CIA AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, BY ROBERT M. GATES, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00224R000702600004-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 29, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 10, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
WOODROW WILSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
29 SEPTEMBER 1987
CIA AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION
OVER THE YEARS, PUBLIC VIEWS OF CIA AND ITS ROLE IN
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY HAVE BEEN SHAPED PRIMARILY BY MOVIES,
TELEVISION, NOVELS, NEWSPAPERS, BOOKS BY JOURNALISTS, HEADLINES
GROWING OUT OF CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES, EXPOSES BY FORMER
INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, AND ESSAYS BY EXPERTS WHO HAVE NEVER
SERVED IN AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE AND BY SOME WHO HAVE SERVED AND
STILL NEVER UNDERSTOOD OUR ROLE. WE ARE SAID TO BE AN
INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT AND YET ARE THE MOST VISIBLE, MOST
EXTERNALLY SCRUTINIZED AND MOST PUBLICIZED INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
IN THE WORLD. WHILE WE SOMETIMES ARE ABLE TO REFUTE PUBLICLY
ALLEGATIONS AND CRITICISM AGAINST US, USUALLY WE MUST REMAIN
SILENT. THE RESULT IS A CONTRADICTORY MELANGE OF IMAGES OF CIA
AND VERY LITTLE UNDERSTANDING OF OUR REAL ROLE IN AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT.
TONIGHT, I WOULD LIKE TO TRY TO ILLUMINATE, AND I HOPE
EXPAND, YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF CIA'S ROLE IN THE MAKING OF
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY.
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THIS ROLE TAKES THREE BROAD FORMS:
FIRST, CIA IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE COLLECTION, ANALYSIS
AND DISTRIBUTION OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION TO
POLICYMAKERS, PRINCIPALLY THE PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL
SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND
DEFENSE -- ALTHOUGH IN RECENT YEARS MANY OTHER
DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES HAVE BECOME MAJOR USERS OF
INTELLIGENCE.. THIS IS A WELL KNOWN AREA, AND I WILL
SPEAK OF IT ONLY SUMMARILY.
-- SECOND, CIA IS CHARGED WITH THE CONDUCT OF COVERT
ACTION, THE ONE AREA WHERE WE IMPLEMENT POLICY. THIS
IS A SUBJECT SO COMPLEX AND SO CONTROVERSIAL AS TO
REQUIRE SEPARATE TREATMENT AT ANOTHER TIME, ANOTHER
PLACE.
THIRD, AND MOST SIGNIFICANT, CIA'S ROLE IS PLAYED OUT
IN THE INTERACTION, PRIMARILY IN WASHINGTON, BETWEEN
CIA AND THE POLICY COMMUNITY. IT IS IN THE DYNAMICS OF
THIS RELATIONSHIP THAT THE INFLUENCE AND ROLE OF CIA
ARE DETERMINED -- WHETHER CIA'S ASSESSMENTS ARE HEEDED
OR NOT, WHETHER CIA'S INFORMATION IS RELEVANT AND
TIMELY ENOUGH TO BE USEFUL, AND WHETHER CIA'S
RELATIONSHIP WITH POLICYMAKERS FROM ISSUE TO ISSUE AND
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PROBLEM TO PROBLEM, IS SUPPORTIVE OR ADVERSARIAL. IT
IS THIS DYNAMIC INTERACTION OF INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY
THAT IS THE LEAST WELL UNDERSTOOD AND IT IS THIS AREA
THAT I WILL FOCUS ON TONIGHT.
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, THE DCI, SERVES BOTH
AS DIRECTOR OF CIA AND HEAD OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY, WHICH ENCOMPASSES CIA; THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY; THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY; THE INTELLIGENCE
COMPONENTS OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF STATE, TREASURY, ENERGY, AND
THE FOUR MILITARY SERVICES; AND THE FBI. OF THESE, ONLY CIA IS
COMPLETELY INDEPENDENT OF ANY POLICY DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY AND
ACCEPTS REQUESTS FOR INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FROM THROUGHOUT THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH. IT IS THE DCI AND CIA THAT SERVE AS THE
PRINCIPAL CONDUITS OF INTELLIGENCE TO THE PRESIDENT AND
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL PRINCIPALS.
WHAT THEN, DOES CIA DO? BECAUSE OF THE MEDIA'S FOCUS ON
COVERT ACTION, I WOULD LIKE TO SAY FIRST OF ALL THAT OVER 95
PERCENT OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BUDGET IS DEVOTED TO THE
COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION. ABOUT THREE PERCENT OF
CIA'S PEOPLE ARE INVOLVED IN COVERT ACTION.
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COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
NOW, IF WE ARE NOT SPENDING MOST OF OUR TIME AND MONEY
ATTEMPTING TO OVERTHROW GOVERNMENTS, WHAT EXACTLY DOES CIA DO?
AS JOHN RANELAGH SAYS IN HIS HISTORY OF CIA, "TO THE PRESENT
THE CIA IS AN ECHO OF ITS FOUNDERS. ITS JOB IS NOT TO FIND
ENEMIES BUT TO DEFINE THEM. ITS THEME IS THE SUBSTITUTION OF
INTELLIGENCE FOR FORCE." CIA DEVOTES THE OVERWHELMING
PREPONDERANCE OF ITS RESOURCES TO MONITORING AND REPORTING ON
DAY TO DAY DEVELOPMENTS AROUND THE WORLD, AND DETERMINING AND
RESPONDING TO POLICYMAKERS' LONGER RANGE REQUIREMENTS FOR
INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS.
WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND HOW IS IT USED BY THE
POLICYMAKER? OUR INFORMATION COMES FROM SATELLITES;
NEWSPAPERS, PERIODICALS, RADIO, AND TELEVISION WORLDWIDE;
DIPLOMATS AND MILITARY ATTACHES OVERSEAS; AND, OF COURSE, FROM
SECRET AGENTS. THAT INFORMATION FLOWS TO WASHINGTON WHERE
ANALYSTS, WITH BACKGROUNDS IN SCORES OF DISCIPLINES, SIFT
THROUGH IT, EXAMINE IT, COLLATE IT, AND TRY TO MAKE SENSE OF
THE BILLIONS OF BITS AND PIECES THAT COME TO US ON ISSUES AND
DEVELOPMENTS WORLD-WIDE OF INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES. WE
THEN REPORT OUR FINDINGS TO POLICY OFFICIALS AND TO THE
MILITARY.
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WHAT CLEARLY DISTINGUISHES INFORMATION SUITABLE FOR
INTELLIGENCE EXPLOITATION IS ITS RELEVANCE TO US POLICY AND US
INTERESTS. IT IS THE COMPREHENSIVENESS OF OUR COLLECTION AND
ANALYSIS, THEIR FOCUS ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE
UNITED STATES, AND THE ADVANTAGE OF UNIQUE OR PRIOR KNOWLEDGE,
THAT MAKE INTELLIGENCE VALUABLE TO THE POLICYMAKER. OFTEN, WE
MAKE A CONTRIBUTION SIMPLY THROUGH OUR ABILITY TO ORGANIZE THE
FACTS IN A CLEAR AND CONCISE WAY, BY PROVIDING THE SAME FACTS
TO DIFFERENT ORGANIZATIONS, AND BY IDENTIFYING THE IMPORTANT
QUESTIONS -- AND BY TRYING TO ANSWER THEM.
THIS INFORMATION FINDS ITS WAY TO THE POLICYMAKER IN
SEVERAL WAYS:
-- FIRST, INTELLIGENCE ON DAY TO DAY EVENTS AND
DEVELOPMENTS AROUND THE WORLD IS PROVIDED TO SENIOR
OFFICIALS DAILY OR EVEN SEVERAL TIMES A DAY.
SECOND, THE CIA CONTRIBUTES ANALYSIS TO POLICY PAPERS
DESCRIBING BOTH EVENTS AT HAND AND POTENTIAL
OPPORTUNITIES OR PROBLEMS FOR THE UNITED STATES.
NEARLY ALL NSC AND SUB-CABINET MEETINGS BEGIN WITH AN
INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING.
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THIRD, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES CAN PLAY AN
IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE MAKING OF POLICY. THESE
ESTIMATES ARE THE MOST FORMAL EXPRESSION OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S VIEWS. ALL OF THE
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT BOTH CONTRIBUTE
TO AND COORDINATE ON WHAT IS SAID IN THESE ESTIMATES.
FOURTH, POLICYMAKERS RECEIVE SPECIALIZED ASSESSMENTS BY
INDIVIDUAL AGENCIES. CIA'S ASSESSMENTS OR RESEARCH
PROGRAM IS THE PRODUCT OF THE LARGEST INTELLIGENCE
COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS ORGANIZATION IN THE WORLD. THE
RANGE OF ISSUES IS BREATHTAKING -- FROM STRATEGIC
WEAPONS TO FOOD SUPPLIES; EPIDEMIOLOGY TO SPACE; WATER
AND CLIMATE TO THIRD WORLD POLITICAL INSTABILITY;
MINERAL AND ENERGY RESOURCES TO INTERNATIONAL FINANCE;
SOVIET LASER WEAPONS TO REMOTE TRIBAL DEMOGRAPHICS;
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION TO
COMMODITY SUPPLIES; AND MANY, MANY MORE.
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CIA-POLICY RELATIONSHIPS
SO FAR, SO GOOD. WHAT I HAVE JUST REVIEWED IS A TEXTBOOK
DESCRIPTION OF THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE. IT IS NEAT,
UNAMBIGUOUS, CLINICAL, NON-CONTROVERSIAL, EVEN COMMENDABLE --
AND HIGHLY MISLEADING. WHAT ABOUT USERS WHO LOOK NOT FOR DATA
OR UNDERSTANDING, BUT FOR SUPPORT FOR DECISIONS ALREADY MADE;
OR THOSE WHO SELECTIVELY USE OR MISSTATE INTELLIGENCE TO
INFLUENCE PUBLIC DEBATE OVER POLICY; OR USERS WHO LABEL
INTELLIGENCE THEY DISLIKE AS TOO SOFT, TOO HARD OR COOKED; OR
INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS WITH THEIR OWN AGENDAS OR BIASES; OR THE
IMPLICATIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY OF A CIA DIRECTOR HELD
AT TOO GREAT A DISTANCE FROM THE PRESIDENT OR ONE WHO IS HELD
TOO CLOSE; OR THE FRUSTRATIONS OF CONSTANTLY CHANGING
EVALUATIONS, OR ANALYSIS THAT IS JUST PLAIN WRONG; OR THE USE
OF INTELLIGENCE AS A POLITICAL FOOTBALL BETWEEN GOVERNMENT
DEPARTMENTS OR BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES?
THE ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR OF OFFICIALS IN CIA AND POLICY
AGENCIES THAT LIE BEHIND THESE AND MANY SIMILAR ISSUES AND THE
INTERACTION AMONG THEM COMPRISE THE DYNAMIC OF THE RELATIONSHIP
-- WHAT PROFESSOR YEHOSHAFAT HARKABI OF HEBREW--UNIVERSITY OF
JERUSALEM DESCRIBES AS "THE INTELLIGENCE-POLICYMAKER TANGLE."
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IN 1949, SHERMAN KENT, IN HIS BOOK STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE
FOR AMERICAN WORLD POLICY, SAID "THERE IS NO PHASE OF THE
INTELLIGENCE BUSINESS WHICH IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE PROPER
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE ITSELF AND THE PEOPLE WHO USE
ITS PRODUCT. ODDLY ENOUGH, THIS RELATIONSHIP, WHICH ONE WOULD
EXPECT TO ESTABLISH ITSELF AUTOMATICALLY, DOES NOT DO THIS."
THE FACT IS THAT, OVER THE YEARS, THE POLICYMAKER AND THE
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER HAVE CONSISTENTLY -- AND WITH
FRIGHTENINGLY FEW EXCEPTIONS -- COME TOGETHER HUGELY IGNORANT
OF THE REALITIES AND COMPLEXITIES OF EACH OTHER'S WORLD --
PROCESS, TECHNIQUE, FORM AND CULTURE. CIA OFFICERS CAN TELL
YOU IN EXCRUCIATING DETAIL HOW FOREIGN POLICY IS MADE IN EVERY
COUNTRY IN THE WORLD SAVE ONE -- THE UNITED STATES. BY THE
SAME TOKEN, AS SUGGESTED BY PROFESSOR HARKABI, THE UNHAPPINESS
OF INTELLIGENCE PEOPLE SWELLS "WHEN THEY COMPARE THE
SOPHISTICATION AND ADVANCED METHODS EMPLOYED IN COLLECTION OF
THE INFORMATION AND THE PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE AGAINST THE
CAVALIER FASHION OR IMPROVISATION WITH WHICH POLICY DECISIONS
ARE MANY A TIME REACHED."
BOOKSHELVES GROAN UNDER THE LITERATURE OF PROPOSED RULES OF
ENGAGEMENT WHEN THESE TWO WORLDS COLLIDE. IN 1956, FOR
EXAMPLE, ROGER HILSMAN WROTE THAT INTELLIGENCE PRODUCERS MUST
"ORIENT THEMSELVES FRANKLY AND CONSCIOUSLY TOWARD POLICY AND
ACTION ... ADAPTING TOOLS EXPRESSLY TO THE NEEDS OF POLICY."
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OTHERS, AS DESCRIBED IN ONE INTELLIGENCE.MONOGRAPH, ARGUED THAT
"THE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCER SHOULD INITIATE NO DIRECT
INTERACTION WITH HIS CONSUMERS, BUT RATHER SHOULD RESPOND TO
REQUESTS FOR DATA AND ANALYSIS."
SHERMAN KENT OF YALE AND THEN OF CIA WAS PERHAPS THE FIRST
OF THE EARLY INTELLIGENCE COMMENTATORS TO SEE THE NEED FOR A
DIFFERENT, MORE DIRECT AND INTENSIVE INTERACTION BETWEEN
POLICYMAKER AND INTELLIGENCE OFFICER. WARNING THAT PROTECTING
THE OBJECTIVITY OF THE INTELLIGENCE ANALYST COULD BE LIKENED TO
PILING ARMOR ON A MEDIEVAL KNIGHT UNTIL HE WAS ABSOLUTELY SAFE
BUT COMPLETELY USELESS, KENT CONCLUDED THAT THE GREATER DANGER
TO AN EFFECTIVE ROLE WAS IN BEING TOO DISTANT. EVEN SO, HE
FORESAW A TROUBLED RELATIONSHIP -- THAT INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS'
SKEPTICISM OF POLICYMAKERS' OBJECTIVITY -- AND THE LATTER'S
CONSEQUENT RESENTMENT -- WOULD STULTIFY A FREE GIVE AND TAKE
BETWEEN THEM; THAT POLICYMAKERS WOULD SEE THE VERY FACT OF CIA
ASSESSMENTS AS AN INSULT TO THEIR OWN INTELLECTUAL
CAPABILITIES; THAT SECURITY CONCERNS BY EACH PARTY WOULD
ENCOURAGE WARINESS AND RETICENCE. AND, IN TRUTH, THESE AND
OTHER DIFFICULTIES STILL LARGELY SHAPE CIA'S ROLE IN FOREIGN
POLICY PROCESS.
LET ME ELABORATE ON THESE DIFFICULTIES -- ON THE REALITY OF
A ROUGH AND TUMBLE WORLD -- BASED ON PERSONAL EXPERIENCE IN
BOTH WORLDS AT DIFFERENT TIMES UNDER FIVE PRESIDENTS.
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THE INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY OF THE AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE -- OF CIA -- IS UNIQUE IN THE WORLD. WHILE THIS
CONFERS CERTAIN ADVANTAGES, ABOVE ALL INDEPENDENCE, SUCH
AUTONOMY ALSO IMBUES THE CIA-POLICY COMMUNITY RELATIONSHIP WITH
A SIGNIFICANT ADVERSARIAL AS WELL AS SUPPORTIVE CONTENT. AND,
THE POLICYMAKER HAS A LONG LIST OF GRIEVANCES, MANY LEGITIMATE,
POLICYMAKERS LEGITIMATELY WANT INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
THAT WILL INFORM AND GUIDE THEIR TACTICAL DAY TO DAY
DECISIONMAKING. IN SOME AREAS, WE CAN AND DO MEET
THEIR NEEDS. FOR EXAMPLE, IN 1980, THANKS TO A VERY
BRAVE MAN, WE WERE ABLE TO PROVIDE POLICYMAKERS WITH
KNOWLEDGE OF THE STEP BY STEP PREPARATIONS FOR THE
IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND. IN EARLY 1986, WE
WERE ABLE TO DOCUMENT IN EXTRAORDINARY DETAIL ELECTORAL
CHEATING IN THE PHILIPPINES. THERE ARE EVEN SOME AREAS
WHERE OUR INTELLIGENCE IS SO GOOD THAT IT REDUCES
POLICYMAKERS FLEXIBILITY AND ROOM FOR MANEUVER. YET, I
WOULD HAVE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THERE ARE COUNTRIES AND
ISSUES IMPORTANT TO THE UNITED STATES WHERE SUCH
TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE -- MOST OFTEN POLITICAL
INTELLIGENCE -- IS SORELY DEFICIENT AND POLICYMAKER
COMPLAINTS ARE JUSTIFIED. OUR CAPABILITIES ARE MUCH
IMPROVED IN RECENT YEARS, BUT STILL UNEVEN. AND NO
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MATTER HOW GOOD WE ARE, THERE WILL STILL BE SURPRISES
OR GAPS.
-- IT WILL NOT SURPRISE YOU THAT VERY FEW POLICYMAKERS
WELCOME CIA INFORMATION WHICH DIRECTLY OR BY INFERENCE
CHALLENGES THE SUCCESS OR ADEQUACY OF THEIR POLICIES OR
THE ACCURACY OF THEIR PRONOUNCEMENTS. INDEED, DURING
THE VIETNAM WAR, A CONSTANT REFRAIN FROM POLICYMAKERS
WAS, "AREN'T YOU GUYS ON THE TEAM?" YET, I CONCEDE
THAT ON MORE THAN A FEW OCCASIONS, POLICYMAKERS HAVE
ANALYZED OR FORECAST DEVELOPMENTS BETTER THAN WE. AND,
TRUTH BE KNOWN, ANALYSTS HAVE SOMETIMES GONE OVERBOARD
TO PROVE A POLICYMAKER WRONG. WHEN SECRETARY OF STATE
HAIG ASSERTED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE BEHIND
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, ANALYSTS INITIALLY SET OUT NOT
TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE IN ALL ITS ASPECTS BUT RATHER TO
PROVE THE SECRETARY WRONG -- TO PROVE SIMPLY THAT THE
SOVIETS DO NOT ORCHESTRATE ALL INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM. BUT IN SO DOING, THEY WENT TOO FAR
THEMSELVES AND FAILED IN EARLY DRAFTS TO DESCRIBE
EXTENSIVE AND WELL-DOCUMENTED INDIRECT SOVIET SUPPORT
FOR TERRORIST GROUPS AND THEIR SPONSORS. FAR FROM
KOW-TOWING TO THE POLICYMAKER, THERE IS SOMETIMES A
STRONG IMPULSE30N THE PART OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS TO
SHOW THAT A POLICY OR DECISION IS MISGUIDED OR WRONG,
TO POKE AN ANALYTICAL FINGER IN THE POLICY EYE.
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POLICYMAKERS KNOW THIS AND UNDERSTANDABLY RESENT IT.
TO PROTECT THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE ANALYST WHILE
KEEPING SUCH IMPULSES IN CHECK IS ONE OF THE TOUGHEST
JOBS OF INTELLIGENCE MANAGERS.
-- IN THIS CONNECTION, THE POLICYMAKER SOMETIMES HAS THE
SENSE THAT CIA IS ATTEMPTING, AT LEAST BY INFERENCE, TO
"GRADE" HIS PERFORMANCE. FURTHER, THE POLICYMAKER IS
OFTEN SUSPICIOUS THAT WHEN CIA'S ANALYSIS SUGGESTS
POLICY IS FAILING OR IN DIFFICULTY, THESE CONCLUSIONS
ARE, WITH MALICE, WIDELY CIRCULATED BY THE AGENCY FOR
USE AS AMMUNITION BY CRITICS OF THE POLICY INSIDE THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH, WITH CONGRESS OR WITH THE PUBLIC.
OFTEN POLICYMAKERS, FACING A SITUATION OF EXTREME
DELICACY WITH ANOTHER COUNTRY, ESPECIALLY WHERE US LAW
OR POLITICAL SENSITIVITIES MAY BE INVOLVED, WILL
CAUTION US AS WE WRITE OR BRIEF: "NOW, YOU HAVE TO BE
CAREFUL WHAT YOU SAY ABOUT THIS -- LET'S WORK IT OUT
TOGETHER BEFOREHAND." AND, WHILE PROTECTING OUR
INDEPENDENCE, WE DO TRY TO BE CAREFUL AND WE DO'TRY TO
TAKE THEIR CONCERNS INTO ACCOUNT -- BUT THAT IS LITTLE
SOLACE TO A POLICYMAKER WHO IS AT THE POLITICAL MERCY
OF ANY CIA BRIEFER WHO GOES TO CAPI1OL HILL.
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-- MANY POLICYMAKERS BELIEVE CIA ALLOWS ITS BIASES TO
DOMINATE ITS REPORTING. WHO WOULD DISAGREE THAT CIA
OFFICERS HAVE VIEWS AND BIASES, AND THAT THEY TRY TO
PROMOTE THEM? BUT, CIA IS NOT MONOLITHIC; THERE IS A
WIDE RANGE OF VIEWS INSIDE ON VIRTUALLY EVERY ISSUE.
INDEED, THE INTERNAL DEBATES ARE FIERCE AND SOMETIMES
BRUTAL -- AFTER ALL, THE STAKES ARE VERY HIGH. IT IS
NOT A PLACE FOR THE FAINT-HEARTED. WE HAVE ELABORATE
PROCEDURES FOR REVIEWING ASSESSMENTS TO TRY TO FILTER
OUT INDIVIDUAL BIAS AND MAKE OUR REPORTING AS OBJECTIVE
AS POSSIBLE. AND WHEN WE SEND OUT A PROVOCATIVE
ANALYSIS BY AN INDIVIDUAL WE TRY ALWAYS TO IDENTIFY IT
AS A PERSONAL VIEW.
BEYOND THIS, IS THERE AN INSTITUTIONAL BIAS THAT
AFFECTS OUR WORK? PROBABLY, IN SOME AREAS, IN THE
BROADEST SENSE, AND PERHAPS BASED ON EXPERIENCE. AS AN
INSTITUTION, WE ARE PROBABLY MORE SKEPTICAL OF SOVIET
INTENTIONS THAN MOST; MORE CYNICAL ABOUT THE PUBLIC
POSTURE OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS WHEN CONTRASTED TO`THEIR
ACTIONS, OVERT AND COVERT; MORE DOUBTFUL ABOUT THE EASE
AND SPEED WITH WHICH THE UNITED STATES CAN USUALLY
AFFECT DEVELOPMENTS OVERSEAS; AND, FAIRLY CONSISTENTLY,
WE WILL TEND TO SEE PERILS AND DIFFICULTY WHERE OTHERS
DO NOT.
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SUSPICIONS THAT CIA's ASSESSMENTS ARE BIASED IN
AREAS WHERE CIA IS INVOLVED IN COVERT ACTION FAIL TO
TAKE INTO ACCOUNT OUR REALIZATION THAT OUR WORK IN SUCH
AREAS IS SCRUTINIZED WITH SPECIAL CARE BY OTHERS
(ESPECIALLY THE CONGRESS) FOR SIGNS OF BIAS. THE
ORGANIZATIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANALYSIS FROM OPERATIONS
IS BUTTRESSED BY INTERNAL AGENCY RIVALRIES.
POLICYMAKERS' IMPATIENCE WITH INTELLIGENCE -- WITH CIA
-- IS INTENSIFIED BY THE FACT THAT WE ARE SOMETIMES
WRONG IN OUR ANALYSIS AND FORECASTS, AND WE OFTEN
CHANGE OUR ASSESSMENTS BASED ON NEW ANALYSIS OR NEW
INFORMATION. WE DO NOT ACKNOWLEDGE ERROR GRACEFULLY,
AND OFTEN DO NOT FOREWARN POLICYMAKERS OF REVISED VIEWS
BEFORE THE INFORMATION HITS THE STREET. A POLICYMAKER
WHO HAS MADE DECISIONS BASED ON ONE ASSESSMENT ONLY TO
SEE IT CHANGE OR TO FIND THAT IT WAS WRONG WILL NOT
THINK FONDLY OF US OR SOON WISH AGAIN TO PROCEED ON OUR
ASSURANCES OR ASSESSMENTS.
AS I SUGGESTED EARLIER, A SPECIAL CRITICISM BY
POLICYMAKERS IS THAT CIA IS TOO FREQUENTLY A VOICE OF
GLOOM AND DOOM. FOR POL'ICYMAKERS WHO MUST TRY TO FIND
SOLUTIONS FOR INTRACTABLE PROBLEMS OR A WAY OUT OF A
NO-WIN SITUATION, OUR FOREBODINGS AND POINTING OUT OF
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PERILS AND DANGERS ARE OF LITTLE HELP AND ARE HIGHLY
AGGRAVATING.
CIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CONGRESS ALSO IS A SPECIAL
PROBLEM FOR POLICYMAKERS FOR SEVERAL REASONS, AND IT
PROFOUNDLY INFLUENCES OUR ROLE. VIRTUALLY ALL CIA
ASSESSMENTS GO TO THE TWO CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE
COMMITTEES. MOST GO ALSO TO THE ARMED SERVICES,
FOREIGN RELATIONS, AND APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES. IN
1986, CIA SENT SOME 5000 INTELLIGENCE REPORTS TO
CONGRESS AND GAVE MANY HUNDREDS OF BRIEFINGS. ALL THIS
IS NEW IN THE LAST DECADE OR SO. AS A RESULT, AND
THANKS TO THEIR STAFFS, MANY SENATORS AND
REPRESENTATIVES ARE OFTEN BETTER INFORMED ABOUT CIA'S
INFORMATION AND ASSESSMENTS ON A GIVEN SUBJECT THAN THE
POLICYMAKER. AND THAT INTELLIGENCE IS OFTEN USED TO
CRITICIZE AND CHALLENGE POLICY, TO SET ONE EXECUTIVE
AGENCY AGAINST ANOTHER, AND TO EXPOSE DISAGREEMENTS
WITHIN AN ADMINISTRATION.
MOST SPECIALISTS WRITING ABOUT THE CHANGED BALANCE
OF POWER IN RECENT YEARS BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND
CONGRESS ON NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, CITE WATERGATE
AND VIETNAM AS PRIMARY CAUSES. I BELIEVE THERE WAS A
THIRD PRINCIPAL FACTOR -- WHEN CONGRESS OBTAINED ACCESS
TO INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION IN THE MID-1970S
ESSENTIALLY EQUAL TO THAT OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.
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IMAGINE THE REACTION OF THE FORD ADMINISTRATION
IN THE MID-70S WHEN THEY WENT TO CONGRESS TO
GET ADDITIONAL MONEY FOR CAMBODIA ONLY TO BE
CONFRONTED BY THE LEGISLATORS WITH A NEW
INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT THAT THE SITUATION WAS
HOPELESS.
0 IMAGINE PRESIDENT CARTER SEEKING A US TROOP CUT
IN SOUTH KOREA ONLY TO FIND CONGRESS AWARE OF A
NEW INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE THAT CONCLUDED THE
NUMBER OF NORTH KOREAN DIVISIONS HAD GROWN.
0 IMAGINE THE REACTION OF A SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SEEKING FUNDS FOR A NEW WEAPON ONLY TO BE TOLD
ON THE HILL OF INTELLIGENCE THAT THE SOVIETS
COULD NEUTRALIZE THE WEAPON.
THIS SITUATION ADDS EXTRAORDINARY STRESS TO THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIA AND POLICY AGENCIES.
POLICYMAKER SUSPICION OF CIA USING INTELLIGENCE' TO
SABOTAGE SELECTED ADMINISTRATION POLICIES IS OFTEN NOT
FAR BELOW THE SURFACE. AND NOT A FEW MEMBERS OF
CONGRESS'ARE WILLING TO EXPLOIT THIS SITUATION BY THEIR
OWN SELECTIVE USE OF INTELLIGENCE THAT SUPPORTS THEIR
VIEWS. THE END RESULT IS TO STRENGTHEN THE
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CONGRESSIONAL HAND IN POLICY DEBATES AND TO HEIGHTEN
GREATLY:THE TENSIONS BETWEEN CIA AND THE REST OF THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH.
THE OVERSIGHT PROCESS HAS ALSO GIVEN CONGRESS --
ESPECIALLY THE TWO INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES -- FAR
GREATER KNOWLEDGE OF AND INFLUENCE OVER THE WAY CIA AND
OTHER INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES SPEND THEIR MONEY THAN
ANYONE IN THE EXECUTIVE WOULD DREAM OF EXERCISING:
FROM EXPENDITURES IN THE BILLIONS TO LINE ITEMS-IN THE
THOUSANDS. CONGRESS HAS BEEN IMMENSELY SUPPORTIVE AND
STEADFAST IN- PROVIDING THE RESOURCES OVER THE PAST TEN
YEARS TO REBUILD AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE. BUT I SUSPECT
IT CAUSES POLICYMAKERS CONSIDERABLE HEARTBURN TO KNOW
THAT CONGRESS MAY ACTUALLY HAVE MORE INFLUENCE TODAY
OVER OUR PRIORITIES AND HOW WE SPEND OUR MONEY THAN THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH.
THE RESULT OF THESE REALITIES IS THAT CIA TODAY IS
IN A REMARKABLE POSITION, POISED NEARLY EQUIDISTANT
BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES -- THE
FORMER KNOWS THAT CIA IS IN NO POSITION TO WITHHOLD
MUCH FROM CONGRESS AND IS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE TO IT,
THE CONGRESS HAS ENORMOUS INFLUENCE AND-INFORMATION YET
REMAINS SUSPICIOUS AND MISTRUSTFUL. THIS MAY BE OR MAY
NOT BE HISTORICALLY CHARACTERISTIC OF OTHER EXECUTIVE
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DEPARTMENTS' RELATIONSHIPS WITH CONGRESS, ALTHOUGH I
SUSPECT;NOT. REGARDLESS, SUCH A CENTRAL LEGISLATIVE
ROLE WITH RESPECT TO AN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IS UNIQUE
IN OUR HISTORY AND IN THE WORLD. AND OUR POLICYMAKERS
KNOW IT.
NOW, LET ME TURN TO CIA'S ROLE AND RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
POLICYMAKER AS SEEN FROM OUR VANTAGE POINT.
-- LET ME SAY AT THE OUTSET THAT IN EVERY ADMINISTRATION
DURING WHICH I HAVE SERVED THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF
SENIOR POLICYMAKERS (ASSISTANT SECRETARY AND ABOVE) WHO
WERE AVID USERS AND READERS OF INTELLIGENCE AND WHO
AGGRESSIVELY SOUGHT CIA ANALYSIS AND VIEWS. THEY
DEDICATED CONSIDERABLE TIME TO TALKING ABOUT
SUBSTANTIVE AND POLICY PROBLEMS WITH US. WE HAVE HAD
UNPRECEDENTED ACCESS IN-THIS ADMINISTRATION FROM THE
PRESIDENT ON DOWN, ESPECIALLY FOR ANALYSIS, AND DAILY
CONTACT WITH THE MOST SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE
GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING THE VICE PRESIDENT AND THE
SECRETARIES OF STATE AND DEFENSE. THEY HAVE OFTEN
DIRECTLY TASKED US AND OFFERED REACTIONS TO THE
INTELLIGENCE THEY READ -- AND THEY HAVE READ A GREAT
DEAL. THIS IS TRUE ALSO OF THEIR SENIOR SUBORDINATES,
WITH WHOM WE ARE IN CONSTANT CONTACT. THIS HAS
CONTRIBUTED ENORMOUSLY TO IMPROVING THE RELEVANCE,
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TIMING, AND SUBSTANCE OF OUR ANALYSIS AND OTHER
SUPPORT. IT IS A DYNAMIC, HEALTHY RELATIONSHIP, EVEN
THOUGH IT IS FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON CURRENT ISSUES.
-- THIS PREOCCUPATION WITH CURRENT REPORTING IS, FROM OUR
PERSPECTIVE, A MAJOR PROBLEM. IF, AS I HAVE BEEN TOLD,
THE AVERAGE TENURE OF AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY IN
GOVERNMENT IS 21 MONTHS, A SHORT TERM FOCUS IS
UNDERSTANDABLE BUT LAMENTABLE, AND, ULTIMATELY, VERY
COSTLY TO OUR COUNTRY.' ONE OF OUR GREATEST CONCERNS
OVER THE YEARS HAS BEEN THE UNWILLINGNESS OR INABILITY
OF MOST POLICYMAKERS TO SPEND MUCH TIME ON LONGER RANGE
ISSUES -- LOOKING AHEAD SEVERAL STEPS -- OR IN HELPING
TO GUIDE OR DIRECT OUR EFFORTS. FOR MANY YEARS WE HAVE
STRUGGLED, LARGELY IN VAIN, TO GET POLICY OFFICIALS TO
DEVOTE TIME TO NON-CRISIS RELATED INTELLIGENCE ISSUES.
FOR EXAMPLE, WE WORK HARD TO DETERMINE THEIR
REQUIREMENTS -- WHAT ARE THEIR PRIORITIES, WHAT ISSUES
OR PROBLEMS SHOULD WE ADDRESS, HOW CAN WE HELP? ONE
REASON CONGRESS HAS ASSUMED A LARGER ROLE IN THESE
AREAS, IN MY VIEW, IS BECAUSE POLICYMAKERS IN
SUCCESSIVE ADMINISTRATIONS HAVE LARGELY ABDICATED THEIR
RESPONSIBILITIES. FOR MANY YEARS, TRYING TO GET SENIOR
POLICY PRINC rPALS TO MEETINGS TO DISCUSS LONGER RANGE
INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS HAS BEEN AN EXERCISE IN
FRUSTRATION. BEYOND THE LACK OF HELP ON REQUIREMENTS,
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WE GET LITTLE FEEDBACK ON OUR LONGER RANGE WORK TO HELP
US BE MORE RESPONSIVE. WE HAVE BEEN MORE AGGRESSIVE IN
RECENT YEARS IN TRYING TO ENGAGE POLICYMAKERS ON THESE
MATTERS, AND KEY FIGURES IN THIS ADMINISTRATION HAVE
SHOWN SOME INTEREST IN SELECTED LONG RANGE PROBLEMS,
BUT SUCH INTEREST REMAINS EXCEEDINGLY, DANGEROUSLY RARE.
-- IN PART BECAUSE OF INSUFFICIENT TIME SPENT ON
INTELLIGENCE, TOO MANY POLICYMAKERS EARLY ON HAVE
UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS ABOUT WHAT WE CAN DO THAT,
WHEN DISAPPOINTED, TURN TO SKEPTICISM WHETHER WE CAN DO
ANYTHING.
-- IT HAS BEEN MY EXPERIENCE OVER THE YEARS THAT THE
POLICYMAKERS' RESPONSE TO INTELLIGENCE THEY DISAGREE
WITH OR FIND UNPALATABLE MOST OFTEN IS TO IGNORE IT;
SOMETIMES, THEY-WILL CHARACTERIZE IT AS INCOMPLETE, TOO
NARROWLY FOCUSED OR AS INCOMPETENT (AND THEY ARE
SOMETIMES RIGHT); AND OCCASIONALLY THEY WILL CHARGE
THAT IT IS "COOKED" OR THAT IT REFLECTS A CIA BIAS. IN
21 YEARS IN INTELLIGENCE, I HAVE NEVER HEARD A
POLICYMAKER (OR ANYONE ELSE FOR THAT MATTER)
CHARACTERIZE AS BIASED OR COOKED A CIA ASSESSMENT WITH
WHICH HE AGREEf ON VIETNAM, VARIOUS ASPECTS OF SOVIET
POLICY AND BEHAVIOR, ANGOLA, LEBANON, THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF EMBARGOES OR SANCTIONS, AND OTHER ISSUES OVER THE
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YEARS, OUR ANALYSTS HAVE DRAWN CONCLUSIONS THAT DASH
COLD WATER ON THE HOPES AND EFFORTS OF THE
POLICYMAKERS. SOMETIMES WE HAVE BEEN WRONG, BUT ON
PROBLEMS LARGE AND SMALL WE HAVE NOT FLINCHED FROM
PRESENTING OUR HONEST VIEW.
THERE IS NO CHARGE TO WHICH WE IN CIA ARE MORE
SENSITIVE THAN THAT OF "COOKING" INTELLIGENCE -- OF
SLANTING OUR REPORTING TO SUPPORT POLICY. EVERY
DIRECTOR SINCE I JOINED CIA HAS BEEN ACCUSED OF THIS AT
ONE TIME OR ANOTHER, I BELIEVE IN VIRTUALLY ALL
INSTANCES UNFAIRLY. FIRST, ONE MUST UNDERSTAND THE
DISTINCTION BETWEEN PERSONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL VIEWS.
NATIONAL ESTIMATES ARE REVIEWED AND COORDINATED BY A
DOZEN AGENCIES; CIA ASSESSMENTS ARE WIDELY REVIEWED
INSIDE THE AGENCY BUT ALMOST NEVER EVEN SEEN BY THE
DIRECTOR BEFORE BEING PUBLISHED AND CIRCULATED. AS
NOTED EARLIER,. ALL GO TO SEVERAL COMMITTEES OF THE
CONGRESS, WHERE THEY ARE SCRUTINIZED.
THESE FORMAL ASSESSMENTS MUST BE DISTINGUISHED FROM
PERSONAL VIEWS EXPRESSED BY INDIVIDUALS AT ALL LEVELS
OF THE AGENCY, FROM ANALYST TO SENIOR OPERATIONS
OFFICER TO DIRECTOR. MORE THAN ONCE, DCI CASEY (AND
PROBABLY HIS PREDECESSORS) APPROVED AN ESTIMATE WITH
WHICH HE DISAGREED PERSONALLY, AND SEPARATELY CONVEYED
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HIS PERSONAL VIEW TO POLICYMAKERS. LEST THIS RAISE
EYEBROWS, I REMIND-YOU THAT IN 1962 DCI MCCONE
DISAGREED WITH THE ENTIRE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ON
WHETHER THE SOVIETS MIGHT INSTALL MISSILES IN CUBA. HE
TOLD PRESIDENT KENNEDY THEY WOULD, AND HE ALONE IN THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH WAS RIGHT. AND, I SHOULD ADD, I AM
TOLD, THIS COST HIM HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
PRESIDENT. AS LONG AS ALL POINTS OF VIEW ARE FAIRLY
REPRESENTED AND REPORTED, THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE -- THE PRESIDENT'S CHIEF INTELLIGENCE
ADVISER -- IS ENTITLED (EVEN OBLIGATED) TO HAVE AND TO
PUT FORWARD HIS OWN VIEW. AS PROFESSOR HENRY ROWEN OF
STANFORD UNIVERSITY RECENTLY WROTE IN THE NEW YORK
TIMES, "... A CIA DIRECTOR IS NOT SUPPOSED TO BE AN
INTELLECTUAL EUNUCH."
POLICYMAKERS HAVE ALWAYS LIKED INTELLIGENCE THAT
SUPPORTED WHAT THEY WANT TO DO, AND THEY OFTEN TRY TO
INFLUENCE THE ANALYSIS TO COME TO CONCLUSIONS THEY
WANT. THEY ASK CAREFULLY PHRASED QUESTIONS; THEY
SOMETIMES WITHHOLD INFORMATION; THEY BROADEN MNARROW
THE ISSUE; ON RARE OCCASIONS, THEY EVEN TRY TO
INTIMIDATE. THE PRESSURES CAN BE ENORMOUS. THIS IS
WHERE THE INTEGRITY OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, BOLSTERED
BY A NATURAL TENDENCY TO RESIST PRESSURE AND AN OFTEN
ADVERSARIAL BUREAUCRATIC RELATIONSHIP, COMES INTO PLAY
TO PROTECT THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE ASSESSMENT.
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BUT, OVERALL, YOU MUST UNDERSTAND THAT THE GIVE AND
TAKE -- THE DIALOGUE -- BETWEEN POLICYMAKER AND
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER ON ISSUES IS NORMAL, HEALTHY, AND
USUALLY IMPROVES OUR ASSESSMENTS AND MAKES THEM MORE
USEFUL TO THE POLICYMAKER -- EVEN WHILE OBJECTIVITY IS
PRESERVED. WE KNOW THEY ARE OFTEN TRYING TO INFLUENCE
AN ASSESSMENT, BUT THAT DOES NOT RENDER THEIR
INFORMATION AND INSIGHTS IRRELEVANT OR OFF-LIMITS.
A FINAL THOUGHT. TO ATTEMPT TO SLANT INTELLIGENCE
NOT ONLY TRANGRESSES IHE DEEPEST ETHICAL AND CULTURAL
PRINCIPLE OF CIA, WE ALL KNOW IT WOULD ALSO BE FOOLISH
-- IT WOULD PRESUPPOSE A SINGLE POINT OF VIEW IN AN
ADMINISTRATION AND WOULD IGNORE THE REALITY OF
CONGRESSIONAL READERSHIP. INDEED, IN MY OPINION, THE
SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE WITH CONGRESS IS ONE OF THE
SUREST GUARANTEES OF CIA'S INDEPENDENCE AND
OBJECTIVITY. AS DIRECTOR WEBSTER HAS SAID, "WE INTEND
TO 'TELL IT AS IT IS,' AVOIDING BIAS AS MUCH AS WE CAN,
OR THE POLITICIZATION OF OUR PRODUCT. POLICYMAKERS MAY
NOT LIKE THE MESSAGE THEY HEAR FROM US, ESPECIALLY IF
THEY HAVE A DIFFERENT POINT OF VIEW. MY POSITION IS
THAT IN THE PREPARATION OF INTELLIGENCE JUDGMENTS,
PARTICULARLY IN NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES, WE
WILL PROVIDE THEM FOR THE USE OF POLICYMAKERS. THEY
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CAN BE USED IN WHOLE OR IN PART. THEY CAN BE IGNORED,
OR TORN UP, OR THROWN AWAY, BUT THEY MAY NOT BE-
CHANGED."
CONCLUSION
WHAT I HAVE DESCRIBED HERE IS THE REALITY OF CIA'S ROLE IN
THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. I HAVE TRIED TO GO
BEYOND THE MECHANICS AND THE HEADLINES TO IDENTIFY THE
STRESSES, TENSIONS, RIVALRIES, ENDURING COMPLAINTS AND
RELATIONSHIPS -- THE PULLING AND HAULING, DAY IN. AND DAY OUT,
REAL LIFE IF YOU WILL -- THAT DETERMINE CIA'S ROLE AND ITS
IMPACT. SOME OF OUR ANALYSES ARE BETTER THAN OTHERS; SOME
INTELLIGENCE EXPERTS ARE BETTER THAN OTHERS; ESTIMATES
SOMETIMES ALLEGED TO BE POLITICIZED OR BIASED WERE NOT THAT AT
ALL -- SOMETIMES THEY WERE JUST NOT VERY WELL DONE. BUT
UNEVENNESS OF QUALITY SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED WITH
POLITICIZATION.
CIA'S AUTONOMY IS UNIQUE IN OUR GOVERNMENT, ITS
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LEGISLATURE IS UNIQUE IN THE WORLD. OUR
RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE EXECUTIVE ARE A
DYNAMIC BLEND OF SUPPORT AND RIVALRY, OF COOPERATION AND
CONFLICT. OUR CHALLENGE IS TO MANAGE THOSE RELATIONSHIPS SO
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THAT THE WHOLE RANGE OF INTERACTIONS -- SUPPORTIVE AND
ADVERSARIAL -- NET OUT TO PROMOTE BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF AN
EVER MORE COMPLEX WORLD AROUND US AND HENCE CONTRIBUTE TO
BETTER INFORMED DECISIONS AND POLICIES.
THE REAL INTELLIGENCE STORY IN RECENT YEARS IS THE
SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT, WITH HELP FROM BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND
CONGRESS, IN THE QUALITY, RELEVANCE AND TIMELINESS OF
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE POLICYMAKER -- A STORY THAT HAS
BEEN NEGLECTED IN PREFERENCE TO CONTROVERSIAL COVERT ACTIONS,
PROBLEMS BETWEEN CIA AND THE CONGRESS, AND SPY SCANDALS. WE
UNDERSTAND THIS POLITICAL REALITY, BUT IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT
AMERICANS KNOW THAT OUR PRIMARY MISSION REMAINS THE COLLECTION
.AND ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION. THIS IS OUR PRIMARY ROLE IN THE
MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. AS RANELAGH OBSERVES, "...
SO FAR FROM BEING THE SECRET POLICE THAT TRUMAN AND MANY
THOUGHTFUL PEOPLE HAD FEARED ONLY HALF A LIFETIME EARLIER, THE
CIA [IS] NOW TAKEN FOR GRANTED AS A MODERATE AND CONSTITUTIONAL
ARM OF THE AMERICAN STATE." THE PRESIDENT, THE POLICY
COMMUNITY, AND THE CONGRESS -- ALBEIT SOMETIMES WITH CLENCHED
TEETH -- DEPEND UPON US, TASK US, AND LOOK TO US MORE EACH
DAY. WE ATTRACT AMERICA'S BRIGHTEST YOUNG PEOPLE, WHO FIND
WITH CIA EXCEPTIONALLY CHALLENGING, HONORABLE, AND CONSISTENTLY
FASCINATING CAREERS. TO QUOTE RANELAGH A FINAL TIME, IN THE
LAST SENTENCE OF HIS BOOK, HE STATES, "IN ITS MOMENTS OF
ACHIEVEMENT AS WELL AS CONDEMNATION, THE AGENCY WAS A REMINDER
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THAT IT WAS A FAITHFUL INSTRUMENT OF THE MOST DECENT AND
PERHAPS THE SIMPLEST OF THE GREAT POWERS, AND CERTAINLY THE ONE
THAT EVEN IN ITS DARKEST PASSAGES PRACTICED MOST CONSISTENTLY
THE VIRTUE OF HOPE."
THE UNITED STATES HAS THE FINEST GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE
.SERVICE IN THE WORLD. FAITHFUL TO THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
LAWS, IT HELPS TO SAFEGUARD OUR FREEDOM AGAINST OUR ADVERSARIES
AND HELPS THE POLICYMAKER UNDERSTAND AND DEAL WITH THE OFTEN
DANGEROUS WORLD AROUND US. CIA IS TRULY AMERICA'S FIRST LINE
OF DEFENSE -- ITS EYES AND EARS. AND OUR DEEPEST COMMITMENT,
.TO BORROW A PHRASE USED BY ERIC LARRABEE TO DESCRIBE GEORGE
MARSHALL, IS "TO SPEAK TRUTH TO POWER."
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CONGRMiONA1 REOORD _-5bNA I It $ 12851 gin le a ehaaoe to be of s~ goveernruriment-to make our
that a porUoo of the Osulty elms. To people ce or mutual rapo ilea under the law
ver be s.Ublished as a national Attars on tin proposal, _
retreaUon arcs, and that the lower public tmeetlrt[s R~D i petard from my YAs clew and certain as we can, has been reported In the press In
.portions of the Mesdow and the Slut-
fact taken a number olaeoncrethe s steps
t and brae burg. recent irl atone be designated as the State'& This bill f will desire to protect their river.-but not
wild and scenic rt rt.
a1also o allow for much-needed boundary through ~ulan that Is putiforth to the Intell [nee Committees Iasi
modifiatlorv In the New Raver Gorge Moreover. any D
National River. ? to protect the Greenbrier must ad- August. He has told w that there Will
. that
not the future
protecting these rivers In their pris- dress the Issue of flood control. In not be ors] fiftings. In
covert
tine state will give people the opportu- 19B5. the region was devastated by a such findings will authorize
silty to en3oy their unmatched beauty flood Currently. tae tCop llof study covert p~ ro[rtetively periodically all
for years to come. Federal designation peers is preparing covertted to m& will pe
. These steps
of these rivers will go a long say that Will suggest various alternatives and commendable. Buts a a is
toward luring more tourists to South- for flood protection. This study will be welcome
em West Virginia- Each year, 700.000 ready for release and public discusalon nevertheless obliged to recognize that River tourists River. the New rt of poste Na- to January o )what I have heard from thethen force are of law. policies which which may do be not have
subject
lions] R. Being ~ v the reases W7 Based oonstltutcnts to exceptions or waivers approved by ded
not al part Syssttm will provide Incrta+e COTIMI issue. and the unresolved the President to specawareness-both nationally and tour' dude the OreenbriereR~ er In this maces-ones that would be highl
t aides &-to the recre-tlen en. - It kglsltion- 81Dce there is an enormous classifed-and which are not binding
give tunl s tst ' le on these rivers. the river. I will upon any future sdminlstrations.
ful vWest Virb inia's wild. wonder-
could offer amy assistance in developing a The bill I am introducing today DA-
will
ever rrivers ? more pulidty than local plan that will protect the river- cepte and builds upon the commit-
The recently funded New River while not precluding effective flood msera ints Commit already tees by made the to the President Inte Intolli?
partway. the , and West Vin- control. not it ees to tfi. it
airila Turnpike. and the soon?t.o-br. President. without a doubt. the
Baer, but it does to represent be the
a Dom does completed Interstate 64 will enable le rivers that I have proposed for
lion are worthy of inclusion In prehenslve attempt to restructure, and
safe, is to visit these convenient on modern, thesigna where %'e Improve the current m Indeed, oginia nt[erstat the c ys e t off this legiand s legislation will com- system oe essi t . improve the
Indeed, West VIMWI' interstate
gment the existing New River Gorge Appended to the bill Is a lengthy sec.
system Is now among the most el-bo- p pliemen
rite and accessible in the Nation. National River and greatly enhance Lion-by?secdi?n analysis which sets
a? the economic development of southern forth Its purposes In great detail. 1
0suley The Area W River National ilecre through tourism. I urge wish only to highlight several of them beg- West Virginia lion Area will cover a 24.5-mile
eoUeagses to pass this legislation
R my
Derv.
Went from Sum le ds nigh as soon as possible..
narrow s,wm r First, the bill would place all of the
With its
ledges. narrow chutes. and d tortuous By Mr. COHEN (for himself, Mr. has bearing upon intelligence over.
la? this area provides one of the B13rrsnr. Mr. DrCoxctxl, and sight In one place in the United States
most
Most spectacular whitewater expeTl Mr )1Ev1Lx?wsa1): Code, and would restructure those
. In a logtal, coherent fashion. Ac-
races In the countryuntry. In 1888,
8. 1741? A bill to improve the con Is
Vh1ttwLter recreation on the Osuley gresslonal oversight of certain tnteli? eordingly? the Hughes?Ryan Amend-.
alone lone pumped over $16 million into
[ens activities. and to strengthen the h Ago dl 61t wto the
ould
the local economy. would
Dress by bl' which such ubrics are Foreign Assistance at portion It Bridge to its confluence with the approved within the executive branch.
The Meadow River, from the Route
stn ove e o th t statute of the intel l-which
In-
Osuley. is a wild and primitive con- and for other purposes: to the Select dltion For r rafting enthusiaata, ft's Committee or n Intelligence. with limitations on the funding of
nr:nmi;aics ovasresi ace telligenee activities. Moreover, the Um-set
even more dcrosa row than the
H Gsuley due to its narrow channel and is Mr. COHEN Mr. along President. with a in- w~ouuld be expanded to cove ahes-R gencies
wreep ap grade. troducing ing Way. along with t hr" rivers
be used other out
the One of the most pris the tine uestone temembers r Senators Bnrrszx.SDrCo?c W~ d CIAhwhich maye _
We II ncou States Is I,Z owsxt. a bill entitled the Int.elll? covert actions. This has been the
nWUeirlcent nt g gorge. , sIts beauty opportunities Bence Oversight Act of 1987, which 1s policy within the executive branch for
superb
exist for fishing. eampin?. rafting, and an effort to strengthen the statutory several years. although Hughes-Ryan
s CLA o ld eliminate
canoeing on the Bluestone. framework already existing in this Itself only apthe plies bill
legislative was also stud- area and to ensure that Congress eill ffective thoe congressional
B t active, intelli- law by specifying ambiguity hos under current
The Greenbrier
In the to pla oversi an
led under the e ledislatlt Fo~tcSertie role continue
study. conducted by the
flee, determined that 133 miles of the Bence activities, including covert u? oversight requirements which pe rtsLin
river were ehirlble provisions for Federal Drotec tions? to intelligence activities and those
lion Under the ht of 106 miles outset that important t bill would place the termed in hen bill to covert ''spec al activities...
Wile and Scenic ivers Act upon were classified as ureucre~tional. The dther~tn~the? conduct ofeinPtelligen aIIrcdunclearnr.nt law. these requirements
were judged to be
Forest Service recommended that the activities generally or of covert actions Third, the bill would. for the first Natu- river protected
se va the State not by In Darticular. Rather, It is aimed at time, provide explicit t~ activ statutory ities au?
:
t tr
h Federal aGovernment through con. sight process t. by clarify g the respon- covert actions. or President l t its s.'
the o
gresslonal action- '
sibilities and roles of both branches in support of U.S. foreign policy other I have received hundre d of letters. l met undere current ltheaw. To be sac e, theteef- alaccordsnce with the requi ehments set
numerous phone cads, uiremen do not
with many residents of Pocahontas festiveness of any lace. will ultimately forth in the bill. As I mentioned at the the
and and Greenbrier Counties on the pros- depend fth of both part es, but 1t ne - enWl newt5ree st is ions on Colo a the
peel of Including g the he Greenbrier in good
the system of federally protected ertheless behooves us-in the interests flora. but are designed to P
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S 1Z8S8 CONGRESSIONAL REOORD - SENATE septe,-nbtr AS, 1987
lieu's ago by the Xatiocal Beturlty Act that there will be no doubt as to what branches In this area a stronger and
of 1147. In the ensuing years. Congress the President has authorized and even more productive oe e.a
has enacted other legislation In this when be authorized It. our legislation tr. WURHOWSRl. Mr. President.
area. Including most recently the Pbr- requires that a Presidential finding be events of recent months have high-
eign Intelligence Burvetllanee Act of In writing and that a copy of each lighted the Importance of eongresaloo-
3178, the Intelligence Oversight Act of finding must be transmitted to the In. v oversight of Intelligence sctivitks.
1080. and the Intelligence Identities telligence Committees within 48 hours The oversight function. performed by
Protection Act of 1562. Each of these after It Is signed. Retroactive Iindings the two Select Intelligence Commlt-
pieces of legislation responded to a re- such as were used In the Inn arms tees-one in the Roux and one In the
quirement that was identified at the sales would be prohibited.
time, ranging from the need to In other aecUons, this legislation
strengthen our counterintelligence ca- would spell out for the first time the
pabilities In the first Instance to a life- statutory power of the President to
and-death situation where CIA agents' authorize covert actions. It also pro-
Identities were being publicly revealed vides that no finding which authorizes
In the past. The legislation we are In- a covert action can operate contrary to
troducing today, too, grows out of our statute and that no funds can be used
own recent experience. for a covert action unless there is a
One of the lessons that we )earned finding. Taken together. It seems to
during the Investigation of the Iranian me that these requirements represent
arms sales and diversion of profits to a reasonable approach to the problem
the Contras Is that current oversight of regaining control over covert ac-
statutes, particularly In the area of lions. while at the same time not to
covert action reporting. are simply not any way harming or endangering our
specific enough. Indeed, It had become Nation's ability to conduct such oper-
obvious during the preliminary Invest!- ations.
gation conducted by the Select Com- Mr. President, I would like to close
mittee on Intelligence late last year this statement on a more personal
that there were ga and loopholes In note. I have been a member of the
our oversight lain and that there were Select Committee on Intelligence for
some Individuals within the executive almost 7 years now. In time of service
branch who exploited these loopholes on the committee I am the senior
as a means of avoiding congressional member on the Democratic side.
notification of a covert operation. During these years it has been my
To be specific, there is currently a privilege to have had weekly, and
statutory requirement that the over- sometimes almost daily, contact with
might committees of Congress-.be noti- the men and women of our Nation's
fied in advance of covert actions, or intelligence services. The work that
must be notified "in a timely fashion" they do for our country Is absolutely
after the fact. This loophole of Invaluable, and many of them routine-
"timely fashion" was broad enough to ly put their lives on the line with little
allow the administration not to report or no public recognition.
the Iranian arras sales for some 18 Indeed, when public recognition does
months. I doubt they would have re- occur. It can sometimes mean death, as
ported them even then, except that a In the case of -William Buckley who
small newspaper In the Middle East was CIA station chief in Beirut. Buck-
broke the story In November of last by was taken hostage, tortured, and
year. killed because of what he was doing
The legislation that we are Introduc- for his country-our country. There
Ing today closes that loophole by re- are similar men and women all over
Quiring that the President provide the world doing their jobs In silence
written notification to the Oversight and without public praise. In the
Committees of the Congress within for lobby of the CIA headquarters build-
48 hours after be has authorized a trig In Langley, VA, there are rows of
covert action. If he believes that the gold stars carved into the wall. Each of
action is too sensitive to reveal to the those stars represents a CIA employee
entire membership of the Intelligence who was killed serving his country. Be-
Committees, he would be authorized neath the stars is a display eau in
to limit notification to the chairmen which has been placed an open book.
and ranking members of those com- There are names In the book repre-
mittees, the majority and minority seating most of the stars on the wall.
leaders of the Senate and the Speaker but there are blank lines as well, for
and minority leader of the House. No- some of these CIA employees still
tification of these eight individuals cannot be publicly Identified, even 35
would insure that we do not have an- years later.
other situation where our country is Mr. President, I end with these sen-
embarked on a course of action with timents because I want to make It
potentially grave foreign policy Impii- clear that in sponsoring this legisla-
cations without notifying the Congress tion today. I am not aiming It at the
that such was about to be done. men and women of the Intelligence
Unlike present law, which does not community. I am not criticizing th:m
require Presidential approval for for the job they do for us each and
covert activities conducted by agencies every day. No. I am not introducing
other than the CIA, this legislation this legislation as a way of strengthen-
spells out for the first time that the trig the oversight process, continuing
President must personally approve the pattern of the past 40 years, and
each covert action or "special activi- making our Nation's partnership be-
ty," as they are sometimes called. So tween the legislative and executive
Senate-Is thfineans by which this de-
mocracy recoficiles the people's right
to know with the intelligence agencies
need for secrecy.
Under existing law the intelligence
agencies are obliged to keep the two
communities currently Informed of
significant intelligence activities. In-
cluding covert action. However, ambi-
guities Inherent in existing statutes
were dramatically highlighted during
the recently concluded congressional
Investigation of the Iran-Contra affair.
It is Important that these ambiguities
are eliminated so that the ground
rules arc clearly understood in both
the Executive and the Congress and
the temptation to look for loopholes Is
reduced.
As an outgrowth of painstaking ne-
gotiations on these Issues between the
staffs of the Senate Intelligence Com-
munity and the National Security
Council, the committee sent a letter
to the President's National Security
Adviser. The'legislation closely follows
the provisions contained in that letter.
This bill does not impose new and
more onerous burdens upon the Intel-
ligence agencies. Rather. 'it clarifies
and rationalizes existing law. For ex-
ample, this bill will, for the first time.
explicitly empower the- President to
authorize covert actions and establish
a Presidential "finding" as the author-
izing document.
I am pleased to join with my distin-
guished colleague from Maine, the vice
chairman of the Senate Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence, in cosponsoring
this legislation.
By Mr. INOUYE (for himsel.'.
Mr. Ev*rts. Mr. Ben. Mr.
CRAASTOrt, Mr. SIMPSON. Mr.
DrCor+cugi. Mr. BVRDncx. Mr.
DASCHLR, Mr. MtRuOwsxi, Mr.
MCCAn31, Mr. BINGAMAT, Mr.
Boscawrrz. Mr. COCFrP.AA, Mr.
Corrp.An, Mr. DOMr]:ICI. Mr.
Goxz, Mr. OF.AYM. Mr. 1xvIx,
Mr. M.ATSIIr1AGA. Mr. Pru., Mr.
Rain, Mr. Rruu. Mr. Rocsi-
rrLLER. Mr. RcDMAc. Mr. STAI-
poan. Mr. SArroRD, Mr. SIMOII.
Mr. W ixTH. Mr. BOREN. and
Mr. Mn.cirsr ):
S. 1722. A bill to authorize the estab?
l shment of the National Museum of
the American Indian. Heye Founda-
tion within the Smithsonian institu-
tion, and to establish a memorial to
the American Indians. and for other
purposes: by unanimous consent, re-
ferred jointly to the Committee on
Rules and Administration and the
Select Committee on Indian Affairs.
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ice of Current Production and Analytic: Support
[A Operations Center
ews Bulletin
'CITE h:\S}iI`:(:TON POST
PAGE : 4
28 OCT. 1987
ITEM NO. 1
Specter Urges Splitting Top CIA Post,
Tougher penalty for Lying
By Walter Pincus tional intelligence to be the pres-
washmgtoo Po.i soft w,;,cr ident's primary adviser on foreign
Sen. Arlen Specter (R Pa.), a intelligence, supervise all U.S. in-
member of the Senate Select Corn telligence-gathering agencies, and
mittee on [ntelligence, yesterday serve as a. member of the National
introduced legislative reforms for Security Council, and a director of
the Central :Intelligence Agency the Central Intelligence Agency to
stemming from the Iran-contra manage the agency and carry out
scandal, including a proposal calling covert action.
for mandatory prison terms for gov- Currently, the CIA director is
ernment officials convicted of lying charged with providing the presi.
to Congress. dent and his advisers objective in-
He also joined other Senate and telligence relating to policy and at
House members who have proposed the same time carrying out covert
that President Reagan and his suc- operations to support that policy.
cessors be required by law to in. Specter said that splitting the job
form Congress within one or two would end what he called problems
days after, approval of any covert of "objectivity and reliability" cre-
intelligence operations. ated by a "foreign policy activist"
Specter also proposed splitting such as the late William J. Casey.
.he director of central intelligence Referring to differences that devel.
Job into two posts: a director of na- oped between CIA Director Casey
and Secretary of Stafea(;eorge Y.
.Shultz, Specter. said, "We cannot
afford to have two secretaries o:
state, two foreign policy-makers
who may be attempting to move the
country in different. directions, one
overtly and the other covertly."
Casey, Specter said, was not the
first director "who desired to be
involved to some degree in the for-
mulation or implementation of for-
eign policy, nor is he likely to be the
last."
Specter called for a presidentially
appointed, independent inspector
general for the CIA. The CIA is one
of the, few government agencies
whose director still appoints his
own inspector general, which Spec.
ter said "is not conducive to objec-
tivity."
He pointed out that the CIA of-
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ficial with operational responsibility
for the controversial 1984 mining
of Nicaraguan harbors was later
named inspector general.
Other sources pointed out yes-
terday that the current inspector
general's investigation of CIA ac-
tivities on behalf of the Nicaraguan
contra rebels during the time it was
prohibited by law had to be redone
when it became apparent that agen-
cy personnel were giving him false
stories.
Specter's proposal for congres-
sional notification of all covert ac-
tions within 24 hours after presi-
dential approval appears to have the
best chance for passage because
versions of it have already been in-
troduced by top members of the
Ho;!se'and Senate intelligence pan-
Sen. William S. Cohen (R-Maine),
vice chairman of the Senate com-
mittee, introduced legislation re-
quiring notice within 48 hours.
Cohen is expected to announce to-
day that his measure is supported
by intelligence committee Chair-
man Sen. David L Boren (D-Okla.)
and three key members of the Iran-
contra investigating panel: Sen.
Daniel K. Inouye (D-Hawaii), the
chairman; Sen. Warren B. Rudman
(R-N.H.), the vice chairman, and
Sen. George J. Mitchell (D-Maine).
Under law, the president is re-
quired to consult with Congress in
advance on covert operations, but
the chief executive is allowed, in
special circumstances, to give only
"timely notice" after an operation
has begun.
Reagan used that loophole to de-
lay telling Congress about the Iran
arms sa.es until after they were
exposed in the press 10 months lat-
er.
The White House has tradition-
ally opposed a time limit on such
notification, and in a letter to Boren
and Cohen after the Iran-contra
hearings ended, Reagan indicated
he still would demand the right to
delay notification in special circum-
stances.
In demanding jail sentences for
officials found deliberately mislead-
ing committees, Specter argued
that congressional oversight cannot
be accomplished if Congress is giv-
en' false or misleading testimony.
Specter said the situation is "espe-
cially problemsome where wit-
nesses appear before the intelli-
gence committees in a secret ses-
sion .... Under those circum.
stances, the committees realisti.
cally have little or no opportunity ?~
determine the truth."
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Onto
[wAsHINGrON
WHISPERS
Two years after the redefection of
KGB officer V Italy Yurchenko, the
CIA faces a similar crisis: Thinking of
a return to Moscow is Anatoly Bogaty.
43. an intelligence officer who. as first
secretary of the Sosiet Embassy in Mo-
rocco. defected in 1982 and who has
been lining under the CIA's protection
in the United States. His wife Larissa is
.o unhappy that he phoned the Soviet
Embassy in Washington. which has
since been demanding that the U.S.
release' the Bogatys and their two
sons. The State Department says the
Bogatys are free to go. One American
who knows Bogaty calls him "complex.
troubled" and says that his threat of
redefection may be a way to pressure
the CIA to get him a better job. Anoth-
er person familiar with the case says
that Bogaty lost big in the recent stock-
market crash and is now deep in debt.
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