SOVIET POLICY TOWARD NICARAGUA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00787R000400510001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 14, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Soviet Policy
Toward Nicaragua
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Secret
Secret
SOV 86-10061X
November 1986
Copy 408
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence - 25X1
Soviet Policy
Toward Nicaragua
World Division
This paper was prepared by I (Office
of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Third
Secret
SOV 86-10061 X
November 1986
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Soviet Policy
Toward Nicaragua
Washington diplomatically and encourage the Latin American left.
regime, the Soviets hope to exploit the Nicaraguan conflict to isolate
Key Judgments Over the last few years, the Soviet Union has seized new opportunities to
Information available increase its influence in Latin America at the expense of the United States.
as of 24 November 1986 Nicaragua is a key element in this policy, second only to Cuba in
was used in this report.
importance. While seeking over the longer term to establish a firmer
strategic position in the region through consolidation of the Sandinista
The Soviets are playing for time. They see short-term risks to their 25X1
interests in precipitating a US military move against Nicaragua-and are
thus probably wary of provoking Washington by allowing the Sandinistas
to obtain jet fighter aircraft in the near term. Moscow appears to believe
US resolve to oppose the Sandinista regime will weaken by the 1988 US
election. We expect the Soviets-in conjunction with their Warsaw Pact
partners and Cuba-to continue, and indeed increase, their military and
other assistance to the regime. The military aid is likely to be delivered
with discretion for the time being, however, to avoid fueling the wrong side
of the debate in Washington.F___1 25X1
Secret
SOV 86-10061X
November 1986
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Secret
Soviet Policy
Toward Nicaragua
General Secretary Gorbachev's projected trip to Latin
America next year reflects both the new activism in
Soviet foreign policy and a heightened interest in this
region. Moscow's perception of opportunity in the
area was stimulated in the late 1970s by the Sandinis-
ta victory and subsequently by the political repercus-
sions of the Falklands war and the opportunities for
penetration in South America offered by the region's
transition to democratic rule and its economic crisis.
Today, in Latin America, the Soviets see numerous
possibilities for enhancing their position and putting
Washington on the defensive. Moscow sees the poten-
tial for long-term gain as gradually increasing, but, at
the same time, it seeks to maximize the prospects for
near-term advantage by exploiting its position in
Nicaragua.
Nicaragua in Soviet Strategy Toward Latin America
other Third World regimes-for military conces-
sions, such as air and naval access rights and
signals intelligence sites.
Moscow seeks to build a Marxist-Leninist state in a
Nicaragua that is militarily strong, economically sta-
ble, institutionally unified, and responsive to Soviet
political and strategic interests:
? In the near term, the struggle over Nicaragua
provides an opening for a Soviet presence in the
region as protection for an embattled regime, fuels
anti-Americanism, and complicates US relations
with other Latin American countries. It demon-
strates the Soviets' capacity to play a critical role in
a prime US sphere of influence. It strengthens,
moreover, their capability, in association with Cuba,
to aid leftist forces and helps to normalize the status
of Cuba by highlighting its role as a Latin patron to
the besieged Sandinistas.
the Soviets have a clear apprecia-
tion of the problems that must be surmounted during
the near term in Nicaragua: the potential for a more
active insurgency, continued economic deterioration,
and lingering internal political opposition to Sandinis-
ta rule. They also understand that their investment in
Nicaragua could be put at risk by their own provoca-
tion of the United States, by ill-timed Sandinista
activities similar to Ortega's visit to Moscow in the
spring of 1985, and by uncoordinated Cuban actions
that might provoke a harsh US response.
? In the longer term, if the Sandinista regime can be
consolidated, it promises to create a platform for
further extending Soviet influence and supporting
the left in Latin America. Inevitably, Moscow will
press Managua-as it has Cuba, Vietnam, and
The Soviets-aided by their Warsaw Pact partners-
are meanwhile stepping up support for the Sandinistas
in a variety of ways.
Secret
SOV 86-10061X
November 1986
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Soviet-Warsaw Pact Economic Disbursements and
Military Equipment Deliveries to Nicaragua
Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact
Soviet
a Includes Cuban disbursements.
b Estimated.
85 Jan-Nov
86
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Military Aid. Since 1982, Soviet military assistance
to Nicaragua has steadily risen (see figure 1), and this
assistance has included helicopters and other equip-
ment useful in combating the insurgency. Soviet
military assistance to Nicaragua so far this year
the increasing share supplied by the USSR
I24 MI-8/17 and six
MI-24 helicopters, more than doubling the helicopter
inventory. Since 1984 support from the non-Soviet
Warsaw Pact has declined substantially, highlighting
Economic Aid and Advisers. The Soviets have also
provided increasing economic assistance and have
encouraged other Bloc states to do so as well. Mos-
cow's aid alone this year is up about 30 percent over
that of 1985. Bloc support includes economic credits,
oil deliveries, and even scarce hard currency: East
Germany, for example, provides a greater share of
hard currency support than does Moscow. The Soviet
Union is also pressing Managua to reorganize its
economic institutions according to the Soviet model.
In the fall of 1985 and during 1986, Soviet State
Planning Committee experts visited Managua to ex-
amine Sandinista economic performance and to advise
the Sandinistas on reordering their planning proce-
Propaganda. The Soviets are supporting a major
propaganda effort to legitimize the Sandinista regime
internationally, especially within Europe and Latin
America, and to isolate those who oppose the regime.
ccording to
the US Embassy in Moscow, Vsevolod Ovchinnikov, a
Pravda commentator, speaking at a foreign policy
seminar at Patrice Lumumba University, stated that
the appearance of a multiparty state provides Nicara-
closely with the Sandinistas to structure the Nicara-
guan security apparatus along Cuban lines to increase
internal political control. Moscow is encouraging the
Sandinistas to consolidate and stabilize their power, to
reorganize their party, and to propagate their ideology 25X1
more deeply among the Nicaraguan population=
the inexperience of the comman-
dantes was of concern to the Soviet Bloc states. He
claimed that, as insurance, Bloc advisers are working
within the Sandinista party to help transform it-
without public fanfare-into a typical Communist
party
Diplomatic Support. Moscow's support for the Conta-
dora peace process is
part of the Soviets' attempt to
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gua with "good camouflage."
Security and Political Advisers.
Soviet and other Bloc advisers-
especially Cubans and East Germans-are working
strengthen the worldwide constituency supporting the
Sandinista revolution. Moscow probably calculates
that a treaty will never be formalized, but that Soviet
rhetoric favoring Contadora projects an image of
solidarity with the regional Latin powers involved in
the process and throws the spoiler role to the United
States.
Despite the Soviets' enthusiasm for their Nicaraguan
client, there are limits to how far Moscow will go to
protect the Sandinistas. There are no indications, for
example, that Moscow contemplates taking direct
military action in support of the Sandinistas-a disin-
clination reportedly made clear to both the Nicara-
guans and the Cubans. Moreover, since the invasion
of Grenada in 1983, Moscow, in our judgment, has
been sensitive to the potential for a harsh US re-
sponse.
The plethora of materiel Moscow and its partners
have provided the Sandinistas in recent years suggests
that they are committed to providing the military
equipment the Soviets judge Managua requires to
defeat the insurgents. In the near term this support is
likely to include, at a minimum, more helicopters,
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upgraded air defense equipment, trucks, mobile artil-
lery, multiple rocket launchers, small arms, and train-
ing.
To protect their interests, the Soviets and their Bloc
partners are also likely to continue and indeed in-
crease economic assistance to Nicaragua;F_
Moscow is showing increasing irritation
with the waste and inefficiency of the Sandinista
economy, but it has tolerated such problems with
other clients-as with Cuba and Vietnam-and there
are no indications it will turn off the economic aid tap.
evidence leaves little doubt that Nicaraguans have
been trained to fly MIGs, and such aircraft may
already have been set aside in Cuba for Nicaragua.
The Soviets are sensitive to Washington's concern
about the introduction of these aircraft into Nicara-
gua, and they almost certainly assume that the pre-
sent US administration would attack such planes if
they were discovered there. If the Soviets chose to
deliver such aircraft, their decision would probably be
based on the calculation that a US attack would, once
the dust had settled, strengthen opposition in the
United States to further aid to the insurgents, or
would, in any event, inflame opinion in Latin America
and Europe against the United States.
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Assessing US Staying Power
Moscow
expects that US opposition to Managua will soften
and that the next administration will tend to accept
the Sandinista regime as a fait accompli. The recent
US midterm Congressional elections may have en-
couraged Moscow's hope that US backing for the
insurgents will decline even before the next election.
This judgment about US staying power would strong-
ly counsel a Soviet policy of playing for time, consoli-
dating the Sandinista regime internally, cultivating
favorable international opinion on behalf of Nicara-
gua, and avoiding major risks or provocative behavior
that could play into the hands of the Reagan adminis-
But Moscow probably finds the arguments for re-
straint more compelling:
? Even if the aircraft were not destroyed, they would
not add appreciably to the Sandinistas' ability to
defeat the insurgency.
? Fallout from a confrontation with Washington over
the jet fighters could affect the whole range of US-
Soviet bilateral issues, including other regional hot-
spots, a possible summit, and arms limitation talks.
? US destruction of the aircraft would once again
expose Soviet inability to defend a client against US
military power.
? The act of introducing MIGs or other aircraft might
well be seen as provocative and alarming by Latin
American countries that the Soviets are wooing,
such as Mexico.
tration
Moscow also probably calculates that Nicaragua has
a more generalized impact on other aspects of bilater-
al relations with the United States, although it is not
clear how finely tuned such calculations may be. The
extent to which Moscow recently went in trying to
conceal the delivery of more helicopters to the Sandi-
nistas is, perhaps, a measure of Soviet sensitivity to
this consideration.
Whether Moscow will deliver MIG-21s or other jet
fighter aircraft to Nicaragua is a key test of how far
the Soviets calculate they ought to go.' The weight of
to think in terms of "spheres of influence," although
not to accept the legitimacy of Washington's claims to
vital geographic interests. Indeed, according to the
US Embassy in Moscow, the chief of one of the Soviet
Foreign Ministry's two departments for Latin Ameri-
ca claimed last year that the US-USSR bilateral
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discussions on Central America signaled the end of
the Monroe Doctrine and legitimized a Soviet role in
Central America. It is conceivable, although we have
no evidence for it, that the Soviet leadership itself
views its support of the Sandinistas not only as a move
to build Communism and extend Soviet influence in
the Western Hemisphere, but also as a counterweight
to US assistance to insurgencies against Soviet clients
elsewhere.
It would not follow from such thinking, however, that
the Kremlin is interested in or sees a realistic possibil-
ity of cutting a deal with Washington. It is unclear
why the Soviet leaders would be interested in
"trading" Nicaragua, since they apparently think that
time is working on their side in consolidating the
Sandinista regime; and it does not appear, in any
event, that they think they now must choose between
Nicaragua and a client of higher priority. It is also
unclear what sort of exchange Moscow would visual-
ize to be acceptable in principle or politically practica-
ble for the current US administration.
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