NSPG ON AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87B00342R000200280005-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2010
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: March 25, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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25 March 1985
NOTE FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : NSPG on Afghanistan
1. The purpose of this NSPG is to review a draft NSDD re US policy
toward Afghanistan and hear various departments' and agencies' comments.
(A copy of the NSDD is on the left side of this folder: the Aaencv has
supported the draft as written.)
2. Attached you will find the following:
TAB A Talking points from Fritz (partial)
TAB B
TAB C
TAB D
TAB E
TAB F
TAB G
State Dept. review completed
NESA/DI sitrep re current situation in Afghanistan.
Memorandum from Fritz with some additional background on
the NSDD and the NSPG.
Copy of your 16 March memorandum to Bud on Gorbachev's
comments on Afghanistan, etc.
Copy of Monday's Washington Times front page article.
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from Fritz Ermarth
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25 March 1985
DCI TALKING POINTS FOR NSPG ON AFGHANISTAN POLICY
(RESPONSIVE TO ADMIRAL POINDEXTER's QUESTIONS)
We believe the Soviet campaign in Afghanistan is stalemated for sure, and
probably losing ground.
The resistance is growing in size and effectiveness.
Soviet casualties and equipment losses are increasing.
The territory over which the Soviet/Afghan government exercises control
is shrinking.
Resistance activity is penetrating further into the cities.
Numerous sources show that the mid-level Soviet military perceive that
they are not winning the conflict, and that their situation is
deteriorating.
Why are the Soviets not winning in Afghanistan despite their overwhelming
physical power and great desire to win?
Virtually the entire nation of Afghanistan is hostile to them.
To a degree greater than any other people the Soviets have sought to
subjugate, the Afghans are willing to fight them, long and hard.
Traditionally warlike and armed, the Afghan resistance is increasingly
better armed and skillful in fighting.
Local factors of terrain and the primitive, fragmented organization of
the resistance make it hard for the Soviets to bring their kind of armed
forces to bear.
National hostility to the Soviets and their quislings makes it very
difficult for the Soviets to build any kind of political base or to
broaden their social-political appeal
So far, the Soviets have been unwilling to make the massive resource and
manpower commitment necessary -- in their own assessments -- to put the
war on a winning path.
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Public reports to the contrary notwithstanding, the Soviets have not
been willing nor had the resources to engage in truly nation-wide
scorched-earth tactics to control the country by killing or driving out
most of its people.
How serious are the threats that the Soviets are now making toward Zia, and
otherwise? ,
[Shall get this to you tomorrow AM; need additional data]
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TOP SECRET
Afghanistan: Situation Update
Talking Points for the DCI
Prepared by Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis
25 March 1985
Soviet and Afghan operational activity will increase this
spring, and the insurgents will renew their pressure on the capitol,
major lines of communication, and Soviet and Afghan posts.
Increases in guerrilla arms supplies and improved training and
cooperation should help them deal with the small-scale Soviet troop
increases observed to date.
Recent Insurgent Successes
Insurgent activity appears to be increasing as the weather
improves. In eastern Afghanistan resistance forces continue to put
heavy pressure on regime and Soviet units:
--On 11 March the guerrillas shot down a Soviet AN-30 turboprop
reconnaissance aircraft near Bagram Airfield with 4 surface-to-air
missile. the Soviets are
speeding up the installation of infrared countermeasures equipment
on all fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters because of concern about
increases in insurgent firings of surface-to-air missiles.
-- Insurgents put so much pressure on an Afghan division at
Asadabad in Konarha Province in early March that Soviet advisers
said the entire division was in danger of being annihilated. The
Soviets sent in a battalion to reinforce the Afghan unit, but
insurgent pressure is continuing.
-- The insurgents captured at least three Afghan border posts in
Nangarhar Province in mid-March.
in the past week, the
insurgents exploded three bombs in Soviet and regime shopping areas
in Kabul. The bombings resulted in over 30 regime and Soviet
casualties.
-- Between 27 February and 10 March, the Soviets counted at
least eleven incidents of fuel pipeline damage in western
Afghanistan and as many as four attacks on the eastern pipeline on
the first two days of March.
Increasing Soviet Interest in the Western Campaign
The Soviets have made a number of changes in the past few months
to try to improve their counterinsurgency capabilities in the west:
the Soviets have completed a
new ruei pipeline to Shindand and increased their fuel storage
capacity near Herat.
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-- The Soviets sent a new motorized rifle regiment from the USSR
to Herat by late February, bringing the Soviet division stationed in
western Afghanistan to full strength.
-- The Soviets have also brought in additional self-propelled
artillery from the USSR, probably for a tank regiment at Shindand
and have completed a new addition to a transshipment and storage
facility.
Operations in the East
The Soviets and Afghans have launched a number of operations in
recent weeks in response to increases in insurgent activity in
eastern Afghanistan:
-- Soviet and Afghan units mounted a large sweep near Oandahar,
the
Soviets have had little success. Prior to the operation the regime
controlled only about 20 percent of the city during the day and even
less at night.
the Soviets launched a
multibattalion operation in the Shomali area, north of Kabul, in
mid-March. Early last week Soviet airborne units were preparing for
another operation in the same area.
-- On 10 March Soviet and Afghan forces began a large operation
in Nangarhar Province. Soviet units also swept the Ali Khel area in
Paktia Province but encountered little resistance and were
unsuccessful in finding the insurgent ammunition depot for which
they were searching.
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SECRET
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC #01612-85
25 March 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM: Fritz W. Ermarth
National Intelligence Officer for USSR
SUBJECT: NSPG on Afghanistan
1. Following our conversation on Saturday morning, I've checked with
the NSC staff about the agenda for the NSPG meeting on Tuesday 26 March, and
have been told that the draft NSDD on policy toward Afghanistan is the main
topic. I've also reviewed the draft NSDD and find it, on the whole, a good
and actionable statement of policy.
Some critics might argue that it should identify the point at which
the risks and costs to us, as posed, say, by Soviet escalation
against Pakistan, should cause us to shrink back. I believe we
should not get into the business of setting hypothetical limits on
our own goals and measures now because, compared with what the
Soviets are doing, we are doing very little. If the actual threat
of Soviet escalation should rise, we shall see it and be able to
react.
The NSDD might have been a bit stronger on "bringing the news of
the war home to the Soviet people," but this is strong enough to
guide important political action and propaganda policies.
2. The question arises as to what this NSDD argues we should be doing
differently than we have been doing, especially on the political and
diplomatic fronts.
Mostly, it is a basis for continuing the present course of
increasing support to the resistance. It also provides the policy
basis for escalating if the Soviets do.
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I believe it is worth considering a more forceful representation to
the Soviets of our view of Afghanistan, along the lines of the
"Policy Implications" paper I gave you last weekend (attached).
3. As useful background prior to the NSPG, also attached is an Embassy
Moscow cable which reinforces our view of the current Soviet commitment to
eventual victory, rejection of retreat options, and conviction that popular
passivity is important in Moscow's ability to stay the course. The last
factor is extremely important. The Soviet strategy really counts on it.
Therefore we must do everything we can to make it less reliable.
Increasing the cost of the war by increasing the effectiveness of
the resistance is one necessary path.
4. But we must also increase the
efforts to bring home the news and the pain.
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,e//1/' /71(itz W. Ermarth
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25)(1
bl 'Policy Implications
- These Soviet probes will cause nervousness and perhaps ill-founded
interest in the payoff of "restraint" on the US side, particularly in Congress.
_
One would hope that some weak-kneed comments will be countered by strong ones
from the Administration and others on the Hill.
- We must keep going on the program. Now would be the worst possible
time to ease off!
-- The Soviets are feeling the heat and must continue to.
-- The odds of some sort of escalation by them are high, but
not catastrophic, because the most likely form is more of
the same.
The chances that things will break in the direction of some
sort of Soviet retreat are not trivial; they're good enough
for us to keep the pressure on.
Meanwhile, the objectives of making them pay a high price
and denying them victory remain sound and very feasible.
US hesitation or retreat now would hurt us with everybody
whose perception of us is important, including the Soviets.
The time may be approaching for some additional diplomatic initiative,
however.
- Especially now it is important to get the Soviets to understand how
important Afghanistan is to us.
-- We may have rather underplayed it in high-level contacts during
the past year.
-- One has the sense that the Soviets perceive our motives as
(a) we're trying to take a cheap shot at them in retaliation
for the growth of their power over the last 15 years, and
(b) displaying a potentially fickle ideological pique at them.
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-- They may not take our strategic and geopolitical interest
seriously enough. They perceive it themselves, but rarely
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hear the US talking about it. We typically criticize them
in moralistic terms, which they don't respect.
- At a private but high diplomatic level we should get across the
following messages, and try to get the Chinese to reinforce what they can:
-- US interests and the security of the neighborhood cannot
tolerate a Soviet victory in Afghanistan.
-- This is because the Soviet invasion and the people's war it
precipitated have all but destroyed options for moderate
political solutions.
-- Soviet success in suppressing the resistance and consolidating
control would inevitably mean:
- A satellite government in Kabul.
- A large and indefinitely protracted Soviet military
occupation of the country; otherwise the Kabul
government would collapse.
- The buildup of a Soviet military infrastructure in
Afghanistan which would markedly raise the Soviet
threat to the region (bases, pipelines, etc.).
- But, given the nature of the terrain and the people,
resistance activity across the borders would go on
indefinitely which would constantly give the Soviets
motives and pretexts to attack Pakistan and Iran from a
stronger base.
2
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-- We are not going to accept this future under the guise of
- a "political resolution," and we don't have to.
-- The only alternative to a continuing and possibly wider war
is for the USSR to recognize--as many of its officials do--
that it made a big mistake and to signal its firm intentions
to pull out, not matter what happens to the Kabul regime.
-- Then various means can be found to make the Soviet pullout
reasonably smooth.
- In addition to more blunt talk at the private diplomatic level, we
might give some thought to the idea of an international conference on
Afghanistan to include:
The Soviets
The DRA
Representatives of the Mujahedin
Paki stan
India
-- Iran
-- China
-- Saudi Arabia representing the Islamic World
-- The US
What we'd aim for is the kind of "peace process" that eventually got
us out of Vietnam. To achieve this we'd have to maintain military heat on
the Soviets and some political discipline among their adversaries.
-- The Soviets would probably reject this because it would put
them at a big disadvantage politically.
3
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-- The danger would be, however, that they'd accept it and, as in
arms control, try to persuade Congress to cut aid to the resistance,
to "encourage progress," and also try to split their opponents.
- But it's worth a thought. The time is approaching when we have to
come up with some "theory of the outcome" other than eventual Soviet victory.
The only one I can think of in practical terms is:
The Soviets decide they have to pull out and look for the
best deal.
They concentrate on holding the cities and their LOCs.
They start removing their most valued communist allies to the
USSR.
They put up a non-communist "reconciliation" government in
Kabul which tries to negotiate ceasefires and a political
settlement.
They try to get the US and Pakistan to stop aiding the rebels,
but fail.
While continuing to put military pressure on them, the
resistance lets the Soviets gradually pull out in good order.
- There are all manners of thing that make this scenario unworkable or
implausible.
- Yet I can think of no persuasive alternative other than a war that
goes on, a war that escalates to something much bigger which we could not
stay out of, or eventual Soviet victory with all the global and regional
consequences we must not and need not accept.
4
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CONF1UENTIAL
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FRP: r 13,
STATE
PP RUEAII5
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
UTS8398
PP RUEHC
DE RUEHMO 03646/01 0811543
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 221531Z MAR 85
FM AmEmBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECS1ATE mASHDC PRIORITY 8577
INFO RUFHLG/AmCONSUL LENINGRAD 1699
RUEHSJ/AmEmbASSY bEIJING 7417
RuFHOL/AmEm8ASSY BONN 8809
RUEHLD/AMEmBASSY LONDON 0073
RUFHFR/AmEMbASSY PARIS 7478
RUF1NA/USMISS1UN USNATO 8257
RuEHDT/USmISSION USUN NE.. YORK 4756
RUDKFMQ/AmEMbASSY STOCKHOLM 3250
RUDKR8/AmEmbASSY BELGRADE 1136
RUFHE8/AmEmbASSY BERLIN 7546
RUDKAR/AMEmbASSy BUCHAREST 1878
RUOKDA/AmEmBASSY BUDAPEST 0926
RUFRMU/AmCONSUL MUNICH 9871
RUDKRP/AmEmbASSy PRAGUE 1625
RUDKSA/AmEmBASSY SOFIA 0873
RUDKRm/AMEMbASSy wARSAm 3133
RUEHIL/AmEmeASSY ISLAmAbAD 2045
RUS8LK/AMEMbASSY KAHUL 1370
RoEHNE/AmEmBASSY NEV DELHI 3046
RUEHKO/AmEmbASsY TOKYO 7902
coNPlUENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
STATE
RUFtimB/uSDEL mBFR VIENNA 3022
RUFHGV/USDEL NST GENEVA 0044
BT
CONFIDENTIAL MOSCOW 03646
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, AF, OR
SUBJECT: SOVIET ATTITUDES ON AFGHANISTAN: HOLDING
STEADY AS. GORBACHEv TAKES OVER
WWI
REF: MOSCOW 3241 (NOTAL)
1. (C ? ENTIRE TEXT).
2, SUMMARY: EMBOFF RECENTLY HAD Two UNUSUAL OPPORTUNI-
TIES TO ASSESS SOVIET ATTITUDES ON Tkt WAR IN AFGHAN-
ISTAN. THE FIRST WAS A CONVERSATION WITH ORIENTAL
INSTITUTE SPECIALIST YURIY VLADImIRoVICH GANKOVSKIY,
THE SECOND WAS A VISIT TO AN UNUSUAL, OfFICIALLY-
SPONSORED ExHIBIT OF PAINTINGS DEPICIiNG THE STRUGGLE
IN AFGHANISTAN, BOTH EXPERIENCES COfif1RmED OUR
IMPRESSION OF A HIGH DEGREE OF CONTINUITY IN SOVIET
ATTITUDES ON THE WAR, WHILE THERE 15 LITTLE OVERT
POPULAR ENTHUSIASM FOR THE wAR, THE kt6ImE CAN DOUBTLESS
CONTINUE TO COUNT ON THE PATRIOTISM *NO POLITICAL
PASSIVITY OF MOST SOVIET CITIZENS. ALIHOUGH A
TURNING POINT IS NOT YET IN SIGHT, SOVIET COSTS ARE
MANAGEABLE AND IT REMAINS PLAUSIBLE 10 ARGUE THAT TIME
IS ON MOSCOW'S SIDE, FACED WITH THE-ALlERNATIvES OF
MASSIVE ESCALATION OR IGNOMINIOUS wiltiORAwAL, MOST
POLITICALLY LITERATE SOVIETS SEEM PREPARED TO STAY
WITH THE CURRENT COURSE: SUSTAINED MILITARY PRESSURE
COMBINED WITH A LONG-TERM EFFORT To soILD SOVIET-STYLE
AFGHAN INSTIloTIONs.
3, THE ONE NEW FACTOR IN THE AFGHANISTAN EUUATION IS
GORBACHEV'S ACCESSION TO THE GENERAL-sEcRETARySHIP.
WE SEE NO EVIDENCE, HOWEVER, THAT HE IS NOW PREPARED
TO SET A NL w COURSE IN AFGHANISTAN,- MOREOVER, THERE
ARE NO INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL PRESSURES POWERFUL ENOUGH
TO FORCE THE GENERAL SECRETARY'S NAND UN THIS ISSUE IN
CoNfIDENTIAL
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STATE
11 THE INITIAL STAGE OF HIS TENURE, IT REmAINS TO bE SEEN
WHETHER GORBACHEV'S REPUTED ImPATIENCE WITH TEMPORIZING
AND ImmObILISm WILL AT SOME FUTURE KOINT DICTATE A
DECISIVE SHIFT IN mOSCOPOS AFGHANISTAN STRATEGY,
END SUMMARY,
4, EMBOFF RECENTLY CALLED AT MOSCOW'S PRESTIGIOUS
11 ORIENTAL INSTITUTE TO DISCUSS AFGHANUSTAN WITH THE
DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE'S DEPARTMENT FOR AFGHANISTAN,
PAKISTAN, AND IRAN YURIY VLADImIROVICA GANKOVSKIY,
11 ALTHOUGH GANKOVSKIY HAS IN THE PAST EJEEN A WILLING AND
INTERESTING INTERLOCUTOR FOR EMBASSY ii10ScOw EMBOFFS,
WE HAD NOT SEEN HIM IN MORE THAN A YLAR BECAUSE OF A
11 GENERAL TIGHTENING ON CONTACTS WITH IHL EMBASSY REPORTEDLY
IMPOSED BY INSTITUTE DIRECTOR PRImAK0v, HAVING AT LAST
AGREED TO AN APPOINTMENT, GANKOVSKIY RECEIVED EmBOFF
11 CORDIALLY AND SEEMED GENUINELY TO APPRECIATE RECEIVING
GREETINGS FROM EMBASSY MOSCOW ALUmN1-AND OTHER LONG-TIME
11 FRIENDS IN THE US, GANKOVSKIY ASKED iHAT HIS COMMENTS
ON AFGHANISTAN BE KEPT "BETWEEN US," AND WE URGE THAT
HE BE STRICTLY PROTECTED AS THE SOURCE OF THIS MATERIAL.
11
GANKOVSKIY ON AFGHANISTAN
INTERVENTION MAY HAVE BEEN ILL-CONSIDERED?,
5, AFTER INITIAL PLEASANTRIES, GANKuvsK IY TURNED TO
AFGHANISTAN AND APPEARED TO WARM oulcKLY To HIS SUBJECT.
HE ASSERTED THAT THOSE IN THE *HEST who SA w EVENTS SINCE
THE APRIL 1978 COUP AS A SOV1ET?INSPIREU EFFORT TO
INSTALL A COMMUNIST REGIME IN KABUL HAD MISREAD THE
E.0, 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, AF, UR
SUBJECT: SOVIET ATTITUDES ON AFGHANISTAN; HOLDING
SITUATION, ACCORDING 10 GANKovSKIY, SU LITTLE AS KNOhN
IN MOSCOW ABOUT TARAKI AND AmIN, THAI; wHEN THE COUP .
OCCURRED, FRIENDS IN MFA TELEPHONE? AIM URGENTLY TO
FIND OUT wHO THE NEW LEADERS WERE, As AN EXPERT UN
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CONFIDENTIAL
STATE
AFGHAN POLIilLS, bANKuVSKlY KNEW BOTH TAPAKI AND AMIN
AND DISCOUNTED ENTIRELY THEIR mARxISi PRETENSIONS.
ACCORDING TO GANKOVSKIY, NEITHER oF THESE LUMINARIES
COULD HAVE PASSED AN ELEMENTARY EXAMINATION ON
SOCIALIST IDEOLOGY, AND THEIR MAIN PULITICAL ATTRIBUTES
WERE STRUNG PUSHTuN NATIONALISM AND A.LARGE MEASURE
OF PERSONAL OPPORTUNISM.
6. GANKOVSKIY MADE NO SECRET OF HIS CONVICTION THAT THE
NEW "REVOLUTIONARY" REGIME HAD FROM [FIE BEGINNING
PURSUED A DISASTROUS COURSE OF REPRESSION AND PSEUDO-
SOCIALIST SCHEMES FOR OVERNIGHT TRAr6FORmATION OF AFGHAN
SOCIETY. IN GANKOVSKIY'S VIEW, THESE-ILL.ADvISED
POLICIES HAD SUCCEEDED ONLY IN CREATING FUR THE FIRST
TIME A LARGE-SCALE FOLLOwING FUR THOSE REACTIONARY,
ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST LEADERS WHO NUW DIRECT "EXTERNAL
INTERVENTION" AGAINST AFGHANISTAN Fmum THEIR SANCTUARY
IN PESHAwAR. BY MID-1979, THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WAS
FACED wITH MAJOR UNCERTAINTIES ALONG-1HOuSANDS OF MILES
OF ITS SOUTHERN BORDER AS AFGHANISTAN LURCHED TOWARD A
VIRTUAL CIVIL wAR AND THE IRANIAN REvuLuTION BEGAN ITS
UNPREDICTABLE COURSE. ACCORDING TO bANKovSKIY, THE
OLD MEN IN THE KREMLIN FOUND THIS uNCERTAINIY INTOLERABLE
AND ULTIMATELY DECIDED TO INTERVENE ON THE SIDE OF THE
AFGHAN FACTION WHICH AT LEAST CLAImEu AN IDEOLOGICAL
AFFINITY FOR THE SOVIET UNION. IMPLICIT IN GANKOVSKIY'S
VERSION OF THESE OFTEN?ANALYZED EVENTS IS THE NOTION
THAT SOVIET LEADERS HAD LITTLE APPRECIATION OF THE
THICKET THEY WERE PLUNGING INTO AS SovIET FORCES LANDED
IN KABUL.
(COMMENT: GANKOVSKIY'S DOWNPLAYING oF SOCIALIST
'SOLIDARITY AS A FACTOR IN MOSCOW'S DECISION TO
INTERVENE IS bOTH UNUSUAL FOR A wELL=PLACED SOVIET
ACADEMIC AND OPEN TO CHALLENGE ON HISioRICAL GROUNDS.
IT IS HIS READINESS TO STATE HIS uNukiHuDoX VIEWS
BLUNTLY THAT MAKES GANKOvSKIY AN INTOILSTING AND
VALUABLE INTERLOCUTOR ON THIS SUBJECT. HE REPORT
HIS VERSION OF AN OLD STORY BECAUSE It SETS THE STAGE
FOR HIS ANALYSIS OF MOSCOW'S CURRENT DILEmNA
IN AFGHANISTAN. END COMMENT)
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CONtIDENTIAL
STATE
I 'SWW.../OW4. W/
...BUT "THERE IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR V1LTURYN
7, WHETHER OR NOT INTERVENTION HAD SEEN THE BEST COURSE
IN 1979, GANKOVSKIY ASSERTED THAT AFTER FIVE YEARS OF
WAR, MOSCOW HAD LITTLE CHOICE BUT 10-PERSEVERE IN THE
EFFORT TO ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVES. GANKOVSKIY NOTED THAT
IN SUCH THIRD WORLD CONFLICTS, GREAT -POWERS CANNOT
ACCEPT DEFEAT WITH IMPUNITY, NOR ARE THEY OFTEN FORCED
BY EXTERNAL PRESSURES TO THROW IN THE-TOWEL, POINTING
TO THE FRENCH EXPERIENCE IN ALGERIAl'uANKuVSKIY ASSERTED
THAT IT WAS EROSION OF WILL WITHIN FwAwCE, NOT
EXTERNAL PRESSURE, WHICH FORCED PARIS TO WITHDRAW. IT
WAS MUCH LESS LIKELY THAT THE SOVIET UNIONWOULD,
EVEN IMPLICITLY, ACKNOWLEDGE DEFEAT-1(4 AFGHANISTAN,
GIVEN THE ABSENCE OF AmY SUBSIANTIAL-IN1ERNAL PRESSURE
FOR WITHDRAwAL AND THE WELL-KNOWN FUR1ITUDE OF THE
RUSSIAN PEOPLE. AS TO AFGHANISTAN'S FUTURE, GANKOVSKIY
SAID THAI FUR A PERIOD FOLLOWING THE 1918 COUP, IT
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, AF, OR
SUBJECT: SOVIET ATTITUDES ON AFGHANISTAN: HOLDING
MIGHT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE TO MOVE TOwARO "FINLANDIZATION"
OF KABUL'S RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW. AP ILK FIVE YEARS OF
WAR, THE ONLY OPTION NOW AVAILABLE 1U-AFGHANISTAN IS
"MuNGOLIZATION,"
8, EMBOFF RESPONDED WITH TWO GUESTIoNs, HOW COULD ONE
SPEAK OF "MONGOLIZATION" OF AFGHANIS-1AN GIVEN ITS
TRADITION OF INDEPENDENCE AND THE SiRtNGTH OF THE RESIS-
TANCE ON THE BATTLEFIELD? SECOND, WAS IT NOT POSSIBLE
THAT OUT OF THE CURRENT STRUGGLE, THERE MIGHT EMERGE
NEW AFGHAN LEADERS WHO COULD MORE SUCCESSFULLY PROMOTE
NATIONAL RECONCILIATION THAN TMOSE-AEREADY ON THE SCENE?
GANKOVSKIY ANSWERED THE SECOND QUESTION FIRST, THERE
WAS NO USE IN SPEAKING OF POLITICAL -ALTERNATIVES TO THE
DRA; THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NEVER AGRtt-TO TURN OVER
PowER TO THE CROWD IN PESHAWAR AND NO-OTHER ALTEPATIVES
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CONF 'DENT IAL
STATE
WERE IN SIGHT. AS TO A SOVIET STRATEGY FOR THE
"MONGOLIZATION" OF AFGHANISTAN, GANKOifSKIY CLAIMED CAS
HE HAD IN MEETINGS WITH EMBOFFS MORE IhAN A YEAR AGO)
THAT MOSCOW RETAINED THE OPTION OF SEALING THE PAK/AFGHAN
BORDER BY FIELDING A FORCE OF A HALF-MILLION SOVIET
TROOPS. AS IF TO DISCOUNT THE MILITARY OPTION HE HAD JUST
RAISED, GANKOVSKIY SAID THAT THE REAL WORKOF PACIFYING
AFGHANISTAN WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED THkuUGH A SLOW BUT
STEADY STRENGTHENING OF SOVIET-STYLE AFGHAN INSTITUTIONS.
THIS, COMBINED wITH A PROPER SUCIALISI EDUCATION FOR -
YOUNGER AFGHANS, MANY OF wHOM *ERE ALFILADY STUDYING IN
THE SOVIET UNION, WOULD EVENTUALLY TORN THE TIDE.
IMPLICIT IN GANKOVSKIY'S LINE wAS THE NOTION THAT,
DESPITE THE OBVIOUS IMPORTANCE OF THE MILITARY DIMENSION,
THE SOVIET UNION OOLD IN THE END FlAt. TO WIN A POLITICAL
AND SOCIAL VICTORY IN AFGHANISTAN. -
?
ART ON AFGHANISTAN: "MISSION ACCOMPLISHED"
?
9. MANY OF GANKUVSKIY'S THEMES ARE GRAPHICALLY PRESENTED
TO A RIDER AUDIENCE IN AN UNUSUAL MOSCOW EXHIBIT OF
PAINTINGS ON THE STRUGGLE IN AFGHANISiAN, THE EXHIBIT
IS TUCKED AwAY IN ONE ALCOVE OF AN ERORmOUS COLLECTION
OF PAINTINGS ON THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY UF THE SOVIET
VICTORY IN WORLD *AR II DISPLAYED IN IME SARN*LIKE
MANEZH HALL ADJACENT TO THE KREMLIN. -1HE THOUSANDS OF
PAINTINGS, POSTERS, AND MEMORABILIA OF THE SOVIET
UNION'S "GOOD WAR" PREDICTABLY., BUJ ALSO POWERFULLY,
EVOKE THE IMAGES OF HEROSIM, SACRIFICE, AND THE HORROR
OF wAR WHICH DOMINATE SOVIET PUPOLAR-AT1ITUDES ON
WORLD WAR 11.
(a)
TEN TO FIFTEEN PAINTINGS ON AFGHANISTAN ARE
DIFFERENT. THERE ARE NO PORTRAYALS UF COMBAT, AND THE
ONLY TWO PAINTINGS WHICH ACTUALLY DEPICT SOVIET SOLDIERS
IN AFGHANISTAN SHOW THEM AS DISTANT,-HA2Y FIGURES
AGAINST THE MOUNTAINOUS DESERT BACKDROP OF CENTRAL
ASIA. ONE OF THE TWO PAINTINGS, A PUkiRAYAL OF A
BARELY DISCERNIBLE COLUMN OF SOVIET MILITARY VEHICLES
DRAWN UP IN A SUNRISE ON SUNSET FORMAIIUN, IS TITLtD
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CONFIDENTIAL
STATE
"MISSION ACCOMPLISHED" (PRIKAZ VPOLNEN). THIS SEEMS
TO HAVE BEEN THE GENERAL THEME UF THOSE PAINTINGS WHICH
DEPICTED THE SOVIET MILITARY ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN,
INCLUDING THE POTRAIT OF A "HERO OF THE SOVIET UNION"
CAREFULLY PLACED AT THE CENTER OF IHt-SmALL EXHIBIT.
?
11. THE PAINTINGS OF AFGHANS IN THE EXHIBIT LOOKED
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, AF, UR
It SUBJECT: SOVIET ATTITUDES ON AFGHANISTAN; HOLDING
AS IF THEY MIGHT HAVE BEEN CHOSEN BY 6ANKOVSKIY TO
ILLUSTRATE MIS POINT ABOUT THE FUTURE (if THEIR COUNTRY.
IN ONE, A GROUP OF AFGHAN YOUTHS PARAUE UNDER A SEA OF
RED BANNERS OBVIOUSLY EXTOLLING THE VIRTUES OF THE NEn
111 ORDER IN KABUL. OTHER VIEWS OF YOUNGAFGHANS SHOW THEM
WORKING OR STUDYING WITH LITTLE HINT-IHAT THEY LIVE IN
A COUNTRY AT WAR; IN ONE PORTRAIT, A iOUNG AFGHAN
ARMY OFFICER IS EVEN SHOWN AT LEISURE IN CIVILIAN
DRESS, PERHAPS THE MOST STRIKING, If ARTISTICALLY
ORDINARY, PAINTING IN THE EXHIBIT DEPICTS AN AFGHAN
BAZAAR THROUGH WHICH A LINE OF DOWNCAST.MUJAHADIN
MOVES UNDER THE WATCHFUL EYE OF A SINGLE DRA SOLDIER.
THE AFGHAN SOLDIER, WITH RIFLE (MUZZLE DONN) AT SLING
ARMS, WATCHES AS EACH MUJAHADIN LAYS 0OwN HIS RIFLE,
OR ROCKET LAUNCHER, OR GRENADES ON 'A GROWING PILE OF
WEAPONS OF OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN MANUFACIoRE, THE PORTRAYAL
OF THIS SIMPLE SURRENDER CEREMONY IS-NUT SURPRISINGLY
TITLED "TRANSFORMATION (PREVRASHCHENYE) IN AFGHANISTAN."
E?
.12. SOVIET VISITORS APPEARED TO ACCEPT WITH EQUANIMITY
THE INCLUSION OF PAINTINGS ON AFGHANISTAN IN AN EXHIBIT
E DEVOTED TO THE SOVIET VICTORY IN WURLD 'AR II. AT THE
SAME TIME, FE h SOVIETS LINGERED IN THIS ALCOVE, AND
EVEN THE MANY UNIFORMED MILITARY VISITuRS SEEMED TO
TAKE ONLY PASSING INTEREST IN Tmou-14.144 PAINTINGS WHICH
ACTUALLY PORIRAYED SOVIET SOLDIERS IFI THEFIELD, UNLIKE
THE SCENES OFTEN REPEATED ELSEWHERE IN THE EXHIBIT,
OLDER VISITORS RARELY PUT THEIR ARMS AROUNDCHILDREN
TO EXPLAIN TO THEM THE SIGNIFICANCEUi THE AFGHANISTAN
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COM'IDENTIAL
STATE
PAINTINGS, WHILE REVERENT TONES ANO HUSHED CONVERSATIONS
PREVAILED THROUGHOUT THE MASSIVE EXHIBIT HALL,
VISITORS TO 1HE AFGHAN ALCOVE SEEMED UNIMPRESSED BY THE
EVIDENCE THAT FORTY YEARS AFTER V?E OAT, THE SOVIET UNION
IS AGAIN AT WAR,
COMMENT
13. THESE TWO VERY DIFFERENT EXPERIENCES UNDERSCORE
OUR IMPRESSION OF A HIGH DEGREE OF CONTINUITY IN SOVIET
ATTITUDES ON AFGHANISTAN, DESPITE THE -HIGHER MEDIA
PROFILE GIVEN THE CONFLICT OVER THE-PAS1 YEAR, THERE
STILL SEEMS TO BE LITTLE POPULAR ENTHUSIASM FOR THE
WAR, AT THE SAME TIME, MOST SOVIETS ?? WHETHER SCHOLARS
LIKE GANKOVSKIY OR LESS SOPHISTICATEO VISITORS TO THE
MANEZH EXHIBIT es. APPEAR 10 TAKE FOR bRANTED THE
KREMLIN'S DETERMINATION TO PERSEVERE UNTIL "VICTORY"
IS WON, GIVEN THE RELATIVELY LOW NUmbER OF SOVIET
CASUALTIES THUS FAR, WE BELIEVE THAT IHE REGIME CAN
CONTINUE TO CUUNT ON THE PATRIOTISM ANOPOLITICAL
PASSIVITY OF MOST SOVIET CITIZENS TO COMPENSATE FOR
THEIR LACK OF OVERT COMMITMENT TO THL-wAR EFFORT.
14, DESPITE RECENT SIGNS OF GROWING SOVIET FRUSTRATION
OVER AFGHANISTAN, GANKOVSKIY'S LINE AEMUST CERTAINLY
REMAINS THE PIILVAILING WISDOM AMONG POLITICALLY ACTIVE
SOVIETS, ALTHOUGH A TURNING POINT IN THE WAR IS NUT
YET IN SIGHT, SOVIET COSTS ARE.MANAOLABLE AND IT REMAINS
POSSIBLE PLAUSIBLY TO ARGUE THAT TIM-CIS ON MOSCOW'S -
SIDE. IN ANY EVENT, WITHURAwAL NOW WOULD INEVITABLY
LEAD TO A RESUMPTION OF TME INSTABILI1Y WHICH, IN
GANKOVSKIY'S VIEW. DREW MOSCOW INTO tilE WAR IN THE
FIRST PLACE, WHILE WE THINK IT PLAuS1BLE THAT THERE
ARE ADHEMENTS OF A NEW ALL?OUT EFFURI TO ACHIEVE A
E.O. 12356: OECL: OAOR
TAGS: PkEL, AF, OR
SUBJECT: SOVIET ATTITUDES ON AFGHANISTAN: HOLDING
MILITARY VICTORY IN THE SOVIET ESTAbLISHMENT, PARTICULARLY
CONI*IOLNTIAL
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C.
C.
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CONFIDENTIAL
STATE
AMONG THE MILITARY, THE POTENTIAL RISKS AND COSTS OF
SUCH A STRATEGY PROBABLY STILL APPEAR PROHIBITIVE TO
MOST SEGMENTS OF THE SOVIET ELITE. PACED WITH THESE
UNPLEASANT ALTERNATIVES, MOST POLITICALLY LITERATE
SOVIETS WOULD, LIKE GANKOVSKIY, TEMPORIZE BY COMBINING
MILITARY PRESSURE WITH A LONG?TERM EFPORT TO BUILD UP
USOVIET?STYLE AFGHAN INSTITUTIONS. --- *
iS, THE ONE NEW FACTOR IN THE AFGHANISIAN EQUATION IS,
OF COURSE, GORBACHEV'S ACCESSION TO IHE GENERAL SECRETARY..
OSHIP, WITH APOLOGIES TO WINSTON CHURCHILL, WE THINK IT
INCONCEIVABLE THAT GORBACHEV SEES HIMSELF AS HAVING
BECOME GENERAL SECRETARY 70 PRESIDE UVER A SOVIET
C) DEBACLE IN AFGHANISTAN, THAT SAID, DETERMINATION TO
SUCCEED IS NOT A POLICY, AND GORBACHEVMAY AT SOME POINT
O DECIDE THAT A REVIEW OF SOVIET OPTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN
IS NECESSARY, FOR THE PRESENT, HOWEVER, WE SEE NO
EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THAT GORBACHEV IS-PREPARED TO SET A
(7' NEW DIRECTION OR EVEN TO MOVE THE AFGHANISTAN ISSUE TO
THE TOP OF AN ALREADY CROWDED FOREIGN-POLICY AGENDA.
MOREOVER, WE SEE NO INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL PRESSURES
POWERFUL ENOUGH TO FORCE THE GENERAL-SECRETARY'S HAND
ON AFGHANISTAN DURING THE INITIAL STAGE OF HIS TENURE,
IN VIEW OF THESE FACTORS, IT MUST FUR Till. PRESENT REMAIN
O AN OPEN QUESTION WHETHER GORBACHEV'S REPUTED IMPATIENCE
WITH TEMPORIZING AND IMMOBILISM WILL AT SOME FUTURE
POINT DICTATE A DECISIVE SHIFT IN MUSLOW'S AFGHANISTAN
STRATEGY, HARTMAN
END OF MESSAGE CONT'IVENTIAL
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tv.,..b.rilion (WS
. ?
--------
E x ec u `. E; y
16 March 1985_,
The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500
Dear Bud,
I think this interpretation of Gorbachev's
comments on Afghanistan at the funeral, together
with Gromyko's discussions with the French Foreign
Minister and Zia's reaction to all this, may be
of interest to the President.
Enclosure
Yours,
/s/
William J. Casey
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Soviet Stance on Afghanistan a la Gorbachev
According to TASS, Gorbachev took a hard line with Zia on Afghanistan,
charging aggressive acts against the DRA and stressing "most unfavorable
effect" on Soviet-Pakistan relations.
The Washington Post carries this story coupled with insinuations from
Soviet officials to Dusko Doder that the Soviets might "link" Afghanistan
and Nicaragua.
- -
If the US goes after Nicaragua, the Soviets could, supposedly,
go after Pakistan by arming the Baluch and otherwise trying to
destabilize Zia's regime.
- Zia characterized the meeting publicly as "pleasant and businesslike,"
focused on Afghanistan, and including agreement that a "political solution"
through the UN indirect talks must be found.
Further Relevant Information
- The Soviets did not raise Afghanistan with the Vice President. He
alluded to it in a passing list of regional issues, but Gorbachev did not
respond.
- What we have on other Gorbachev meetings with Western delegations
shows little or no attention to Afghanistan.
Gromyko did discuss it with French Foreign Minister Dumas.
He took a "hard line," said Moscow intervened reluctantly
at DRA request, and would remain until stability is restored.
- There wasn't much discussion of Afghanistan when Shcherbitskiy was
here. But what there was displayed a defensive, frustrated mood.
SECRET
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-- In response to the President's challenge, Shcherbitskiy repeated
the line that the Soviets intervened reluctantly.
-- In conjuction with Soviet charges about the US in Grenada,
Shcherbitskiy said Afghanistan is a "more difficult" military
problem.
-- On the margins of another discussion, General Cherov (The
General Staff man on arms control) muttered that Afghanistan
was the USSR's biggest post-war mistake.
- Zia's public comments on the Soviet pitch suggests he wasn't much
rattled.
Interpretation
- The Soviets have raised the rhetorical ante, but not too dramatically.
The charges are familiar. Note they don't go to the point, as some diplomatic
messages have, of characterizing Pak actions as attacks on the USSR and its
forces.
- The most important thing is that, while just short of a public speech,
Gorbachev has personally and publicly associated himself now with the Soviet
strategy and policy in Afghanistan.
- This is probably the opening of a somewhat more vigorous political/
propaganda effort to spook Zia and the US. Even this the Soviets want to
apply cautiously, however, listening for what resonance they get before trying more.
2
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- The "linkage" to Nicaragua is a bit surprising only in how long it's
taken them to get to this point.
- But the "threat" seems somewhat hollow.
Arming Baluch groups and seeking to destabilize Zia are options
for which the Soviets have had strong motives all along, but
weak practical means of effecting and controlling. They can't
just turn this on at will, although they could try harder and
thereby make more trouble.
The real Soviet motive for destabilizing Pakistan is not Nicaragua
but Afghanistan. For the Soviets, however, to say so admits how
much trouble they are having.
The Soviets probably want the US to start thinking about some
sort of a tradeoff between Afghanistan and Central America.
They know that, by showing even mild interest in this, the US
could pull the political rug out from under Zia and demoralize
the Mujahedin, plus all other freedom fighters who look to us,
without getting anything solid in Nicaragua.
- I don't see anything yet that would oblige us to change the analysis
in the forthcoming SNIE on the military side (more of the same but more),
although we can forecast more vigorous propaganda action now.
- The net effect of all reporting in the last week is to heighten
the impression of Soviet frustration and basic unhappiness with their Afghan
strategy, their interest in some better approach, but their lack of good
options.
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The Washington Times, Monday, 25 March 1985
Pakistan-U.S S.R. showdown
By Mahn Strmecki
SPECIAL TO THE PASHINOTON TIMES
"PESHAWAR, Pakistan ? Mos-
cow's new campaign of intimidation
against Pakistan has produced its
first tangible success, forcing
Afghan resistance forces to abandon
a string of military posts along the
Afghan-Paldstani border overrun
just 10 days ago. ?
The Afghans yielded, and the
Soviet Union re-established its con-
trol over a 15-kilometer stretch of
the strategic lbur Itham Highway
running from the Khyber Pass
toward Kabul after threatening to
bomb populated border Areas in
? Pakistan.
In addition, an Afghan resistance
group said yesterday that two of its
leading guerrilla commanders were
killed by mines scattered by Soviet
Marin Strmecki has been in Paki-
stan for two months and has spent
the last three weeks on the Afghan-
Pakistani border. Earlier, he worked
for three years as a research assis-
tant for former President Richard M.
Nixon on his books.
In addition, an Afghan resistance group said
yesterday that two of its leading guerrilla
commanders were killed by mines scattered by
Soviet troops during the sweep through rebel
bases near the Pakistani border
troops during the sweep through
rebel bases near the Pakistani bor-
der.
At the same time, according to
analysts in Washington, a 5,000-
member Afghan army force assisted
by Soviet special forces is chewing
up permanent Afghan resistance
bases stretching from the highway
to the Khyber Pass.
"They're obviously going for the
kill," an analyst said.
The Soviet campaign of intimida-
tion against Pakistan was signaled
less than two weeks ago, when Paki-
stani President Mohammed Zia
ul-Haq traveled to Moscow to attend
the funeral of the late Soviet Pres-
ident Konstantin Chernenko.
According to a report from the
Soviet news agency Tass, Mikhail
Gorbachev, the new Soviet leader,
castigated President Zia for support-
ing "aggression" against Afghan-
istan from Pakistani soil, and
warned that Soviet-Pakistani ties
could be affected in a "most neg-
ative" way.
President Zia referred to that
stern warning from Mr. Gorbachev
when he addressed the new Parlia-
ment last week and pledged anew his
support for the Afghan resistance.
Moreover, in Soviet academic cir-
cles, a major theme recently is the
artificiality of Pakistan's borders,
characterized as a "colonial cre-
ation." The implication of such argu-
ments is that in any overall
settlement of Central Asia, there
may be no place for Pakistan as a
state.
There has been speculation
recently that the Soviet Union,
under an aggressive new leader,
may be using threats against a U.S.
ally in an attempt to encourage the
United States to reduce its pressure
on Nicaragua.
An analogous maneuver was
attempted during the Cuban missile
crisis, when Moscow demanded that
Washington pull its nuclear missiles
out of llirkey, a Soviet neighbor, in
exchange for the removal of newly
placed missiles in Cuba.
According to sources in the
Peshawar-based Afghan political
parties, the Soviet Union claimed
that Pakistan was assisting the resis-
tance forces holding the highway
and that bombardment on the Paki-
stani side of the border would be
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undertaken if the roadside posts
were not evacuated.
In the past year, Afghan air force
jets and helicopters have flown over
70 sorties across the border, killing
more than 250 people.
Sources said that Pakistani
authorities informed leaders of the
Afghan resistance of the Soviet
demand and insisted that their
,forces comply immediately. At the
same time, border troops also began
stopping supply trucks traveling
toward the area and arresting resis-
tance commanders who were
returning to the front after consult-
ing with military leaders. in Pes-
hawar.
As a result of ammunition
shortages and in accordance with
the orders of their parties' military
committees, the resistance fighters
withdrew from their positions on the
highway within 48 hours.
The next day a major Soviet-
Afghan government force, which
witnesses said included some 200
tanks, reoccupied the area and
assaulted resistance positions in
nearby mountains for two days.
The crisis was precipitated 10
days ago, when resistance com-
manders in the field decided to
mount a systematic attack on gov-
ernment posts along the highway in
retaliation for recent heavy artillery
bombardment.
Sources said that offensive,
launched without consulting leaders
in Peshawar, violated an informal
agreement beween Islamabad and
resistance organizations not to
attack Kabul government posts near
the border to avoid giving the Soviet
Union a ?pretext to strike directly
against Pakistan.
Sayed Mohammed, a commander
from the area whose units are affili-
ated with the National Islamic Profit
of Afghanstan (NIFA), said local
military leaders chose unanimously
to ignore the agreement with Paki-
stan.
"We were being bombed by artil-
lery fire from those posts, and so it
was out of the duty of self-defense
that we retaliated. Can the Pakistani
authorities secure our lives?" he
said.
After two days of sporadic but
heavy fighting, resistance units had
overrun 10 government posts ?
including positions on. strategic
Sham Shat Mountain that control the
Afghan end of the Khyber Pass.
Sayed Mohammed said 300 resis-
tance troops were involved in the
attacks. He said that more than 100
Afghan government troops were
killed and that another ISO were cap-
tured. He also reported that casual-
ties to the resistance forces included
only five killed and about 20
wounded,
Lal Mohammed, another NIFA
commander who returned from the
area yesterday, said intelligence
reports 'were" received indicating
that Llarge armored column was.
preparing to retake the area. As a
result,' resistance forces planted
dozens of mines along the road.
Gus 'Constantine contributed to.
this report from Washington.
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