ANTI-MISSILE DEFENSE OF TROOPS OF A FRONT BY LT. GEN. V. MIKHAYLOV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029000100001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 30, 1961
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29000100001-8
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29000100001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29000100001-8
E` SECRET
Anti-Missile Defense of Troops of a Front
by
Lt. Gen. V. Mikhaylov
It is known that at the present time our potential enemies con-
sider missiles as the basic means of delivering nuclear charges to
targets. In recent years appropriations in the USA for work in the
field of missile technology have increased by fivefold. The success
of operations conducted by our front operational groupings (obedi-
neniye) will depend to a significant degree on the number of available
means for combating enemy nuclear weapons delivery vehicles, including
ballistic missiles.
Combat against ballistic missiles is conducted on the ground, and
in the air. This article will not take up combat against missiles on
the ground. The purpose of this article is to examine the charac-
teristics orballistic missiles as air targets and to indicate methods
of creating appropriate armament and military equipment, and to
present a number of principles of organization of anti-missile defense
in front operations. In this regard, it is to be borne in mind that
initially anti-missile weapons will supplement the existing PVO
system of the front; subsequently, depending on the extent to which
the potential enemy increases his use of ballistic missiles in oper-
ations, it will become necessary to create a system of anti-missile
defense which is supplemented by the weapons for combat against
piloted aircraft.
As is known, the term ballistic missile is given to a flying
object which is controlled only in the initial sector of the
trajectory (up to 10 percent of D), which has the appearance of a
ballistic curve. Ballistic missiles possess supersonic speeds,
various ranges, high trajectories, and different weights of war-
heads (boyevaya chast). This permits them to be used in strikes
against objectives at tactical, operational, and strategic depths.
Missiles can carry nuclear charges of different magnitudes (in
TNT equivalents of from several thousand to several million tons).
AM SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29000100001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29000100001-8
UN SECRET
It should be assumed that operational - tactical designation
ballistic missiles can be used against troops and objectives in
the front zone. The use of strategic-designation missiles in the
front zone can be expected when objectives of a strategic nature
are deployed at operational depth or when the conditions of the
situation compel the enemy to carry out strikes with these missiles
against front targets.
Combat against ballistic missiles can be carried out in the
areas of their launch, in the flight trajectory, and also in the
sector o` he r'stabilization on entering the dense layers of the
atmosphere. Success in combatting ballistic missiles will depend
on the tactical-technical data of the anti-missile defense weapons,
the system of anti-missile defense created, and the quality of the
automated system of control of the anti-missile weapons.
It is known that the employment of means of air attack by the
enemy, including ballistic missiles, will be influenced by: the
stage of the war, the importance of the theater of combat oper-
ations, the enemy capability to use missiles, and the nature of
the operations being conducted by the front in a given theater of
combat operations.
We shall try to examine, by a concrete example, the quantity
and types of missiles the enemy can be expected to use in a front
offensive operation in the Western TVD /eatr voyennykh deystviy -
theater of combat7.
Let us assume that opposing the front is a group of armies
comprising two field armies and a tactical air army. Each field
army is reinforced with one group of the URS fpravl.yayemyy
reaktivnyy snaryad - guided missile? "Redstone", two to three
battalions (divizion) of the URS "Corporal", and six to nine
battalions of "Honest Jbhn". In the interest of defensive oper-
ations for the group of armies one squadron (eskadrilya) of
"Thor" missiles carries out one launching by all its installations
(ustar*vka). Let us also assume that the missile weapons of
neighboring field armies are not called upon in the strike
against the troops and objectives in the---'front which we are
studying. In this situation the following quantity of ballistic
missiles can be employed by the enemy in the front offensive
zone (Table 1). ,
-3-
IM. SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29000100001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29000100001-8
Table 1
SECRET
Type of Number of Number of Number of Time Required
Missile, Sub-Units Launch Sites Missiles for Reload
per Battery, in One
per Battalion Launching
Redstone 4 1 4 5-8 hours
batteries
Corporal 4 2 8 4-6 hours
battalions
Honest 12 4 48 Oo5-1 hour
John battalions
reinforced
8
mixed
battalions
from divisions
of the first
echelon
2 16 up to 3-4
hours
Thor 1 15 15 8-10 hours
squadron
TOTAL 91
missiles
'SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29000100001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29000100001-8
SECRET
As can be seen from the table, 91 missiles can be fired simul-
taneously, of which up to 76 are, operational-tactical and up to 15
missiles are of strategic designation. The second firing of
ballistic missiles is possible after 3-8 hours, taking into con-
sideration the need to prepare the next firing, to define the targets
better, and to change the launching sites (startovaya popitsiya)
for the operational-tactical missiles.
In the event of missile firing at irregular intervals (deliber-
ate firing), which can take place in an operation conducted in a
subsequent stage of the war, the number of missiles in a front
zone that can be fired in a 24-hour period is only 30-45, of which
25-40 will be directed against objectives in the tactical depth.
Considering the limited number of ballistic missiles at the
disposal of a group of armies, it is possible to assume that the
strikes of the operational-tactical missiles will be directed
against the main formations of front troops, assembly bases for
nuclear and missile weapons, and missile large unit and unit
positions, control centers, airfields where the frontal air support
is based, main railroad junctions, and crossings; the strikes of
strategic designation missiles will be directed against the most
important rear-area objectives of the front. Strikes by ballistic
missiles will be made in conjunction with sorties of piloted air-
craft, the launching of balloons, and strikes by winged missiles.
In a defensive operation, the front can repel an attack of a
group of armies made up of three field armies and a tactical
air army, reinforced with a large quantity of missiles for use
in offensive actions. In the zone of defense of a front, as
an alternate, the enemy may employ the following number of
ballistic, missiles (Table 2).
?i SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29000100001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29000100001-8
SECRET
Type of Number of Number of Number of
Missile Sub-Units Launch Missiles
Sites per in One
Battery Launching
(Battalion)
Redstone
4
batteries
Corporal 6 2
battalions
Honest 18
John battalions
reinforced
12
mixed
battalions
from divisions
of the first
echelon
24
.SECRET
Time Required
for Reload
5-8 hours
4-6 hours
from 0.5-one
hour
up to 3-4
hours
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29000100001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29000100001-8
- SECRET
We can see that in a defensive operation a front can expect
a greater number of missiles to be launched simultaneously by the
enemy than in an offensive operation. The use of nuclear warheads
(yadernyye boyepripasy) in all missiles makes it possible to knock
out 112 objectives in the defense zone of the front in one launching,
96 of these being within the limits of the tactical zone. Such a
strike, naturally, can sharply reduce the defensive stability of
the troops, especially in the tactical depth..
In the case of deliberate missile firing, 35 to 55 missiles
can be expected in a 24-hour period, of which 30 to 50 will be
directed against the most important objectives in the tactical
depth of the defense.
The means for anti-missile warfare must be capable of destroying
both ballistic missiles with a relatively short range (up to 30 km)
and ballistic missiles with a range of from 160 - 300 up to 3,000
km. It is necessary to take into consideration the fact that the
short-range missiles will comprise up to 70 percent of all the
missiles the enemy will use in the frontal zone.
It is known that the existing PVO means of a front do not have
the tactical-technical characteristics to cope with the ballistic
missiles of the potential enemies. A radical change is needed in
these weapons, especially in the surface-to-air (zenitnaya) guided
missiles.
Combat against ballistic missiles in the air requi.res: an
increase in the distance and altitude at which the missile can
be detected and tracked by radar; the creation of a guidance
system for anti-missiles (sistema navedeniya antiraket), combined
with a system of long-range reconnaissance of enemy ballistic
missiles and with a system for automatically computing the
required data, to insure the interception of enemy ballistic
missiles at specified distances and altitudes; the creation of
anti-missiles which possess appropriate tactical-technical
characteristics; the development of new radio-technical. sets
(stantsiya) to jam the guidance and the homing systems (apparatura
samonavedeniya) of the ballistic missiles of the enemy.
The combat employment of all these means will be more
effective upon the creation of an automated guidance syst;e~-r.
-7-
AM SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29000100001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29000100001-8
IM SECRET
(avtomatizirovannaya sistema upravleni.ya) which is based on electronic
computing machines (elektronno-vychislitelnaya mashina) and which
insures the continuous automatic evaluation of the air situation and,
the working out of the problem of committing appropriate forces and
means of anti-missile combat.
Thus, we view anti-missile combat as a complex system of
measures which includes the reconnaissance and assured tracking
of ballistic missiles in the air; the automatic computation of the
necessary data which will insure the interception of ballistic missiles
in the air at specified parameters of the objectives (areas) being
covered; the launching of anti-missiles in order to destroy the enemy
missiles in the air; radio countermeasures (radioprotivodeystviye)
assuring the generation of jamming of the missile guidance system
and their homing devices.
In order to effect the timely detection and tracking of ballistic
missiles, radar reconnaissance must insure a detection range of not
less than 250-500 km in combat with missiles of operational-tactical
designation and 2,000 - 2,500 km in combat with missiles of strategic
designation.
From the point of view of anti-missile combat, the detection
range for missiles should exceed, or at least be equal to, the
missile range. However, it is known that any radar station acts
only in the limits of direct line of sight. The maximum. range of
intercept of a radar station located near an objective (group of
objectives) being defended, with optimum trajectories, for ballistic
missiles with a range of 3,200 km is 2,000 km.,and for missiles
with a range of 1,600 km it is 1,400 km.
Increasing the height of the antenna does not., result in an
increase in the detection range. In order to attain an increase
in the detection range, it is necessary to move the radar stations
away from the objectives (groups of objectives) being defended
toward the directions from which strikes by strategic missiles
are expected to come. In addition, in order to insure the timely
detection of ballistic missiles it is advisable to exploit the new
principle of radar-- coherent integration (kogerentnoye integrirovaniye)
(random summation) (vyborochnoye sumrr,.irovani.ye), which consists of
amplifying the strength of the useful signal (pomeznyy signal)
-8-
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29000100001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29000100001-8
SECRET
against the background of fluctuating (local) noises. A radar
station, working on this principle, can quickly and correctly
determine the distance, speed, and angular coordinates of a
moving target within the limits of the line of sight.
According to our calculations, in order to insure the effective
use of appropriate weapons (anti-missile), the minimum distance of
the boundary of detection of ballistic missiles of operational-
tactical designation, with the exception of missiles of the type
of Honest John, Corporal, Sergeant, and Blue Water, must be within
the limits of 370-620 km, and for missiles of strategic designation,
within the limits of 1,420-- 2,100 km.
Taking into consideration the range of ballistic missiles of
the Honest John, Corporal, Sergeant, and Blue Water types, as well
as the distance of their launching positions from the main line of
resistance, it can be assumed that existing radar stations for
reconnaissance and target indication will detect these missiles
in good time after they are launched. This pertains to missiles
having a height of flight trajectory of not less than 4,000--
5,000 in. It is imperative that the data obtained be processed
automatically and transmitted to the anti-missile weapons in no
later than 10-15 sec. for missiles of the Honest John type, and
one to two min. for missiles of the Corporal, Sergeant, and Blue
Water type.
The necessity for receiving data on the flight of ballistic
missiles of operational-tactical designation (such as Pershing and
Redstone) with ranges of 370-620 km and on missiles of strategic
designation with ranges of 1,420--2,100 km requires that radar
stations for reconnaissance have a detection range of up to 500 and
1,000 to 1,500 km, and an altitude capability up to 200 to 800 km.
In connection with this, the system of anti-missile combat must
have two types of radar stations for reconnaissance in order to
assure the system's effectiveness in combating both the operational-
tactical and the strategic missiles of the potential enemies.
From the radar stations for reconnaissance of operational-
tactical missiles there should be formed: detection centers (uzel
obnaruzheniya) consisting of four to six stations with ranges up
to 500 km and altitude capabilities up to 300 km; and interception
centers (uzel perekhvata) consisting of three to four stations
WSECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29000100001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29000100001-8
M SECRET
with operational ranges up to 200 km and altitude capabilities up
to 150 km. The number of centers will deperndpn the number of
important objectives (groups of objectives) to be defended. The
missile detection centers should be connected with the interception
centers in a manner which will insure the automatic computation of
data necessary for interception and the synchronous transmission
of these data to the anti-missile launching sub-units (podrazdeleniye)
The detection and tracking of ballistic missiles of strategic
designation should be carried out by special long-range detection
centers, having radar stations with an operational range of up to
1,500 km, an altitude capability up t8 800 km, and synchronous
connections with missile interception centers which have stations
with an operational range of up to 300 km and an altitude capability
of up to 200 km.
It must be noted that early warning (dalneye obnaruzheniye) of
enemy ballistic missiles can be carried out not only during the
trajectory of their flight by radar stations with a great range,
but also by picking up and amplifying the radio signals which are
emitted by the powerful missile engines at the time of their firing.
However, this method should only be supplementary (dubliruyushchiy)
in the anti-missile combat system organized in a front.
For the detection and interception of strategic missiles the
Americans are developing two interconnected systems-- a system of
early warning (raneye obnaruzheniye) and a system of interception.
The mission of the early warning system is the detection and
identification of enemy ballistic missiles,
the determination of the approximate trajectory data, and the
transmittal of tk}ese data to the anti-missile combat means. The
mission of the intercept sysilem is the interception and destruction
of enemy ballistic missiles at a safe distance from the objectives
being defended.
Under simultaneous development are several systems for the
interception and destruction of ballistic missiles (Nike-Zeus,
Plato, and Wizard). The main system is Nike-Zeus. This system
has three types of radar stations: scanning, determination of
trajectory, and tracking; the system also includes computers, a
tactical control center of the defense area, communication lines,
and launching installations (startovaya ustanovka) with Nike-Zeus
anti-missiles. The operational procedure of the system is a.
-10-
-"IMSECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29000100001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29000100001-8
_SECRET
follows: after receiving the signal from the early warning cen-
ter, the scanning radar station goes into action first; having a
detection range of 1,600 km, it continuously scans (swings) in the
direction of the expected attack within a 30? sector. After the
target is detected, the station which determines the trajectory
goes into operation; 'this station picks up the target at a distance
up to 960 km and tracks it until it obtains p'ecise trajectory data.
Each anti-missile battery (batereya) has two radar tracking
stations with an operating range up to 320 km; these stations go
into operation upon a command from the radar station which determines
trajectory. Both stations continuously- feed target and anti-missile
location data into a computer which, by means of radio commands,
guides the anti-missile to the target. During the final phase
(uchastok) of the anti-missile flight, the homing system goes into
operation and insures the interception of the target.
In order to destroy enemy ballistic missiles in the air., both
during the trajectory and as it begins to zero in on the target,
anti-missiles are needed which have the tactical-technical
characteristics for the reliable interception and destruction of
enemy missiles at specified distances in relation to the objectives
(troops) being defended. The system of anti-missile launching
devices must assure the necessary acceleration before the
sustainer engines (marshevyy dvigatel) are ignited, the timely
ignition of the sustainer engines, and the accurate guidance and
homing of the anti-missiles on the ballistic missiles of the
enemy.
It is imperative to have such anti.-missiles as would assure
the destruction of enemy ballistic missiles regardless of their
range, altitude, or speed of flight.
It seems to us that in order to destroy ballistic missiles
of the Honest John type it is advisable to employ the troop
surface-to-air (zenitnaya) missiles which have been developed.
The effectiveness of such missiles has been shown by their range
tests (poligonnoye ispytaniye) abroad, particularly in the USA.
The deployment of an automated system of interception and its
synchronization with the launching system of the troop surface-
to-air missiles will provide the combat system needed against
missiles of the Honest John type.
'SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29000100001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29000100001-8
'M SECRET
For the destruction of operational-tactical missiles of the
Corporal and Pershing type, it is necessary to have an anti-missile
with a range of 100-150 km, a speed of not less than 1,000 m/sec,
and an altitude capability of 50--100 km. It is advisable that a
launching sub-unit for such anti-missiles have 8-10 launching mounts,
a duration of firing cycle (tsikl strelby) of three to five minutes,
and a preparation time for a repeat firing of not more than 10-15
min. The systems of reconnaissance, of interception, and of the
launching of the anti-missiles should be interconnected by means
of an automated system based on electronic computers.
To combat enemy ballistic missiles of strategic designation,
it is necessary to have anti-missiles with a range on the order of
200-300 km, an altitude capability of not Bless than 100-200 km,
and a speed of 3,000--5,000 m/sec and more.' It is desirable that
a launching sub-unit of such anti-missiles have not less than 8-10
launching mounts, a duration of firing cycle of not more than 5
min., and a preparation time for a repeat firing of 20-30 minutes.
In order to increase the mobility of anti-missile launching instal-
lations, it is desirable to install them on railroad mounts, barges,
ships, and prime movers with a high degree of roadability.
For anti-missile warheads it is desirable to have both a frag-
mentation-high, explosive type to destroy enemy ballistic missiles
in a'vacuum (while in free flight trajectory), as well as a type
capable of carrying a nuclear charge in order to insure the
destruction of missiles during their flight through the dense
layers or at the time of entry into the dense layers of the
atmosphere (.during the phase of stabilization).
Combat against enemy ballistic missiles can be made more
effective by creating radio-jamming directed against the missile
guidance systems in the initial phase of the trajectory and
against the homing device during the final phase of the trajectory.
Radio-jamming of the guidance systems of ballistic missiles in the
initial phase should prevent the missile from entering its
specified trajectory; the radio-jamming of the homing device should
deflect the missile from its specified target, but with sufficient
deflection to insure the safety of the objective being defended
from the explosion of a high-yield nuclear charge. Radio-jamming
can be created by special radio-technical jamming sets operating
in the same frequency ranges as the guidance and',homing systems of
ballistic missiles.
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29000100001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29000100001-8
SECRET
Objectives may also be protected from strikes by enemy
ballistic missiles by concealing them with radar camouflage
(Prot ivo-radiolokatsionnaya maskirovka).
Under present-day conditions, a front, as a rule, will carry
out operations in a theater of combat operations in coordination
with operational groupings (obedineniye) of other branches of the
armed forces. We have already pointed out above that in the front
zone of operations we must be ready to combat ballistic missiles
of operational-tactical and strategic designation, which will be
used by the enemy against objectives in the front zone and against
objectives in the deep interior of the country. Within the
boundaries of the TVD (teatr voyennykh deystviy - theater of military
operations) there should be a single system for the destruction of
missiles in the air by the troops in that theater. It appears that
the anti-missile defense system in a TVD will consist of the PRO
(protivoraketnaya oborona - anti-missile defense) systems of the
front and of operational groupings of other branches of the armed
forces (the navy, long-range aviation - DA) which are deployed
within the boundaries of a given TVD. The anti-missile defense
of the zone of interior (tyl strany) will most likely operate
in coordination with this system of anti-missile defense.
The anti-missile defense of a front can represent the first
echelon of anti-missile defense organized in a given TVD, which,
in turn, will be the first echelon of anti-missile defense of the
country as a whole.
The task of the front anti-missile defense is to prevent strikes
by enemy ballistic missiles against the troops and rear area objectives.
As we have indicated above, the front anti-missile defense must
include an operational system of special forces and. means, intended
specifically for combatting enemy ballistic missiles in the air.
Anti-missile defense must be continuous, active, and capable
of repelling strikes by enemy ballistic missiles under all circum-
stances and at any season of the year or time of day.
Anti-missile defense in front operations can be set up according
to the principle of defending the most important objectives. This is
explained by the fact that at the present time the relatively small
amount of ballistic missiles in the enemy's possession limit his
use of them to particular objectives (formations of troops). In
JM SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29000100001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29000100001-8
=SECRET
addition, the process of working out the necessary data for anti-
missile launchings is relatively simpler when it is related to
separate sub-units defending specific objectives. Hence it is
possible to set up suitable equipment without a considerable
expenditure. of materiel.
At the same time, the anti-missile systems being formed on
the basis of range for the defense of individual objectives will
permit, as we see it, the defense of groups of important objectives
(individual zones) in the front zone of action, if the distances
between the targets do not exceed the operational range of the
anti-missiles, i.e., anti-missile defense can be formed according
to a zonal principle.
A front anti-missile defense is organized in close coordination
with the anti-missile defense of adjacent fronts (fleets) and of
the zone of interior. In organizing a front anti-missile defense,
consideration should be given to the character of the operation being
Carrigd at by the front; and it should be in conformance with the
concept of the operation and with the operational deployment of
the troops.
Anti-missile defense can reach its goal when its forces and
resources are combined with the measures for the direct protection
of troop formations and objectives in the rear area of the front
from strikes by ballistic missiles.
In the interests of PRO, all types of reconnaissance should be
used to carry out continuous reconnaissance against enemy military
industrial plants, supply depots, missile bases, and site locations
for missile weapons. This reconnaissance should be organized in
the theater of combat operations as well as in t11e froh1 both
during the planning and the execution of the operation.
During the execution of an operation, the front radar centers
for the detection and tracking of enemy ballistic missiles can be
located outside the tactical zone, at a distance of not less than
60-80 km from the main line of resistance. Frequently the location
of these radar centers may be designated by directives of the High
Command (Verkhovnoye glavnokomandovaniye) for the purpose of using
the data of these centers for the anti-missile defense of adjacent
fronts and the zone of interior in a given theater of combat
operations, and, in coastal areas, for the anti-missile defense
of the fleet.
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29000100001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29000100001-8
SECRET
The radar posts for control and assurance of intercept by
anti-missiles are synchronously connected with the anti-missile
launching system and should be located in the areas of the
launching sites of the latter.
To protect the more important objectives in the front zone,
it will be necessary to detach several anti-missile launching sub-
units. The number of these sub-units will be determined by the
importance of the objective, its nature and size, and the possible
density and duration of the enemy missile strikes.
In defending an objective the anti-missile sub-units can be
deployed in a sector (whence the missile attack is expected) in
such a manner that their zones of fire will overlap in order to
insure the concentration of fire of several anti-missile aub-units
in repelling strikes of greater density. The distances between the
anti-missile launching sub-units must not exceed the optimum
distance needed for the firing of, let us say, ' three or four
anti-missiles on the border of the zones of fire of adjacent sub-
units (assuming that the enemy ballistic missile will be destroyed
by this number of anti-missiles).
It is advisable to deploy the detached anti-missile sub-units
around an objective at a-distance which insures the effective
interception of ballistic missiles and the control of the anti-
missile sub-units by the control points of the anti-missile defense.
It cannot be excluded that the anti-missile launching sub-units
can be deployed at a distance of 50 - 100 km and more from the
objective being defended, which htay be determined by the distance
of the approach of the missile to the objective, by the dimensions
of the internal borders of the zone of fire of the anti-missile
sub-unit, and. the feasible distance from the control point of
anti-missile defense (depending on the range of radiosynchronous
transmission).
If several important objectives within the limits of a
theater of combat operations are in close proximity to each other,
a zonal defense can be created for their protection.
It would be advisable to deploy those anti-missile launching
sub-units detached for zonal defense purposes in a sector from
which the enemy ballistic missile strike is most likely to come;
and they should be deployed in several rq,4s'(two or three) in such
-15-
MR SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29000100001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/05: CIA-RDP80T00246A029000100001-8
- SECRET
a manner that the zones of fire of these sub-units will overlap.
The dense overlapping of the zones of fire of these anti-missile
sub-units creates conditions for repelling a concentrated missile
attack from the most likely direction, and it allows for the
destruction of enemy missiles in the dead zones of adjacent anti-
missile sub-units.
The total number of anti-missile launching sub-units needed
by a front will depend, on the one hand, on the number of ballistic
missiles which the enemy is able to use against objectives within
the front zone and, on the other hand, on the probability of
destruction of each missile by the weapons of the PRO. We must also
take into consideration the maximum number of missiles the enemy
can fire in a simultaneous launching. There should be a sufficient
number of anti-missile launching sub-units in a front to insure the
certain destruction of all ballistic missiles launched simultaneously
by the enemy against front objectives or those flying over the
front zone in the direction of the zone of interior.
If we calculate that four or five anti-missiles are needed to
destroy one ballistic missile (according to American data 8-10
anti-missiles are needed to destroy one ballistic missile), then
a front, according to our previously stated examples (see Tables
1 and 2), may have to launch the following in a 24-hour period:
-- in an offensive operation, up to (4-5) X (15-27) = 60-135
anti-missiles (combat against ballistic missiles of the
Honest John type will be conducted principally by carrying
out strikes against enemy site locations and assembly
bases; in the air it will be conducted by surface-to-air
missile units of the PVO system).
-- in defensive operatiorf,, up to (4-5) x i6 = 64-8o anti-
missiles.
The indicated number of anti-missiles used in rapid fire by
anti-missile sub-units, 15-20 launchings in a 24-hour period, can
be launched by four to seven launching sub-units in an offensive
operation and by four or five in a defensive operation. This
number of anti-missile launching sub-units thereby makes up the
necessary strength of a front.
-16-
'SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/05: CIA-RDP80T00246A029000100001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29000100001-8
10 SECRET
In view of the fact that a front system of anti-missile
defense will be coordinated with the anti-missile defense systems
of adjacent fronts and of the zone of interior, the number of
anti-missile launching sub-units in a front can be decreased accor-
dingly.
In the event that the missile strikes against objectives in
the front zone are carried out in greater density, it will be
necessary to increase the number of anti-missile sub-units.
The system of anti-missile defense in front operations
initially can consist of several formations of the means of anti.-
missile combat:
-- formations of the means of combat against missiles of
operational-tactical designation wit.h a range of 50 to
100 on and speeds up -to 1,000 m./sec; in our opinion,
this formation can consist of PVO surface-to-air missile
units which have new missile systems capable of
destroying the above-mentioned missiles of the enemy;
-- formations of means of combat against missiles of operational-
tactical designation with a range of 100 to 1,000 In and
speeds of 3,000 m/sec and above;
-- formations of means of combat against missiles of strategic
designation.
The development and refinement of missile and electronic tech-
nology will, evidently, increase the possibilities for the creation
of a universal defense system which will insure effective combat
against missiles of the most varied designations. Furthermore,
this system will actually encompass combat against all enemy means
of air attack, including piloted aircraft.
The successful combat against; ballistic missiles in a front
requires the organization of close communication between the means
of reconnaissance and 'tracking of enemy missiles and the systems
of anti-missile launching. The best way to achieve this close
communication is to combine them into a single troop entity.
'' SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29000100001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29000100001-8
SECRET
In our opinion, it would be desirable for a front to have an
anti-missile brigade or regiment comprising several sub-units
(three or four) for the detection and tracking of ballistic missiles,
several anti-missile sub-units (five or seven), and several sub-
units for radio-countermeasures fadioprotivodeystviye7 (four --
five); all of these sub-units would be interconnected during combat
by an automated system based on electronic computers. This brigade
or regiment should be subordinate to the commander of front air
defense troops.
As we have already indicated above, as the number of anti-
missile units of a front increases, the existing PVO system will
gradually grow into a system of PRO, headed by the chief of PRO
troops.
Inasmuch as it is too difficult for a front to organize
reconnaissance of the guidance systems of ballistic nissiles of
strategic designation during the initial phase of their trajectory,
it would be advantageous, during front operations, to set up
jamming principally directed against the homing devices of enemy
missiles, in order to prevent them from homing in on their
programmed objectives. It is advisable to locate the jamming
sub-units in the directions of the probable flight of enemy
ballistic missiles, on the approaches to the more important
targets of the front zone, at distances which would assure reliable
detection and the subsequent neutralization of the homing devices
of the ballistic missiles.
The anti-missile defense system in front operations can be
effective only if there is developed an expedient control system
for the means which participate in combating enemy ballistic
missiles. We believe that the control of the means of anti-
missile defense can be centralized on the scale of a theater of
combat operations for the destruction of missiles of strategic
designation, on the scale of a front for the destruction of
missiles of operational-tactical designation with ranges up to
1,000 km, and on the scale of an army for the destruction of
missiles with ranges up to 50--100 km.
Thus, in order to insure success in combatting enemy ballistic
missiles, it is necessary:
T SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29000100001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29000100001-8
4W SECRET
-- to work out the following technical means of combat in a
short period of time: radar stations for the early
warning and tracking of ballistic missiles in the air;
radar stations for controlling the anti-missiles; a
system of automated control of all the means of anti-
missile combat; various types of anti-missiles
and stations for jamming the guidance systems and homing
devices of ballistic missiles.
-- to supplement the present PVO system with means of
combating enemy ballistic missiles and subordinating
these means to the chief of front PVO troops; subsequently,
to work out a unified system of. combating: the air enemy,
which would include combating ballistic and cruise
missiles (krylataya) and piloted aircraft on the scale
of a front and which would operate in coordination with
similar systems in adjacent fronts and in the zone of
interior; considering that the principal means of air
attack in the future will be missiles of various
designations, such a system of combat can be called
an anti-missile defense system;
-- to control the means of anti-missile combat from a control
point of front PVO whenever these means are supplementing
a front PVO system; upon the creation of an anti-missile
defense system, it will be possible to control the means
of this system from special control points organized in
a 'front and, sometimes, in a theater of combat operations.
-19-
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/05: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29000100001-8