TERRORISM REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00893R000100330001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 5, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of c~
Intelligence
MASTER FILF COPY
JLOT 6WE BUT
Terrorism
Review
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GI TR 84-001
5 January 1984
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Secret
Review
5 January 1984
1 Perspective-1983: Not All Bad
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3 Highlights
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Nicaragua's Support of International Terrorism
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Threats and Hoaxes: Dealing With the Ambiguity of Nonviolent Terrorism
19 Chronology
Director, Instability and Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues,
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Deputy
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Secret
Review
The serious escalation in the level and intensity of terrorist violence in the Middle
East should not be allowed to obscure the positive developments of 1983, a year
when not all terrorists had it their own way. The picture brightened most in
Western Europe:
? In Italy, the number of violent terrorist events was well down from previous
years. The Red Brigades, decimated by arrests and defections, limited them-
selves primarily to rebuilding efforts. Threatened terrorist incidents at Comiso,
Sicily, Italy's sole INF deployment site, did not materialize.
? In West Germany,, not one person died from terrorism during 1983. The hunted
remnants of the Red Army Faction hardcore mounted no attacks, and their call
for the amalgamation of "the guerrilla and the resistance" into a single front ap-
parently went unanswered. Overall, the number of violent terrorist incidents
decreased by about half compared with the previous year. Five of the six
members of the Kexel-Hepp Group, the country's only rightwing terrorist cell,
were arrested, and the sixth (Hepp) is believed to have fled the country.
Terrorists threatened but failed to forestall the scheduled INF deployments.
? In Turkey, the military government completed its self-assigned task of suppress-
ing both rightwing and leftwing terrorism in Turkey and turned back authority
to a civilian government in a peaceful election.
Even in the Middle East there were some bright spots in the picture:
? The Government of Iraq kicked Abu Nidal and his organization (formerly known
as Black June) out of the country. It also apparently suppressed the sophisticated
bombing operations of the Baghdad based 15 May Organization.
? The Government of Jordan refused to yield to Abu Nidal's demands that it
release members of his group that it holds prisoner, even though as a
consequence its diplomats have become the targets of repeated assassination
attempts by the group.
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GI TR 84-001
5 January 1984
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? In an attempt to repair relations with certain moderate African and Arab states,
Libya's Muammar Qaddhafi downplayed terrorism during the year. Threats
against exiled opponents of Qaddhafi were not followed up.
? The Government of South Yemen ceased fomenting terrorist attacks against
neighboring North Yemen and in general reduced its support for international
terrorists.
? Despite serious setbacks to Yasir Arafat and his moderate supporters, their ban
against international terrorist operations by the PLO continued in effect.
In the Far East, South Korea resisted the blandishments of the Taiwan Govern-
ment and upheld its international obligations by trying and sentencing to prison
terms of seven to 10 years the four Chinese who mounted the first successful
hijacking of a Chinese civil airliner.
In Latin America, there were positive developments in a number of countries:
? The newly elected civilian government of Argentina has indicted several former
military leaders on criminal charges in connection with the thousands of.
"disappearances" which occurred while they were in power. And several
Montonero leaders have returned to the country professing to have abandoned
terrorist tactics in favor of peaceful political activity, which would be good news
only if they mean it.
? In Honduras in early May, authorities captured three key members of the
Popular Revolutionary Forces-Lorenzo Zelaya Command, the most violent
Honduran terrorist group. Among those apprehended was the group's leader,
Efrain Duarte, who was persuaded to identify other members of the group and
provide details of Cuban and Nicaraguan support; ultimately, he even con-
demned violent revolution at a government-sponsored press conference. The
information he provided enabled the Honduran Government to arrest many
members of the group and, for the present, render it ineffective as a revolution-
ary force.
? In the fall, the Honduran military decimated a force of some 100 Honduran
insurgents, backed by Cuba and Nicaragua, that had tried to establish a base of
operations in the remote region of Olancho. The defeat was a serious setback to
Cuban and Nicaraguan plans to destabilize the Honduran Government and to
punish it for its support of anti-Sandinista forces and US regional policy.
? Several terrorist groups-the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) and the
Movement of 19 April (M-19) in Colombia and the Shining Path in Peru-
offered cease-fires. While these offers may have been tactical in nature (and may
not be accepted), they demonstrate that the groups in question were failing to
achieve their political objectives through purely terrorist tactics.
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Highlights
Significant Costa Rica: Militants Seize Control of Communist Party. Leading San Jose
Developments dailies reported that militant elements of Costa Rica's traditionally bland, pro-
Moscow, nonviolent Popular Vanguard Party (PVP) seized control of the party's
machinery in a vicious internal power struggle. According to the media reports, the
militants advocate armed struggle and guerrilla warfare. PVP legislator Arnoldo
Ferreto was quoted in the local press as stating, "We have a hundred companeros
fighting in Nicaragua and we will send a thousand more if we have to." The PVP
is the country's largest leftist party. It claims a membership of some 6,000 to
7,000, can mobilize an estimated 50,000 union militants, and controls Costa Rica's
most powerful union. The party
currently maintains a 200-man paramilitary capability and provided the Sandinis-
tas armed volunteers during their struggle against the Somoza regime.
Italy: Antonov Under House Arrest. The Bulgarian Airlines functionary Sergei
Antonov, under investigation for complicity in the May 1981 Papal assassination
attempt, was released from prison and placed under house arrest, ostensibly
because his health was deteriorating. Antonov is 25X1
required to remain at home but may receive phone calls and visitors. His passport
was lifted to prevent departure from Italy. 25X1
Spain: Attack on Jordanian Officials. The Arab Revolutionary Brigades (ARB)
claimed responsibility for the 29 December attack on two Jordanian officials in
Madrid. We suspect the ARB is a cover name for Abu Nidal's organization, which
has been attacking Jordanian officials abroad for the past few months. Earlier this
month, Abu Nidal threatened Jordan with renewed terrorism if Amman continued
to refuse to release imprisoned members of his group. In addition, Abu Nidal may
be targeting Jordanians to dissuade King Hussein from reinitiating a dialogue with
Yasir Arafat.
Colombia: No Truce With Guerrillas. According to Defense Minister Landazabal,
in late December President Betancur bowed to military pressure not to agree to a
cease-fire with Colombian guerrillas. In recent weeks the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the 19th of April Movement (M- 19) announced
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GI TR 84-001
5 January 1984
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they were joining forces in a "peace offensive" in order to obtain a cease-fire and a
Argentina: Montonero Leader Arrested. Exiled Montonero leaders Ricardo Obre-
gon Cano and Oscar Bidegain returned to Argentina on 20 December to announce
the organization's formal dissolution. Obregon Cano was immediately arrested.
Earlier this month, five exiled Montonero leaders, including Obregon Cano and
Bidegain, published an open letter to President Alfonsin announcing they would.
return to Argentina to pursue their political objectives through peaceful means.
France: Moves Against Potential Iranian Terrorists. The French Government has
moved to disrupt a potential Iranian terrorist network in France. According to
press reports, France closed the Iranian Islamic Center in Paris, expelling three
Iranian Embassy officials and eight members of the Center on the grounds it was a
potential staging ground for terrorist operations in the country. Quoting French
security service sources, the press reports indicated the Center was involved in
propaganda activities in France and also was involved in preparations to assassi-
nate Iranian exiles and conduct attacks against French interests as well. No
connection has yet been established between the expulsions and the two bombings
in Marseilles on 31 December.
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Nicaragua's Support of
International Terrorism
Nicaragua promotes and supports terrorism in Cen-
tral America to further its primary objectives of
preserving its revolutionary gains and destabilizing
non-Marxist governments in the region. Managua
provides revolutionary groups with arms, ammuni-
tion, training, and safehaven, as well as propaganda
and financial support. The Sandinistas also offer
sanctuary to South American terrorists.
In El Salvador
The Salvadoran insurgents regularly employ terrorist
tactics to intimidate the opposition and to coerce the
uncommitted.
Managua.serves as base and safehaven for
the Salvadoran insurgent command whence it directs
the political and military struggle
Ma-
nagua also furnishes large quantities o arms, ammu-
nition, and other material received from Cuba, the
Soviet Union, North Vietnam, and other sympathetic
states. A variety of overland, sea, and air routes are
used to transport war materials from Nicaragua to
the Salvadoran guerrillas. Local revolutionary groups
and sympathetic or corrupt officials facilitate this
Sandinista leadership has described Salvadoran
guerrillas as "our shield"-viewing their survival as
essential to the preservation of Nicaragua's revolu-
tionary gains.
In Honduras
Nicaragua also serves as sanctuary for Honduran
terrorist leaders and, in the past, has provided direct
support for terrorist operations. These include the
sabotage of two electric substations in July 1982 that
blacked out 80 percent of the country's capital, cost
the Honduran economy an estimated $20 million, and
idled some 50,000 workers. There is also evidence that
Managua may have provided direction and weapons
to the terrorists responsible for the 1981 skyjacking of
a Honduran airliner and may have played a role in the
1982 seizure of the Chamber of Commerce Building
in San Pedro Sula, an operation in which many of
Honduras's financial leaders were taken hostage.
In July 1983, a group of 96 Cuban-trained Honduran
guerrillas infiltrated Honduras from Nicaragua. They
were decimated by the Honduran military, and their
leader, Reyes Matta-who reportedly served with
Che Guevara in Bolivia and with the terrorist Rebel
Armed Forces in Guatemala-was killed.
In Guatemala
Nicaragua, we believe, facilitates the travel of Guate-
malan terrorists to Cuba and Eastern Europe for
clandestine meetings and training.
In Costa Rica
In 1983, Costa Rican authorities charged Nicaragua
with complicity in two assassination plots against
Eden Pastora and the Costa Rican-based anti-Sandi-
nista leadership. The arrest of a Basque terrorist,
accused of involvement in this latest plot and allegedly
tied to Managua, raises the possibility that extrare-
gional terrorists with a high order of expertise are
being imported by the Sandinistas to target opposition
leaders.
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GI TR 84-001
5 January 1984
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The Sandinistas have placed renewed pressure on
President Monge to enforce Costa Rican neutrality in
response to recent attacks by anti-Sandinista forces
they charge are based on Costa Rican soil. This,
coupled with Monge's antipathy towards Managua
and his strong support of US policy in the region, we
believe, could lead Nicaragua to sponsor terrorism
targeted directly against the Costa Rican Government
if the Sandinistas come to believe that San Jose,
despite its declared neutrality, is unwilling to restrain
the anti-Sandinista opposition. For such operations,
Managua would probably use Costa Rican or third-
country nationals to provide the Sandinistas a degree
of plausible denial
In South America
Nicaragua also is a haven for South American terror-
ists, including Argentine Montoneros and Uruguayan
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Threats and Hoaxes:
Dealing With the Ambiguy
of Nonviolent Terrorism
The terms threat and hoax reflect a wide variety of
terrorist actions, some of which have major impacts
on the targets and victims. The fear engendered by a
credible threat or hoax may be as intense as that
resulting from a violent terrorist act-and sometimes
more debilitating. Accordingly, in our computerized
data bases we have been characterizing threats and
hoaxes as terrorist incidents, thereby giving them the
same statistical weight as bombings, armed attacks,
and other forms of terrorist violence.
But threats and hoaxes are not the same as other
forms of terrorism. They do not involve direct physical
violence, nor its customary consequences, personal
injury or property damage. Instead they work at the
psychic level, and the damage that they cause is often
difficult to identify and usually impossible to quanti-
fy. Consequently, threats and hoaxes are seldom
taken very seriously or examined very closely by
terrorism analysts.
Thus there is a fundamental ambiguity in the way we
think about and deal with terrorist threats and hoax-
es. In the current period of heightened anxiety occa-
sioned by recent major terrorist successes against US
and allied targets in the Middle East, terrorist threats
are being taken more seriously than usual, in some
cases more seriously than necessary. The great num-
ber of spurious threats tends to overload the system,
interfering with the capability of potential US targets
to recognize and protect themselves from true danger.
Therefore, in an effort to assist those who must
evaluate and respond to terrorist threats and hoaxes,
we present below some facts and observations about
the ambiguous terrain of nonviolent terrorism.
Impact of Threats and Hoaxes
The impact of a threat or hoax (not to be con-
fused with the impact of the event itself, should it
subsequently materialize) is almost completely depen-
dent on whether it is believed or not.' If it is believed,
or if the target is uncertain about whether to believe it
or not, the impact can be severe. Our records are
replete with examples in which buildings have been
evacuated or closed (temporarily or even perma-
nently), personal and physical security precautions
upgraded (perhaps at great expense or inconvenience),
diplomats, executives, officials, functionaries, and de-
pendents moved or reassigned, trips called off and
travelers rerouted, plans and programs substantially
modified or even abandoned, all on account of terror-
ist threats. Often, however, nothing is done at all
because the threat is not believed.
How does a target decide whether or not to believe a
threat, whether or not to take action to try to avert the
consequences? In our opinion, based on examination
of data involving thousands-of international terrorist
threats over the past 15 years, the impact of a threat
or hoax is a product of the credulity of the target, the
gravity of the anticipated consequences, and-clearly
most important-the credibility of the threat.
Credulity of the Target
Whether a terrorist threat is believed, or has any
impact at all, depends partly on who the target is.
Some people are naturally more credulous than oth-
ers, or more inclined to believe that bad things may
happen to them, or more certain that enemies are out
to get them. Other people, in contrast, may refuse to
credit even overwhelming evidence of danger.
' We are talking in this article about articulated threats-what
prospective attackers say to their targets. We are not talking about
perceived threats-what prospective targets apprehend about the
danger they face. Such apprehension can spring from many
sources-from an articulated threat, to be sure, but also from an
intelligence report or analysis, from a tip by?a third party, or from
an accretion of observations by an individual that causes him to
conclude he is in danger.
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GI TR 84-001
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In the context of terrorism the terms threat and hoax
may have have multiple meanings or connotations,
depending on who is talking-or listening. In fact, in
some cases the terms may be deemed interchange-
able. Soon after beginning any discussion of these
phenomena, then, we must carefully define our terms.
For the purpose of recording incident data, we define
a threat as the expression of an intent to inflict injury
on a person or thing. It may be conditional: "We will
get you unless you do this-or stop doing that. " Or
absolute: "We will get you. no matter what you do. "
The extortion of "revolutionary taxes "from Spanish
businessmen and bankers by members of Basque
Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) is a kind of condition-
al threat. So was the recent vague but menacing
message from an alleged spokesman for Islamic
Jihad in Beirut, who gave the US and French Multi-
national Force (MNF) contingents 10 days to get out
of town or face "an earthquake. " In contrast, most of
the hundreds of threatening telephone calls received
around the world each year by US diplomatic and
military installations are absolute threats, simple
expressions of animosity coupled with a stated inten-
tion to do harm.
Threats should be distinguished from warnings, in
which terrorists who have already arranged for vio-
lence to occur, typically by planting a time bomb, try
to limit the casualties, typically by encouraging
persons in the immediate area to depart before the
explosion. Warnings are not terrorist acts.
For the purpose of recording incident data, we dine
a hoax as an attempt to mislead someone into
believing that a terrorist event has just occurred.
(false notification) or is just about to occur (false
Regardless of whether they are predisposed toward
credulousness or skepticism, however, prospective
targets come to rely heavily on their own experience in
deciding whether to believe a terrorist threat. For
example, if a particular installation had been the
target, say, of 50 anonymous bomb threats over a
warning). Most hoaxes are verbal. Commonly, an
anonymous person telephones the target installation
and announces that a time bomb has been planted
there, but a subsequent search turns up nothing.
Occasionally, a hoax takes the form of the planting of
a dummy explosive device; this increases the ostensi-
ble menace, since it demonstrates that the perpetrator
had access to the premises and could have planted
(and might still plant) a real bomb.
It will be observed that we are treading through a
semantic minefield. Most threats, after all, are also
hoaxes, since the perpetrators rarely intend to follow
through-but a target has no way of knowing that at
the time the threat is made. By the same token, the
planting of a fake bomb is surely a threatening act.
Indeed, the very idea that someone hates you enough
to try to trick you into thinking you are about to die
is in itself threatening. Consequently, in examining
the ramifications of threats and hoaxes, it is neces-
sary to distinguish carefully between them. The
distinction we employ, admittedly rather arbitrarily,
is that threats refer to events which are to take place
in the future, whereas hoaxes refer to events that
have already taken place. Note that the actual intent
of the perpetrator-to harm or. just to frighten-is
not a distinguishing criterion. To cite two examples:
? Threat: 'I am going to plant a bomb in your
embassy, " announces a telephone caller. (It is irrel-
evant whether the caller actually intends to plant
the bomb and equally irrelevant whether he later
actually does so or not.)
? Hoax: "A bomb has been planted in your embassy, "
announces a telephone caller, but a subsequent
search turns up nothing, indicating he was lying.
week or so, and if none of them had panned out, the
person receiving the 51st anonymous bomb threat-
no matter how credulous he was innately-would not
take it nearly as seriously as he took the first one.
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Gravity of the Consequences
Other things being equal, a threat to level a building
with a car bomb will have more impact than a threat
to pour acid into the innards of a subway ticket
vending machine. A threat to firebomb a crowded
theater is clearly of more consequence than a threat to
torch an automobile=even an occupied automobile,
unless the occupant is a VIP.
If the potential consequences are grave enough, even
obviously incredible threats receive serious consider-
ation even by extremely skeptical people. For exam-
ple, threats involving the use of chemical, biological,
or radiological agents always cause a flurry of activity
and concern because the potential consequences might
involve mass casualties or huge damage. This is so,
even though acts of so-called hi-tech terrorism have
been extremely rare and none have done much
damage.
Credibility of the Threat
More influential than the credulity of the target or
the gravity of the consequences, however, is the
credibility of the threat itself. Deciding whether or not
a threat z is credible, however, may be a complicated
process, for credibility is the product of the interplay
among several factors, including the identity, capabil-
ities, and reputation (alleged, suspected, or known) of
the person or agency making the threat and the
context or environment in which the threat is made. If
the threat is of an immediate, bomb-in-the-building
nature, a decision must be made instantly, whether or
not there is enough information at hand to determine
whether the threat is credible. In most such cases, the
target decides to evacuate now and evaluate later.
' All such incidents must be treated initially as threats or bona fide
warnings; only after evaluation or more information can some be
identified later as hoaxes.
Identity. Determining the identity and affiliation of
the person making the threat often involves negotiat-
ing a maze of possibilities:
? The person making the threat may or may not
identify himself. In the latter case, the threat is
anonymous.
? If the person making the threat identifies himself,
either as an individual or as a member of a particu-
lar group, the name he gives may or may not be
known to the target (or to the security authorities); if
not, the threat might as well be anonymous.
? Even if the name given by the person making the
threat is known to the target, it must nevertheless
still be established whether this person is in fact the
person he claims to be or actually represents the
organization he claims to represent; if he is not, or
does not, the threat might as well be anonymous.
to distinguish their warnings from hoaxes, some ter-
rorist groups offer proof of their bona fides.
Capabilities and Reputation. However accomplished,
once the identity and affiliation of the person making
the threat have been firmly established, the probabili-
ty that the threat is real may usually be determined
rather easily. In most cases, this entails deciding (a)
whether the authors of the threat are capable of
carrying it out; and (b) whether they have a record of
carrying out their threats.
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In contrast, consider the following hypothetical exam-
ple: an anonymous telephoned threat to the effect that
Black June will soon explode a nuclear device at the
US Embassy in Beirut. Such a threat would not be
credible. The organization almost certainly does not
possess nuclear weapons, and it no longer uses the
name Black June; thus the caller would probably be
deemed a crank having no connection to the Abu
Nidal Group and neither the intention nor the capa-
bility of carrying out his threat.'
Evaluating Anonymous Threats. The great majority
of anonymous threats are never carried out. The same
goes for most of the threats made by persons or in the
names of organizations nobody ever heard of. And
even threats made in the names of well-known terror-
ist groups can often be discounted after a bit of
thought. Suppose, for example, that a self-proclaimed
spokesman for Islamic Jihad purported to announce
the date and site of the next truck bomb attack
against a US facility in Beirut. We should doubt the
validity of this threat on the basis that such attacks
succeed only through surprise and that Islamic Jihad
would hardly provide what amounted to a warning
that would eliminate any possibility of achieving
surprise.`
Nevertheless, once in a while an anonymous threat is
followed by action. Occasionally, a new terrorist
group announces its arrival by making a threat and
then carrying it out. And just because the representa-
tive of a real terrorist group cannot prove he is who he
' It should be noted, though, that the extreme gravity of such a
threat would ensure that it received serious attention.
' At the same time, a report by an intelligence source-or even a tip
by a one-time informant-that offered details of a planned car
bomb attack by Islamic Jihad might be highly credible.
says he is does not mean that what he says can safely
be disregarded.
Environment and Context. When the identity of the
person making the threat cannot be established, the
environment and context in which the threat was
made take on increased importance. Almost any
kidnaping threat in Colombia, for example, is credi-
ble, because kidnaping seems to have become the
Colombian national sport; more than 100 kidnapings
have occurred there this year alone, and many of the
kidnapers have never been identified. In Spain, so
many Basque bankers and businessmen have been the
victims of kidnapings, bombings, and other ETA
depredations that explicit threats from this quarter
are hardly needed any more; after numerous object
lessons, many pay protection money without being
asked. This must be the ultimately anonymous threat;
yet its credibility is unquestioned.
Recently one evening, the US Embassy in San Salva-
dor received the following series of threatening, one-
sentence telephone calls from an anonymous male
who spoke English with a heavy Spanish accent:
First call: "You will die tonight."
Second call: "Americans ... [verb, obscene in
context]."
Third call: "You will die tonight."
Fourth call: "There's a bomb in your Embassy."
Fifth call: ". . . [obscene verb] you."
After the fourth call (which was, in fact, the only
explicit threat), Embassy security officials searched
the chancery and grounds, with negative results. They
also notified appropriate Embassy personnel and put
into effect standing bomb drill procedures, checking
the neighborhood to determine whether anybody
might be watching; apparently nobody was. This was
a case where the environment weighed heavily in the
assessment of credibility. In other US installations in
other countries, the calls might have been taken less
seriously.
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Threats as Indicators
When all is said and done, it does not much matter to
a target whether he learns of a possibly impending
terrorist attack via an articulated threat or from an
intelligence report or tip. In either case, he must go
through a similar process of evaluation:
? To evaluate a threat, the target needs to identify the
author and his affiliation; and if he can do so, he
must then decide whether the group in question can
and is likely to carry out its threat.
? To evaluate an intelligence report, the target needs
to determine the reliability of the source and of any
subsources; and if they seem reliable, he must then
decide whether the group in question can and is
likely to carry out the allegedly planned attack.
It may be seen that, both in import and impact,
terrorist threats are operatively much closer to warn-
ings, tips, intelligence reports, and other indicators of
impending terrorist attacks than they are to the
attacks themselves. Partly for this reason, we have
under reconsideration our longstanding practice of
recording threats and hoaxes as terrorist incidents.'
' Another reason is our growing suspicion that most terrorist threats
and hoaxes are perpetrated not by practicing terrorists but by
feckless counterfeits who would never dare to act out their hostility.
Probably more often than not, the author is an adolescent misfit
acting in solitude or in the giggling company of others of his ilk. To
liken such posturing to the activities of real terrorists may hinder
rather than promote a clear understanding of the actual terrorist
threat.
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Statistical Overview: International Terrorist Incidents, 1982-83
Total, 1136
? Of which: US targets, 528
100
Category of
International
Terrorist Incidents,
1982-83, by
Month
J A S 0 N D J F M A M J J A S 0 Na D
1982 1983
72 90 52 59 47 50 57 59 77 82 59 66 71 60 56 86 93 1136
Barricade.
hostage
Hijacking 3 4 1 3 3 1 44 6 3 4 7 6 10 3 2 1 61
Threats, hoax 19 44 18 23 14 16 20 15 29 25 18 17 24 23 23 37 41 406
aFigures for the most recent months are subject
to change as additional data are received.
bBreak.ins, conspiracies, shootouts. etc.
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November 1983 Djibouti: Hijackers Convicted
Suddenly and without public notice, the Government of Djibouti tried, convicted,
and sentenced to six months' imprisonment the three Palestinians who on 20
January 1983 hijacked to Djibouti a South Yemen Airlines flight bound from
Aden to Damascus. The light sentences violated the spirit if not the letter of
international laws regarding air piracy. Since they had already spent 10 months in
jail, the hijackers were released after the trial. D'i currently looking for a
country that will accept them. 25X1
5 November 1983 West Berlin: Bombing of Turkish Bank
The bomb exploded outside the bank, causing property damage but no injuries. On
14 November, Associated Press in West Berlin received an unsigned confessor
letter which stated the bank had been singled out because of its support to the
Turkish junta. Police believe the bombing was the work of Turkish leftists.
10 November 1983 Spain: Bombing of National Police Station
In Barcelona, the Catalan separatist group Tierra Lliure (Free Land) claimed
responsibility for a handgrenade attack on a station of the National Police which
caused no damage or injuries. Although Tierra Lliure had previously conducted 25X1
minor terrorist attacks against the Spanish Government in its attempt to gain
Chronology
unless new information has been received.
This chronology includes significant events, incidents, and trends in international
terrorism. It provides commentary on their background, importance, and wider
implications. It does not treat events listed in previous editions of the chronology
autonomy for the Catalan region, it had not been active in nearly a year.
Spain: Bombing of Courthouse
In Valencia, Tierra Lliure claimed responsibility for a bomb which exploded.at the
19 Secret
GI TR 84-001
5 January 1984
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6 December 1983 Guadeloupe: More Attempted Bombings
Authorities disarmed two butane bombs in Point-a-Pitre, one under the car of the
Sub-Prefet and the other under a military vehicle. These attempts followed the
arrest on 5 December of three independence activists; they were charged with
plotting against the state.
16 December 1983 Guatemala: Ultrarightist Murdered
A regional leader of the ultraright National Liberation Movement (MLN) in the
Department of Chiquilmula was murdered by unknown assailants using automatic
weapons. The facts surrounding the case are obscure, but the US Embassy doubts
the killing was perpetrated by terrorists and suggests the MLN leader may have
fallen victim to a family feud. The MLN has demanded a full investigation, and
we believe the organization may use the incident to justify continued attacks
against Guatemalan reformist and liberal elements as well as leftists.
Peru: Terrorist Leader Captured
Peruvian police arrested Antonio Diaz, a key lieutenant of Sendero Luminoso (SL)
leader Abimail Guzman. Diaz was reportedly operational head of SL activities in
much of southern Peru. This marks the first time since the SL began its armed
campaign in the spring of 1980 that Peruvian security forces have captured a
ranking terrorist leader.
19-21 December 1983 Turkey: Abu Nidal Linked to Recent Bombings
On 19 December in Izmir, a car bomb was discovered and defused at the French
Cultural Center. On 21 December in Ankara, a car bomb exploded near the office
and residence of PLO Representative Abu Firaz. No deaths were reported, but
there were some injuries and property damage. A French weapon with a silencer
was found at the scene. On 21 December in Istanbul, a bomb exploded near the
Iraqi Consulate, injuring three people. Turkish police, after arresting several
people, have established that members of Abu Nidal's group and at least one
Syrian agent were responsible for all three bombings.
20 December 1983 South Korea: Hijackers' Appeal Overturned
The six Chinese found guilty of the first successful hijacking in Chinese aviation
history lost their appeal to have their seven-to-l0-year sentences overturned. China
is unhappy with the sentences and. wishes the hijackers returned to China-where
the penalty for hijacking is death. Taiwan, which sees the hijackers as political ref-
ugees, would offer them asylum if South Korea would release them.
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South Africa: ANC Strikes Again
Two bombs that exploded in government buildings outside Durban caused no
injuries but damaged the Port Natal Administration Board offices. The African
National Congress was probably responsible.
Madrid: Attack on Jordanian Officials
One employee of the Jordanian Embassy in Spain was shot and killed and another
wounded by an unknown assailant. The Arab Revolutionary Brigades (ARB)
claimed responsibility in a call to the Agence France Press in Paris. We suspect
that ARB is a cover name used by Abu Nidal's organization, which has been
carrying out a terrorist campaign against Jordan for the past few months.
21 December 1983 South Korea: American Cultural Center Threatened
In Kwangju an anonymous telephone caller claimed that there was a bomb in the
building housing the American Cultural Center. A search produced negative
results.
21-27 December 1983 Lebanon: Continuing Attacks Against MNF
Troops of the Multinational Force (MNF) in the Beirut area continue to be the tar-
gets of terrorist attacks. On the afternoon of 21 December, a large truck bomb ex-
ploded outside the French MNF headquarters killing at least one French soldier
and nine Lebanese civilians, and wounding more than 125 others. US sources
credit extensive fortification of the facility with preventing more French casualties.
At about the same time, one person was killed in another blast at a bar in West
Beirut frequented by US Marines. An individual claiming to represent the
previously unknown "Black Palm" or "Black Hand" organization took credit
immediately following both bombings in a telepone call to a Lebanese radio
station. In a call to the French news agency in Beirut the following morning, an in-
dividual also took credit for the headquarters bombing in the name of Islamic
Jihad and warned.of further attacks if US and French forces were not withdrawn
from Lebanon in 10 days.
The same afternoon, a US airman searching for explosives was wounded'by a
sniper. Neither the airman nor others present heard the shot fired, suggesting that
the sniper may have used a silenced weapon.
Finally, the first attack directed at British MNF forces was recorded on 27
December, when a car bomb was detonated by remote control as a British convoy
passed near it in the port area. Two British soldiers were slightly wounded; no
group claimed credit for the attack.
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22 December 1983 Guatemala: Terrorists Destroy Government Information Office
The Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA) claimed responsi-
bility for the bombing of a government information office located in an office
building only two blocks from the US Embassy. The attack was carried out by
three masked terrorists carrying automatic weapons. They set off three bombs
which gutted the facility and caused heavy smoke damage in the rest of the
building. No injuries were reported.
Italy: Arrest Warrant for Yasir Arafat
Italian dailies report that a Venice court has upheld an international arrest order
for Yasir Arafat on charges that the PLO leader and Al Fatah were directly
involved in supplying arms to the Red Brigades (BR) in 1978-79. Since an
extradition agreement exists between Italy and Tunisia, Arafat could face arrest
on the Italian charges when he sets foot on Tunisian territory-although this
seems unlikely. The warrant against Arafat was first issued in September of this
year by a Venetian magistrate but was rejected by his superiors due to a lack of
solid evidence against Arafat personally. However, the Venetian "Liberty Tribu-
nal" which later reviewed the case found the evidence-much of it based on the
testimony of "repentant" BR members-strong enough to call for Arafat's arrest.
Saudi Arabia: Bombing in Taif
A series of bombs exploded at a power plant, causing extensive damage. No group
has claimed credit, and the Saudi Government has made no public statements
23 December 1983 Malta: Israeli Charge Attacked
In Valletta, Esther Millo, the Israeli Charge d'Affaires, was shot at five times
from close range by an assailant who approached on foot the parked car in which
she was sitting. Improbably, none of the shots hit her, although she suffered minor
cuts from pieces of glass. Some diplomats in Valletta suspect the Maltese
Government-under pressure from Libya-was behind the attack, which may
have been intended to frighten the Israelis into closing their mission.
France: Restaurant Bombing Injures 12
In Paris, a shrapnel-filled bomb exploded at an exclusive restaurant injuring 12
people, including five Americans. No group has yet claimed responsibility for the
Spain: Bombing of Government Buildings in Basque Region
Two bombs exploded in government buildings in the Basque port of San Sebastian
and Vitoria, causing damage but no injuries. The Basque separatist group
Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) has claimed credit for the attacks.
25X1
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that have been carrying out a bombing campaign in the French Caribbean.
Guatemala: Terrorists Attack Nicaraguan Embassy
24 December 1983 Martinique: Two More Bombings
The Court of Appeal building in Fort de France was bombed but received only mi-
nor damage. A television relay station near Grand Riviere was destroyed in a
second blast. We believe both attacks were the work of proindependence forces
Members of a previously unknown group which identified itself as Counterrevolu-
tionary Solidarity fired on the Nicaraguan Embassy with automatic weapons from
a passing car. Damage was minimal, and no one was injured.
25 December 1983 United Kingdom: Second Bombing in London Shopping District
A second bomb-believed to be the work of the same Active Service Unit of the
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) which attacked Harrods department
store on 17 December-exploded outside the Marks and Spencer department store
on Oxford Street, a major London shopping area. Two people were injured in the
blast, which also caused minor damage to store windows. Police believe that the
current bombin campaign may continue through the traditional post-Christmas
sales season.
Spain: Bombing of Socialist Party Offices in Basque Country
Two bombs exploded outside the headquarters of Spain's ruling Socialist Party in
Hernani and Lasarte, causing damage but no injuries. Although no group has
claimed responsibility for the attacks, we suspect the ETA Military wing
(ETA/M) was responsible.
26 December 1983 Peru: Harassment Bombing at Chinese Embassy
On Mao Zedong's birthday, unknown individuals presumed to be Sendero
Luminoso (SL) terrorists tossed five dynamite sticks over a wall into the Chinese
Embassy compound. Damage was minor and no injuries were reported. This
incident marks the third occasion in which the PRC Embassy has been targeted
since 1981. SL is an avowedly Maoist organization.
28 December 1983 Chile: Three Cities Darkened i
Terrorists bombed electric power installations in three cities, blacking out large
parts of central Chile for the second time in two weeks. No group claimed
responsibility for the bombings.
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29 December 1983 Egypt: US Ambassador Threatened
In Cairo, the US Embassy received an anonymous telephone call indicating that
the US Ambassador's life was in danger. Later the same day, the US Embassy
switchboard received a second call alleging that the first call was in error.
30 December 1983 Turkey: Fake Anti-US Banner Bomb
In Izmir, police discovered a banner stretched across the street near Ege
University bearing an anti-US slogan by the leftist Turkish terrorist group Dev Sol
(Revolutionary Left) and attached to metal canisters believed to contain explosives.
Police detonated the canisters and found both were empty. The use of banner
bombs has been a trademark of Turkish terrorist groups; however, most have
carried slogans about the Turkish military junta rather than anti-US statements.
Spain: Bombings Continue in Basque Country
In Plascencia de Las Armas, a bomb exploded outside a bank, causing damage but
no injuries. Although no group has yet claimed credit for the attack, we believe a
faction of ETA was responsible for the attack, which was probably associated with
its attempts to extort "revolutionary taxes" from banks in the Basque country.
31 December 1983 France: Retaliatory Bombings
In Marseilles, a bomb exploded at the St. Charles train station, killing two persons.
It was followed shortly by a second bomb explosion aboard a high-speed train en
route from Marseilles to Paris. Three persons on the train were killed and nearly
40 injured. Although eight groups so far have claimed credit for the attacks, police
are most inclined to believe the claim of the Armed Arab Struggle, which also
claimed credit for the bombing of the French Cultural Center in Tripoli, Lebanon,
on 1 January. A communique from the group asserted that the attacks were in re-
venge for French air raids on Baalbek, Lebanon, on 17 November (which, in turn,
were in retaliation for the suicide truck bomb attack on the Beirut Headquarters of
the French Multinational Force on 23 October which killed 58 French paratroop-
ers.)
1 January 1984 Lebanon: Bombing of French Cultural Center
In Tripoli, the Armed Arab Struggle-a Middle Eastern terrorist group with links
to the notorious international terrorist Carlos-claimed credit for a bomb which
destroyed the French Cultural Center. No one was injured in the attack.
Peru: Another Big Blackout
Coordinated attacks by Sendero Luminoso terrorists at midnight left nearly 40
percent of Peru's population without electrical power. The US Embassy called the
attacks the most telling blow against the government since the attacks in the
capital last summer.
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2 January 1984 Spain: Reemergence of GRAPO
In Madrid, the leftwing urban guerrilla organization October First Anti-Fascist
Resistance Group (GRAPO) claimed responsibility for the murder of two police-
men. The killings were carried out to commemorate the death of GRAPO's leader,
who was killed in a gun battle with police in Barcelona on 5 December 1982. De-
spite numerous police claims that GRAPO has disbanded, the group reappears
regularly to attack police targets.
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