MASSED AVIATION STRIKES BY LIEUTENANT GENERAL OF AVIATION D. V. BOBROV, USSR HONORED MILITARY PILOT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000403340001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 10, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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VOYENNAYA MYSL' [MILITARY THOUGHT], No. 10, October 1984, pp. 37-49.
Massed Aviation Strikes
(Historical Experience and the Present)
by
Lieutenant General of Aviation D. V. BOBROV,
USSR Honored Military Pilot
One of the most important factors for restraining the hegemonistic
aspirations of the American imperialists is the constant combat readiness of the
Soviet Armed Forces to repulse aggression from no matter where it may come. Its
basis consists of the troops' skillful mastering of weapons and combat
equipment, the.high level of development of methods for their combat employment
in accordance with the intended use of each of the military services in
contemporary operations, and the ability of the leadership personnel to
creatively use the achievements of military theory in actual practice during the
planning of engagements, battles, and attacks, and to make decisions with
consideration of our own and foreign combat experience.
The air forces, armed with supersonic aircraft of various types with an
extensive tactical radius of action and equipped with modern weapons of
destruction, are capable of quickly concentrating and shifting efforts from one
axis to another, and of destroying any stationary or mobile target practically
to the entire depth of the operational deployment of the enemy forces. In
proportion to the extent of the development in the NATO armed forces of
conventional weapons, reconnaissance-attack systems, drones and cruise missiles,
aviation will play an ever-increasing role in combined-arms operations. This
predetermines the need for constantly improving existing methods and searching
for new ones for the fulfillment of aviation's combat missions.
An effective form of military operations for air forces is the massed air
strike which takes the form of a short-term, powerful action by aviation against
the enemy with the goals of destroying (or striking) the most important land (or
sea) targets using various aviation munitions, and is carried out by one or
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significance of the strike targets, and the capability for reaching and
destroying them in extremely short periods of time.
several aviation large units in a unified operational-tactical formation on an
operational (or strategic) axis or in an extensive area.* Its determining
characteristics are: the composition of the employed forces, the operational
t
The massed air strike incorporates the requirements of the most importan
principles of the Soviet art of warfare: the concentration of the main efforts
on the most important axis at the decisive moment to carry out the main tasks;
the coordinated use and close cooperation of various types of forces and
weapons; the reliable suppression of the air defense; the concealed nature of
preparations and surprise in actions; and comprehensive support as well as
stable command and control. Its effectiveness in combined-arms and air
operations has been confirmed by the experience of the Great Patriotic War.
An objective precondition for the origination of this form of military
operations was the achievement of the appropriate level of development of strike
aviation in a qualitative and, mainly, in a quantitative respect.
Massed aviation strikes were considered in the West as the most effective
method for implementing the well-known bourgeoise theory of "aerial warfare,"
which resulted in a sharp growth in the quantitative composition and a
significant improvement in the combat equipment of bomber aviation in the armies
of the main capitalist states before the Second World War. Thus, in 1940, its
proportion in the air forces of Hitlerite Germany was over 57 percent,** and in
comparison with the period of the First World War the bombing salvo increased by
22.3 times.*** Simultaneously, corresponding organizational measures were also
carried out.
Actual experience has proven the unsoundness of relying solely on any one of
the military services, but the principle of the massed use of air forces and
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* Vo enn Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar' (Military Encyclopedic Dictionary),
Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1983t PP. 761-762.
Sovetskiye Vo enno-Vozdushn a Sily v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945
Soviet Air Forces in the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945), Moscow,
Voyenizdat, 1968, p. 26.
***Istoriya VVS Sovetskoy Armii (History of the Soviet Army Air Forces), Moscow,
Voyenizdat, 19589 P. 377.
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corresponding forms of military actions has been theoretically and practically
substantiated.
Soviet military thought in the prewar period concentrated the main attention
on the development of methods of using air forces in combined-arms operations
or battles in close cooperation with other branches of the armed forces and
the arms of service. The results of military-scientific research and the
experience of operational training found reflection in the "Provisional
Instructions for the Independent Operations of the Air Forces," officially
reinforcing a new form of using aviation -- the air operation. Its basis
consisted of concentrated air strikes carried out by a unit (or several
subunits) simultaneously or sequentially.*
In the practice of actual combat operations of the air forces in the
military conflicts of 1938-1940, there had already been carried out strikes
which by their scales and importance substantially exceeded concentrated
strikes. Thus, in the course of battles in the area of Lake Khasan on
6 August 1938, 180 bombers and 70 supporting fighters participated
simultaneously in the air support of our troops. The results of the aviation
actions and the artillery preparation were used skillfully by the attacking
units and large units in successfully carrying out their combat tasks.'
Aviation was also similarly used in the actions at the Khalkhin-Gol River.
Thus, an important principle of Soviet military science on the massed use of
aviation in a combined-arms operation (or battle) and also in the fight for air
superiority was theoretically validated and verified in practice.
In the Great Patriotic War the elaborated theory was validated and further
developed in the very first combined-arms and air operations. Thus, in the air
operations carried out by order of the General Headquarters [Stavka]
25-30 June 1941 on the Northwest axis, there were planned several powerful air
strikes on airfields of the 5th Air Fleet of fascist Germany. The most
effective of them turned out to be the 25 June strike, which was delivered in
e Boyevoy ustav bombardirovochnoy aviatsii (BUBA-40) (Combat Regulations for
Bomber Aviation), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1940, p. 34.
Istori a vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945 (History of the Second World War,
1939-1945), vol. 2, Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1977, p. 213.
***Polevoy ustav Krasnoy Armii (Field Regulations of the Red Army), 1941, Draft,
p. 178.
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anticipation of the operations of the ground forces and according to all
indicators corresponded to a massed strike (236 bombers and 244 fighters took
part in it).*
In support of the ground forces a massed air strike was carried out on 13
June 1941 in the area of Vitebsk with the goal of stopping the enemy
offensive.**
However, this form of air force operations did not become very widespread in
the first period of the war because of the small numbers of our strike aviation
due to losses suffered during the treacherous enemy attack and the huge area in
which combat operations were being conducted.
As bomber and ground attack aviation was developed, as its organizational
structure was improved, and as combat experience was accumulated, the level of
massing aviation forces during the fulfillment of combat tasks increased.
Powerful strikes by several bomber and ground attack aircraft divisions under
the cover of fighters became the basis of air operations as well as of the
Soviet air offensive developed by Soviet military science.
In the air operations of the Great Patriotic War massed air strikes were
delivered mainly against airfields of the opposing aviation groupings with the
goal of winning air superiority. Of these, among the most instructive were the
massed strikes in the 1943 spring-summer air operations on the eve of the battle
at Kursk. Their successful implementation was attributable to. the skillful
conduct of a whole complex of measures.
The majority of the airfields of the enemy groupings was subjected to
simultaneous pressure. For example, in the air operation carried out in May,
the first strike was delivered against 17 airfields out of 22, and the second --
against 20. In the third, all 22 airfields were attacked.
Surprise was achieved through careful selection of the time of attack on the
basis of a detailed evaluation of the combat activity schedule of the units
based on the airfields. The first strike in the examined operation began at
* TIMOKHOVICH, I. V. Operativnoye iskusstvo Sovetskykh VVS v Velikoy
Otechestvennoy voyne (Operational Art of the Soviet Air Forces in the Great
Patriotic War), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1976, p. 71.
**Soviet Air Forces in the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945, p. 51.
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dawn when preparations for combat sorties were being carried out on the
airfields, and when flying and technical personnel were located by the aircraft
on which bombs were suspended, and this aided in the effectiveness of the
attacks. In the next air operation the first strike was planned for the evening
with a subsequent shift to night attacks, which forced the enemy to take care of
the bomb damage in the dark under extremely unfavorable conditions.
Theo rational-tactical structuring of the aviation forces provided for the
allocation to each enemy airfield of a strike group (bombers and ground attack
aircraft to destroy aircraft, runways, and other targets), a support group
(direct escort fighters, ground attack aircraft for suppressing the airfields'
air defense), and one or two crews to monitor attack damage. Altogether, an
average of 300-400 aircraft participated in the strikes.
Depending on the situation, from 30 up to 60 percent of the forces was
allocated for carrying out the main attack. The following pattern was normally
used: in the first strikes when it was intended to achieve surprise, the main
forces were concentrated in the strike groups, and in the subsequent strikes the
number of support aircraft was increased. The calculation was based on a
"forced" breakthrough to the targets through the air defense system. For this
purpose there was envisaged the timely and systematic battle against enemy
fighters on the ground and in the air by the blockade of their airfields, by the
establishment of screening forces and groups for intercepting air defense
fighters on the flight routes of the bombers and ground attack aircraft, by the
direct escorting of the attacking aircraft, and also by the destruction of
antiaircraft weapons. The number of aircraft allocated for a strike against one
airfield fluctuated greatly -- from 10-20 up to 160, and this substantially
influenced the results of the strike.
Preparation of massed strikes was carried out on the basis of the air
operation plan prepared by the staff of the Air Forces of the Red Army and
approved by Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.
In the divisions and regiments, during the organization of the battle, after
receipt of the mission, there were selected the flight routes and profiles; and
there were designated the methods for the assembly of the groups, the combat
formation on the flight route, in the area of the strike targets, and on the
return route, and also the kind of maneuvers to use and the number of approaches
to the target. Special attention was devoted to working out the cooperation of
the bombers and ground attack aircraft with the supporting fighters.
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Through combat practice there were worked out the main questions on the
organization and maintenance of cooperation, and these procedures are still
applicable under contemporary conditions. Among the most important of them can
be included: determining the procedure for communications between staffs and
group leaders (commanders) in the air, the part of the flight route where the
fighters will join up with the bombers (or ground attack aircraft), their
positions in the overall operational-tactical formation at stages along the
flight route and in the target area, the methods of mutual recognition and for
the exchange of information about enemy aviation, the lines where escorting will
begin and end, the tactical methods for the coordinated fire of fighters 50X1-H U M
bombers (or of ground attack aircraft) in repulsing the attack of enemy
fighters; specifying the organization for the escorting of aircraft which are
damaged and forced to cease fulfilling of their combat mission, the possibility
of bombers using fighter airfields on their return from a combat mission, and
others. It should be noted that the commander of the supported large unit
(unit) was always designated the leader of the overall combat formation. 0~
In preparing a massed air strike, great importance was attached to
preliminary (or final) air reconnaissance of targets. It was carried out to
reveal the types and numbers of aircraft at airfields, the locations of the
parked aircraft, alert crews, antiaircraft weapons and storage areas, to
establish the flight routine of the aviation units based there, and to determine
the most advantageous directions for attacks. Using available aerial photos,
the commanders and flight personnel studied the targets of the strikes, selected
orientation points which could be used while carrying out the approach maneuver
to the bombing run, and the aiming points, and they specified the procedure for
withdrawal from the target area.
Massed air strikes in front operations began to be employed mainly in the
second and third periods of the war. They were also the main form of operations
used by air forces in an air offensive. Most often, massed strikes in support
of ground forces were carried out by bombers. Ground attack aircraft operated
primarily in small groups with a sequential build up of efforts. Strikes by a
regiment or larger unit comprised 80 percent of the bomber operations and 15-18
percent of ground attack aircraft operations.*
* TIMOKHOVICH, I. V. 0 rational Art of the Soviet Air Forces in the Great
Patriotic War, p. 14 .
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In offensive operations they were carried out and were most effective in the
process of air preparation during the commitment into a battle (or a
breakthrough) of mobile groups of armies and fronts, the forcing of water
obstacles, the defeat of counterattacking and encircled enemy groupings, and the
neutralization of strongly fortified centers of resistance. Near the end of the
war massed strikes were also employed during the air support of attacking
forces,, especially in support of the breakthrough of the enemy's second
defensive zone. In order to carry out a given mission, sometimes long-range
aviation was also employed (for example, in the massed air strike of
16 April 1945 in the Berlin Operation).* Depending on the goals of such massed
air strikes, it is possible to distinguish a number of their characteristic
features, which must be taken into consideration in contemporary operations as
well.
As a rule, air preparation was completed with massed strikes. The intensity
of the pressure on the enemy continuously increased, reaching a maximum directly
before the ground forces went over to the attack. In a number of operations the
massed strikes were delivered at night or in the predawn twilight with a
subsequent shift to daylight actions. The main targets were aircraft, enemy
troops and weapons in the breakthrough sector, the strongest centers of
resistance, and command and control points.
The composition of the forces participating in the strike depended on the
scale and goals of the operation, and on the number of aviation groupings. The
operational-tactical formation of the aircraft in this case also differed
somewhat from the massed strikes in air operations. First, the targets of the
bomber and ground attack aircraft were more varied (the former operated mainly
against the troops on"the forward edge of the battle area, and the latter --
against the more distant and fortified objectives). Fighter cover was carefully
coordinated with the missions of the strike groups designated for various
tactical assignments SIn support of the bombers, hunter aircraft operated in
the target areas of the strike, and there were instituted fighter covering
forces and direct escort groups 4Srhe ground attack aircraft were more often
supported over the battlefield by the fighters providing cover for the ground
forces.
* Ibid, p. 149
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Second, the success of the massed strike to a considerable degree depended
on the quality of the development of cooperation between aviation and the ground
forces. Special attention in this was devoted to coordination on the following
questions: defining the main targets and the sequence in which they would be hit
by aviation; developing the methods for getting the strikes of the ground attack
aircraft as close as possible to the forward edge of the battle area so as to
eliminate any gap in the depth of firing pressure being exerted by the weapons
of combined-arms armies and of aviation, for the reliable marking of the
positions of friendly forces and for target identification for aviation during
the strike, and for specifying the procedure to be used by antiaircraft
artillery to differentiate between enemy fighters and friendly aircraft
attacking enemy targets close to the front line.
All of these questions were worked out in advance and were reflected in the
plan for the attack. An example of well-organized and effective execution was
the massed strike in the course of the air preparation during the 26 May 1943
breakthrough by our forces of the "Blue Line" established by the Germans on the
Taman Peninsula. Taking part in it were 338 aircraft (84 bombers, 104 ground
attack aircraft, 150 fighters), and it lasted 40 minutes. As a result of their
skillful and coordinated actions, substantial damage was inflicted on the enemy.
Our aviation had no losses.*
Aviation was also similarly used to support the commitment into combat of
tank armies and cavalry-mechanized groups for destroying enemy objectives which
were blocking their forward movement. Thus, on 6 July 1943 in the Kursk battle
the 16th Air Army used massed air strikes by nearly 450 aircraft against an
enemy tank grouping before a counterattack on it by our ground forces.** The
targets for aviation and their locations were precisely specified directly
before the takeoff of the aviation units and large units based on the data from
air reconnaissance.
Massed air strikes to destroy strong counterattacking and encircled enemy
forces played an important role in ground forces' operations. In contrast to
all of the strikes mentioned above, which were planned and prepared in advance,
* Soviet Air Forces in the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945, p. 167.
**K07.IIEVNIKOV, M. N. Komandovaniye i shtab VVS Sovetskoy Armii v Velikoy
Otechesvennoy voyne 19 1-19 5 (Command and Staff of the Air Forces of the
Soviet Army in the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945), Moscow, Nauka,
1977,P. 151.
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the necessity for carrying out such tasks arose, as a rule, during the course of
combat actions when the time for detailed preparation and for coordination on
questions of cooperation was very limited. Sometimes the task was specified
and, at times, even assigned to the group leaders only after takeoff. For the
qualitative and timely execution of the strike under these conditions, there
were used previously developed variants of operations and operational-tactical
formations of the different types of aviation forces and there were employed the
already established methods of communications between the commanders of bomber,
ground-attack and fighter units and large units. The role of aviation
representatives in the ground forces increased sharply. In this area there were
very fully displayed such characteristics of aviation as mobility and the
capability to quickly concentrate efforts where needed. The opportunely
delivered massed air strike at times decided beforehand the outcome of the
ground battle. Thus, for example, to frustrate the attempts of the encircled
German groupings to break out of the pocket in the area of Bobruysk on
27 June 1944, the forces of the 16th Air Army were effectively used. Its
commander received this order: "G. K. ZHUKOV, A. A. NOVIKOV and
K. K. ROKOSSOVSKIY know about the critical situation in the area of Titovka and
are expressly assigning to aviation the mission of destroying the enemy
column."*
Orders were immediately given to commanders of aviation corps and
divisions. Launched for the attack were 175 bombers, 217 ground attack aircraft
and more than 100 fighters. The strike lasted one-and-a-half hours and was
exceptionally successful. Aviation destroyed 150 tanks, 6,000 motor vehicles,
and much artillery.**
Deserving special mention is the massed use of long-range aviation in
support of the ground forces. Whereas in air operations long-range aviation
operated only at night and independently, in front operations there were
employed both nighttime and daytime massed strikes by long-range aviation
bombers.
A night massed strike of long-range aviation took the form of the sum of the
actions of individual crews flying at established time intervals on strictly
defined routes and carrying out strikes against designated objectives. Their
* Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal (Military History Journal), No. 2, 1971, p. 26.
**Arkhiv MO SSSR (Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense), E. 368, op. 142206,
d. X19, 1. 41.
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main targets were strong points, troops in the second defensive zone, reserves
moving on approach routes, and centers of communications.
In the daytime massed strikes of long-range aviation were carried out, as a
rule, during the breakthrough of a strongly fortified enemy defense and on the
approach routes to large populated areas. Their greatest effectiveness was
achieved through efficient coordination with the activities of attacking ground
forces. Such a strike was first used in the Great Patriotic War in the East-
Prussian Operation to destroy the defensive installations of Koenigsberg.* Its
distinguishing feature was the organization of reliable anti-fighter support for
the long-range bombers in all phases of the combat flight. This was achieved
through their direct escorting by significant fighter forces, blockading
airfields where the fighter aircraft of the enemy were based, clearing the air
space in the target areas of the operations, and having tactical bombers and
ground attack aircraft carry out advance strikes on airfields. The efforts of
long-range aviation were immediately augmented by tactical aviation bombers.
It should be noted that during the course of the majority of the daytime
massed air strikes intense air battles took place as a result of the active
counteractions by enemy fighter aviation providing cover for their own troops
and rear area facilities.
Fighter support of massed air strikes was carried out through the assignment
of special fighter aviation forces distributed on the basis of the methods and
times of the operations.
The pattern followed was to have a larger percentage of fighters
participating in massed air strikes than in an air offensive. This is explained
by the great distances of the main targets from the front line and the
corresponding increase in the opportunities for enemy air defense fighter
aircraft to repulse the raid. Air battles broke out, as a rule, in the area of
the strike objectives of the bombers and ground-attack aircraft, and this was
the result of low informational capabilities of the fighter command and control
system. Their introduction into battle most often began after the visual
detection of the strike groups by ground observation posts, and by ground troops
or the crews of airborne aircraft.
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* KOZHEVNIKOV, M. N. Command and Staff of the Air Forces of the Soviet Army in
the Great Patriotic War, 19 1- 9945, p. 205.
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Combat operation methods for the supporting fighter aircraft were constantly
being improved during the course of the war, and this also determined the
procedure for the commitment into an air battle. At the beginning of the war,
direct escorting was mainly used, but later more active methods such as
blockading enemy fighter airfields and providing fighter screens in the air
began to be introduced. In some cases, for this purpose "freelance" fighters
were used, and they not only destroyed enemy aircraft in advance of the massed
air strikes, but also provided target designations to the direct cover fighters.
With the appearance of radar stations in troop units, fighters began to be
committed to battle much sooner.
The success of the air battle, and correspondingly of the massed air strike
as well, substantially depended on the level of reliability of the cooperation
of fighters with bomber and ground-attack aircraft units and large units. The
coordination of operations in an air battle involving different types of
aviation forces was achieved through the selection of the location of fighters
in the operational-tactical formation and the parameters of the overall combat
formation based on ensuring the timely detection of enemy fighters and the
repulsion of their attacks, and on the fact that maximum use would be made of
the defensive firing systems of bomber and ground-attack aircraft.
Thus, in the Great Patriotic War the theory worked out by Soviet military
science for preparing and carrying out massed air strikes both in operations in
order to gain air superiority as well as in the air offensive was validated and
further developed. Its main principles are still applicable under contemporary
conditions.
Massed strikes were also a main form of using aviation in the Hitlerite
army. Having a large number of bombers, the aggressor counted on creating the
preconditions for achieving his goals with a treacherous attack on important
objectives. From 200 to 1,000 aircraft participated in the massed strikes
carried out both in daylight and at night. The most characteristic feature of
fascist German aviation was the echeloned formation of forces (in 2-3 echelons)
and the simultaneous raids from several directions.
Near the end of the war the Americans and the British also began the
widespread use of massed air strikes with the participation of from 500 up to
1,200 aircraft for supporting amphibious landings (the Normandy Operation),
destroying large cities and industrial centers in Germany and Japan, and for
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cooperative support of attacking troops. In their planning and execution it is
possible to note the following special features:
-- the creation of decoy and diversionary groups in the operational-tactical
deployment of aviation and the use of reflection jamming of radar stations for
the purpose of concealing the direction of the raid;
-- the employment of so-called "carpet bombing" (over a designated area)
from an altitude of 5,000-8,000 meters, which was often used for frightening and
senselessly destroying the population. For example, as a result of the massed
raid on Tokyo during the night of 9-10 March 1945 by more than 300 B-29 "flying
fortresses" nearly 120,000 peaceful residents were killed or wounded by high-
explosive and incendiary bombs, that is, more than from the atom bomb dropped on
Nagasaki.* Based on the accomplishment of other missions, this method of
attacking important objectives led to disproportionate expenditure of munitions
and forces;
-- the maximum reduction of the time from the moment that a massed strike
was delivered on enemy forces and objectives until friendly forces reached them
(even at the risk of being hit by bombs);
-- the delivery of strikes using the method of "shuttle operations" (taking
off from their own airfields and landing on Soviet airfields, and the other way
around) with the goals of increasing the range of aviation.
Also characteristic was the fact that the evaluation of the effectiveness of
the strike was calculated not on the basis of the damage inflicted on the enemy,
but on the number of aircraft sorties and the tonnage of the bombs dropped.
The experience acquired by the Americans during the Second World War was
later reflected in the appropriate air force regulations of the US and other
NATO countries, which, to a significant degree, determined the employment
methods and the aviation tactics of the American aggressors in local wars.
Massed air strikes in local wars also were one of the main forms of aviation
actions.
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* History of the Second World War, 1939-1945, Volume 11, p. 145.
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In, the Korean War the Americans relied on the massed use of strategic and
tactical aviation and new weapons of destruction (tanks filled with napalm,
bombs with parachute braking systems and with correctable descent trajectories)
for achieving their aggressive goals. And although the calculations based on
the "omnipotence" of American aviation, as is known, ended with complete
failure, certain lessons were learned from the war on the preparation and
execution of massed air strikes with the use of strategic bombers and first
generation tactical jet fighters.
First, a conclusion was reached on the need for the timely receipt of
accurate target coordinates for the effective use of bombers, equipped with
SHORAN-type radioelectronic sighting and navigational systems, at night and
during the day from behind clouds.
Second, the complexity of protecting slow-flying strategic bombers powered
with piston engines from the attacks of air defense jet fighters and the
inability to solve that problem by increasing the number of support fighters
with the same kind of characteristics, which, because of the great difference in
speed of flight, could not maintain their place in the overall combat formation
and could not repulse the attack of North Korean fighters.
Third, there was confirmed the advisability of using varied aviation forces
(strategic bombers, tactical fighters, carrier-based ground-attack aircraft) in
massed strikes against specific target groups (power systems, bridges, troop
concentrations) under the new conditions. Targets were assigned on the basis of
the combat capabilities of the aircraft and the aiming-navigational systems.
Thus, participating in the massed strike on the power system of North Korea on
23 June 1952 were 500 aircraft (230 from carrier-based aviation and 270 from the
8th Air Army). The operational-tactical formation of the forces included: an
echelon for suppressing antiaircraft artillery (mainly tactical fighters)
comprising up to 35 percent of the forces, two strike echelons (fighter-bombers)
-- 45 percent of the forces, and more than 100 covering fighters -- 20 percent
of the forces.*
* STYUART, Dzh. Vodushnaya moshch' -- resha shcha a sila v Koreye (STEWART, J.
Airpower: The Decisive Force in Korea), Moscow, Inostrannaya literatura,
1959, P. 145.
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Fourth, the low effectiveness of massed strikes by strategic bombers in
direct support of ground forces as a result of the complexity of organizing
cooperation and detecting targets.
In the local wars in Southeast Asia and in the Middle East, in operation
were second and third generation jet strike aircraft using fundamentally new
guided "air-to-surface" weapons, armed with warheads filled with conventional
explosives as well as with special casualty-producing elements. All this and
also the increasing capabilities of the air defense and the development of the
means for radiotechnical surveillance and radioelectronic warfare substantially
influenced the composition and operational-tactical formation of forces in a
massed air strike.
In the US aggression in Vietnam, as a consequence of the special features of
the theater of military operations and the specific character of combat
operations, the air strikes on troops and rear area objectives, based on the
composition of the forces used and the targets selected, did not completely
match those of a massed strike. However, in the opinion of foreign military
experts, they could be viewed as a distinctive "model" for the operations of
powerful aviation groupings equipped with supersonic aircraft armed with guided
"air-to-surface" and "air-to-air" missiles while contending with the active
counteractions of air defense systems consisting of antiaircraft missile
systems, antiaircraft artillery, and fighter-interceptors.
In the process of such strikes there were tested aircraft tactics for
penetrating air defenses, there were determined the optimal composition and
tasking of strike groups and the variations of their operational-tactical
formations for destroying various rear area objectives and troops with the use
of specialized weapons of destruction, and there were developed methods for
command and control and for providing support, with special emphasis on the
conduct of radioelectronic warfare. In the course of actual combat operations
it was determined that for achieving a high level of effectiveness with the
strikes, to a greater degree than during the years of the Second World War there
was needed a preemptive attack against the air defenses, whose capabilities had
significantly increased. For this purpose there were designated special
aircraft to operate as support groups (50-60 percent of the overall number of
forces participating in the raid). They conducted reconnaissance, jammed the
radioelectronic facilities of the enemy's air defense command and control
systems, and also destroyed his antiaircraft artillery and antiaircraft missile
systems with the use of unguided and guided weapons, and repulsed fighter
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attacks. A strike group was formed to carry out the main mission. Its
composition depended on the features of the targets, the employed weapons of
destruction, and the conditions for the combat actions. A conclusion was
reached on the need for developing specialized and highly accurate weapons for
combating air defense radar stations and antiaircraft missile systems, and for
destroying targets on the battlefield (mainly armored) as well as in the enemy's
rear areas.
The! 16 April 1972 strike on objectives in North Vietnam can serve as one
example for illustrating American views on the use of aviation under
contemporary conditions. The formation of the aviation forces included a strike
group consisting of 17 B-52 strategic bombers (a prototype strike echelon) and
several support groups (or echelons): the aircraft responsible for passive and
active jamming along the flight route of the strike aircraft, and also for
radioelectronic surveillance as well as for the destruction of antiaircraft
missile systems and antiaircraft artillery (F-105G "Wild Weasel" aircraft with
air-launched antiradar guided missiles and A-7E ground attack aircraft), and the
fighters providing cover both as "screening forces" and by direct escorting. As
in the Second World War, the strategic bombers used the "carpet" bombing method
in attacking targets. A similar organization of forces was also subsequently
used during tactical aviation operations.
Thus, based on information in the foreign press, during the Vietnam war the
Americans developed the tactics for carrying out massed air strikes under
contemporary conditions with the use of conventional weapons. The main features
of these tactics are: an echeloned formation of aviation (a support echelon and
one-two strike echelons), the use of varied forces, the specific designation of
support groups for destroying enemy air defense means and for deceiving the
enemy relative to the intention of the strike, the use of diversionary and
deception actions, and the concealment of the operational-tactical structure and
the combat formations with the assistance of passive and active jamming of the
radar stations of the air defense and of the command and control systems.
In the wars in the Middle East (1967-1982), the decisive striking force of
the aggressor was tactical aviation. The attack by Israel on the Arab countries
in 1967 began with a surprise massed air strike on 20 Egyptian airfields. In
the process maximum use was made of the experience of past wars taking into
account the new aviation equipment and command and control facilities. All
available methods were used for the advance conduct of detailed reconnaissance
of the objectives within the range limitations of aviation, and their
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functioning was constantly observed. In selecting the time of day and the day
of the week for the start of the aggression, the special national
characteristics of the troops, the combat capabilities of the aviation and air
defense systems, and the location of airfields of the opposing side were
considered in detail. The surprise of the strike was achieved by approaching
the targets at extremely low altitudes from directions which the air defense
would not expect and out of the rising sun. All of the combat ready forces
(except those designated as reserves) participated in the raid. The actions of
each crew had been carefully planned on the basis of hitting the targets during
the first run and were worked out during preparations for the raid. The targets
of the strikes on airfields were determined by their significance: first
priority targets were the bombers, next were the supersonic fighters, and then
all the remaining aircraft and the take-off and landing strips. It should be
noted that on several airfields the strikes were carried out on the basis of
their subsequent capture and use, that is, the runways were destroyed only to
the extent necessary to impede the takeoff of the alert fighters.
In 1973 the aggressor again placed his emphasis on surprise, but, as West
German specialists pointed out, the Arab side made widescale use of more
effective combat methods in its combat actions, and the Israelis ran into an
amazingly effective air defense and suffered heavy losses from antiaircraft
fire.* Under these conditions the command of the Israeli Air Force began to
make maximum use of the American experience in Vietnam while taking into
consideration the specific character of the theater of military operations and
the goals of the war.
In the armed conflict in Lebanon (1982), in the massed strikes during the
invasion the Israeli aggressors used airborne command posts and fighters of
different types (F-15 and F-16) for the sole purpose of combating the opposing
aviation. The airborne command posts in the E-2C Hawkeye AWACS aircraft
patrolled in zones beyond the range of the air defense fighters. They conducted
surveillance of the air situation, guided the strike aviation to ground targets,
fixed the location of the air defense fighters taking off to repulse the raid,
and committed to combat their own F-15 and F-16 aircraft carrying out the
support mission, and controlled their operations. Each strike was preceded by a
detailed reconnaissance of the air defense system and by the violation of air
space at regular intervals by individual aircraft and remotely piloted vehicles
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* Wehrkunde (Military Affairs), No. 2, 1974, pp. 79-81.
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to blunt vigilance and exhaust the combat crews in the command posts and at the
antiaircraft missile sites.*
The experience of combat operations in local wars is being widely used by
the Americans in the training of their air forces. In accordance with the "air
war" doctrine adopted in NATO, the American concept of an "air-land operation"
envisages the massed use of aviation, cruise missiles, and reconnaissance-attack
systems for achieving aggressive goals. The calculation for this is based on
the conduct of offensive air and air-land operations, including a number of
massed missile-artillery and aviation strikes with the combined use of drones,
cruise and ballistic missiles, operational and tactical reconnaissance-attack
systems, and radioelectronic warfare facilities for the top priority disruption
of the air defense system with the subsequent shift of efforts to other
objectives in a wide area to the entire depth of the operational deployment of
enemy forces.
The efforts of the air forces are to be concentrated for combating aviation
in the air as well as the second echelons and reserves. It is planned to
destroy stationary objectives mainly with various types of missiles. The
implementation of such a concept, according to foreign military specialists, is
possible only with the availability of reliable data on the location and
functioning of the strike objectives. For this purpose a detailed model for the
allocation of the main enemy objectives according to depth and importance within
the boundaries of the Central European theater of military operations has been
developed in the allied air forces of NATO.** Based on this plans are being
prepared for the operational-tactical deployment of the forces in a massed air
strike, the composition of the echelons, the tactical assignment and combat
formations of groups, and the support measures.
According to the foreign press, in the regularly conducted "Cold Fire"
exercises, there is being worked out the eventual structure for a massed air
strike with the use of conventional weapons. The operational-tactical formation
of the aviation forces includes two to three echelons. The first echelon (for
penetrating the air defense) is assigned the suppression of the antiaircraft
facilities and the air defense fighter aviation on air alert with the use of
weapons fire and radio jamming within a zone of up to 120 km wide. It consists
of groups with various tactical assignments: the destruction of antiaircraft
* Military Thought, No. 5, 1984, p. 42.
**Interavia, No. 1, 1981, p. 19.
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guided missile systems and antiaircraft artillery ("Wild Weasel" fighter-bombers
with air-launched antiradar guided missiles, and aircraft armed with air-to-
surface guided missiles and guided aerial bombs), radioelectronic warfare
aircraft, and fighters for clearing the air space and for direct escorting to
repulse the attacks of air defense interceptors.
The strike echelons (one-two) carry out the mission of destroying aviation
in the air and on the airfields, destroying takeoff and landing runways,
isolating areas of combat actions and combating reserves. The strike groups
approach the assigned targets along corridors in the air defense system which
have been "opened up" by the support echelon flying at a wide range of altitudes
-- from very low to high. Attempts are made to reduce the time interval between
echelons to a minimum.
The number of aircraft (or groups) in each echelon depends on the planned
number of objectives to be destroyed (or suppressed) in the massed strike, the
strike weapons to be used, the expected counteractions and capabilities of the
enemy air defense, and the composition of the aviation groupings.
According to the experience of local wars and regularly conducted exercises,
the Americans have determined the optimal detail of aircraft for striking
"typical" objectives. Thus, for example, 12-16 tactical fighters and ground-
attack aircraft have been designated for striking an airfield, and up to a wing
for attacking an antiaircraft missile system.
Taking into account the above-mentioned model for assigning objectives in
the Central European theater of military operations and the composition of the
NATO allied air forces in a massed strike, up to 800 aircraft of various types
could participate in a massed strike (100-150 in the support echelon and 600-700
in the strike echelon).*
At the present time, in connection with the intensive development of highly
accurate weapons and of aviation and air defense command and control systems,
there is clearly noted a new tendency in the views of the US Air Force
leadership for the operational-tactical deployment of forces in massed strikes
and in their missions. In particular, it is considered advisable to decrease
the size and increase the number of groups of various tactical purpose in the
echelons so as to deliver strikes simultaneously on the main objectives to the
* Foreign Military Review, No. 10, 1980; No. 5., 1982.
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entire depth of the operational deployment of enemy forces,* and, in the
echelons for suppressing the air defense, to include cruise and ballistic
missiles and remotely piloted vehicles to destroy stationary targets of the air
defense and command and control systems, to destroy airfield runways, and for
jamming. In this case the tactical fighters carry out strikes from their
territory without entering the firing zone of the antiaircraft missile systems.
It is intended to ensure the necessary effectiveness of aviation actions by
using guided weapons with a "fire-hit" capability. In order to accurately guide
the numerous strike groups to the targets, it is planned to use on-board
precision sighting and navigational systems with the data transmitted to them
from the TR-1 aircraft of the reconnaissance-attack and AWACS systems.
Thus, under contemporary conditions, in connection with the significant
increase in the combat power of aviation groupings, in massed air strikes it is
intended to carry out a much wider scale of tasks than during the Second World
War. ]Foreign military specialists consider that the use of remotely piloted air
strike vehicles along with piloted aircraft, the striving to deliver a strike on
the main objectives with a minimum amount of forces, the widescale use of
radioelectronic means for the command and control of subunits and crews from
ground and airborne command posts, and intensive radioelectronic warfare
represent a new tendency in the development of the theory and practice of the
massed use of strike aviation.
However, during the preparation and execution of massed air strikes the
following principles developed through actual combat in past wars are also taken
into account:
-- as in the past, massed strikes are one of the main forms of using air
forces in the battle for air superiority and in destroying the enemy by weapons
fire;
-- the increase in the role of reconnaissance in selecting the time and
place of a strike;
-- the differentiated use of various aviation forces in accordance with the
characteristics and level of importance (or danger) of the strike objectives;
* Military Thought, No. 2, 1984, p. 54.
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-- the purposeful preemptive combat against the air defense;
-- the skillful command and control of aviation units and large units in
every stage of the combat flight and cooperation between air forces and ground
troops (or naval forces).
The experience of using air forces in past wars and in contemporary armed
conflicts, where aviation sometimes played the decisive role, and the training
exercises regularly carried out in NATO must be constantly studied, analyzed and
creatively used in carrying out combat and operational training measures in
order to combat the probable enemy's new means and methods for air attack with
no less effective forces and methods for repulsing his strikes.
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