DCI TALKING POINTS TO BE PROVIDED EARLY TUESDAY MORNING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01117R000401120007-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 22, 2011
• Sequence Number: 7
• Content Type: MISC

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
Table of Contents
Tab Item
Proposed DCI talking points (on top of package)
Q Agenda
R Comparison of US views on SALT II heavy bomber accountability
S Relevant US policy statements:
o US Interim Restraint Policy: Responding to Soviet Arms Control
Violations, May 27, 1986; and
o Interim Restraint: US and Soviet Force Projections, August 5,
1986.
T SOVA papers:
o "Soviet Views on SALT II", 24 Nov 86; and,
o "Soviet Views on Mutual Restraint in Strategic Arms", 7 Oct 86
U NIO/SP IIA: "Soviet Strategic Forces in the 1990s in a No-SALT
Environment", 3 Sept 86
V SOVA SCIM: "Soviets Increasing Number of Mobile ICBMs"; and,
NID Article: "USSR--Possible Reaction to US Position on SALT"
X Recent press articles:
o "US Aide Disputing Others Over Stance on Missile Ban", New York
Times, 22 Nov 86
o "Reagan Administration is Moderating the President's Arms Control
Proposals", Wall Street Journal, 21 Nov 86
o "Kremlin Official Blasts Reagan", Washington Post, 21 Nov 86
SE
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
DCI TALKING POINTS TO BE PROVIDED EARLY TUESDAY MORNING
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
 . . Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
Acme nda
SYSTEM II
90755
II. Review of Status of 131st Bomber
And of Submarine Overhauls
NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING
Tuesday, November 25, 1996
Situation Room
3:00 p.m. - 4:00 p.m.
INTERIM RESTRAINT
i. Introduction John H. Poindexter
(5 minutes)
?III. Discussion
IV. Timing.Considerations
Discussion
VI. Sumary
Secretary Weinberger
(10 minutes)
All Participants
125 minutes)
John M. Poindexter
(2 minutes)
All Participants
(15 minutes)
John M. Poindexter
(3 minutes)
S8CRET
c ossify on: OADR
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
MWIFICATICN SUM= Ix1R.D 3 PCM
LOWICN f 131
Ar,rd appa*cb taking appt+Ki telY 97 eoelodsMs - all
noelfieations adrsduled in cc juction with PM are psrforasd
in canju ticn during Phsss III
Mme is Prepare aircraft *w and/PM dsfuel/clsara, r Indoews Rtitered PM late
, spoilers, batdoe, rte. July
Phase II: Auer fuel taeslcs,. jactc aircraft, pr foe's Irdooce
EiZration and inwntocy (SI) and halytical Oocrosicn
Inapscticn (ACI).
Fu se III: FM work - strip wires/panda/equipasnt radca, Indoors
Tam' gear, firawa11a/ptss:stic egAp^. t - install wires
and now . 4pmt associated with all sods Arno xi er t w/Pf 1a
align aircraft, replace *ng noes an3"mks stsvctssal repairs
electriosl pa+ac diedcs/>hrake chocks - darn jack.
Phase 7V: Chodc bleed air, autopilot, air ca diticning, Irdoors/outdoors First (observable
radRW. replace batches, cabin pressure dick, to N!1) 11 Nov 86
ft +l leak deck.
Phase \': Paint aircraft. indoors (Sep facility)
Phase VI: 'P*i7ht an] M1ar a th c)',, aA"50'-e8dir-9
sw: ,1g .
outdoors In Phase VI currt
as of 18W~v 86
P`u-se VII: Flidr,t prep f ,r " (firal leak chador, engine outdoors Oonpletion projec:er
1ENT, Fa, fir*1 sd;t, fly amy. 15 Dec 96
~NC~ass~F!E~
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
Special
Report
No. 147
U. S. Interim Restraint Policy :
Responding to Soviet Arms
Control Violations
United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.
Following are texts of the President's control process itself. A country simply
statement and a White House fact sheet' cannot be serious about effective arms
of May 87, 1986, concerning U.S. in- control unless it is equally. serious about
terim restraint policy and the U.S. compliance.
response to Soviet ar-na control In spite of the regrettable Soviet
violations. record, I concluded last June that it re-
PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON
INTERIM RESTRAINT
On the eve of the strategic arms reduc-
tion talks (START) in 1982, I decided
that the United States would not under-
cut the expired SALT I [strategic arms
limitation talks] interim offensive agree-
ment or the unratified SALT II agree-
ment as long as the Soviet Union
exercised equal restraint. I took this ac-
tion, despite my concerns about the
flaws inherent in those agreements, to
foster an atmosphere of mutual restraint
conducive to serious negotiations on
arms reductions. I made clear that our
policy required reciprocity and that it
must not adversely affect our national
security interests in the face of the con-
tinuing Soviet military buildup.
Last June, I reviewed the status of
U.S. interim restraint policy. I found
that the United States had fully kept its
part of the bargain. As I have docu-
mented in three detailed reports to the
Congress, most recently in December
1985, the Soviet Union, regrettably, has
not. I noted last June that the pattern
of Soviet noncompliance with their exist-
ing arms control commitments increas-
ingly affected our national security. This
pattern also raised fundamental con-
cerns about the integrity of the arms
mained in the interest of the United
States and its allies to try, once more,
to establish an interim framework of
truly mutual restraint on strategic offen-
sive arms as we pursued, with renewed
vigor, our objective of deep reductions
in existing U.S. and Soviet nuclear ar-
senals through the Geneva negotiations.
Therefore, I undertook to go the extra
mile, dismantling a Poseidon submarine,
U.S.S. Sam Rayburn, to give the Soviet
Union adequate time to take the steps
necessary to join us in establishing an
interim framework of truly mutual re-
straint. However, I made it clear that,
as subsequent U.S. deployment mile-
stones were reached, I would assess the
overall situation and determine future
U.S. actions on a case-by-case basis in
light of Soviet behavior in exercising
restraint comparable to our own, cor-
recting their noncompliance, reversing
their unwarranted military buildup, and
seriously pursuing equitable and verifia-
ble arms reduction agreements.
Later this month, the eighth Trident
submarine, U.S.S. Nevada, begins sea
trials. In accordance with our announced
policy, I have assessed our options with
respect to that milestone. I have consid-
ered Soviet actions since my June 1986
decision and U.S. and allied security in-
May 27, 1986
terests in light of both those actions and
our programmatic options. The situation
is not encouraging.
While we have seen some modest in-
dications of improvement in one or two
arias, there has been no real progress
ioaatd meeting U.S. concerns with
respect to the general pattern of Soviet
noncompliance with major arms control
commitments, particularly in those areas
of most obvious and direct Soviet non-
compliance with the SALT and ABM
[antiballistic missile] agreements. The
deployment of the SS-25, a forbidden
second new intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) type, continues apace.
The Soviet Union continues to encrypt
telemetry associated with its ballistic
missile testing in a manner which im-
pedes verification. The Krasnoyarsk
radar remains a clear violation. We see
no abatement of the Soviet strategic
force buildup. Finally, since the Novem-
ber summit, we have yet to see the
Soviets follow up constructively on the
commitment made by General Secretary
Gorbachev and myself to achieve early
progress in the Geneva negotiations, in
particular in areas where there is com-
mon ground, including the principle of
50% reductions in the strategic nuclear
arms of both countries, appropriately
applied, as well as an interim agreement
on intermediate-range nuclear forces
(INF).
Based on Soviet conduct since my
June 1985 decision, I can only conclude
that the Soviet Union has not, as yet,
taken those actions that would indicate
its readiness to join us in an interim
framework of truly mutual restraint. At
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
the same time, I have also considered
the programmatic options available to
the United States in terms of their
overall net impact on U.S. and allied
security.
When I issued guidance on U.S. pol-
icy on June 10, 1986, the military plans
and programs for fiscal year 1986 were
about to be implemented. The amount of
flexibility that any nation has in the
near term for altering its planning is
modest at best. Our military planning
will take more time to move out from
under the shadow of previous assump-
tions, especially in the budgetary condi-
tions which we now face. These
budgetary conditions make it essential
that we make the very best possible use
of our resources.
The United States had long planned
to retire and dismantle two of the oldest
Poseidon submarines when their reactor
cores were exhausted. Had I been per-
suaded that refueling and retaining
these two Poseidon submarines would
have contributed significantly and cost-
effectively to the national security, I
would have directed that these two
Poseidon submarines not be dismantled
but be overhauled and retained.
However, in view of present circum-
stances, including current military and
economic realities, I have directed their
retirement and dismantlement as
planned.
As part of the same decision last
June, I also announced that we would
take appropriate and proportionate
responses when needed to protect our
own security in the face of continuing
Soviet noncompliance. It is my view
that certain steps are now required by
continued Soviet disregard of their
obligations.
Needless to say, the most essential
near-term response to Soviet noncompli-
ance remains the implementation of our
full strategic modernization program, to
underwrite deterrence today, and the
continued pursuit of the Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI) research pro-
gram, to see if it is possible to provide a
safer and more stable basis for our fu-
ture security and that of our allies. The
strategic modernization program, includ-
ing the deployment of the second 50
Peacekeeper missiles, is the foundation
for all future U.S. offensive force op-
tions. It provides a solid basis which can
and will be adjusted over time to
respond most efficiently to continued
Soviet noncompliance. The SDI program
represents our beat hope for a future in
which our security can rest on the in-
creasing contribution of defensive sys-
tems that threaten no one.
It Is absolutely essential that we
maintain full support for these pro-
grams. To fail to do so would be the
worst response to Soviet noncompliance.
It would immediately and seriously
undercut our negotiators in Geneva by
removing the leverage that they must
have to negotiate equitable reductions in
both U.S. and Soviet forces. It would
send precisely the wrong signal to the
leadership of the Soviet Union about the
seriousness of our resolve concerning
their noncompliance. And it would sig-
nificantly increase the risk to our secu-
rity for years to come. Therefore, our
highest priority must remain the full im-
plementation of these programs.
Secondly, the development by the
Soviet Union of its massive ICBM
forces continues to challenge seriously
the essential balance which has deterred
both conflict and coercion. Last June, I
cited the Soviet Union's SS-25 missile, a
second new type of ICBM prohibited
under SALT II, as a clear and irreversi-
ble violation. With the number of
deployed SS-25 mobile ICBMs growing,
I now call upon the Congress to restore
bipartisan support for a balanced, cost-
effective, long-term program to restore
both the survivability and effectiveness
of the U.S. ICBM program. This pro-
gram should include the full deployment
of the 100 Peacekeeper ICBMs. But it
must also look beyond the Peacekeeper
and toward additional U.S. ICBM re-
quirements in the future, ine iding the
small ICBM to complement Peace-
keeper. Therefore, I have directed the
Department of Defense to provide to me
by November 1986 an assessment of the
best options for carrying out such a
comprehensive ICBM program. This as-
sessment will address the basing of the
second 50 Peacekeeper missiles and
specific alternative configurations for
the small ICBM in terms of size, num-
ber of warheads, and production rates.
Finally, I have also directed that the
advanced cruise missile program be ac-
celerated. This would not direct any in-
crease in the total program procurement
at this time but rather would establish a
more efficient program that both saves
money and accelerates the availability of
additional options for the future.
This brings us to the question of the
SALT agreements. SALT II was a fun-
damentally flawed and unratified treaty.
Even if ratified, it would have expired
on December 81, 1985. When presented
to the U.S. Senate in 1979, it was con-
sidered by a broad range of critics, in-
cluding the Senate Armed Services
Committee, to be unequal and unverifia-
ble in important provisions. It was,
therefore, judged by many to be inimical
to genuine arms control, to the security
interests of the United States and its al-
lies, and to global stability. The pro-
posed treaty was clearly headed for
defeat before my predecessor asked the
Senate not to act on it.
The most basic problem with
SALT II was that it codified major
arms buildups rather than reductions.
For example, even though at the time
the treaty was signed in 1979, the
United States had, and only planned for,
560 MIR.Ved [multiple independently-
tar-getable reentry vehicle] ICBM
launchers, and the Soviet Union pos-
sessed only about 600, SALT II per
mitted each side to increase the number
of such launchers to 820. It also per- -
mitted a buildup to 1,200 MIRVed bal?
listic launchers (both ICBMs and
submarine-launched ballistic missiles)
even though the United States had only
about 1,050 and the Soviet Union had
only about 750 when the treaty was
signed. It permitted the Soviet Union to
retain all of its heavy ballistic missiles.
Finally, it limited ballistic missile
launchers, not the missiles or the war-
heads carried by the ballistic missiles.
Since the signing of SALT II, Soviet
ballistic missile forces have grown to
within a few launchers of each of the
820 and 1,200 MIRVed limits and from
about 5,000 to over 9,000 warheads
Mousy. What is worse, given the failure
of SALT II to constrain ballistic missile
warheads, the number of warheads on
Soviet ballistic missiles will continue to
grow very significantly, even under the
treaty's limits, in the continued absence
of Soviet restraint.
In 1982, on the eve of the START
negotiations, I undertook not to under-
cut existing arms control agreements to
the extent that the Soviet Union demon-
strated comparable restraint. Unfor-
tunately, the Soviet Union did not
exercise comparable restraint, and un-
corrected Soviet violations have seri-
ously undermined the SALT structure.
Last June, I once again laid out our
legitimate concerns but decided to go
the extra mile, dismantling a Poseidon
submarine, not to comply with or abide
by a flawed and unratified treaty but
rather to give the Soviet Union one
more chance and adequate time to take
the steps necessary to join us in estab-
lishing an interim framework of truly
mutual restraint. The Soviet Union has
not used the past year for this purpose.
Given this situation, I have deter-
mined that, in the future, the United
States must base decisions regarding its
strategic force structure on the nature
and magnitude of the threat posed by
Soviet strategic forces and not on stan-
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
dards contained in the SALT structure
which has been undermined by Soviet
noncompliance and especially in a flawed
SALT II treaty which was never rati-
fied, would have expired if it had been
ratified, and has been violated by the
Soviet Union.
Since the United States will retire
and dismantle two Poseidon submarines
this summer, we will remain technically
in observance of the terms of the
SALT II Treaty until the United States
equips its 131st heavy bomber for cruise
missile carriage near the end of this
year. However, given the decision that I
have been forced to make, I intend at
that time to continue deployment of
U.S. B-52 heavy bombers with cruise
missiles beyond the 131st aircraft as an
appropriate response without dis-
mantling additional U.S. systems as
compensation under the terms of the
SALT II Treaty. Of course, since we
will remain in technical compliance with
the terms of the expired SALT II
Treaty for some months, I continue to
hope that the Soviet Union will use this
time to take the constructive steps
necessary to alter the current situation.
Should they do so, we will certainly
take this into account.
The United States seeks to meet-its
strategic needs, given the Soviet build-
up, by means that minimize incentives
for continuing Soviet offensive force
growth. In the longer term, this is one
of the major motives in our pursuit of
the Strategic Defense Initiative. As we
modernize, we will continue to retire
older forces as our national security re-
quirements permit. I do not anticipate
any appreciable numerical growth in
U.S. strategic offensive forces. Assum-
ing no significant change in the threat
we face, as we implement the strategic
modernization program, the United
States will not deploy more strategic
nuclear delivery vehicles than does the
Soviet Union. Furthermore, the United
States will not deploy more strategic
ballistic missile warheads than does the
Soviet Union.
In. sum, we will continue to exercise
the utmost restraint, while protecting
strategic deterrence, in order to help
foster the necessary atmosphere for sig-
nificant reductions in the strategic ar-
senals of both sides. This is the urgent
task which faces us. I call on the Soviet
Union to seize the opportunity to join us
now in establishing an interim frame-
work of truly mutual restraint.
Finally, I want to emphasize that no
policy of interim restraint is a substitute
for an agreement on deep and equitable
reductions in offensive nuclear arms,
provided that we can be confident of
Soviet compliance with it. Achieving
such reductions has received, and con-
tinues to receive, my highest priority. I
hope the Soviet Union will act to give
substance to the agreement I reached
with General Secretary Gorbachev in
Geneva to achieve early progress, in
particular in areas where there is com-
mon ground, including the principle of
50% reductions in the strategic nuclear
arms of both countries, appropriately
applied, as well as an interim INF
agreement. If the Soviet Union carries
out this agreement, we can move now to
achieve greater stability and a safer
world.
Summary
The United States has completed a com-
prehensive review of its interim re-
straint policy and of the required
response to the continuing pattern of
Soviet noncompliance with arms control
agreements. Based on this review, and
following consultations with the Con-
gress and key allies, we have been
forced to the conclusion that the Soviet
Union has not, as yet, taken those ac-
tions that watdd indicate a readiness to
join us in an interim framework of truly
mutual restraint.
Given the lack of Soviet reciprocity,
the President has decided that in the fu-
ture the United States must base deci-
sions regarding its strategic force
structure on the nature and magnitude
of the threat posed by Soviet strategic
forces and not on standards contained in
the SALT II agreement of 1979 or the
SALT I interim offensive agreement of
1972. SALT II was a flawed agreement
which was never ratified, which would
have expired if it had been ratified, and
which continues to be seriously violated
by the Soviet Union. The SALT I in-
terim offensive agreement of 1972 was
unequal, has expired, and is also being
violated by the Soviet Union.
After reviewing the programmatic
options available to the United States,
the President has decided to retire and
dismantle two older Poseidon subma-
rines this summer. The United States
will thus remain technically in observ-
ance of the terms of the SALT II agree-
ment until we equip our 181st heavy
bomber for cruise missile carriage near
the end of this year. The President has
determined that, given the decision that
he has been forced to make by lack of
Soviet reciprocity, the United States
will later this year continue deployment
of B-52 heavy bombers with cruise mis-
siles beyond the 131st aircraft, without
dismantling additional U.S. systems as
compensation under the terms of the
SALT II agreement.
The President has also called for:
renewed bipartisan support for the Ad-
ministration's full strategic moderniza-
tion program including all 100
Peacekeeper ICBMs; full funding of our
research under the Strategic Defense
Initiative; an assessment of options on
future ICBM programs, including Peace-
keeper basing and the small ICBM; and
acceleration of the advanced cruise mis-
sile (ACM) program.
The President has determined that,
in carrying out this policy, the United
States will continue to exercise utmost
restraint. We will seek to meet our stra-
tegic needs by means that minimize in-
centives for continuing Soviet offensive
force growth. As we modernize, we will
continue to retire older forces as our na-
tional security requirements permit. We
do not anticipate any appreciable numer-
ical growth in the number of U.S. stra-
tegic offensive forces. Furthermore, the
President has emphasized that, assum-
ing no significant change in the threat
we face, as we implement the needed
strategic modernization program, the
United States will not deploy more stra-
tegic nuclear delivery vehicles or more
strategic ballistic missile warheads than
does the Soviet Union.
The President indicated that since
the United States will remain in techni-
cal observance with the terms of the ex-
pired SALT II agreement for some
months, the Soviet Union will have even
more time to change the conditions that
now exist. The President hopes that the
Soviet Union will use this time construc-
tively; if they do, the United States will
certainly take this into account. (Con-
cerning the SALT I agreement, even
without any U.S. retirement of older
systems, the United States could remain
in technical observance of its terms for
several years until the 10th Trident sub-
marine begins sea trials in mid-1989.)
Finally, the President has reiterated
that his highest priority in the nuclear
arms control area is to obtain Soviet
agreement to a new and more durable
arms control framework-one built upon
deep, equitable, and verifiable reduc-
tions in the offensive nuclear forces of
the United States and the Soviet Union.
He, therefore, calls upon the Soviet
Union to carry out in the ongoing Gene-
va negotiations the agreement which he
and General Secretary Gorbachev
reached at the November summit, call-
ing for 50% reductions, appropriately
applied, in U.S. and Soviet strategic
nuclear forces, and an interim agree-
ment on intermediate nuclear forces. If
Moscow instructs its negotiators to ap-
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
ply themselves seriously and flexibly
toward these goals, as the U.S. negotia-
tors are prepared to do, we can move
together now to build a safer and more
stable world.
Introduction
Over the past 2% years, the President
has sent three reports to the Congress
detailing the serious realities of Soviet
noncompliance with arms control agree-
ments, including major agreements on
strategic arms. The United 6tates has
unsuccessfully pressed the Soviet Union
in the U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative
Commission (SCC) and through other
diplomatic channels to resolve our
concerns.
In spite of this pattern of Soviet
noncompliance, the President decided
last June to go the extra mile in dis-
mantling a U.S. Poseidon submarine,
U.S.S. Sam Rayburn, to give the Soviet
Union adequate time to take the oppor-
tunity to join the United States in an
interim framework of truly mutual
restraint on strategic offensive arms. He
stated that such a framework required
that the Soviets correct their noncompli-
ance, reverse their unwarranted military
buildup, and make progress at the Gene-
va negotiations. In addition, he indicated
that the United States, which has
scrupulously complied with its arms con-
trol obligations and commitments, would
be required to develop appropriate and
proportionate responses to assure U.S.
and allied security in the face of uncor-
rected Soviet noncompliance. He di-
rected that all programmatic responses
be kept open, and he requested specific
programmatic recommendations of the
Secretary of Defense and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
In recent months, the President has
reviewed these issues in great detail
with his senior advisers and has con-
sulted extensively with Members of
Congress and allied leaders. He an-
nounced his decision in the statement is-
sued today. This fact sheet reports on
the President's decision.
Background
1982 Decision. In 1982, on the eve of
the strategic arms reduction talks, the
President decided that the United
States would not undercut the expired
SALT I agreement or the unratified
SALT II agreement as long as the
Soviet Union exercised equal restraint.
Despite his serious reservations about
the inequities of the SALT I agreement
and the serious flaws of the SALT II
agreement, he took this action in order
to foster an atmosphere of mutual re-
straint on force deployments conducive
to serious negotiation as we entered
START. He made clear that our policy
required reciprocity and that it must not
adversely affect our national security in-
terests in the face of the continuing
Soviet military buildup. The Soviet
Union also made a policy commitment
not to undercut these agreements.
1985 Decision. In a decision re-
ported to the Congress on June 10,
1985, the President reviewed the status
of U.S. interim restraint policy concern-
ing strategic agreements in light of the
continuing pattern of the Soviet Union's
noncompliance with its arms control ob-
ligations and commitments. He found
that the United States had fully kept its
part of the bargain and had scrupulously
complied with the terms of its obliga-
tions and commitments.
By contrast, he noted with regret
that the Soviet Union had repeatedly
violated several of its major arms con-
trol obligations and commitments. His
three reports to the Congress on Soviet
noncompliance in January 1984, Febru-
ary 1985, and December 1985 enumerate
and document in detail the serious facts
and U.S. concerns about Soviet viola-
tions. The overall judgment reached by
the President in his June 1985 decision
was that while the Soviets had observed
some provisions of existing arms control
agreements, they had violated important
elements of those agreements and asso-
ciated legal obligations and political com-
mitments.
The President noted that these are
very crucial issues, for to be serious
about effective arms control is to be
serious about compliance. The pattern of
Soviet violations increasingly affects our
national security. But, perhaps even
more significant than the near-term mili-
tary consequences of the violations
themselves, they raise fundamental con-
cerns about the integrity of the arms
control process, concerns that, if uncor-
rected, undercut the integrity and via-
bility of arms control as an instrument
to assist in ensuring a secure and stable
future world.
The President also noted that the
United States had repeatedly raised our
serious concerns with the Soviet Union
in diplomatic channels, including the
U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Com-
mission. His assessment was that,
despite long and repeated U.S. efforts
to resolve these issues, the Soviet Union
had neither provided satisfactory expla-
nations nor undertaken corrective ac-
tion. Instead, Soviet violations had
expanded as the Soviets continued to
modernize their strategic forces. U.S. in-
terim restraint policy has always been
conditioned on Soviet reciprocity. In his
June assessment, the President was con-
sequently forced to conclude that the
Soviet Union was not exercising the
equal restraint upon which U.S. interim
restraint policy had been conditioned,
that we could not accept a double stan-
dard of unilateral U.S. compliance cou-
pled with Soviet noncompliance, and
that such Soviet behavior was fun-
damentally inimical to the future of
arms control and to the security of our
country and that of our allies.
At the same time, given the goal of
reducing the size of Soviet and U.S.
nuclear arsenals, the President made
the judgment that it remained in the
interest of the United States to go the
extra mile in seeking to persuade tha.
Soviet Union to join us in establishing
an interim framework of truly mutual
restraint on strategic offensive arms, as
we pursued with renewed vigor,
through the negotiations in Geneva, our
goal of deep, equitable, and verifiable
reductions in existing U.S. and Soviet
nuclear arsenals.
The President made clear, however,
that the United States could not estab-
lish such a framework alone. Movement
toward an acceptAble framework re-
quired the Soviet* Union to take the
posiitive, concrete steps to correct its
noncompliance, resolve our other compli-
ance concerns, and reverse or substan-
tially-reduce its unparalleled and
unwarranted military buildup. Although
the Soviet Union had not demonstrated
a willingness to move in this direction,
the President announced that in the in-
terest of ensuring that every opportuni-
ty to establish the secure, stable future
we seek is fully explored, he was pre-
pared to go the extra mile.
The President thus decided last June
that to provide the Soviets a further op-
portunity to join us in establishing an
interim framework of truly mutual re-
straint which could support ongoing
negotiations, the United States would
continue to refrain from undercutting
existing strategic arms agreements to
the extent that the Soviet Union exer-
cised comparable restraint and provided
that the Soviet Union actively pursued
arms reductions agreements in the
nuclear and space talks in Geneva. Fur-
ther, he stated that the United States
would constantly review the implications
of this interim policy on the long-term
security interests of the United States
and its allies. He indicated that, in doing
so, the United States would consider
Soviet actions to resolve our concerns
with the pattern of Soviet noncompli-
ance, continued growth in the strategic
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88G01117R000401120007-6
force structure of the Soviet Union, and Soviet Noncompliance
Soviet seriousness in the ongoing negoti- In the most recent of his three reports
ations.
As an integral part of the implemen-
tation of this policy, the President an-
nounced that the United States would
take those steps made necessary by
Soviet noncompliance to assure U.S. na-
tional security and that of our allies. He
noted that appropriate and proportion-
ate responses to Soviet noncompliance
are called for to make it perfectly clear
to Moscow that violations of arms con-
trol arrangements entail real costs. He
stated clearly that the United States
would, therefore, develop appropriate
and proportionate responses and would
take those actions necessary in response
to, and as a hedge against, the military
consequences of uncorrected Soviet
violations of existing arms control
agreements.
The President decided last June that
to provide still more time for the Soviet
Union to demonstrate by its action a
commitment to join us in an interim
framework of truly mutual restraint, the
United States would deactivate and dis-
mantle, according to agreed procedures,
an existing older Poseidon submarine as
the seventh U.S. Ohio-class TridE:nt sub-
,
marine put to sea in August 1986. - ? The President added that in the area of
However, the President also directed strategic defense, the possible extent of
that the United States keep oper. all fy- . the Soviet Union's military gains by vir-
ture programmatic options for handling tue of its noncompliance with the ABM
such strategic deployment milestones as
they occurred in the future. He made it
clear that, as these later milestones
were reached, he would assess the over-
all situation and make a final determina-
tion of the U.S. course of action on a
case-by-case basis in light of Soviet ac-
tions in meeting the criteria which he
cited.
U.S. Compliance
In :Accordance with U.S. interim re-
straint policy and our efforts to build an
interim framework of truly mutual re-
straint, the United States has not taken
any actions which would undercut exist-
ing agreements. We have continued
scrupulously to live within all arms con-
trol'agreements, including the SALT I
and II agreements. For example, we
have fully dismantled one Poseidon and
eight Polaris missile-carrying subma-
rines and 27 Titan II ICBM launchers
as new Trident missile-carrying subma-
rines have been deployed. Unfortunate-
ly, while the United States has been
attempting to hold to the structure of
SALT through our policy of interim re-
straint, the Soviet Union, through its
continued noncompliance, has under-
mined the very foundation of that
structure.
to the Congress on Soviet noncompli-
ance with arms control agreements,
issued on December 28, 1985, the Presi-
dent confirmed that the Administra-
tion's continuing studies supported the
conclusion that the pattern of Soviet
noncompliance continues largely uncor-
rected. As documented in the Presi-
dent's reports, particularly the detailed
classified versions, the Soviet Union has
violated its legal obligations under, or
political commitments to, the SALT II
agreement of 1979, the SALT I interim
offensive agreement of 1972, the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, the
Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the
Biological Weapons Convention of 1972,
the Geneva Protocol on chemical
weapons of 1925, and the Helsinki Final
Act of 1975. In addition, the U.S.S.R.
has likely violated the Threshold Test
Ban Treaty of 1974.
In his December 1985 report to the
Congress, the President noted that
through its noncompliance with arms
control agreements, the Soviet Union
has made military gains in the areas of
strategic offensive arms as well as
biological, and toxin weapons.
chemical
Treaty is also of increasing importance
and serious concern to the United
States.
The President noted in his Decem-
ber report that in a fundamental sense
all deliberate Soviet violations are equal-
ly important. He made clear that as vio-
lations of legal obligations or political
commitments, they cause grave concern
regarding Soviet commitment to arms
control and darken the atmosphere in
which current negotiations are being
conducted in Geneva and elsewhere.
In another sense, the President
noted, Soviet violations are not of equal
importance. Some Soviet violations are
of significant military importance-like
the illegal second type of new ICBM,
telemetry encryption, and the Kras-
noyarsk radar. While other violations
are of little apparent military sig-
nificance in their own right, such viola-
tions can acquire importance if, left
unaddressed, they are permitted to be-
come precedents for future, more
threatening violations. Moreover, some
Soviet actions that individually have lit-
tle military significance could conceiva-
bly become significant when taken in
their aggregate. Finally, even if a spe-
cific violation does not contain an inher-
ent military threat, it still undermines
the viability and integrity of the arms
control process.
Specific Soviet Violations
Concerning SALT II, the President's
December report, in addition to citing
the Soviets' SS-26 ICBM development
and extensive encryption of telemetry
on ICBM missile flight teats as viola-
tions, also enumerated additional clear
Soviet violations of SALT II, including
exceeding the numerical limit of stra-
tegic nuclear delivery vehicles and con-
cealment of the association between the
SS-25 missile and its launcher. In addi-
tion, the President's report cited three
areas of ambiguous Soviet behavior as
involving possible violations or incon-
sistencies with regard to SALT II-
SS-16 ICBM activity, the Backfire
bomber's intercontinental operating
capability, and the Backfire bomber's
production rate.
Concerning the SALT I Interim
offensive agreement of 1972, the Presi-
dent's December 1985 report cited a vio-
lation in Soviet use of former SS-7
ICBM facilities in support of the deploy-
ment and operation of the SS-25 mobile
ICBMs.
Concerning the ABM Treaty of
1972, the President's December 1986
report indicated that in addition to ille-
gal construction of the ballistic missile
detection and tracking radar at
Krasnoyarsk, the combination of other
Soviet ABM-related activities involving
mobility of ABM system components,
concurrent testing, rapid reload, etc.,
also suggested that the Soviets might be
preparing an ABM defense of their na-
tional territory, which is prohibited by
the ABM Treaty. Such an action, if left
without a U.S. response, would have
serious adverse consequences for the
East-West balance that has kept the
peace.
Three key Soviet violations of stra-
tegic arms agreements enumerated be-
low are particularly disturbing-the
SS-25 ICBM, encryption of telemetry,
and the Krasnoyarsk radar.
? SALT II: SS-85 ICBM. The Presi-
dent stated in his December 1986 report
that the SS-25 mobile ICBM is a clear
and irreversible violation of the Soviet
Union's SALT II commitment and has
important political and military irnplics-
tions. Testing and deployment of this
missile violates a central provision of
the SALT II agreement, which was in-
tended to limit the number of new
ICBMs. The agreement permits only
one new type of ICBM for each party.
The Soviets have informed us that their
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88G01117R000401120007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
one new ICBM type will be the
SS-X-24, which is now undergoing test-
ing, and have falsely asserted that the
SS-25 is a permitted modernization of
their old silo-based SS-18 ICBM. The
President also concluded that the techni-
cal argument by which the Soviets
sought to justify the SS-25, calling it
"permitted modernization," Is also
troublesome as a potential precedent, as
the Soviets might seek to apply it to ad-
ditional prohibited new types of ICBMs
in the future.
? SALT II: Telemetry Encryption.
The President stated in his December
report that Soviet use of encryption im-
pedes U.S. verification of Soviet compli-
ance and thus contravenes the provision
of the SALT II Treaty which prohibits
use of deliberate concealment measures,
including encryption, which impede
verification of compliance by national
technical means. This deliberate Soviet
concealment activity, he explained, im-
pedes our ability to know whether a
type of missile is in compliance with
SALT II requirements. It could also
make it more difficult for the United
States to assess accurately the critical .
parameters of any future missile.
Since the SALT I agreement of
1972, the President reported, Soviet en-
cryption practices have become more ex-
tensive and disturbing. The President
noted that these Soviet practices, Soviet
responses on this issue, and Soviet
failure to take corrective actions which
the United States has repeatedly re-
quested, demonstrate a Soviet attitude
contrary to the fundamentals of sound
arms control agreements, undermine the
political confidence necessary for con-
cluding new agreements, and underscore
the necessity that any new agreement
be effectively verifiable.
? ABM Treaty: Krasnoyarsk Radar.
The President stated in his December
1985 report that the radar under con-
struction near Krasnoyarsk in Siberia is
disturbing for both political and military
reasons. First, it violates the 1972 ABM
Treaty, which prohibits the siting of an
ABM radar, or the siting and orienting
of a ballistic missile detection and track.
ing radar, in the way the Krasnoyarsk
radar is sited and oriented. Politically,
he said, the radar demonstrates that the
Soviets are capable of violating arms
control obligations and commitments
even when they are negotiating with the
United States or when they know we
will detect a violation.
Militarily, he noted, the Krasnoyarsk
radar violation goes to the heart of the
ABM Treaty. Large phased-array radars
(LPARs), like that under construction
near Krasnoyarsk, were recognized dur-
ing the ABM Treaty negotiations as the
critical, long lead-time element of a na-
tionwide ABM defense.
When considered as a part of a
Soviet network of new LPARs, the
President concluded, the Krasnoyarsk
radar has the inherent potential to con-
tribute to ABM radar coverage of a sig-
nificant portion of the central U.S.S.R.
Moreover, the Krasnoyarsk radar closes
the remaining gap in Soviet ballistic
missile detection and tracking coverage.
Together with other Soviet ABM-related
activities, it suggests, as noted above,
that the Soviets might be preparing an
ABM defense of its national territory,
which is prohibited by the treaty and
would have serious adverse conse-
quences for the East-West balance that
has kept the peace.
The Current U.S.
Deployment Milestone
On May 28, the eighth U.S. Trident sub-
marine, U.S.S. Nevada, begins its sea
trials. As called for by the U.S. interim
restraint policy announced last June, the
President has carefully assessed our op-
tions with respect to that milestone. He
has considered Soviet behavior since his
June 1985 decision to go the extra mile,
and he has considered U.S. and allied
security interests in light of that Soviet
behavior and our own programmatic
options.
Since the President made this deci-
sion in June 1985 to dismantle a
Poseidon, U.S.S. Sam Rayburn,. in
order to give the Soviets adequate time
to join us in establishing a truly mutual
framework of interim restraint, the situ-
ation has not been encouraging with
respect to the three criteria that the
President established for gauging con-
structive Soviet action-i.e., 1) correc-
tion of Soviet noncompliance, 2) reversal
of the Soviet military buildup, and
8) promoting progress in the Geneva
negotiations.
While we have seen some modest in-
dications of improvement in one or two
areas of U.S. concern-for example, with
respect to the production rate of Back-
fire bombers-there has been no real
progress by the Soviets in meeting the
most serious U.S. concerns. The deploy-
ment of the SS-25, a second new ICBM
type forbidden by SALT II, continues.
The Soviet Union continues to encrypt
telemetry associated with its ballistic
missile testing and impedes SALT II
verification. The Krasnoyarsk radar re-
mains a clear violation. We see no
abatement of the Soviet strategic force
buildup. Finally, after a hopeful meeting
in Geneva last November between the
President and General Secretary
Gorbachev, we have yet to see the
Soviet Union follow up in negotiations
on the commitment made in the joint
statement issued by the two leaders to
seek common ground, especially through
the principle of 50% strategic arms
reductions, appropriately applied, and
through an agreement on intermediate
nuclear forces. In light of these circum-
stances, it is the President's judgment
that the Soviet Union has not, as yet,
taken those actions that would indicate
by deed its readiness to join us in a
framework of truly mutual interim '
restraint.
As the President has considered pp-
tions associated with the current deploy-
ment milestone with the sea trials of the
eighth Trident, he has also carefully
reviewed the military programmatic op-
tions available to the United States iii
terms of their overall net impact on
U.S. and allied security. It should be
noted in this context that when the
President issued guidance on U.S. policy
in June of last year, the military plans
and programs for fiscal year 1986 were
about to be implemented. The amount of
flexibility that any nation has in the
near term for altering its planning is
modest at best, and our military plan-
ning will take more time to move out
from under the shadow of previous as-
-su#rptions. This shadow lengthens and
darkens with each reduction made in the
funds available for our defense. Operat-
ing under such a shadow, especially in
the budgetary conditions which we now
face, makes it essential that we make
the very best possible use of our
resources.
It had long been planned to retire
and dismantle two of the oldest
Poseidon submarines. The President
indicated in the decision announced to-
day that had he been persuaded that
refueling and retaining these particular
two Poseidon submarines would have
contributed significantly and cost-
effectively to the national security, he
would have directed their overhaul and
retention. However, in view of present
circumstances, including current military
and economic realities, it is the Presi-
dent's judgment that, at this particular
juncture, the proper course with respect
to these two older Poseidon submarines
is to retire and dismantle them, accord-
ing to agreed procedures.
Proportionate U.S. Responses
In announcing his decision last June, the
President made clear at the same time
that the United States would take ap-
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
propriate and proportionate actions
when needed to assure U.S. and allied
security in the face of Soviet noncompli-
ance. It is the President's view that,
while two Poseidon submarines should
be dismantled for military and economic
reasons, certain new programmatic U.S.
steps focused on the Administration's
strategic modernization program are
now necessitated by the continued lack
of Soviet action up to this point in meet-
ing the criteria established by the Presi-
dent's interim restraint policy decision
last June.
Strategic Modernization Program.
The Administration's highest priority in
the strategic programs area remains the
full implementation of the U.S. strategic
modernization program to underwrite
deterrence today and the full pursuit of
the Strategic Defense Initiative research
program to seek to provide better alter-
natives in the future. The President's
decision to retire the two older Poseidon
submarines at this point is fully in ac-
cordance with that program. Under any
set of assumptions, our modernization
program is, and will always be, designed
to guarantee that our nation always has
modern forces in sufficient quantities to
underwrite our security and that of our
allies-nothing more and nothing less.
This goal ensures that the appropriate, a;
best, and proper use is made of our na-
tional resources.
The U.S. strategic modernization
program, including the deployment of
the second 50 Peacekeeper missiles; to
the full program of 100 missiles, which
was called for in 1983 by the Scowcroft
commission, is fully supported by our
military leadership. The Administra-
tion's full strategic modernization pro-
gram has been very carefully crafted by
our best defense planners. It is the
foundation for all future U.S. strategic
program options and provides a solid ba-
sis which can and will be adjusted over
time to respond most efficiently to con-
tinued Soviet noncompliance. The Presi-
dent believes it is absolutely critical that
this program not be permitted to erode.
That would be the worst way to
respond to the continuing pattern of
Soviet noncompliance, would increase
the risk to our security and that of our
allies, and would undercut our ability to
negotiate the reductions in existing ar-
senals that we seek. It, therefore, would
send precisely the wrong signal to the
Soviet leadership.
? Bipartisan Support for the U.S.
ICBM Program. Soviet actions to con-
tinue the accelerated development of
their ICBM force are of great concern.
Last June, the President cited the
Soviet Union's flight-testing of the
SS-25 missile, a second new type of
ICBM prohibited under the SALT II
agreement, as a clear and irreversible
violation and noted that deployment
would constitute a further violation. He
noted that since the noncompliance as-
sociated with the development of this
missile cannot, at this point, be cor-
rected by the Soviet Union, the United
States reserved the right to respond
proportionately and appropriately. At
that time, he also noted that the U.S.
small ICBM program was particularly
relevant in this regard. Given the
events that have occurred since last -
June, including the Soviet Union's
deployment of over 70 SS-26 mobile
ICBMs, the President calls upon the
Congress to join with him in restoring
bipartisan support for a balanced, cost-
effective, long-term program to restore
both the survivability and effectiveness
of our own ICBM program.
? Peacekeeper (MX). The program
we require should include the full
100-missile deployment of the Peace-
keeper ICBM. It is sometimes forgotten
by critics of the Administration's 100-
missile Peacekeeper program that this
represents a number only one-half that
requested bythe previous Administra-
tion. The Peacekeeper missile has just
completed another flawless flight test. It
!makes both good military and economic
sense fully to exploit the great technical
success that we have had with this
missile.
? Small ICBM. The President be-
lieves that our ICBM program must also
look beyond the Peacekeeper and
toward additional U.S. ICBM require-
ments in the future. Our small ICBM
program makes a significant contribu-
tion not only in this regard but also as
an appropriate and proportionate U.S.
response to the irreversible Soviet viola-
tion associated with their SS-25 mobile
ICBM.
? A Comprehensive Program. To en-
sure that he has a more robust range of
options as he approaches future mile-
stones, the President has, in the deci-
sion announced today, directed the
Department of Defense to provide to
him by November 1986 an assessment of
the best options for carrying out a com-
prehensive ICBM program.
? Advanced Cruise Missile. Finally,
the President has also directed the
Secretary of Defense to take the steps
necessary, working with the Congress,
to accelerate the production of the ad-
vanced cruise missile (ACM) program.
The President is not, at this time,
directing any increase in the total ACM
program procurement but rather is es-
tablishing a more efficient program that
both saves money and accelerates the
availability of additional options for the
future.
The U.S. and SALT
Having completed a comprehensive
review of U.S. interim restraint policy
and of the required response to the con-
tinuing pattern of Soviet noncompliance
with arms control agreements, and fol-
lowing consultations with the Congress
and key allies, the President has been
forced to conclude that the Soviet Union
has not, as yet, taken those actions that
would indicate a readiness to join us in
an interim framework of truly mutual
restraint.
Given the lack of Soviet reciprocity,
the President has decided that in the fu-
ture the United States must base deci-
sions regarding its strategic force
structure on the nature and magnitude
of the threat posed by Soviet strategic
forces and not on standards contained in
the SALT II agreement of 1979 or the
SALT I interim offensive agreement of
1972. SALT II was a flawed agreement
which was never ratified, which would
have expired if it had been ratified, and
which continues to be seriously violated
by the Soviet Union. The SALT I in-
terim offensive agreement of 1972 was
unequal, has expired, and is also being
violated by the Soviet Union.
After reviewing the programmatic
options available to the United States,
the President has decided to retire and
dismantle two older Poseidon subma-
rines this summer. The United States
will thus remain technically in observ-
ance of the terms of the SALT II agree-
ment until we equip our 131st heavy
bomber for cruise missile carriage near
the end of this year. The President has
determined that, given the decision that
he has been forced to make by lack of
Soviet reciprocity, the United States
will later this year continue deployment
of B-52 heavy bombers with cruise mis-
siles beyond the 131st aircraft, without
dismantling additional U.S. systems as
compensation under the terms of the
SALT II agreement.
Continued U.S. Restraint
The President emphasized that the
United States will continue to seek to
meet its strategic needs, in response to
the Soviet buildup, by means that
minimize incentives for continuing
Soviet offensive force growth. In the
longer term, this is one of the major
motives in our pursuit of the Strategic
Defense Initiative. The President
pointed out that, as the United States
*U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1 9 8 6.. M 9 1- 7 8 8, 4 0 0 1 3
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6 7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
modernizes, it will continue to retire
older forces as our national security re-
quirements permit. Therefore, he does
not anticipate any appreciable numerical
growth in U.S. strategic offensive
forces. The President also emphasized
that, assuming no significant change in
the threat that we face, as we imple-
ment the needed strategic modernization
program, the United States will not
deploy more strategic nuclear delivery
vehicles or more strategic ballistic mis-
sile warheads than does the Soviet
Union.
Since the United States will retire
and dismantle two Poseidon submarines
this summer, we will remain technically
in observance of the terms of the
SALT II agreement until the United
States equips its 181st heavy bomber
for cruise missile carriage near the end
of this year. However, given the deci-
sion that the President has been forced
to make, he announced today that, at
that time, he intends to continue deploy-
ment of U.S. B-52 heavy bombers with
cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft
without dismantling additional U.S. sys-
tems as compensation under the terms
of the SALT II agreement. Of course,
since the United States will remain in
technical observance of the terms of the
expired SALT II agreement for some
months, the President continues to hope
that the Soviet Union will, use this time
to take the constructive steps necessary-.
to alter the current situation. Should
they do so, the President noted that the
United States will certainly take this
into account.
In sum, the United States will
continue to exercise the utmost re-
straint, while ensuring the credibility of
our strategic deterrent, in order to help
foster the necessary atmosphere for sig-
nificant reductions in the offensive
nuclear arsenals of both sides. This is
the urgent task that faces us.
The ABM Treaty
Our obligations under the ABM Treaty
remain unchanged. The President has
made it clear that U.S. programs are,
and will continue to be, in compliance
with our obligations under the ABM
Treaty. The President's statement today
also makes it clear that we remain
deeply concerned over Soviet violation
of the ABM Triaty. In contrast with
SALT I and SALT II, however, the
ABM Treaty is not an expired or unrati-
fied agreement. One of our priority ob-
jectives remains to have the Soviet
Union return to compliance with their
obligations under We treaty.
Bureau of Public Affairs
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
II address is kworrect
pease kdNwte change.
Do not cover or destroy
this address label. Mall
change of address to:
PAIOAP. Am. 5815A
Hope for Progress in
Geneva Negotiations
Time has not altered the basic truth
that a policy of interim restraint is not a
substitute for an agreement on deep,
equitable, and verifiable reductions in
offensive nuclear arms. Achieving such
reductions has received, and continues
to receive, our highest priority.
It, therefore, remains our hope that
the Soviet Union will take the necessary
steps to give substance to the agree-
ment which President Reagan reached
with General Secretary Gorbachev in
Geneva to negotiate 50% reductions in
strategic nuclear arms, appropriately- ap-
plied, and an interim agreement on
intermediate-range nuclear arms. If the
Soviets agree to take those steps with
us, we can together achieve greater sta-
bility and a safer world.^
Published by the United States Department
of State - Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Public Communication ? Editorial
Division ? Washington, D. C. ? June 1986
Editor. Colleen Sussman ? This material is in
the public domain and may be reproduced
without permission; citation of this source is
appreciated.
Postage and Fees Paid
Department of State
STA-501
u~i-wt.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
Special
Report
No. 151
Following is the President's letter to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
the President of the Senate, and the
Chairmen of the House and Senate Com-
mittees on Armed Services of August 5,
1986, transmitting an unclassified report
to the Congress.
Transmittal Letter
Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
(Dear Mr. Chairman:)
Enclosed is an unclassified version of a
classified report which I provided on June 19
in response to related Congressional requests,
including a request for projections and com-
parisons of U.S. and Soviet strategic force
dismantlements, inventories, etc., in terms
of adherence to existing arms control
agreements.
As I noted in my letter of June 19
transmitting the classified report, it is clear
that SALT II and I codified a very major
arms buildup including a quadrupling of
Soviet strategic weapons (warheads and
bombs) since SALT I was signed in 1972 and
near doubling of Soviet ballistic missile
warheads from about 5,000 to more than
9,000 since SALT II was signed in 1979.
The report further found that the SALT I
and II agreements, even if fully complied
with, would not prevent a very substantial
further expansion of Soviet capabilities. We
believe that, absent SALT II, the Soviets
would not necessarily expand their forces
significantly beyond the increases already
projected with SALT II since the Soviet
forces are very large and would appear, in
our judgment, more than enough to meet
reasonable military requirements.
In my letter of June 19, I noted that in
view of the adverse implications of Soviet
noncompliance for our security and for the
arms control process, I had determined on
May 27 that, in the future, the United States
must base decisions regarding its strategic
force structure on the nature and magnitude
of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces,
and not on standards contained in the SALT
structure which has been undermined by .
Interim Restraint: U.S. and
Soviet Force Projections
United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.
August 5, 1986
Soviet noncompliance, and especially in a
flawed SALT II treaty which was never
ratified, would have expired if it had been
ratified, and has been violated by the Soviet
Union.
I have also noted that the full implemen-
tation of the Strategic Modernization Pro-
gram is critical botb to meeting our future
national security needs and to appropriately
responding to Soviet noncompliance. How-
ever, we will exercise utmost restraint. As we
modernize, we will continue to retire older
forces as national security requirements per-
mit. We do not anticipate any appreciable
growth in the size of U.S. strategic forces.
Assuming no significant change in the threat,
we will not deploy more strategic nuclear
delivery vehicles or more strategic ballistic
missile warheads than does the Soviet Union.
I want again to emphasize that no policy
of interim restraint is a substitute for an
agreement on deep and equitable reductions
in offensive nuclear arms, provided that we
can be confident of Soviet compliance with it.
Achieving such reductions continues to
receive my highest priority. This is the most
direct path to achieving greater stability and
a safer world.
Sincerely,
RONALD REAGAN
Unclassified Report
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON U.S.
INTERIM RESTRAINT POLICY AND
REPRESENTATIVE SOVIET AND U.S.
DISMANTLEMENT AND STRATEGIC-FORCE
PROJECTIONS WITH AND WITHOUT
SALT I AND II
I. Introduction: U.S. Interim
Restraint Policy and U.S. Responses
to Soviet Noncompliance
This report is an unclassified version of a
report forwarded to the Congress on
June 19, 1986, in response to the
requirements of the fiscal year 1986
Department of Defense Authorization
Act (Title X, Section 1001 (b)) for a
report on certain data and assessments;
related to U.S. and Soviet strategic
offensive forces and on possible Soviet
political, military, and negotiating
responses to changes in the U.S. policy
of interim restraint. As requested by this
legislation, the report covers a 5-year
period. It is provided in conjunction with
material including the President's state-
ment of May 27 and a White House fact
sheet of the same date on "U.S. Interim
Restraint Policy: Responding to Soviet
Arms Control Violations."
The U.S. policy of interim restraint
as first announced by the President in
1982 has been that, in spite of the flaws
inherenx in the SALT [strategic arms
limitation talks] agreements and in an
effort to foster an atmosphere of mutual
restraint conducive to serious negotia-
tions on arms reductions, the United
States would not undercut the expired
SALT I Interim Offensive Agreement of
1972 or the unratified SALT II Treaty of
1979 so long as the Soviet Union exer-
cised equal restraint.
In three detailed Administration
reports to the Congress on Soviet non-
compliance, and through diplomatic
channels including the U.S.-Soviet
Standing Consultative Commission, the
President has consistently made clear
that this U.S. policy required Soviet
reciprocity and that it must not
adversely affect our national security
interests in the face of the continuing
Soviet military buildup and uncorrected
Soviet noncompliance.
In accordance with U.S. interim
restraint Folicy and our efforts to build a
framework of truly mutual restraint, the
United States has not taken any actions
that would undercut existing agree-
ments. We have continued scrupulously
to live within all arms control agree-
ments, including the SALT I and II
strategic arms agreements. Unfortun-
ately, while the United States has been
attempting to hold to the structuse of
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
SALT through our policy of interim
restraint, the Soviet Union has undercut
the very foundation of that structure
through its continued violations.
In June of 1985, the President went
the extra mile. He decided to dismantle a
U.S. Poseidon submarine, in order to
give the Soviet Union adequate time to
correct its noncompliance, reverse its
unwarranted military buildup, and
seriously pursue equitable and verifiable
arms reduction agreements in the
Geneva negotiations. Regrettably, the
Soviet Union has so far failed to move
constructively in these three areas.
In spite of our expressed concerns
and our diplomatic efforts for corrective
Soviet actions, the Soviet Union has not
corrected its noncompliance. Concerning
SALT II, the President's most recent
report, of December 23, 1985, to the
Congress cited as Soviet violations:
(1) the development of the SS-25
missile, a prohibited second new type of
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM);
(2) extensive encryption of telemetry on
ICBM missile flight tests, which impedes
verification; (3) concealment of the
association between the SS-25 missile
and its launcher during testing; and
(4) exceeding the SALT II numerical cap
of 2,504 strategic nuclear delivery
vehicles (SNDVs). In addition, the Presi-
dent's report cited three areas of
ambiguous Soviet behavior as involving
possible violations or other problems ? --
with regard to SALT II: (1) SS-16 ICBM
activity, (2) the Backfire bomber's inter-
continental operating capability, and
(3) the Backfire bomber's production
rate. Concerning SALT I, the Presi-
dent's report cited a violation in the
Soviet use of former SS-7 ICBM
facilities in support of the deployment
and operation of the SS-25 mobile
ICBMs. These SALT II and SALT I
violations and other ambiguous situa-
tions involving these treaties remain
matters of serious concern, as does
Soviet violation of the Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM; Treaty of 1972 and of
other major arms control agreements.
The Administration has now con-
cluded a comprehensive review, and
extensive consultations with our allies
and friends abroad and with Members of
the Congress on the continuing Soviet
pattern of noncompliance, the Soviet
strategic arms buildup, and the lack of
progress by the Soviets at the Geneva
negotiations. The President announced
on May 27 that in the future the United
States would base decisions regarding its
strategic force structure on the nature
and magnitude of the threat posed by
Soviet strategic forces, not on standards
contained in the flawed SALT structure,
which has been seriously undermined by
Soviet noncompliance.
In his May 27 announcement on U.S.
interim restraint policy and on the U.S.
response to continued Soviet non-
compliance, the President pointed out
the inappropriateness of continuing with
the SALT II agreement. SALT II
codified continuing major arms buildups.
It was considered by a broad range of
critics, including the Senate Armed
Services Committee, to be unequal and
unverifiable in important provisions. It
was never ratified by the U.S. Senate
and was clearly headed for defeat before
the President's predecessor asked the
Senate not to act on it. With SALT II
the Soviets have nearly doubled their
strategic ballistic missile warheads from
about 5,000 to 9,000, and with SALT II
they could legally undertake a further
significant increase. Even if SALT II
had been ratified, it would have expired
on December 31, 1985.
Finally, continued Soviet violations
have seriously undercut the agreement
for several years in spite of repeated
U.S. requests for corrective Soviet
action. (Concerning SALT I, this agree-
ment expired in 1977, and since it was
signed in 1972, the Soviet Union has
quadrupled the number of its strategic
nuclear warheads. As for the United
States, even if we did not retire older
systems, theOUnited States would, under
current plans, remain in technical
observance of the SALT I numerical
limits until mid-1989.)
The President made clear in his
May 27 announcement that the United
States would continue to exercise utmost
restraint in the future, seeking to meet
U.S. strategic needs, given the Soviet
buildup, by means that minimize incen-
tives for continuing Soviet offensive
force growth. The President stated that,
as we modernize, we will continue to
retire older forces as our national secur-
ity requirements permit and that we do
not anticipate any appreciable numerical
growth in U.S. strategic forces. He also
indicated that, assuming no significant
change in the threat we face as we
implement the strategic modernization
program, the United States will not
deploy more strategic nuclear delivery
vehicles or more strategic ballistic
missile warheads than does the Soviet
Union.
The President also noted that, as a
result of his decision to dismantle two
older Poseidon submarines, the United
States will remain technically in observ-
ance of the terms of the SALT II Treaty
for some months. He continues to hope
that the Soviet Union will use this addi-
tional time to take the constructive steps
necessary to alter the current situation.
Should they do so, the President has
stated that this would be taken into
account.
Needless to say, the most essential
near-term response to Soviet non-
compliance remains the implementation
of our full strategic modernization pro-
gram, to underwrite deterrence today,
and the continued pursuit of the
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
research program, to see if it is possible
to provide a safer and more stable basis
for our future security and that of our
allies. The strategic modernization pro-
gram, including the deployment of the
second 50 Peacekeeper missiles, is the
foundation for all future U.S. offensive
force options. It provides a solid basis
that can and will be adjusted over time
to respond most efficiently to continued
Soviet noncompliance. The SDI program
represents our best hope for a future in
which our security can rest on the
increasing contribution of defensive
systems that threaten no one.
In his May 27 statement, the Presi-
dent emphasized that no policy of
interim restraint is a substitute for an
agreement on deep and equitable reduc-
tions in offensive nuclear arms, provided
that we can be confident of Soviet com-
pliance with it. Achieving such reduc-
tions has received, and will continue to
receive, his highest priority. We hope
the Soviet Union will act to give
substance to the agreement reached by
the President and General Secretary
Gorbachev at the summit meeting last
November to achieve early progress in
the Geneva negotiations. It was agreed
to focus, in particular, on areas where
there is common ground, including the
principle of 50% reductions, appropri-
ately applied, in the strategic nuclear
arms of both countries, as well as an
interim agreement on intermediate-
range nuclear forces. If the Soviet Union
carries out this agreement, we can move
now to achieve greater stability and a
safer world.
The classified report transmitted to
the Congress on June 19 provided a com-
parison of representative U.S. and
Soviet strategic weapons dismantlement
that would be required over the next 5
years if both countries were actually to
observe all of the quantitative limits of
the SALT I and SALT II agreements. It
then presented representative projec-
tions of the strategic offensive forces of
the two sides, assuming that the SALT I
and SALT II limits no longer apply.
Finally, it provided an assessment of
possible Soviet political and negotiating
responses, insofar as these are under-
stood and anticipated at present. For
security reasons, the present, unclassi-
fied version provides the information
concerning U.S. and Soviet forces in
substantially abbreviated form.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
At the outset, it must be noted that
there are important uncertainties in the
assessments presented herein. With
respect to the data on Soviet forces, the
projections represent broad trends-
based on both evidence and assumptions
-and are not intended to be precise
forecasts. On the basis of U.S. exper-
ience, it is unlikely that Soviet strategic
forces 5 years from now will be identical
(or necessarily even extremely close) to
these force projections. Nevertheless, we
believe that Soviet strategic forces in the
next 3-5 years can be reasonably charac-
terized, based on evidence of ongoing
programs that would be difficult to alter
radically in this timeframe.
By contrast, the size and complexion
of future U.S. strategic forces are
relatively easier for the Soviets to deter-
mine. We must contend with potential
increases in Soviet strategic programs
and capabilities. However, the principal
source of uncertainty for Soviet planners
about the scope and size of future U.S.
strategic programs is, in all likelihood,
the extent to which future U.S. pro-
grams may be reduced by congressional
or executive branch action.
The data presented here assume full
implementation of the Administration's
strategic modernization program. It is
absolutely essential that we maintain full
support for these programs. To fail to do
so would be the worst response to Soviet
noncompliance. It would immediately '
and seriously undercut our negotiators
in Geneva by removing the leverage that
they must have to negotiate equitable
reductions in both U.S. and Soviet
forces. It would send precisely the
wrong signal to the leadership of the
Soviet Union about the seriousness of
our resolve concerning their non-
compliance. And, it would significantly
increase the risk to our security for
years to come. Therefore, our highest
priority must remain the full implemen-
tatiOn of these programs.
H. Projected Soviet and U.S.
Dismantlements
This section of the report provide:
representative projections on disn.antl-
ing that would result if SALT limitations
were extended. They should be con-
sidered to be approximations and would
be subject to alteration by policy deci-
sions or programmatic adjustments by
either side. It should be pointed out that,
as documented in the President's
December 23, 1985, report to the Con-
gress on "Soviet Noncompliance With
Arms Control Agreements," the Soviet
Union's SALT-accountable strategic
nuclear delivery vehicle level is above
the SALT II cap of 2,504, in violation of
the Soviets' political commitment not to
undercut the treaty.
Representative Soviet Dismantle-
ments. The Soviet Union has several
programs underway to introduce new
strategic delivery systems that would
necessitate dismantling of older systems
if the Soviets were to restrict their
overall force to SALT levels. Under a
representative projection of such pro-
grams, consistent with SALT limits over
the next 5 years the Soviets would
deploy significant numbers of new
delivery vehicles, including SS-25 and
SS-X-24 ICBMs, Typhoon- and Delta-
type SSBNs, and Backfire bombers and
ALCM [air-launched cruise missile]
carriers.
If SALT I and II limits were to be
complied with, these actions would
necessitate dismantling some older
systems in the Soviet inventory, as well
as some more modern systems. The
older systems include SS-11 and SS-13
ICBMs, SS-N-6 SLBMs [submarine-
launched ballistic missiles] on Y-class
SSBNs, and Bison and Bear aircraft.
Because the Soviets already are very
close to the SALT II sublimit of 820
MIRVed [multiple independently
targetable reentry vehicle] ICBM launch-
ers, deployment of the MIRVed
SS-X-24 would require dismantling of
existing MIRVed ICBMs-most likely
SS-17s and possibly some SS-19s-to
stay within the ceiling. Similarly, with
the continued deployment of SS-N-20
and SS-N-23 SLBMs, their total of
MIRVed missile launchers would exceed
the ceiling of 1,200 in a year or two;
then they would need to dismantle more
MIRVed ICBMs or some SS-N-18
launchers on relatively new D-III-class
SSBNs to continue observing the
cumulative sublimit of 1,200 MIRVed
ICBM and SLBM launchers. They have,
for some time, been at the limit of 62
modern SSBNs established by SALT I;
thus deployment of new SSBNs would
require continued dismantling of older
submarines.
The dismantlements that would
derive from these actions probably would
total over the next 5 years slightly more
than 600 strategic nuclear delivery
vehicles, with, some 1,000-1,200
associated ballistic missile warheads.
(The SNDV figure also includes heavy
bombers judged to have a capacity for
some 300 nuclear weapons.) Some dis-
mantling of older systems would occur
eventually in any case, with or without
SALT limits. These projected dismantl-
ing actions do not take into account the
Soviet potential for additional cheating,
while nominally observing SALT
numerical limits. This might be intended
to avoid compensatory dismantlement of
other ICBMs, including MIRVed ICBMs.
Representative U.S. Dismantle-
ments. With respect to U.S. programs
and dismantlements, full implementation
of the strategic modernization program
would require continued dismantlements
under SALT of U.S. older strategic pro-
gram systems, most of which are near-
ing the end of their useful life based on
both military and economic
considerations.
III. Projected Soviet and U.S.
Strategic Forces
Projected Soviet Forces. In projecting
Soviet strategic offensive force deploy-
ments, assuming SALT limits no
longer apply, the caveats discussed
above regarding assumptions and uncer-
tainties underlying such projections are
relevant.
To place these figures in historical
perspective, since 1972 when SALT I
was signed, there has been a fourfold
increase in the number of Soviet
strategic nuclear weapons (missile
warheads and bombs) and nearly a
doubling of Soviet ballistic missile throw-
weight. Indeed, since the signing of
SALT II in 1979, the number of Soviet
strategic ballistic missile warheads has
nearly doubled from about 5,000 to more
than 9,000. This great expansion of
Soviet strategic forces has been possible
for the most part with SALT. (The
agreements limited launchers and only
indirectly affected deployed weapons.)
As noted, however, the Soviet Union has
also violated the arms control limitations
imposed by these agreements.
The Soviet Union now has about
10,000 strategic nuclear weapons
(missile warheads and bombs). The
SALT I and II Treaties, even if fully
complied with, would not prevent a very
substantial further expansion of Soviet
capabilities. Even assuming future
Soviet compliance with SALT II-other
than the continuation of current Soviet
violations-deployed Soviet weapons are
projected to increase to over 12,000 in
the next 5 years. Moreover, by further
violating the agreements, the Soviets
could plausibly add in the same time
period a relatively modest increase of
even more weapons to their forces.
It is difficult to predict precisely
what the Soviets might do absent SALT
constraints. They would not necessarily
expand their forces significantly beyond
the increases discussed above, which are
very large and would appear, in our
judgment, more than enough to meet
reasonable military requirements. Thus
there might well be little appreciable dif-
ference, in terms of total weapons,
between the forces that the Soviets
might deploy with and without SALT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
constraints. It is reasonable to expect
that in the absence of SALT, the Soviets
would not dismantle all their older
systems as rapidly as under SALT.
Some classes of weapons (e.g., SSBNs)
might not be dismantled at all during the
next 5 years without SALT constraints.
Given the great extent of the Soviet
strategic modernization program,
however, many of these older systems
would have relatively little impact on the
overall threat to U.S. security.
The Soviets have the potential to
expand their forces somewhat further,
should they decide to do so for either
military or political reasons. If a
deliberate effort were made by the
Soviet Union to expand its strategic
forces beyond SALT II levels, they
might increase their forces somewhat
further, to about 15,000 weapons by
1991.
However, the costs associated with
such an expansion of capability, on top
of an already very aggressive and expen-
sive modernization program, would be a
disincentive against any such Soviet
effort. -
With or without SALT, the Soviets
are, in any case, likely to modernize
their intercontinental nuclear attack
forces further by replacing most of their
currently deployed land- and sea-based
ballistic missiles and heavy bombers by
the mid-1990s. This impressive Soviet
modernization program, which will
result in significantly improved sur-
vivability, flexibility, and hard-target
capability, has been in train for a long
time.
Projected U.S. Forces. The United
States could achieve roughly 14,000
weapons by fiscal year 1991 in a
no-SALT environment by introducing
the full strategic modernization program
Bureau of Public Affairs
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
STAT
If address is incorrect
please indicate change.
Do not cover or destroy
this address label. Mail
change of address to
PNOAP, Rm 5815A.
without undertaking the dismantlements
that would otherwise be required by
SALT.
IV. Soviet Political and
Negotiating Reponses
It is difficult to predict specific moves
the Soviets might decide to take
politically or in the negotiations to try to
increase criticism of, and build pressure
against, the President's May 27 decision.
They have already leveled a propaganda
campaign against the decision. Iron-
ically, in light of ongoing Soviet viola-
tions of SALT II, including violation of
the strategic nuclear delivery vehicles
numerical limit, they have warned that
they will go beyond the SALT limits if
the United States does. While they have
stated that they would take the
"necessary practical" steps, e.g.,
increasing missiles and warheads, it is
not at all clear that they would further
expand their forces beyond the increases
already planned, as discussed above.
However, they are likely to portray any
expansion, including that already
planned, as a response to U.S. actions.
The Soviets may decide to make
political or negotiating moves as a mat-
ter of tactics that seek to discredit the
U.S. decision. However, the May 27 deci-
sion is not likely permanently to alter
their basic, overall objectives for
negotiations or for a summit. These
objectives include increasing opposition
to the U.S. modernization program, par-
ticularly the Strategic Defense Initiative,
and weakening the Western alliance.
We hope that the Soviet Union will
join us in a framework of truly mutual
restraint. For its part, the United States
will continue to exercise utmost restraint
in the future, seeking to meet U.S.
strategic needs, given the Soviet contin-
uing buildup, by means that minimize
incentives for continuing Soviet offen-
sive force growth. As we modernize, we
will continue to retire older forces as our
national security requirements permit.
Assuming no significant change in the
threat we face as we implement the
strategic modernization program, the
United States will not deploy more
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or
more strategic ballistic missile warheads
than does the Soviet Union.
No policy of interim restraint is a
substitute for an agreement on deep and
equitable reductions in offensive nucleat
arms, provided that we can be confident
of Soviet compliance with it. We hope
the Soviet Union will act to give
substance to the agreement reached by.
the President and General Secretary
Gorbachev at the summit meeting last
November to achieve early progress in
the Geneva negotiations.
Our objectives in Geneva remain the
same as stated at the summit: to seek
common ground in negotiating deep,
equitable, and verifiable reductions in
strategic and intermediate-range offen-
sive nuclear arsenals and to discuss with
the Soviet Union how we could enhance
deterrence and stability by moving
toward a world in which we would no
longer rely exclusively on the threat of
nudeaf retaliation to preserve the peace.
We hope the Soviets will negotiate
seriously with us toward these important
goals. ^
Published by the United States Department
of State ? Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Public Communication . Editorial
Division ? Washington, D.C. ? August 1986
Editor: Colleen Sussman ? This material is in
the public domain and may be reproduced
without permission; citation of this source is
appreciated.
BULK RATE
POSTAGE & FEES PAID
U.S. Department of State
Permit No. G-130
1!394
V/ 22101
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
Next 8 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
EXCERPTS FROM THE PRESIDENT'S 27 MAY
DECISION ON MUTUAL RESTRAINT
"...I have determined that, in the future, the United States
must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the
nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic
forces, and not on standards contained in the SALT structure.
"...As we modernize, we will continue to retire older forces
as our national security requirements permit. I do not anticipate
any appreciable numerical growth in US strategic offensive
forces. Assuming no significant change in the threat we face, as
we implement the strategic modernization program the United States
will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles than does
the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the United States will not deploy
more strategic ballistic warheads than does the Soviet Union.
"In sum, we will continue to exercise the utmost restraint,
while protecting strategic deterrence, in order to help foster the
necessary atmosphere for significant reductions in the strategic
arsenals of both sides...I call on the Soviet Union to seize the
opportunity to join us now in establishing an interim framework of
truly mutual restraint" (emphasis in text).
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
Next 6 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
Next 5 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
Gorbachev Warns
Gorbachev Warns SDI Of SDI's Impact
Can Arrest Arms Talks. On Arms Talks
Leader Addresses U.S. Through Indians
By Richard M. Weintraub
and Celestine Bohlen
Washington Post Foreign Service
NEW DELHI, Nov. 23-Soviet
leader Mikhail Gorbachev- warned
the Reagan administration today
that its Strategic Defense Initiative
could bring arms talks to a halt.
Expressing alarm over the re-
sults of the summit talks in Reyk-
javik, the Soviet leader appealed to
the American people to "think
again, let America weigh the situ-
ation again and make a responsible
decision."
In a two-hour broadcast interview
with Indian journalists in his Kremlin
office, Gorbachev signaled that the
future of arms control will be a major
focus of his talks this week with In-
dian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi,
who has taken an active role with
ether world leaders in pressing for
nuclear disarmament.
Gorbachev begins a four-day visit
to the Indian capital on Tuesday in
an effort to reinforce the close ties
that have marked Soviet-Indian re-
lations for three decades.
Ile is likely to find fertile ground
for his arguments on SDI in India,
which has been highly critical of
that program for research into a
space-based antimissile system. Un-
derscoring Moscow's recognition of
this was the appearance today of
the leading Soviet expert on the
United States, Georgi Arbatov, at a
New Delhi press briefing. Ile said
the United States had "retreated in
panic" from agreements reached at
Reykjavik.
There were widespread reports
in the press here today that Mos-
cow, in continuing arms sales here,
will begin delivery of the advanced
MiG29 aircraft to India next month.
This would be the first delivery of
the plane outside the Soviet Union.
The U.S.-Soviet relationship re-
ceived most of Gorbachev's atten-
tion in tonight's interview with four
Indian journalists broadcast at
prime time on national television.
"The proposals of Reykjavik are
possible," Gorbachev said. "The
world sees it, the world wants it."
Instead, he said, "we are being
pushed backwards." o`:
Gorbachev also accused Western
European leaders of lacking the
courage to support U.S.-Soviet
steps toward disarmament, saying
some of them "are afraid of such
rapid and substantial movement by
the U.S. and the Soviet Union on
strategic and medium-range mis-
siles."
It was SDI, however, that con-
tinued to draw the sharpest re-
marks by the Soviet leader. Slam-
ming his hand on the table, he said,
See GORBACHEV, A20, Col.1
GORBACHEV, From A17
"SDI is a fraud, an attempt to de-
ceite the American people, all oth-
er people. Some have been taken in
by; .this deception." This was an
apparent reference to countries
that have agreed to participate in
the- program in the belief that it
wiR be a shortcut to technological
gain.
Qorbachev's emphasis on what
he'said would be illusory technolog-
icafgains was an addition to long-
stiding Kremlin arguments
against the Reagan administration
initiative. He linked the develop-
ment of SDI and the future of arms
talks by arguing that the space pro-
gratn undermines basic trust be-
tween nations, a prerequisite for
reducing nuclear armaments.
OR SDI is to be implemented,
theft that is the use of negotiating?
WGy should we make it easier for
tho.military-industrial complex, the
militarist -adventurers, to achieve
their goals?" he asked.
This will make negotiations more
difficult, this will destabilize the stra-
te#ic situation. This will undermine
instead of strengthening confidence.
It 'ill fuel suspicions and distrust. It
will: create a situation where rash
delusions can be made."
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117ROO0401120007-6
U.S. Aide Disputing Others
Over Stance on Missile Ban;
By MICHAEL R. GORDON
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 - A senior
PDefense Department official today
disputed statements by other high-
level Administration officials that the
United States had backed away from
its proposal to Moscow to ban ballistic
missiles in 10 years.
The official, Richard N. Perle, an
Assistant Secretary of Defense, dis-
puted the Idea in testimony to the
House Armed Services Committee. He
also appeared to differ with senior Ad-
ministration officials about other
aspects of the proposal, which Presi-
dent Reagan advanced at the Iceland
summit meeting on Oct. 11 and 12.
The committee has begun a series of
hearings to assess the performance of
the Administration at the Reykjavik
meeting and to determine the Amer-
ican policy on arms control.
Representative Les Aspin, Demo-
cratic. of Wisconsin, the -chairman of
the committee, began the hearing by
charging that the Administration's per-
formance in Iceland was "slipshod"
and that Its arms-control policies since
then have been confused.
'Careful Deliberation' Cited
Mr. Perle strongly disputed this.
"I reject the notion that Reykjavik
was conducted in a slipshod manner,"
he said. "There was a great deal of
careful deliberation."
He also maintained that the Adminis-
tration's policy on arms-control issues
was clear.
Despite this, Mr. Perle's testimony
suggested that there were important
differences in emphasis and substance
in the Administration over the United
States proposal to eliminate all ballis-
tic missiles within 10 years. .
In the last week, senior Administra-
tion officials have said the United
States has backed away from its pro-
posal, although it technically remains
on the negotiating table.
. The director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, Kenneth. L.
Adelman, told a group of reporters
Wednesday that the proposal had been
"de-emphasized" and was "not opera-
tional at this point." On Thursday, the
State Department spokesman, Charles
E. Redman, said the United States
would give- higher priority to reduc-
tions in long-range arms to be carried
out over five years,
Sees No Change in Policy .~
But Mr. Perle suggested there had'
been no change in policy and said the'
United States would still like to con
elude an agreement to eliminate ballis,
tic missiles in 10 years.
Mr. Perle's testimony also revealed
other differences in the Administra1
Lion.
He acknowledged, for example, thab
the Joint Chiefs of Staff were con'
cerned about the "specifics" of Mr;
Reagan's proposal, particularly th
military implications of eliminating all
ballistic missiles in such a short period
One question the Joint Chiefs havo
asked is whether "10 years is ei.actlyi
the right time," Mr. Perle said., , .1
The Joint Chiefs and other elements
of the Administration are studying th
implications of the proposal. That
study was ordered In a directive signed
by the President two weeks ago.
Mr. Perle said the Join['Chiefs ha4
not directly opposed Mr. Reagan'; pros
posal. "The President has not put for,
ward any proposal that has been op-
posed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff," he
said.
Differs With Shultz
He also differed with Secretary of
State George P. Shultz on whether the
ballistic missile forces of other nations
would also have to be eliminated if the
United States and the Soviet Union did
away with theirs.
Mr. Shultz has maintained that the
United States would not agree to elimi-
nate its ballistic missiles if Britain,
France and China kept theirs.
But Mr. Perle said the United States
would agree even if Britain, France
and China still had ballistic missiles.
Mr. Adelman and Adm. William J.
Crowe, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, will appear before the
committee next week.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117ROO0401120007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
Reagan Administration Is Moderating
On Wednesday, a top official finally
said what Mr. Reagan, Mr. Shultz and
Mrs. Thatcher had hinted. The proposal to
ban all ballistic missiles "is not opera-
tional at this point," Kenneth Adelman, di-
rector of the Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency, told reporters over break-
fast.
After a week of backing away from
sweeping proposals, Mr. Reagan sowed
some confusion at his press conference
Wednesday night by saying that at Reykja-
vik "an agreement was reached on the de-
sirability of eliminating all strategic nu-
The President's Arras-Control Proposals clear missiles in a five-year period." Yes-
terday White Ho k
use
By JOHN WALCm1'
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
WASHINGTON - President Reagan's
oft-stated dream of making nuclear
weapons "impotent and obsolete" Is slip-
ping away.
When Mr. Reagan met with Soviet
leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Iceland-last
month, he discussed proposals to abolish
all ballistic missiles and to render strate-
gic nuclear weapons useless with new
space-based defenses. After the summit,
Mr. Reagan startled America's allies and
some In Congress by revealing that he also
had discussed the complete elimination of
strategic nuclear arsenals.
In the past week, however, the adminis-
tration has backed away from these vision-
ary proposals and adopted more-modest
negotiating goals. Now the administration
is talking about trying to negotiate
less-radical 50% cuts in the superpowers'
long-range nuclear arsenals.
Some senior officials also have begun to
argue that Mr. Reagan's space-based Stra-
tegic Defense Initiative, or SDI, should be
redirected toward developing limited mis-
sile defenses that could strengthen nuclear
deterrence In the near future, Instead of
concentrating on near-perfect defenses
which theoretically might be able to re-
place deterrence in two decades.
Following a weekend visit by British
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, Mr.
Reagan and Secretary of State George
Shultz both gave speeches that highlighted
less-sweeping arms-reduction negotiating
goals. Along with a 50% reduction in U.S.
and Soviet strategic weapons, Washington
will aim for sharp reductions in intermedi-
ate-range nuclear arms in Europe and
Asia, a ban on chemical weapons and lim-
its on conventional forces.
Although top administration officials
tried to portray the Iceland summit as a
triumph for the administration and for
arms control, officials now concede that
the president's willingness to discuss abol
ishi ng nuclear weapons, strategic weapons,
or ballistic missiles with Mr. Gorbachev
has provoked a storm of controversy from
Capitol Hill to the capitals of Europe.
One tentative agreement reached in
Iceland, to eliminate all U.S. and Soviet
medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe,
could leave the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization allies exposed to superior War-
saw Pact conventional forces and to Soviet
short-range nuclear missiles in East Ger-
many and Czechoslovakia, West German
Defense Minister Manfred Woerner cau-
tioned U.S. officials this week.
At home, worries Brent Scowcroft, a
former national security adviser, Mr. Rea-
gan's flirtation with the rhetoric of nuclear
abolitionism could undercut congressional
support for modernizing America's nuclear
deterrent by suggesting that the MX, Mid-
getman and D-5 ballistic missiles ate noth-
ing more than bargaining chips or very ex-
pensive insurance policies.
"Reagan has talked about the total
elimination of nuclear weapons from day
one, but not at a summit meeting with Gor-
bachev," says Rand Corp. Sovietologist Ar-
nold Horelick. "Politically, it's extremely
damaging. He has to get off it." And that's
what the administration has scrambled to
do this week.
Mrs. Thatcher signaled the retreat at a
press conference In Washington last Satur-
day. The prime minister announced that
she and Mr. Reagan had agreed on an
arms control agenda that pointedly in-
cluded neither the abolition of nuclear
weapons nor a ban on ballistic missiles.
On Monday Mr. Shultz told a Chicago
audience that the U.S. and its allies "will
have to continue to rely on nuclear
weapons for deterrence far, far into the fu-
ture." He suggested that the superpowers
might want to retain some ballistic mis-
siles as an "insurance policy" against
cheating or attacks from third countries.
And he raised doubts about whether Mr.
Reagan's SDI, the key to abolishing nu-
clear weapons, wil! prove to be effectiv'
and economical.
On Tuesday night, the ballistic missile
proposal was missing again, this time from
a speech by the president himself.
spo esman Larry
.
Speakes said the elimination of nuclear
weapons remains "an ultimate goal" of
Mr. Reagan.
Mr. Reagan first proposed to ban ballis-
tic missiles In 10 years In a July letter to
Soviet leader Gorbachev, before it had
been studied by defense experts at the
Joint Chiefs of Staff or the National Se-
curity Council staff, senior officials say.
Nevertheless, Mr. Reagan reiterated the
proposal in Iceland; the Soviet leader then
suggested eliminating all nuclear weapons
over 10 years. (Yesterday, Mr. Speakes
said the president's press conference men-
tion of five years was a "misstate-
ment,")-
The President's freewheeling approach
to nuclear strategy, like the controversy
over the sale of U.S. arms to Iran, has
raised questions about how Mr. Reagan's
impulses get translated Into policy and
about whether proposals are evaluated ad-
equately by a small circle of advisers led
by White House Chief of Staff Donald Re-
gan.
At first glance, the plan to eliminate
ballistic missiles appeared sensible-it
would eliminate the most dangerous part
of both sides' nuclear arsenals-and even
advantageous to the U.S. It would wipe out
a Soviet advantage in ballistic missiles, es-
pecially big, accurate, land-based ones.
but leave intact a U.S. edge in high-tech-
nology bombers and cruise missiles.
But Mr. Scowcroft says closer inspec-
tion revealed that the proposal would leave
the U.S. more vulnerable than the Soviets
to attack by bombers and sea-launched
cruise missiles. And the allies feared that
weakening the U.S. nuclear umbrella
would increase Europe's vulnerability.
"This is an administration that has al-
ways had to be reminded of the implica-
tions of what it was doing," says former
Reagan Undersecretary of State Lawrence
Eagleburger.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6
00
icial Blasts Reagan
Kremlin ' Off
Arbatov Questions President's Competence, Credibility
By Gary Lee
Washington Post Foreign Service
MOSCOW, Nov. 21-A senior
Kremlin official today delivered the
sharpest Soviet attack against Pres-
ident Reagan in months and raised
doubts for the first time publicly
about whether Moscow will contin-
ue to deal with him.
Georgi Arbatov, in remarks
prompted by Reagan's speech at
Washington's Ethics and Public Pol-
icy Center Tuesday, blasted the
president as a "provincial ideolog-
ist" nurtured on anticommunist
falsehoods and charged him with re-
peating Nazi propaganda.
"I think we in Moscow should
now give serious thought to our at-
titude to the U.S. president's
word," said Arbatov, director of the
U.S.A. and Canada Institute and an
adviser on American affairs to So-
viet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, in
an article in Pravda, the official
Communist Party newspaper. ,
Arbatov's article escalated the
tone and content of Soviet criticism
leveled at the Reagan administra-
tion since the Reykjavik summit
meeting. It also marked a notewor-
thy shift in the target of such at-
tacks, toward Reagan himself and
away from White House advisers,
Defense Secretary Caspar W. Wein-
berger and other figures often ac-
cused here of giving bad counsel to
the president.
The new wave of attacks against'
Reagan has intensified speculation
among Soviet officials and western
diplomats about whether the two
sides will be able to reach any major
agreements in the remaining two
years of the Reagan presidency.
In his speech Tuesday, Reagan
called for support of those "who
GEORGI ARBATOV
would take arms against the sea of
darkness," a phrase that followed
his denunciation of "three decades'
of Soviet adventurism around the
world."
He also listed as among his pri-
orities in arms control a 50-percent
cut in nuclear forces, but he failed
to list the elimination of all ballistic
missiles, which he had also pro-
posed at Reykjavik.
Since the summit, Arbatov
charged, Reagan has flip-flopped on
relations with Moscow to the point
that his credibility has been called
into question.
"In Reykjavik," Arbatov said of
Reagan, "he all but put his signature
on an accord on the total abolition
of nuclear weapons. A little more
than a month later, he not only
went back on everything, but
launched a crusade against the
U.S.S.R. and made everything de-
pendent on changes in our domestic
structures."
Gorbachev and other senior
Kremlin officials pledged after the
Oct. 11-12 summit to seek an arms
control deal with the Reagan admin-
istration, despite the tensions from
the meeting and a series of sweep-
ing reductions in U.S. and Soviet
Embassy personnel in Moscow and
Washington that followed.
But Reagan's speech Tuesday
has given rise to a flurry of out-
bursts here against him from Ar-
batov, chief Foreign Ministry press
spokesman Gennadi Gerasimov and
others.
"Where is he, the true president
Reagan?" Arbatov asked. "Who are
we doing business with in reality?
... Both ordinary people and, I
think, polic;,makers are pondering
these questions in Moscow today.
"What Ronald Reagan said on
Nov. 18 creates the impression that
he is reverting to his original part of
the provincial ideologist nurtured
on' anticommunist falsehoods and
arcane quotations-like 'the Ten
Commandments of Nikolai Lenin,'
cited by him every now and then,
which had been borrowed from a
book cooked up by [Nazi propagan-
da chief Joseph] Goebbels' hacks
way back during World War II.
"Is the president a competent
person at present," Arbatov asked,
"or is someone else talking out of
his lips-now one, now another, de-
pending on the circumstances?"
In a briefing Thursday at the So-
viet Foreign Ministry, Gerasimov
also blasted Reagan for his Tuesday
speech, accusing him of "many fal-
sifications," "vulgar rhetoric" and of
trying to deflect attention from his
recent congressional election defeat
and the Iranian arms issue.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401120007-6