NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05S02029R000300960003-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 46
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 11, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Near East and
South Asia Review
11 September 1987
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Near East and
South Asia Review
11 September 1987
Articles Israel-India: A Speculative View of Military Cooperation
Israel and India do not have diplomatic ties, but a convergence of
interests in several military areas would make a closer relationship
between the two mutually beneficial and may eventually lead to
cooperative efforts.
Trends in Middle Eastern Terrorism: A Workshop Report
At a workshop on trends in Middle Eastern terrorism sponsored by
the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the
Counterterrorism Center, most experts agreed that Syria and Libya
have become more cautious in their approach and that Palestinian
terrorism is in a lull. Iranian-sponsored Shia terrorism, however, is
growing.
Iran-Syria-Iraq: An Event Analysis
Event analysis?a method of systematically tracking the
interactions between states?of the last seven years of relations
between Iran and Syria and between Iraq and Syria shows that Iran
remains strongly committed to a relationship with Syria and that
Iraq began signaling Syria in 1986 that it would like to improve
relations.
The Lebanese Presidential Election: Setting the Stage
Lebanon's presidential election is not scheduled to take place until
fall 1988, but it is already becoming the focus of Lebanese domestic
politics. Although continuing violence and social and economic
turmoil highlight the confessional mistrust, most Lebanese view the
presidency as a symbol of national unity and hope for a relatively
peaceful election.
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Egypt: Prospects for the Parliamentary Opposition
The increased opposition presence in Egypt's People's Assembly
resulting from the election in April 1987 may make proceedings
more raucous and difficult for the government to control. To
reassert control President Mubarak probably would dissolve the
assembly, possibly after his own reelection on 5 October.
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Afghanistan: Insurgent Response to Soviet and Regime Interdiction 21
Efforts
In response to increased Soviet and Afghan regime interdiction
efforts in recent years, Afghan insurgents have adopted tactics that
have reduced the risk of attacks on supply convoys and made it
easier to move supplies into Afghanistan. Some of these
countermeasures, however, have increased the cost and caused
delays in moving materiel.
Pakistan-USSR: Limited Economic Ties
Pakistan's economic ties to the Soviet Union are too limited and the
potential for expansion too small to provide Moscow with significant
leverage over Islamabad's foreign policies. Major barriers to closer
cooperation include Pakistani disenchantment with the quality of
Soviet equipment and Moscow's support for India.
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Pakistan: Ahmadis Allege Mounting Persecution
Ahmadis?generally considered an Islamic sect but labeled heretics
by Muslim fundamentalists?charge that they are being persecuted
by the Pakistan Government and general public. They have begun a
concerted effort to publicize their problems through letterwriting
campaigns and other nonviolent methods.
Algeria: Seeking To Halt Fundamentalism
The Algerian Government fears Islamic fundamentalism could
transform an apathetic younger generation into Islamic activists and
is trying to avoid the threat to combining repression of religious-
based opposition activities with encouragement of a moderate
"official" Islam. These efforts, however, have failed to address
longer term problems.
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Algeria: Current Internal Political Dynamics
President Chadli Bendjedid, who has ruled Algeria for nine years,
does not face an immediate threat to his hold on power, but his
authority has slipped over the past year largely because of mounting
social and economic problems and factional infighting among the
ruling elite.
Algeria: Bendjedid's Foreign Policy
President Bendjedid has been undertaking highly visible foreign
policy initiatives in response to foreign and domestic pressures. His
moves, which entail risks, are designed to refurbish his leadership at
home and the Arab world and will probably create difficulties for
US-Algerian relations.
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Mauritania's Debt Situation: Trying Hard?With Few Resources 41
Since early 1985, Mauritania has adhered to a rigid austerity
program aimed at reducing its debt problems. The improvement in
the country's debt situation, however, comes at the cost of higher
unemployment and prices for consumer goods, threatening the
popularity of the Taya regime.
Briefs
Saudi Arabia: Effects of Gas Plant Explosion
Women in the Work Force
Lebanon: Syria Still Deeply Involved in the Bekaa Drug Scene
India: Corruption Underwrites Continuing Opium Production
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Some articles in the Near East and South Asia Review are preliminary views of a
subject or speculative, but the contents normally will be coordinated as
appropriate with other offices within CIA. Occasionally an article will represent
the view of a single analyst; an item like this will be designated as a
noncoordinated view. Comments may be directed to the authors, whose phone
numbers are listed.
Reverse Blank
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Near East and
South Asia Review
Articles
Israel-India: A Speculative
View of Military
Cooperation
Israel and India do not have diplomatic ties, but a
convergence of interests in several military areas
would make a closer relationship between the two
mutually beneficial and may eventually lead to
cooperative efforts.
India quickly recognized Israel after the latter was
formed in 1948 but broke ties following the 1973
Arab-Israeli war. Since then, India has permitted
Israel to maintain a consulate in Bombay and?after
intense deliberation?now allows Indian athletes to
participate in sporting events with Israelis.
Nevertheless, official contacts are still nonexistent,
The two nations share a strong interest in monitoring
and limiting Pakistani military power?particularly
Pakistan's nuclear program. We believe such concern
could form the basis of expanded cooperation in
military technology
Existing Contacts
Despite the absence of official ties to Israel and
India's official pro-Arab foreign policy,
Israel has sold
military equipment to India, assisted New Delhi in
technical programs, and sent unofficial but high-
ranking military delegations there. Israel's strapped
economy and the inability of its armed forces to
procure sufficient goods to keep its defense industries
active have forced Tel Aviv to search for alternative
buyers. It undoubtedly views India as a potentially
lucrative market.
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In a highly unusual move, a nine-member Israeli
military delegation visited India in Jul', according to
the The Israelis?
headed by chief of military intelligence General
Shahak?visited nine Indian Air Force bases, some of
which are ordinarily off limits to foreigners, even to
the Soviets.
discussed methods of converting India's
existing aircraft to aerial refueling platforms.
Prospects for Expanding the Military Relationship
We believe that India and Israel have strong
incentives to establish closer military relations?
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covert or otherwise?despite the absence of
diplomatic ties. Both have emerging defense
industries and have encountered similar problems in
developing their high-technology defense sectors.
Technology Exchange. India is keenly interested in
acquiring military and technical abilities that Israel
has already developed. US Embassy and
are having
problems designing their Light Combat Aircraft that
are similar to those Israel experienced with the
recently scrapped Lavi fighter program. India is
determined to pursue the program to help strengthen
the country's technological and industrial base, and
Israel would almost certainly leap at the chance to
market technology it acquired in developing the Lavi.
India is searching for technology to modify transport
aircraft into aerial tankers with midair refueling
capabilities for its Soviet- and Western-origin fighter
and strike aircraft. The Israelis have developed?and
have sold to South Africa and Argentina?refueling
kits for Boeing 707 transports, and we are certain it
would sell them to the Indians. We believe that the
recent visit of the Israeli delegation to the Indian
airbases indicates this may be the next cooperative
venture between the two countries.
We believe that the Indians would benefit from
Israel's experience developing the Merkava tank.
India is planning to produce its own tank?the
Arjun?by 1990. The Israelis are in the forefront in
armor development and ammunition production?
particularly penetrator rounds. Although they would
be unlikely to transfer sensitive armor technology?
especially ceramic and reactive armor?they probably
would sell to the Indians less advanced, but still
effective, armor.
Information Exchange. The Israelis and Indians
would benefit from exploiting each other's hardware
inventories. Each country is equipped similarly to the
other's adversaries?Israel with state-of-the-art
Western gear much like that possessed by Pakistan,
and India with the most modern Soviet hardware
much like that belonging to Syria.
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We suspect the Indians are particularly interested in
obtaining performance specifications of the F-16?
Pakistan's frontline fighter?and in return could
provide Israel details about its MIG-29s?newly
delivered to Syria, and possibly soon to Jordan. The
Israelis have combat experience with their F-16s
against Syrian MIGs that would be invaluable to the
Indians in developing tactics to counter Pakistan's
Western-equipped Air Force.
Exchanges could expand to weapon systems. India
deploys modern Soviet armored vehicles, including T-
72 tanks and BMP armored fighting vehicles, and
antitank weapons, in which Israel is particularly
interested. India could benefit from Israel's
experience in modernizing and modifying captured
Soviet tanks to make its own force more effective.
India is interested in China's use of Israeli technology
to improve its tank force because of the possibility
that Beijing will use these improvements to upgrade
Pakistan's tank fleet
Diplomatic Obstacles to Cooperation
Despite the potential benefits, India's strongly
nonaligned and pro-Arab policies make a significant
increase in Israeli-Indian cooperation unlikely. An
overt Indian relationship with Israel would come at
the expense of India's far more important ties to Arab
states?which New Delhi is not willing to risk. Indian
political leaders, always looking for ways to placate
the country's Muslim minority, value India's high-
profile, friendly ties to the Arab world. New Delhi has
accorded full diplomatic status to the Palestine
Liberation Organization and received its leader, Yasir
Arafat, in July.
Good relations with Arab states also help India to
counter Pakistani influence with the Arabs in
international forums on foreign policy issues such as
UN General Assembly votes on the status of
Kashmir, claimed by both Pakistan and India.
Although New Delhi allows Tel Aviv a low-visibility
consulate in Bombay, it maintains an official distance
from the Israelis and keeps other contacts?such as
sports matches and cultural and academic
exchanges?in unofficial channels.
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Rumors of Israeli-Indian Contingency
Planning To Attack Pakistan
Both Israeli and Indian leaders are concerned about
Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. Israel is
concerned that Pakistan might share its technology
sharing with Arab countries that are openly hostile to
Tel Aviv. India fears a direct threat to its security.
Neither country has viable options to significantly
curtail Pakistan's ability to produce fissile material.
India probably believes Pakistan has the bomb
already, or at least has ready components of one or
more bombs safely hidden. If India believes this, its
primary motive for conducting a preemptive strike?
delaying Pakistan's ability to build a bomb?has
disappeared.
The risk that a unilateral Israeli military strike
against the Pakistani facilities would fail is so high
that Tel Aviv would be unlikely to undertake such a
move except under desperate circumstances. The
risks would be greatly reduced if India could be
persuaded to cooperate at least covertly by providing
Israel with staging facilities. We do not believe,
however, that India would agree to such an
arrangement, particularly since plausible denial
would be almost impossible.
The Pakistanis are nonetheless worried about an
Indian-sponsored or Indian-assisted Israeli attack on
their nuclear facilities.
Israel's strike
in 1981 on Iraq's nuclear reactor, however, and its
ability to conduct long-range bombing missions have
intimidated the Pakistanis, who will continue to fear
an eventual Israeli-Indian attack.
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We believe that Tel Aviv is eager to improve ties to
India and would be willing to use its military expertise
to improve the relationship. Israel has provided
nonsensitive military technology to other countries in
hopes of of attaining diplomatic recognition and
would almost certainly do the same for India. More
important, with the National Unity government's
austerity program reducing defense expenditures,
Israel's defense industries are eager to sell their
products overseas?and India is a potentially lucrative
and largely untapped market. Despite these
inducements, India's close ties to Israel's enemies
probably preclude Tel Aviv from sharing its most
sophisticated military technology?particularly
missile suppression techniques and state-of-the-art
avionics developed for the Lavi fighter aircraft.
Outlook
We believe the deep political differences between
India and Israel will outweigh the potential benefits of
broader military cooperation for the foreseeable
future.
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The same constraints, in addition to operational
limitations, make highly unlikely a joint Israeli-
Indian attack on Pakistani nuclear facilities. An
Israeli strike with or without Indian cooperation 25X1
probably would lead to criticism of New Delhi both 25X1
within India and abroad. Skepticism that the attack
could have occurred without New Delhi's knowledge
and cooperation could precipitate a Pakistani reprisal
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Trends in Middle Eastern
Terrorism: A Workshop
Report
On 24-25 August the Office of Near Eastern and
South Asian Analysis and the Counterterrorism
Center sponsored an experts' workshop on trends in
Middle Eastern terrorism. Although no formal
conclusions were reached by the workshop, several
interesting areas of discussion emerged.
Most experts agree that US counterterrorist policy
has had an impact on the two principal state sponsors
of terrorism in the Arab world. Both Syria and Libya
have become more cautious in their approach to high-
profile acts of terrorism, although neither has
abandoned it as a policy tool. Palestinian terrorism is
in a prolonged lull that is not likely to change
appreciably in the next year but which may increase
gradually as the Palestinians strengthen their hold on
pockets of southern Lebanon.
Radical Shia terrorism--much of which has an
Iranian sponsor?is the greatest threat in the next
year. Experts concur that the Lebanese radical Shia
group Hizballah has already been implicated in
several terrorist attacks in Western Europe and may
well sponsor more. Hizballah seems willing to align
itself with other terrorist groups?increasing its threat
potential. Hizballah and its Iranian patron have yet to
pay a significant price for their acts of terror?
especially hostage taking?which experts agree
encourages further terrorism.
Arab State Sponsors?More Cautious
The US retaliatory raid on Libya in April 1986 and
the sanctions imposed on Syria the following
November have had an impact on both states.
Although neither has abandoned terrorism, most
analysts agree they are more cautious and less likely
to sponsor high-risk acts of terror like the Abu Nidal
Organization attacks on airports in Rome and Vienna
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in December 1985. Analysts stress that the impact of
US actions was enhanced by other factors including
support from the European allies and the political and
economic crisis affecting Syria and Libya.
Damascus's acute economic problems, for example,
greatly magnified the psychological impact of the
limited US and European sanctions.
Experts speculate Libya will revert to its former
patterns of terrorist behavior sooner than Syria.
Damascus is exploiting its occupation of two-thirds of
Lebanon to improve its image in dealing with Western
nations while maintaining ties to various terrorist
groups. Libya's setbacks in Chad, on the other hand,
may incline Tripoli to strike out soon at French and
US targets.
Analysts expressed concern at the community's ability
to monitor the state sponsors' activities as they try
harder to hide their involvement in terrorism. If the
sponsors step up their attempts to conceal their role, it
will be more difficult to sustain international pressure
on them.
Palestinian Terrorism?A Lull
After a surge of attacks on high-visibility targets in
1985, the level of Palestinian terrorism has receded.
Analysts believe this lull reflects:
? The breakdown in the Arab-Israeli peace process. 25X1
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? Palestinian preoccupation with the camps war" in
Lebanon.
? Internal leadership difficulties.
The most notorious Palestinian terrorist group, the
Abu Nidal Organization, is undergoing a profound
transformation. Although it remains fundamentally a
terrorist rather than a political organization, it is
developing a sizable militia in Lebanon and is
becoming a political force to be reckoned with in the
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Palestinian resistance movement. It is unclear how
much appeal Abu Nidal has among disaffected
Palestinian youth.
Another
unknown is the degree to which a stalemated peace
process will foster nihilistic terrorism among
despondent and frustrated Palestinians.
Experts noted the gradual revival of Palestinian
strength in part of South Lebanon?especially around
Sidon?and the buildup in the Palestinian presence in
Libya. These developments could set the stage for
increased terrorism in the next year.
On balance, most analysts concur that the Israeli
invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the Syrian-PLO rift
that followed in 1983 have significantly eroded the
PLO's political clout. This tacit Israeli-Syrian
cooperation against an independent Palestinian
movement underscores the volatility and
unpredictability of Middle Eastern trends.
Shia Terrorism?A Growth Industry
Experts agree that Shia radicals pose the greatest
immediate terrorist danger. The hostage threat in
Lebanon remains acute, and there is growing evidence
of Hizballah terrorist activity in Western Europe and
Western Africa.
and terrorist apparatus. It must deal more carefully,
however, with the more independent political figures
in the movement like Shaykh Muhammad Fadlallah.
There is no question of deep and direct Iranian
culpability in hostage taking, although analysts
continue to believe that the family and clan interests
of various Hizballah activists like Imad Mughniyah
and the Hammadi clan play a role in hostage
developments. Analysts stress that Iran and Hizballah
see the world similarly and have few significant areas
of policy disagreement.
Analysts concur that inconsistencies in Western
policies toward Iran and Hizballah have encouraged
their terrorist activities. Neither has yet to pay a
significant price for their terrorism.
most analysts foresee an emerging Shia
terrorist threat outside the Middle East.
Iranian-Hizballah relations are difficult to
characterize, but most experts agree that Iran seems
to play a close to decisive voice in Hizballah's military
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Although the existence of large Islamic immigrant
populations (North Africans in France and Spain,
Turks in West Germany and Austria) is well known,
Some estimates say there are as many as 3
million Muslims in France, including about 60,000
university students. Iranian radicals have been
proselytizing there since well before the 1979
revolution, but the extent of their success is unclear.
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Iran-Syria-Iraq:
An Event Analysis
We used event analysis?a method of systematically
tracking the interactions between states?to examine
the last seven years of relations between Iran and
Syria and between Iraq and Syria. The analysis was
intended to determine the patterns evident in each
relationship and to identify, if possible, warning signs
of a change in either relationship. The results show
that Iran remains strongly committed to a
relationship with Syria and that Iraq began signaling
Damascus in 1986 that it would like to improve
relations. The Iraqi-Syrian pattern was too erratic to
be used confidently as a basis for warning. The
pattern of Iranian-Syrian relations was strongly
defined, however, suggesting that a change in volume
and type of bilateral activity is likely to signal
significant deterioration in the relationship.
Event Analysis
The main strengths of event analysis are organization
and flexibility. It can be used for sophisticated
quantitative analysis but also lends itself to qualitative
interpretations. The object is to see "who is saying
what to whom" through a study of reported events.
The data for our analysis came from the FBIS Daily
Report. Its use has two limitations. First, reports do
not cover the full range of interactions between states.
Second, each set of country reports probably has
different criteria for the selection of items.
Nonetheless, we believe that the Daily Report reflects
reasonably consistent criteria applied to reports on
any one country or pair of countries, making an
analysis of changes over time meaningful.
Event analysis is coded by date, actor, type of event,
and target. The codes allow computerized tracking of
activity and provide a basis for later investigation.
The scheme is based on the World Event Interaction
Survey (WEIS) developed at the University of
Southern California. WEIS defines events along a
continuum of intensity.
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Analysis focused on three indicators: event volume,
actor-target ratio, and activity range. The event
volume is the number of recorded actions between
each pair of states in each year. Changes in event
volume over time give a "big picture" of the Iranian-
Syrian and Iraqi-Syrian relationships.
The actor-target ratio assesses the degree of interest
each state has in a relationship. The "actor" is the
state initiating an event, and the "target" is the state
to which the action is directed. If a state continues as
the main "actor" over time, it probably has a higher
level of interest in the relationship. It is trying, by its
actions, to signal the target. This signal may be either
positive or negative. Motivations and intent must be
determined by the analyst.
The activity range refers to the intensity of a
relationship as determined by the categories of events
defined by the WEIS coding scheme. It is constructed
by a simple count of the type of events that occur
between states. The object is to determine which
events frequently appear and, in doing so, to assess the
general nature of a relationship.
Event analysis can not only summarize the nature of
past relationships but also indicate approaching
change. The more clearly defined the past behavior,
the firmer the basis for identifying warning
indicators. The analyst must look for behavioral
changes that signal a shift in tactics or concern.
The Iran-Syria-Iraq Triangle
The event analysis of the Iran-Syria-Iraq triangle
focused on the question, "Will tensions with Iran over
Hizballah's activities in Lebanon, along with
pressures from the Soviets and moderate Arabs for a
rapprochement with Baghdad, shift Syria's
orientation away from its alliance with Tehran?"
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Iraq aims to break up the Iranian-Syrian alliance and
end Syria's limited military aid to Iran. Isolation of
Iran from its most important ally would, in the Iraqi
view, increase the likelihood that Tehran would wind
down its war against the Saddam Husayn regime.
Baghdad believes that current Syrian-Iranian tensions
over Lebanon provide it an opening for improving
relations with Damascus. Iraq also hopes that Syria's
economic difficulties will interest President Assad in
the increased financial assistance from moderate
Arab states that would accompany rapprochement
with Baghdad.
Assad has been increasing Syria's contacts with Iraq,
partly to press Iran to restrain its Hizballah client in
Lebanon. Although Iran desires to preserve its
relationship with Syria, it is suspicious of contacts
between Damascus and Baghdad. It has stated that
improvement in relations between the two will
damage the Iran-Syria relationship. Iran has also
refused an offer by Assad to mediate the war with
Iraq.
Syria-Iran: Iran as Initiator
The data for the Syrian-Iranian relationship show a
strong pattern of interaction beginning in 1982 and
continuing into 1987. Iran has been the main initiator
of events throughout this period.
The Event Volume. Changes in the event volume in
this relationship correspond to analyst views of its
high and low points. The rise in 1982-83 reflects the
development of a close bilateral relationship after the
Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Shared
opposition to the US-brokered talks between Israel
and Lebanon intensified relations. A series of
specialized meetings between Iran and Syria took
place in 1983.
The drop in volume in 1984 occurred when we believe
that Syria was more concerned with internal
developments than foreign policy maneuvering.
Assad's heart attack sparked a succession rivalry,
followed by a government crisis. His health improved
by 1985, after which Syria again concentrated on
international affairs.
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Figure 1
Iran?Syria Event Volume
0 --1
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1988 1987
We believe that the near doubling of events between
the countries in 1985 can be explained in part by
trilateral meetings of Syria, Iran, and Libya and,
more important, by Syria's growing dialogue with
Iran over Hizballah activities in Lebanon. Tensions in
Lebanon have been the dominant factor affecting
relations from 1985 to the present.
The Actor-Target Ratio. Iran has initiated more
events than Syria, suggesting that the relationship has
been more important to the Iranians. Iran's concern
grew after 1984. It evidently was signaling Syria that
they needed to reinforce relations, despite Iranian
moves to exert increased influence in Lebanon
through Hizballah. Syria maintained a low response
level both before and immediately after Assad's heart
attack in 1984.
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Figure 2
Iran?Syria Interactions
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1988
I. Initiated by Iran
Initiated by Syria
The Activity Range. Activity between Iran and Syria
has included five categories of events: comments
(favorable), statements of approval, reassurance,
agreement/reward, and consultation (meetings). Iran,
as the main initiator of events, has used a combination
of high-level exchanges, rewards (such as oil
agreements and memorandums of understanding),
and statements of support to court Syria. Syria has
confined its behavior to statements of general support
and to participation in selected events (signing of
agreements, receiving Iranian visitors). Syrian
officials have not visited Tehran as often as Iranians
have gone to Damascus.
Iraq-Syria: Iraq as Initiator
The Event Volume. The fluctuations in event volume
for Iraqi-Syrian relations reflect both the shifting
tides of the Iran-Iraq war and the efforts by Jordan
and other moderate Arab states to reduce tensions
between Syria and Iraq. In 1982, for example, Syria
closed its border with Iraq, eliminating the principal
routes for exporting Iraqi oil. The closure predictably
triggered protests from the Iraqis. The high event
volume for the year reflects this situation.
A change in Iraq's war goal from "victory" to a cease-
fire that would leave the Ba'th regime and Iraqi
territory intact also occurred in 1982. Heavy
casualties, declining oil revenues, and the loss of
initiative in the war moved Iraq to implement a
9
50
40
30
20
10
Figure 3
Iraq?Syria Event Volume
o
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
strategy in which willingness to negotiate a settlement
and a search for alternative pressures on the Iranians
accompanied military responses. It also attempted to
reduce Syria's support to Iran by claiming the support
violated Arab solidarity.
The propaganda war between Iraq and Syria
increased in 1983-84. Charges and countercharges of
terrorism and subversion characterize the event file.
The volume climbed in 1984 as the Iraqis increased
pressure on Syria during the tense period following
Assad's health problems.
The event volume rose again in 1986 after the Iraqi
defeat at Al Faw. The shock of this setback led Iraq to
intensify its efforts to conclude the war. It began to
signal Syria that it wanted to improve relations,
hoping that closer ties would further isolate Iran from
the Arab world, while reducing the limited Syrian
support for the Iranian war effort.
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20
15
10
5
o
Figure 4
Iraq?Syria Interactions
1981 1982 198,3 1984 1985 1986
ill Initiated by Iraq
Initiated by Syria
:?:*:
Much of the fluctuation from 1985 to the present is
the result of Jordan's efforts to ease tensions between
Syria and Iraq. During 1987, Saddam and Assad
agreed in principle to reduce their propaganda. In
April the two leaders held an inconclusive summit
meeting. The event volume for June 1987 is
significantly less then that of the preceding year.
The Actor-Target Ratio. Between 1981 and 1983 both
sides hurled charges and countercharges. Iraq blasted
Syria for its support of Iran, activities in Lebanon,
and other foreign policies. Each pointed to domestic
unrest in the other. Syria violated Iraqi airspace.
Since 1983, Iraq has been the principal initiator of
events and has continued to lambaste Syria. The
Syrians have appeared uninterested in replying to
Iraqi charges and have used a low response level to
maintain its options.
In 1986, Iraq initiated four out of five events,
indicating that it wanted to provoke a response from
Syria, probably to counter Iran's victory at Al Faw.
Criticisms of the Iran-Syria relationship continued,
but for the first time Iraq made subtle statements
about a rapprochement with Syria.
The Activity Range. Interactions between Iraq and
Syria have been limited almost exclusively to two
categories: comments (negative) and accusations/
denigrations. A slight change in the activity range
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Figure 5
Syria: Relations with Iran and Iraq
(Measured by Event Volume)
50
40
30
20
10
0
1981 1982 198.3 1984 1985 1986 1987
? Iran?Syria
---- Iraq?Syria
took place in 1985-86, when verbal exchanges became
less intense (for example, a higher proportion of them
were comments rather than accusations).
Events other than negative verbal ones have been rare
in Iraqi-Syrian relations. Two exceptions in 1987
suggest the importance of the acts: the high-level
meetings between Syria and Iraq and the agreement
in principle to tone down propaganda.
Looking Ahead
Iran-Syria. Several warning signs of change would
probably appear in the event file should the Iran-
Syria relationship deteriorate further. Iran probably
would initiate a large amount of activity, causing the
actor-target ratio to become more unbalanced.
Because the relationship is so important, Iran would
most likely send signals of concern to Syria before any
break. Past behavior suggests the signals would take
the form of an increase in meetings and statements of
concern, although we would expect the earliest sign of
change to be a sudden shift in verbal exchanges from
"comment" to "accusation." The number of meetings
would probably escalate quickly and then abruptly
drop. Event volume would show a corresponding
trend.
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Iraq-Syria. The erratic pattern of the Iraq-Syria
relationship suggests that the warning period
preceding a change in behavior would probably be
short and the warning signs ambiguous. The two most
probable signs of change would be a slight movement
away from the present negative, verbal categories of
behavior and a moderate increase in the event volume
as both countries attempted to signal a willingness to
cooperate. Such signals, however, might not be strong
enough to alert analysts to the possibility of change.
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The Partition of Lebanon, September 1987
BEIRUT
Syrian
occupied
Sidon
Palestinian
controlled
Druze
controlled
Tripoli.
Christian
controlled
Contested
UNDOF
Zone
Tyre., r 1
/ I
I
'1 1 Golan
I
Heights
I 1
c..e .,
---"'"? \ ?'...?,i Israel I
\1949 / (Israeli
occupied)
----
----- I
Syria
DAMASCUS
0 20 Kilometers
0 20 Miles
Boundary ,cert,entatton r,
not necessarily autheritatlye
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The Lebanese Presidential
Election: Setting the Stage
Lebanon's presidential election is not scheduled to
take place until fall 1988, but it is already becoming
the focus of Lebanese domestic politics. The positions
of most major political leaders and factions are well
known, even though only one candidate has officially
announced. Although continuing violence and social
and economic turmoil highlight the confessional
mistrust and inability to cooperate, most Lebanese
view the presidency as an important symbol of
national unity and hope that a relatively peaceful
election by the legislature will take place.
The desire for an election is consistent with the
current jockeying for position within Lebanon.
Although the terms of the unwritten National
Covenant of 1943 reserve the presidency for a
Maronite Christian, the 1988 election presents the
most realistic opportunity ever for a member of
another confessional group to win the office.
The election of a Lebanese President has traditionally
been accompanied by violence. In 1958 President
Camille Chamoun sought to run for a second term
against Lebanese Muslim and Syrian opposition,
leading to a civil war that ended only after the United
States and United Nations intervened and Lebanese
Army chief Fuad Shehab was elected as the new
President. In 1976 the selection of a succcessor to
Sulayman Franjiyah was a major instigator of the
second civil war. Ilyas Sarkis was elected only
following the intervention of 30,000 Syrian soldiers
and the death of more than 40,000 Lebanese and
Palestinians in civil strife. In 1982 the Israeli invasion
was in part intended to secure the election of
Christian hardliner Bashir Gemayel to the presidency.
Israeli tanks guarded the Parliament as it voted
Bashir into office. He was assassinated within weeks
by Syrian agents, and his brother Amine was selected
to replace him.
Actors Behind the Scenes
The election of a Lebanese President has generally
been influenced heavily by pressures from both
internal and external forces. An election in 1988 will
occur under these same circumstances.
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Syria. Syria, whose troops occupy large parts of
Lebanon, is widely viewed as the major force in next
year's election, and any successful candidate will
require Syrian backing. Syria's goals in Lebanon have
remained unchanged since its intervention in the civil
war in 1976. Damascus hopes to balance more evenly
the political power between Christians and Muslims
and to tie the country more closely to Syria so that its
military control of Lebanon's Bekaa Valley, which
Syrians consider a likely avenue of Israeli attack, is
assured. We believe that the Syrians want to prevent 25X1
the creation on their western border of a potentially
hostile Muslim fundamentalist state or a Christian
state dependent on Israel. In preparation for the
election, the Syrians have formed a coalition of
Lebanese Muslims, the Liberation and Unification
Front, which we believe will be used to depict the
Syrian-backed candidate as having widespread
support. 25X1
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The Christians. The Christian community is
searching for presidential candidates who can bridge
the growing rift between hardliners represented by the
Lebanese Forces militia and less militant members of
the community. The Lebanese Forces has not yet
chosen a candidate, according to Deputy Commander
Karim Pakraduni, but they intend to put forward
their own candidate. We believe this candidate,
possibly Lebanese Forces leader Samir Ja Ja, will run
on an anti-Syrian platform and attempt to use the
office to restore Maronite dominance throughout
Lebanon or, short of that, de facto Christian
independence in their enclave north of Beirut. Less
militant Christian viewpoints are expressed by a
myriad of candidates expressing interest in the
presidency.
The Muslims. The political ambitions of Lebanon's
Muslim community are split between different
groups. Struggling to maintain its position as the
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Election Mechanics
The Lebanese presidential election is governed by
Article 49 of the Constitution, which says that "the
President of the Republic shall be elected by the
Chamber of Deputies by secret ballot and by a two-
thirds majority of the votes. After the first ballot, an
absolute majority will be sufficient."
Lebanese parliamentary elections, which are
scheduled every four years, have not been held since
1972 because of security conditions. The current
body has repeatedly extended its tenure. Seventeen of
its 99 members have died, prompting a debate over
the definition of a quorum. Sides are drawn between
those who favor a quorum based on the full 99
members and those favoring a more liberal reading of
the Constitution with a quorum based on the 82
surviving members.
On the basis of 99 deputies, a candidate would have
to receive 66 votes on the first ballot or 50 on
subsequent ballots to win. tf the vote is based on 82
deputies, which, according to some Lebanese
deputies, has been generally accepted, a candidate
would need only 55 on the first ballot or 42 on
subsequent ballots to win.
The Constitution does not directly address the
potentially troublesome question of the number of
deputies that must be present to establish a quorum
when meeting to elect a president. Some believe that
the election can proceed if a simple majority is
present?no small feat given the fact that several
deputies reside outside Lebanon or are simply
unwilling to risk attendance. In such a case, the first
ballot requiring a two-thirds vote would be declared
invalid, and the chamber would elect a president on a
subsequent ballot by majority. Others argue that
two-thirds must be present to establish a quorum.
The venue of the balloting will be important. The
Lebanese Parliament building, located near the
demarcation line between East and West Beirut, has
not been used since the civil war, and the deputies
have met in the "Mansur Palace," once the home of a
member of Parliament. It is also located near the
demarcation line and is vulnerable to violence in the
area.
principal representative of Lebanon's Shias?the
largest sect in Lebanon?Amal may attempt to
disrupt the 1988 election. Amal militia leader Nabih
Barri has proposed the election of a Muslim president
in 1988, and other Amal officials have stated they will
not accept the election of a Maronite. Although Amal
has not proposed a candidate, we believe Barri
harbors a desire for the presidency. Yet we believe
Amal can be coerced to support Damascus's choice in
the presidential race because the organization
depends on Syrian support for its survival.
We do not believe that other Muslim groups will
directly affect the outcome of the election. Because
Syrian troops occupy almost all Sunni Muslim areas
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of Lebanon, we believe that most Sunnis realize they
cannot afford to oppose Syrian policy on the election.
The more radical representative of the Lebanese
Shias, the pro-Iranian Hizballah, will not put forth a
candidate of its own, given its goal of creating an
Islamic republic. Hizballah, however, probably will
influence the outcome of the election through acts
affecting the security situation throughout Lebanon.
Outlook
Lebanon's presidency has become such a weakened
office that we believe it is the campaign, as much as
the outcome of the election, that holds the most
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Potential Candidates
Although only one candidate has officially entered
the race, several people have been mentioned or
expressed interest as potential candidates:
? Johnny Abdu. Currently Lebanese Ambassador to
Switzerland and former chief of Lebanese military
intelligence, Abdu has approached Saudi' Lebanese
businessman Bak Hariri for assistance in gaining
Syrian and Saudi backing for his bid for the
presidency.
? Michel Awn. Commander of the Lebanese Armed
Forces, Awn has an established base of support
within the Christian community. He might win
Syrian approval but would be unacceptable to the
militant Lebanese Forces militia. At this time, we
have no indication that Awn is actively pursuing the
presidency.
? Dany Chamoun. President of the militant National
Liberal Party, Chamoun is the only officially
announced candidate, according to the US Embassy
in Beirut. Chamoun may attempt to burnish his
militant credentials in the coming months to
enhance his chances for support from anti-Syrian
groups, such as the Lebanese Forces militia.
? Rene Mouawd. A Maronite member of Parliament
from North Lebanon, Mouawd is rumored to be the
preferred candidate of the Soviet Union and
acceptable to Syria. It is unlikely that the Soviets
are supporting a candidate this early in the
campaign, and he remains an unknown.
? Henri Sjayr. A wealthy Lebanese businessman and
cousin of the Maronite patriarch, Sfayr has already
approached the US Government for support in the
presidential campaign. He is a relative unknown
and is unlikely to gain sufficient Maronite support
for a successful bid.
? Jean Ubayd. A Maronite former aide to President
Gemayel and pro-Syrian, Ubayd was kidnaped by
Hizballah in February 1987 and released after
intense Syrian pressure.
Reverse Blank 15
immediate importance. As social and economic
conditions continue to deteriorate, we expect a
prolonged and violent campaign that will increase
unrest and threaten a collapse of the country's
remaining political and economic institutions. We do
not foresee the emergence of a president strong
enough to heal the damage caused by the campaign.
The most likely election winner will be a relatively
apolitical Christian technocrat?much like President
Sarkis?who will pose the least threat to the interests
of Syria and other major actors.
Alternative Scenarios
Although it is not likely that any of the forces
involved in the election will accept an extension of
President Gemayel's term, which expires in
September 1988, there is precedent for an extension.
In 1948 Bishara al-Khuri, Lebanon's first president
after independence, persuaded Parliament to allow
him to serve a second term.
Another possibility, less remote, is a coup attempt by
the Lebanese Forces or elements of the Lebanese
Army sympathetic to the Christian hardliners' views.
Samir Ja Ja might attempt a coup before the election
to avoid the likely election of a Syrian-controlled
president or after election of such a president. There is
limited evidence that the Lebanese Forces is
considering such an attempt, and it continues to seek
support in the Lebanese Army for its cause
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Egypt: Prospects for the
Parliamentary Opposition
The increased opposition presence in Egypt's People's
Assembly resulting from the election in April 1987
may make proceedings more raucous and difficult for
the government to control. President Mubarak has
signaled his determination to keep tight control over
the assembly, however, and the opposition's strength
is diminished by internal divisions. If opposition
deputies waste opportunities for constructive debate in
favor of sniping at the government, Mubarak
probably would dissolve the parliament and call for a
fresh election?possibly within the next few months,
after his own reelection by national referendum on 5
October.
We do not believe that the strengthened opposition
poses a threat to the ruling National Democratic
Party's?or Mubarak's?hold on power. Opposition
deputies are unlikely to provoke a major confrontation
with the government, although they will almost
certainly take advantage of opportunities to score
points against Mubarak. We believe that an
opposition campaign to dramatize and exploit
sensitive national issues?such as economic reform
and relations with the United States and Israel?
would reinforce Mubarak's innate caution in dealing
with pressing problems.
The April Election
In February 1987 Mubarak dissolved the People's
Assembly, which had been elected in 1984 for a five-
year term, to sidestep a court ruling that had
invalidated the law under which it was elected. In
calling for a new election more than two years early,
the President risked reducing the National
Democratic Party's hefty majority that he would need
this summer for his renomination to the presidency.
On balance, Mubarak appears to have won his
gamble, but at a cost:
? The National Democratic Party won a reduced but
nonetheless handsome majority that was sufficient
to ensure Mubarak's renomination for a second
term in office.
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? Mubarak's goal to increase and diversify the
opposition representation was also reached, adding
to the election's popular credibility and
strengthening the President's program of gradual
democratization. By virtually all accounts, the
election was the most fairly conducted since the
1952 revolution. With almost 100 opposition
deputies?a twofold increase?the new People's
Assembly will probably represent public opinion
better than its predecessor.
? The price Mubarak paid for this diversity, however,
was the influx of a major Islamic opposition element 25X1
in the assembly that may not provide the degree of
national consensus in favor of government programs
that Mubarak seeks. 25X1
The new official opposition is an alliance of
convenience between the Socialist Labor Party, the
tiny and weak Liberal Party, and the technically
illegal Muslim Brotherhood. These groups pooled
their resources in the early days of the campaign to
ensure that they would gain at least the 8 percent of
the national vote that is necessary for representation.
Socialist Labor Party chief Ibrahim Shukri was
named the official opposition leader, but it is almost
certainly the Brotherhood and its Islamic allies that
are setting the opposition agenda. Brotherhood
leaders claim at least 36 of the 59 seats held by the
alliance.
Another result of the election was the further
weakenening of the New Wafd?the only major
secular alternative to the Islamic alliance. The New
Wafd won only 36 seats, 21 less than in the last
assembly where it was the only legal party
represented. It is unlikely to play a major role in
assembly proceedings. The Wafd's decline has
deprived the National Democratic Party of a potential
moderate center-right ally and given greater scope to
the alliance. Saddled with an aging, ineffective
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leadership that is focused on the past, the Wafd has
concentrated on maintaining prerevolutionary
loyalties and family connections rather than
recruiting and nurturing a younger generation of
supporters. According to US Embassy reporting,
Wafd leaders are oblivious to their weakness, yet are
actively seeking ways to challenge Mubarak?a high-
risk course that may indicate their desperation about
the party's declining fortunes.
The Alliance Agenda: Collaboration or Confrontation?
We believe the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies will
pursue diligently but patiently their agenda to bring
about an Islamic society in Egypt. They remain
fiercely committed to the implementation of Islamic
law, but they insist that legal reform should be
undertaken only gradually and after careful study.
Brotherhood deputies have told US officials that their
chief goal is to employ Islam to bolster development,
increase production, and provide people with adequate
food, housing, and other necessities.
The Brotherhood appears willing to work within the
system to advance its goals, using its new public
platform and parliamentary techniques to maximum
political advantage. This is a significant departure
from its history of unrelenting and sometimes violent
opposition to the government. In particular,
Brotherhood leaders say they want to avoid disruptive
tactics that would give the government an excuse to
crack down on their operations. Embassy and
Consulate General reporting indicates that
Brotherhood deputies plan to emphasize points of
agreement with the government and will back
Mubarak's program when they consider it reasonable.
They claim they will not oppose the ruling party
without good cause?a posture that will make it
difficult for the National Democratic Party leadership
to dismiss them as irresponsible and may force the
ruling party to engage in serious debate. Indeed, the
alliance voted unanimously to renominate Mubarak
for the presidency last July.
The Brotherhood is likely to use its proven electoral
strength and new image of respectability to bolster its
claim to legal representation as a political party.
Although often turned down in the past, Embassy
reports indicate Brotherhood leaders are once again
planning to petition the government for permission to
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establish a party. The law forbids parties to be based
on religion, however, and Mubarak is virtually certain
to bar any exceptions.
In time, the alliance may conclude it has little to gain
by behaving responsibly. Unlike its counterparts in
the British and other Western systems, the opposition
in Egypt has no chance to gain power through a vote
of no confidence without a full-scale election.
Consequently, it has greatly reduced incentives for
adopting a statesmanlike posture.
If the assembly fails to make progress on Brotherhood
goals over the next few months and openly resists
implementing Islamic law, we expect the Brotherhood
and its allies to adopt a tougher and more
confrontational posture on sensitive issues to put
pressure on Mubarak, possibly to provoke a new
election.
Mubarak's Perspective
Mubarak appears committed to working with the new
assembly to advance his program of democratization.
He has long sought a way to bring moderate Islamic
elements into the political mainstream in order to
expose their arguments to public scrutiny and isolate
the extremist fringe. Above all, he seeks to build a
broad national consensus around himself in
preparation for difficult years of economic belt-
tightening.
Even so, with a crowded political agenda this fall,
Mubarak is hedging his bets on the question of
opposition moderation. Many in Egypt's ruling
establishment have expressed strong misgivings about
letting the Brotherhood into politics. Surprised by its
strong showing, Mubarak has wasted little time
looking for ways to prevent the opposition from
interfering with his exercise of power:
? We believe that Rifaat al-Magoub's reappointment
as Speaker of the People's Assembly is the clearest
indication that Mubarak intends to prevent
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opposition activities from getting out of hand. An
adept and wily parliamentarian, Magoub was
widely blamed for poor relations between the
National Democratic Party and the opposition in
the last assembly. He will almost certainly control
debate with an iron hand and is likely to use all of
his parliamentary skills to manipulate and
embarrass the opposition into submission.
? Mubarak did not allot any of the 10 deputy
positions reserved for presidential nominees to
opposition figures?a clear indication that he is
reluctant to further strengthen the opposition's
hand. In the past, Mubarak has used these
appointments to give some political groups token
representation.
Opposition Tensions
The opposition's capacity for troublemaking may be
undercut by internal differences that the National
Democratic Party will almost certainly attempt to
exploit. Despite its increased strength, the opposition
is far from monolithic. The alliance partners and the
Wafd are old political enemies who are highly
unlikely to cooperate effectively. There is a strong
chance that, after an initial honeymoon, controversy
and splits will erupt as all sides seek to justify their
competing claims.
Discord within the alliance along secular-religious
lines began to surface even before the election and is
likely to grow. In addition, the Socialist Labor Party's
coalition with the Muslim Brotherhood has generated
discontent within the party and challenged its socialist
ideology, several
senior Socialist Labor Party leaders accused Ibrahim
Shukri of betraying the party by joining the coalition.
They maintained that the Brotherhood holds
conflicting beliefs?that it has traditionally opposed
socialism, for example--and would attempt to control
the alliance. If this happened, they threatened to expel
the Brotherhood from the coalition and oust Shukri as
party leader. Instead, Shukri expelled them. Some of
the dissidents are considering forming a new party of
the center-left to fill the void created by the Socialist
Labor Party's rightward shift under Brotherhood
influence. Similar disputes could break out in the
19
Liberal Party if leader Mustafa Kamal Murad
mounts a power play to regain control of his assembly
members from his Islamic extremist deputy.
Fears of Brotherhood domination appear well
founded.
the Brotherhood believes it controls the alliance and
will resist any attempt by its partners to manipulate
its agenda. The Brotherhood is pressing Shukri to
provide the Socialist Labor Party with an Islamic
name but is unlikely to push the issue in the near term
in the face of the party's resistance.
We do not believe the Brotherhood will be immune
from infighting.
five distinct factions exist within the
organization, and disputes between them could
hamper its activities. Perhaps most serious is the rift
between the wealthy old guard, represented by the
current leadership, and younger radical members who
believe these leaders collaborated with the
government to gain political power. If the
Brotherhood's policy of nonconfrontation in the
People's Assembly does not bear fruit, we expect the
radicals to press the leaders to take a harder line
against the government. Although unlikely, we cannot
rule out the possibility that impatient radicals will
target old guard deputies for assassination.
Outlook: A New Election?
We do not believe the Brotherhood's entry into
conventional politics presents an immediate threat to
the existing system. Indeed, the presence of a large
opposition could force National Democratic Party
deputies to debate seriously and work harder for
popular support. A vocal opposition, however, is likely
to reinforce Mubarak's innate caution and persuade
him to go slow on sensitive but pressing issues like
economic reform.
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If the assembly becomes too disruptive, we believe
Mubarak will not hesitate to dissolve it and call for a
new election, possibly as early as this fall. He and
many other Egyptians are eager to scrap the country's
complex "party list" system of voting in favor of
direct voting for individual candidates. By ensuring
Mubarak's renomination, the current assembly has
already fulfilled its most immediate purpose.
Even if a new election is held, the prospects for an
opposition coalition coming to power are extremely
remote. Mubarak probably would attempt to
minimize the Muslim Brotherhood presence, but the
ruling National Democratic Party still possesses
overwhelming advantages in any electoral contest.
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Afghanistan: Insurgent Response
to Soviet and Regime
Interdiction Efforts
In response to increased Soviet and Afghan regime
interdiction efforts in recent years, Afghan insurgents
have adopted tactics that have reduced the risk of
attack on supply convoys and, in our view, made it
easier to move supplies into Afghanistan. Some of
these countermeasures, however, have increased the
financial cost and caused delays in moving materiel
from Pakistan and within Afghanistan. We believe
the threat of interdiction will remain a serious but not
insurmountable obstacle to insurgent resupply.
The Insurgents Fight Back
Beginning in early 1985, Soviet and regime forces in
Afghanistan increased their efforts to interdict
insurgent supplies, primarily by seeking to block
routes from Pakistan. These efforts?which include
ambushes, mining operations, the establishment of
security posts, the increased use of Special Purpose
Forces, and air attacks--made it more difficult for
resistance commanders to resupply their forces and, in
our view, contributed to escalating transportation
costs. Many insurgent commanders complained that
interdiction was hurting their military effort.
The success of the Soviet interdiction effort was
almost certainly due partly to the lax security
procedures of the insurgents. To reduce the impact of
Soviet and regime interdiction, some insurgents have
adopted countermeasures?including smaller
caravans, alternative routes, and more effective
counterintelligence?to improve the security of
caravans moving supplies from Pakistan.
Probably the most widely adopted security precaution
has been the restriction of caravan movement to the
night hours, particularly in high- risk areas.
the insurgents
consider night the best time for travel because their
caravans are less visible and, in the event of ambush,
caravan personnel can escape into the darkness.
Convoys often begin their journey in the late
afternoon and continue through the night. While
traveling through high-risk areas, caravan vehicles do
21
not use headlights and the insurgents are not allowed
to smoke for fear of being detected,
During the day the
insurgents usually rest, hiding vehicles and pack
animals.
The threat of interdiction has prompted some groups
to reduce the size of their caravans.
smaller
convoys are more difficult to spot from the air and, in
the event of successful ambush, the loss of a small
convoy is preferable to the annihilation of a large one.
Still, some resistance groups continue to travel in
large convoys
these insurgents feel more secure in a large group and
believe they would be better able to defend against
ambush if the convoy were detected.
Repeated interdiction and emplacement of security
posts on some of the main supply routes have forced
the insurgents to use secondary routes more
frequently.
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In general, insurgent caravans are more heavily
armed and security conscious than in previous years.
Scouts are sometimes deployed on motorcycles. The
motorcyclists generally travel several hours ahead of
the caravan to check the route, question the local
populace, and return to the caravan with regular
security reports. If a motorcyclist does not report, the
caravan is halted and a detour may be taken,
Counterintelligence efforts have improved in response
to greater regime efforts to penetrate resistance
groups. Information on a caravan's route and
departure and arrival times are usually closely
guarded.
Although not common, some insurgent groups have
established security posts along supply routes.
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When members of an insurgent group have warning
of a planned Soviet ambush of their caravan, they
usually take an alternative route. On some occasions,
however, the insurgents counterattack, with the
element of surprise often working to their advantage.
Last July, for example, insurgents under Hizbi Islami
(Gulbuddin) Commander Farouki mounted a
successful counterambush in Paktia Province that
caused heavy casualties to a Soviet ambush team.
Despite a better overall security record for the
insurgents, some caravans still follow lax security
procedures, leaving themselves vulnerable to attack.
Noise and lack of discipline in large caravans are
cited as continuing problems, for example.
Increased Cooperation
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We believe some insurgent groups are relying more on
the civilian population to provide early warning
against Soviet and regime road ambushes.
Although many insurgent groups
have increased their reliance on the civilian
population to provide information on the presence of
Soviet patrols or ambush teams, the depopulation of
some areas?particularly in the eastern border
provinces through which most insurgent supply routes
run--has deprived many insurgent convoys of this
valuable intelligence resource, in our view.
The Air Threat
Several insurgent commanders said last year that they
considered attacks by Soviet and regime aircraft?
particularly helicopters?to be the most serious
interdiction threat.
23
source, the insurgent practice of traveling only at
night neutralized this threat somewhat by making
caravans less visible. Nevertheless, many insurgents
continued to have difficulty defending. themselves
against these attacks,
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Since the introduction of more sophisticated air
defense weapons?including Stingers and Blowpipe
surface-to-air missiles?into Afghanistan last fall, the
insurgents have had greater success in reducing the
threat of air interdiction. Even though most supply
caravans are not equipped with the new missiles, the
Soviets apparently are concerned that they are
deployed along the supply routes. Although Soviet air
operations have increased over last year, the
effectiveness of air interdiction has been reduced in
some areas.
air interdiction along the route between Miram
Shah and Wardak has decreased since the surface-to-
air missiles were introduced. The introduction of the
new air defense weapons has also caused the Soviets
to modify their air tactics. Aircraft now fly at higher
altitudes, reducing the accuracy of the ordnance
delivered. As a result of the degradation of their air
capabilities, Soviet and regime forces have begun to
rely more on ambushes and heavy artillery attacks,
We nevertheless
believe that the air interdiction will continue to
hamper insurgent resupply efforts.
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The Interdiction Balance Sheet
We believe insurgent countermeasures have reduced
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Although interdiction was the logistic problem
mentioned most frequently by insurgent commanders
last year, most claim the risk is manageable this year.
A diplomatic source of the US Embassy in Kabul
reports that senior regime officials are concerned that
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groups in northern Afghanistan. In our view, the
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countermeasures to interdiction?particularly the
adoption of longer, more circuitous routes?have
increased the cost, time, and difficulty of resupply.
Although reduced, the threat of interdiction will
remain a problem for the insurgents, in our view.
Some resistance groups will continue to lose portions
of their materiel and transportation assets to Soviet
attacks, possibly resulting in temporary supply
shortages in some areas. Soviet interdiction will also
continue to contribute to rising transportation costs.
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Pakistan-USSR:
Limited Economic Ties
Pakistan's economic ties to the Soviet Union are too
limited and the potential for expansion too small to
provide Moscow with significant leverage over
Islamabad's foreign policies. Major barriers to closer
cooperation include Pakistani disenchantment with
the quality of Soviet equipment and Moscow's support
for India. Both countries, however, have chosen to
continue the Soviet aid deliveries to Pakistan and to
maintain other trade even while overall relations are
soured by Soviet actions in Afghanistan and Pakistani
support for the Afghan resistance.
Trade Ties Limited
Transactions with the Soviet Union are a small and
declining part of Pakistan's total foreign trade?down
from a peak of 4 to 5 percent in 1979 to 2 percent of
exports and 1 percent of imports in 1986. Pakistani
exports were $68 million last year, while imports
totaled $53 million.'
Imports. Machinery, much of which is financed by
Soviet aid or trade credits, dominates Pakistan's
imports from the Soviet Union. Deliveries funded by
Soviet loans accounted for one-half to four-fifths of
Pakistani purchases from the USSR during 1975-84,
when a steel plant near Karachi was under
construction. The Soviet Union also supplied
"unspecified goods," possibly helicopter spare parts,
worth more than $15 million a year during 1982
through 1985.2 In addition to recorded imports, Soviet
goods smuggled through Afghanistan such as
refrigerators, air conditioners, and luxury food have
been conspicuous since 1983 in Peshawar bazaars,
near the Afghan border. US Embassy officials
believe, however, that the quantities are too small to
have much economic impact.
' Our estimates of Pakistani trade with the USSR are based on
Soviet data. Pakistani statistics apparently exclude much of the
equipment delivered for a Soviet-aided steel plant, perhaps because
the goods did not pass through an established customs checkpoint.
We believe the Soviet category "unspecified goods" frequently
includes dual purpose goods. Pakistan purchased Soviet helicopters
in 1978.
25
A reputation for low quality hinders Soviet sales in
Pakistan, even for projects that were begun with
Soviet assistance. Officials of public-sector steel and
petroleum organizations have complained that Soviet
technology, although cheap, is inferior to that
available from Western countries. Delays in delivery
of spare parts or inability to supply them have been a
recurrent problem,
n part because some machinery is obsolete
even by Soviet standards.
Private traders have also been unwilling to take more
Soviet goods, according to US Embassy reports,
because of poor after-sale service and low quality. The
Soviet Ambassador complained publicly in 1984 that
an additional barrier to trade came from Pakistani
harassment and interrogation of businessmen who
visited the Soviet trade representative. As a result, a
plant that assembles tractors from imported parts is
the only major collaboration between a private-sector
firm and the Soviets.
Exports. Textiles and apparel have accounted for
more than 95 percent of Pakistan's exports to the
Soviet Union in recent years, according to trade data.
The Soviet share of Pakistan's garment exports?
more than 13 percent for some items such as men's
shirts?is large enough to be significant for
employment in this growing industry, especially since
quota restrictions limit sales to Western countries. At
least one private Pakistani firm sells marketing
advice. It helps the Soviet textile export organization
find buyers in the United States and suggests
strategies to foil US import restrictions.
Grandiose Aid Projects
Soviet economic aid has been concentrated on a few
conspicuous projects and accounts for less than 4
percent of the total aid Pakistan has received since the
mid-1970s. The steel mill outside Karachi, completed
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Million US$
250
200
150
100
50
t PAKISTAN'S TIES WITH THE USSFIll
Pakistani Imports
Pakistani Exports
AAV----
Aid Deliveries
1970
75
*Trade estimates are based on Soviet data.
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85
in late 1984, has been the centerpiece of public-sector
industrialization. It has received almost $840 million
in Soviet aid and trade credits since 1966, according
to our estimates, and was the only major
manufacturing project continued after President Zia
shifted development priorities away from public-
sector industry. Although the plant is already obsolete
and operates at a substantial loss, Islamabad
subsidizes its output to encourage private
entrepreneurs to develop downstream industries.
The Soviet Union has also provided substantial aid in
oil exploration and electric power, including financial
assistance to expand a gas-based power plant at
Guddu. In 1983 it offered $277 million, as yet
undisbursed, for another gas-based power plant.
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We do not believe that Soviet aid is a great bargain?
even when prices are competitive and technology
acceptable?compared to official aid from other
sources or Soviet support to India. No grants have
been offered. Earlier Soviet loans to Pakistan charged
2.5 percent interest payable over 10 to 12 years. More
recent credits have been for 5.5 percent amortized
over 12 years?which is still cheaper than Western
commercial terms. Recent Soviet economic aid to
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India, in contrast, calls for a more generous 2.5
percent interest over 17 years. According to US
Embassy reports, Pakistani officials complain that
Soviet aid brings an excessive number of advisers?at
times more than 700 for the steel mill?who cannot
communicate easily with their Pakistani counterparts.
Political Conditions Delay New Aid
Moscow sometimes has blatantly linked offers of
economic aid to changes in Pakistan's policies.
Reversing both countries' efforts in the early 1980s to
separate trade and aid from Pakistan's policy toward
Afghanistan, Soviet officials began in mid-1984 to
warn that political difficulties were impeding
economic cooperation. Moscow turned down
Pakistan's request for support for a nuclear power
plant and for the Kalabagh Dam, although we believe
Soviet doubts about the viability of these projects ma
have preceded the litical si nal
Both countries have continued to implement existing
trade and aid agreements despite severe bilateral
strains over Afghanistan. According to Pakistani
diplomats, even in 1984 Soviet officials did not want
to curtail bilateral relations. Moscow probably wants
to maintain a presence in Pakistan and preserve
channels of communication and commercial
opportunities. Islamabad has been willing to maintain
existing cooperation, not only for the economic
benefits, but also, according to US Embassy officials,
because Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials believe
some Soviet aid helps maintain Pakistan's nonaligned
credentials.
Reviving Cooperation
The Soviet Union is moving to revive economic
cooperation, which has languished since completion of
the Karachi steel mill.
27
Pakistani offficials believe that
Moscow changed its policies in mid-1986 following
General Secretary Gorbachev's speech at Vladivostok.
It became willing, even without a change in
Islamabad's support for the Afghan resistance, to
restore the "normalcy" that existed before 1984. In
July 1987 a new agreement was signed to implement
the 1983 offer of aid for the Multan power project.
Soviet officials have also suggested additional support
for the Karachi steel mill. They have emphasized in
public speeches that Soviet support is reliable?an
implied contrast with past and possible US aid
cutoffs.
Contacts between the Soviet Union and Pakistan's
private sector are increasing, probably spurred by
Moscow's search for profitable commercial
opportunities and Islamabad's need for exports to
cover mounting debt service payments?about $73
million to Moscow in 1987,
Soviet officials have emphasized their interest
in joint ventures and willingness to finance purchases
of Soviet machinery. A delegation from the
Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and
Industry traveled to Moscow in July and signed an
agreement with the USSR Chamber of Commerce
and Industry to promote exchanges of information
about trade and intellectual property regulations.
Soviet officials have even hinted that Moscow would
be willing to buy more textiles?but only if Pakistan
buys Soviet textile machinery.
Restricted Scope for Expansion
These efforts are unlikely within the next year or so to
raise economic cooperation above previous peak levels.
Although willing to disburse more than $300 million
left over from previous aid and trade credit
commitments, Moscow probably would not initiate a
major new project so long as fighting in Afghanistan
overshadows bilateral relations. Pakistani
businessmen and public-sector officials remain
skeptical of the quality of Soviet equipment. Moscow
is probably unwilling to expand trade under a barter
arrangement by supplying Pakistan with commodities
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Barter Agreements
Payments for some bilateral trade and debt servicing
are handled through barter arrangements first
established in 1956. The two governments negotiate
annual protocols that establish target values for
exports and imports and list tradable commodity
categories.
The most recent protocol, signed in March, calls for
Pakistani exports of $60 million and imports of $30
million during 1987. Pakistan's trade surplus will
help repay Soviet loans. Trade targets in earlier
agreements were more nearly balanced but,
frequently were not met
because Pakistan lacked interest in Soviet products.
Bank of Pakistan (a nationalized commercial bank)
and the Bank for Foreign Trade of the USSR.
Pakistan neither receives nor pays foreign exchange
for goods and services that are handled through these
clearing accounts even though all letters of credit
must be drawn in US dollars.
A low rate of interest is paid or charged on
imbalances in the clearing account. The bilateral
agreement sets a maximum "swing" balance, which
US Embassy officials believe may have been as low
as $1 million in 1984.
Actual trade under the annual protocols?the barter
arrangement?may account for as little as one-third
of total bilateral trade, in our judgment. Pakistani
import targets apparently include goods financed
with Soviet commercial credits but not concessional
official aid. Some transactions are excluded because
one government was unwilling to authorize barter
trade in a commodity of interest to the other or
would do so only at a higher price. Pakistani export
targets are set high enough to cover some but not all
interest and amortization payments.
some Pakistani
businessmen are convinced that certain third country
trade?for example, Pakistani imports of US
fertilizer?can be charged to the supposedly bilateral
barter.
The Soviet Union has accounts at Pakistani banks to
make and receive payments with Pakistani
organizations. All transactions under the barter
agreement are ultimately routed through special
nonconvertible US dollar accounts at the National
however, actual
imbalances have sometimes been as high as $25
million. In theory, any persistent imbalance in the
account should be eliminated by curtailing or
expanding trade.
Payment for most other transactions is apparently
made in foreign exchange. Some trade, however, can
take place under negotiated special barter
arrangements, possibly specific deals of equal value.
Barter arrangements designed to simplify and
expedite bilateral trade have sometimes hindered
cooperation. Annual protocols have often been signed
several months after the beginning of the year.
Pakistan's reluctance to import Soviet goods,
combined with both countries' attempt to balance
bilateral payments, has limited potential Pakistani
exports. Both countries, in our judgment, are
reluctant to make cash purchases of goods listed in
the barter protocols, even though they sometimes do
SO.
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that could be sold elsewhere for cash?although an
unconfirmed Pakistani press report noted a recent
Soviet offer to supply a small quantity of crude oil.
Trade ties to the Soviet Union would be more likely to
expand if a cutoff of US aid were to limit Pakistan's
foreign exchange receipts. Government austerity
measures might then force buyers who prefer Western
equipment to turn to Soviet suppliers so that payment
could be made in exports of goods through the
bilateral barter agreement. Discussion of some sort of
overall accommodation with the superpower on
Pakistan's doorstep would probably ensue. Even so,
we doubt that Moscow would be in a position to wield
significant economic leverage or offer many
inducements other than a slight increase in textile
purchases.
Reverse Blank
29
Soviet military and economic support for India will
continue to hinder closer cooperation between
Islamabad and Moscow. Soviet trade with Pakistan is
less than 4 percent as large as Soviet trade with India.
We doubt the Soviets would be willing to provide
Islamabad with loans at the low interest rates they
still offer New Delhi but no longer provide to most
other developing countries. Moscow would probably
not be willing to divert substantial textile purchases
from India to Pakistan. Islamabad is unlikely to
permit a significant part of its economy to become
dependent on the Soviet Union so long as Pakistani
officials continue to believe?as they do now,
-that
Moscow gives New Delhi a near veto over USSR-
Pakistan relations.
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Pakistan: Ahmadis All e
Mounting Persecution
Ahmadis?generally considered an Islamic sect but
labeled heretics by Muslim fundamentalists?charge
they are being persecuted by the Pakistani
Government and general public. Alleging increased
restrictions on their ability to practice their particular
variety of Islam, they have begun a concerted effort to
publicize their problems through letterwriting
campaigns and other nonviolent methods. We believe
these tactics will elicit additional anti-Ahmadi actions
and sporadic violence. Some Ahmadis could begin to
react with violence of their own on occasion. Because
of their small numbers, Ahmadis will continue to pose
only a minor threat to public order in Pakistan and
will not threaten the stability of the Pakistani
Government.
Ahmadis?accounting for no more than 2 percent of
Pakistan's population?are followers of Mirza
Ahmed, a prophet based in Qadian, India at the turn
of the century. Although their practices are generally
Islamic, Ahmadis are considered apostates by more
traditional Muslims primarily because they reject the
finality of the prophet Muhammad, a cardinal tenet
of Islam proclaimed in the Koran. Opponents assert
that, in recognizing Ahmed as the last prophet,
Ahmadis reject the teachings of the Koran, thereby
renouncing any right to call themselves Muslims,
according to the US Embassy in Islamabad. The
Ahmadis assert they are Muslims and should be
treated as such.
Discriminatory Actions
Anti-Ahmadi sentiment has turned to violence on
several occasions. In recent years Ahmadi mosques
have been attacked by mobs, according to the US
Embassy. Local authorities in several areas have
attempted to erase the Muslim creed, called the
Kalima?"There is no deity but God: Muhammad is
the prophet of God"?from Ahmadi mosques,
claiming Ahmadis are apostates and commit heresy
by displaying it. Anti-Ahmadi fanatics have on
several occasions occupied empty Ahmadi buildings in
the Rabwah area, forcing the Ahmadis to file suit to
31
Ahmadi Demographics
Ahmadis are a well-educated, tightly knit group
compared to other Muslim sects in Pakistan. Pockets
live in urban areas throughout the country, but the
largest concentration, nearly 20,000, is found at
Rabwah, the world headquarters of the Ahmadi
movement founded in 1949 and located about 120
kilometers west of Lahore. The Ahmadis occupy land
around Rabwah allocated to them by the Pakistani
Government in 1947 when the Ahmadis arrived from
India. The second largest concentration, about
15,000, inhabits an area about 50 kilometers east of
Umerkot in southeastern Sind Province. The
majority of these Ahmadis are farmers or
sharecroppers, according to the US Consulate in
Karachi.
regain control of the property, according to US
Embassy sources. The newly elected member of
parliament for the Rabwah area is a leading member
of the Tehrik-e-Khattam-e-Nubbawat (Movement for
the Finality of the Prophethood)?the principal anti-
Ahmadi organization? and has been particularly
active in harassing the Ahmadi community in
Rabwah. On as many as 20 occasions in the last three
months he has led processions of 40 to 50 men?many
brandishing arms?through Rabwah, demanding the
disbanding of the Ahmadi community.
Such actions have been particularly acute in Sind
Province. One spiritual leader in southeastern Sind is
particularly aggressive toward Ahmadis, often
speaking out against them in his well-attended Friday
sermon, according to the US Consulate in Karachi. In
Sukkur in northern Sind, Sunnis?the predominant
Muslim sect in Pakistan?decided that Ahmadis
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played a role in a recent explosion at a Sunni mosque
and attacked and burned several Ahmadi-owned
businesses, causing property damage but no deaths.
Anti-Ahmadi fanatics in Sind are engaged in a
systematic campaign to assassinate Ahmadi leaders,
according to sources of the US Embassy, who cite the
murder of a leading Ahmadi official in Sukkur on 15
March 1985 and the murder of the president of an
Ahmadi movement in central Sind on 10 January
1984. Sources of the US Consulate in Karachi report
that the unsuccessful murder attempt in the spring of
1985 of an Ahmadi official in Ranipur in northern
Sind was one of eight attempts to murder Ahmadis in
the Sukkur area at that time.
The Pakistani Government has generally attempted to
placate anti-Ahmadi sects with legislation and other
restrictions, but we have no evidence that it advocates
death for Ahmadis. A constitutional amendment was
passed in 1974 declaring the Ahmadis a non-Muslim
minority, and an ordinance was promulgated in April
1984 prohibiting Ahmadis from calling themselves
Muslims, from proselytizing, and from using Muslim
religious symbols, according to the US Embassy.
Since 1984 federal officials have banned an annual
international gathering at Rabwah that usually
attracted 200,000 Ahmadis. Officials have also
allowed two non-Ahmadi mosques to be built at
Rabwah where anti-Ahmadi grievances are
broadcast, but Ahmadis are prohibited from giving
their own sermons, according to US Embassy sources.
The government is sponsoring legislation that would
prohibit publication of the Ahmadi version of the
Koran. Islamabad regularly bans Ahmadi religious
publications on the grounds that they may foment
sectarian tension, but anti-Ahmadi statements appear
in all the nation's media, according to US Embassy
sources.
Ahmadi prospects for advancement, particularly in
the public sector, are poorer than those of the Muslim
majority and may be growing worse. Ahmadis are
being forced to resign from civil service positions,
according to US Embassy sources. Employment
discrimination is a major and growing problem, and
Ahmadis find it increasingly difficult to get into good
schools.
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Ahmadis recently alleged?but could not document?
two new areas of discrimination, according to US
Embassy sources. They claimed the Education
Ministry requires Ahmadi examination candidates to
indicate their religion on their examination papers.
They also charged that the government directs that
bids by Ahmadi contractors be rejected. A source of
the US Consulate in Lahore reports that government
and local officials have mounted a coordinated plan to
persecute Ahmadis by arresting those who wear the
Kalima and defacing Ahmadi graves and buildings on
which the Kalima is inscribed. The Embassy believes
these developments could signal a new "get tough"
campaign by the government.
Ahmadis are allowed to worship as long as they do not
proselytize, and their places of Worship remain open,
according to the US Embassy. Moreover, since the
1984 ordinance, the parliament has not passed
additional anti-Ahmadi legislation. The proposed
legislation requiring enforcement of Islamic law
would probably allow Ahmadis to practice their
religion and proselytize as long as they acknowledge
their minority status, according to the Embassy.
The Ahmadi Reaction
Ahmadis have begun publicizing their problems in
response to increased discrimination and persecution.
They have distributed leaflets critical of government
policies toward Ahmadis at several colleges in Sind,
according to the US Consulate in Karachi. Ahmadis
have written hundreds of letters to Western embassies
requesting political or religious asylum and special
consideration for immigrant visas to escape the
alleged persecution. US Embassy and Consular
officials in Pakistan have received more than 100 such
requests since 1 February 1987, and more are likely,
according to the Embassy. Many letters cite a
television broadcast in November 1986 by a Muslim
fundamentalist professor, Mujib ur-Rehman, who
advocated death for Ahmadis. An Embassy source
asserts that Mujib's speech was the last straw for
many young Ahmadis, who increasingly see no future
for themselves in Pakistan.
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Ahmadis have strict orders from the leader of the
world Ahmadi movement?currently residing in
London?to react nonviolently to the provocations of
anti-Ahmadi fanatics, according to an Embassy
source. Ahmadis receive instructions, however, from
their "elders" in Lahore to court arrest, according to a
source of the US Consulate in Karachi. Ahmadi men
court arrest on a daily basis in the village of Kunri in
southeastern Sind. In what has become a ritual, two
men wearing the Kalima arrive each morning on the
train. The crowd jeers, throws vegetables or anything
else at hand, and the police arrest the pair. To date,
no serious injuries have occurred. The men are jailed
for several weeks and then released.
Outlook
We believe the Ahmadis will continue to be a target
of violence and discrimination throughout the
country. They will continue to publicize their
problems mainly through nonviolent tactics that will
foster additional anti-Ahmadi resentment and
possibly violence among Muslim fundamentalists. We
believe the proposed legislation banning the Ahmadi
version of the Koran and fresh charges of
Reverse Blank 33
discrimination against Ahmadi examination
candidates and contractors indicate a continuing
trend of discrimination that could drive some
Ahmadis to violence, especially if their pleas for
asylum go unanswered. Much of the anti-Ahmadi
agitation, however, has been, and will continue to be,
the work of local officials and private individuals
acting without government sanction.
The Ahmadi problem poses no threat to the stability
of the Pakistani Government but will continue to
contribute to general sectarian tensions. Although
Ahmadis are part of an exclusively Muslim religious
dispute and pose no major threat to US officials, they
will continue to urge US legislators and diplomats to
intervene with Islamabad to protect Ahmadi rights.
US efforts to assist the Ahmadis, however, would be
resented by Pakistanis and regarded as interference in
their internal affairs.
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Algeria: Seeking To
Halt Fundamentalism
The Algerian Government fears Islamic
fundamentalism could transform an apathetic
younger generation into Islamic activists. President
Bendjedid's government is trying to isolate the
fundamentalist threat by combining repression of
religious-based opposition activities with
encouragement of a moderate, apolitical "official"
Islam. These efforts have quashed immediate threats
to the regime and driven the fundamentalists
underground. Nonetheless, growing economic and
social inequalities, uncertain prospects for a
burgeoning youthful population, and a secular,
socialist national ideology out of the past may provide
a fertile ground over the long term for a radical
fundamentalist challenge to the stability of the
regime.
Background
Although Islam was a major component of Algerian
nationalism during the struggle against France, it was
pushed out of politics at independence in 1962. The
new government created a national ideology that was
secular, socialist, and more concerned with Third
World than with Islamic causes. The regime viewed
Islam as a matter of personal practice confined to
marriages, funerals, fasting, and other innocuous
areas. A modus vivendi developed between the secular
ideology of the ruling party and the religious faith of
ordinary citizens, and that relationship has remained
generally untroubled for almost 25 years. The Islamic
revolution in Iran, however, began to undermine this
arrangement, and events inside Algeria in the 1980s
seriously shook the government's complacency. Leftist
and Muslim students clashed at the University of
Algiers in November 1982; fundamentalists
successfully opposed the government's introduction of
a liberal family code in 1984; Muslim groups tried to
impose codes of personal behavior in Algiers's
secondary schools in 1984-85; the authorities
experienced increasing difficulty controlling the
activities of privately financed mosques; and a small
35
fundamentalist group led by Mustapha Bouali
attempted an armed uprising that left at least 20 dead
before the security forces killed him in January 1987.
The Fundamentalist Breeding Ground
Islam is
increasingly attractive to youth. Algeria has a young
and growing population?half are under 15, and two-
thirds were born after independence. Many have
known only poor housing, inadequate education, and
limited job prospects. These frustrations coupled with
a stringent austerity program increased pressure on
Algeria's already limited social services. Two recent
Algerian newspaper polls reflect youth dissatisfaction.
A survey published in July in "Algerie Actualite" 25X1
stated that 55 percent of youths polled said that the
government has not done as well as it could have since
independence (30 percent said it has). Almost 60
percent said Algerian youth were unhappy and
overcome with frustration; only 30 percent were
satisfied. Another poll that appeared in "Horizons"
ranked youth's concerns in descending order of
importance as jobs 59 percent, housing 51 percent,
standard of living 47 percent, and social status 45
percent. Youthful dissatisfaction of this sort provides
potential recruits for religious radicals and increases
the gravity of the fundamentalist threat. Indeed, some
youths are joining independent mosques funded by
private donations which continue to spring up despite
the government's efforts to curb them.
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The Government Response
The government has begun to take the fundamentalist
challenge seriously. Indeed, according to the US
Embassy in Algiers, the regime sees it as the most
serious long-term threat to its stability. Algerian
leaders are taking firm steps to counter groups that
politicize Islam and to placate potential youthful
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supporters of the radicals' cause. The government
security court recently imposed the death penalty on
four members of the group that supported Bouali's
uprising and sentenced others to prison terms ranging
from a few years to life.
the regime has also tried to stir up
police efforts against fundamentalist groups by
transferring principal responsibility for monitoring
them from the gendarmerie to the national police.
Since then, the national police have organized a
special brigade to investigate, infiltrate, and arrest
fundamentalist group members.
At the same time that the government is cracking
down on fundamentalism, it is trying to foster a
version of Islam that supports the secular state, the
nationalist ideology, and the pursuit of social justice.
This Algerian Islam rejects the Iranian type of
liberation theology that turns pilgrimage, prayer, and
fasting into political statements and guerrilla warfare.
The government uses its control of the mass media to
spread its "official" brand of Islam and has founded
the Islamic University of Constantine and smaller
Islamic institutes throughout the country to train
teachers as well as bureaucrats to staff the Ministry
of Religious Affairs. It also has increased state
support and control of religious personnel, especially
the imams who have civil servant status and receive a
comfortable salary. In addition, the regime is building
new mosques. The current five-year plan calls for the
construction of 160. The government has enlisted the
help of a senior religious figure, Egyptian Imam
Muhammad Ali Ghazzali, who came to Algeria in
1983 after spending time in prison in Sadat's Egypt.
Ghazzali appears regularly on Algerian television,
where he propounds the approved religious views of
the state.
To burnish its Islamic image, the regime became the
only one in the region to make its weekend Thursday
and Friday instead of Saturday and Sunday. It also
announced that, despite austerity measures that have
touched virtually all areas of government spending,
the same number of persons as in 1986-25,000?
would be allocated the hard currency needed to make
the pilgrimage to Mecca. This measure is especially
significant because the government's lottery to
distribute the travel grants allows even the poorest
citizen to hope that he might someday be able to
comply with this basic Islamic duty?an obligation
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that even the greatest sacrifices on his part might not
allow him to fulfill without outside help. According to
the US Embassy in Algiers, this program will cost the
government as much as $30 million in hard currency
even though the allocation per person has been
slightly reduced from $1,300 to $1,200 per person.
The government is also making a special effort to
prevent the fundamentalists from establishing an
institutional base from which they can appeal to the
nation's youth. The regime is spending large sums of
money in building schools, universities, cultural
centers, sports complexes, and summer camps in the
hope that these institutions will compete with the
mosques for the young people's time and attention. It
also is trying to keep religion out of its institutions
except on its own terms. It has refused to allow prayer
in schools and has resisted vigilante moves to restrict
alcoholic beverages, while allowing provincial
governments the option of doing so within the existing
bureaucratic structure.
Outlook
The fundamentalists have gained some support among
youth, but the government's efforts to contain them
have kept radical Islam on the periphery of Algerian
politics. The regime's effective security network
closely monitors the fundamentalists, and this further
reduces the threat. Moreover, no identifiable
leadership or organization for a religious-based
opposition movement has surfaced.
The regime will persevere with its two-pronged
program over the near term. It also will continue to
try to make its secular and national ethos attractive to
larger numbers of young Algerians. The country's
difficult social and economic conditions will probably
preclude it from achieving major success in that
regard, but only in the unlikely event that these
conditions worsen appreciably or the government
appears incapable of dealing with national problems
will fundamentalism gain widespread support in the
next few years.
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Algeria: Current Internal
Political Dynamics
We do not believe that President Chadli Bendjedid,
who has ruled Algeria for nine years, faces an
immediate threat to his hold on power. Leftist
opponents of the regime, such as Communists and
former leaders in exile, represent marginal groups.
Fundamentalists and Berber nationalists have larger
followings but have been effectively repressed by the
government's pervasive security apparatus.
Nevertheless, we believe that the President's authority
has slipped over the past year largely because of
mounting economic and social problems and factional
infighting among the ruling elite. The decline in
government revenues caused by lower international oil
and gas prices, coupled with Algeria's rapid growth in
population and urbanization, has crippled efforts to
meet growing demand for housing, food, and health
and educational services. These failures have created
public disgruntlement which flared into riots late last
year and student disturbances this spring.
Consensus Politics Fraying
Collegial decisionmaking, in which the President is
"first among equals" within the ruling group of senior
military officers and officials of the ruling National
Liberation Front (FLN), has been the trademark of
the Bendjedid government. The leadership has
generally been united in its maintenance of a highly
centralized political system, government control of
leading economic sectors, and budget austerity to deal
with the economic downturn. Domestic problems in
1986-87, however, have produced acrimonious debate
among the rulers over financial and political
priorities.
Bendjedid, supported by other pragmatists, wants to
break up state-run farms, promote private initiative,
attract Western investment in selected industries, and
decentralize the government to rationalize the
country's inefficient bureaucracy. As part of his
efficiency program, he has attempted to replace party
officials in government with qualified technocrats and
37
loyalists and eradicate corruption and
mismanagement. He hopes to create a foreign policy
climate conducive to his reforms by improving
relations with Morocco and Libya and expanding
economic ties to the United States and Western
Europe. I
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Despite these efforts, the President's opponents? 25X1
spearheaded by FLN Permanent Secretary
Messaadia and other party leftists?are gaining
momentum. Leftists have long argued that
Bendjedid's proposed changes?which would
undermine their prerogatives in the large public
sector?are ideologically unpalatable. They have
seized on new uncertainty over the economy to
support their contention that further change will
increase social turmoil. Leftists also argue that
economic constraints necessitate continued reliance
on Moscow for major weapon systems and keeping a
distance from the United States?a point that finds a 25X1
receptive audience among some key Army leaders
such as acting Chief of Staff Belhouchet.
We believe that the resurgence of hardline opposition
has compelled Bendjedid to slow the pace of reform.
Earlier this year he was only partly successful in
electing new people to the country's legislature?a
development that probably convinced him to abandon
rumored Cabinet changes. He has been reluctant to
force much-needed retirements in the country's
topheavy and aging officer corps. The President's
recent foreign policy moves to improve relations with
Libya, to escalate the fighting in Western Sahara by
the Algerian-backed Polisario guerrillas, and to
purchase new weapons from Moscow probably were
also intended to placate hardline rivals.
Prospects
Bendjedid probably will not abandon his reform
program, but he is likely to move cautiously. We
believe that gradualism is the most expedient course
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for the President over the short term, even though it
risks further political immobility, economic decline,
and social turmoil. As long as the entire leadership
believes in the need to maintain tight political control
over the country, Bendjedid will continue to have the
necessary support for dealing harshly with political
threats from outside the government.
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Algeria: Bendjedid's
Foreign Policy
President Bendjedid has been undertaking highly
visible foreign policy initiatives in response to foreign
and domestic pressures. We believe that his moves,
which entail risks, are designed to refurbish his
leadership at home and in the Arab world. They also
probably will create difficulties for US-Algerian
relations.
Recent Meetings
Over the past five months Bendjedid met with
Tunisian President Bourguiba, took part in summit
meetings with Libyan leader Qadhafi, Morocco's
King Hassan, and Saudi Arabia's King Fahd, and was
host to the Palestine National Congress. We believe
that these events represent an uncharacteristic
activism on the part of the usually cautious
Bendjedid.
Bendjedid's Motives
The President's key foreign policy objective is to push
Morocco to agree to a compromise settlement of the
Western Sahara dispute. Algeria and the Polisario
guerrillas it supports are stymied by Morocco's static
defense behind an earthen berm:
? Bendjedid hopes his efforts to expand cooperation
with Qadhafi will help isolate Morocco and force
Hassan to compromise on terms for a settlement, or
at least lead to financial support from Tripoli for the
Polisario.
? As part of this plan, he hopes to coax Tunisia and
Mauritania into allowing Libya to join their Treaty
of Fraternity and Concord, despite his lack of
success in resolving disputes between Tunisia and
Libya.
Bendjedid also is eager to establish Algeria's
leadership in the Arab world as well as his own
credentials as a senior Arab statesman. He actively
supports reconcilation of the Palestinian factions and
has ties to radical Palestinian groups. He continues to
play a role as an intermediary in the war in Chad.
Reverse Blank 39
Domestic considerations have also influenced
Bendjedid's actions. He almost certainly hopes his
foreign policy offensive will strengthen his position
against his rivals at home, or at a minimum deflect
public attention from the country's increasing
economic and social problems.
Risks for the President
Bendjedid probably overestimates his ability to
control Qadhafi, obtain financial compensation for
Tunisian workers expelled from Libya in 1985, or stop
Libyan meddling in Tunisian affairs. New terrorism
by Libya or radical Palestinian groups could provoke
Western censure. Bendjedid is probably also too
optimistic about his ability to force King Hassan to
meet Algerian terms for a settlement of the Western
Sahara dispute. Moreover, his foreign policy
initiatives may increase frictions among competing
factions in his government over how best to deal with
Morocco and Libya.
Implications for the United States
Bendjedid undoubtedly realizes that some of Algiers's
moves will not be welcome in Washington. He
evidently has decided, however, that the possible
regional and domestic gains are worth the strains in
US-Algerian relations. He is most likely dissatisfied
with US neutrality on the Western Sahara issue. He
also probably believes that Qadhafi is weathering his
military defeats in Chad, is less vulnerable to a coup,
and that Algiers must seize the opportunity to develop
a working relationship with the Libyan leader on
more favorable terms.
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Mauritania's Debt Situation:
Trying Hard?With Few
Resources
Since early 1985, Mauritania has adhered to a rigid
austerity program aimed at reducing its debt
problems. Foreign debt was about $1.6 billion in 1986
but the rate of growth of debt slowed during the year
and the ratio of debt to the value of exports fell.
Mauritania will need further debt relief as current
loans mature, but, if Nouakchott continues to comply
with the adjustment program, we believe commercial
and official lenders?who have been impressed with
Mauritania's performance thus far?will reschedule
and perhaps grant other relief. The improvement in
the country's debt situation, however, comes at the
cost of higher unemployment and prices for consumer
goods, threatening the popularity of the Taya regime.
Persistent Debt Problems
Mauritania's foreign financial problems steadily
worsened during the 1970s and early 1980s. The
failure of several large, unwise development projects
and the collapse of the price of iron ore?then
Mauritania's main export? forced Nouakchott to
adopt austerity programs in 1978 and 1980. The
latter IMF-supported program was abandoned in
1984 because a prolonged drought forced increased
food imports and Mauritania refused to devalue its
currency.
Turning the Corner
After a coup in 1984, the new leader, Colonel Taya,
met with the IMF within 48 hours after taking power
to restore the austerity program and revive the
economy. Twelve-month standby loans were granted
in April 1985 and April 1986. By the end of 1986
Mauritania had:
? Eliminated all foreign and domestic debt
arrearages?about $100 million.
? Reduced the current account deficit from 22 to 7.7
percent of GDP, exceeding the target for the end of
1988.
? Achieved a budget surplus of about 1 percent.
? Reduced investment by eliminating wasteful
projects.
? Let the currency depreciate about 22 percent by
adopting a flexible exchange rate.
41
Table 1
Mauritania: Debt Indicators
Percent
(except where indicated)
1975
1984
1986
Foreign debt (million US $)
188
1,323
1,582
Debt as a share of exports of
goods and services
99
391
344
Debt service as a share of
exports of goods and services
21
17
25
Interest payments as a share
of goods and services
3
11
12
Because it has continued to impress lenders,
Mauritania has been able to obtain new support.
Since August 1986 the IMF has granted a structural
adjustment loan and approved a third 12-month
standby for about $13 million; the World Bank has
lent about $42 million; and Saudi Arabia and West
Germany have cofinanced an additional $8 million.
The Paris Club has rescheduled Mauritania's debt
over 15 years. No creditor has asked for significant
changes in targets or performance. All apparently are
satisfied with the program and Mauritania's
compliance.
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Cost of Austerity
Progress has had a cost. Because of the costs of the
austerity program, the government has only limited
ability to provide employment for the population
steadily streaming into the cities from the desert.
Unemployment is high and increasing. Consumer
discontent is rising because of higher prices. Some
food prices have doubled in recent months, according
to the US Embassy in Nouakchott. The costs of
electricity and water increased 15 and 10 percent,
respectively, Although price 25X1
liberalization and the reduction in the number of
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Mauritania: The Economy at a Glance
Agriculture, Mauritania's main economic sector, has
been devastated by drought, poor farming techniques,
and overgrazing. As a result, the Sahara is replacing
former farmland at a rate of about 7 kilometers per
year. Desertification has led to extremely rapid
urbanization. Since the late 1960s the urban
population has risen from about 15 percent of total
population to about 85 percent. Nouakchott, for
example, has increased from about 30,000 people to
approximately 500,000. Unemployment is high, and
the government has adopted food-for-work programs
including sweeping sandy streets.
Mauritania has few marketable natural resources.
Iron ore provides about 40 percent of foreign
exchange earnings. The market, however, is severely
depressed, and Mauritania was forced to accept a 10-
percent price cut in March 1987 that left real prices
lower than they were in 1975. Copper mining was
suspended in 1979, and there is little phosphate
mining because of low prices. Oil in commercially
viable amounts has not been discovered.
Fish are the most valuable resource. Fishing and
rental of fishing rights have become the main source
of foreign exchange. The fishing industry is small but
growing, and Nouakchott usually requires foreign
firms to hire and train Mauritanians and to invest in
equipment.
In late June 1987 the fishing treaty with the Soviet
Union was renewed on terms favorable to
Mauritania. The Soviets agreed to reduce
significantly the size of their catch but to pay more,
according to the US Embassy. We believe that
Mauritania will try to get similar terms in impending
negotiations with other countries. We doubt, however,
that the country's small Navy can enforce the
treaties, and we expect Mauritania to seek Western
aid to upgrade its capabilities.
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items subject to artificially low price controls will
increase incentives to produce and will make prices
reflect the costs of production, many Mauritanians
resent their reduced purchasing power and blame the
Taya government and the IMF and World Bank for
their plight.
Outlook
We expect Mauritania to continue its efforts to limit
the growth of its debt in the coming year while trying
to build an economic base for long-term growth.
Adherence to the structural adjustment program will
almost surely continue as long as Taya stays in
power.' Tax revenues will probably continue to rise
because of increased collection efforts. Nouakchott
and the IMF are exploring ways to increase revenues
without creating serious disincentives to saving and
investment. For example, special tax exemptions that
are no longer regarded as socially useful?such as
exemptions from tariffs on raw materials and spare
parts?may be eliminated,
There is also a proposal to unify the tariff system at
lower overall rates. This fall the proposals will be
evaluated, and improvements will be written into the
1988 Budget Law.
Interest payments on foreign debt will increase about
7 percent this year, more?in percentage terms?than
any other item in the budget except spending on social
services, according to Mauritanian data
Although military expenditures will
continue to be the largest amount in the budget, they
will grow by only about 1 percent this year. Subsidies
to public firms that sell products have been abolished.
We believe that Nouakchott will be better able to
keep track of its spending because budgeting
procedures will be improved. This fall Nouakchott
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Table 2
Mauritania's Foreign Debt, 1979-86
Million US $
Total Debt
1979
683
1980
824
1981
1,042
1982
1,199
1983
1,349
1984
1,323
1985
1,465
1986
1,582
and the IMF will evaluate several new budgeting
measures tested this year,
Successes will be carried over to the 1988 budget
along with new suggestions. Special attention will be
paid to the cost effectiveness of social services
spending and to increased local financing.
Plans call for the banking system to be restructured?
with IMF assistance ?to increase the Central Bank's
ability to regulate the money supply, control other
banks, and use interest rates to increase investment.
With IMF and World Bank help, two other banks will
merge to form a development bank. One bank has
been privatized, and two others will be as soon as their
balance sheets improve. To overcome the shortage of
skilled bankers, Mauritania is trying to recruit
foreigners.
Reverse Blank 43
Increased efficiency will not come without political
risk. Under the nationalized system, managers often
granted loans to politically important people and
relatives who could not or would not repay. Banks
rarely tried to collect, according to the US Embassy
in Nouakchott. We believe that some of these
influential businessmen will resent the new policy of
granting loans based on creditworthiness and may
begin to encourage opposition to the Taya regime.
Real GDP will probably grow about 4 percent next
year if Taya stays in power and the weather is good.
Two new dams on the Senegal River that will begin
operation will increase food production. We expect
fishing revenues to increase because newly signed
treaties entail significantly higher fees.
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remain impoverished and in need of foreign aid and
debt relief because growth will be from a very low 25X1
base. Aside from the structural adjustment program,
the economy remains in extremely bad shape with
little prospect for significant improvement.
Mauritania is almost certain to remain poor.
Population growth of almost 3 percent per year will
lead to only a slight increase in the per capita income
of about $450 per year.
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Near East and
South Asia Briefs
Saudi Arabia Effects of Gas Plant Explosion
The explosion at the Ju'aymah natural gas plant in the industrial port of Al Jubayl
on 15 August will curtail petrochemical exports for up to one year. The US
Consulate in Dhahran reports that both ethane production trains at Ju'aymah
sustained damage as a result of an industrial accident and fire. The facility is the
chief source of feedstock for a variety of petrochemical factories in the Al Jubayl
area, according to the US Consulate. The Saudis are planning to draw down stored
ethane, but supplies are limited. Excess ethane production capacity at the Yanbu
industrial complex also is being brought back on line, but the feedstock must be
shipped around the Arabian Peninsula to Al Jubayl at added cost. Repairs are
estimated to cost up to $100 million. Although petrochemical
exports from Al Jubayl probably will fall up to 35 percent until the damaged
ethane production facilities are brought back into service, prices of petrochemicals
are unlikely to be affected because of excess world production capacity.
Women in the Work Force
Recent gains by some Saudi women in the work force give promise of still greater
opportunities. The US Embassy says that one foreign oil company plans to hire
more women for clerical positions after an overwhelming female response to a
vacancy notice. Female employees usually outperform their male counterparts in
such positions and approach their work with greater enthusiasm. Male secretaries
often see clerical work as menial and below their abilities. Moreover, better
education and encroaching Western values are increasing the desire of some
women for a greater role in the work force and for loosening the strictures against
broader female participation. Pressure from religious quarters, however, remains
strong, and one foreign oil company plans to reduce its female work force by
attrition. Progress also will be hindered by the spread of Islamic fundamentalism
and the continuing Gulf recession.
Lebanon Syria Still Deeply Involved in the Bekaa Drug Scene
Syrian security forces controlling Lebanon's Bekaa Valley continue to benefit from
the area's lucrative drug production despite Damascus's claim of mounting a
major antidrug program in the region. Syrian leaders announced widespread drug
eradication campaigns in eastern Lebanon earlier this year, claiming to have
significant financial support from several Western countries and the United
Nations, however,
there is no evidence to suggest that Damascus has received international
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antinarcotics funds in 1987. Furthermore, in our judgment, Syria's limited
eradication activities in the Bekaa reflect an effort to channel drug profits to
corrupt Syrian military commanders and confirm their control of the region's
narcotics business.
leading Syrian military officers continue
to extend their protection to the Bekaa 's poppy and marijuana growers.
Damascus's antinarcotics efforts this year have been limited to
punishing Lebanese families who failed to buy protection from the Syrian military.
Local opium and hashish producers believe that, if Damascus received foreign
antidrug funds, they were shared among the local Syrian commanders in the
Bekaa and not applied toward drug eradication.
In our judgment, Damascus has little motivation to pursue a serious antinarcotics
effort in Lebanon because:
? Drug money underwrites much of the local economy.
? Extortion by Syrian forces stationed in the Bekaa offsets the low salaries
Damascus pays both soldiers and commanders.
? Attempting to eradicate the popular and lucrative drug trade would
unnecessarily alienate the local population.
India Corruption Underwrites Continuing Opium Productior
Secret
The corrupting influence of strong and resilient networks of local drug growers and
traffickers prevents effective drug enforcement programs in India. There is little
likelihood for success in locally initiated antinarcotics efforts in Indian states?
Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan in particular?where illegal drug
money supports longstanding relationships among private growers and local
officials. Moreover, the federal government is unlikely to mount the kind of
committed long-term campaign necessary to break these linkages
Farmers in north India grow illicit opium poppies, confident that they have the
protection of powerful local, state, and central government officials.
New Delhi outlawed licit opium growing in Uttar Pradesh in
1962, but opium growers in the state's isolated northwest use a complex system of
payoffs and kickbacks to guarantee local officials' support. The source notes that
farmers and officials have grown mutually dependent on the income from
narcotics. Local and state officials rely on drug money to subsidize the large
campaign chests necessary to secure public office. Farmers in economically
depressed areas of the state rely on the relative stability of the illicit opium market
to supplement their incomes and to earn the large sums necessary to buy
bureaucratic protection
Corrupt state officials are in turn protected by powerful figures in the national
government, according to the source. New Delhi's efforts last spring to reduce the
opium output in Uttar Pradesh were thwarted by the intervention of members of
the national legislature who used their influence to prevent anything more than
symbolic poppy eradication in a few isolated villages
46
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