ECONOMIC POLICY COUNCIL MEETING -- FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 1986

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01117R000602140003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 49
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 31, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 13, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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EMMAi s Registry
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ad-
0660
CABINET AFFAIRS STAFFING MEMORANDUM
Date: 2/13/8f Number: 317057CR Due By:
Subject: ECONOMIC POLICY COUNCIL MEETING -- FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 14. 1986
1:00 P.M. -- ROOSEVELT ROOM
ALL CABINET MEMBERS
Vice President
State
Treasury
Defense
Justice
Interior
Agriculture
Commerce
Labor
HHS
HUD
Transportation
Energy
Education
Chief of Staff
Action
11
r
EPA
GSA
NASA
OPM
SBA
VA
CEA
cEQ
OSTP
Poindexter
Svahn
Chew (For WH Staffing)
FF
Executive Secretary for:
DPC
EPC
REMARKS:
There will be a meeting of the Economic Policy Council tomorrow
at 1:00 P.M. in the Roosevelt Room.
The agenda and background paper for the second agenda item are
attached. No paper will be distributed for the first item.
RETURN TO:
Alfred H. Kingon ^ Don Clarey
Cabinet Secretary ^ Rick Davis
456-2823 ^ Ed Stucky
(Ground Floor, West Wing)
Associate Director
Office of Cabinet Affairs
du-'MM 1e.,.%..'22c nCnsi
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THE WHITE HOUSE
February 13, 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ECONOMIC POLICY COUNCIL
FROM: EUGENE J. McALLISTER"1
SUBJECT: Agenda and Paper for the February 14 Meeting
The agenda and paper for the February 14 meeting of the
Economic Policy Council are attached. The meeting is scheduled
for 1:00 p.m. in the Roosevelt Room.
The first agenda item will be the Multifiber Arrangement.
No paper-s will be distributed for this topic.
The second agenda item will be a discussion of the report on
textile and apparel import limit enforcement requested by the
President in December. The report, drafted by a working group
chaired by the Treasury Department, is attached.
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THE WHITE HOUSE
ECONOMIC POLICY COUNCIL
February 14, 1986
1:00 P.M.
Roosevelt Room
1. Multifiber Arrangement
2. Report to the President on Textile Imports
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2/13/86
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON TEXTILE IMPORTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
On December 17, 1985, in the message accompanying his veto
of the 'Textile and Apparel Trade Enforcement Act of 1985',
President Reagan directed Secretary Baker, as Chairman Pro
Tempore of the Economic Policy Council, "to investigate the
import levels of textiles and apparel to determine if these
imports have exceeded those limits agreed upon in international
investigations".
It is the conclusion of this report that, while annual
imports of these products have doubled since 1980, the growth in
imports has not been the result of imports allowed in excess of
established quotas. Furthermore, while some errors have
occurred, even flawless enforcement and administration of the
U.S. textile quota program could not significantly reduce the
overall level of textile and apparel import growth.
The growth occurred because of the strong demand for
imported textile and apparel products in this country as well as
the structure and coverage of our quota agreements. Most of our
agreements establish quotas only on certain sensitive categories
of textile and apparel, but do not establish quotas on other
categories until the United States determines that those imports
are causing or threaten to cause market disruption. Much of the
growth has occurred in these other categories before the
imposition of quotas. Other sources of growth are countries not
subject to quotas (OECD members except Japan, and small
suppliers) and fibers not covered by quotas (principally ramie).
MFA and Bilaterals
The United States has negotiated with its trading partners
an agreement, called the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA), which
essentially grants the U.S. the right to limit the imports of
textile and apparel products from a country when our market is
disrupted by the exports of that country. The principal goal of
the MFA is to provide for the orderly development of trade in
textiles while preventing the disruption of markets in the
importing countries. The MFA includes general guidelines for
defining market disruption and for minimum growth to be allowed
in sensitive categories.
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The MFA also allows for bilateral agreements between
importing and exporting countries that further spell out the
terms of the bilateral textile trade. The U.S. currently has 35
bilateral agreements with 34 countries. These agreements vary in
their scope, some including aggregate ceilings and others being
limited to ceilings on specific categories of sensitive products.
The MFA allows countries to negotiate agreements that are more
restrictive than the general guidelines for growth and market
disruption. The U.S. has done so on many occasions.
Import Growth
From 1980 through 1985, imports covered by the Multi-Fiber
Arrangement (i.e., textile and apparel products of cotton, wool
or man-made fibers) grew by 6 billion square yard equivalents
(SYE), an increase of approximately 100%. (The annual growth
rate peaked in 1984, at 30%. Growth in 1985 was less than 7%.)
Only eight-tenths of one percent of this six-year increase was a
result of entries allowed in excess of negotiated limits. This
amount is equivalent to one-tenth o one percent of total
imports.
This doubling in imports came from:
o Agreement Countries. Imports from countries with which
we have bilateral textile agreements accounted for 35%
of the 6 billion SYE growth. Some of this growth was
built into category and group limits included in the
agreements. The remainder was in categories for which
quotas were not included in the bilaterals. Growth in
these categories is monitored by the interagency
Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements
(CITA), and quotas are imposed when market disruption
occurs or is threatened.
o The "Big Three". Taiwan, Hong Kong and Korea, the
three largest suppliers to the U.S., accounted for 26%
of the 1980-85 growth. This growth occurred primarily-
in categories not at the time subject to quotas. CITA
monitors growth from these countries and imposes quotas
when necessary.
o OECD (except Japan). These developed countries
accounted for 25% of the 1980-85 growth. The U.S. does
not have quotas on these suppliers.
o China. Imports from the PRC accounted for 11% of the
growth in the six-year period. A bilateral agreement
was negotiated in 1983 with quota limits on specific
categories. CITA has placed 25 additional categories
under quota since then.
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o New Starters. Imports from LDCs which are relative
newcomers to the international textile market accounted
for the remaining 3% of the 6 billion SYE growth.
Imports from these new starters, with whom we have not
negotiated comprehensive bilaterals, are monitored to
determine market disruption, and quotas are imposed
when CITA considers appropriate.
In addition to growth in MFA-covered products, there has
been substantial growth in imports of apparel manufactured from
fibers, such as silk, linen, and ramie, that are not covered by
the MFA or subject to quantitative restraints. While comparable
data on imports of non-MFA fiber products are not available for
years prior to 1983, imports of non-MFA fiber apparel grew by
nearly 600% between 1983 and 1985. In 1985, imports of non-MFA
fiber apparel represented 9% of total apparel imports.
Overshipments _
Excluding possible overshipments from Hong Kong and Japan
(discussed below), overshipments of agreed limits equalled 58
million SYE since 1980, accounting for 0.1% of total textile and
apparel imports during the period. There were 57 instances of
such overshipments caused by a variety of factors:
o Human error by Commerce and Customs personnel accounted
for 53% of the 58 million SYE.
o Sudden surges in imports and delays in imposing import
controls accounted for 33% of the overshipments.
o Technical flaws in agreements which prevented adequate
enforcement accounted for 10% of the overshipments.
In addition, U.S. Census data shows 43 instances of
overshipments from Hong Kong and Japan, which totalled an
additional 42 million SYE during the six-year period. Hong Kong
and Japan, however, dispute the Census numbers, arguing that
their export data show no overshipments. Because of the large
number of entries involved, it has not been possible to reconcile
the data. We therefore cannot state with certainty whether Hong
Kong and Japan have overshipped, and accordingly these possible
overshipments are not included in the totals above. The United
States has not imposed import controls on Hong Kong or Japan.
Fraud
Fraud is also a problem in the textile and apparel import
program. The product- and country-specific nature of the U.S.
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quota system invites a variety of schemes involving fraudulent
description of merchandise, transshipment through third countries,
or other methods. For instance, a quota on men's cotton shirts
from India might lead an importer to describe his product as
cotton shirts from Bangladesh, as man-made fiber shirts from
India, or as women's cotton shirts from India, none of which
would be subject to the men's cotton shirt quota.
Customs currently has $242.5 million worth of textile trade
under investigation for some form of quota fraud. This includes
entries going back to 1981 and is contrasted with a total value
of textile imports in 1985 alone of $16 billion.
Administrative and Enforcement Difficulties
In addition, there are a variety of specific aspects of the
U.S. textile import system that, for various reasons, make fraud
and overshipment much more likely. These include among other
things:
o Fiber substitution - Customs enforcement efforts are
complicated by the fact that many fibers used in the
manufacture of textiles and apparel (such as ramie,
silk, and linen) are not covered by the terms of the
MFA. Distinguishing among these fibers often requires
expensive and time-consuming laboratory analysis.
o Non-standard Bilateral Agreements - Provisions of
bilateral agreements that vary across countries
complicate the monitoring and enforcement efforts of
both Customs and the Commerce Department.
o Cottage Industry/Folklore Exemption - It is often
extremely difficult for Customs personnel to identify
traditional or hand-made items, which are exempt from
quotas in many of our bilaterals.
o Overseas Investigations - Customs personnel often find
it difficult to conduct investigations in exporting
countries without the full support of the host
government.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
Administration
1. To reduce the incidence of overshipments: in addition
to implementing any import control directives received from CITA,
Customs should also place under import controls any textile or
apparel category not already subject to such controls, as
permitted by U.S. bilateral agreements, when Census data show
that imports in that category have reached 50% of the quota
levels.
2. U.S. negotiating teams should continue to seek a higher
level of input from the Customs Service on the content of
bilateral agreements, particularly with respect to category
definition, in order to prevent any unenforceable provisions from
being established.
3. To the greatest extent possible, category and part
category definitions, quota and visa bilateral agreements and
other administrative provisions (such as visa formats and cover-
age) should be standardized across agreement countries.
4. CITA should review on an ongoing basis the
administrative aspects of its "call" process, including the
availability of current data, to ensure that the process is as
expeditious as possible.
Enforcement
1. The Customs Commercial Fraud Enforcement Program should
be maintained at its current high priority level so that it is
(along with drug enforcement and Exodus) among the highest
enforcement priorities of the Customs Service. The Commissioner
of Customs should immediately undertake a thorough review of this
program to ensure that staffing and resource allocation are
sufficient to address enforcement and administrative needs. This
review should address all aspects of the Customs textile program
and other commercial efforts, including the effective allocation
of import specialists, inspectors, investigators, laboratory
technicians and personnel attached to U.S. embassies overseas.
2. The Attorney General should communicate to all U.S.
Attorneys that prosecution of textile and other commercial fraud
cases should be designated as a high priority of each U.S.
Attorney's office. whenever fraud is discovered, it should be
prosecuted to the fullest extent under the law, in both criminal
and civil cases. The Attorney General's Economic Crime Council
should address textile and other commercial fraud activities and
develop appropriate enforcement and prosecution strategies.
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3. The Customs Service, in consultation with the
Departments of Justice and Treasury, should review the principal
statutes providing for criminal and civil penalties, including
the seizure and forfeiture of merchandise, for the false,
fraudulent and negligent entry into the U.S. of textiles subject
to quota agreements and other related commercial violations, and
shall recommend any legislative changes necessary to strengthen
those statutes.
4. A category system with fewer, more broadly defined
categories would decrease the opportunities for quota fraud.
CITA should investigate possible alternative systems that meet
the needs of the program and the international trading system.
5. Quota exemption provisions for handloomed and
traditional products are extremely difficult for Customs to
enforce. CITA should analyze options to address this issue,
including tighter definitions for inclusion in future bilateral
agreements.
6. The recent Customs directive requiring formal entries
for all textile imports should help to address the problem of
entries that fraudulently or unfairly abuse the exemption for
shipments less than $250 to avoid the quota limitations. Customs
should closely monitor the import data after this directive takes
effect to determine if any further action is required.
7. The fact that some fibers used in the manufacture of
textiles and apparel are not covered by the Multi-Fiber
Arrangement creates opportunities for fraud and increases
Customs' workload. The interagency team renegotiating the MFA
should continue to address the expansion of the MFA to include
such fibers.
8. Future Bilateral Textile Agreements should be modified
to include clauses providing for cooperation from foreign countries
on the exchange of necessary information and the facilitation of
U.S. Customs' investigative efforts in such foreign countries.
9. Customs should continue to take all necessary steps to
ensure that the Textile Regulations (TD 85-38) promulgated on
March 5, 1985, are strictly enforced in all respects.
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REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON TEXTILE IMPORTS
INTRODUCTION
In your message accompanying the veto of the Textile and
Apparel Trade Enforcement Act of 1985, you directed me, as
Secretary of the Treasury and Chairman Pro Tempore of the
Economic Policy Council, "to investigate the import levels of
textiles and apparel to determine if these imports have exceeded
those limits agreed upon in international negotiations," to
report within 60 days, and to "recommend changes in existing
administrative and enforcement procedures, if necessary, so that
corrective action is taken."
In response to that directive, this paper explores the
following questions:
To what extent have textile and apparel imports
exceeded limits agreed upon under the authority of the
Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA)? -
o By what means have quota restrictions been
circumvented?
o What measures could improve the administration and
enforcement of the textile import program and reduce
the potential for fraudulent importations and quota
avoidance?
Having carried out the requested investigation, I have
concluded that overshipments of negotiated import levels have not
represented a significant portion of the increase in textile and
apparel imports to the U.S. since 1980. Only eight-tenths of one
percent of the import growth for this period can be attributed to
entries allowed in excess of imposed quotas. This amount is
equivalent to one-tenth of one percent of total imports. These
entries occurred for a variety of reasons, including human error
and technical difficulties in the administration of the program.
In addition, an indeterminate percentage of textile and
apparel imports involve some form of quota fraud. Such fraud
includes transshipment to avoid quotas and misdescription of
imports to avoid specific category limits.
These findings are contrasted with the fact that total
imports of cotton, wool and man-made fiber products have
approximately doubled since 1980, as discussed below.
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An evaluation of import data establishes that the growth in
MFA fiber imports for the period 1980 through 1985, which
totalled approximately 6 billion SYE (square yard equivalents),
was not the result of over-shipments of agreed levels. Rather,
the growth occurred because of the strong demand for imported
textile and apparel products in this country as well as the
structure and coverage of our quota agreements. Most of our
agreements establish quotas only on certain sensitive categories
of textile and apparel, but do not establish quotas on other
categories until the United States determines that those imports
are causing or threaten to cause market disruption. Much of the
growth has occurred in these other categories before the
imposition of quotas. Other sources of growth are countries not
subject to quotas (OECD members except Japan, and small suppliers)
and fibers not covered by quotas (principally ramie).
I. PRESENT SYSTEM AND MULTI-FIBER ARRANGEMENT
International trade in textiles and apparel is currently-
regulated by the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA), under the aegis
of GATT. The MFA first went into effect on January 1, 1974, and
was renewed in 1977 and 1981. The current agreement expires July
31, 1986. The MFA covers only textiles and apparel made of
cotton, wool and man-made fibers. The MFA is an exception to the
principles of GATT as it permits discrimination among exporters,
allows a lower standard of injury for the imposition of
restrictions, and does not require the restricting importing
country to pay compensation. The MFA has, inter alia, the
following objectives:
- to provide for orderly and equitable development of
trade;
- to prevent market disruption caused by low-priced
imports;
- to allow access to markets for developing countries; and
- to allow for safeguard action in the form of quantitative
restrictions on imports.
The MFA provides a framework for the controlled expansion of
textile and apparel trade. It authorizes the negotiation of
bilateral quota agreements between exporting and importing
nations. The MFA also allows for the imposition of unilateral
restraints when import prices are substantially below those
prevailing in the importing country market for similar products.
It further provides guidelines for determining market disruption,
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minimum levels of import restraints and annual growth rates for
import restraint levels.
Under the provisions of the MFA, importing nations may enter
into bilateral agreements with exporting nations to eliminate the
risk of market disruption and to ensure the expansion and
development of textile trade between the two countries. The U.S.
is currently party to bilateral agreements with 34 nations.
These agreements permit the U.S. to regulate textile imports by
providing for limits, growth rates and consultations to set
limits on unrestrained categories.
The agreements with the 34 countries vary in their
provisions and in scope. Six agreements set aggregate ceilings
on total textile and apparel exports or on total cotton, wool or
man-made fiber textile and apparel exports. Four others set
ceilings for groups of products or specific categories of
sensitive products. Most other agreements, including those with
the leading suppliers, set limits only on a number of specific
products.
All U.S. bilateral agreements provide for trade growth,
assured market access, flexibility to adjust restraint levels in
response to market changes, and consultations to resolve issues
raised by either party. In addition, each comprehensive
agreement contains an equity clause assuring that exports will
not be restrained to the benefit of exports from countries with
which the U.S. does not have a bilateral agreement.
In deciding whether to seek a specific limit or a
consultation level in a bilateral agreement, the U.S. studies
historical data on the imports from the particular supplier
country, as well as worldwide imports, and the vulnerability of
that portion of the domestic industry to increased import
penetration. Tighter limits are sought for categories in which
the domestic industry is more susceptible to serious injury from
increased imports. Established suppliers of particular products
are typically given limits at least equal to their current trade
level in that category plus some "uplift". Bilateral agreements
also typically contain growth rates, permitting suppliers to
increase the quantity of imports annually. Most agreements
permit 6 percent annual growth for cotton and man-made fiber
categories and 1 percent growth for wool categories, although
agreements with some of the larger suppliers contain smaller
growth rates. In addition, the bilateral agreements contain
"flexibility" provisions for increases and decreases in
particular restraint limits through the use of carryover (use in
the present agreement year of an unused portion of the limit for
the same category in the previous year), carryforward (use for a
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category in the present agreement year of a portion of the next
year's limit in the same category), or swing (allowing shipments
in excess of a specific limit of an individual category or group
provided that the specific limit for another category or group is
reduced by a corresponding amount). The extent to which these
flexibility provisions can be applied is generally 11 percent for
carryover, 7 percent for carryforward and 6 percent for swing.
A unique aspect of the MFA is the Textile Surveillance Body
(TSB), which supervises the Arrangement and reviews the
justifications for actions taken under it. The TSB, which is
composed of representatives of signatories to the MFA, meets in
Geneva. Both importing and exporting nations may refer issues to
the TSB for its consideration. TSB recommendations are not
binding.
When imports of a specific textile product from a country or
territory appear to be causing disruption in the U.S. market for
that product, the U.S. may request consultations with the foreign
government to reach a mutually agreeable quota level for the
product. If the two governments are unable to reach a solution
to the matter within a reasonable amount of time (usually 60
days), the MFA gives the U.S. the right to unilaterally impose
import controls on the specific textile product pending an
agreement between the two countries on a restraint level.
Authority
The domestic authority for the textile and apparel import
program is Section 204 of the Agricultural Act of 1956, as
amended (7 U.S.C. 1854) which gives the President the authority
to enter into bilateral or multilateral trade agreements to
restrain trade in agricultural or textile products. In 1962, the
Congress added the authority to unilaterally restrain disruptive
imports from non-participants if a multilateral agreement exists
among countries accounting for a significant part of world trade
in those articles. That multilateral agreement at this time is
the MFA.
The U.S. textile and apparel import program, as administered
by the Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements
(CITA), was established by Executive Order 11651 on March 3,
1972. The Executive Order (as amended) provides that CITA be
comprised of members of the Departments of State, the Treasury,
Commerce and Labor, and of the Office of the U.S. Trade
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Representative. It directs CITA to supervise the implementation
of all textile agreements. The Commissioner of Customs is
directed to take such actions as CITA recommends to carry out
these agreements.
The CITA Process
CITA is chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Textiles and Apparel of the Department of Commerce. The Commerce
Department provides the staff work for the Committee, monitors
all agreements as well as imports from non-restrained suppliers
and non-restrained categories, recommends requests for
consultations to set limits on unrestrained disruptive imports,
provides data on market disruption and imports, and recommends to
CITA actions such as import controls to prevent overshipments of
agreed or unilateral restraint limits. The CITA agencies are
in daily contact on the operation of the textile program. At
least one formal CITA meeting is held each month. CITA decisions
are by majority vote.
Consultation Requests ("Calls")
Each month, the Chairman of CITA recommends a number of
consultation requests ("calls") to set restraints on increasing
uncontrolled imports. The recommendation is based upon
indications of market disruption, as set forth in Annex A of the
MFA and in a December 16, 1983 statement by the White House.
Annex A provides that market disruption is the existence of
serious damage or the actual threat thereof to domestic producers
and that factors indicating a market disruption include "a sharp
and substantial increase or imminent increase of imports of
particular products from particular sources. . . offered at
prices which are substantially below those prevailing for similar
goods of comparable quality" in the domestic market.
The December 16, 1983 statement provides additional criteria
which create a presumption of market disruption or the threat
thereof. These are: (1) more than 30 percent total growth in
imports of a particular product or category in the most recent
year or a ratio of total imports to domestic production in that
product or category of 20 percent or more, and (2) imports from
an individual supplier equalling 1 percent or more of total U.S.
production of that product or category. Additionally, the
statement instructs the Chairman of CITA to recommend a call on
products from countries with which the U.S. has Export
Authorization Arrangements (E-Systems) when: (1) export
authorizations issued in a particular category reach 65 percent
of the maximum formula level (MFL), (2) it appears that the MFL
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will be exceeded if not called, and (3) that category has an
import-to-production ratio of 20 percent or more or there has
been a 30 percent or greater increase in the quantity of imports.
Currently, the U.S. has Export Authorization Agreements with Hong
Kong, Taiwan and Korea.
The Commerce Department produces a monthly computerized
report indicating the categories and the respective countries
that meet the December 16, 1983 additional criteria. The report
typically lists approximately 100 possible categories which meet
the presumption of market disruption under the White House
criteria. Commerce staff then reduces this group of requests to
approximately 20 to 30 recommendations in which Commerce believes
there is actual market disruption or the threat of market
disruption. Normally, a working level group, the "SubCITA",
meets before CITA to discuss the recommended calls. CITA
generally meets in formal session once a month to consider the
Chairman's call recommendations. To initiate a call, a majority
of the CITA agencies must agree that there is actual market
disruption, or the threat thereof.
Between 1980 and 1985, CITA made 426 calls. When CITA makes
a call, it compares import levels with the most recent data on
U.S. production (which usually lags a year or more). These 426
calls were made at levels that averaged 6.6% of U.S. production.
As a result of these calls, as well as our comprehensive
bilateral agreements, 51% of 1985 textile and apparel imports to
the U.S. were subject to a quota ceiling. Attachment 4 cites the
number of calls each year and the percentage of production which
the level of trade from the exporting country represented.
The MFA establishes formulas for determining the minimum
extent to which imports may be restrained. Thus, when a call is
made, the MFA provides that the restraint level should be at
least equal to the quantity of imports during the twelve month
period terminating two months before the call was made (a "12 of
14 months" formula). For example, if a call is made on March 1,
the restraint level should be no less than the quantity of
imports from that supplier during the previous January through
December. The actual level of the restraint will be higher
whenever an agreement is reached with the supplier country. When
calls are made under the consultation mechanisms of our bilateral
agreements, the level established by the "12 of 14 month" formula
is increased typically by 20 percent and that level becomes the
basis for further negotiations.
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Import Controls
The Commerce staff monitors imports by date of export under
the provisions of each bilateral agreement and under unilateral
restraints imposed as a result of "calls" and recommends to CITA
the implementation of import controls by the U.S. Customs Service
where there is the possibility of overshipment. in making the
decision to recommend import controls, Commerce considers
previous fill rates and shipping patterns. It also utilizes a
computerized report that selects product categories for which the
rate of shipment is disproportionate to the portion of the quota
period which has elapsed.
Once the import controls are implemented, Customs counts all
affected imports exported on or after the effective date of the
limit and embargoes further imports after the number of imports
equals the quota limit. As the number of consultation requests
and bilateral agreements has risen over the past few years, so
have the number of import controls. In 1980, CITA directed
Customs to administer import controls for 275 categories. By
1985, this had jumped to 642 categories. The public is notified
through the FEDERAL REGISTER each time import controls are
imposed. In 1980, CITA published 22 such notices; in 1985 it
published 171.
III. SOURCES OF TEXTILE IMPORT GROWTH
Imports of MFA products (i.e., textiles and apparel of
cotton, wool and man-made fibers) grew by approximately 100% in
the 1980 to 1985 time period. The rate of growth was 25% in
1983, 30% in 1984, and less than 7% in 1985. The doubling of the
import level is the basis of the belief that the United States
has not adequately asserted its rights under the Multi-Fiber
Arrangement (MFA) to limit the growth of imports. However, the
MFA neither specifies a limit on overall import growth nor covers
all textiles and apparel. Rather, the MFA provides mechanisms
for importing countries to ensure orderly growth and provides for
action to prevent specific imports from causing market dis-
ruption. Nevertheless, it is often contended that the growth in
textile and apparel imports has resulted from import shipments
that have exceeded agreed limits. Some suggest that because of
various means of quota circumvention, the actual level of imports
is far greater than reported by the United States.
Agreement Countries
The largest portion of import growth in MFA fiber imports is
the result of shipments that originate in countries with which
the U.S. has bilateral restraint agreements. Imports from
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agreement countries other than the top four suppliers (Hong Kong,
Korea, Taiwan and China) increased from 1.5 billion SYE in 1980
to 3.6 billion SYE in 1985, or by 140 percent over the period.
The increase from these agreement countries, other than the
top four suppliers, accounted for 35 percent of the growth from
1980 to 1985. Although these agreements cover MFA fibers and
limit growth rates on selected products to approximately six
percent per year and one percent per year for wool products, most
agreements do not establish specific quotas on all product
categories. Instead, agreements establish consultation
mechanisms that provide for limits to be imposed when exports on
those products threaten disruption in the U.S. market.
The Big Three
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Korea are the "Big Three" suppliers
of textiles to the United States. Imports from the "Big Three"
accounted for 26 percent of the doubling in imported textiles and
apparel made from MFA-covered fibers during the period 1980-1985.
Between 1980 and 1985, imports of textile and apparel from these
countries increased 71 percent, from 2.2 billion SYE in 1980 to
3.8 billion SYE in 1985. Before 1982, the agreements with these
countries provided for 6 to 6.5 percent aggregate growth in
cotton, wool, and man-made textiles and apparel. However, in
1982 the U.S. re-negotiated these agreements to provide, on
average, less than one percent growth to specific limits covering
a portion of their trade in return for elimination of the
aggregate ceilings on imports. These exporting nations then
shifted their exports to uncontrolled categories, which, as a
result of the December 1983 White House criteria, the Chairman of
CITA can place under quota when imports in such categories meet
established criteria.
China
China is the fourth largest supplier of textiles to the
United States. Between 1980 and 1985, imports from China
increased 201 percent, from 324 million SYE to 976 million SYE,
and accounted for 11 percent of the total growth during the
period. Under the bilateral agreement negotiated in 1983,
sensitive categories are subject to limits; all others are
subject to the CITA "call" system. There is no limit on overall
growth.
Imports from high-wage industrialized countries, i.e., the
OECD (excluding Japan, with which we have had a bilateral textile
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and apparel agreement), accounted for 25 percent of the increase
in imports between 1980 and 1985, growing from 500 million SYE in
1980 to 2 billion SYE in 1985. Because of the high wages paid in
these developed countries, imports from these sources generally
have been of relatively high cost and have not been considered
disruptive. The United States has avoided restraints on imports
from the high-cost developed countries (excluding Japan) because
of the "Gentlemen's Agreement", an understanding that some
developed countries would not impose textile and apparel quotas
on each other under the MFA.
New Starters
A smaller portion of the MFA import growth between 1980 and
1985 is accounted for by so-called "New Starters". These are
less developed countries (LDCs) which are new entrants in the
international textile market. Imports from New Starters
increased by 68 percent between 1980 and 1985, accounting for
three percent of the import growth during that period. We do not
have comprehensive bilateral restraint agreements with most of
these suppliers. To ensure orderly market growth in imports from
these sources, CITA may invoke Article 3 of the MFA, which
authorizes "calls" for consultations to establish limits on
products causing market disruption. Growth in imports from New
Starters can be attributed to importers' trying to keep one step
ahead of CITA -- successively shifting sourcing from restrained
suppliers to as yet unrestricted suppliers -- and to the desire
of developing countries to generate employment.
Non-MFA Fiber Products
In addition to import growth caused by textile and apparel
products subject to the MFA, imports of textiles and apparel made
of fibers not subject to the Arrangement (i.e., linen, ramie,
silk and jute) have increased. At the time the MFA was last
renegotiated in 1981, imports of non-MFA fiber products were
limited to traditional jute and other hard-fiber products (such
as carpet backing, cordage and burlap bags) and small amounts of
expensive silk and linen apparel products. In the past three
years, however, U.S. imports of apparel composed of blends of
ramie, silk, or linen and MFA fibers have dramatically increased.
These blends have been engineered to avoid the quotas established
for MFA apparel products. Although overall imports of non-MFA
fiber products have remained relatively stable (growing from 1.5
billion SYE in 1983 to 1.8 billion SYE in 1985), imports of
non-MFA fiber apparel products have grown substantially
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-- from 80 million SYE in 1983 to over 500 million SYE in 1985,
or by almost 600 percent, and now account for an amount equal to
10 percent of MFA apparel imports.
IV. OVERSHIPMENTS OF CONTROLLED PRODUCTS
Overshipments of agreed limits equalled 58 million SYE
between 1980 and 1985, or 0.1 percent of total imports for
textiles and apparel over the period. Known overshipments of
textile products subject to restraints in 1985 amounted to 14
million SYE -- 0.1 percent of total textile and apparel imports.
One reason that this percentage is so small is that the
Commerce Department closely monitors imports of textile products
through monthly Census Bureau reports. When a quota gets within
reach of being filled, CITA directs Customs to put the product
under import control. Customs then controls the imports of that
product by permitting entries only after determining that the
quota is not filled.
Overshipments are charged to an agreement's subsequent
limit. A detailed list of each overshipment is contained in
Appendix 3.
Excluding possible overshipments from Hong Kong and Japan
(discussed below), there were 57 instances of such overshipments
caused by a variety of factors:
1. Sudden surges in imports and the delay in imposing
import controls, and the delay in providing Customs with Census
data -- responsible for 19 million SYE, or 33 percent, of
overshipments between 1980 and 1985.
-- It is not always possible to foretell accurately where
or when import surges will occur. On several
occasions, quotas not under import control because they
had never filled in recent years suddenly filled in a
single month or late in the year, making it impossible
to restrain imports before the limits were exceeded.
-- All import control directives are cleared by CITA. A
lapse between the period when Commerce first determines
that import controls are necessary to prevent
overshipments and the clearance and implementation of a
directive to Customs may permit an overshipment to
occur.
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2. Human error -- either by Customs or by Commerce
personnel -- responsible in at least thirteen instances of
overshipment and, accounting for approximately 31 million SYE, or
53 percent of total overshipments between 1980-1985.
-- Such errors include, for example, the failure of a
Customs officer to determine that the merchandise was
subject to quota or that the quota had been filled
prior to entry of the goods, or the failure of a
Commerce country analyst to recognize that import
controls on a specific, group or aggregate limit are
necessary.
3. Technical obstacles to adequate implementation of an
agreement -- responsible in 15 instances, and accounting 5.7
million SYE, or 10 percent, of the overshipments during that
period.
-- An example is the Philippine bilateral agreement, which
established separate limits for infants' garments for
most major apparel categories even though there had not
been adequate tariff annotations to identify these
products. Until an alternative method was found which
implemented this agreement without the use of TSUSA
annotations, it was not possible to accurately charge
imports to the limits as specified in the agreement.
In addition, U.S. Census data shows 43 instances of
overshipments from Hong Kong and Japan which totalled an
additional 42 million SYE during the six-year period. Hong Kong
and Japan, however, dispute the Census numbers, arguing that
their export data show no overshipments. Because of the large
number of entries involved, it has not been possible to reconcile
the data. We therefore cannot state with certainty whether Hong
Kong and Japan have overshipped, and accordingly these possible
overshipments are not included in the totals above. The U.S. has
not imposed import controls on Hong Kong and Japan.
V. TEXTILE FRAUD INITIATIVES
The circumvention of U.S. restraints under the MFA is the
primary target of U.S. Customs Service's efforts to stop textile
fraud. Because the U.S. system of controls is elaborate and
complex, it gives rise to significant opportunities for
fraudulent importation.
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Statistics maintained by the Customs Fraud Investigation
Center reveal that Customs currently has $242.5 million worth of
textiles and apparel under active investigation. The investi-
gations include Customs entries since 1981 and for which criminal
prosecution and civil penalty action is pending.
Current Schemes in Textile Trade Fraud
As the number and extent of the restraints on textile and
apparel imports have increased, ever more sophisticated schemes
for circumvention of import requirements have developed. Current
intelligence data, examination discoveries, laboratory analysis
results, and investigative findings have established that
importers are using the following methods to import fraudulently
shipments of textiles and apparel:
1. Misdescription: Garments are frequently misdescribed on
the import documents in order to qualify for a more available
quota. This practice may even include temporary modifications to
the articles themselves. There were 180 seizures, valued at
$16,166,892, of textile and apparel products in 1985 in which
misdescription was the scheme utilized. This represented 53.7%
of all textile and apparel seizures made during this time.
The narrowly-defined U.S. category system invites
misdescription in order to evade the quotas. Some of these
misdescriptions occur where quota levels are determined by the
age or gender of the wearer. In many instances, men's garments
have been invoiced as women's or unisex when the men's category
is filled. Women's garments are frequently described as men's
when the women's category is filled. In instances such as these,
a one-word change in the invoice description is all that is
required to effect this scheme.
Some examples of this practice include:
o Tacking flimsy liners of cotton twill shorts and
describing them as swimwear.
o Describing ladies maternity tops as dresses when they
weren't long enough to reach even the top of the thigh.
o Describing children's jogging suits as men's underwear
and undervaluing them so that the value would match the invoice
description.
o Loosely stitching panels to the bottom of polo-type
shirts, which were then described as dresses.
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o Loosely sewing bibs across the front of girls jeans
which were described as overalls, with entry attempted under a
visa for a basket category with a large quota. These garments
could not have been worn as imported.
o Stitching unfinished bibs on men's corduroy shorts and
describing them as boys rompers. The shorts were also under-
valued to bring the value in line with the invoice description.
The MFA provides that hand-loomed fabrics, products
hand-made from them, and traditional folklore products are to be
exempt from quota, provided that a certification arrangement is
agreed upon. From June 1984 through June 1985, Customs made 18
seizures covering over 250,000 items and valued in excess of
$750,000 for attempted fraudulent entry through misdescription
under this exemption. These figures do not include a much
greater volume of detained shipments for which the importers were
allowed to secure corrected visas or visa waivers prior to
release of the goods. Nor do these figures include the demands
for redelivery for shipments already released. Statistics are
not available for these latter two categories.
2. Understatement of Quantities or Weight: The
declaration of false quantities or weights to circumvent quota
and visa restrictions continues to be a common practice. Not
only does this minimize the payment of duty, but misrepresents
the actual amount charged to the quota, thereby effectively
circumventing the quantitative restraints. In 1985, there were
123 separate textile and apparel seizures, valued at $6,154,517,
in which the merchandise was understated as to quantity or
weight. This represented 36.6% of the textile and apparel
seizures made during this time.
3. Transshipment: Textile and apparel products can be
marked with a false country of origin and then shipped through a
country which has either no quota or available quota, making it
appear that the merchandise was produced in the intermediate
country. In 1985 there were 19 seizures of textile and apparel
products, valued at $2,280,695, in which transshipment was the
scheme employed. This represented 5.7% of the seizures made
during this time.
Although seizures under this scheme represent only 5.7% of
the seizures made, Customs estimates that this is one of the most
frequently used schemes involved in the fraudulent entry of
textiles and apparel. It is a very difficult scheme to prove and
very time consuming in that it involves investigation in many
different countries. Information on a particular transshipment
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is often not available to Customs until after release of the
goods.
A problem related to transshipment has been the minor
modification or finishing in one country of textiles and apparel
products that originated in another country, with the former
country claimed as the country of origin.
Pursuant to Executive Order 12475, issued on May 9, 1984,
CITA provided policy guidance to the Secretary of the Treasury in
issuing regulations to avoid circumvention of multilateral and
bilateral textile agreements and other provisions determined to
be necessary for the effective and equitable administration of
the textile program. It was under this authority that Treasury
and Customs promulgated new country of origin regulations for
textile and textile products. These regulations set forth
criteria to determine the correct country of origin of textile
products for quota purposes. These regulations were promulgated
on March 5, 1985 (T.D. 85-38).
4. False Fiber Content: As certain fibers are not subject
to the restraints of the MFA (i.e., linen, ramie, and silk),
fiber content is often falsely stated to avoid the import
restrictions. Laboratory analysis and extensive analysis of cost
data is required to determine correct fiber content. Because
shipments cannot be detained on mere suspicion, garments are
usually in distribution channels by the time that a determination
is made. In 1985, there were 14 seizures, valued at $1,420,365,
in which this scheme was utilized. This represented 4% of
textile and apparel seizures made during this time.
In August 1984, Custom field offices were directed to sample
and lab test products claimed to be silk, linen, ramie, or blends
thereof. Initially, 20% of the sampled shipments purporting to
be of non-MFA fibers failed the lab tests. Parenthetically, the
governments of the exporting countries subsequently provided visa
waivers for some of these shipments. As importers and shippers
realized that U.S. Customs was tightening its enforcement in
non-MFA fiber imports, the number of violations nationwide
decreased. It is also common for products made from MFA fibers,
such as cotton pants, to be described as being made from man-made
fibers when the cotton pants quota is closed, or vice versa.
Many exporters and importers are tempted to falsify the fiber
content on wool pants as cotton and utilize the cotton pants
quota.
5. Split Shipments: Many of our bilateral agreements
provide for an exemption from quota for commercial shipments
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valued at $250 or less. One way of circumventing visa
restrictions is to split larger commercial shipments into smaller
quantities valued at $250 or less in order to enter the
merchandise by means of a visa exempt certificate, thereby
avoiding the requirement for a valid debited visa. This practice
also allows the importer to utilize the informal entry
procedures, which are available for textile shipments valued at
$250 or less.
Investigation of the informal entries found widespread abuse
of the exempt certification through a variety of schemes designed
to circumvent the restraint levels. Customs also discovered
undervaluation and understatement of quantities on many of these
entries.
OPERATION SPLIT was conducted at six targeted Customs
international mail facilities from October 28 through November
30, 1985, to address the problems of splitting textile and
apparel mail shipments abroad in an attempt to avoid formal
Customs entry and applicable quota and visa requirements.
OPERATION SPLIT resulted in 600 detained parcels, 105 seizures,
and two criminal cases already accepted by the U.S. Attorney for
criminal prosecution.
A second survey was conducted from November 1 through
November 15, 1985, to determine the use of non-quota exempt
certifications for textile products entering the United States.
With only 43 ports responding, it was learned that 1,139 exempt
certifications were cleared each day, accounting for 2,173 dozen
garments per day. Extending this figure based upon a five-day
work week, over 500,000 dozen garments enter the United States
each year under exempt certifications, with no charges made to
quota.
As a result, Customs Directive 3500-06 of January 9, 1986,
which becomes effective March 9, 1986, requires the filing of a
formal entry on all shipments of textiles, regardless of value.
This Directive is necessary to address the increased abuses of
the under-$250 shipments and the circumvention of quota restraint
levels by many countries through the improper use of exempt
certifications.
6. Counterfeit Visas: Although not as common as the other
methods of textile fraud, this illegal practice has been detected
as a means to circumvent our bilateral textile agreements.
7. Cargo Manipulations: Restricted merchandise is often
packed in interior cartons within containers with non-restricted
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merchandise in exterior cartons to avoid detection through either
visual examination or even through sampling and laboratory
analysis.
Summary of Recent Accomplishments in the Textile Fraud Program
Fiscal year 1984 was a significant year for textile and
apparel seizures, showing a 300 percent increase in value of
these seizures over 1983. The seizures in FY 1984 removed $31
million in illegal goods from the U.S. market. Fiscal year 1985
resulted in 389 separate seizures valued at over $30
million. In 336 (86.4%) of these seizures, quota fraud was
involved. The seizures for quota fraud were valued at over $26
million.
In considering the problem of fraud, it would be a serious
oversight to fail to consider also the number of shipments which
are detained or upon which redelivery is ordered due-to lack of
compliance with textile restrictions (i.e., incorrect category,
incorrect fiber content, etc.). It would be no exaggeration to
state that detentions and redeliveries outnumber seizures by at
least 30 to 1. Although these actions are not included in
enforcement statistics, they are a very significant enforcement
effort in that failure to detect and force correction of these
errors would result in debiting incorrect restraint levels or, in
other cases, allowing unreported oversubscription of some levels.
Textile Seizures for Quota Fraud
FY-1985
Reason
Number
%
Dom. Value
8
1. Misdescription
180
53.7%
$16,666,892
62.1%
2. Understated Quanti-
ties and Weights
123
36.6%
6,154,517
23.6%
3. Transshipment
19
5.7%
2,280,695
8.8%
4. False Fiber
Contents
14
4.0%
1,420,365
5.4%
TOTALS
336
100.0%
$26,022,469
100.0%
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VI. ADMINISTRATIVE AND ENFORCEMENT DIFFICULTIES
Fiber Substitution
Non-MFA fibers (silk, ramie, and linen) are being
increasingly used in place of fibers under the MFA umbrella
(cotton, wool, and man-made fibers). From January through
November 1985, apparel imports of non-MFA fibers totalled 469
million SYE, from 245 million SYE during the same period last
year (109.5%).
Non-MFA Apparel
YTD/84
YTD/85
% of Change
H.K.
95.2
203.5
113.7
Korea
74.1
134.1
81.0
PRC
14.8-
54.3
266.2
Taiwan
18.2
35.5
95.1
TOTAL
245
469
109.5
Any form of fiber substitution may create an administrative
burden for U.S. Customs in that shipments must be scrutinized to
determine fiber content, a process that often requires laboratory
analysis.
Some fiber substitution may be a result of the textile
category system developed for the negotiation of bilateral
textile and apparel restraint agreements. For most products
(e.g., women's trousers) separate categories exist for each of
the three MFA fibers. When restraints are imposed, for instance
on a cotton product from a given country, exports are then
frequently developed in the corresponding man-made fiber
category.
Pure silk and linen are traditional fibers which were not
included in the MFA because they were not considered to be a
major factor in textile and apparel trade. Other fibers used in
non-apparel, such as jute, similarly were not considered during
the MFA negotiations. However, the possibility exists that
blends of some of these fibers, perhaps from silk waste, can be
used in place of an MFA apparel product and not charged to any
quota. Statistics are not available to differentiate between
pure silk and linen, and blends of these fibers.
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Moreover, statistical breakouts on non-MFA fibers are still
being refined, and data may be incomplete or misleading. For
example, statistics used for non-MFA fiber apparel may include
some leather products and such items as straw hats. Nonetheless,
according to available statistics, non-MFA apparel imports
excluding silk and silk blends totalled 417 million square yard
equivalents (SYE) in 1985, equalling 10 percent of MFA apparel
imports for the same period. As much as 65 percent of vegetable
fiber apparel imports other than cotton (i.e., linen and ramie)
occurred in sweaters.
Ramie is a fiber that has been used for many years to make
various products, particularly in China. However, its emergence
as an apparel fiber in the U.S. is a relatively new phenomenon.
Importers and retailers claim that ramie sweaters are
necessary to fill the growing U.S. demand for cotton-like knit
wear products. Domestic producers, they claim, are unable to
keep pace with this expanding market. Trade in ramie sweaters
may have also been spurred by the above-mentioned changes in the
country of origin rules, which no longer permit Hong Kong to
assemble sweaters subject to quota from panels knitted in China.
Therefore, Hong Kong and Chinese manufacturers may have had the
incentive to further develop the "ramie market" in the U.S. so
that they could continue their joint sweater operations.
It must be assumed that much of the increased trade in ramie
sweaters is a by-product of the quotas on cotton sweaters.
Ramie fiber is more expensive than cotton fiber, but according to
a major retailer speaking before the Importers and Retailers
Textiles Advisory Committee, it is increasingly being ordered by
retailers because these are no quota charges or concerns about
quotas.
The cotton sweater market has itself expanded greatly. From
1980 to 1984, domestic production of cotton sweaters increased
from 423,000 dozen to 2,950,000 dozen. At the same time, imports
increased from 507,000 dozen to 1,262,000 dozen and may reach
1,700,000 dozen when final 1985 figures are available.
During this time, quotas were negotiated with Hong Kong,
Korea, Taiwan, China and Malaysia. As a result, new suppliers
emerged in the U.S. market, such as Italy (which is now the
second largest supplier), Thailand, and India. Although Malaysia
has yet to export ramie sweaters to the U.S., the other suppliers
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with which the U.S. negotiated cotton sweater restraints have
become significant suppliers of ramie sweaters.
When the opportunity has arisen, agreements patterned after
our MFA bilaterals have been negotiated to cover non-MFA fibers.
Thus far we have negotiated a ramie agreement with Indonesia, a
ramie, linen and silk-blend agreement with Thailand; and an
all-fiber agreement with Israel.
Different requirements for countries; lack of standardized
agreements.
Under the MFA, the United States has negotiated 35 bilateral
restraint agreements and 25 visa agreements. Each of the 60
agreements has requirements that differ from the requirements in
every other agreement. This complicates the administration and
enforcement of the program and invites circumvention by foreign
manufactures, exporters, and U.S. importers through a variety of
schemes. As described above, these schemes include, but are not
limited to, the following: undervaluation, invoice misdescrip-
tions, transshipment through countries with under-utilized quotas
use of the under-$250 exemption and use of the folklore
exemption. Customs and CITA are working to develop standardized
bilateral quota and visa agreements to reduce the complexities
introduced by non-uniform agreements and close loopholes in the
program. However, much of the complexity is inherent in the
system itself, with its category-specific, country-specific
limits.
Cottage Industry/Folklore Exemption from Quota and Duty.
As discussed above, Article 12 of the Multi-Fiber
Arrangement provides an exemption allowing entry of developing
country exports of handloom fabrics of the cottage industry,
hand-made cottage industry products made of such handloom
fabrics, and traditional folklore handicraft textile products.
The folklore/handicraft exemption and the lack of uniformity
among the agreements that the U.S. has with 10 countries
exempting such merchandise produce administrative difficulties,
confusion, and opportunity for fraud.
Lack of Foreign Government Assistance in Enforcement and
Administration.
Difficulties in obtaining the assistance of our trading
partners have impeded the Customs Service's efforts to control
certain fraudulent practices in textile trade. The most
significant instances of noncooperation have occurred when
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Customs has sought assistance in controlling and uncovering
transshipments of textiles and apparel to evade quota
restrictions.
Many textile-producing countries make no real effort to
monitor or control diversions of their products through third
countries, often claiming that such problems are beyond their
control or not their responsibility. Certain other countries
that are not subject to quotas or that have under-utilized quotas
have been used as transshipment points and are often unwilling to
assist U.S. Customs in investigating the fraudulent practices.
Another problem in controlling fraud involves importations
into the United States through the use of incorrect visas. It is
occasionally difficult for the highly trained experts of U.S.
Customs to classify certain garments and assign them to their
proper quota category. These complex classification questions
cannot be any less difficult for the manufacturers and government
officials of the developing countries of the world. As a result,
when Customs detects such a problem it routinely detains the
shipment until the importer obtains from the exporting country's
government a corrected visa for the shipment.
However, even in cases in which false information has been
entered on a visa intentionally, exporting countries have
nevertheless validated shipments by issuing corrected visas.
Accordingly, there is little or no disincentive to engage in such
a practice, and quotas are successfully evaded when the false
information on the visa goes undetected.
Textile TSUS Items Under Import Control
The U.S. Customs Service Quota Section has import controls
on approximately 40% of the categories eligible for restraint.
The remaining categories are monitored by the Commerce Department
through Census Bureau data. The existing import controls require
Customs field offices and Headquarters to process more than
1,080,000 transactions a year. Processing all transactions
through the Quota Section would increase this workload to
3,000,000 transactions per year, thus requiring an increase in
Customs staffing.
When CITA does direct Customs to control additional
categories, the quota period is often retroactive, thereby
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necessitating after-the-fact charges against the new category.
These charges are obtained from Census Bureau printouts, which
contain data that is months old. Thus the categories often can
be overfilled by the time the after-the-fact charges are
transmitted to Customs.
Section 807 Textile and Apparel Shipments
Section 807 of the Tariff Schedules provides for the
duty-free re-entry of U.S. goods incorporated in foreign products
("American goods returned"). The American Textile Manufacturer's
Institute (ATMI) and various members of the domestic industry had
submitted statistics to Customs reflecting that far more
merchandise entered the United States with duty-free benefits
under the provisions of 807 than had been exported from the
United States for assembly under this provision.
Customs analyzed the import and export statistics submitted
by ATMI and the domestic industry. The analysis of the data
revealed a number of errors, and as a result, it is likely that
the problem has been overstated. Nevertheless, Customs has
intensified its enforcement efforts with regard to Section 807.
Specifically, Customs has directed its Regulatory Audit Division
to set up audits of companies using 807 provisions for wearing
apparel, with an emphasis on exported material versus the
imported product.
Fifteen firms importing 807 textile and apparel products
have been nominated for regulatory audit review during 1986.
There are currently two cases on 807 garments from Mexico where
the fabric may, in fact, be of Asian origin. Most of the 807
investigations and audits that have been completed, however, have
revealed violations on the dutiable costs and loss of revenue, as
opposed to discovering the use of foreign fabric.
In 1985, Customs sent alerts to the field offices which
receive the bulk of the 807 importations covering the categories
targeted by ATMI. Another precaution has been requests for more
frequent examination of overseas production plants utilizing 807
provisions by our foreign attache offices. Customs has also
requested the assistance of domestic industry contacts in
identifying potential 807 fraud.
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TEXTiLZ AND APPAM D&W ANALYSIS
Calendar Yiar 1985
Ccepared to Calendar Year 1980
70ML: 10,845 million BD; in Cy 1985, up 5,961 million SYE or a
1229 increase from CY 1980.
Apparel: 5,133 million BYE in CY 1985, up 2,249 million SYE
or a 78.0% increase froe CY 1980. 3,712 million SYE
Textile: 5,712 million BYE in CY 1985, up
or a 1868 increase from CF 1980.
BIG mm: 3,784 million SYE, up 1,574 million BYE or a 71.28
increase over CY 1980. the Big Three accounted for
26.4% of the total increase fr m 1980 to 1985.
CHM: 977 million sm. up 652 million SYE or a 201% increase over
of 1980. China aooamted for 10.98 of the total growth
from 1980 to 1985.
JAPAN: 716 million SYE, up 255 million BYE or a 55.4% increase
from CY 1980. Japan's growth was 4.3% of the total growth
from 1980 to 1985.
0?C~: 2 014 million SYE. up 1,468 million SYE or a 269%
(era ludes increase from CY 1980. The 08In Contributed 24.6% of the
Japan) total growth from 1980 to 1985.
AGUMKW O W1R>'ESS: 2,886 million SYE, up 1,822 million SYE
or a 171% increase from CY 1980. Other agreement Countries
accounted for 30.6% of the total grwth from 1980 to 1985.
NETT STARTERS: 470 million SYE, up 190 million SYE or a 68.1%
increase from CY 1980. New starters accounted for
3.2% of the total increase from 1980 to 1985.
Cr 1980
Cif 1985
Total
4884.4
10845.4
Apparel
2884.1
5132.9
Textiles
2000.2
5712.5
Big free
2209.6
3783.9
Chin
324.7
976.5
Japan
460.5
715.7
546.0
2013.7
0. Agree C.
1064.2
2886.0
New Start.
279.3
469.6
Data for 1980 does not include flatgoods.
Prepared by
Off Ice of Textiles and Apparel
January 27, 1986
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NON-WA Fiber textiles and Apparel Import Analysis
Janoiary - December 1985
Non-WA Fibers
Total: 2.0 billion sye, up 90 msye or a 4.8% increase from the same
period last year.
Textiles: 1433 msye, down 194 msye. a 11.9% decrease.
Apparel: 536 msye, up 284 msye or a 112.7% increase.
Big Three:
China:
OECD:
EEC:
428 msye, up 216.8% msye, a 102.6%
increase.
62 msye, up 44.9 ^sye, a 264.9%
increase.
18 msye, up 6.0 msye, a 48.0%
increase.
13 msye, up 5.4 msye, a 69.3%
increase.
Major Non-WA Fiber Apparel Suppliers
WA Apparel
Non-WA Apparel
Country
YTD/84 YTD/85
SCCh
YTD/84
YTD/85
SCh~
Hong Kong
814.3 824.9
1.3
108.8
230.0
230.0
Korea
684.7 672.3
-1.8
80.7
156.6
94.2
China
444.6 421.7
-5.1
17.0
61.9
264.9
Taiwan
931.1 958.6
2.9
21.8
41.5
90.1
Major Products/Country
1984
1985
%Change
%Share
Non-WA Sweaters
166.5
340.2
104.3
63.4
Hong Kong
33.2
135.2
307.2
Korea
15.5
81.6
426.5
Prepared by OTEXA/IAMD
January 27, 1986
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Attachment 3
1980 OYERSHIPMENTS BY CATEGORY/COUNTRY
-
(I IMU
M
Country
Category
Oversnipment Percent
Reason
Hong Kong
334
96
100.8
(*)
Hong Kong
338pt339pt
444
102.4
(*)
Hong Kong
347/348
2,352
102.3
(*)
Hong Kong
641
161
101.5
(*)
Hong Kong
350
569
111.7
(*)
Hong Kong
447
48
116.3
(*)
Hong Kong
3,670
Pakistan
317
308
104.7
(1)
Pakistan
339pt
10
101.0
(3)
Pakistan
318
Philippines
443
30
125.5
(3)
Philippines
348pt
316
108.0
(3)
Philippines
346
Taiwan
604
245
109.0
(1)
Malaysia
338
136
110.3
(1)
Mexico
345
3
100.4
(2)
Thailand
445/446
76
132,0
(1)
TOTAL 1980 OVERSHIPMENTS 4,794
*This issue is discussed in the text
Prepared by OTEXA/IAMD
January 1986
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1981 OVERSHIPMENTS BY CATEGORY/COUNTRY
te
or
C
Overshi mp ent
Percent
g
y
a
Count
Colombia 435
7
102.2
(1)
Hong Kong 347/348
289
100.3
(*)
Korea Aggregate
6,536
100.9
(1)
a Group II
K
5,437
100.9
ore
Korea 4 7
83
104.3
(1)
Korea
12.056
Macau 338
5
100.5
(1)
Macau 641
67
106.1
(1)
Macau
72
kistan 339pt 33
P
101.8
(3)
a
Pakistan 347 107
115.3
(1)
Pakistan
140
ines 431 5
Phili
104.3
(3)
pp
Philippines 341pt 290
130.8
(3)
ines
Phili
295
pp
Singapore 320
136
102.2
(1)
Taiwan 351
626
107.6
(1)
TOTAL 1981 OVERSHIPMENTS
13,620
*This issue is discussed in the text
Prepared by OTEXA/IAMD
January 1986
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1982 OVERSHIPMENTS BY CATEGORY/COUNTRY
(is( SYE)
Country
Category
Overshipment
Percent
Reason
Hong Kong
338pt/339pt
572
103.0
(*)
Hong Kong
345
678
105.6
(*)
Hong Kong
445/446
1,586
109.2
(*)
Hong Kong
645/646
1,241
102.7
(*)
Hong Kong
444
3
100.5
(*)
Hong Kong
4,080
Korea
345
307
115.9
(1)
Philippines
333/334
509
113.9
(3)
Romania
338pt
98
114.0
(1)
Taiwan
313
665
101.6
(1)
Thai 1 and
644
256
136.5
(1)
TOTAL 1982 OVERSHIPMENTS 5,916
This issue is discussed in the text
Prepared by OTEXA/IAMD
January 1986
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1983 OVE4ZSHIPMEN1S BY CATDGORY/COURM
(1000 SYE)
County
Category
Overshipment
i Filled
Reason
Hong Kong
333/4
669
104.6
(*)
338/9
1296
106.9
(*)
340
1896
103.2
(*)
341
1217
103.4
(*)
345
1614
114.1
(*)
347/8
5310
105.1
(*)
444
83
113.3
(*)
445/6
2172
112.9
(*)
447/8
90
109.6
(*)
633/4/5
1227
103.2
(*)
638/9
2970
104.5
(*)
640
888
105.6
(*)
641
966
109.1
(*)
645/6
1641
103.7
(*)
648
647
104.0
(*)
336
31
100.4
(*)
442
11
100.9
(*)
459
5
100.6
(*)
642
82
103.5
(*)
649
109
104.4
(*)
HONG KCMG
22,924
JAPAN
612
6851
102.7
(*)
KOREA
300
309
111.7
(1)
MACAO
345
218
131.1
(2)
MEXICO
604Pt
2049
165.7
(2)
444
71
170.8
(2)
632
683
197.5
(2)
MEXICO
2,803
PHILIPPINES
348nt
14
100.2
(3)
637nt
4252
539.5
(3)
PHILIPPINES
4.276
ROMANIA
443
5
101.1
(1)
TAIWAN
350
513
111.1
(1)
650
130
106.0
(1)
669ppbags
371
109.5
(1)
TARN
1,014
TOTAL 1983 OVERSHIPMERM 38 , 400
*This issue is discussed in the text.
Prepared by CrTF,XA/IAM
February 5, 1985
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1984 (1
HIPMENIS BY 00(Rd1RYit CRY
(1000 SYE)
OOUNIRY
CATDGORY
OVFRSEIIPMENT
% FILLED
REASON
BRAZIL
604
2,128
246.2
(2)
COMA
340
70
110.0
(1)
HONG KONG
336
152
102.4
(*)
342
194
102.7
(*)
345
1281
111.1
(*)
633/4
234
101.6
(*)
640
830
105.2
(*)
641
168
101.6
(*)
644
22
101.6
(*)
HONG KONG
2,881
JAPAN
444
14
101.5
(*)
631w
387
146.4
l*)
634
319
110.8
(*)
JAPAN
720 -
KOREA
614w
657
107.7
(1)
659s
280
113.5
(1)
670L
1,792
103.5
(1)
KOREA
2,729
MACAO
351
66
109.4
(1)
438
3
102.8
(1)
MACAO
69
MEXICO
359-0
175
104.2
(1)
443
81
142.9
(2)
MEXICO
256
PHILIPPINES
345
118
112.7
(3)
634
524
106.1
(3)
669 190
PHILIPPINES 832
U3.7
(3)
SINGAPQRE
337
42
106.2
(1)
TAIWAN
333/4
32
101.2
(2)
341
119
102.1
(2)
350
236
104.9
(2)
633/4/5
430
100.7
(2)
645/6
172
100.1
(2)
670F
7,936
146.3
(2)
TAIWAN
8,925
THAILAND
GROUP II
18,560
122.0
(2)
TOTAL 1984 WERSHIPMEN S 37,212
*This issue is discussed in the text.
Prepared by OTEXWIAMD
January 1986
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KNOWN 1/ OYERSHIPMENTS OF 1985 LIMITS
(Census data - 10/31, Customs Data - 12/13)
(1,000 SYE)
COUNTRY
CATEGORY
SYE OVERSHIPPED
S FILLED
REASON
Brazil
604
283
115%
(2)
Spain
604
767
121%
(2)
Turkey
340
1,565
148%
(1)
Hong Kong
444
21
104%
Japan
442
18
1014
Japan
631W
46
104%
Japan
64
Philippines
442
30
125%
(2)
Mexico
447
18
117%
(2)
Mexico
340
440
110%
(2)
Mexico
659
6,970
139%
(2)
Mexico
7,428
Thailand
GROUP
4,310
105%
(2)
TOTAL
14,729
1/1985 export data not considered complete until April 1986..
T This issue is discussed in text.
Prepared by OTEXA/IAMD
January 1986
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/31: CIA-RDP88GO1117ROO0602140003-5
Attad in t 4
1983 10 1985 RESTRAINT ACTIONS
1983
19B4
1984+
1985
101AL
TOTAL'
----------------------------- - --------
- ---- - -- - -- - -- - -- - ------
ALL COUNTRIES 7.3
56.8 5.5
6.6
21.5
6.6
THE 816 THREE
8.7
229.8
6.9
7.5
44.1
8.1
CHINA
6.4
- 2.2
24.8
8.6
EIPIRED ABREERENT 3 (BRAZIL)
4.3
4.3
OTHER COUNTRIES
3.1
5.8
4.8
4.9
I/ The isport to production percentage 14663.9 1) for category 670PT for Taiwan in 1981 is excluded.
OTEIA/IAD February 4th, 1966.
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1915 RESTRAINT ACTIONS
PRODUC- IW$TS AS
IMPORTS l1PDRTS
PRODUCTION 110N
1 OF
CAT. .
COJNTR
CALL LEVEL UK115
LEVEL UNITS
PRODUCTION
301
TAIWAN
352,420 LIS
25,131,000 LBS
1.41 E
301 PT.
THAILAND
3,756,162 LIS
25,131,000 LIS
14.51
310/318
SUATERALA
4,138,429 SYD
183,329,000 SYD
2.71
310/318
JAPAN
15,332,408 SYD
151,987,000 SYD
10.11
310/318
TAIWAN
4,041,284 SYD
151,987,000 SYD
2.71 E
3101311
PORTUGAL
6,733,536 SYD
151,987,000 SYD
4.41
313
INDIA
11,517,319 SYD
325,256,000 SYD
3.51
313
TURKEY
12,713,472 SYD
325,256,000 SYD
3.92
313
JAPAN
4,172,283 SYD
299,000,000 SYD
1.71
315
BRAZIL
11,475,558 SYD
425,486,000 SYD
2.71
315
INDIA
5,687,641 SYD
450,000,000 SYD
1.31
317T
TURKEY
6,441,771 SYD
128,000,000 SYD
5.02
3175
BRAZIL
7,324,755 SYD
45,612,000 SYD
16.11
334
BANGLADESH
31,068 802
670,000 802
4.61
335
IANSLADESH
14,010 102
525,000 DOI
16.01
335
BRAZIL
21,076 101
742,000 DOI
2.11
335
SOUTH AFRICA
25,925 802
525,000 D02
4.91
335
TURKEY
37,322 101
742,000 802
5.01
335
URUGUAY
32,201 D02
525,000 DOZ
6.11
336
INDONESIA
29,361 002
3,900,000 002
0.81
337
INDONESIA
41,804 801
3,361,000 D01
1.21
337
BRAZIL
59,433 801
3,361,000 D02
1.81
337
THAILAND
74,381 102
3,361,000 DOI
2.21
337
SRI LANKA
79,903 102
2,531,000 101
3.21
337
NEPAL
56,188 001
2,531,000 DOI
2.31
33819
BRAZIL
444,078 801
14,948,000 101
3.02
338
SRI LANKA
218,165 102
8,073,000 D02
2.71
339
PORTUGAL
257,153 101
4,735,000 101
5.41
339
TURKEY
320,172 101
5,125,000 DOI
6.31
340
BANGLADESH
212,011 101
4,735,000 101
4.51
340
JAPAN
79,627 102
5,125,000 101
1.61
340
PORTUGAL
133,733 102
5,125,000 802
2.61
340
TURKEY
134,629 101
4,735,000 002
2.81
340
NEPAL
132,527 102
5,125,000 001
2.61
340
YUGOSLAVIA
147,576 101
4,735,000 802
3.11
342
KOREA
63,176 102
2,027,000 101
3.21 E
347/8
BANGLADESH
615,044 801
40,895,000 DOI
1.51
347/8
SOUTH AFRICA
246,159 801
40,895,000 802
0.61
348
TURKEY
389,682 102
15,191,000 DO1
2.61
350
BRAZIL
51,150 D02
571,000 101
9.01
350
KOREA
12,221 101
741,000 801
1.61 E
352
TAIWAN
585,792 101
67,000,000 102
0.91 E
352
KOREA
96,959 DOI
71,300,000 101
0.11 E
3591659 CHINA 4,438,701 LIS
6,425,000 DOZ
a
359H KOREA 4,122,889 LIS
6,425,000 DOI
a E
359V CHINA 879,414 LIS
29,000 802
a
3591 CHINA 1,112,732 LIS
2,569,000 D02
a
3591 TAIWAN 983,876 LIS
6,425,000 101
a E
360 CHINA 226,410 LIS
259,000 101
a
if
PfITIICAI
135.507 101
250.000 101
54.21
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1985 RESTRAIN! ACTION!
PRODUC? IMPORTS AS
tAT.
COUNTRY
IMPORTS IMPORTS
CALL LEVEL UNITS
PRODUCTION TION
LEVEL UNITS
IOF
PRODUCTION
360
TAIWAN
58,978 D02
203,000 002
29.11 E
_
360
HONG KONG
70,090 002
203,000 007
34.51 E
361
DRA21L
37,500 002
1,014,000 102
3.71
361
CHINA
205,758 DO!
174,000 DO!
23.51
361
ISRAEL
52,205 DOI
1,014,000 101
5.11
361
PORTUGAL
248,370 DOI
1,014,000 101
24.51
361
TAIWAN
67,139 101
727,000 D02
9.31 E
361
TURKEY
15,756 102
174,000 101
1.11
361
NONE KONG
57,383 DOI
174,000 001
6.61 1
363
BRAZIL
1,020,780 102
41,037,000 DOI
2.41
363
SRI LANKA
5,172,883 DOI
472,512,000 002
1.11
363
TAIWAN
8,460,920 D02
472,512,000 DO!
1.81 E
369L
CHINA
3,320,320 LBS
5,157,000 LBS
64.41
3695
SRI LANKA
741,929 LBS
137,600,000 NOS
369S
MALAYSIA
800,000 LBS
137,600,000 NOS
a
3696
TAIWAN
1,852,291 LBS
5,157,000 LBS
35.91 E
433
SOUTH AFRICA
5,244 DOI
485,000 DOI
1.11
434
YUGOSLAVIA
7,603 DO!
314,000 DOI
2.42
434
THAILAND
7,071 DOI
292,000 DO1
2.41
435
YUGOSLAVIA
32,555 DO!
1,269,000 801
2.61
436
TAIWAN
3,832 D02
312,000 DOI
1.21 E
440
HONE KONG
12,490 DOI
623,000 DOI
2.01 E
440
TAIWAN
1,151 DOI
110,000 DO1
7.41 E
442
TAIWAN
31,047 DOZ
1,045,000 DOZ
3.01 E
442
URUGUAY
16,775 DO!
1,045,000 DO1
1.6t
44;
TAIWAN
3,482 DO!
285,000 DOZ
1.21 E
44E
YUGOSLAVIA
22,933 D02
800,000 DOI
2.91
446
PORTUGAL
29,916 DOI
752,000 DOI
4.01
604A
BRAZIL
376,227 LBS
35,772,000 LIS
1.12
604A
SOUTH AFRICA
580,000 LBS
35,772,000 LIS
1.61
604A
PORTUGAL
573,563 LBS
35,772,000 LIS
1.61
604
SOUTH AFRICA
966,346 LIS
35,712,000 LBS
2.71
605 0
KOREA
531,633 LIS
15,106,000 LIS
3.51 E
6051
CHINA
248,117 LBS
14,700,000 LIS
1.71
611
KOREA
1,669,935 SYD
102,000,000 SYD
1.61 E
611
TAIWAN
1,001,210 SYD
102,142,000 SYD
1.02 E
613C
INDONESIA
4,981,714 SYD
79,600,000 SYD
6.31
6130
MALAYSIA
8,020,078 SYD
69,500,000 SYD
11.51
614P
INDONESIA
2,953,271 SYD
70,086,000 SYD
4.21
632
KOREA
1,654,116 DPR
266,079,000 OPR
0.61 E
632
TAIWAN
3,305,414 DPR
266,079,000 DPR
1.22 E
634
MALAYSIA
129,934 DPR
4,595,000 DPR
2.81
635
MALAYSIA
94,960 DOI
4,632,000 DOI
2.11
637
HONG KONG
142,007 101
4,923,000 DOI
2.91 E
640
BANGLADESH
237,569 102
9,449,000 001
2.51
640
THAILAND
374,516 101
10,217,000 DO1
3.71
645/6
INDONESIA
192,472 10?
7,368,000 DOI
2.61
645/6
MALAYSIA
128,237 001
7,192,000 DOI
1.81
646
JAPAN
124,814 DOZ
4,950,000 DOI
2.51
647
SRI LANKA
3339354 DOI
20,074,000 101
1.71
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/31: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000602140003-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/31: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000602140003-5
1915 RESTRAINT A:TiONS PRODUC- IMPDRTS AS
IMPORTS IMPORTS PRODUCTION TION l OF
CAT. COUNTRY CALL LEVEL UNITS LEVEL UNITS PRODUCTION
-------------------------------------- - ---------- - -------------- - ------------
6/C
BRA21L
190,041 101
21,641,000 DOI
0.91
648
INDONESIA
894,804 DO1
21,641,000 101
4.11
648
JAPAN
3541,124 DOI
21,641,000 DOI
1.61
648
NALAYSIA
349,829 102
21,641,000 102
1.61
651
CHINA
324,449 001
19,055,000 DOI
1.71
651
7AINAN
332,415 001
19,055,000 DOI
1.71 E
652
CHINA,
1,235,609 D02
39,783,000 DO1
3.11
6591
CHINA
1,001,981 LBS
3,854,000 002
a
670P1
CHINA
12,042,605 LBS
22,041,000 LBS
54.61 E
67OFT
HONE KONS
6,246,119 LIS
30,000,000 LBS
20.81 E
670PT
TAIWAN
3,641,138 LBS
24,373,000 LBS
14.91 E
670PT
KOREA
2,618,256 LBS
22,041,00t LIS
11.91 E
---------------------------------- - ------------------
if Production and import data not available in Comparable units of leisure.
E/ Import call level is E's issued.
LTA/OTEIA January 31st. 1986.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/31: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000602140003-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/31: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000602140003-5
1914 RESIRAINI ACTIONS
PRODUC- IMPORTS AS
IMPORTS IMPORTS
CALL LEVEL UNITS
PRODUCTION TION
LEVEL UNITS
19
PRODUCTION
300/301
KOREA
2,799,520 LOS
122,203,000 LIS
2.31 E
310/318
INDIA
4,001,753 SYD
183,329,000 SYD
2.21
313
EGYPT
9,755,663 SYD
281,715,000 5YD
3.51
313
MALAYSIA
9,012,111 SYD
325,000,000 SYO
2.11
314
JAPAN
10,480,770 SYD
73,300,000 SYD
14.31
317
PERU
1,173,427 SYD
126, 780, 000 SYD
6.41
317
INDONESIA
3,176,364 SYO
126,780,000 SYD
3.11
319
INDDNESIA
4,096,546 SYD
93,625,000 SYD
4.41
3l9
PERU
15,076,495 SYD
93,625,000 SYO
16.11
32OPT
CHINA
6,251,330 SYD
394,966,000 SYD
1.61
320P7
INDONESIA
3,265,210 SYD
470,421,000 SYD
0.71
334
INDIA
28,466 DOI
109,000 DOI
3.51
334
INDONESIA
16,972 002
670,000 DOI
2.51
334
JAPAN
16,744 DOZ
109,000 101
2.11
334
PAKISTAN
26,400 D07
109,000 DOI
3.31
335
PAKISTAN
29,866 D02
647,000 002
4.61
336
SRI LAN-:A
35,954 D01
3,404,000 D0I
1.12
337
HONE KONG
409,424 DOI
3,194,0% DOI
12.81 E
337
KOREA
33,066 101
3,363,000 DOI
1.01 E
337
INDIA
69,346 10I
3,194,000 002
2.21
337
JAPAN
62,585 DOI
3,194,000 D01
2.01
338
INDONESIA
184,788 DOI
15,905,000 DOZ
1.21
339
Ski LANIA
335,508 DO1
7,386,000 DO!
4.51
339
INi;JI~_SIA
170,146 002
7,386,000 DOI
2.31
340
MAURITIUS
100,756 D01
4,735,000 002
2.11
345
MALAYSIA
49,134 80I
1,372,000 80I
3.61
350
HAITI
18,754 DOZ
518,000 002
3.61
350
INDIA
15,880 802
518,000 001
3.11
350.
PAt:ISIAN
14,400 801
518,000 002
2.11
352
KOREA
84,952 101
60,661,000 80I
0.11 E
359?T
CHINA
553,885 LOS
650,000 80I
a
359FT
INDIA
111,059 002
650,000 102
17.11
359PT
HONG KONS
1,757,912 LOS
308,000 00I
E
359F1
HONG KONG
5,662,952 LOS
2,469,000 DOI
E
359P1
INDIA
728,410 LOS
205,000 DOI
a
359PT
TAIWAN
947,730 LOS
29,000 DOZ
E
359PT
HONG KONG
784,347 LOS
650,000 DOZ
a E
359PT
1AIMAN
190,324 LIS
650,000 80I
a E
359P1
HONG KONG
1,132,581 LBS
128,560,000 NOS
E
369PT
CHINA
4,296,657 LOS
128,560,000 NOS
a
369PT
PERU
615,102 LDS
128,560,000 NOS
a
410
CHINA
1,563,447 SYD
115,474,0% SYD
1.41
410
URUGUAY
1,185,000 SYD
115,474,000 SYD
1.01
433
HONG KONG
2,631 80I
373,000 DOI
0.71 E
433
URUGUAY
10,915 802
402,000 DOI
2.71
433
YUGOSLAVIA
3,184 80I
373,000 DOI
0.91
434
CHINA
5,841 801
315,000 002
1.91
434
URUGUAY
9,636 802
315,000 801
3.11
435
URUGUAY
31,733 801
1,095,000 DOI
2.92
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/31: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000602140003-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/31: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000602140003-5
1914 RESTRAINT ACTIONS
MtODUC- IMPORTS AS
CAT.
IMPORTS IMPORTS PRODUCTION 110N to
COUNTRY CALL LEVEL UN175 LEVEL UNITS PRODUCTION
-
------------
-----------------------------------------
-
9
0 DO1
11
211
2
436 ?
CHINA
6,320 107
5,00
2
.
61 E
3
436
KOREA
10,545 002
295,000 Vol
.
72 E
0
436
TAINAN
1,926 107
295,000 DOI
.
9
11 E
438
KOREA
42,046 DOI
423,000 101
.
01 E
7
438
10.1NkN
34,863 DOI
500,000 Vol
.
71
4
438P1
THAILAND
1,398 801
178,000 001
.
31
1
442
CHINA
18,230 102
1,359,000 DOI
.
11
5
444
CHINA
9,074 DO1
178,000 DOI
.
4
32
444
YUGOSLAVIA
7,626 102
178,000 001
.
41
2
445
BRAZIL
22,954 DOI
945,000 DOI
.
21
0
445
HUNEARY
1,501 DOI
945,000 D02
.
11
445
INDIA
10,984 D02
1,017,000 DOZ
1.
11
3
446
DOM. REPUB:IC
19,550 802
623,000 DOI
.
21
446
INDIA
20,240 101
623,000 301
3.
a
459PT
KOREA
455,968 LOS
128,000 DO1
4
31
604
JAPAN
5,531,034 LBS
38,719,000 LBS
.
1
21
2
404
SPAIN
857,396 LIS
38,319,000 LBS
.
31
604P1
TURKEY
476,014 LIS
35,323,000 LBS
1.
21 E
1
605P1
NONE KOHl
468,691 LIS
5,705,000 LBS
.
51 E
15
605P1
TAINAN
882,442 LIS
5,705,000 LBS
.
81
5
605PI
THAILAND
331,074 LIS
5,704,000 LIS
.
14
61
611
JAPAN
14,772,228 SYD
101,402,000 SYD
.
01
4
613PT
CHINA
14,411,465 SYD
361,000,000 SYD
.
81 E
0
614
KOREA
11,690,808 SYD
1,494,508,000 SYD
.
9
91
631P1
INDONESIA
100,000 DPR
502,000 DPR
.
1
41
15
631P1
PAV1ETkk
72,256 DFF
470,000 DPR
.
47
61
631PT
PAKISTAN
238,750 DPR
502,000 DPR
.
0
41
631PT
JAPAN
202,851 DPR
502,000 DPR
4
.
22
634
JAPAN
59,672 101
5,121,000 DOI
1.
9
637
CHINA
101,185 D01
5,354,000 DOI
1?
2
E
637
NONE KOKS
92,304 101
5,354,000 DOI
1.71
3
638
CHINA
435,649 DOI
32,586,000 801
1
1.
2
639
INDONESIA
236,391 DOl
22,474,000 DOI
1.1
640
INDONESIA
170,746 101
11,521,000 DO1
1.51
640
INDONESIA
208,114 002
10,217,000 002
2.01
1
641
JAPAN
171,998 D0I
17,602,000 DOI
1.0
21
2
643
CHINA
18,899 Sol
175,000 DOZ
.
644
CHINA
8,432 101
878,000 DO1
1.01
644
JAPAN
13,071 D01
878,000 DO1
1.52
446
JAPAN
86,434 002
5,306,000 DO1
1.61
649
CHINA
485,440 802
18,495,000 DOZ
2.61
649
BARBADOS
539,348 DOI
18,495,000 DO!
2.91
649
HONE KONG
399,498 DOZ
18,495,000 DOI
2.21 E
E
650
HONE KONS
64,104 101
3,022,000 D02
2.11
651
HONE KONG
227,430 101
18,400,000 DOZ
1.21 E
652
HONG KONG
2,847,670 DOZ
62,100,000 DOI
4.62 E
652
TAINAN
1,237,130 DOZ
65,738,000 DOZ
1.91 E
659PT
NONE KONG
258,196 LIS
604,000 DO1
a E
659PT
TAIWAN
3,369,343 LBS
3,704,000 Doi
? E
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/31: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000602140003-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/31: CIA-RDP88G01117R000602140003-5
1914 RESTRAINT ACTIONS
PRODUC- *W TS AS
IMPORTS 1NPORIS PRODUC110N 11ON I OF
CAI. COUNTRY CALL LEVEL UNITS LEVEL UNITS PROIUCIION
-???---- ???---------------- ------?-?????._???..------?--?-??.-..-.-_
659P1
NONE EONS
344,574 LIS
5,678,000 102
? E
659PT
NONE KOLAS
111,228 LIS
106,490,000 DOI
E
659?1
1A1WAN
473,083 LIS
604,000 DOI
o E
659PT
KOREA
416,889 LIS
5,671,000 102
? E
659PT
TAINAi
4,019,462 LIS
5,678,000 DOI
a E
659PT
TAIWAN
1,446,243 1102
2,061,000 D02
a E
670P1
KOREA
11,435,270 LIS
33,401,000 LIS
55.21
670PI
TAIWAN
23,211,071 LIS
520,000 LIS
4463.11
a/ Production and laport data got available is toaparable units of Measure.
E1 Isport call level is E's issued.
ITA!OTEIA January 31st. 1986.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/31: CIA-RDP88G01117R000602140003-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/31: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000602140003-5
PRODUC- IMPORTS AS
CAT.
COUNTRY
IMPORTS IMPORTS
CALL LEVEL UNITS
PRODUCTION TION
LEVEL UNITS
1 OF
PRODUCTION
300/301
E6YPT
6,122,719 LIS
188, 983,000 LIS
3.21
300/301
KOREA
3,069,350 LDS
188,983,000 LBS
1.61 E
313
CHINA
38,771,418 SYD
101,191,000 SYD
38.11
313
KOREA
25,576,906 SYD
278,416,000 5Y0
9.22 E
313
NONE, KONG
41,131,946 SYD
278,416,000 510
14.11 E
314
NONE KONG
5,117,191 SYD
73,000,000 SYD
1.01 E
314
KOREA
1,418,006 SYD
79,679,000 810
1.11 E
314
TAIWAN
3,033,640 SYD
79,679,000 SYD
3.81 E
315
NONE KONG
6,395,180 SYD
394,382,000 SYD
1.61 E
315
INDONESIA
9,365,039 SYD
394,382,000 SYD
2.42
315
KOREA
12,560,652 SYD
394,382,000 518
3.21 E
315
TAIWAN
20,738,611 SYD
409,657,000 518
5.11 E
317
CHINA
6,706,249 SYD
795,097,000 510
0.82
317
EGYPT
6,223,000 SYD
795,097,000 SYD
0.81
317
KOREA-
10,388,000 SYD
717,917,000 SYD
1.31 E
317
TAIWAN
13,778,582 SYD
787,917,000 SYD
1.71 E
318
HONG KONE
855,051 SYD
65,875,000 SYD
1.31 E
318
TAIWAN
2,954,654 SYD
65,875,000 SYD
4.51 E
319
KOREA
6,574,604 SYD
100,446,000 SYD
6.51 E
319
NONE KONG
25,102,266 SYD
100,446,000 SYD
25.01 E
319
TAIWAN
16,321,048 SYD
100,446,000 SYD
16.21 E
320
KOREA
28,672,367 SYD
1,846,203,000 SYD
1.61 E
320
TAIWAN
68,682,713 SYD
1,846,203,000 SYD
3.71 E
331
INDONESIA
246,582 BPR
18,105,000 DPR
1.41
335
INDONESIA
32,814 D02
647,000 D02
5.11
336
CHINA
72,268 002
3,073,000 DOI
2.41
336
KOREA
30,635 002
3,885,000 801
0.82 E
336
HAITI
63,893 DOI
3,885,000 00I
1.61
336
HONG KONG
135,732 DOI
3,885,000 102
3.51 E
336
TAIWAN
639041 D02
3,885,000 802
1.61 E
336
PAKISTAN
829220 802
3,194,000 102
2.62
337
HONE KONG
591,979 101
3,194,000 801
18.52 E
338
TURKEY
264, 020 002
16,456,000 802
1.62
341
INDONESIA
234,064 102
5,296,000 002
4.41
341
NALAYSIA
180,721 801
4,317,000 102
4.21
342
TAIWAN
146,698 601
1,493,000 002
9.81 E
350
TAIWAN
79,810 001
606,000 801
13.21 E
351
HAITI
106,873 101
3,713,000 102
2.92
352
CHINA
7399796 801
13,463,000 802
5.51
352
NONE KONG
3,456,154 DOI
56,321,000 80I
6.11 E
359
HONG KONG
9,528,781 LBS
72,700,000 LBS
13.12 E
359
KOREA
4,742,125 LBS
72,700,000 LBS
6.51 E
359
TAIWAN
6,929,627 LIS
72,700,000 LIS
9.51 E
361
HONG KONG
49,417 001
562,000 101
1.81 E
361
NONE EONS
54,630 101
562,000 801
9.71 E
369
TAIWAN
9,234,769 LBS
265,700,000 LIS
3.52 E
369
HONG EONS
7,296,438 LBS
265,700,000 LIS
2.71 E
369
KOREA
2,082,497 LBS
265,700,000 LBS
0.82 E
433
CHINA
6,211 002
373,000 802
1.71
433
TAIWAN
9,751 DO1
417,000 802
2.32 E
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/31: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000602140003-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/31: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000602140003-5
1913 RESTRAINT ACTIONS
PRODUC? IMPORTS AS
CAI.
COUNTRY
INPOM IMPORTS
CALL LEVEL WITS
PRODUCTION 1ION
LEVEL UNITS
1 OF
PR1000110N
134
TAIWAN
7,366 DOI
306,000 80I
2.41 E
434
NONE KONG
8,378 DOI
306,006 801
2.71 E
434
HUNGARY
5,264 DOI
306,000 )02
1.71
435
CHINA
13,193 DO1
1,095,000 DO1
1.31
435
KOREA
26,245 002
1,083,000 102
2.61 E
435
NUN6AF.Y
14,762 D02
1,095,000 002
1.31
436
KOREA
7,889 102
295,000 102
2.71 E
438
CHINA
12,074 001
428,000 102
2.8!
436
KOREA
35,889 D01
428,000 10I
1.41 E
442
KOREA
35,688 102
1,215,000 002
2.11 E
442
NONE KONG
37,229 DOI
1,215,000 802
2.9! E
442
TAIWAN
28,820 D02
1,359,000 002
2.11 E
444
TAIWAN
11,618 D02
146,000 101
1.01 E
444
URUGUAY
4,781 DOI
146,000 DOZ
3.31
444
JAPAN
15,087 002
146,000 002
10.31
446
PANAMA
32,563 002
623,000 DOI
5.21
447
TAIWAN
5,042 DOI
618,000 DOI
0.11 E
448
KOREA
26,758 002
747,000 DOZ
3.61 E
459
HONE KONG
425,038 LBS
1,359,000 DOI
E
459
TAIWAN
588,059 LBS
178,000 DOI
E
604
BRA21L
276,426 LBS
44,749,000 LDS
0.61
448
TAIWAN
10,051 D02
747,000 DOZ
1.31 E
604
ROMANIA
2,446,418 LBS
654,994,000 LDS
0.41
b^1
HONE KONG
303,126 LBS
36j7199000 LDS
0.81 E
604
INDONESIA
474,639 LBS
38,719,000 LIS
1.21
612
TAIWAN
7,544,516 SYD
524,100,000 SYD
1.41 E
613
TAIWAN
24,296,684 SYD
5,628,391,000 SYD
0.41 E
E13
KOREA
18,707,149 SYD
5,628,391,000 SYD
0.31 E
631
HGNE KON:
337,931 DPR
1,635,000 DPR
20.71 E
631
TAIWAN
1,069,244 DPR
3,374,000 DPR
31.71 E
631
KOREA
191,708 DPR
3,374,000 PR
5.71 E
631
THAILAND
146,210 DPR
1,470,000 DPR
9.91
636
KOREA
163,636 DOZ
15,695,000 DOZ
1.01 E
636
NONE KONG
156,641 001
15,695,000 002
1.01 E
636
TAIWAN
244,507 DC?
15,695,000 DOZ
1.61 E
637
TAIWAN
248,861 001
5,226,000 DOZ
4.81 E
639
CHINA
631,639 002
22,474,000 80I
2.81
641
INDIA
163,360 D02
17,602,000 002
0.91
642
KOREA
53,474 DOI
5,560,000 DOZ
1.0! E
642
TAIWAN
457,982 801
5,560,000 DOZ
1.2! E
642
NONE KONS
83,926 D02
5,560,000 DOZ
1.51 E
643
TAIWAN
39,154 802
1,201,000 DOZ
3.31 E
644
DON. REPUBLIC
22,807 DOI
178,000 DOZ
2.61
644
TAIWAN
95,841 D0I
1,010,000 DO!
9.51 E
644
KOREA
70,840 001
1,010,000 102
7.01 E
644
NONE KONG
23,411 DO1
1,010,000 DOZ
2.31 1
647
KOREA
550$039 DOZ
20,411,000 DOZ
2.71 E
647
NONE KONG
180,393 DOI
20,411,000 102
0.91 E
649
NONE KONG
478,511 101
18,495,000 DOZ
2.61 E
649
TAIWAN
623,448 DO]
18,495,000 DOZ
3.41 E
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/31: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000602140003-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/31: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000602140003-5
i
1983 RESTRAINT ACTIONS
PRODUC- IMPORTS AS
IMPORTS IMPORTS
PRODUCTION TICK I OF
LAT. COUNTRY
CALL LEVEL UNITS
LEVEL UNITS PRODUCTION
650 TAIWAN
30,323 101
2,682,000 001 1.11 1
669 CHINA
1,270,611 LIS
63,100,000 LIS 2.01
669F KOREA
564,590 LIS
4,258,000 LIS 13.31 E
669F TAIWAN
862,359 LIS
4,258,000 LIS 20.31 E
669 NONE KONS
123,712 LIS
452,000,000 LIS 0.031 E
669 0 TAIWAN
1,908,139 LIS
210,000,000 LIS 0.91 E
669P KOREA
3,051,706 LIS
61,300,000 LBS 5.01 E
669P TAIWAN
382,893 LIS
61,300,000 LIS 0.61 E
6691 KOREA
4,486,152 LBS
19,931,000 LIS 22.51 E
6691 TAIWAN
1,530,928 LIS
487,000 NOS a E
670P7 TAIWAN
58,004,491 LBS
25,066,000 LBS 231.41
a/ Production and ieport data not available in cosparable units of measure.
E/ ieport call level is E's issued.
ITA/DIEZA January 31st. 196L.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/31: CIA-RDP88GO1117R000602140003-5