AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001300080001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 17, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Top Seem
Intelligence
Afghanistan Situation e
17 January 1984
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17 January 1984
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killed or wounded.
THE VIEW FROM KABUL
An assessment of the war from the US Embassy in Kabul indicates
that the Soviets have a basis for believing things are not going
badly.
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near Eastern and South
Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis.
Moscow marked the fourth anniversary of the invasion of
Afghanistan with increased press coverage reiterating standard
themes but also revealing that seven more Soviets have been
17 January 1984
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17 January 1984
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Moscow marked the fourth anniversary of the invasion of
Afghanistan with increased press coverage. Major themes included
reiteration that Soviet security interests necessitated the
intervention; that the Soviet military presence is limited and
temporary; that the Soviets desire to have Afghanistan remain
neutral and nonaligned; that popular support for the Babrak
regime is expanding; and that the United States has been a major
obstacle to a political solution. Recent coverage also revealed
that seven more Soviets have been killed or wounded in
Afghanistan.
17 January 1984
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iur acunci
Moscow increases media coverage each year around the time of
the anniversary to counter increased Western press attention.
Some recent articles also suggest that the Soviet military has
been pressuring the leadership to give more attention to its
efforts in Afghanistan. The mention of seven killed or wounded
brings to 19 the number of Soviet casualties in Afghanistan
acknowledged in Soviet media over the past four years. We
estimate total Soviet casualties to be at least 17,000.
-- An insurgent who was dissatisfied with distribution of arms
and ammunition held up guerrilla arms convoys into southern and
western Afghanistan for two weeks, according to insurgent
sources. The sources told Western media that 1,000 guerrillas
dislodged the dissident and his 300 followers to reopen the road
-- According to Western embassy sources in Islamabad, an emissary
of former King Zahir Shah said that the King would travel to
Rabat to meet with Saudi King Fahd, who is attending the Islamic
summit in Morocco. The emissary added that Hizbi leader Younus
Khalis and three others who share the King's views would also go
17 January 1984
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-- Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman has denied a
Western press report that the Soviet Union in April 1983 had
offered to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan in an 18-month
timeframe. The spokesman added that the withdrawal timetable
remains "one of the most outstanding problems" to a political
settlement.
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PERSPECTIVE
THE VIEW FROM KABUL
(The following assessment of the war in Afghanistan was proXJded by
the US Embassy in Kabul.
From the perspective of Kabul, it would seem that the Soviets have
reason to believe that things are not going badly for them in
Afghanistan. Kabul is basically secure, with mujahidin activity having
only limited impact on the life of the city. The Soviets are probably
willing to leave the rest of the war on the back burner. Eventual
control over much of the country is probably a long-term goal but
secondar to defendin and consolidating what has been achieved in
Kabul.
While the resistance seemed to have made some moderate gains during
recent months, the stalemate that has existed for years remained
basically unchanged. From the vantage point of Kabul, it is difficult
to escape the conclusion that the Soviets, who still have the option of
trying to break the stalemate by stepping up their military effort, have
chosen not to do o b cause they do not see things as going all that
badly.
From here it appears that, apart from holding strategically important
air bases such as Shindand and Bagram, the Soviet goal in Afghanistan is
to maintain its own regime in Kabul while hoping that a combination of
military force and deals with resistance groups will eventually bring
violence elsewhere down to a tolerable level. Complete domination of
most of the country may be a more distant objective, but for the middle
run, the Soviets probably view Afghanistan in terms of the title of a
classic 19th-century study: The Kingdom of Caubul.
With Kabul secure and a puppet regime in place, Afghanistan is a
totally subservient client nation, acting as a mouthpiece for the USSR
in the UN, the NAM, and other international forums. It is of
relatively little consequence for these purposes that regime control
over many parts of the country is either nonexistent or paper-thin. In
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strategic terms, a puppet regime in Kabul also guarantees that no Afghan
Government will call for withdrawal of existing Soviet bases or any that
Moscow may decide to establish in the future. Finally, keeping its own
regime in Kabul enables Moscow to avoid the embarrassment, if not
trauma, of having allowed a revolution which it has backed to the hilt
to be reversed.
If it is indeed true that the security of Kabul and the maintenance
of a facade of national government are overriding elements in Soviet
thinking on Afghanistan, then Moscow must regard the situation in the
city as a reasonable success, a success which compensates for any
failure to crush the resistance elsewhere and which by itself is a good
reason to stay militarily involved in Afghanistan. The view of most
Western diplomats here is that Kabul is basically secure. Regularly
recurring resistance activity has generally been confined to the farther
fringes of the city, with the administrative and commercial centers
remaining relatively untouched. Moreover, although it is difficult for
us to observe the results of mujahidin activity around town, it appears
that such activity has had only limited physical impact on the city.
The very tight security throughout the city is, of course, a sign not
only that there is a war on but that the regime fears incidents even in
central Kabul. But the other side of the coin is that the precautions
are generally paying off. In this regard we note the absence of any
significant resistance activity in the city during the invasion
anniversary despite widespread reports that major operations were being
planned.
Moscow must also take some satisfaction from the fact that, outwardly
at least, the vast majority of the Kabul population appears to be
reacting submissively to the Soviet presence and to the regime. Except
for rampant draft-dodging by draft-age men, most people seem to be doing
nothing overtly to challenge the regime. There have been, for example,
no reports of demonstrations in the city since February 1980, shortly
after the Soviet invasion. Most people in the city seem to be going
about their business, accommodating to Soviet-directed rule as they
accommodated to previous regimes in order to get on with their lives.
The animosity is, of course, there beneath the surface, but the
important thing from the Soviet standpoint is that the animosity is
generally suppressed. In this atmosphere of basic security, the Soviets
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have embarked on a program of indoctrination and of gradually expanding
regime controls over economic and social life. They evidently
understand that in some areas this will be a very slow process. But
over the longer run they probably expect that in Kabul, as in eastern
Europe, some people will begin to believe what they are told, while most
of the rest will do what they are told in order to get ahead or to get
along.
Apart from being basically secure, Kabul is a functioning city.
Reported truck hijackings and road interdictions have not stopped the
flow of trucks from Jalalabad and from the north. As a result, Kabul
markets are filled with goods, with most of the manufactured items
continuing, as before, to come in from Japan, China, Pakistan, India,
and the West. Bread, the staple of the Afghan diet, is in plentiful
supply, and there are no lines at the city's many small bakeries.
Prices have gone up, although it is difficult to judge to what extent
this results from the war. We do not have the impression that there is
runaway inflation. Power outages are a major problem but, like the
shortage of heating fuel, have not apparently led to any major economic
standstills or caused more than resigned grumbling among the populace.
Gasoline appears to be reasonably available, and taxi traffic on Kabul's
main thoroughfares is traffic on Kabul's main thoroughfares is
surprisingly heavy.
Against this backdrop of an essentially secure, functioning capital
with the trappings of a national government, the Soviets may well view
the fighting outside as a secondary issue. Even if the military
situation in the countryside should deteriorate, it would probably have
to take a drastic and sustained turn for the worse, a turn ' which the
Soviets would consider too costly to reverse, before they would throw in
the towel on what they have achieved in Kabul. The chances of the
resistance changing the military picture so markedly are slim.
Implications for the US
It is difficult to say under these circumstances what we can do to
contribute even in the slightest way to that withdrawal. Apart from the
question of any aid to the resistance, we are already making efforts to
keep the Afghan issue alive both in the media and as a subject to be
raised in international forums and bilaterally with the Soviets. These
efforts should, of course, be continued.
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I would suggest that we also should explore more actively whether we
can do anything to nudge the resistance groups toward unity. Perhaps a
first step in this direction would be some consultations on the issue
with the Saudis and Pakistanis. I know that dealing with the Afghan
resistance groups can be like walking through a minefield and that the
prospects for unity are dim to say the least. But I have the impression
that our current hands-off policy is overly cautious. We may be passing
up an opportunity to add a new factor to the Afghan equation, one that
has the potential of rallying political support for the resistance,
improving its efforts inside Afghanistan, and shoring up the morale of
the Afghan people.
Finally, we have indications here from some East Europeans and from
the Kabul media that the Soviets are concerned about the possibility
that the resistance groups might eventually achieve some degree of
unity. Such concern alone would be reason enough for us to begin to
explore creatively how we could help bring unity about.
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