LETTER TO GEORGE P. SHULTZ FROM ROBERT M. GATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90G01359R000200090010-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2011
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: March 13, 1986
• Content Type: LETTER

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Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence
13 March 1986
NOTE TO: The Honorable George P. Shultz
The Secretary of State
;Ult
Here is the paper you requested outlining
what we think you will encounter during your
trip to France, Italy, Greece and Turkey next
week. I am also including papers on the Polish
situation and the Church in Eastern Europe that
may be helpful as you prepare for your audience
with the Pope.
Attachment:
As Stated
Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence
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Washington. D. C. 20505
BACKGROUND FOR SECRETARY SHULTZ' WEST EUROPEAN TRIP
Summary
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The West European countries you visit next week all
place a high priority on ensuring amicable exchanges, but
individual leaders in each capital will see your presence as
a unique opportunity to press for US concessions --
particularly on trade and aid issues. As distracted as the
French will be in the aftermath of the election, we do not
rule out a strong demarche by Mitterrand aimed at US
objections to recent EC tariff and quota revisions affecting
Spain and Portugal. In Italy, Prime Minister Craxi will
probably press for your help in gaining Rome G-5 membership,
while Foreign Minister Andreotti may grumble about US
policies on trade and the Middle East. Greece's Papandreou,
hoping that you will invite him to the US, will be on his
best behavior but is unlikely to promise much on contentious
issues like the US bases. The Turks, for their part, may
our personal intervention in the DECA negotiations. ^ 25X1
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This memorandum was prepared by the Western Europe
Division. Comments and questions are welcomed and should be
addressed to Chief, Western Europe
Division, Office of European Analysis,
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France
French officials who meet with you will be preoccupied
with domestic politics in the aftermath of the National
Assembly election on 16 March.
--Assuming the conservatives win the election, French
officials, including President Mitterrand, will be
distracted by the confusion surrounding the
transition to a government of "cohabitation."
--Opposition leaders will still be jockeying for
position, and we strongly doubt that the details of a
new government will have been settled by the time you
arrive. If the situation is clearer than we
anticipate, you may be asked to meet with opposition
leaders, such as Jacques Chirac, in addition to -- or
instead of -- your scheduled sessions with former
President Giscard and Foreign Minister Dumas
--The last thing French leaders want at this stage is
new troubles with the US, and they probably will try
to avoid surprising you with an si ni n new
departures in French policy.
In your most important meeting, Mitterrand will try to
demonstrate his firm grip on the French foreign policy
rudder since he will want to carve out foreign affairs as
his preserve during the cohabitation period.
--We believe Mitterrand will underscore the continuity
in French foreign policy under cohabitation and stress
the importance to France of close Franco-American
ties.
On specific foreign policy issues, Mitterrand is likely
to hew to familar French themes.
--He will join in decrying international terrorism--
especially in light of the recent kidnapping of four
more French citizens in Lebanon--but in our view will
continue to balk at proposals for significantly
enhanced international cooperation to combat
terrorism. The French do not want to expose
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themselves to criticism in a multilateral forum for
their traditional policies of granting asylum
liberally and resisting extradition requests from
other countries.
--Similarly, Mitterrand will be eager to condemn Libya
but is unlikely to agree to any more concrete French
actions in support of US sanctions.
--If pressed on the Libyan issue, he will probably argue
that France is doing its part in the struggle against
Qadhafi by frustrating his designs on Chad.
--Mitterrand is relieved that Duvalier's presence in
France did not become a campaign issue, but he will
probably stress that Paris expects continued US help
in finding Duvalier a permanent home.
The one issue that we think could become a serious bone
of contention during your visit is the trade conflict with
the European Community over tariff and quota revisions in
Spain and Portugal caused by EC accession.
--Should the US announce retaliatory measures before
your visit, Mitterrand will almost certainly register
strong French objections. Any other French officials
you meet will doubtless echo these protests.
--We believe that Mitterrand's response will be
tempered, however, by his preoccupation with domestic
politics and the overall favorable climate of
Franco-American international economic relations. His
reaction, therefore, is unlikely to go beyond a stern
warning that US actions not only justify EC
retaliation but may also jeopardize the new GATT
round.
Mitterrand may well take the opportunity to applaud
recent advances in international monetary cooperation.
--He has long pressed for more stable exchange rates and
is likely to reiterate his support for the notion of
an international monetary conference.
--He may ask that you to clarify US thinking on
stabilizing exchange rates and offer the recent French
Treasury proposal on target zones as a starting point.
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--Mitterrand is also likely to applaud the recent wave
of interest rate cuts. He may also try to assure you
that he will be calling the shots for France at the
Tokyo Summit in May, although preparations for the
Economic Summit could be the first test of strength
between Mitterrand and a new center-right government.
Italy
Your visit to Rome could find Italian leaders on the
verge of a government shakeup.
--Prime Minister Craxi's cabinet, which has been in
office for a record-setting two and a half years,
appears to be running out of steam.
--Craxi and Christian Democratic Party leader De Mita
have been considering several options -- including a
major cabinet shuffle and early elections -- but now
seem to e leaning toward minor cabinet changes.
Regardless of the situation within the governing
coalition, your interlocutors are likely to press you on a
number of issues.
--Craxi, President Cossiga, and Defense Minister
Spadolini, while expressing support for US efforts to
combat terrorism, are likely to emphasize that
situations like the confrontation at Sigonella between
US and Italian forces during the Abu-Abbas affair must
not be repeated. They will call for more advance
consultations to avoid similar incidents in the
future.
--Craxi and Spadolini probably will also stress that the
US must alert Rome about its intentions in the Gulf of
Sidra far enough in advance for Italy to adjust its
forces.
--Craxi is apparently convinced that the US can persuade
the UK and West Germany to support Italy's membership
in the G-5, and he is likely to press you for such
efforts. He may bring up the Tokyo Summit and state
his support for the French Droposal on exchange rate
target zones.
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In our view, your most contentious session may be with
Foreign Minister Andreotti.
--An outspoken critic of many US policies in the Middle
East, Andreotti probably will argue that Washington
must prod Tel Aviv to be more flexible. He may also
complain that the evidence linking Qadhafi to the Rome
massacre is weak and argue that the US maneuvers in
the Gulf of Sidra will not dissuade Qadhafi.
--Andreotti might respond to US criticism of Italian
trade practices by threatening to enforce an agreement
to keep bilateral military trade balanced -- annual US
military exports to Italy have so far heavily
outweighed Italian sales to the United States.
Greece
Prime Minister Papandreou probably views your visit as a
major opportunity to convince Washington of the sincerity of
his commitment to steer bilateral relations into "calmer
waters"-- a consistent theme since his reelection last June.
We believe his interest in better relations with the United
States derives largely from Greece's need for foreign
assistance to cope with its economic problems and
Papandreou's need to preserve his political credibility with
centrists and the Greek military. In addition, he probably
has several more specific goals:
--We believe securing an invitation to visit the US is
at the top of his agenda. This would strengthen his
position with the Greek military and political
moderates and put him on equal footing with Turkish
Prime Minister Ozal who visited the US last May.
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--He may also urge speedy delivery of the F-16s.
Papandreou needs these to blunt opposition charges
that his policies have weakened security ties with
the US. We assume he also calculates that the longer
delivery of the F-16s is delayed the greater leverage
Washington has on key questions such as the renewal
of US bases.
--He probably sees a successful visit by you as an
important step in creating the impression that Greece
is a good credit risk, offers profitable investment
opportunities, and is a safe place for tourists. F
Papandreou will also want to avoid making commitments that
would decrease his bargaining power later or limit his
ability to pursue other important policy goals.
--US bases. We believe Papandreou will not want to be
totally negative, but it is unlikely that he will make
a more definite commitment to you at his time. There
are indications, however, that he and his advisors are
beginning to think less in terms of eliminating the
bases and more in terms of what concessions they can
wring from the US in return for renewal.
--NATO. Papandreou is unlikely to make any commitment to
deepen or extend Greek participation in NATO
exercises.
--Cooperation against terrorism. While the Greek
government has taken some measures--upgrading security
at the Athens airport, participating in
counter-terrorist programs, and monitoring its large
Arab population more closely--Papandreou will want to
avoid public commitments that could affect Greece's
standing with either moderate or radical Middle
Eastern countries. He will avoid endorsement of
sanctions against Libya.
Although Papandreou is unlikely to be strident or
argumentative in conversations with you, we would not be
surprised by negative statements or posturing before or
after your departure. If he comes under pressure from
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domestic critics, he is quite capable of taking positions
that run counter to points he may have made privately with
you.
--If the left criticizes him for colluding with you, for 25X6
example, he may revert to a more negative public
posture on the US bases and cooperation with NATO.
Turkey
Prime Minister Ozal and other Turkish officials are
likely to view your visit as a prime opportunity to press
for trade concessions and other economic benefits from the
US, defend Turkey's policies in the Middle East, and impress
upon you the importance of Turkey's contributions to Western
security. Given the role the Turks would like you to play
in championing their interests, we believe your Turkish
hosts will not use high pressure tactics but will rely on
their diplomatic skills in trying to win a positive response
from you.
Foremost among Turkish goals during your visit will be:
--To derive additional benefits for Turkey in return for
renewal of the US-Turkish Defense and Economic
Cooperation Agreement (DECA). In particular, they
want expanded access to the US market for Turkish
products, especially textiles and steel. They may
also urge you to intervene personally in the DECA
negotiations.
--To secure your help in obtaining other economic and
trade benefits from the United States. They might,
for example, ask you to intervene to secure
forgiveness of debts on Foreign Military Sales and to
lobby for increased economic and military assistance,
or even increased private investment.
--To solicit your understanding and support for Turkish
policies in the Middle East and the importance of
Turkey's ability to play the role of an "honest
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broker" between the West and the Muslim world,
stressing Turkey's geographically exposed position and
the military threat from Syria. They may emphasize
Turkey's interest in promoting an equitable and
non-destabilizing settlement of the Iran-Iraq war.
Ozal will just have returned from Baghad before
meeting you and may wish to discuss new moves to
settle the conflict.
--To counter what you are likely to hear from the Greeks
concerning Turkey's alleged responsibility for the
impasse in disputes over the Aegean and Cyprus.
--To probe for signs of US willingness to tolerate a
change in the Cyprus situation, perhaps by hinting
that Greek Cypriot intransigence is paving the way for
international recognition of the "Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus."
--To minimize possible points of contention with the US
and to stress mutual interests. We therefore conclude
that the Turks, even when pressing for concessions,
will advance their views in a low-key and
non-confrontational manner.
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Solidarity have not been resolved and could, under the ri ht
combination of circumstances, provoke another crisis.
Background Paper on Poland
Poland seems little closer to consensual stability than
it was when shipyard workers went on strike in August 1980
or when martial law was declared in December 1981.
Demonstrations have become more infrequent and fewer people
attend Lhem, but the issues that gave rise to the birth of
his grip on the party by removing some or his critics.
The authorities have become more adept at maintaining
order. The Polish legal structure has been strengthened to
give the regime more options in handling dissent. The
universities -- a traditional source of trouble -- have been
brought under tighter control. The expansion of the
Church's power has been slowed. Jaruzelski has strength
Jaruzelski has had some foreign policy successes with
kept US-Polish relations at a very low level.
Poles to move toward a genuine national reconciliation has
visits to India, Yugoslavia, the United Nations, and France.
A visit to Italy may be in the offing, and Gorbachev seems
to have accepted him. The unwillingness, meanwhile, of the
Domestically, the economic reform that once was touted
as a solution to Poland's problems is dead in the water,
partly because of conservative bureaucrats but also because
reform would require austerity measures that would not be
Poland.
Economy
The modest recovery of the Polish economy from the
depths of 1980-82 has slowed, and there are no indications
that the Poles can expect significant outside help from
either the Soviets or the West. The Poles may join the IMF
this spring, but that clearly will not be enough to turn the
economy around. Warsaw's Western creditors -- immersed in
debt rescheduling negotiations with the Poles -- show no
enthusiasm for extending significant new credits. Poland
continues to receive more favorable economic treatment from
the Soviets -- in the form of trade credits -- than any
other East European country. These credits are slated to
end next year. The Poles continue to request additonal help
but the current panacea being touted by Moscow -- increased
emphasis on CEMA integration, especially in science and
technology -- is not likely to bring near-term results for
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accept a virtually stagnating standard of living.
accepted by workers. Although there are spot shortages,
especially of coal this winter, supplies of food and other
goods seem generally to have improved over 1981-82; the most
sensitive issues gripping workers are prices and wages.
Many factory managers have managed to dampen complaints
about price hikes by agreeing to wage increases that exceed
national targets. The perpetual grumbling in the factories
has thus far not resulted in any significant strikes, but we
cannot be certain how long Polish workers will quietly
to be more aggressive in their dealings with the regime.
The Opposition
Although currently pessimistic about its prospects, the
opposition remains a potent force. It represents a large
cadre of people with political experience in organizing
workers. It has an extensive underground press that.
circulates information throughout the country. It conducts
a number of social and cultural events -- in conjunction
with the Church -- that the regime cannot control. The
older generation of the opposition -- the establishment so
to speak -- seems disposed to wait for better times. But
there is an ill-defined group of younger people who
apparently are more willing to turn to violence to achieve
their aims. This group, with occasional backing from the
general population, would like Cardinal Glemp and the Church
building materials.
The Church
The authorities continue to be cautious when dealing
with the Church. A number of issues under discussion remain
unresolved: the amount of paper the state will give the
Church to publish its censored but independent newspapers,
legislation giving the Church a legal status, the
establishment of diplomatic relations with the Vatican, and
Church control over outspoken, anti-regime priests. Another
key issue is whether the regime will allow the Church to
operate a fund to aid private agriculture. The authorities
have been delaying approval for this fund for several years
believing such a program would further entrench the Church
in the Polish countryside. Over the past several weeks
there have been optimistic assessments from the Church that
the government is ready to go ahead. Such optimism has
arisen before only to be dashed. The Church's future
building plans -- which call for more than the one thousand
buildings currently under construction -- are being
discussed with the regime, which would clearly like to
severely cut back on this aspect of the Church's activites.
The regime rarely misses an opportunity to draw the
population's attention to the Church's use of scarce
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reflects his own personnel choices.
The Party
In the population's eyes, the party remains a
discredited organization from which the more liberal,
openminded members fled (or were purged). Although
Jaruzelski gave up the Premiership in November 1985 to
concentrate on party work, it is unlikely that he can turn
it into a more dynamic organization with new or workable
ideas for achieving reconciliation with the Poles.
Jaruzelski is now in the midst of preparations for the party
congress in June from which he will probably emerge with a
top leadership and a party apparatus that more closely
Polish-Soviet Relations
Gorbachev seems more pleased today with Jaruzelski's
performance than he was last April when the leaders first
met. At that time Gorbachev pushed Jaruzelski to take a
tougher stand toward the opposition and Church, a course the
Polish leader has followed partly as a result of the Soviet
pressure and partly because he saw that his less harsh
approaches to normalization were not working. His ascetic
style fits in well with Gorbachev's attacks on alcoholism
and corruption. Gorbachev's attitude seemed evident in the
positive treatment Jaruzelski has received during the
ongoing Soviet party congress. Jaruzelski, at the congress,
was clearly seeking to curry favor with the Soviet leader.
official policies.
Polish-US Relations
The unwillingness of the Poies to move toward a genuine
national reconciliation has hampered, from the US point of
view, an improvement in relations. Despite several
amnesties, the number of political prisoners (now estimated
at about 250) is again inching upwards. The authorities
continue to harass known opposition leaders, including
Walesa, and are following a hostile policy toward
intellectuals. The regime is dragging its feet on a number
of Church/State issues and, in general, is not inclined to
seek the active cooperation of those who are critical of
seriously, but it is on the table.
For their part, the Poles want a higher level of
contacts with the US as a sign of legitimacy, but they
insist that the US make the first public gesture as it would
seem to vindicate Warsaw's claim to being the aggrieved
party. The Poles continue to demand that the US stop
interfering in their internal affairs through Radio Free
Europe or via comments by US Administration officials and
occasionally repeat their demand for monetary compensation
(now set at $15 billion) for damages caused by US sanctions.
We are not convinced the Poles make this last demand
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Central Intelligence Agency
Catholicism in Eastern Europe
Except in Albania, where all religious practice
has been eliminated, the Roman Catholic Church has
survived the establishment of Marxist societies in
Eastern Europe. In recent years, and particularly
since the appointment of a Polish Pope, there have even
been signs of a revival of Catholicism in the region.
While no country seems close to developing the same
level of religious intensity that exists in Poland--
where crucifixes hang in some state schools--East
European and Soviet authorities are worried about the
attraction of religion, particularly among the youth.
The Vatican is pleased with this trend, but it
recognizes that much more needs to be done to secure
genuine religious rights in Eastern Europe. There is a
shortage of priests and churchs, and most of the
regimes insist on participating in the selection of new
clerics. The Pope has been pressing hard to correct
these inequities and would like to visit several East
European countries in addition to another planned trip
Catholicism and the East European Marxist states
are likely to maintain an uneasy coexistence. The
governments need stable societies in order to prosper,
and the Church needs state support to function; neither
wants to create conditions that would prompt Soviet
intervention. Whatever the outcome, the practice of
religion has demonstrated the limitations of state
power in Eastern Europe for over 40 years and the
yearnings of the people for a spiritual life to fill
the vacuum created by Marxist atheism.
EURM86-20024
This memorandum was prepared by the East European Division.
Comments and questions are welcome and should be addressed to
Chief, East European Division, EURA on F 25X1
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The Pope continues to keep well-informed on events in Poland
through a constant stream of visits to Rome by both clerics and
lay people. Nevertheless, it seems clear that he recognizes
Cardinal Glemp as the man who has to fight the battles with the
Polish authorities and leaves most of the tactical decisions to
him. The Pope has, on occasion, favored a tougher response by
the Church to regime policies, but these xpressed as
opinions and not order to Glemp. 25X1
By some accounts, the Pope is at a loss on what to do about
Poland. He appears to favor constructive engagement with the
Jaruzelski regime, but is unwilling to extend diplomatic
relations until the regime goes ahead with legislation giving the
Church a legal status in the country. The Pope does not appear
to believe that there will be any near-term change by the
Jaruzelski regime toward more liberal policies. In the meantime,
he has strongly supported the Church's efforts to expand its
activities into various social-cultural activities to substitute
for discredited state institutions. The Pope endorsed the
Church's effort to create an internationally financed fund to aid
private agriculture and, on balance, believes sanctions
have lost much of their efficiency. 25X1
Uppermost in the Pope's mind is his desire to return to
Poland in June 1987 for a Eucharistic Congress. As with his
previous trip in 1983, the Pope undoubtedly sees such a visit as
an opportunity to give comfort and hope to his people. He also
hopes to impress on Jaruzelski the need to go further in seeking
reconciliation with the Polish people.
The Polish authorities have reportedly already given their
approval for the visit although negotiations remain on some
details. The Pope would clearly like to visit Gdansk and other
reported Solidarity strongholds, but the authorities are
adamantly opposed, fearing that a visit would stir up the
As a forerunner to his visit in 1987, the Pope reportedly is
prepared to receive Jaruzelski in Rome in the near future. In
recent weeks Jaruzelski has been angling for an invitation to
Rome to further increase his international legitimacy. The
stumbling block apparently is the unwillingness of Italian Prime
Minister Craxi to receive him. The prospects of such a visit
remain unclear since the Italians stipulated that three prominent
political prisoners be released and the Polish regime responded
by only reducing marginally the sentences of two.
The Czechoslovak regime's tight controls over the activities
of the Catholic Church are a matter of continuing concern to the
Vatican and have contributed to very contentious relations
between Rome and Prague. The government's restrictive policy
reflects its concern that the Church could become a haven for
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anti-regime activity similar to neighboring Poland. Government
control of the Catholic Church includes state licensing and
payment of priests and required state approval of ordinations.
The Czechoslovak Catholic Church, which claims 11 million
followers out of a population of 15 million, has experienced a
revival of popular support in recent years. The most recent
manifestation occurred at the town of Velehrad in July 1985 when
over 100,000 attended the 1100th anniversary of the burial nearby
of St. Methodius, who is credited with bringing Christianity to
the Slavs. The generally young crowd that attended loudly
objected to attempts by government representatives to focus the
celebration on secular terms. Vatican State Secretary for
Foreign Affairs Cardinal Casaroli was received enthusiastically
and expressed the desire that the Pope would be able to visit
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Ten of the 13 Czechoslovak bishoprics and two archbishoprics
are currently vacant. The Vatican refuses to accept candidates
from among the approximately 500 priests in the pro-government
"Pacem in Terrs" organization, and the government will not
consider candidates from among the remaining 2600 priests in
Czechoslovakia. Cardinal Casaroli's consultations with
government leaders last summer after the Velehrad celebrations
The Vatican's greatest concern for the future of the
Czechoslovak church is finding a successor for Cardinal Tomasek
who is 86 and ailing. Tomasek has been a fairly cautious leader
of the Catholic Church, although even his limited outspokenness
has led the government to isolate and criticize him. Government
nominees to succeed Tomasek -- Bishop Feranec being the most
likely -- would be pro-government "Pacem in Terris" supporters
that would present the Vatican with the same problem it has
experienced with the Czechoslovak bishoprics.
The Vatican's relations with Hungary are comparatively
good. Religious practice is not rigorously interferred with and
the Catholic Church has it own newspaper, although it is subject
to the same sort of ill-defined censorship as all Hungarian
publications. The Hungarian Catholic Church claims 6 million
adherents out of a total population of 10.7 million.
At times the Vatican appears uneasy with the relatively cozy
church-state relationship in Hungary. The Primate of Hungary,
Cardinal Laszlo Lekai, has paid for the regime's goodwill with
acts of political cooperation that include participation in the
official peace movement, public defense of Hungary's human rights
record, and support for most of the regime's foreign and domestic
policies. This has apparently led to concern in Rome that the
government has coopted the Church hierarchy and that Cardinal
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Lekai was not bein assertive enough in advancing the interests
of the Church. 25X1
Some of the Hungarian faithful agree and a minority have
formed the so-called Base Communities of Catholics, who object to
following both the dictates of the Church hierarchy and some of
the regime's policies. In particular, the Communities' advocacy
of conscientious objection to military service has strained the
church-state relationship. The regime has tried to defuse the
situation by quietly allowing Catholic conscientious objectors to
perform alternate civilian service, and the Vatican, which does
not want a confrontation that might undermine the progress made
by the Hungarian Church, has enjoined the dissidents to obey
their ecclesiastical superiors.
The Pope received East German leader Honecker during the
latter's official visit to Italy in April 1985, but the visit has
not led to improvements in church-state relations. According to
US Embassy sources, the Pope has been urging Cardinal Meisner to
modify the German Church's traditional policy of keeping the
government at arm's length. John Paul wants the German Church to
adopt, at least in some degree the Protestant Church's policy of
political engagement. There is little evidence that Meisner has
moved in this direction. The Catholic Church in East Germany is
a -small minority -- 1.5 million in a population of almost 17
The rise in recent years of public concern in East Germany
over "peace" issues has strained traditional Catholic
detachment. In January 1983, after journalistic criticism of
their stance from abroad and reportedly after Papal urging, the
East German bishops issued a pastoral letter on world peace that
challenged several regime positions. Days later, Pope John Paul
II announced that the leading East German bishop, Meisner, would
be made a cardinal. The pastoral letter was not followed,
however, by any noticeable change in relations between the church
and the regime, and, the 25X1
t r a d i t i o n a l arm's-lengtri posture s t i l l pea in the
East German Catholic hierarchy. 25X1
The position of the Roman Catholic Church in Romania is
surprisingly good, in view of the Ceausescu regime's extremely
restrictive policy toward religion in general, its brutally
repressive approach toward fundamentalist Protestant believers,
and the close identification of the Catholic Church with the
country's beleaguered Hungarian and German minorities. The
Vatican desk officer for Romania told U.S. diplomats last year
that in many ways the Catholic Church encountered less pressure
from the Ceausescu regime than it did elsewhere in Eastern
Europe.
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2oA-i
The Vatican nevertheless has a number of concerns. Chief
among them is the plight of the Uniate, or Greek Catholic Church
(which practices the Eastern rite but communes with Rome),
officially suppressed and annexed to the Orthodox Church in
1948. The Uniate Church, centered in Transylvania, has about 1.6
million adherents (almost entirely ethnic Romanian) and was the
second most influential Church in the country prior to its
dissolution. It continues to function underground with a network
of secretly ordained priests and claims some 500,000 to 700,000
adherents. The Pope celebrated a mass for one of the Uniate
Church's underground bishops upon learning of his death last
year, thereby conveying his continuing interest in the fate of
Other major Vatican concerns are the regime's refusal since
1949 to recognize four of the Catholic Church's six dioceses and
the lack of an official statute regularizing the Catholic
Church's status. Negotiations for a statute have been going on
between Bucharest and the Vatican for several years. Agreement
seemed near in 1978, but the regime has been dragging its feet
since then, possibly in reaction to the election of Pope John
Paul II and hi-, tion with the rise of Solidarity in
Poland.
A final issue of concern is the regime's discrimination
against the country's sizable (nearly two million) Hungarian
minority, the majority of whom are Roman Catholic. These
concerns reached a high point in 1984 because of the alleged
beating death of an ethnic Hungarian Roman Catholic priest at the
hands of the security authorities. The issue
resolved conclusivel
Yugoslavia is the only East European country that has 25X1
diplomatic relations with the Vatican, and the Pope as recently
as last December expressed an interest in paying it a visit. But
bilateral relations remain cool, and the prospects for an
improvement, or a papal visit, look dim for the near future- I
the Yugoslav Government in February invited the Pope to
visit this year but deliberately couched the invitation in terms
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25X1
The main sticking point to better Belgrade-Vatican ties, and
a papal visit, is deep-seated friction between church and state
in Croatia, one of Yugoslavia's six constituent republics. As in
Poland, the Communist Croatian authorities fear the Croatian
Church for its longstanding role as a defender of Croat
nationhood. They attack it for its collaboration during World
War II with the fascist regime installed by the Nazis. Croatia's
ideologically alienated youth nonetheless flock to church to
church events in record numbers. Church-state relations are much
the pontiff could not accept.
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better in the less doctrinaire liberal northerly Republic of
Slovenia. Catholics make up nearly one-third of the country's 23
million people, the others being mainly Orthodox or Muslim.
Pope John Paul is worried about the survival of the Church
in Bulgaria where less than one percent of the population is
Roman Catholic. The training of new priests is a major problem
for the Church, since there is no seminary in Bulgaria. Although
the government claims that it would allow some priests to go to
Rome to study, the number of new vocations is low and most
priests are elderly. Sofia and the Vatican have not been able to
agree on the appointment of a new bishop to Plovdiv. The
Bulgarian government rejected the Vatican's nomination in 1984.
In recent years--especially since the charges of Bulgarian
complicity in the assassination attempt--the Bulgarian government
has actively sought to project a facade of better relations with
the Vatican. Before the Antonov trial began last May, the regime
sent a delegation to Rome in connection with the anniversary of
Saints Cyril and Methodius. Reportedly, the head of the
delegation sought the Pope's intervention on behalf of the
Bulgarian defendants.
25X1
25X1
The Vatican has made no public comment on the assassi on
trial in Rome, 25X1
The Pope does not 25X1
wan a i n c i en to a to the Church's already weakened
standing in Bulgaria. ~Ithe 25X1
Pope last May instructed Vatican officials and the staff of the
official Vatican daily to refrain from making Public references
to the Pope's position on the trial. 25X1
Before World War II, ten percent of the Albanian population
was Roman Catholic, with roots back to the first missionary
campaigns of the Apostles. Hundreds of clergymen were jailed, or
executed in the first decade after the war. The Catholic Church
seemed to suffer the most, apparently because of its foreign
links, and was forced to break with the Vatican. In 1967
organized religion was outlawed altogether and Albania proclaimed
the establishment of "the world's first atheistic state." 25X1
The Pope on a number of occasions during the past few years
has publicly criticized Albanian religious persecution. In
return, Tirane censors all references to the Pope from Italian TV
programs, which are rebroadcast otherwise untouched to the
domestic audience. Prospects for improved conditions for the
country's Catholic minority are slim under h reaime of Ramiz
Alia that came to power almost a year ago. 25X1
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