(SANITIZED)WORLD COMMUNIST AFFAIRS(SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000300040006-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 6, 2012
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: September 13, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

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13 September 1965
Briefly Noted 0000"
Power Sixth WFTU Conress
Fight
Brewing Soviet Communists will be
put to a severe test at
the Sixth WFI'U (World Fed-
eration of Trade Unions) Congress,
to be held in Warsaw from 8 to 22
October. Moscow-directed policy,
present and future, will be serious-
ly contested, especially on the
grounds of WFPU failure to capture
the interest of labor organizations
in Europe and developing areas, no-
tably in Africa and Latin America.
The Chicoms and their followers
will remain openly opposed to the
Soviet planned focus on "united ac-
tion" or penetration of non-Communist
labor movements. Rather than exclude
them from the Congress, Moscow will
more subtly use their (and others)
failure to pay dues as the excuse. for
economy moves. Actually, the reduc-
tion of activities is designed to
remove opposition to Soviet control
and to cover the basic switch in the
Soviet approach to the labor target.
These economy measures include.
personnel reductions at WFTU head-
quarters in Prague, closing of some
information offices, discontinuation
of publication of the WFTU organ,
Would Trade on Movement, notably
in'.Japan and Peking.
Rumania is stressing the role
of the labor union in economic plan-
ning in a Socialist state and perhaps
in response to this the WFTU has re-
cently been invited to take some part
(probably token) in CEMA affairs.
But the Italians pose the biggest
problem for continued Soviet control
because their reasons for coopera-
tion with non-Communist labor dif-
fer markedly. the CGIL wants to
concentrate on occupational matters;
the Soviet on ideological and polit-
ical. While the Soviets have led
the WFTU into greater efforts to
-Join non-communist organizations
(ILo, UNESCO), and invite non-
commies to occupational union meet-
ings (e.g., several Trade Union In-
ternationals), and have extended
their interest in regional and na-
tional trade union activity in
Europe and the developing areas,
the WFIU is still stridently polit-
ical [.e.g., at the ILO Geneva meet-
ing (2-24 June), the II Conference
of the International Trade Union
Committee for Solidarity with the
Workers and People of Vietnam
(Hanoi 2?7 July)]. There is no
indication that the Communist fac-
tion (PCI) in the CGIL will bolt,
but the Socialist (PSI) faction
could well revolt against Soviet
intransigence e 50X1-HUM
World
Federation of -Trade n ons (WFTU),"
noting especially the concluding
emphasis on exacerbation of dissen-
sions within European Communist
labor circles, East and West. We
add these points. what the Italians
say about Socialist countries as
models for workers should be drawn
to the attention of labor in devel-
oping areas, the implication being
that there are other models; WFTU
economy measures should be inter
preted, in dissident Communist
media, to mean that the Soviet funds
S E C R E T (Briefly Noted Cont.)
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for labor activity are now funneled
into other channels, in effect aid-
ing the "imperialists"; in non-
Communist labor groups, this should
come as a warning of possible Commu-
nist..penetration attempts.
Refuses to Cuban Ambassador
Represent Resigns
Castro's Cuba
Your attention is
invited to the
article from the London Times of 28
August 1965 (see Press Comment of
1 September) Tahich carries lengthy
extracts from the letter of resig-
nation of Cuban Ambassador to London,
Dr. Luis Ricardo Alonso Fernandez.
In an eloquent plea he asks Cuban
President Dorticos: "... why not
build [in the words of the intellec-
tual author of the Cuban Revolution,
Josh Marti] 'a republic with all and
for all, whose first law should be
respect for the dignity of man'?"
Watch for further material in Press
A copy of the Senate document
is available upon request. We think
it will prove to be a useful source
of facts and especially of quotations
demonstrating the nature of the Com-
munist menace to Latin America, the
concern of the governments of the
hemisphere, and their determination
to cope with the problem.
USSR Lauds Does Moscow Really
Rumanians Mean It?
Comment on this very important de-
fector from Communist Cuba.
L.A. Apprehension OAS Reports on
Documented Communist Sub-
version
The United
States Senate's
Committee on the Judiciary has just
published a reprint of various re-
ports originally issued by the Organ-
ization of American States, There
are five documents reproduced in the
Senate study, four relating to the
general pattern of Communist subver-
sion in the Western Hemisphere, and
a fifth report dealing with the out-
break of revolt in the Dominican
Republic and the OAS decision to
intervene.
According to the study, the
first report contained therein was
widely circulated by the OAS in
Spanish, Portuguese, and English,
but the others received only
distribution.
Moscow Radio broad-
cast to Rumania on
22 Aug 65 "the most cordial greet-
ings on the occasion of your nation-
al day ... The Rumanian people are
welcoming the 21st anniversary of
the country's liberation with a
great political and economic up-
surge."
Rumania's longstanding resist-
ance to the Moscow-sponsored Council
for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA),
which body sought to keep Rumania in
the role of pastoral breadbasket (and
producer of raw materials, notably
oil) for the Communist Bloc, culmi-
nated in a 22 Apr 65 "declaration of
independence" by the Rumanian CP Cen-
tral Committee. This declaration re-
jected the suggestion that Moscow
was the center of world communism
and stated that USSR-Rumanian rela-
tions must be based on "national
2
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independence and sovereignty, equal
rights, reciprocal gain, non-inter-
ference in internal affairs and
respect for territorial integrity."
Bucharest's anti-Sovietism was so
vigorous at this stage that there
was widespread fear of the Soviets
being actually provoked to forcible
intervention. Certainly Rumania led
the way in reducing CEMA to impotence.
It is therefore possible to be-
lieve that Moscow's applause off'
Rumania's political and economic pol-
icies is less than wholehearted or
sincere. Moscow's attempt to paint
"Socialist Rumania's" progress as a
triumph of "Leninist principles" also
has a hollow ring. Rumania's prog-
ress has been in direct proportion
to the degree of her escape from
Soviet domination and her abandon-
ment of orthodox Communist ideology.
Postponed II Afro-Asian Conference
or
Canceled? In its most recent effort
to ensure high level at-
tendance at the II Afro-
Asian Conference (AAC) scheduled for
5 November in Algiers, the Algerian
Government held consultations in
Asian capitals, notably Peking, and
then dispatched (in late August)
seven new diplomatic teams into the
Afro-Arab world. A major problem is
Ghana's move to postpone the OAU Sum-
mit in Accra to 21 October, just be-
fore the AAC. Algerians feel that
this would steal some of the thunder
from the AAC and argue that the OAU
should come after it. Even if a
sizable proportion of Africans con-
cur with the Algerians, Ghana is
not likely to yield.
Those Africans who agree with
Algeria may just be interested in
avoiding the OAU meeting. The En-
tente states (former French colonies
of the OCAM group), for example,
remain disinterested in the AAC
while others -- including ? Arab
states at this time -- seem inclined
to favor only low level representa-
tion. No matter what Foreign Min-
ister Bouteflika's teams urge, most
Arabs will follow Nasser's example.
Although Soviet-Algerian re-
lations are not overly warm (e.g.,
the Soviet press publicized the
fire at the Club des Pins, where
the AAC is supposed to be held,
implying that the security situa-
tion there remains questionable;
an official Algerian visit to Mos-
cow has been indefinitely post-
poned), the Soviets will want to
be present if the AAC convenes.
It may be assumed that further
efforts were made to induce Nasser
to support Soviet participation
during his recent visit to Moscow
and Belgrade. 50X1-HUM
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PKI's Sukarno S onsors Another
Front Chinese Communist Conference
Man
The Indonesian Communist
Party (PKi) newspaper Harian
Rakjat has announced that the Indo-
nesian Peace Committee, one of the
PKI's front organizations, will spon-
sor an "International Anti-Foreign
Military Base Conference" in Dja-
karta October 10-15, 1965. The con-
ference is being held under the pa-
tronage of President Sukarno who
will deliver the opening address.
It will reportedly be attended by
representatives of Communist Front
groups from more than 50 countries.
The Indonesians and Chicoms have
teamed up for several similar confer-
ences in Djakarta over the past few
years and they have developed smooth
techniques for controlling and man-
ipulating the delegates to the con-
ference. It is anticipated that one
of the main objectives of this con-
ference will be to denounce the U.S.
role in Vietnam and the "British
colonialist project," Malaysia. It
may also serve as a dress rehearsal
for the Afro-Asian "Bandung" confer-
ence scheduled for Algiers at the
beginning of November. The confer-
ence will not discuss the fact that
both Peking and Moscow, whose own
vast territories are contiguous with
that of multitudinous countries,
have subversive bases in almost all
countries of the world in the form
of local Communist Parties and front
groups, with their own guerrilla or
paramilitary capabilities.
Communist Blueprint for World Aggression
Wolfgang Leonhard's Child of the Revolution is a
detailed account of the manner in which the State
apparatus of a Communist country trains exiled
rebels of other lands in techniques, tactics and
ideology against the day when they may be returned
to lead "civil wars" against legitimate governments.
The graduates of these Stalin days still rule in
many East European countries; and they together with
the USSR, ComChina and Cuba carry on the tradition
of training foreign rebels to subvert their homelands.
Shao-T'ang Liu's Out of Mao's China gives an autobio-
graphical account of a more limited experience -- the
year 19+9-1950 in a military-propaganda office in Red
China. It is again pertinent reading for current
affairs.
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ignIficant Dates
OCT.
3 '20th anniversary, adoption of statute of World Federation of Trade
Unions WFTU) at founding congress, Paris, 3 Oct 1945. (Communist)
8 6th WFTU Congress, Warsaw, 8-22 Oct.
10 International Meeting for Opposing Foreign Military Bases (Kiapma),
Djakarta, 10-15 October, sponsored by Chicom oriented Indonesia Peace
Committee (Communist)
14 Russia signs treaty with Finland, recognizing Finnish independence
and sovereignty. 1920.
17 22nd Congress of CPSU. Khrushchev and Chou En-lai clash on Stalinism
and Albania. 17-31 Oct 1961.
19 Political upheaval in Poland defies Kremlin and places Gomulka at
head of party and government. 1956.
20 Chicom troops begin advance into India, escalating border war. With-
drawal announced 21 November. 1962.
21 III Annual Organization of African Unity (OAU) Summit, Accra, origi-
nally scheduled for early Sept.
21 UN condemns Chicom suppression of Tibet. 1959,
22 President Kennedy calls for OAS and UN Security Council meetings over
offensive missile site build up in Cuba. Soviet's agree to withdraw
missiles 28 Oct. 1962
23 UN General Assembly convenes first session (part two) at Lake Success,
1946.
23 Orderly student demonstration in Hungary becomes national anti-Soviet
uprising when Soviet tanks fire. (See 1 Nov). 1956
26 Chinese Communist "volunteers" intervene against UN forces sweeping
through North Korea. 1950
29 KOMSOMOL (Communist Union of Youth) established. 1918
NOV.
1 Hungarian Revolt 1-4 (see 23 Oct above). 1956
it. UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) estab-
lished, 1946.
4 Greek Civil War ends with Communist acknowledgement of defeat. 1949
7 UN Emergency Force established, ending Suez Crisis. 1956
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a t b K L I
COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS
~+X
Commentary
Principal Developments:
18-31 August 1965
1. Polemics are restrained. The Chinese publish Volume 8 of
Khrushchev's Statements without editorial comment and publicize a long,
harsh anti-CPSU editorial from Japanese CP organ Akahata. Soviet Kom-
munist and Pravda articles repeat the call for unity and -- indirectly
-- deplore Chinese conduct.
2. A series of top-level bilateral CP meetings are announced,
mostly on the Soviet side. CPSU leaders in Moscow met the chiefs of
the Italian, French, East German and West German parties, all announced
as being in the Soviet Union on vacation: the Czech and Rumanian bosses
are due in September on official party-state visits. All are said to
have "exchanged opinions" on questions of mutual interest: only in the
case of West German Reimann is there reference to "unanimityg" In the
opposing camp, two Japanese CP leaders and wives are feted in Peking.
3. Pro-Chinese factionalism advances in two West European parties.
Nuova Unita, monthly organ of the Italian Communist dissidents, calls
for the constitution of "a new Marxist-Leninist Party" and carries a
statement by one of the PCI local sections resigning unanimously to
"adhere to the new M-L Movement." And Swedish dissident leader Holm-
berg begins publishing a new organ, Marxist Forum.
4. Around the world, the Indonesian CP takes a new initiative in
a message to the Burmese CP prodding it to "launch efforts to crush the
modern revisionists," who, together with the imperialists,"are the prin-
cipal enemy of the ICM."
5. A clandestine report says that a group of West European Com-
munists met in Luxemburg 7 August in response to the Swiss CP initia-
tive to discuss the founding of a new "Internationale Revolutionnaire"
-- as had been forecast by earlier reports (see #59). Reportedly, they
drafted and mailed to various Communist elements around the world a
"manifesto" which denounces both the Soviet and Chinese Parties and
calls for a renaissance of revolutionary theses on a national Communist
basis. It includes a strong denunciation of the Belgian Jacques Grippa,
who has been the most active and successful pro-Chinese Communist in
Western Europe`. Text not yet available here.
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Significance:
The pattern of international Communist activity during this period
befitted the summer vacation time, the uncertain leadership in the
Kremlin, possibly also Peking's preoccupation with Vietnam. A continu-
ing lull in polemics, but considerable personal contacts by Party leaders.
We note further evidence of the trend toward fragmentation, especially in
Western Europe, where pro-Chinese elements have apparently made some ad-
vances and the Swiss CP initiative toward forming a new "third force"
alignment between the Soviets and Chinese seems to have moved a first
step forward. (The latter seems to be a small-scale move by a group of
independent opportunists or malcontents which may not go far: neverthe-
less, it could add significantly to the confusion, ferment, and fragmenta-
tion already rampant in Communist and left socialist circles.)
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CHRONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS
18-31 August 1965
50X1-HUM
June delayed): Nuova Unita, monthly journal of the pro-Chinese dis-
sident 1 Italian Marxist-Leninist Movement" carries an article by
Alberto Bucco attacking PCI discussion of creating a new unified party
of the left as a "plan for the liquidation of the Party" which demon-
strates clearly that "the situation of the Party is grave and the
relations with the masses very weak."
"At present, the modern reformists are seeking, not very
skillfully, to mask their political failure and the liquidation
of principles with the 'discovery' of the 'unified party.' As
the prestidigitator, to enchant the public, draws a rabbit
out of the hat, so the leadership of the PCI, in order to
deceive the masses once more, draws from its worn revisionist
hat the 'little rabbit' of the organic unity of all socialist
forces. Rabbits, as is known, are prolific, and the leader-
ship of the PCI is dreaming up millions and millions of
revisionist rabbits which will meet in the great rabbitry of
the 'unified party.' And thus the plan for the liquidation
of principles will be decisively advanced....
.... This signifies that one is ready to join a fake
unity with all and abandon openly the M-L conception of the
state, the central Leninist idea to destroy the bourgeois
state machine and create a new one, the Leninist theory of
the conquest of power, and the conception of the dictator-
ship of the proletariat as the indispensable condition for
the Leninist transformation of society. These principles are
established Points of thought and of revolutionary experience,
and to modify and abandon them implies inevitably ... the
transformation of the PCI into a social democratic rubbish
heap....
It is necessary to constitute a new M-L Party...."
This issue also carries a statement signed by Secretary Dallaguda
of the PCI Piacenca Section announcing that "we have decided unani-
mously to resign from the PCI and to adhere to the new M-L Movement,"
inasmuch as
"It has now become clear to all of us that the bureaucracy
and leadership of the PCI, faithful to the bitter end to
(Chronology Cont.)
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Khrushchevian policy, are sliding even farther down the slope
of revisionism and opportunism...."
Jul, 17 (delayed): Finnish CP daily KsnsenUutiset, which in recent
months has carried an increasingly open discussion of Party policies,
publishes a sharp challenge to the leadership by Toivo Ryhanen under
the heading "Clarification Is Wanted."
"... If we as a party adopt peaceful transition as the
main orientation, then that principle ought to be clearl
recorded in the p rogramns of the Party.... Of the matters on
which a new and clear standpoint is needed, I list the following:
(1) The Number of Parties. ... the Finnish CP should state
that ... there obviously will be several political parties in
Finland and that freedom of opposition will be guaranteed....
A monopoly of a single party can readily lead to bureaucracy
and intellectual lifelessness, and it impedes progress.
(2) Dictatorship of the Proletariat. ... The FCP should
therefore make it known, even in its program, that we do not
pose the establishing of a dictatorship of the proletariat in
Finland as one of our goals.
(3) Vanguard Position of the Party. ... The responsibility
of leadership in a peaceful transition to socialism does not
rest alone with the CP; it is basically a form of operational
unity between socialists and Communists ....
(4) The Content of Socialism. ... Is it to be a form of
Stalinist rule by force, or democratic socialism? ...
(5) Party Internal Democracy.
(6) Reforms. ... the political struggle will be waged
mainly in the sphere of reform policies. Its value must not
be diminished through the expounding of false revolutionary
,premises....
July 23-29 (delayed): Swedish CP weekly Ny Dag article signed PF
reveals that pro-Chinese Swedish Communist dissident leader Nils
Hol.rner is now publishing a newspaper (sic) entitled Marxist Forum
which 'is all through extremely hostile to the SKP, and naturally
above all to its Chairman C. H. Hermansson."
August 18: TASS reports that Italian CP Gensecy Longo, "who is now
spending his vacation in the USSR,' held a "comradely exchange of~~
views" with Brehnev, Suslov and Ponomarev in Moscow on the 17th on
questions of interest in both parties and on urgent international
problems and the ICM."
2 (Chronology Cont.)
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&?st 19: The CPSU again urges unity and -- indirectly and in a low
key -- deplores Chinese conduct in an editorial in Kounist No. 12
and a Pravda article signed by I. Pomelov. The Kommunist editorial,
entitled Soviet Foreign Policy and Social Progress acknowledges
that "ter.:porary differences ... may arise in the socialist community,
which consists of countries with different historical conditions of
development and different initial levels from which they started their
socialist construction," saying that "the Soviet Union takes account
of this in its policy" and "respects the sovereignty of the fraternal
countries and the national dignity of the peoples." "The CC of our
Party continues and will go on exerting persistent efforts to rally
together the countries of the socialist community.... Our Party and
people believe that in the present situation it is necessary not
to brine le differences to a head artificially, but to do everything
possible for joint actions...." Pomelov, whose article is pegged to
the 30th anniversary of the 7th Comintern Congress, quotes from its
resolution to convey his message:
"... It is of prime importance to follow a principled M-L
policy and flexible tactics, taking into account the concrete
conditions, to wage a resolute struggle against right-wing
opportunism, dogmatism., and sectarianism. To achieve a united
front in reality, Communists must overcome complacent
sectarianism in their own ranks, which at the present moment
in a number of instances is no longer an infantile disease
but an ingrained vice...."
A Yugoslav I AZst commentary on Chinese policy toward the
developing countries accuses the Chinese leaders of "trying to impose
their influence and concepts"'on these countries to serve China's
"interests of great-power policy" and to "bring about its hegerionistic
projects."
NCNA D a reports on an 18 August Indonesian CP jKIJ release
covering a press conference of PKI Chairman Aidit with "50 Afro-Asian
and Latin American journalists" on the 16th. In reply to a question
on polemics, Aidit is quoted as saying: "I think it would have been
a__ pity if the -polemics had been discontinued. From the open polemics
the Communists of Indonesia have come to realize what modern revi-
sionism actually is.... If the open polemics had not taken place,
we might now have become revisionists without knowing it."
August 22: Inozemtsev in Pravda (according to a TASS summary)
rebuffs bourgeois propaganda which claims that capitalism and social-
ism are varieties of the same 'industrial civilization' and that the
process of development tends to bring socialism and capitalism 'closer
together''.
TASS announces that Brezhnev, Suslov, and Ponomarev met on
21 Aug with French CP GenSecy Rochet, who is resting in the
3 (Chronology Cont.)
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Soviet Union." "In a friendly conversation, opinions were exchanged
on questions of interest to both parties."
Radio Bucharest announces that Italian CP GenSecy Longo left for
home after a two-day visit, during which he had a meeting in "a warm,
comradely atmosphere" with Ceausescu, Maurer, and Niculescu-Mazil
"on problems of interest to both parties."
August 24: East German ADN reports that &ED First Secy Ulbricht,
who is in the Soviet Union on a vacation," met "in an atmosphere of
cordial and fraternal harmony" with Brezhnev and Suslov. "Opinions
were exchanged on questions concerning both parties."
Peking announces publication of Volume 8 of Statements by
Khrushchev, containing 34 items "made public from January to April 1958."
August 26: Radio Bucharest announces that a Party-Government delegation
headed by SecyGen Ceausescu will make "an official visit" to the USSR
in September.
August 27: TASS announces that Brezhnev met with First Secy Reimann
of the CP of West) Germany, "who is now spending a vacation in the
USSR.," "marked by an atmosphere of friendly unanimity."
Pravda publishes a statement by the Brazilian CP reaffirming
support of the decisions of the 19-party March meeting in Moscow,
advocating an end to open polemics, and endorsing "another inter-
national meeting at an appropriate time."
UAR President Nasir arrives in Moscow on a state visit.
August 28: Prague Radio announces that a Novotny-led party-state dele-
gation will visit the Soviet Union "at the beginning of September."
A_akarta MUZ& announces that PKI Chairman Aidit sent a cable of
congratulations To the Burmese CP on the occasion of the latter's
26th anniversary. He "expressed hope that the BCP would be in a
position to launch successful efforts to crush the modern revi-
sionists,"who , as he put it, "constitute the twin of the imperialists
and are the principal enemy of the ICM."
August -29-30: Close ChiCom relations with the Japan
28 ese CP are
reflected in: an NCNA Peking report on the 2 th of a warm reception
by GenSecy Teng Hsiao-ping, Politburo Member Peng Chen and other high
CCP officials for JCP Presidium and Secretariat Member Hakamada,
Secretariat Member Sunama and wives- and Peking's publication of a
14 August Akahat apaane es CP daily article entitled "The Modern
Revisionists' Theory of War and Peace and Its Judgement by History,"
with an NCNA sunmlary oii the 29th and the full text (half a page) in
People's Daily on the 30th. As NCNA says, "the article exposes the
moves made by the new leadership of the CPSU to remedy Khrushchev's
absurd excesses, and its new maneuvers to carry on the policy of
opportunism, splittism, and big-nation chauvinism."
4 (Chronology.)
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SEC R E T 13 September 1965
REFUGEES: A TOOL IN VIET CONG AGGRESSION
The Refugee Problem in South Vietnam
President Johnson has announced that he is sending Dr.
Howard Rusk to South Vietnam to survey the needs and requirements of
refugees with the purpose of developing plans to expand U.S. assistance
to the South Vietnamese government in this area. Dr. Rusk, Director of
New York University Medical Center's Institute of Physical Medicine and
Rehabilitation, performed a similar service for the United Nations in
Korea when the Chicoms and North Koreans attacked South Korea and drove
millions of people from their homes.
The refugee problem has plagued South Vietnam since its earliest
days. In 1954 when the country was partitioned at the 17th Parallel
with a Communist government to be installed in the North and a non-
Communist government in the South, close to a million people fled their
homes in the North rather than remain and face life under Communist rule.
The South Vietnamese government undertook to resettle these people and
assist them in building a new life for themselves. It was not an easy
task, particularly since the South Vietnamese authorities were confronted
with other complex problems at the same time. Steady progress was
achieved, however, and by about 1960 the refugees from the North were
mostly resettled and self-supporting.
No sooner had that refugee problem been settled than another one
began to assume major proportions. As the Viet Cong stepped up their
insurrection against the Vietnamese Government, they increased their use
of terrorism, maiming and killing peasants and villagers, expropriating
their rice and property, and threatening the people in diverse ways.
Word of Viet Cong actions spreads through the rural areas and the peas-
ants flee their homes in increasing numbers to seek refuge in areas con-
trolled by the central government. It is estimated that there are over
400,000 such refugees at this time and that the number is increasing at
the rate of 70,000 per month. If this rate continues some 840,000 re-
fugees per year will have to be cared for. If Viet Cong terrorism con-
tinues to increase, the number will go even higher.
The South Vietnamese Ministry of Social Welfare has been made re-
sponsible for administering the government program to provide for these
refugees. They have allocated about 25 kilos [approx. 55 lbs] of rice
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SECRET
per month to every refugee over two years old. After the food require-
ment, the Vietnamese government has made housing the number one priority
and an extensive construction program has been started.
In addition to the daily needs of the refugees, a recent survey
indicates that 35 schools must be built to take care of the refugee
children and that a suitable teaching staff must be assembled; sanita-
tion facilities in the refugee camps are inadequate and must be improved;
water wells must be dug; orphanages must be built; and medical services
must be provided. All of these tasks would be difficult enough under
normal circumstances. They place a monumental burden on a government
and people forced to defend themselves against Communist attack.
Recently completed studies indicate that over $8.5 million has
already been spent in providing for the refugees from the Viet Cong
terrorism. The US government is currently allocating some $12 million
to provincial Vietnamese authorities for their use in this field. It
is estimated that the current plans of the US and Vietnamese Governments
to expand their efforts to meet the needs of the refugees will come to
well over $20 million. But the cost is not in money alone: scarce re-
sources of trained leadership and material are being expended.
The Communist forces are not burdened by such considerations. On
the contrary, they gain from the additional drain they place upon their
adversary. In times of danger, people do not flee to, but f r o m
Communist controlled areas for they have come to learn that the Com-
munists have no tolerance for nor interest in their problems, nor are
they willing to divert any of their funds or other resources to the
comfort or rehabilitation of war refugees, (See unclassified attach-
ments for statements by Leo Cherne and Donald Luce on the Vietnamese
refugee problem. These statements were made to the US Senate Judiciary
Committee, but need not necessarily be attributed as such because Cherne's
and Luce's organizations have published the statements independently.
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SECRET 13 September 1965
.THE KONbSONDL -- THE SOVIET UNION'S MONOPOLY 50X1 -H
ON YOUTH A IVITIES
The Komsomol is not an organization created to help
students in their various problems. It is an organization created by
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for the purpose of getting and
keeping the Soviet youth within the party's control. It accomplishes
this by maintaining a monopoly control over the paths to advancement in
every field; and it also accomplishes this by virtue of its power to pun-
ish those who get out of line. The Komsomol also fulfills a vital role
,in Soviet economics: it recruits youth corvees to develop the virgin
lands and to build fertilizer factories and it provides the organizational
capability to oversee their performance. A further important function of
the Komsomol is its role in selecting, training and testing future cadres
for the Party and the government. Finally, the Komsomol is in charge of
all relationships of Soviet youth with foreigners. It controls the
chief international Communist youth fronts, the World Federation of Demo-
cratic Youth (WFDY), and the International Union of Students (IUS).50X1 -HUM
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ument Denied
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'!'llI tt1: i Olt`I Tit
1 ti~ 1, 1965
the New Communist
Propaganda Strategy
PARIS
711E POET Robert Lowell has re-
fused to attend a gala at the
White House," a front-page editorial
in the Communist l'Humanitd ex-
ulted recently. "... Six other Pulitzer
Prize winners, painters, composers,
critics, and twenty writers or artists
have associated themselves with his
gesture. . . . These twenty intellec-
tuals not only, do America honor;
they are humanity's chances for
peace. And we on our side do not
begrudge them our admiration."
This unusual testimonial to the non.
Communist protest movement in
the United States, signed by Andre
Wurmser, one of the French Party's
leading journalistic hatchet-men, was
naturally balanced with attacks on
the Johnson administration's foreign
policy. Even so, a hasty reader might
have been impressed by the apparent
sincerity of Wurmser's. disclaimer of
any anti-American intent. Impressed,
that is, until he turned to the third
page, which featured reports on dem-
onstrations or meetings organized
throughout the country ley the Com-
munist-controlled Peace Movement.
In Marseilles, the newspaper noted,
a crowd of several hundred persons
demonstrated on the Canebi@re
against the arrival in port of a
United States warship. Another street
demonstration at Ivry in the Paris
suburbs was punctuated, according
to the paper, with cries of "Peace in
Vietnam," "U.S. Assassins," "Out
with the 'Ricains (Americans.)"
A Concerted Attack
Talking out of both sides of the
mouth is not exactly a new accom-
plishnient for l'Humanitd or for
Communist propaganda in general.
In recent years, however, the hate-
America line, the basic theme of So-
viet psychological warfare during
TAYLOR
the Korean war, has been so muffled
under layers of Khrushchevian coex-
istence that a number of supposedly
hard-minded western policymakers
thought it had disappeared for good.
Its recent vicious revival is a phe-
nomenon that does not yet appear
to have received adequate attention
either from the United States's allies
abroad or from campus critics of the
Johnson administration at home or
from the administration itself.
It is only within the last month
or so that signs of a coherent offen-
sive strategy have become apparent
behind Communist propaganda and
subversive tactics in Europe. There
was, naturally, some ? ranting in the
Communist press about the U.S.
bombing of North Vietnam and the
dispatch of marines to Santo Do-
mingo; there were meetings and
street demonstrations in various
countries, including France. But to
experienced students of Communist
propaganda the campaign, if it could
be called that, had an essentially de-
fensive character: All the party really
seemed concerned about was to show
the European masses that its heart
still bled for the victims, of imperi-
alism, despite Peking's insinuations
to the contrary. Sophisticated Euro-
pean leftists were not taken in. "The
Sino-Soviet split has paralyzed the in-
ternational Communist movement,"
declared the weekly Nouvel Observa-
teur. ". . . Its inability to react is
creating a kind of vacuum in his-
tory."
Gradually Moscow's anti-U.S. line
toughened. Borrowing a favorite tac-
tic of certain Gaullist publications,
the official Communist organs in
France and elsewhere in Europe re-
pudiated anti-Americanism while
stuffing their columns with written
or pictorial matter calculated to
make the United States look odious
and contemptible. The Soviet-con-
trolled rumor-mills and forgery
plants in western Europe which had
been idling in the last few years be-
gan to step up their output. One
hitherto unheard-of literary agency
has been calling up prospective cli-
ents in Paris to offer documents
allegedly filched from official archives
and said to prove that President
Roosevelt's State Department helped
finance the Franco revolution in .
1936.
T HE STRATEGIC GOAL of this new
propaganda offensive emerged in
an editorial signed. by Jeannette
Thorez-Vermeersch, Maurice Thorez'
widow, which appeared in 1'Human-
itd on June 2. "By the admission of
the American leaders themselves," the
editorial declared, "their [foreign]
military bases are not . . . intended
to insure peace, to defend the coun-
tries in question against an eventual
aggression, but to impose on them by
violence governments subject to the
United States...." The recom-
mended counter-strategy for French
patriots was summed up in the arti-
cle's title: U.S. Go Home.
The familiar slogan has some new
trimmings that promise to give it
-at least in France-a far greater
potential for subverting the Atlantic
Alliance than it has possessed in
the past. For one thing, Mine.
Thorez-Vermeersch's editorial, re-
flecting current Kremlin policy di-
rectives, was peppered with catch-
words borrowed from Gaullist pro-
paganda and seemingly addressed
more to the nationalist than to the
revolutionary sentiments of 1'Hu-
manitd's readers. It appeared, more-
over, precisely ,at the moment when
Paris was buzzing with rumors that
President de Gaulle would soon de-
mand the withdrawal of American
troops from French soil or that of
SHAPE headquarters. The Commu-
nist intent apparently is at once
to force de Gaulle's hand and to
sow suspicion of him in the minds
of his allies by creating the false
impression that his nationalist poli-
cies are secretly inspired by Moscow.
Anything that can be exploited by
Communist propaganda to exacer-
bate French suspicion or disapproval
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gle, provided it is an anti-American
angle. An editorial in Le Monde on-
the success of Gemini IV must have
seemed to Communist and Gaullist
anti-American specialists a master-
piece of its kind, Was there not, the,
editorial asked, "some kinship be-
tween the Big Stick which the U.S.
is brandishing here and there and
the brutal acceleration of the space
program?"
n
e
s
t .. c c e. r. ,a 4. z s to n h Anxiety and Forecast
meeting took place in Geneva be-
tween Waldeck Roclhet, Thorez' nom- Viewed against this background, the
inal successor as head of the French danger of the Atlantic Alliance being
Corm-nuhhist party, ;in(] Luigi Longo, gravely damaged by cultivated doubts
secretary of the italiatr party, to of American leadership seems great-
coordinate the anti-American ac- er than Washington realizes, and the
tivities of their respect.iv.c organiza- need for counter-measures of various
tions. From time -, to 1, delegations kinds more urgent. The aid the en-
iroin eighteen West.> rsh 1:uropcan enties of America are getting from
nations held an extraordinary con- irresponsible, hysterical, and misin-
ference in Brussels which among formed domestic criticism of the
other actions called for the launch- administration's foreign policy is il-
ing of ""an immense eti`ort" to pro- lustrated by the editorial in l'Hu-
mote the campaign. Significantly, inanitc; that has been cited. But there
the final resolution of The conference can be no doubt that the admin-
called special attention to those istration itself has supplied the anti.
western European countries 'most AtttCrictatt propagandists in Europe
of whose govern rents are continu- with some of their most effective
ing to support in fact the aggressive . ammunition. Any resolute opposi-
olicies of American imperialism." tion to Communist expansionism is,
Dc:14pite the allusion to tine NATO of course, bound to draw psycholog-
governments that have refrained-?- ical fire from the enemy and arouse
unlike the French one--from criti- apprehension among the more
c,izing U.S. policies in Vietnam and. faint-hearted of our allies. Brash
Santo Domingo, there is reason to declarations of what the London
believe that France has act tally been Times has called "American omnipo-
selected by the i'ienilin strategists tence" are not likely to improve mat-
as the most promising theatre in ters. To be sure, the more sophisti-
;,urnpe for a major political break- cared European observers realize that
tl~rou;*fh, '"f'he choice is understand much of the tough talk out of Wash-
able when one remembers that the ington is often mere bureaucratic
taullist. high, command here is opportunism on the part of officials
waging, for quite different reasons, who used to profess just as loudly
a parallel anti-American campaign how much we loved the Russians
that inevitably reinforces the one and vice versa, but that does not
directed from 14toscow. make it any less unpleasant to their
Moreover, the pro-Chinese, Cas- ears.
trois`, and Yugoslav Communist We likewise appear to suffer, at
all have significant bridge- least in Europe, from a consistent
beads in the French intellectual inadequacy in the presentation of
world, and however much they may our policies. As a consequence, there
insult one another, they still pitch in is a good deal of doubt. about both
with a, common accord to blacken our motives and our capabilities. To
the United States image whenever thoughtful Europeans one of the
possible. And then there is the most disturbing things about a num-
strongly entrenched French neutral- her of our mistakes is the impres-
ist contingent which is always ready Sion that they stem basically from
to examine a situation from any an- the absence of any broad political
K the United States obviously helps
increase the hresnire for the elimina-
t: prk , f American ba;c c htire?, which
to turn strengthens American doubts
about Gaullist France as an ally.
N -cro observers are roovinced. that
the campaign is, being directed from
Moscow on a E.urol-tean, or even
worldwide basis. Recent dispatches
from it special corr.'spondent of
l' HIuntanite' in the Soviet Union
'
thi
l 1 t
tl
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than in the military or economic portant combat commands in Viet.
sector, they cannot help having mis- nam and Algeria. Writing early this
givings about the quality of Ameri- month in Le Figaro, Beaufre did
communist threat. Since in their
judgment the threat lies primarily
in the field of political warfare rather
istration's failure to impose more
effective verbal discipline on U.S.
officers and officials abroad, by the
can leadership of the free world.
These doubts are aggravated by what
the Europeans consider to be our in Vietnam or argue that victory is
unimaginative counter-guerilla doc- hopeless. He voiced some fear, how.
trine in Vietnam, by the admin. ever, that too much reliance on con-
growing sophistication of Commu-
nist political-warfare techniques.
Even without some of the errors
of execution that have been com-
lack of any effective machinery for
on U.S. policy comes from General
Andre Beaufre, former deputy chief
of staff at SHAPE, who has held im-
not condemn the American policy
of increased military commitment
ventional military doctrines and too
little imagination in seeking political
solutions may lead us into a costly
impasse. He depicted Chinese strat-
coordinating press statements in egy as being primarily aimed at in-
Washington and in the field, and by flitting a political or psychological
the apparent failure of the rnt and defeat on the United States in order
the CIA to keep up with the ever- to discredit Soviet leadership in the
Communists and Gaullists have been
vigorously exploiting against us. One
encounters Europeans-even French-
men---who can find excuses for Pres-
ident Johnson's decision, or who
honestly believe that it may turn out
on balance to the advantage of the
West, but this reporter at least has
yet to meet one who believes that
it was absolutely necessary or whole-
p
ly justifiable. What especially dis- posing a nuclear U.S. to a virtually
turbs the sincere friends of the United non-nuclear China, while the USSR
States about our Santo Domino would tend to become the leader of
e
in the struggle against Communist
expansionism.
ONE of the most significant and
constructive French comments
weaken our position in Vietnam
.which is considered a more impor-,
tant and a more dangerous theatr
policy is the fear that it will tend 'to A third-force neutralist bloc englob-
Communist world. The Soviets on
their side, Beaufre believes, are wait-
ing for Peking to over-reach itself
and provoke the United States into
mitted, it is certain that our inter- direct attacks on China. There would
vention in Santo Domingo would be little risk of such a conflict esca-
still have aroused the wide moral lating into a general nuclear war,
and political disapproval that both in Beaufre's opinion, but it would
not end the guerilla menace in Asia,
and regardless of what material dam-
age the United States inflicted on
China it would be a disaster for the
West. ""The present world equilib-
rium would be profoundedly upset,"
lie concluded. "The system existing
since 1945 with the United States
rind the USSR forming its two poles
would probably give way to one o
-
ing a large part of the 'third world'
and of Europe.... I hope that our
American friends in directing. their
effort toward the Far East will not
lose sight of the possible conse-
quences of their decision for Europe
and for the world."
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ENCOU1 'ER
April 1965
Z. K. Brzezinski
Peaceful Engagement
A Plan For Europe's Future
HE C O L D W A R in Europe has lost its
Told meaning. It had vitality and passion as
long as either side had reason to believe that
it could prevail and felt genuinely threatened
by the other. Neither condition truly exists to-
day. The West feels that it cannot remove the
Communist regimes in East Europe, re-unify
Germany, or, most important of all, eliminate
the Soviet presence on the banks of the Elbe
by direct political action. The Communists, and
particularly the Soviet leaders, now privately
discount the likelihood of Communist revolu-
tions in the West. The two Soviet rebuffs suf-
fered in Berlin-in 1948-49 and again in 1958-62
-have had much the same effect on Communist
expectations as the passivity of the West during
the East German uprising of 1953 and during
the Hungarian revolution of 1956 had on
Western hopes.
Yet the status quo in Europe is far from
satisfactory. The division of Europe on the Elbe
TIIE READER of the two comprehensive
articles by Richard Lowenthal on "Has the
Revolution a Future?" (ENCOUNTER, January
and February) could scarcely help putting a
question-in view of these radical changes in
the present political situation what, then, can
and must be done? With this new study of
the tragic East-West partition, we offer for
discussion a bold and dramatic plan for the
future of Europe. Professor Brzezinski, a
well-known member of Columbia University,
has been travelling extensively in Eastern and
Western Europe. His most recent books are
The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (Pall
Mall, London), and Political Power: USA/
USSR (Chatto & Windus and Viking); his
article on "How to Control a Deviation"
appeared in the September x963 ENCOUNTER.
is unnatural, unhistorical, and contrary to pre-
sent trends favouring not only European econo-
mic and then political unification, but also the
rapidly spreading psychological sense of Euro-
pean unity. Hardly anyone in Europe, on either
side of the river Elbe, is willing to argue that
the division is in the interest of Europeans, and
this includes even the Russians. It certainly is
not in the interest of peace.
Yet policies derived from past illusions, fears,
and aspirations freeze both sides on the dividing
line. Meanwhile, the danger mounts that the
East, frustrated ideologically, torn by internal
divisions, will turn against itself, with the pos-
sibility of bitter political explosions. The West
at the same time becomes increasingly divided.
Its former unity of purpose, born largely out
of fear of Russian aggression, is dissipated in a
destructive feud over priorities, objectives, and
interests. Western spasms of resolve reinforce
Soviet insecurity while Western irresolution re-
awakens Soviet offensive hopes. Both postures
serve to perpetuate artificially and pointlessly
the European partition.
Tua SOVIET ATTITUDE is still wedded.to the ex-
pectation that West Europe will fragment,. and
accordingly Soviet policy in Europe still makes
the achievement of that fragmentation its prin-
cipal objective. German policy, influenced by
narrow national perspectives, remains com-
mitted to the pursuit of basically contradictory
goals, "reunification" and (formally, at least)
frontier revision, with the latter having the
effect of stimulating Polish and Czech support
for the division of Germany. The French en-
visage a- "Europe to the Urals," but by seeking
simultaneously to exclude America from Europe,
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are fragmenting Western unity, re-awakening
Soviet offensive hopes, and denying themselves
the necessary Western wherewithal for the pur-
suit of this grand goal. The British seem to
speak simultaneously in terms of the Anglo-
American alliance and European disengage-
ment. The United States, having abandoned
"liberation," is tending to pursue "bridge-
building" to the East almost as an end in itself,
thereby confusing means with ends of policy.
Thus no major power is effectively addressing
itself to the problem of European partition.
How to bridge the gap dividing Europe with-
out either side seeming to capitulate? How to
achieve the restoration of Europe without creat-
ing new tensions in the process? These ques-
tions pose the central problem of the coming
decade in Europe. With the internal pressures
for change (accelerated by the Sino-Soviet dis-
pute) surfacing in the Soviet Union and in East
Europe, and with West Europe increasingly
preoccupied with its identity, the division on
the Elbe becomes more intolerable and the ques-
tions more urgent. To-day Europe is still, to
borrow de Gaulle's striking phrase, "without
soul, without backbone, and without roots."
But more and more Europeans, both eastern
and western, are coming to resent this condi-
tion.
Indeed, the time has passed when Germany
could be satisfied with a purely declaratory
Atlantic policy on the issue of German reunifi-
cation. The present internal trends in Germany,
as well as general change in the European rela-
tionship to America, point clearly to the re-
emergence of "the German issue" as the key
problem for Western policy, and the nature of
the American response to it may determine the
future American relationship to Europe. To be
meaningful and effective, the response will have
to be based on a broader evaluation of the
European scene, particularly with regard to the
changes in the eastern bloc. The problem of
the German partition has become critically
linked to the problem of the European partition,
and neither can be resolved without the resolu-
tion of the other.
To as SURE, since that partition is the outcome
of a historical process spanning two world wars,
the European restoration accordingly cannot be
accomplished by a single political settlement.
Neither will it come about by American or Rus-
sian disengagement from Europe. America and
Russia will not abandon Europe, for neither
could be certain that its departure will not mean
the extension of the power of the other-no
matter what formal guarantees, were seemingly
provided. Moreover, in spite of de Gaulle's
oratory, Europe in. the foreseeable future will
not be powerful enough to end its own parti-
tion. This partition can only be ended if the
American-Soviet confrontation in Europe is
gradually transformed into co-operation. That
requires both patience and imagination. And it
does not exclude an occasional bold initiative,
designed to make the gradual process take a
qualitative step forward.
D D E G A U L L E once wrote that great leaders
are remembered "for the sweep of their
endeavours." This is true of great nations as
well, for their leadership is measured not only
by their power but also by the scope of their
goals. Commitment to a grand goal by itself can
generate the power of attraction and mobilise
adherents. Leadership is a dynamic-not a static
--condition, and it expands with the tasks
undertaken.
To-day, the West faces a great and growing
challenge: to take the initiative towards ending
the partition of Europe. In present circum-
stances, merely to strive to tie Western Europe
to America in order to defend it from Russia
will only awaken European suspicions of
"American hegemony," especially as the Euro-
pean fear of Russia wanes and the European
sense of dependence on America declines. New
security schemes (e.g., some form of MLF),
even if otherwise desirable, will not solve the
problem of the American-European relationship
for the problem is now less one of European
security than of the purpose of the relationship.
There is widespread evidence of growing
European feeling that America is becoming
irrelevant to the future of a divided, safe, but
somehow frustrated Europe. The fact that de.
Gaulle's appeals for a "European Europe, in-
cluding a "Europe to the Urals," have been
evoking an increasingly sympathetic reaction
among a growing number of Europeans and
the fact that German politics give every sign
of mounting restlessness, are testimony to the
proposition that a new era is dawning in
Europe, that a new European mood is shaping.
This new condition has special implications for
America's relations to Europe.
By taking the initiative in developing policies
designed to bring both Russia and East Europe
into a closer relationship with the West, and
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thereby to end the European partition, America
would be furthering its own basic interests.
First of all, the very fact of such commitment
would do much to revive America's waning
relevance to Europe. Secondly, it would pro-
vide a framework for restoring the East Euro-
pean nations to independence without simul-
taneously creating new instabilities or stimu-
lating narrow nationalisms. Finally, by laying
the foundations for a broader East-West settle-
ment, it would eliminate the persisting Euro-
pean fears of an American-Soviet power
duopoly. All that would be consistent with
domestic American values and the American
quest for world order.
IT Is SOMETIMES SAID that a Europe "free from
America" would be in a better position to solve
the problem of its partition. Such a Europe
would seem less threatening to Russia and East
Europe, and hence they would be more inclined
to accept a closer relationship with it. But this
view overlooks the probability that the process
of achieving such an "independent" Europe,
detached from America, would cause conflicts
and instabilities which the Russians would be
tempted to exploit. Secondly, and just as im-
portant, such a Europe would probably be domi-
nated by Germany, and hence would be un-
likely to offer an appealing magnet to the East
Europeans and to the Russians. Because the
U.S. has no claims beyond the Elbe, its con-
tinued association with Europe offers the best
guarantee to the Russians and the East Euro-
peans that the West poses no direct political
threat to them.
As far as the West Europeans are concerned,
American commitment to the goal of peaceful
reunification of Europe is more likely to com-
mand European support than either past calls
for "liberation" or present attempts to develop
a more equitable control of nuclear weapons,
not to mention efforts to involve Europe in the
rather remote problems of Asian or African de-
velopment. Such a broader design could displace
the Gaullist appeal, or even preempt eventual
Gaullist approaches to Russia. Moreover, it
would mitigate the danger that the disintegra-
tion of Western unity would leave the Ameri-
can-German alliance as the sole bond between
America and Europe.
A bilateral German-American relationship
could only be defensive; it would have no
appeal in East Europe and no constructive
Eastern policy could be based on it alone. Such
a relationship could perhaps provide a shield
for West Europe, but its effectiveness in this
respect would paradoxically contribute to fur-
ther divisions in the West. European dissensions
would flourish in the protected haven provided
by American-German power. There would be
little room for America in such a Europe, and
eventually even the German-American ties
might crumble as their insufficiency in assuring
German reunification became more evident.
Three Assumptions
T H R E E C A R DIN A L assumptions should
guide U.S. and Atlantic policy in the pur-
suit of the goal of European restoration: First,
Western military strength must be maintained
and Western interests vigorously protected. This
point may seem self-evident. But military
strength is a prerequisite as much for policies of
increasing co-operation and eventual reconcilia-
tion, as for those of pressure and hostility. Pre-
cisely because both the objectives and the means
of the policy advocated here are peaceful, it is
important that there be no uncertainty on the
other side as to the West's determination to pro-
tect its interests. If the status quo is to be the
starting-point for an eventual reconciliation, it
follows that the West must remain vigilant in
protecting it.
The Soviets have provided much evidence
over the last two decades that they consider
Berlin to be an exposed Western outpost, vulner-
able to pressure. Occasional acts of Soviet
pressure may, therefore, be expected. These
ought to be resisted, for even a few hours' in-
terruption of the lines of access to Berlin under-
mines the Western position. The final release
of a Western convoy after a fifty-hour delay
represents not a Western victory, but proof of
the Soviet capacity to interrupt access. More
vigorous responses than those heretofore applied
are needed in the future. Since the United
States has indicated that it will not invade Cuba,
Cuba could perhaps serve as a useful hostage for
Berlin. Soviet-engineered delays in the Allied
right of access to Berlin should perhaps be im-
mediately reciprocated by similar harassment of
Soviet shipping on the international waters
around Cuba. Exactly because that action
would be arbitrary, it would drive home the
lesson to the Soviet leadership that the West will
not tolerate impairment of its present position.
The fundamental point is that no Western
policy of conciliation is possible in a context
which allows the other side opportunities for
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effective military blackmail. The historical sig-
niiica.nce of the Cuban confrontation was its
deflation of the confidence of Soviet leaders in
their ability to extort concessions from the West
by military threats. We must never allow them
to think they can.
SECONDLY, any basic change in the East-West
European relationship will have to involve East
Europe jointly with Russia. A policy based on
the assumption that individual East European
states can be encouraged to defect to the West
is not likely to succeed because in the final
analysis the ruling Communist elites have no
interest in becoming absorbed by the West, even
though pushed in that direction by economic
and popular pressures. The Soviet Union is
likely to exert every effort to prevent open
defections either from coMacoN or from the
Warsaw Treaty Organisation. Moreover, the
experience of Yugoslavia and Poland suggests
that the ruling Communist elites gravitate back
towards a closer relationship with Moscow, once
the more objectionable aspects of the relation-
ship with the Soviet Union have been elimin-
ated. Their defections were thus limited and
revocable.
Indeed, defections of the East European
countries individually, even if possible, might
not be in the interest of peace. The United
States and the Soviet Union will remain for a
long time to come the two leading competitors
for global power. Dramatic change either way
-the defection of the East European states to
the West or the fragmentation of West Europe
and the expulsion of America-would directly
threaten the present balance of power and set
in motion dangerous reactions and counter-
reactions. In addition, individual defections,
especially if the result of encouragement from
the West, would reduce the moderating in-
fluence of East Europe on Russia, and thus de-
celerate the ultimately crucial process of Russian
evolution.
The more desirable sequence of change would
begin with the internal liberalisation of the
East European societies and lead towards their
gradual evolution into a Greater Europe jointly
with the Soviet Union. This obviously does not
mean a synchronised evolution. East Europe,
given its historical links with the West and in
some cases more advanced internal conditions
prior to Communist take-over, is likely to
evolve more rapidly than Russia. This is especi-
ally true of Czechoslovakia, and to a lesser
extent of Hungary and Poland. While it would
be unrealistic to expect these East European
countries soon to become democratic societies,
or leave the Communist orbit, their more rapid
evolutioft may be more effective in bringing
similar evolution of the Soviet Union, precisely
because of their continuing links with it. In
its turn, change in the Soviet Union may stimu-
late further changes in those East European
states which (also for historical reasons) may
lag behind even Russia. Thus East Europe,
while not breaking away, may pull the Soviet
Union forward while moving ahead of it, thus
cumulatively preparing the ground for a better
East-West relationship.
Not that we should actively discourage the
occasional acts of nationalist self-assertion, as,
for instance, in the case of Rumania. Bucharest's
nationalist self-assertion automatically reduced
the restrictive influence of the Soviet Union on
East Europe. To the extent that Moscow was
compelled to reconsider its own heavy-handed
economic nationalism in dealings with the East
European states, the development was all to
the good. Its importance, however, should not
be overrated. It is doubtful that a healthy
Europe can be built by prompt.. anti-Soviet
nationalist dictatorships. They c:, ..d bring in
their wake all the traditional territorial and
ethnic conflicts, providing temptations for the
U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. again to become in-
volved. It would be short-sighted for the West
to ride the tiger of nationalism in the hope that
it will threaten only the Soviet dominated
world; the tiger could endanger all of Europe.
Tm RDLY, the end of the division of Germany
will come only as a consequence of a gradual
but qualitative change in the relationship be-
tween: both Russia and East Europe and the
West. In all likelihood, German reunification
will be the last and not the first act in the evolu-
tionary unification of the European continent.
It will come about through a process of change,
and it is not likely to be the outcome of some
far-reaching diplomatic settlement around a
green table. At long last, both German and
American policies have come to recognise this
reality. But this recognition carries with it addi-
tional implications for our perspective on such
problems as the Berlin Wall and the issue of. the
eastern frontier.
Paradoxical as it may seem, the Wall has in-
creased the long-range prospects for German
reunification. As long as East Germany was
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drained by massive defections of its population,
the situation became increasingly unstable and
the front-line confrontation on the German
demarcation line .was intensified. Since the
Soviet Union was far from ready to resign
itself to the dismantling of the East German
regime, this merely forced a further assertion
of the Soviet presence in East Germany and the
reinforcement of Soviet domination throughout
the adjacent regions. Moreover, the events of
1953 and 1956 show the improbability of
Western intervention in support of a major re-
bellion in Eastern Germany. Accordingly, the
tensions and the massive flights merely increased
the hostility between the East and the West
without in any way increasing the prospects.
that the dividing line could be erased.
The Berlin Wall, however, provides the West
with a striking symbol of the basic artificiality
of the East German regime but without the
dangers inherent in the daily exposure and
exacerbation of that artificiality. More impor-
tant, the relative quiet on the German front-
line permitted Western activity in East Europe
designed to stimulate evolutionary changes; the
East Europeans were more responsive because
of the seeming security provided by the buffer
East German state. The cumulative effect was
clearly in the West's (including Germany's)
long-range interest, despite the anguish and
demoralisation it caused.
Moreover, the shifting of the central focus of
the European problem from Germany to East
Europe has created more favourable conditions
for a more genuine enlistment of British and
French support for the cause of European re-
unification. Although paying lip-service to the
proposition that Germany should be reunified,
neither could look forward with equanimity
to the prospect of a reunified Germany 7o
million strong, and by far the preponderant
power in Europe. But though a mere shift
of the European partition from the Elbe to the
Oder River, with East Europe in the Russian
sphere and West Europe dominated by Ger-
many, was not very appealing to many non-
German Western Europeans, a broader solution
involving East Europe and Russia could
mobilise the support even of those who are
fearful of Germany, and make their commit-
ment to German reunification more than a
hollow ritual. This broader solution, however,
requires a normalisation in Germany's relation-
ship with East Europe, particularly on the
critical issue of the German eastern frontier.
WESTERN POLICIES IN EUROPE thus should be
based on three main premises: the maintenance
of Western military power, the joint involve-
ment of Eastern Europe and Russia in any
ultimate solution, and the interdependence of
German reunification with evolutionary change
in the East. These premises are interdependent
and the policy goals they imply should be pur-
sued simultaneously. The West cannot solve
the German problem without developing
policies which transcend it to encompass the
whole range of problems associated with the
division of Europe. The five policy goals that
follow are designed to meet that need.
The Problem of Eastern Germany
1 To convince the East Europeans, particu-
. larly the Czechs and the Poles, that the
existence of East Germany limits their freedom
without enhancing their security. Otherwise,
the Czechs and the Poles will continue to sup-
port the Soviet presence in East Germany as a
convenient and reassuring buffer against West
Germany. To undermine the East European
stake in East Germany, the West will have to
differentiate sharply in its attitude towards East
Germany and towards the rest of East Europe.
For East Germany, the policy must be one of
isolation; for East Europe, one of peaceful en-
gagement-economic, cultural, and eventually
political. Only then will East Germany become
a political anachronism on the map of Europe,
a source of continuing embarrassment to
Moscow, and no longer a source of security to
the East Europeans.
The efforts so far undertaken by the West
German government to establish closer relations
with the East European states have already con-
tributed greatly to isolating the East German
regime. To further this process, the West Ger-
man government should be encouraged to find
some formula freeing it from the self-imposed
limits oa relations with the East European states
inherent in "the Hallstein doctrine." Perhaps
excluding from the application of the doctrine
those states which are members of the Warsaw
Treaty Organisation (or possibly those that
border on Germany) could provide a loophole,
without encouraging other states to recognise
East Germany. In any case, it is only through
better relations with West Germany that the
East Europeans can eventually become con-
vinced that the reunification of Germany opens
to them the doors to the West that are now
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shut by the Soviet occupation forces in East
Germany.
Only the Communist fanatics attach any
ideological importance to the continued exist-
ence of a Communist East Germany. Otherwise,
East Germany is valuable to the East Europeans
primarily in terms of their national interests,
largely defensive since the East European states
are themselves small and cannot entertain any
aggressive designs. But with the progressive
evolution of the East European states, skilfully
abetted by a conciliatory West, East Germany
eventually may lose even its appeal as a buffer,
and begin to resemble a Soviet Mozambique-
a source of irritation to the East Europeans and
of embarrassment to Moscow. Only then will
the Kremlin consider the possibility of liquidat-
ing East Germany, and it is only the Kremlin,
not the German Communists, who can consider
its liquidation. Creation of conditions for this
should be the goal of Allied and German policy
-not merely the transformation of the East
German regime into a more moderate Com-
munist regime, more acceptable to the West
and to its own people.
THE OSTRACISM OF East Germany can be further
advanced by treating the East European states
as if in fact they were fully independent states,
unlike East Germany doomed to remain a mere
Soviet puppet. The East European states can
gradually evolve because they are national states.
Their nationalism inherently works in the direc-
tion of increasing the independence of these
states from the one state that now limits this
independence-the Soviet Union. Therefore, the
United States and Western Europe ought to
respond seriously to any East European foreign
policy proposals, and even encourage the East
Europeans to make more.' Our response to these
proposals need not be affirmative, but more of
an effort should be made to engage the indivi-
dual East European states in prolonged negotia-
tions and discussions. These breed national
pride, expose East European leaders to Western
counter-arguments in relative privacy and with
' That this is becoming a more sensitive issue
among the East Europeans was suggested to the
author by the reaction of a high East European
official when he was asked why his country, unlike
Communist Poland, did not take any foreign policy
initiatives. After an embarrassed silence, he agreed
that perhaps his country had been remiss on the
international scene and hoped that perhaps in the
near future it would become more active in taking
international initiatives.
freedom from Soviet supervision, and stimulate
an awareness of their own national interest. It is
counter-productive to Western interests to
simply dismiss (as has often been the case) the
East Europeans as proxies for the Soviet Union
even when, in fact, they are acting as such.
Poles and Germans
2 To promote a German-Polish reconcilia-
. tion, somewhat on the model of the
Franco-German reconciliation of the 'fifties.
Such a reconciliation should be a proclaimed
goal of the United States, the closest ally of
Germany and the home of many millions of
Americans of both German and Polish parent-
age. Just as peace and stability in Western
Europe could not have been achieved unless the
old Franco-German quarrel was ended, so a
German-Polish reconciliation is the sine qua non
of peace and stability in the East. The U.S.
could benefit greatly in terms of moral prestige
from proclaiming such a reconciliation as one
of its principal objectives, in contrast to the
Soviet Union and the Communists who find it
convenient to keep alive the bitter Polish-
German hatred.
The pursuit of this goal inevitably raises the
difficult and sensitive issue of the Oder-Neisse
frontier. Perhaps some day frontiers will cease
to be important in Europe, but that day will
come only after the European frontiers have
become secure and accepted. A sense of in-
security as to frontier issues keeps alive national
hatreds and fears. At the present time, since
"anti-Germanism" is the principal asset of a
weak and unpopular Polish regime, it may not
be in the interest of the Polish government to
reach any substantial agreement with Germany,
which would include the frontier issue. Indeed,
the ideal situation for that government would
be to obtain Western economic aid while not
obtaining but persistently demanding the recog-
nition of the Oder-Neisse frontier. Moreover, it
is certainly in the Soviet interest to keep the
issue alive. Accordingly, Western moves will
have to be designed to dispel the widespread
Polish popular fears of the Germans, even in
the absence of a formal German-Polish agree-
ment.
In seeking this goal, the U.S. will have to
be careful not to rupture the American-German
relationship, on which both the unity of the
West and internal German democracy much
depend. A German feeling that America has
"betrayed" them will certainly not serve the
6
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 .-. ,: ..- ? 4. a., .. ;... ... ,.....mow .. :. a .w ..:-.....y .:. n..,. ... r, .r :.. -.r.E
_ ., .,...:.. -.... is ..
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cause of German-Polish reconciliation. The Poles
ought to realise this, just as the Germans should
pcrceivc that the propitiation of Polish fears
would deprive Moscow of a major asset and re-
present a major step towards German reunifica-
tion. The Germans increasingly realise that it is
politically sclf defeating to demand German re-
unification without defining precisely the loca-
tion of the eastern frontiers of Germany. But
since sudden recognition of the present frontier
would provoke bitter resentment in Germany,
one can only proceed by stages, designed to con-
vince the Poles that no one in the West either
expects or favours a change in the present
frontiers.
A preliminary step would be an immediate
opening of American consulates either in
Szczecin or Wroclaw: this would be useful both
politically and symbolically. Further, a NATO
pledge to oppose the use of force to change the
existing European frontiers would also go far
in creating the preconditions for a German-
Polish reconciliation (it would fortify the
unilateral 1954 German declaration to the same
effect). Having made such a declaration itself,
the West German government could hardly
object to NATO doing the same. Yet an inter-
national Western pledge would certainly be
more convincing to the Poles than one coming
from Germany alone, given the possible German
interest in changing the frontier.
A similar declaration by the American Presi-
dent at some appropriately symbolic occasion
(but not during an electoral season), with specific
reference to the desirability of ending the Polish-
German feud, would also serve to put to rest an
issue which simply keeps alive old hostilities,
primarily to the advantage of the Soviet Union.
Such a statement could perhaps even be modelled
on the several French statements on the frontier
issue, made without harm to the Franco-German
relationship. This declaration would have
special significance to the Poles, given the popu-
larity and prestige of America in Poland.
Finally, the Western powers could pledge in
advance their intention to recognise formally the
present frontiers at the moment that Germany
I This would be in keeping with the recent
pledge made to East Europe by Chancellor Erhard
(October 15th, 1964): "We shall therefore leave
nothing untried to demonstrate to these countries
again and again that the only hindrance to a mutual
reconciliation is the unsolved German question,
and that for this reason an early settlement for this
issue would be in their own best interests."
is reunified, thereby stimulating a Polish
national interest in that reunification, even if
the Polish Communist government should
initially oppose it.
FROM THE STANDPOINT of advancing German
reunification, such assurances to Poland would
be more productive if made at a time when the
Poles feel so insecure on the frontier issue.
Eventually, the sense of insecurity may fade;
the Poles may come to care less for Western
guarantees and may derive greater security from
the existence of the two German states. German
policy should strive to prevent the development
of a lasting Polish vested interest in the partition
of Germany; it should strive to rekindle the
bonds of sympathy and co-operation that at
different times in history did link these two
neighbouring states. Only then will the founda-
tion be laid for an eventual settlement. Without
this foundation, the Poles can hardly be expected
to see any interest in having any settlement of
the German issue.
On the West German side, this may require a
non-partisan political approach, since it has been
said that neither of the two major parties could
afford to give the other the opportunity of
charging that German interests have been sacri-
ficed. A non-partisan stand, which explicitly
links the solemn renunciation of claims to terri-
tories lost in the aftermath of World War II to
German reunification, and which is presented
to the German people as a historical contribution
to the reconciliation of the German and Polish
peoples, could overcome much of the inevitable
resistance from the more nationalistic elements 2
The cause of German-Polish reconciliation is
growing increasingly popular among German
youth. Moreover, prior adoption of that stand
by the Western allies would reduce the risk of
charges that German politicians are precipitately
"betraying" German interests.
In addition, the U.S. could promote specific
undertakings, designed to forge bonds of mutual
understanding between the Germans and the
Poles, thereby also re-emphasising America's
own constructive relevance to Central Europe.
To the extent possible, three-way meetings
could be sponsored, in addition to the various
bilateral German-Polish activities already in
progress. Special emphasis should be put on
youth activities; collaborative humanitarian
efforts could perhaps help to erase the recent
memories of conflict and restore some of the
fraternal atmosphere that prevailed among the
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Germans and the .Poles as recently as during
"the spring of nations" of 1848.
The Russian Obsession
To minimise the Russian obsession with
3. Germany. It is probably impossible to
rr.Ulieate the deeply-grounded Russian fears of
the Germans, 'especially in view of the relatively
recent memories of the war. Furthermore, there
is no doubt that the Soviet leaders find it con-
venient to use Germany as a bogey, and accord-
ingly will take advantage of every opportunity
to portray West Germany as "militaristic" and
"revanchist." Nonetheless, given the slow but
still discernible evolutionary trends in Russian
society, it is desirable not to stimulate counter
pressures or to provoke needless and pointless
irritations. It is essential to bear in mind that
the solution for the partition of Europe (and
hence German reunification) is not to be found
either in the context of worsening relations be-
tween America and Russia, or intensified Rus-
sian and East European hostility towards
Germany.
The kind of approach to avoid is exemplified
in the proposal, occasionally voiced in West
Germany, that China be aided as a form of
pressure on the Russians. The political argument
on behalf of aiding China (leaving aside the
purely economic interest of some business circles
in obtaining Chinese trade), is based on the
thesis that the Soviet Union can eventually be
induced to seek an accommodation with the
West if it becomes fearful of a new, hostile
encirclement. A weak and isolated China (so'
goes the argument) cannot effectively threaten
Russia. Furthermore, a Chinese-West German
trade agreement, containing the Berlin clause
(which includes West Berlin as part of the West
German mark area), will mean the further
isolation of East Germany and hence be a step
towards eventual reunification. Although in
deference to the U.S., the matter was post-
poned until after the 1964 elections, Germans
apparently have considered exploring the possi-
bility of concluding with the Chinese first an
informal trade agreement, signed perhaps by a
consortium of German firms, to be followed
a Nervous editorials in Neues Deutschland sug-
gest that the East German regime was quite un-
easy about this possibility. On October 29th, 1964,
a commentary concludes with the hope that West
German calculations "will not succeed because the
leadership of the Chinese People's Republic is not
interested in supporting West German monopoly
capitalism."
later by a more formal arrangement, with the
Berlin clause in it, and even including credits.
An even more extreme point of view has been
taken with regard to China by those Germans
(fortunately a minority) who fear a reduction of
tensions between Moscow and Washington and
who see in China an instrument for upsetting
the existing territorial arrangements in Europe.
The notion of a "second intermediate zone,"
directed at both Washington and Moscow, has a
special appeal to those who chafe under the
apparent restraints of the American-German
alliance and who would like to pursue a policy of
revision with regard to the territorial status quo.
Yet to follow this course would be to - re-
awaken the relatively dormant European border
disputes. This would have a highly divisive
effect in the West, where there is a universal
lack of support for any change in the existing
European frontiers. In Germany itself it would
serve to strengthen the extreme right wing and
eventually contribute to Germany's isolation in
the West. Moreover, it still involves a "political
warfare" approach to the problem of German
reunification. It could only have the effect of
intensifying East Europe's dependence on Rus-
sia and of stimulating a new wave of anti-
German Russian nationalist sentiments. Such
pressure would merely confirm to Moscow what
it tends to assume anyway: that West Germany
is unalterably hostile and perhaps even
dangerous. It is difficult to see how this would
contribute either to the cause of German re-
unification or to that of peace. Indeed, in a self-
fulfilling prophecy, it could help to produce an
implicit Russian-American alliance dedicated to
the preservation of the European status quo,
thereby consummating the division of Germany.
The road to East Berlin seems hardly shorter by
way of Peking.
THESE CONSIDERATIONS suggest why West Ger-
many ought to be very cautious in even explor-
ing trade ties with China. The objective of
further isolating East Germany is desirable and
perhaps an agreement with China (containing
"the Berlin clause") would serve that end.'
But it should not be forgotten that China once
before, in 1957, signed such an agreement (which
later was not renewed), and that this inherently
reduces the political import of any new arrange.
ment. More important, to generate real "pres-
sure" on the Soviet Union a German-Chinese
trade agreement would have to involve a very
major effort to underwrite Chinese industrial
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development and hence also military potential.
Such an undertaking is hardly possible now,
without introducing strains in the German-
American relationship, given the continued con-
flict between the U.S. and China. And of
course the inherent economic obstacles to any
single-handed Western effort to sustain the
development of as large and backward a country
as China are close to insuperable.
The effect would be the opposite from that
achieved by limited collaboration with East
Europe. Since East Europe does not represent
a hostile and competitive challenge to Moscow,
closer contact with the West can serve also to
bring the West closer to Russia; Western and
particularly German aid to China, Russia's
"'For us, Central Europe is vital because it is a
matter of life and death. It is a question of our
survival. We think that neutrality would be a great
danger in Central Europe, because neutrality
means a vacuum, and it would be a vacuum be-
tween the immense mass of Soviet military might
and what would be left of Western Europe, that
is, France, the Benelux countries, and Italy." Couve
de Murville, Interview, U.S. News and World
Report (March 16th, 1964).
American disengagement from Europe would
also be politically self-defeating, "for nothing
thrusts Germans more rapidly towards a Gaullist
view of the world-or towards thoughts of a deal
of their own with Russia-than fear of American
disengagement from Europe." Robert Kleiman,
The Atlantic Crisis (1964). For a good review of
the various disengagement plans, see E. 1=Iinterhoff,
Disengagement (1959).
More recently, some warmed-over versions of the
plan rested on the premise that the American role
in Europe is finished and that a joint Soviet-Ameri-
can disengagement would restore both European
stability and unity. For example, see the somewhat
obscure and pontificating attack on NATO by Ronald
Steel, The End of Alliance (1964)-
5 In this connection, there is an illusion shared
by some that a West German military build-up
may some day become a useful basis for bargaining
with the Soviet Union: East Germany for the de-
nuclearisation of West Germany. The fact is, how-
ever, that the development of armed forces creates
a vested interest. Subsequently, it becomes incon-
ceivable that these forces be sacrificed, in toto or
even in part, in return for Soviet political conces-
sions, b :cause then the argument is raised that
unity is. purchased at the price of dependence.
Since (ire the meantime) the Soviet defensive stake
in East. Germany would have been increased, re-
armameitt as a bargaining device is an illusion.
It is also wrong to think that the U.S. might be
able to trade German participation in an MLF or in
nuclear planning for Soviet concessions. Nothing is
more l kely to undermine Western confidence in
American protection than the thought that Western
collecti- e security measures may be subject to bi-
lateral American-Soviet negotiations.
growing challenger, could hardly induce in the
Russians a pro-Western orientation. Thus if
trade develops between Germany and China,
as well it might for purely economic reasons,
the Germans would be well advised not to give
it a political flavour or to strive to expand it
artificially for political purposes.
A MORE DIFFICULT PROBLEM in the Russian atti-
tude towards Germany is raised by the issue
of military security. In facing it, certain basic
facts must be recognised: Germany is now re-
armed conventionally; it is not going to be
disarmed; no one in the West would contem-
plate that task and it could not be undertaken
without fragmenting the West. Thus all schemes
advocating the "military neutralisation" of West
Germany are politically unrealistic. The Central
European problem cannot be solved by drastic
changes in the existing security structure-
faulty. and tense though it may be-for the
problem is basically a political one, and the
military situation is its consequence. Political
changes will have to precede the military
changes; and political changes, as both sides
have now learned, can only come gradually.
The creation of a "neutral" or disengaged
vacuum through the co-operative efforts of the
two adversary super-powers-leaving aside its
general improbability, given West German and
even French opposition to it'-would simply
mean the creation of new "hunting grounds"
for the two opposed sides, unless that step was
preceded by profound changes in their political
goals. by that time the scheme would no longer
be necessary.
Rejecting disengagement is not tantamount to
standing pat on the present division of Europe,
nor does it justify the argument for the indepen-
dent development of a militarily powerful West
Europe. The legitimate Western interest in Ger-
many's defensive forces ought not to obscure
the fact that under certain circumstances it may
increase the Soviet military stake in East Ger-
many. Again, this is not a matter for "either/
or" solutions. It is now probably idle to speculate
whether Germany should have been denied
rocket weapons or kept out entirely from the
nuclear club (especially given the complications
of the France-American rivalry). However, the
possibility should not be excluded that under
certain conditions it might be desirable for
Germany to limit its further military build-up,
in view of the historically founded Russian fear
of Germany.'
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It is therefore not too late to note that the
cause of German reunification is not likely to be
served by the development of an independent
German national nuclear force. To the extent
that the Russians and the East Europeans
strongly suspect that the MLF-or some Atlantic
nuclear force-is a first step precisely in that
direction, it is in the interest both of Germany
and the West to disabuse them of that impres-
sion. Accordingly the United States might he
well advised to reiterate formally and more ex-
plicitly the position taken in this regard by
President Kennedy in his Izvestia (November
1961) interview. Germany might also derive
political advantages from filing a formal declara-
tion with the U.N. to the effect that under no
circumstances will it seek an independent
nuclear deterrent outside of multilateral control
and management e
Similarly, more thought should be given to
the political implications of providing West
Germany with rockets capable of striking
directly at the Soviet Union. While still subject
to the "two-key" system of control, the availa-
bility of such rockets to the West German armed
forces brings Russia directly within reach of
German striking power for the first time since
World War II. This cannot but intensify the
Russian, Polish, and Czech feelings that a
divided Germany is preferable to a united one.
In this situation West Germany stands to lose
little-and perhaps to gain a great deal-by
repeatedly offering to conclude bilateral non-
aggression treaties with the East European
states and by reiterating past pledges never to
use force against the security and territorial
integrity of its neighbours.
6 See my "Moscow and the MLF: Hostility
and Ambivalence," Foreign Affairs (October 1964).
This suggestion was subsequently seconded by
Senator J. William Fulbright in November 1964.
' Those who advocate the development of the
power of the West without much regard. for its
impact on the East inadvertently perpetuate the
division of Germany. See, for example, Dean
Acheson, "Withdrawal from Europe? An Illusion,"
The New York Times Magazine (December 15th,
1963). That is also why the opposite point of view
as expressed by George Kennan, namely, that East
Germany should at least transitionally be accepted
("Polycentrism and Western Policy," Foreign
Affairs, January 1964) is also undesirable. Formal
acceptance of the status quo would inevitably
prompt dissension among the West Germans and
the Americans and permit the Russians to have
their cake and eat it too.
IN A NUTSHELL, Western military policy should
always strive to meet three basic requirements:
to provide an adc quite defence of West Europe;
to develop a satisfactory distribution of respon-
sibility in order to cope with the political prob-
lems of the Al',iance; and, without sacrificing
either of the preceding, to avoid a negative
political feedbac 1: to the East. The last considera-
tion has been most often neglected, even though
it has become all the more important since the
West is now increasingly inclined to promote
"evolutionary changes in the East." In our
preoccupatior with Western security we often
tend to forgc-.t that the world looks quite
different fro.n the Russian and East European
perspective, and that the history and psychology
of the adver!;ary must be taken into account,
especially when our policy has as its ultimate
objective the peaceful resolution of existing
differences a.nd a peaceful change in the status
quo.
It cannot. be stressed too often that no basic
change in the division of Germany can be
expected t.ntil such time as the Russians and the
East Et:r,.)peans are prepared to accept the re-
unificanon of Germany. Such acceptance will
require at some point a qualitative change in
their :rutlook. The way to it is by gradual,
marginal steps, carefully calculated to bring
about a situation whereby some day Moscow
and i he East Europeans discover that they no
longs have any stake in East Germany (as in
1955 in the case of Austria).'
A- this stage the basic preconditions for a
Ger.nan reunification that involve neither a
Communist take-over (a maximum Soviet goal)
not a unilateral Soviet pull-out (a maximum
Western goal) can be outlined only in very
ge coral terms:
,,a) The Soviet position in East Europe must
h::ve changed to the point where the East
European states are no longer pliant tools and
Last Germany has become an isolated Soviet
colony, still entirely dependent on Soviet gar-
risons. It is clearly within the power of the West
to exert some influence to bring about this
coiidition.
(b) Poland and Czechoslovakia, at least on the
broad popular level, must have ceased to view
Germany as a territorially revisionist power;
they must no longer feel the need of a Soviet
presence in East Germany, and must have
ceased to be responsive to Soviet manipulation
of the German bogey. Here, too, the West can
exert influence by providing explicit guarantees
10
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of East European national and territorial in-
tegrity.
(c) The Soviet Union and the East European
states must have been guaranteed that East
Germany, once united with the rest of the
country, will not become an outpost of NATO.
This the West could certainly promise in
advance. For example, commitments and arrange-
ments could be made for an agreed period
of time to keep East Germany a demilitarised
area. While one German government would
.exercise sovereignty in all of Germany, only the
present western part would remain in NATO
(assuming the organisation still existed), while
in the present eastern part U.N. peace-keeping
forces would temporarily be stationed. From the
Soviet point of view, a more acceptable alterna-
tive could involve the transitional retention for
some years of Soviet garrisons in East Germany,
even though the country will have been re-
united under one political authority (in effect,
the Austrian precedent). Furthermore, the resi-
dual Polish and Czech fears of Germany would
provide reassurance to Moscow that a new
cordon sanitaire was not being created on its
frontiers.
(d) The economic benefits now flowing from
East Germany to COMECON and to the Soviet
Union must be maintained. This too is within
the power of the West to assure. East Germany
is the Soviet Union's principal economic partner
and the Soviet Union's economic stake in East
Germany is considerable. Substitute arrange-
ments could be made bilaterally by Germany,
or if such should develop, within a broader
framework of European economic co-operation.
However, for all of this to happen, more general
changes in the East-West economic relationship
will be required.
Economics and Culture
4 To relate the expansion of economic ties
. to more extensive cultural and social con-
tacts. In the expansion of East-West trade, the
West should attempt to erode the narrow ideo-
logical perspectives of the ruling Communist
elites and to prevent them from restricting
closer contact exclusively to the economic realm,
thus resolving their economic difficulties while
consolidating their power and perpetuating the
present partition of Europe. The Communist
leaders, with their public pleas for closer com-
mercial relations (including Western credit..),
have been successful in representing themselves
as the apostles of international co-operation.
Western statesmen should be as vocal in stress-
ing that concrete improvements in cultural
relations, more intellectual dialogue and free-
dom of expression are as important as trade in
creating genuine co-operative relationships. The
two should always be related in every East-West
negotiation.
The economic situation in East Europe and
(to a lesser extent) in the Soviet Union has
arrived at a rather critical point. These countries
desire closer economic relations with the West
and in some cases even large Western credits.
This makes East-West trade a potential Western
asset, and it should be used to advantage. Those
in the West who oppose the expansion of such
trade on the grounds that it helps the Com-
munist governments overlook the fact that, first
of all, such trade will grow in spite of American
objections and that, secondly, to the extent that
such trade and credits are badly needed by the
Communists, they could be useful as sources of
leverage.
The Communist leaders have made it plain that .
they see in the "eventual economic superiority"
of their system the way to victory. Helping their
economic development can be justified only if at
the same time other consequences follow, result-
ing in the erosion of the Communist commitment
to domination, in structural reforms in the Com-
munist economic systems, in the growth of
closer contacts, in an increasingly free flow of
ideas and people.
These changes will not take place spon-
tatLeously, but as a result of steady pressure.
Economic difficulties in the East stimulate in-
tense power conflicts and tend to loosen the
Communist structure. It should not be forgotten
that the strongest impulses towards liberalisa-
tion-the Malenkov period in Russia and the
later Khrushchev period of economic de-
centralisation, the first Nagy period in Hungary
and the recent reforms in Czechoslovakia-came
because there were severe economic crises. They
strengthened the hands of those who argued on
behalf of liberalising the system; they under-
mined the position of those who wished to
avoid making a choice between political totali-
tarianism and economic reforms. It is no acci-
dent that foreign trade officials of the Com-
munist countries are foremost among those who
advocate structural reforms in their economic
system. An indiscriminate Western approach to
trade and credits merely plays into the hands
of those ruling Communist officials who would
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like to avoid making substantial internal
changes .6
Precisely because acceptance of Western aid
and development of trade with the West is no
longer proscribed as heretical by the Com-
munists, the West needs to define for itself a
clearer political perspective on the problem of
East-West trade. It will not do to view it, as
often is the case among otherwise conservative
and staunchly anti-Communist businessmen, as
merely an opportunity for profit-making, the
more so because once the gates have been opened
it becomes increasingly difficult to control
economic appetites. Advance precautions will
have to be taken to preserve a proper political
perspective. Perhaps trade can be considered to
be purely an economic issue when it takes place
spontaneously, on the basis of reciprocal needs
and advantages of the trading parties. But when
such trade has to be artificially stimulated by
Western governments, when such trade is fos-
tered in the context of continued political and
ideological conflict, and when the Western
businessmen who wish to extend credits to the
East at the same time desire their governments
to underwrite these credits, such commercial re-
lations cease to be purely an economic matter.
IN VERY BROAD TERMS, American and West
European economic assistance policy with re-
spect to East Europe should be guided by two
criteria: whenever a country increases the scope
of its external independence from Soviet con-
trol, or liberalises appreciably its domestic
system, it should be rewarded. And similarly
whenever an opposite trend develops, the West
should be prepared to discontinue its assistance,
withdraw special privileges (such as the U.S.
"most-favoured-nation" clause, a matter of vital
importance to the East Europeans), and should
not hesitate to indicate the real reasons involved.
aGiving aid to individual Communist states and
letting them use it as they see fit is exactly what
Molotov proposed in 1947, in response to the Mar-
shall Plan invitation. It was unacceptable then and
there is no reason to feel that it should be accent-
able now. For details, see Harry B. Price, The
Marshall Plan and its Meaning (Ithaca, 1955).
9I-Iowever, the use of surplus food for this pur-
pose is ill-advised, for it creates the impression
that the U.S. is playing politics with people's
hunger. Accordingly, the U.S. would be wise to
avoid making surplus food the princinal com-
mod;ty extended to countries to be influenced
politically. Once granted, it becomes almost impos-
sible to withdraw (e.g., the difficulties with Nasser).
Given East Europe's acute need for foreign
capital investment, the flexible use of American
long-term credits in this regard could be an
important factor for change.
That is why it is cause for regret that the
U.S. Congress has been so rigid with regard
to the "most-favoured-nation" clause and to the
application of Public Law 4$o to Communist
countries. Legislative restrictions on economic
policy towards the Communist states automati-
cally restrict the power of the executive to
negotiate with the Communist states. Increasing
the executive's room for manoeuvre would in-
crease its ability to negotiate concessions from
the Communist states in exchange for more
trade and credit?
To be sure, it is difficult to use economic rela-
tions simply as a spigot, turning them on and
off. Applied too obviously, such leverage could
become self-defeating, making trade relations
with the West seem undesirable to the East
European countries. Furthermore, it would be
pointless to react to every unfavourable domestic
turn in East Europe, given its political flux, by
turning on economic pressures. Indeed, there is
some long-range advantage in developing a
relatively stable level in trade relations with
East Europe as that inescapably helps to widen
the range of its contacts with the West.
Unlike the case of East Europe, it is diffi-
cult at the present to see any political advantage
in granting long-term credits to the Soviet
Union. The West has no political interest in
promoting Soviet economic development, or in-
directly subsidising Soviet economic aid pro-
grammes, designed to reduce Western influence
and to increase Soviet prestige in the develop-
ing countries, not to mention Soviet arms ex-
ports and efforts to encourage subversion. The
argument that "a fat Communist is a good
Communist" is too patently specious to be taken
seriously. One need only speculate what the
Soviet attitude would be if a Western economy
needed Soviet credits for further development
and what conditions then the Soviet Union
would try to impose. Therefore, limits on long-
term credits to the Soviet Union should be
maintained. Private enterprises which are per-
mitted under special circumstances to extend
longer term credits should do so at their own
risk and not be entitled to government guaran-
tees. The recently concluded trade agreements
between West Germany and some of the East
European states demonstrate that marginal
political concessions can be sought and obtained
12
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in exchange for trade. The West Germans were
wise at the same time not to demand too much
(e.g., a rupture of relations with. the Ulbricht
regime).
Examples of marginal concessions which
could be sought in exchange for a liberalised
trade policy and for Western credits include
rules governing' access to Berlin, thereby mini-
mising Soviet opportunities for mischief-making
arising out of the absence of formal rules guid-
ing that access; binding and applicable consular
agreements with all the Communist states; the
admission and free circulation of the Western
press; more extensive and less regimented cul-
tural exchanges; relaxation of Communist
controls on travel of their citizens to the West10
IN THE CASE of actual aid to the East European
states, either by grants or credits, it is important
that symbolic items of a lasting nature be also
included. This facet of the problem has been
almost entirely neglected. Few Russians remem-
ber to-day that millions of Russian lives were
saved in the early 'twenties by the Hoover
missions. Decades from now few Egyptians
might remember the free distribution of Ameri-
can food, but the Russian-built Aswan dam will
remind them of Russian aid. Accordingly, at
least some of the assistance extended occa-
sionally ought to be earmarked for undertakings
which represent a lasting investment in popular
good-will. For example, the reconstruction of
the Royal Castle in Warsaw with American
funds (like the Rockefeller-financed restoration
'"To promote such travel, the Americans and
West Europeans might be well advised to consider
lifting existing visa restrictions, especially with re-
gard to the East European youth. It might be
possible to consider a scheme whereby East Euro-
pean students are freely admitted for visits to the
West and benefit from special arrangements
designed to overcome the East European shortage
of hard currency. For example, thought could be
given to a plan under which the East Europeans
would be permitted to exchange their currency at
the frontier for convertible Western funds with the
East European currency thus acquired then used by
the West to finance common East-West under-
takings designed to establish closer contacts: fellow-
ships for worthy students, perhaps funds for West
European tourists travelling in the East, highway
systems, waterways, all of which would have the
desirable effects.
"The American-built children's hospital in
Cracow, scheduled for completion in x966, is a
good precedent. This venture, however, was con-
ceived and executed by a private individual, who
had to overcome obstacles on both sides of the
ocean,
of Versailles) would be a fitting symbol, con-
trasting favourably with the generally un-
popular Soviet-built Stalin Palace of Culture
that dominates the Warsaw skyline. Better yet,
the offer to construct a modern housing district
in the war-devastated Polish capital would cer-
tainly have a major impact, regardless of
official response. Joint American-West German
financing of such a scheme might also be bene-
ficial, given the desirability of healing the
Polish-German hostility." In Czechoslovakia or
Hungary the offers to construct and operate
schools of business administration and/or agri-
cultural colleges have a real impact, given the
present difficulties faced by the Communist
governments in these areas. Similar gestures
elsewhere would provide symbolic proof of the
West's desire to bridge the political and ideo-
logical partition of Europe.
Western scholarships have already made a
considerable contribution to bringing closer to-
gether the intellectual communities of the two
sides. In this connection it is important to
make certain that scholarships for study in
the West, especially in the U.S.-an opportunity
most eagerly sought in the Eastern states and
one providing enormous personal prestige to the
recipients-are not misused as awards for loyalty
to the Communist regimes and ideology. This
danger is implicit in arrangements that leave
the nominating process entirely in the hands of
the Communist governments concerned. Obvi-
ously, no Communist government will permit
foreign institutions to reward its political oppo-
nents; the point is that more of a systematic
effort should be made in the West to be aware
of those scholars and intellectuals who have
demonstrated both creativity and intellectual in-
tegrity and to insist that Western-financed
fellowships not be awarded on the basis of other
criteria. Unfortunately, departures from this
standard have occassionally occurred, with some
demoralising effects within the East European
intellectual community. To the extent that the
Communist governments are gradually becom-
ing more sensitive to their own public opinion
(and to the extent that the intellectual com-
munity certainly has been pressing for closer
contacts with the West), the West should be-
come more vigorous in asserting its own stan-
dards, while continuously and openly insisting
that closer-economic contacts must be paralleled
by closer and freer cultural relations.
A special issue arises with respect to the role
of East European public opinion. The present
i;
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diversity in the Communist world has made
the Communist leaders more responsive to the
attitudes of the people. It would be counter-
productive to focus U.S. and Western policy on
the sole goal of improving relations with the
present governments and to abandon efforts both
to inform and. to shape East European public
opinion. The 1964 trip by Robert Kennedy to
Poland, with its direct access to the masses,
provided a good illustration of how relation-
ships with the people can occasionally be estab-
lished. It is incorrect to dismiss this as merely
an empty gesture or to argue that it complicates
relations with the governments in power. Culti-
vation of these relations, it should always be
remembered, is a means to an end and not the
end in itself. A certain amount of direct popu-
lar appeal is desirable to keep alive pro-Wcstern
popular sentiment and stimulate it anew. The
Communist leaders, especially Khrushchev,
have done this on their trips to the West; there
is no reason for Western leaders to be more
reticent in appealing directly to the people.
East and West
5 To promote multilateral ties with West
. Euro pe and East Europe. As direct Soviet
control wanes, as East European nationalism
(even under Communist leadership) reasserts
itself, as the East-West dichotomy becomes less
sharp, it should be an explicit goal of U.S. and
Western policy to promote multilateral political
and economic relations, lest East Europe-and
even all of Europe-become Balkanised.
Closer multilateral European ties would
eventually render superfluous the present semi-
totalitarian East European regimes which thrive
on isolation; involvement in all-European under-
takings would mellow their ideology and would
inhibit the tendency already noted for
some of them to become more autono-
mous national-Communist technocratic dictator-
ships. A Rumanian-style external independence
with a semi-Stalinist dictatorship at home is not
enough; a Hungarian-style internal liberalisation
with almost complete external dependence on the
Soviet Union is also not enough. The two pro-
cesses should be linked, but the West cannot
encourage that to happen from the positions
of the Cold War. That is why economic
assistance is important, but employed construc-
tively with a long-range goal in mind. Had
more of an effort been made in the early 'fifties
to draw Yugoslavia into all-European activities,
perhaps some of its recent drift towards more
regimentation at home and closer identification
with the Communist world abroad might have
been averted.
Therefore, in subsequent relations with states
that have nationally asserted themselves, it is
essential to emphasise their gradual internal
liberalisation and the creation of more binding
multilateral links with the developing European
community. The response to such Western
approaches is likely to be twofold: an effort to
achieve a compromise with the West, thereby
meeting some of its concerns; and, to prevent
absorption by the West, avoidance of a com-
plete break with Moscow. This would contribute
to the desirable evolutionary trends in the
region as a whole, both with regard to more
autonomy and evolutionary liberalisation.
A policy of bilateral differentiation made
political sense in a period when Soviet control
in East Europe was solid, because it weakened
Soviet hegemony. In the period of greater East
European. diversity, bilateral relations of in-
dividual East European states with the West
cease to have the same desirable effect. And just
as in the West multilateral economic relations
became the first step on the long road towards
a broader political solution, so in the East-West
European relationship the beginnings of a
multilateral economic approach could pave the
way to an eventual political reconciliation.
Economic assistance to the East European coun-
tries inevitably has to begin on a bilateral basis,
in conjunction with the expansion of other re-
lationships. However, it should be clear that it
is neither in the interest of East Europe nor
of Europe as a whole to assist the economic
development of individual East European states
entirely on a bilateral basis, for this will resolve
neither their specific economic problems nor
the basic political issues dividing Europe.
THE TIME MAY HAVE COME to create a special fund
for underwriting multilateral East-West econo-
mic projects. Hungary, for example, has been
eager to undertake common industrial enter-
prises with Western partners. The creation of
a special fund to assist such endeavours would
encourage greater economic multilateralism.
Also, to the extent possible, the multilateral
West European institutions could make it a
matter of policy to hire the quite numerous
East European specialists now resident in West
Europe in order to train a cadre of "'European
14
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technocrats." Similarly, the East European
states should be invited to permit their surplus
working force to participate in the European
labour market. Some East European countries
suffer from hidden unemployment, while
France, Switzerland, and Germany badly need
labour and import it from afar. Greater East-
West tabour mobility could be beneficial to all
concerned while also undermining the existing
European division. The exposure of many
thousands of East Europeans to West Europe
would have in time a profound effect on the
e.,
eve
op. To en-
East. courage such evolution the Western states
Some East European states are beginning to -should continue urging them to join GATT and
engage in limited regional co-operation outside to extend formal diplomatic recognition to the
of COMECON, the membership of which is deter- Common Market as a supranational Western
mined ideologically and includes even Mon- institution. The designation of Communist
golia. This development also deserves Western ambassadors to the EEC would have considerable
encouragement. East European regional econo- ideological significance: it would mean a change
mic co-operation helps to overcome the national in a doctrinaire position. From a practical point
antipathies still very strong in the area, and of view it would mean that
on som
i
h
,
e
ssues, t
e
inevitably will soften Soviet political control. Communist states would be able to negotiate
So far, the East European states have not taken directly with the EEC instead, as now is the case,
advantage of the facilities of the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund. Other dc-
veloping nations have derived great benefits
from such assistance, which, unlike many
bilateral arrangements, is given on a continuing,
long-term basis. Perhaps widely publicised offers
by the World Bank and the imp to assist East
European regional economic undertakings
might arouse both the interest of the Com-
munist government in joining the institutions
and East European popular pressure on behalf
of more regional ventures?'
As a preparatory measure, it would be desir-
able for Western multilateral economic
organisations to review, from a more political
perspective, the character of East-West economic
relations. The Common Market's headquarters
do not have a regular political planning organ.
The creation of such an office, charged with re-
"In a stimulating article on "World Bank
Credits," in Kultura (Paris, r964), W. A. Zbyszew-
ski discusses the extensive long-term credits
obtained by Spain in modernising its railroad net-
work and by India for its economic development,
and proposes that Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hun-
f ary, and Rumania should formulate joint proposals
or their further development, to be assisted by
the World Bank and the imp,
13 Since the Etc is a supranational organ and
coMECON is not, Communist diplomatic recognition
of the EEC should not be equated with Western
recognition of coMECON. There is no formal or
structural equivalence between the two.
sponsibility for analysing the long-range politi-
cal implications for East Europe of West
European economic development, should be
undertaken without delay, before the Common
Market is in a position to shape a common com-
mercial policy.
On their side, the Communist states eventu-
ally will have to abandon their ideologically
motivated hostility towards Western multi-
lateral economic organisations, and it is to be
hoped that they will do so as economic relations
between the East and W
d
l
of having to deal indirectly with the various
member states. It would mean greater contacts
with a major supranational European organisa-
tion and hence it would have the effect of draw-
ing the Communist states into a more involved
relationship with Europe.13 Perhaps as a pre-
liminary step, some third institution (viz., the
Ford Foundation, which has sponsored many
East-West conferences) may find it desirable to
sponsor special conferences on the subject of
the Common Market to which Eastern Euro-
pean and Soviet economists would be invited.
A more flexible and less ideological Com-
munist attitude towards Western multilateralism
may pave the way to other measures that could
be economically beneficial to the Communist
states and could serve to unite Europe. The
domestic acceptance by the Communist states
of world prices as a basis for their pricing system
would facilitate multilateral trade, now in part
inhibited by the arbitrary and incalculable Com-
munist pricing system. Consideration could be
given to special arrangements providing for the
accession of Communist states to some sort of
association with the oECO, or at least of inviting
them into particular phases of work that con-
cern them. The advantages of East European
participation in OECD would be: (t) They would
be allowed to take part in preliminary and
private discussions of measures that some mem-
ber states may intend to take and that affect
states that do not belong to the OECD: this would
'1.5
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give them an indirect share in the economic
decision-making of greater powers; (2) they
would benefit from a certain amount of pooling
of information, both economic and technical,
that is of importance to their economic planning
and development; (3) they could take advantage
of the limited technical assistance that OECD pro-
vides to less developed states. Some members
of the OECD have insisted on being categorised
as less developed states so that they could bene-
fit from such technical aid" East European
participation in the OECD would thus symbolise
the triumph of the Western conception of Euro-
pean multilateral development, while also bene-
fiting the East European nations economically.
THY, DEVELOPMENT on a multilateral basis of
economic relations between the East and the
West could gradually pave the way for progress
in the more sensitive field of politics. It would
minimise the fear of the East European ruling
elites that the West's intent is to absorb the
East European states one by one. It would work
against the revival of historically retrogressive
inner-oriented nationalist states. With progress
in increasing economic, cultural, and human
contacts, consideration in turn could be given to
more formal steps on the political level. For
example, the formation could be explored of a
standing committee of prominent East and West
Europeans (also with Soviet and American
participation) for the purpose of periodically
examining and discussing East-West relations.
14 Finland, which for political reasons must be
extremely careful not to offend the Soviet Union,
participates in OECD through observers and specifi.
cally in regard to matters affecting its basic indus-
tries. Yugoslavia, which has recently become
associated with eoMECON, is a full member for
confrontation of economic policies, scientific and
technical matters, agriculture and fisheries ques-
tions, technical assistance and productivity, and par-
ticipates through observers in other matters. Yugo-
slavia and Finland could both serve as useful
precedents for the other East European states.
15 Whereas in many places in the world the
United States seems to be losing its hold on popular
imagination, in East Europe it is still viewed in
highly idealised terms as the society of to-morrow,
a feeling strengthened by personal bonds with
many millions of Americans of East European
origin. Symptomatic of the feeling of the youth
was the finding of a survey conducted in Warsaw
during the Communist May, Day Youth Celebra-
tion: when asked where they would like to go
if all restrictions were lifted, the universal answer
was "America." (See Z. Bauman, Kariera, Warsaw
1960.)
A formal standing committee, on the model of
the various precedents that paved the way for
the West European unification efforts, would
have an advantage over the occasional ad hoc
bilateral and multilateral East-West conferences,
for it could gradually develop into a working
body with a professional staff, in effect creating
the first nucleus of functional all-European
bodies.
It is to be expected that the Soviet Union
would wish to take advantage of any multi-
lateral forum to enhance 'the status of its East
German regime. However, with the passage of
time and with progress in the areas of policy
already discussed, it' may be expected that not
all of the East European states would give
Moscow complete and unilateral backing on
that issue. Some of them may be tempted to
become involved in all-European undertakings,
even if it does mean that East Germany is ex-
cluded from them, provided some face-saving
device could be found.
The development of multilateral ties also
within East Europe would be desirable as a
stepping stone towards a larger European com-
munity. Since much of the tragic history of
East Europe can be traced to its internal
divisions, there may be a special merit for the
United States, which continues to enjoy un-
equalled prestige among the East European
peoples,'s to go on public record as favouring
the eventual formation of an East European
confederation, thereby emulating the West
European development. Historically all the
foreign efforts to "organise" East Europe have
been associated with hostile designs to dominate
the region. No one in East Europe could suspect
hegemonistic designs on the part of the United
States if, at some appropriately historic and
symbolic occasion, the President was to outline
in bold terms the hope for an East Europe that
would rise above its traditional divisions and
assume a more prominent role in the shaping of
the future Europe. With the decline in Soviet
control and with the weakening of the ideo-
logical commitment of the ruling East Euro-
pean elites, the resulting East European void
could be filled by an idea that is in keeping
especially with the widespread but often un-
articulated aspirations of the younger generation
to surmount the old divisions. Otherwise, there
is the danger that as the Communist elites
become "nationalised," the old antagonism will
be rekindled and even exploited by internal and
external forces.
3.6
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Such a U.S. statement might be particularly
timely because many East Europeans (including
even officials) are concerned that the new
American-Soviet stability might result in East
Europe becoming again a backyard of interna-
tional politics-an area to be occasionally ex-
ploited in order to put pressure on the Soviet
Union, but otherwise left to its own devices and
to its own more powerful neighbours, including
eventually also Germany. That is why a con-
structive policy statement defining the hopes for
the future development of East Europe would
have more than merely a propaganda effect.
Even if initially criticised by the Communist
press as "interference," it would inevitably give
a new sense of direction to many East Euro-
peans who are concerned about their future but
see no one providing them with a constructive
alternative to the present.
From Confrontation to Co-operation
UN T I L Now, most East-West agreements
have been negotiated during periods of
tension and crisis. Since most of the crises were
initiated by Soviet efforts to change the status
quo, the initiative has tended to rest with
Moscow. The settlements (with the exception of
the Austrian Treaty and the Test Ban Agree-
ment) involved merely the restoration of the
previous situation. In the present post-Cuba
detente there is a broader opportunity for the
'Vest to come to grips with the basic problem
of East-West relations. By taking the initiative
America would point up the wider European
scope of Western policy and also accelerate the
tendencies in the East which are favourable to
closer East-West relations. The appropriate con-
tent of such an initiative would be economic,
since this is the most sensitive point in Eastern
Europe, and since the possibility of East-West
economic co-operation has achieved a certain
ideological respectability in Eastern Europe.
To that end, a proposal should be addressed
to the European powers, including Russia, to
join with America and Western Europe in
formulating a joint all-European economic de-
velopment plan. The Plan would be designed
to cut across the present European partition,
to narrow existing disparities in European
living standards, to reduce the economic and
political significance of existing frontiers, and
to promote East-West trade and human contacts
by the development of an all-European system
of communications. The proposal would be a
fitting climax to past American efforts to foster
the unity of Western Europe, to bring about
closer contacts between East and West, and in
this context to build a stable relationship be-
tween Germany and East Europe. In such a plan
American financial participation would be con-
ditioned on complementary efforts by Western
Europe. Britain and Europe could participate
as an entity by creating a special fund to finance
East-West trade and common European invest-
ment projects, or by extending the scope and
the size of both the Development Fund and the
European Investment Bank. Working out new
trade agreements with the East in the context
of a larger plan of East-West economic activity
would accelerate also the process of West Euro-
pean co-operation.
A venture of this kind would take advantage
of the West's economic strength, of economic
pressures in the East, and of the growing appeal
of "the European idea" in Eastern Europe in
contrast to the waning attraction of Communist
ideology. There is reason to hope that West
Europeans would be ready to make the contri-
butions necessary to bring this collective enter-
prise into being. For example, a 1962 poll
showed a large majority of the West Europeans
in favour of using national taxes to promote the
development of the poorer regions of Europe
(while a small majority opposed the same for
Africa). That West Europe could contribute sub-
stantial capital is suggested by the present size
of 'Vest German commitments to international
development: $1,050 million to the capital stock
of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, $200 million to the development
fund of the EEe, $300 million to the European
Investment Bank. Together with contributions
from the other Western European states and
from the United States, a proposal of this kind
would have a dramatic appeal in both Eastern
and Western Europe.
The proposal would be premised on a phased
reunification of Germany and on an implicit
acceptance by the East of the principle that the
reconstruction of Europe would involve in time
the reunification of Germany. A general plan
of European economic co-operation, involving
multilateral Western participation and open
both to Russia and to East Europe, would be
more acceptable in the East than any bilateral
attempt by West Germany "to buy" East Ger-
many in exchange for credits to Russia, as has
at times been proposed in the West German
press and repeatedly rejected by the East. A
17
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direct German-Russian relationship would create
:mars and opposition in East Europe, not to
speak of suspicions of "a new Rapailo" in the
West. Only a solution of the German problem
in the context of broader East-West co-operation
could reasonably assure both that the conse-
quence of unification will not be the fragmenta-
don of one side or the other.
No DOUBT the Soviet Union would try to take
advantage of a proposal of this kind to legalise
the existence of the two German states by insist-
ing that East Germany should formally partici-
pate in any all-European undertaking. Yet it is
by no means certain that, if the West takes the
steps already suggested to reassure the East
Europeans on the German question, the Soviet
Union would be able to count on the solid sup-
port of the East European states. The idea of
"rejoining Europe" would generate popular en-
thusiasm in East Europe. The economic oppor-
tunity thereby presented would doubtless be
attractive to the harassed East European econo-
mic cadres. The economic character of the pro-
posal would diminish the suspicions of the
political elites. Increasingly concerned with their
own well-being, these governments might be
receptive to a formula excluding East German
participation on the grounds that East Germany
benefits already from advantageous bilateral
economic arrangements with West Germany.
If actually launched, and in operation for a
period of years, such unprecedented multilateral
economic co-operation would sooner or later
create a favourable context for resolving peace-
fully the many outstanding European political
and security problems." In the new atmosphere,
it might be possible to find solutions for the
more intractable problems of arms control; to
achieve perhaps a freeze on nuclear weapons;
and even to explore again various regional
security schemes. In the present hostile con-
frontation it is unavoidable that each side
assumes that any security scheme proposed by
the other has ulterior motives.
Of course, the Soviet Union may reject any
such co-operative venture; or, more likely, it
may equivocate and attempt to shift the focus
of the proposal to direct grants to individual
Communist states, thereby frustrating the un-
derlying purpose of the initiative. Yet at least
some of the East European states would surely
be attracted, and there would be great popular
pressure in East Europe for participation. It is
by no means certain that a Soviet refusal would
be automatically followed by East European
refusals, as happened with the Marshall Plan.
Indeed, one should not assume that the Soviets
will reject it indefinitely.
In assessing possible Soviet reaction, one must
recognise that the general evolutionary trend in
Russia towards a more European orientation is
counterbalanced by increasing Russian national-
ism and even chauvinism, and by the power
interests of the bureaucratic technocratic dic-
tatorship which is likely to continue to dominate
the Soviet political scene. It is quite possible
that the ruling elite may justify their power by
emphasising the global competition with the
United States, building on the desire of many
Russians to become "the Number One world
power." It is therefore quite possible that the
Soviets may be unwilling to participate in any
scheme which would involve eventual reunifica-
tion of Germany and lessening of Russian con-
trol over East Europe. For this reason, Western
policy must reckon both with the possibility of
a favourable Soviet evolution, and with persist-
ing Soviet hostility.
The proposed initiative for all-European
economic co-operation does just this. If the
favourable Soviet evolution, foreseen in this
article, comes to pass, the proposal opens the
way for the Soviet Union and East Europe to
move towards a grand settlement and recon-
ciliation with the West. If Soviet hostility per-
sists, the proposal would put increased strain
on the Soviet control of East Europe. It would
magnify the cost of Soviet domination by giving
the East Europeans new leverage to extract
greater Soviet economic assistance in return for
their rejecting the Western initiative. Thus, the
initiative is desirable on either assumption
about the trends of Soviet developments.
Once made, the proposal would become
an objective force, just as Khrushchev's bold
disarmament proposals gave Soviet foreign
policy a certain positive momentum, though
they were never implemented. The initiative
could revivify the West and attract the East,
irrespective of formal acceptances or refusals.
Its positive appeal would doubtless create at
least some divisions of opinion in Moscow and
might help the moderate forces in Soviet society.
THE READER WILL NOT HAVE failed to note the
historical connection between the proposal here
made and the original proposal of the Marshall
Plan. The immense political force of a far-
reaching initiative, made at the right time, was
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never more clearly demonstrated. In the
eloquent words of its chronicler, Harry Price:
The Marshall Plan demonstrated that the free
nations can seize the initiative in the East-West
struggle if goals are set which exert a wide and
potent appeal and if enough intelligence, energy,
and resources are devoted to the attainment of
these goals.
The Plan began with an idea. It was an idea
which satisfied a widely felt yearning and fired
the imaginations and hopes of millions. Its con-
ception and projection was a creative event. Yet
the uniqueness of the concept was less extra-
ordinary than its historic timing, the way in
which it entered into and became a part of exist-
ing currents of thought and feeling.... To usher
in a new era in relations between peoples-an era
in which the energies released in co-operative
enterprises eventually outstrip those dedicated to
defence or destruction-not one or two ideas
but a whole sequence of new concepts is needed.
One of the lessons of the Marshall Plan appears
to be that for an idea to be effective in the inter-
national sphere, as has been true in the indus-
trial sphere, it must be addressed to a situation
that is ripe for it.
Recall the starkness of the European situa-
tion in 1947. The Marshall Plan was born of the
frustration and failure of the Moscow Con-
ference and was designed to be "a broad and
dramatic effort." To-day, in the context of
nuclear proliferation, the rise of West European
nationalisms, the decline of U.S. influence on
the European continent, the growing frustra-
tion in West Germany, and the increasing
opportunities in the more divided East, there
is again a need and an increasingly ripe his-
torical opportunity for a bold and creative idea.
As long as the West is militarily strong and
clear about its goals, we need not fear to extend
to the Communist world a sincere offer of econo-
mic co-operation designed neither to strengthen
nor to weaken those who have made themselves
our adversaries, but to bind us all together so
that we cannot consider warring against each
other. Even in the darkest days of.the 'forties,
the Policy Planning Staff of the U.S. State
Department felt (and rightly so) that "Ameri-
can effort in the aid to Europe should be
directed not to the combating of Communism as
such, but to the restoration of the economic
health and vigor of European society."
THE IDEA of THE Atlantic community. was a
creative and effective response to a challenging
Russia. The challenge we face is no longer the
same. The Atlantic idea alone is not an adequate
response to the opportunity presented :by a
weakening Soviet bloc and to Europe's quest
for identity. The proposed initiative would have
the merit of creating a larger context for con-
tinued American-European co-operation, some-
what subsuming the inherent tendency for
European processes to become also an expression
of the European desire for autonomy from the
United States. A larger conception of a co-opera-
tive community, involving eventually four
major units, America and Russia as the peri-
pheral participants, and West Europe and East
Europe as the two halves of the inner core (in
time perhaps becoming even more closely
linked), would provide a more constructive and
politically appealing image of to-morrow than
a troubled Western partnership implicitly based
on the notion of continued European partition.
A broader conception, of which the Atlantic
partnership could be one component, would be
more likely to keep the United States relevant
to Europe's future, to prevent the recrudescence
in Europe of narrow nationalisms or the per-
petuation of xenophobic national Communisms,
and to create a new political context in which
the legacies of World War II can at last be
settled. The West can set itself no nobler or
more timely task than to end the partition of
Europe.
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SECRET 13 September 1965
FURTHER CHINESE COMMUNIST
EFFORTS IN AFRICA
Although the Chinese Communists have experienced several
setbacks in their African campaign and encountered some'resistance among
the leaders of the "Afro-Asian Bloc" (e.g., postponement of II Afro-Asian
Conference, the Chicoms major propaganda effort of the last three years),
her subsequent activities demonstrate once again both the fanaticism of
her leaders and their ability to adjust their tactics swiftly and abruptly
to the prevailing political winds. In addition to direct approaches on
the highest levels, Peking has been trying recently to improve her ima
e
g
in Africa through the cooperation of third countries, especially Indonesia,
North Vietnam and to some extent Pakistan.
Recent Chicom setbacks. Since the beginning of the year, the Chicoms
have been expelled from Burundi for interfering in its internal affairs -
the first time 'this has hap e enp d to them in Africa. They have been strong-
ly criticized by President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, President
Hamani Diori of Niger and President'Mau'rice Yameogo of Upper Volta for
"teaching Africans to kill Africans" and coveting Africa's "empty spaces"
for their own overflowing population.
President Diori has had special cause to complain for, aside from
the terrorist attacks in Niger by the Sawaba Party which he said were
"organized, financed and directed by Communist China," an attempt in
April 1965 was made on his life by a Chinese-trained Sawaba terrorist.
As a result of reports in July 1965 that the Chinese were involved in
a plot to assassinate President Senghor of Senegal, he is expected to
expel the NCNA representative in Senegal and to refuse to establish
diplomatic relations with the CPR.
The diplomatic forays of Chou En-lai in June 1965 highlighted his
miscalculation of African revolutionary prospects. While in Dar-es-
Salaam, Chou reiterated that an "exceedingly favorable" revolutionary
situation still prevailed. Although he received a warm initial welcome
in Tanzania, enthusiasm waned steadily under the impact of Chou's re-
petitive and ill-conceived attacks on "imperialism, colonialism and
neo-colonialism." President Nyerere then made it clear that Tanzanians
were determined to assert their non-alignment and independence. The
F-50X1-HUM
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SECRET
Kenya government also reacted to Chou's remarks by issuing an official
statement that it intended to avert "all revolutions, irrespective of
their countries of origin."
When Chou returned to Africa, two days after the Algerian coup, it
was clear that his lobbying to hold the Afro-Asian Conference on schedule
and China's precipitate recognition of the new Algerian regime, untempered
by any concern for the fate of China's erstwhile fraternal ally, Ben Bella,
profoundly shocked other African leaders. It was a striking; example of
China's indifference to African views and interests when pursuinn her own
ends.
The decision of the Government of Kenya to expell the New China News
Agency (NCNA) correspondent, Wang Teh-ming, in July 1965, focused at-
tention again on the unprofessional activities of China's official news
service. Wang, whose presence in Kenya was said to be "against the in-
terests of national security," was known to have been in touch with dis-
sident groups, including left wing elements in the ruling KANU. The
expulsion of Wang was welcomed by the Nairobi brance of KANU, which urged
the government to make a full investigation into the activities of those
embassies "which are causing misunderstanding and confusion to Kenya
people." At the same time, Defense Minister Mungal stated that Kenyan
citizens would not be recruited into the armed forces if they underwent
unauthorized foreign military training - a warning clearly intended to
apply to trainees sent to communist nations.
Although expressing sympathy for the views of moderate officials,
President Jomo Kenyatta has refused, at least for the time being, to
agree to their request that the Chicom embassy be closed and its staff
expelled.
New "official" Chicom, efforts. Faced with the need to do some fence-
mending in Africa, the Chicoms have stepped up their efforts, concentrat-
ing on those countries that appear most ready to accept the wares they
offer. In August 1965, for example, Peking concluded a commercial pact
with Guinea, a cultural cooperation treaty with the Somali Republic,
and reached agreement with the Congo-Brazzaville on a plan to implement
the cultural accord signed earlier this year. (See unclassified attach-
ment for major Communist moves in specific African countries.)
The Chinese have found that while a number of African countries will
not accept aid directly from them, they will accept it from Indonesia.
One of the rain purposes of the visit of Communist China's Foreign Minister
Chen Yi to Indonesia, in mid-August 1965, reportedly was to discuss the
channelling 2f economic assistance to Africa throuh :Indonesia. It
vas further reported that during First Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio's
tour through Africa in July 1965, he committed Indonesia to a total of
50 million dollars in economic assistance to African states; this sum
will be sullied b~_,the Chicoms.
2
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Chicom strategy. Peking appears to divide African nations into
four ,eneral categories and tailors its program to fit the Chinese con-
ception of the situation and circumstances which apply to each case.
The First group, composed of the radical states with which close co-
operation is possible, include Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Congo/B, and
prior to the June 1965 coup, Algeria. (There are encouraging indica-
tions, however slight, of a less radical trend in the policies of both
Mali and Guinea and some disillusion with Communist China.) The Chinese
maintain cordial ties with the leaders of these countries and work
closely with them to establish bases for operation against third coun-
tries.
The Second category of states includes those which have recently
become independent and where the political orientation of the govern-
ment is still in the process of development. Dahomey, the Central
African Republic, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania fall into this group
which Peking is attempting to steer towards the left.
The Third category consists of conservative states, vulnerable
to revolutionary efforts in the long run, but not targets ripe for
active subversion at present. Tunisia, Morocco and Ethiopia are in
this group. Peking has diplomatic relations with Tunisia and Morocco
and makes periodic overtures for the exchange of diplomatic missions
with Ethiopia.
The Fourth category is composed of "reactionary" regimes -- those
which do not recognize Peking and have been resisting Chicom blandish-
ments. Included in this group are Upper Volta, Niger, Chad, Gabon,
Congo/L, and Rwanda. All are targets for active subversion at the
present time. Other conservative governments - Liberia, Ivory Coast,
Malawi and the Malagasy Republic - appear to be on the list for future
attention.
Peking now maintains diplomatic ties with 17 African nations.
(See attachment) Many conservative African governments, however, in-
cluding Cameroon, Niger, Upper Volta, and the Ivory Coast, are genuinely
suspicious of the Chinese potential for subversion and are not anxious
to see them established locally.
Propaganda mechanisims and media. All Chicom posts abroad serve as
major propaganda outlets. Chinese diplomats and press representatives
throughout Africa, as well as Chou En-lai and other lesser figures tour-
ing the continent, assiduously echo the line that Peking is Africa's
best friend, overflowing with understanding of African problems and
sharing a common experience of foreign exploitation.
The Chinese now beam more than 100 hours of radio propaganda to
Africa each week, as compared with about 50 hours three years ago.
Languages include English, French, Arabic, Cantonese, Portuguese,
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S,-zahili and Hausa- The Cantonese -language broadcasts are directed
toward the more than 110,000 overseas Chinese in East Africa, about
half of ,Thom inhabit Mauritius.
High-quality pamphlets and periodicals in both English and French
are widely distributed. in Africa. The NCNA, Peking's .?r.N incipal agency
for dissemination _o:f 22a anddaa, now maintains offices in 15 African
countries, and has numerous effective and often influential local
stringers. Tanzanian Minister Babu formerly served as an NCNA repre-
sentative in East Africa.
Economic aid and infiltration. There are over 1,500 Chinese
technicians and laborers in Africa. This figure is likely to increase
substantially in the future.
The Chinese aid programs have stressed assistance for agricultural
development and the establishment of small-scale industries for food
processing and consumer goods. Chinese schemes to grow sugar, rice
and tea in Mali apparently are working out well and several hundred
Chinese technicians continue to be employed on these projects. In
Ghana, Chinese technicians are providing assistance in growing swamp
rice; others are to initiate similar projects for the production of
vegetables, cotton and peanuts.
Total Chinese trade with Africa has been small, amounting to ap-
proximately $120 million in 1963, but is growing. During the first
half of 196+ total Chinese trade with Africa was 50 per cent larger
than that in the comparable period of th22 previous year.
Since Peking is unable to afford economic and technical assistance
programs on the same scale as those offered by the West and by the
Soviet Union, it relies heavily on the propaganda effect of its more
modest efforts. For example, Chou En-lai gained respect for the CPR
by offering aid as one poor country to another. Offers of economic
assistance amounted to a, total of about $335 million. Agreements
negotiated in 1964 alone came to approximately $195 million. As in
other parts of the world, however, Chicom economic assistance to Africa
has remained, largely a paper proposition. Only about one-fourth of the
funds have been obligated (as of April 1965) and less than 10 per cent
about $20 million - have been drawn.
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Fact Sheet For Background Use Only
13 September 1965
The KOIOIDL - The Soviet Union's Mono
on Youth Activities
Non-Communists are at a serious disadvantage in attempting to under-
stand Communist organizations such as the Komsomol when they view it
from their own background and experience. A youth organization, for
example, is normally conceived of as an organization formed and run by
youths for their own purposes. But the Soviet youth organization,
Komsomol (properly the Vsesoyuznyy Leninskiy Knmmunisticheskiy S ro uz
Molodezhi -- All-Union Leninist Communist League of Youth), can only be
described as an organization of, not for the youth of the nation. An
organization of the youth by the Party for the State.
Somehow the idea persists that the Komsomol is, to some degree at
least, "independent" of the CPSU. True, at the founding First Congress
of the Komsomol, October 29 to November 4, 1918, a motion was passed that
"The League is an independent organization." This was for the deliberate
purpose of permitting the Komsomol to reach beyond Party members to
attempt to gather in other youth not yet in the Party. Lest this word
"independent" cause confusion, however, the Central Committee of the
Komsomol abandoned the term at a Plenum meeting five months later, and
adopted in its stead the word "autonomous." Further to clarify matters,
a joint resolution of the Central Committees of both the Party and the
Komsomol proclaimed on August 8, 1919, that "The Central Committee of
the Komsomol is directly subordinated to the Central Committee of the
Party.... The local organizations of the Komsomol work under the control
of the local committees of the Party." And this has become the standard
pattern for Party control of mass organizations; the Central Committee
controls the leadership, the lower Party echelons control the lower
levels of the organization.
There are other facts which convincingly demonstrate the fact and
nature of CPSU control of the Komsomol: Fifty percent of the voting
delegates to the First Congress of the Komsomol were Party members; this
figure rose to 97.8% at the Sixth Congress (1924), and fell to 59% at
the Thirteenth Congress in 1958. Although the normal age of Komsomol
members is supposed to be limited to the 14 to 26 year bracket, 52% of
the delegates to this Thirteenth Congress were over 26 years of age, and
14 percent were even over 30. And the largest single category of dele-
gates consisted of full-time, paid, professional Komsomol employees
(they formed 87% of the delegates in 1924; the percentage fell to about
45% in 1954). All of which proves that the Congress of the Soviet youth
organization is controlled by Party members over 26 years old who are
professional employees of the organization itself. But it still pro-
fesses to represent Soviet youth:
(Cont.)
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The basic function of the Komsomol, it is obvious, is to control
the youth of the Soviet Union. And it does this both with a carrot and
a stick. As a carrot, the Komsomol offers practically the only path to
advancement in those things to which youth aspire. If a young person
desires to get an advanced education, to join an athletic team, to
travel abroad, even to go to a night club, the path is via the Komsomol.
And the Komsomol carries a big stick too. It organizes the "druzhiniki,"
groups of young activists who patrol the schools, the night clubs, and
the beach resorts to assure that the youth dress properly, stay sober,
say the right things, and generally avoid the dissolute ways of "hooli-
gans." Zr way of punishment, the druzhiniki can send a wayward lard to
a "Comrades' Court" where he can be severely reprimanded. Or they can
arrange for him to "volunteer" for service in the "new lands." A clas-
sic illustration of the size of the stick wielded by the Komsomol ap-
peared in the organization's daily newspaper, Komsomolskaya Pravda, on
March 29, 1962: A malingerer named Potapov was sentenced to three years'
deportation to Siberia because "in the morning he went out into the
courtyard and indolently ruminated 'what can I do with myself,' and then
came to the invariable conclusion that the best thing would be to devote
his attention to a tin can with which one can amuse oneself to one's
heart's content in place of a ball, and to chase pigeons."
Of course sending youth to the "new lands" serves a second purpose
in addition to providing a punishment which helps keep people in line;
it provides a steady flow of manpower for areas which could not other-
wise hope to recruit sufficient workers to fulfill their plans. And
indeed support to agriculture and industry is a very major function of
the Komsomol. An indication of the scope of activity involved has been
given by the current First Secretary of the organization, Sergey Pav-
lovich PAVLOV: over a period of 4 years 2 million youths were recruited
to work on farms (700,000 of them for the virgin lands) and many sectors
of Soviet industry are organized around 54 million Soviet youths directed
by the Komsomol. In connection with the current stress on agricultural
chemicals, Komsomol was called on to assist in the completion of more
than 50 mineral fertilizer plants. The Soviet news agency Tass compared
the size of the call-up with Khrushchev's mammoth "new lands" campaign
of the 1950's.
Another important function of the Komsomol in the Soviet scheme of
things is its role in selecting, training, and testing future cadres for
the Party and the government. By and large the Komsomol members are
divided between those who join because it is a sine qua non for their
schooling or other interests, and those who become activists in the
Komsomol for the purpose of making a career in the ruling class. This
2 (Cont. )
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is readily reflected in the statistic quoted earlier to the effect that
the largest group of delegates to Komsomol Congresses consists of pro-
fessional workers in the Komsomol. These activists receive excellent
training in Communist ideology, Party organization, strategy and tactics,
and in the various other matters necessary for the Soviet elite. Two
current examples of the value of this background may be cited which are
not only to the point, they are devastating indictments of the Komsomol.
The first case is that of Alexander Nikolayevich SHELNPIN, borm in
Voronezli :n 1918, who rose through the Komsomol to the heights of the
Soviet system. In 1940 he began his career in the Moscow City Komsomol
Committee. In 1943 he became a Secretary of the Central Committee of
the All-Union Komsomol and advanced to Second Secretary in 19+9 and
First Secretary (i.e., boss) in 1952. He graduated from the Komsomol
to become Chairman of the Committee on State Security (KGB) in 1958.
After three years with the ,KGB (the Soviet Secret Police organization)
he was elected to the Secretariat of the Central Committee (October 1961),
and was named Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Chairman
of the Party-State Control Committee in 1962. Following Khrushchev's
fall, Shelepin was elected a full member of the Presidium of the CPSU
in November 1964 -- at the age of 46.
Shelepin's replacement as First Secretary of the Komsomol was
Vladimir Yefimovich SEMICHASTNIY, born 192+ at Grigoryevka in the Ukraine.
He had worked up through the ranks of the Ukrainian Komsomol organization
and had also been elected to the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Party
in 19+9 (he arose while Khrushchev was First Secretary of the Ukrainian
Party). In 1956 he made the Central Committee of the CPSU and in 1958
was elected to the Council of the Union of the Supreme Soviet. That
same year he became boss of the Komsomol. He distinguished himself dur-
ing his tenure as First Secretary of the All-Union Komsomol by being one
of the first to attack Boris Pasternak following the awarding of the
Nobel Prize for Literature to the author of Doctor Zhivago in October
1958. Addressing the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Komsomol at
a meeting commemorating the organization's 40th anniversary, in the pres-
ence of Khrushchev and facing a television camera, he said Pasternak was
worse than a pig since he had "defiled the place where he has eaten, ...
defiled those by whose toil he lives and breathes...." After a year as
head of the Komsomol he was transferred to Azerbaydzhan to try to
straighten out messes in the oil and cotton industries. A year later,
however, he was back in Moscow as ... Chairman of the KGB, replacing
Shelepin. And he's still there.
The current First Secretary of the Komsomol -- Semichastniy's
successor -- is Sergey Pavlovich PAVLOV, born January 1929 in Kalinin.
He rose through the Moscow City committee of the Komsomol, having been
Secretary (1955), Second Secretary (1956) and First Secretary (1958).
In April 1958 he moved over to the All Union Komsomol as a secretary and
became First Secretary of the latter organization in March 1959 at the
3 (Cont.)
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age of 30. He became a full member of the Central Committee of the CPSU
in October 1961. He has been an active campaigner against the liberal
writers and poets, having been a principal speaker during the meetings
held with the intellectuals by Khrushchev in December 1962, and in March
and April 1963-
A final point to make in discussing the Komsomol is its role in
international youth affairs. Naturally the Komsomol is the organizer and
leader of the international Communist youth fronts. Shelepin was Vice-
President of the International Union of Students from 19+7 to 1952 and
was Vice President of the World Federation of Democratic Youth (TPDY)
from 1953 to 1959. (That is, for a period he was simultaneously head of
the Soviet Secret Police and vice president of the chief international
Communist youth front:: Bogdan Stashinskiy, the self-admitted KGB
assassin of the Ukrainian exile leader Stepan Bandera, has testified
that during this period he was awarded the Soviet Red Banner for the
assassination by Shelepin himself.) Shelepin was succeeded in the WFDY
by Pavlov who became its First Vice President in 1959. Pavlov was also
leader of the Soviet delegation of some 800 "youths" at the Eighth World
Youth Festival in Helsinki in the summer of 1962.
The Komsomol is also charged with selecting all delegations of
Soviet youth which attend the myriad meetings around the world each year
and it receives all youth delegations visiting the USSR. It has a very
special role to play at the "People's Friendship University named after
Patrice Lumumba" (known as PFU or Lumumba U.), where the students from
Africa, Asia and Latin America are generally segregated from the bull
of Soviet and European students. In order that these foreigners not be
entirely segregated from Soviet life, a certain number of Soviet students
are assigned to PFU to be friendly with them, assist them ... and indoc-
trinate them. Of course these Soviet students are almost exclusively
Komsomol activists. And of course they are in close touch with the pro-
rector of the University, Pavel Dimitriyevich YERZIN, a General in the
KGB according to the London Daily Telegraph of 17 April 1963.
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