NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW SUPPLEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01184R000301480002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 24, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/12 :CIA-RDP85T01184R000301480002-9
Directorate of
~~~n
~~~f
~~,~
~~~
~~ ~ ~~ Intelligence }-{~
~i
~_~~,
Near East and
South Asia Review
Supplement
?A May 1985
NESA NESAR 8S-012JX
2~ May 1985
COPY
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/12 :CIA-RDP85T01184R000301480002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/12 :CIA-RDP85T01184R000301480002-9
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/12 :CIA-RDP85T01184R000301480002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/12 :CIA-RDP85T01184R000301480002-9
[ op ,ecre[
Near East and
South Asia Review
changes.
British military sales to Tehran in the last five years have been
limited, but have helped Iran maintain its military capabilities by
keeping some of its Western military hardware operational, and
they may secure London a stronger political position in Iran when
the war with Iraq ends or the clerical regime's political structure
25X1
25X1
cannot run the risk of being drawn into atwo-front war.
There are increasing signs that the faction-ridden Kurdish
opposition is coalescing; but, although the Iraqis plan to pacify the
Kurds this summer, a major assault is unlikely, since Baghdad
authors,
Some articles are preliminary views oj'a subject or speculative, but the contents
normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items
will be designated as noncoordinated views. Comments may be directed to the
i Top Secret
85-0/ 2JX
24 May 1985
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/12 :CIA-RDP85T01184R000301480002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/12 :CIA-RDP85T01184R000301480002-9
Top Secret
Iran-United Kingdom:
Military Trade
British military sales to Iran in the last five years have
been limited but have helped Tehran maintain its
military capabilities by keeping some of its Western
military equipment operational. British willingness to
provide spare parts and equipment to Tehran appears
designed to secure a stronger political position in Iran
when the war with Iraq ends or the political structure
of the clerical regime changes after Khomeini dies.
London's sales of defensive hardware-vehicles,
avionics, and air defense systems-to Tehran will
improve Iran's military capabilities against Iraqi and
US forces in the Persian Gulf region. The British
recognize that the spare parts and equipment they
provide are being used in military operations but
regard the improvement in Iranian military
capabilities as marginal.
UK-Iranian Trade
Iran was the United Kingdom's second-largest arms
customer before the war, buying $800 million in
hardware between 1970 and 1980. Major Iranian
purchases included 900 Chieftain tanks, 350 Scorpion
light tanks, a destroyer, four destroyer escorts, and
Rapier surface-to-air missile systems. Since the war
with Iraq began, the United Kingdom has provided
about 10 percent of Iran's arms purchases.
Trade with Iran is important to the United Kingdom,
and London maintains a very favorable overall
balance of trade with Tehran despite the war. In 1983
and the first three-quarters of 1984 Britain exported
over $1.7 billion in goods to Iran, while imports were
valued at $519 million. Over 90 percent of British
exports were manufactured goods, while oil accounted
for 82 percent of the imports from Iran.
Motivations
British Defense Secretary Heseltine has made a major
effort to encourage British arms sales in the Persian
Gulf region, including Iran, in large part because of
what London sees as fierce competition from other
potential suppliers. The British see obvious economic
benefits to their industries from such sales, but British
officials also have argued to US counterparts that a
link to Iran could provide leverage to the West by
avoiding the complete isolation of Tehran
We believe that the British view Iran as the naturally
dominant power in the Persian Gulf over the longer
term regardless of the outcome of the Iran-Iraq war
and the future of the Khomeini regime. London
probably wants to be in a position to take advantage
of ties to Iran in order eventually to have a stronger
position than other Western nations. The British
undoubtedly recognize that their spare parts are being
used for military purposes, but they appear convinced 25X1
that such use has only a mar final effect on the Iran-
Iraq conflict. 25X6
Official Military Sales
Since the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war in late 1980,
Tehran has purchased at least $200 million in
military hardware and spare parts from the United 25X1
Kingdom. Most of these deals have consisted of
helicopters, radars, spare parts, and ammunition. In
1983 Iran signed a $50 million contract with the 25X1
British firm Westland to purchase helicopters. 0
in November 25X1
1982 Iran placed an air defense radar purchased from
Britain on Khark Island. 25)(1
London also has supplied Iran with equipment 25X1
ordered by the Shah. Britain recently delivered the
Khark, a naval oiler, to Iran. In early May the United
Top Secret
- l 2JX
4 Mav 1985
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/12 :CIA-RDP85T01184R000301480002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/12 :CIA-RDP85T01184R000301480002-9
Top Secret
Kingdom delivered to Iran two landing support ships,
each capable of transporting nine tanks across the
Gulf.
Despite US demarches, $ritish officials told US
diplomats recently that the United Kingdom will sell
certain material such as trucks or spare parts that will
not improve Tehran's military capability.
purchase spare parts from US firms, particularly for
Fragmentary evidence does not provide a total figure
on the value of military-related purchases that the
Iranian mission in London buys from third countries
or on the gray arms market. We estimate, however,
that this office probably spends tens of millions of
dollars a year on such equipment.
International Gray-Market Arms Purchases
Iran's most important arms purchasing office is in
London
Iran.
Outlook
The British are unlikely to halt their military trade
with Iran despite US pressure. British officials have at
times shown much irritation over expressions of US
concern about arms sales and have responded that
Washington is overreacting to "minimal dealings."
Foreign Office officials have resisted pressure to halt
deals with Iran, and last summer some officials even
claimed that Washington was attempting to undercut
Britain's position in the Arab world by spreading
exaggerated accounts of the sales. We would also
expect the British to be sensitive about how the
United States acquires information about deals with
Although Baghdad will continue to have a wide edge
in firepower, equipment and spare parts from the
United Kingdom will improve Iranian capabilities
against Iraq. British spare parts will help Iran field
and maintain more armored vehicles. The Iranians
also have been pleased with the effectiveness of
helicopter attacks against Iraqi forces, and Iran
probably will adapt new "civilian" helicopters from
the United Kingdom to carry ordnance or transport
men. Large numbers of trucks will help Iran to move,
concentrate, and supply its forces
London office provides the Iranians with an important British-supplied or -manufactured parts and defensive
means to avoid the Western arms embargo that would weapons also could help Tehran maintain or perhaps
otherwise block Western firms or suppliers from even improve its air defenses, increasing the threat to
selling items directly to Iran. The Iranians, for
example, have used the London office to try to
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/12 :CIA-RDP85T01184R000301480002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/12 :CIA-RDP85T01184R000301480002-9
US operations in the Persian Gulf should there be a
confrontation. Replacement electronic components
would enable Iran to keep more of its aircraft
operational. Spare parts for British ground radars
already in Iran, new radars, or new antiaircraft
weapons would improve Tehran's ability to locate and
destroy aircraft over southern Iran.
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/12 :CIA-RDP85T01184R000301480002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/12 :CIA-RDP85T01184R000301480002-9
Iraq: Kurdish
Situation Worsens
There are increasing signs that the faction-ridden
Kurdish opposition is coalescing. The two major
Kurdish resistance groups have effected a
reconciliation after years of feuding. Iran, Syria, and
Libya support the rapprochement because they would
like to marshal the Kurdish guerrillas into a more
formidable force against Baghdad. The Iraqis plan a
"total campaign" to pacify the Kurds this summer,
but we believe a major assault is unlikely, since
Baghdad cannot run the risk of being drawn into a
two-front war.
Background
In early February, Iraq attacked the stronghold of the
second-largest Iraqi Kurdish resistance group, the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The Iraqi Army
moved in atwo-pronged assault against the guerrillas
concentrated around the Kurdish city of
Sulaymaniyah. Using bulldozers and dynamite,
military units leveled communities deemed
sympathetic to the PUK to destroy the guerrillas'
popular base. Within days after launching the assault,
the Iraqi military commander in charge of the
operation declared its successful conclusion
The guerrillas, however, were hardly defeated. They
mounted a major assault near the important southern
Iraqi city of Al Basrah, and Iraq pulled troops out of
Kurdistan to repel the Iranian attack, according to
US diplomats in Baghdad. As of this writing, the
PUK was continuing its rampage in the north.
Unity Among the Guerrillas
The PUK, led by guerrilla chief Jalal Talabani,
apparently was caught off guard by the Iraqi assault.
At the time Baghdad struck, Talabani's guerrillas had
been observing an uneasy truce with the Iraqis. In late
1983, Talabani had agreed to support Baghdad's war
effort in return for a grant of autonomy for Iraq's 2.5
million Kurds. Technically, the autonomy deal was
still pending when Baghdad unilaterally abrogated
the arrangement by attacking the guerrillas
Iraqi side, Barzani labeled him a traitor.
Baghdad probably believed that Talabani was
vulnerable to attack. His offer to discuss peace with
the government had isolated him his alliances with
Syria and Libya were severed by the two states as
soon as the truce with Iraq became public. In
addition, the truce intensified ill feeling between the
PUK and other Kurdish guerrilla groups, particularly
the largest group led by Masud Barzani. Barzani and
Talabani both aspire to lead Iraq's Kurdish
community, and, when Talabani went over to the
Nevertheless, when Baghad launched its assault
against Talabani, Barzani behaved with statesmanlike
restraint. He did not try to exploit his rival's
difficulty.
Baghdad responded to the guerrilla violence in March
by resuming its attacks on the local Kurdish
communities. Before the riposte was launched,
however, it had to be scaled back. Tehran had
-ot1~x
ati~
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/12 :CIA-RDP85T01184R000301480002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/12 :CIA-RDP85T01184R000301480002-9
Top secret
Pressure From the North
The reconciliation between the two strongest Iraqi
Kurdish guerrilla groups opens the way for Talabani
to join the anti-Baghdad front of Kurds and
Communists that Syria put together last summer.
This coalition of Kurds and Communists originally
numbered less than 10,000, fighters, with the bulk of
its cadres supplied by the Barzanis. If-as seems
likely-Talabani joins the front, its strength will swell
to over 10,000, and it will be able to contest Iraq's
control of the Kurdish north.
The rebels now occupy most of the territory from the
Turkish-Iraqi border to Mosul and Irbil and operate
in the area surrounding Sulaymaniyah. From Irbil
and Sulaymaniyah they threaten Kirkuk, Iraq's major
oil center. The US Embassy in Baghdad recently
reported that the Australian Ambassador required a
70-man escort during a recent visit to Irbil, and that
he was accompanied entering and leaving the city by
an armored column.
Outlook
Iraq's President Saddam Husayn is planning a major
offensive to pacify the Kurdish north
The magnitude of the offensive probably will depend
on the status of the war with Iran, but in any case we
doubt Iraq will be able to eradicate the guerrillas.
(With shoulder-fired ground-
to-air missiles and wire-guided antitank missiles, the
Kurds can inflict heavy losses on attacking Iraqi units.
regions until after the war.
Saddam has pursued a strategy throughout the war
with Iran of avoiding heavy casualties. It therefore
seems likely that, as soon as casualties begin to
mount, the Iraqis will break off hostilities with the
Kurds. They will choose instead to contain the
resistance, throwing a cordon across the Kurdish
north from Rawenduz in the east to Zakho in the
west. They will then defer pacification of the Kurdish
Even this strategy, however, may not prove effective.
Iraq must keep open the main roads through the
region, particularly the major highway to Turkey,
over which important commercial goods are
transported. It also must maintain control of the
major cities in the north. If the guerrillas cut the
roads or threaten the cities, Baghdad will have to
respond militarily and, thus, could be drawn into a
two-front war-which it has neither the manpower
nor the resources to wage. If this occurs, we expect it
will turn to the Turks for assistance.
rulers prefer to accommodate the Iranians.
Turkey-with a large and potentially rebellious
Kurdish population of its own-fears the Iraqi
Kurdish revolt will spill into its territory, and has
conducted a number of cross-border raids against the
Iraqi Kurds. [ran, however, has warned Turkey
against continuing these incursions. Tehran supports
the Kurds to reduce Iraqi military pressure on Iran
and to keep the Baghdad regime off balance. The
Turkish General Staff is urging the government to
keep up the cross-border raids, while Turkey's civilian
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/12 :CIA-RDP85T01184R000301480002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/12 :CIA-RDP85T01184R000301480002-9
Q
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/12 :CIA-RDP85T01184R000301480002-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/12 :CIA-RDP85T01184R000301480002-9
Too Secret
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/12 :CIA-RDP85T01184R000301480002-9