December 1981.
The past two years have seen a dramatic rise in
Iranian involvement with international terrorist vio-
lence. During the period, Iranian operatives have
gained considerable experience in organizing support
elements and in planning and carrying out terrorist
operations in foreign countries. As a result, Tehran
has become bolder in striking out at perceived ene-
mies of Islam, and the regime has broadened the
range of its terrorist operations.
Motivations. Iran's ruling clerics believe it is their
religious duty to foster the creation of Islamic govern-
ments along Iranian lines. This has been the principal
motivation for Iranian support of Iraqi Shiites and
Persian Gulf Islamic liberation groups. With this in
mind, Tehran has also seized the opportunity provided
by sectarian strife in Lebanon to support fundamen-
talist Shiites there. Because Tehran perceives the US,
Israeli, Lebanese, and moderate Arab governments as
obstacles to the achievement of Tehran's objective,
Iranian and pro-Iranian terrorists have targeted the
interests of these states. Tehran's terrorist activities
also are designed to protect Iran's own revolution, as
indicated by attacks against Iraq and France, Bagh-
dad's chief Western arms supplier and financial sup-
porter.
Terrorist Capabilities and Assets
In many cases, Iran draws upon the resources of its
own Revolutionary Guard either to carry out terrorist
operations or to plan for and equip foreign surrogates
to act on its behalf. Elements of the Foreign Ministry
also support these activities and, at least in some
countries, control terrorist operations directly:
? The Iranian Embassies in Paris and Vienna and the
Consulate in Karachi appear to be important cen-
ters for this activity.
Islamic Association (ISIA). carried out a coordinated
series of attacks against French targets in Karachi
and Lahore in February 1983. This operation was
carried out under the direction of the Iranian
Consul General in Karachi, who was subsequently
expelled from the country.
Secret
GI TR 84-005
1 March 1984
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
Tehran also has at its disposal a number of surrogate
groups that can conduct terrorist activities. Some of
these groups-such as the smaller Islamic revolution-
ary groups in the Persian Gulf-owe their creation
and existence to Tehran, while others-such as the
Iraqi Da'wa Party-predate the Iranian revolution
but have come to depend heavily on Tehran for
financing and training. In addition to enhancing
Iran's operational capabilities, these surrogates permit
Tehran to create the perception that an increasing
number of independent, international Islamic funda-
mentalist organizations are at work against US,
Western, and moderate Arab interests. In some cases,
operations are carried out by Iranian agents and
subsequently claimed by surrogate groups; in other
instances, operations are carried out by Iranian opera-
tives or various surrogates and claimed using a com-
mon nom de guerre:
? While Iranians were involved in the anti-French
bombings in Pakistan-and probably in a December
1982 bombing of the Iraqi Consulate in Bangkok
and the 11 August 1982 bombing of the Iraqi
Embassy in Paris-pro-Iranian Iraqi Shiite dissi-
dents claimed credit.
? Similarly, the name "Islamic Jihad" has been used
to take credit for a number of terrorist threats and
actions by groups of differing nationalities, includ-
ing the MNF bombings in Beirut on 23 October and
the bombings in Kuwait on 12 December.
To date we have found no reliable information to
indicate that Islamic Jihad is a distinct, organized
terrorist group. We believe it almost certain that it is
only a cover used for Iranian-inspired or directly
controlled operations, whether employing locally re-
cruited agents such as Shias in Lebanon or Iraqi
Da'wa Party activists, as was the case in Kuwait.
With time, however, Tehran could change the present
character of "Islamic Jihad" from a loose association
of largely independent, irregularly organized Shiite
factions into a more formalized, international organi-
zation with an enhanced ability to coordinate and
expand radical Islamic terrorist activities.'
Terrorist Targets
Lebanon. During the past year and a half, most
Iranian terrorist activity has been concentrated in
Lebanon. Islamic Amal, the radical Shia group head-
ed by Husayn al Musawi, has received both material
and financial support from Tehran via Damascus and
has developed links to Shia elements in the southern
Beirut suburbs by providing both funds and training.
Clearly backed by the Iranians, Musawi and his
radical Amal of Islam are seen by many Lebanese as
the vanguard of an.Iranian-influenced revolutionary
movement.
During the past year there have been many instances
of Shia-inspired violence in Lebanon. Presumably,
several Shia clans have participated in that violence,
but the extremist Amal of Islam-and a possible
subgroup called the Husayn Suicide Commandos-
has been linked to the 23
October bombing attacks on US and French Multina-
tional Force (MNF) components.
Iraq. Members of the Shiite opposition in Iraq serve
Iranian interests through attacks against the Baghdad
regime. According to public confessions, they have
been responsible for a number of bloody bombings of
Iraqi and French targets:
? The 1 August 1982 bombing of the Iraqi Ministry
of Planning in Baghdad.
? The 16 December 1982 bombing of the Iraqi News
Agency in which seven died.
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
Secret
? The 5 March 1983 bombing of an Air France office
in Baghdad that killed one employee.
? The car bombings of the Iraqi television and radio-
broadcasting complex and the Iraqi Air Force
Headquarters on 21 April that reportedly killed two
busloads of children and at least 29 other individ-
uals.
The factionalized, Shia-based Iraqi Da'wa Party-led
by the al Hakim brothers, Muhammad Baqr, Mahdi,
and `Abd al `Aziz-probably is the most credible
long- term terrorist threat to the Baghdad regime.
Iran is most closely aligned to the faction headed by
Muhammad Baqr al Hakim. His faction is headquar-
tered in Tehran and is probably the group that has
carried out the bombing attacks in the name of the
Iraqi Mujahedin Movement. A more secularly orient-
ed faction headquartered in London is led by Mahdi
al Hakim, who has made an attempt to lessen depen-
dence on Tehran by seeking support from Syrian,
Libyan, and wealthy Iraqi exiles.
Persian Gulf. Tehran has made extensive prepara-
tions for subversive/ terrorist activities in the Persian
Gulf. Iran has trained and equipped Islamic funda-
mentalist groups from several countries, including
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Kuwait. Although
only a few of these groups have more than several
dozen members, they all provide Tehran an increas-
ingly more capable terrorist pool to use against the
Gulf states:
Iranian Revolution-
ary Guards run special training camps near Tehran
and Isfahan. Training activities reportedly include
ideological/ religious instruction as well as paramili-
tary/terrorist instruction in the use of small arms
and explosives and the techniques of economic
sabotage and assassination.
More recently, Iran has used these surrogates to strike
at a number of its enemies in Kuwait. On 12 Decem-
ber 1983 powerful car bombs exploded at a number of
US, French, and civilian Kuwaiti installations in
Kuwait. The US Embassy was seriously damaged by
an explosives-laden truck, which crashed through the
main gate and detonated in the Embassy compound.
We believe that the selection of targets and informa-
tion, which surfaced subsequent to the attacks, leave
little doubt of Iranian involvement at the highest
levels:
? Kuwaiti authorities reportedly have established that
the explosives used in the bombings were smuggled
(along with a quantity of weapons) into Kuwait from 25X1
Iran via Qatar some two months before the bomb-
ings.
? The truckdriver killed in the attack on the US
Embassy was a member of the Iraqi Da'wa Party.
He owned most, if not all, of the vehicles used for
Exiles. Tehran's concern regarding the activities of
exiled opposition groups apparently has prompted
planning for terrorist attacks against dissidents livin
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Iranian officials 25X1
have provided financial support to and encouraged 25X1
mob violence by pro-Khomeini activists against dissi-
dent student groups. The best documented case oc-
curred in April 1982 at Mainz University in West
Germany when a group of anti-Khomeini Iranian
demonstrators was attacked by a large group of pro-
Khomeini counterdemonstrators. One death, several
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
continued to be a serious problem
incidents between pro- and anti-
Khomeini students continued in 1983; in both Novem-
ber and December in Giessen, West Germany, stu-
dent clashes resulted in further arrests and injuries.
Iran also has
prepared for and succeeded in assassinating exiled
opposition leaders and individuals associated with the
former imperial government.
the murder of the
late Shah's nephew in 1979 and an unsuccessful
attempt against former Prime Minister Bakhtiar in
1980 were the work of Iranian agents. The assassina-
tion of General Oveisi in January 1984 in Paris
almost certainly was the work of Iranian agents.
We believe that Iranian attempts to eliminate dissi-
dents are likely to continue to be centered in France.
Since the overthrow of the imperial regime in Iran,
France has become a mecca for dissidents opposed to
the present Islamic government. In addition, a large
expatriate Iranian population in France provides a
cover from which Iranian agents can operate. French
authorities believe that the Iranian Government has
developed a large, elaborate structure in France to
keep watch on active dissidents and to support opera-
tions against them.
International Terrorist Cooperation
Over the past two years, Iran has cooperated to
varying degrees with other Middle Eastern govern-
ments and groups with which it shares a similar
political outlook or willingness to use terrorism to
promote common objectives. The cooperation has
occurred in the areas of financing, material support,
and training. In recent months, cooperation with
Syria and radical Palestinian terrorist groups has
increased significantly.
Syria. Because Iran shares Syria's desire to counter-
act Western influence in Lebanon and prevent the
establishment there of a government friendly to Isra-
el, Damascus condones the presence in Syria of
Iranian Revolutionary Guards and their paramilitary
and propaganda activities in Syrian-controlled areas
of Lebanon. Only through Syrian sufferance do per-
haps 700 Iranian Revolutionary Guards, centered in
the Baalabaak area of the Bekaa Valley, direct the
activities of extremist groups such as Islamic Amal (a
splinter faction of Amal, the main Lebanese Shiite
group) and the obscure Hezbollah, the Party of God.
Information suggests that some tensions have sur-
faced between the Syrian and Iranian Governments
over Iranian terrorist activities in Lebanon. Damascus
appears increasingly concerned that Iran's radically
violent activities may involve Syria in a war with the
United States or Israel not of its own choosing:
in early
January 1984 Damascus imposed stricter visa con-
trols over Iranian personnel entering Syria out of
concern for their activities in Syria and Lebanon.
This development leads us to conclude that Syria is
not aware in advance of every terrorist incident
sponsored by Iran in Lebanon. In addition, while
Damascus generally has been content to allow Iran to
act as the front in these violent activities, this acquies-
cence appears conditioned upon Iranian activities
continuing to serve Syria's objective of forcing an
MNF withdrawal from Beirut. The secular Ba'thist
regime in Damascus has no desire to see the establish-
ment of an Islamic fundamentalist regime in Leba-
non. The failure of Syrian air defense to respond to
Israeli and French air attacks on Iranian training
camps in the Bekaa Valley may indicate the extent of
Damascus's support for Iran and the radical Islamic
groups
Damascus and Tehran also have cooperated in other
terrorist fields. Because of their common hatred for
Iraq's Saddam Husayn, Syria and Iran are cooperat-
ing against Iraq. Damascus allows Iraqi Shiite opposi-
tionists-elements of which have carried out numer-
ous car bombings in Baghdad-to maintain offices
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
Secret
I Irani-
an-backedBahraini dissidents also have office facili-
ties in Damascus, and, on at least one occasion,
members of the group were given refuge in Syria
following their explusion from another country. (In
mid-October 1983, Bahraini Shias arrested in Vienna
were put aboard a flight to Syria.)
Prospects
Because many of the high-ranking Iranian officials
involved in terrorism believe that using violence as a
tool to spread their fundamentalist version of Islam is
morally right, it will be difficult to dissuade Tehran
from engaging in terrorist activities. Iranian leaders
have applauded publicly, while denying actual in-
volvement in, the recent terrorist operations directed
against US and French interests in the Middle East,
characterizing them as the inevitable consequences of
opposition to Islam
The attraction of Lebanon as a locus of Iranian
terrorism will not diminish. Iran remains committed
to the establishment of an Iranian-style Islamic state
there, or at least of a system in which Tehran would
have great influence over religious activities. While
the character of future Iranian involvement in Leba-
non will hinge upon the continued acquiescence of
Syria, Tehran maintains and will continue to
strengthen surrogate assets to use in attacks against a
variety of domestic and foreign targets.
A second major arena for Iranian operations will be
Iraq. In its war against the regime in Baghdad,
Tehran continues to train, finance, and equip religious
opponents of the Iraqi regime and will continue to
support terrorist attacks by these groups. Occasional-
ly, Tehran also may utilize its own assets to carry out
attacks against Iraqi interests located in third coun-
tries, attacks such as those it has already conducted in
India and France; the responsibility for such attacks
would most likely be claimed by the Iraqi Shiite
opposition.
The Persian Gulf and the South Asian regions also 25X1
will be of operational importance to Iran. Tehran will 25X1
continue to train Islamic dissidents from several Gulf
states. Assets already in place may conduct isolated
terrorist attacks-Bahrain would be a prime candi-
date. In the unlikely event that a settlement involving
all the major players in Lebanon, including Syria,
were achieved, Damascus would probably restrict 25X1
Iranian activities there. This might lead Tehran to
shift more of its attention to the Gulf states. Simi-
larly, should the Iran-Iraq war end, Iran almost
certainly would continue to support Shiite groups in
Iraq opposed to the regime, but could direct other
Iranian assets now devoted to the war effort to
Persian Gulf targets. Many of the attacks in this
region probably will be directed against Western
interests in addition to the interests of the country in
which they occur, such as Kuwait.
Implications for the United States
Iran apparently intends to expand the scope of its
anti-US terrorist activities not only in the Middle
East but also possibly to Europe.
Point to Iranian plans for terrorist
activity in the Persian Gulf and in some European
capitals where assets already are in place:
? The December 1983 bombings in Kuwait-which
we are almost certain were executed by Iranian
agents-probably were the opening salvo in this new
wave of terror.
? According to the US Embassy, only two days before
the bombings in Kuwait, the Iranian Ambassador in
Abu Dhabi-in a comment to a UAE official-
made an explicit threat against US interests in the
Persian Gulf and the rest of the world.
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
(Terrorist operations against the
United States and France conducted in a European
city such as Athens-easily accessible and contain-
ing a large number of anti-US Palestinian and
leftist groups-would enable Tehran and Damascus
to hide their involvement and avoid US military
reprisals.
The short-term threat to US personnel and facilities
in much of the Middle East remains critical. The ease
with which the extensive and well-coordinated series
of bombings was carried out in Kuwait-a country
whose security service probably is as good as any in
the Persian Gulf-illuminates the vulnerability of US
interests in the region:
? Many of the Gulf countries such as Bahrain and
Saudi Arabia have large Shia populations that
provide pools from which Iran can recruit-or
already has recruited-terrorist assets. While Bah-
rain and the UAE-which has extensive trade and
transportation ties to Iran-might be most vulnera-
ble, the large number of small, motorized boats
operating along largely unguarded coastlines makes
nearly all of the Persian Gulf countries susceptible
to terrorist infiltration.
? US establishments in countries with large Iranian
student populations-such as Pakistan-could also
be threatened. (While large numbers of Iranians,
many in sympathy and in contact with Tehran,
reside in the United States, we have no credible
information regarding an immediate Iranian terror-
ist offensive here.)
? In Baghdad as well, Iranian-supported Iraqi Shia
terrorists, who have carried out a number of devas-
tating car bombings during the past couple of years,
could be directed against US facilities or personnel.
We believe there exists an increased prospect for some
type of Iranian-sponsored violence in Western Europe.
There appears to be little doubt that pro-Iranian
activists are considering terrorist operations-bomb-
ings and assassinations-in Europe;
Iranian opera-
tives are already active in a number of European
countries:
a "handbook for
terrorists" was found among the personal belongings
of four Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain
activists arrested in Vienna in October 1983. Noth-
ing among the belongings suggested an imminent
terrorist attack by this group.
? Despite the expulsion in December of one Iranian
diplomat and 10 Iranian citizens connected with the
cultural center in Paris, the subversive "infrastruc-
ture"
almost certainly continues to operate under the
direction of Iranian diplomats and agents who are
resident in France.
While moving to reduce the possible danger from the
overt Iranian presence, the French-and the United
States and moderate Arabs-may face another more
serious at to counter.
the international terrorist
ar os an a pro- raman Lebanese Islamic Amal of
Husayn Musawi reached agreement in December
the agreement would serve as a
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
Secret
convenient division of labor between the two anti-
French terrorist groups:
? The claim by Carlos for the 31 December and
1 January bombings against French targets in Mar-
seilles, France, and Tripoli, Lebanon-carried out
in retaliation for French actions in Lebanon-lend
credibility to this reported agreement.
? In addition, on 25 January 1984 an Aerospatial
facility near Paris involved in the production of
Exocet missiles was bombed. Although a caller took
credit in the name of the "Martyrs of Baalabek,"
the previous bombings in Paris by Carlos and the
reference to the agreement in Lebanon.lead us to
believe Carlos's group may have been responsible
for this attack as well.
We believe that Islamic Amal could take advantage
of links to a group with established capabilities in
Europe and a successful anti-French track record. On
the other hand, Carlos, whose background includes
mercenary activities for the Syrian Government,
would likely benefit financially-probably from
Musawi's Iranian backers. The agreement might also
be a convenient incentive for Carlos to continue his
1982 and 1983 attacks on the French for the 1982
arrest in Paris of two of his associates. In this regard
we speculate that he also could take advantage of
Islamic Amal's terrorist capabilities in Lebanon. For
example, the bombing of the French cultural center in
Tripoli on 1 January was more likely the work of the
Lebanese group
While our analysis leads us to believe that the Iranian
threat remains high, we are unable to provide details
on specific targets or timing for attacks. To a large
degree, warning capabilities are hampered by our lack
of access to those sources knowledgeable about the
plans of individuals or groups most likely to be
directly involved in such activity. Furthermore, we
know very little about the size and capabilities of the
Da'wa and Islamic Amal organizations in Europe.
The presence of Iranian operatives in some European
countries, however, would enable Tehran to initiate,
at a minimum, limited operations on fairly short
notice. In addition, the relatively open environment
that prevails in Western Europe also would make it
fairly easy for Iran to infiltrate specially trained
terrorists for other selected operations.
We believe that any operations sponsored by Tehran
would most likely follow the pattern of attacks in
Lebanon and include operations against relatively
vulnerable military and diplomatic facilities. Car
bombs or other explosive devices could again be
employed, while attacks against individuals are possi-
ble and would be consistent with an emerging trend in
the geographic distribu-
tion of Iranian terrorism in the near term is likely to
be confined principally in those areas where Iran has
an established network of operatives, such as the
Middle East and Europe.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
Secret
Iranian Terrorism:
The Warning Problem
ing in Beirut
warnings of terrorist threats and impending
Iranian actions against US interests across a wide
geographic area. These reports have taken an increas-
ingly alarmist tone, giving the impression that virtual-
ly every US interest or diplomatic establishment
abroad-and even in this country-was at imminent
risk from radical Islamic terrorists. It is possible, for
example, that Iran's violent reputation recently was
for terrorist operations in places as diverse as Africa,
Southeast Asia, and China.
At the same time, the rumored methods of attack
have become more and more sensational. Since the
bombing of the US Embassy in Beirut last year, we
have received warnings of everything from bomb-
laden gliders to the surgical implantation of explosives
into animals destined for shipment to Europe. Nearly
all of these warnings thus far have turned out to be
false alarms:
remote control, television-guided rubber dinghies
and suited-up Iranian frogmen were spotted in
Muslim areas of Lebanon preparing for attacks
against the US Navy.
the scenario of such attacks in Lebanon seems
extremely implausible, especially since easier tar-
gets were available on the ground in Beirut.)
Iranian "Red Cross"
members had entered Saudi Arabia in late 1983 to
plot attacks against US AWACS aircraft. (One of
the more obvious problems with this report is that
Muslims are members of the Red Crescent, not the
Red Cross.)
Although a critical threat from Iranian-backed terror-
ists does exist to US personnel and facilities in a
number of countries in the Middle East and possibl
Europe
(sorting fact from fiction has become
increasingly difficult. In this environment, anticipat-
ing, in a broad sense, Tehran's next moves is difficult;
specifically predicting its next target is almost impos-
sible. And while a germ of truth may lie at the core of
many of these reports, we usually cannot identify with
certainty what that is before the warnings must be
relayed to the purported targets. What is more, as the
Long Commission investigation into the bombing of
the Marine headquarters pointed out, a continuous
stream of warning reports eventually can lead to
uncertainty in security precautions as many of the
threats fail to materialize. All this only makes the
terrorists' job easier by overextending or misdirecting
security and intelligence services that otherwise might
normally perform their protective function well.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
The excitement generated by spectacular internation-
al incidents like the Beirut bombing seems to bring 25X1
25X1
Secret
GI TR 84-005
1 March 1984
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
Secret
Chronology
unless new information has been received.
This 'chronology includes significant events, incidents, and trends in international
terrorism. It provides commentary on their background, importance, and wider
implications. It does not treat events listed in previous editions of the chronology
14 January 1984 Spain: Telephone Company Bombed
In Bilbao, the Basque terrorist group Iraultza claimed credit for the explosion of
one of four bombs placed at the National Telephone Company. The three other
bombs were deactivated.
25 January 1984
to blow them up unless the offices are closed within two months.
Greece: Threat of Bomb Attack on El Al Offices
An unidentified person telephoned the El Al Airline offices in Athens, threatening
members and confiscated arms and ammunition belonging to the group.
Turkey: Actions Against TPLP/F
In the Sumerevler area of Adana, the Turkish National Police arrested two
Turkish People's Liberation Party/Front, Revolutionary Way (TPLP-F RW)
30 January 1984 Bahrain: Arrest of Da'wa Party Leader
On the opening day of the trial of a Da'wa Party member for keeping arms buried
in his garden, the President of the Islamic Enlightenment Society of Bahrain, Abd'
Early February 1984 Bolivia: Potential Terrorist Organization Discovered
25X1
25X1
an umbrella 25X1
reportedly Cuban sponsored and led by President Siles's aide, Felix Rospigliosi.
organization designed to coordinate the underground activities of leftist political
parties should they need to resort to terrorist activity in response to a rightwing
coup. The organization, called the Democratic Coordinating Committee (JDC), is
27 Secret
GI TR 84-005
1 March 1984
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
Italy: Arrests in Connection With Burning of Italian Air Force Aircraft
Italian press reports five members of the Italian Air Force assigned to Pisa Airbase
have been arrested in connection with the burning of a military aircraft on 17 Jan-
uary, lending credence to the conjecture of some Italian Air Force officials that
the incident was the work of disgruntled base personnel, rather than terrorists.
February 1984 Pakistan: Expulsion of PLO Members
Four PLO officials and 16 Palestinian students, accused of plotting to kidnap Arab
diplomats in Pakistan, were and expelled
2 February 1984 Guatemala: Law Student Kidnaped
A law student was kidnaped by unidentified men and released unharmed some two
weeks later. His family reported that he had been working on a labor case just pri-
or to his abduction. This was one of several recent kidnapings of labor lawyers and
4 February 1984 Central African Republic: Libyan Terrorists Arrested
Two additional suspected Libyan terrorists were arrested in Bengui as they
attempted to place a Soviet explosive in the French compound. Of the original
team of five Libyans, three have been apprehended.
Iraq: Kurds Kidnap Two West Europeans
The Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) kidnaped one Italian and one Swiss
construction engineer while they were driving through Kurdish territory in Iraq.
The KDP announced on 14 February that it will release the prisoners if Baghdad
agrees to free jailed party members and to end its summary executions of Kurdish
prisoners. Baghdad is unlikely to comply with these demands.
6 February 1984 Turkey: TIKKO Members Arrested
The Turkish National Police arrested two members of the Turkish Workers and
Peasants' Liberation Army (TIKKO) in Istanbul. One of the arrested was
identified as the.military wing chief of TIKKO. A sizable amount of ammunition
was also discovered at this time.
Secret 28
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
Secret
8 February 1984 West Germany: Bombing at the Turkish Consulate
The German leftist group Revolutionary Cells (RZ) claimed responsibility for a
bomb explosion at the Turkish Consulate in Cologne, which shattered windows
and caused other damage but no injuries. The Turkish and Northern Kurdistan
Liberation Organization also claimed responsibility.
9 February 1984 Angola: Explosion on Angolan Plane
An Angolan plane crashlanded soon after takeoff from Huambo. The government
believes that a bomb had been placed in the forward cargo hold by four members
of UNITA whom they have in custody. There were no injuries.
Greece: Turkish Airlines Offices Occupied
In Athens, 15 leftwing Turkish extremists occupied the offices of Turkish Airlines
where they issued a statement condemning "American imperialists and their
followers." After surrendering, the Turks claimed they belonged to six leftwing
extremist groups and stated they were also protesting the alleged deaths of eight
Turkish hunger strikers in eastern Turkey
Guatemala: Political Leader Murdered
Five hooded armed men kidnaped and subsequently murdered a leader of the
social democratic political party, New Force, as he was leaving party headquarters
in Guatemala City. His body, which was found the following day, showed signs of
torture.
10 February 1984 Australia: Threat to Consulate
The Melbourne Consulate received a letter threatening to destroy 18 embassies
around the world if the USS New Jersey continues to shell Lebanon.
11 February 1984 Poland: Bomb Threat at Private Residence of Embassy Personnel
The housekeeper for the commercial officer at the US Embassy in Warsaw told
Embassy officials that several bomb threats had been made to the private
residence of the commercial officer by unidentified callers.
Guatemala: Labor Leader Kidnaped
The Secretary General of the Prensa Libre newspaper union was kidnaped by
unidentified men and released three days later. Embassy sources at Prensa Libre,
however, do not believe he was abducted by the security forces and suggest the op-
- " "
eration was
government.
25X1
1
25X6
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
12 February 1984 Spain: Police Post Bombed
In San Sebastian a police post was damaged by two rocket grenades and
machinegun fire. There were no injuries from the attack. The Basque Separatist
Group ETA is suspected of perpetrating it. Police also defused a bomb on the road
near Bilbao, also probably the work of ETA.
13 February 1984 Chile: Terrorists Attack Police Garrison
A five-man terrorist commando unit attacked a national police garrison with
automatic weapons in Santiago, causing extensive damage but no injuries. Fleeing
the scene, the unidentified terrorists left behind a bag containing two powerful
homemade bombs and a Chilean flag inscribed with the logo of the Movement of
the Revolutionary Left (MIR).
14 February 1984 Sudan: Attack on Steamer
Southern dissidents attacked a river steamer which was evacuating foreigners from
the south, reportedly killing hundreds of passengers. The steamer may have been a
target of opportunity rather than the object of a planned operation.
Colombia: Guerrillas Occupy US News Agency
Members of the 19th of April (M- 19) guerrilla organization occupied the offices of
the Associated Press (AP) in Bogota. Two men and three women, posing as
journalism students, forced the news agency's correspondents at gunpoint to send a
message to Panama demanding its government to return the body of former M-19
leader Jaime Bateman. They then painted M-19 slogans on the walls of the offices.
Spain: Preelection Bombings
In Zarauz, the Autonomous Anticapitalist Commandos (CAA), a radical splinter
group of ETA, claimed responsibility for two bomb explosions outside a school hall
where Spanish opposition leader Manuel Fraga was addressing a rally. No injuries
Spain: Bombings in Reuteria and Bilbao
Members of ETA are suspected of bombings at two banks in Renteria and at a bar
in Bilbao. No injuries were reported.
Secret 30
25X1
25X1
I
25X6
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
Secret
15 February 1984 Chile: Rightwing Terrorists Strike Again
Unidentified terrorists threw a firebomb at the parked vehicle of Dr. Rodolfo
Seguel, chairman of the Arica Human Rights Commission. The vehicle was
destroyed but no injuries were reported. The previously unknown "Command of
Peoples Organizations" claimed responsibility for the incident.
Peru: Terrorists Black Out Lima
Unidentified individuals, presumed to be members of the Sendero Luminoso (SL),
bombed three high tension electrical towers, plunging portions of Lima into
darkness. Terrorists also set off bombs at a bank and several businesses, causing
little damage. Minor attacks occurred in several other Peruvian cities, also causing
little damage. The last instance of coordinated attacks in Lima occurred 1 January
1984.
a shootout with Turkish security forces
Turkey: Terrorist Killed
In Tunceli Province, .a member of the Turkish leftist group, Dev Sol, was killed in
the Turkish National Police
in Bursa, Ankara, Adana, Usak, and Izmir.
arrested 102 suspected members of the leftist terrorist group Acilciler (Swift Ones)
16 February 1984 Spain: Bomb Blasts Unemployment Office
An explosion at a Madrid unemployment office caused extensive damage, but no
casualties. Basque separatist guerrillas are suspected.
Spain: ETA Members Killed, Wounded
One member of ETA was killed and two others seriously injured in a shootout with
police near Bilbao. Several other members of ETA were arrested during the
operation.
guerrillas burned tents and stole several pieces of equipment.
Colombia: ELN Raids Petroleum Camp
A small band of guerrillas from the National Liberation Army (ELN) raided a pe-
troleum company camp in northeast Colombia along the Venezuelan border. The
action.
Vicenza police authorities received a telephone
caii irom an um en i ie person who stated, "We will kill an American citizen,
stuff the body in the trunk of an auto, and park the auto either in an American
housing area or at Site Pluto." Occurring as it did on the heels of the assassination
of Leamon Hunt, this threat is probably part of the spate of anti-US threats-
many not attributable to terrorists-that often accompanies a major terrorist
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
Italy: Telephone Threat Against Jordanian Embassy
An unidentified caller threatened to carry out an unspecified attack against the
Jordanian Embassy in Rome stating, "We've killed Hunt and now it is your turn."
Officials of the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Rome were notified by the Jordanians
of the telephone threat and reportedly are concerned that they will be the next tar-
get for terrorists in Rome.
Lebanon: Prominent Shiite Imam Assassinated
Shaykh Raghab Harb, the second-highest Shiite leader in south Lebanon, was
killed by unknown gunmen. Harb was one of several militant clergymen cam-
paigning against Israeli occupation of the south and had contacts with revolution-
ary Moslem clerics in Iran. Violent demonstration followed the assassination, as
most Lebanese blame Israel for the attack.
17 February 1984 Peru: State of Emergency Extended
The Belaunde government decided to suspend civil liberties in 11 provinces in
south central Peru for at least 60 more days in an effort to aid the military in its
battle against the Sendero Luminoso guerrilla group. The extension of the state of
emergency is the ninth since guerrilla action escalated in 1982.
Italy: Bomb Explodes at US Company Concessionary
A bomb exploded in the parking lot of the Rome-area concessionary of the US
Caterpillar Tractor Company, causing slight damage, and no injuries. No group or
individual has claimed responsibility.
Guatemala: Labor Lawyer Abducted
Unidentified men kidnaped and murdered a prominent labor lawyer. A note
pinned to his shirt said he had been executed as a traitor to Guatemala's
Communist Party Orthodox Wing.
18 February 1984
Guatemala: Trade Union Leader Kidnaped
The Guatemalan press reported that the leader of a trade union, affiliated with the
Communist trade-union confederation FASGUA, was kidnaped from the streets
of Guatemala City by armed men. (FASGUA, at one time the trade-union arm of
Guatemala's Communist party, remains a legal entity.) The union leader's
abduction in broad daylight and his FASGUA affiliation suggests the operation
was probably mounted by the security forces.
25X1
25X6
25X6
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
Secret
19 February 1984 Lebanon: Saudi Diplomat Released
The Saudi Consul General in Lebanon was released by Syrian officials after being
held for over one month by radical Lebanese Shias we believe are members of the
Islamic Amal. The Saudis apparently sought Syrian help to obtain the release of
their diplomat.
21 February 1984
Egypt: Jewish Terrorist Threat to Anti-Mubarak Intellectuals
Meir Kahane acknowledged publicly that his "Kach" organization had sent letters
threatening violence to several Egyptian academics and journalists loosely associ-
ated with the anti-Mubarak opposition. Kahane stated the threats to these
Egyptian intellectuals is merely a beginning, and he accused them of anti-
Semitism.
Iran: Possible Threat to Exiles in United States
Several former Iranian military officers in exile in the United States reportedly re-
ceived letters threatening them with the same fate as General Oveisi, who was as-
sassinated by Iranian agents in Paris on 7 February.'
23 February 1984 Greece: Caller Threatens Safety of US Personnel in Athens
An unidentified caller to the State Department made an unspecified threat against
US Government personnel in Athens if one Dimitrios Mattes, apparently charged
in connection with criminal activity in New York, is not "left alone" by US legal
authorities. The caller, who claimed to be calling from Athens, said he represented
the "Progressive Greek Officers Organization.'
Spain: Preelection Assassination
In Bilbao, a faction of the Autonomous Anticapitalist Commandos (CAA)
Mendeku (Vengeance in Basque) claimed responsibility for the assassination of a
Socialist senator, who was a leading candidate in regional parliamentary elections
and an outspoken critic of ETA. The action was in revenge for recent attacks
against ETA exiles in the French Basque country by the Antiterrorist Liberation
Group (GAL).
25X1
I
25X6
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
Secret
Peru: Terrorists Attack Senate President's Home
Six members of the Sendero Luminoso guerrilla organization traveling in a car
hurled explosives at the home of the President of Peru's Senate, Ricardo
Monteagudo. The early morning attack caused minor damage to the residence and
South Africa: Bombing of Power Substation
Three explosions in a power substation near Pietermaritzburg caused extensive
damage but did not affect the electrical power supply. Police found five additional
unexploded limpet mines which, had they exploded, would have cut the power.
Police suspect the African National Congress was responsible.
24 February 1984 Peru: Government Expands Emergency Zone
The government has extended the state of emergency to a 12th province in
southeastern Peru, placing it under military control and suspending individual
rights. Interior Minister Luis Percovich announced that emergency decrees would
be applied in Castrovirreyna Province because of "the continued acts of violence
and terrorism generated" by the Sendero Luminoso guerrilla movement.
Italy: Sentences for Red Brigades Crimes
An Italian court sentenced 22 defendants to jail terms of up to 25 years for
shootings, kidnapings, and membership in the Red Brigades. Among the defend-
ants was Barbara Balzarani, who was tried in absentia. One of the most notorious
BR figures still at large, she is suspected by Italian authorities of having played a
25 February 1984 Spain: Spanish Basque Killed in France
In Idaux-Mendy, members of the Antiterrorist Liberation Group (GAL) claimed
26 February 1984 Iran: British Businessman Killed
A British businessman was shot dead in Tehran, apparently because he was
mistaken for a French diplomat. An anonymous phone call in Tehran described
the murder as a revolutionary execution of a French diplomat by a group called
Late February 1984 West Germany: Threat Against Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Employees
US Embassy officials in Munich report that a former Bulgarian militia officer,
whose current reliability is undetermined, has relayed information to Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty personnel about a possible threat by the Bulgarian
Intelligence Service to two RFE/RL staff members, one of whom was the victim
of an apparent unsuccessful assassination attempt in 1978. The Bulgarian
Government reportedly is upset about broadcasts of Sofia's alleged complicity in
Secret 34
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0
Secret
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100370001-0