PERSPECTIVES ON THE PHILIPPINES' POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DRIFT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000201720001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 19, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
19 July 1985
Perspectives on the Philippines'
Political and Economic Drift
Summary
0*
Most intelligence analysts believe there is
still:time to halt the political and economic slide
in the Philippines and to limit the growth of the
Communist insurgency there. They agree that
President Marcos has done much to create these
problems during two decades of rule, but there is
also consensus that his future role will be critical
in determining whether or not the deterioration can
be slowed or stopped.
In this regard, our own analysts are divided
over whether,or not Marcos can be part of the
solution. One view is that Marcos is the most
effective vehicle for reform and a necessary element
for a return to stability. Those who hold his view
argue that Marcos has already taken some positive
steps and would continue to do-so under what are
likely to be mounting internal and external
pressures. The alternative view--and one that has
been gaining strength as conditions in the
Philippines deteriorate--is that continuation of
Ma.rcos's ?ruTe ensures the worst of all possible
outcomes. Analysts holding this view argue that
This typescript memorandum was prepared b
of the Islands Branch, Southeast Asia Division, Office of
East .Asian Analysis. Information available as of 15 July was
used in its preparation. Comments are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Southeast Asia Division,
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Marcos--out of political necessity--will block the
reforms required to reinvigorate the political
center and undercut the left. They say that the
slide cannot be reversed until there is a change in
government.
This paper examines both hypotheses and sets
out some key areas where Marcos must take positive
action if he is indeed to be "part of the,
solution." It is intended to furnish the reader
with a framework for analyzing the efficacy of the
Marcos government from the US perspective as the
country approaches the presidential election in May
The Pivotal Role of President Marcos
In our judgment, there is still time to stem the growth of
the insurgency, including its political front activities, and to
prevent the CPP from gaining eventual control of the Philippine
Government. The Communists have exploited near-perfect
conditions during the last several years--a foreign debt crisis,
declining living standards, human rights abuses, the political
polarization caused by the Aquino assassination, Marcos's ill
health, a preoccupation in the military with internal politics
rather than counterinsurgency. Most domestic and foreign
observers believe--and we agree--that economic, political, and
military reform would significantly reduce the possibility that
the coincidence of these conditions will be repeated. This would
undercut the causes of growing Communist influence, begin to
defuse the threat, and set the country on a reasonable path back
to stability.
President Marcos is in the strongest position to begin the
process of redirection. Despite his unpopularity and failing
health, he has near-total control over domestic politics, and is
free to make wide-ranging policy changes. Marcos controls a
powerful political machine--based on personal and financial
allegiances developed during 20 years in power, and his ruling
KBL party continues to dominate the Batasan,l The opposition
remains highly fragmented, lacks cogent alternative policies for
addressing the country's serious political and economic ills, and
on some issues is less receptive to reform than Marcos,
particularly in the area of economic policy. The key question is
thus whether Marcos has the energy and the will to become part of
1The Batasan, or National Assembly, contains 183 elected
seats--110 of which are held by the KBL. 25X1
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The Case For Marcos as Part of the Solution
To those who hold the affirmative view, the events of the
past several years have demonstrated that Marcos can be
influenced to undertake policy reforms and refrain from
politically inflammatory actions, although he must be convinced--
often through extensive lobbying--that the alternatives to reform
are unattractive. In 1983, for example, Marcos eliminated the
controversial coconut levy which, though supported by his
political allies, depressed the finances of already struggling
The following year, under the auspices of the International
Monetary Fund, the President deregulated interest rates, a bold
initiative that removed one of the factors contributing to
financial crisis in the banking sector and--by stimulating
savings--removes one of the causes of the foreign debt runup of
the early 1980s. In addition, tax and tariff reform measures
designed to increase government revenues and improve the
efficiency of domestic corporations have been put in place. But
an even more dramatic example of Marcos undertaking reform at
political cost is his unilateral dismantling, under IMF-World
Bank auspices, of the country's tariff system during 1981-83.
The move exposed the manufacturing empires of several of his
political allies to international competition. forcing a number
This view also argues that Marcos has taken reassuring steps
on several key political issues. Despite growing criticism of
his government and the obvious political risks, for example,
Marcos has not censored the domestic press, thereby continuing to
allow an important safety valve for dissent. The Philippine
press--currently considered among the freest in Asia--is now an
important forum for debate. In addition, Marcos accredited the
National Citizen's Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL)--a
nonpartisan poll watching group staffed by private citizens--to
monitor the 1984 National Assembly elections. NAMFREL's
accreditation under US pressure was the most important factor in
making the 1984 elections the "cleanest" in recent memory.
Pressure brought to bear on Marcos has also produced a more
vigorous follow-through by the administration in the Aquino
assassination investigation by the Agr va Board and the
Marcos has also shown restraint in reacting to recent
developments in the Philippine military. Contrary to what is
2The Agrava Board was a fact finding body commissioned by
Marcos under pressure from the United States to counter
allegations that his first investigative board--the Fernandez
Commission--was not objective.
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surely his personal inclination, Marcos has responded to outside
pressure and allowed the prosecution of Armed Forces Chief of
Staff Fabian Ver while privately leaving open the question of
Ver's permanent reinstatment. At the same time, Marcos appointed
the generally well-respected Fidel Ramos as acting Chief of Staff
and has been publicly supportive of Ramos's initial efforts at
reform. Marcos has not blocked Ramos's prosecution of lower
level military personnel accused of criminal acts and human
rights abuses. Most recently, moreover, Marcos has resisted the
temptation'to crush the newly-emerged reform movement among
junior Philippine military officers. His recent meeting with
leaders of the "We Belong" group to discuss their concerns will
if anything give them a further sense of legitimacy.
Finally,'Marcos's most important role in returning stability
to the Philippines is properly setting the stage for an eventual
successor government--a process beyond the scope of other
politicians. One of the most dramatic examples of a determined
Marcos turnaround is his 1983 support for an amendment
establishing a succession mechanism. The result of intense
lobbying by Washington as well as several domestic interest
groups, the amendment provides the Philippines with a framework
for an orderly and legal transfer of power in the event that
Marcos dies or becomes incapacitated.
Whether controlled by the KBL or an opposition coalition, a
future government will lack the political machine and the stock
of "reciprocal obligations" Marcos has acquired over the last two
decades--suggesting it will be weaker than the present regime.
In the conventional wisdom, reform in the economic, political and
military spheres will be painful and politically costly in such
an environment. Initial steps by Marcos at this time to
institute changes in traditional political and economic practices
may be the only way of assuring change without violence over the
longer term.
The Case for the Alternative View
The alternative analysis grants that there is sufficient
time to reverse the Philippines' downward trend and does not deny
Marcos's preeminence as a political actor. Nonetheless, it
maintains that Marcos is unwilling to move forward with the
military, political, and economic reforms required to avoid a
slide into chaos. It also argues that he will be increasingly
resistant during the next two critical years--the period leading
up to the May 1987 presidential election.
Since the assassination of Benigno Aquino in 1983, in the
alternative view, Marcos has lost much of his aura of
invincibility that evoked fear and respect in both his political
adversaries and members of his ruling party. This has forced him
to depend more than ever on the support of associates unreceptive
to reform, such as agricultural magnate Eduardo Cojuangco and
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Fabian Ver. Marcos's serious health problems have further
reduced his manuevering room and are likely to continue
preventing him from managing events with his former political
skill. He will become increasingly resistant to pressure for
even limited reform because most of these measures would require
that he move against the interests of his most trusted and loyal
supporters. Thus Marcos is likely to spend the remainder of his
tenure fighting a series of rear-guard actions designed to
prolong his political survival--at the expense of his country's
long-term stability--and protect his family's post-Marcos
political and financial fortunes.
Although Marcos has made policy changes over the past two
years, most concessions have been wrung from him during periods
of extended illness. Upon recovering his health, Marcos has
routinely moved to ensure that reforms remain cosmetic, so as not
to undercut his traditional power bases or give the appearance of
bowing to pressure from his political opponents or the US
Government.
During his health crisis in 1983, for example, Marcos was
pressed by the opposition, his own ruling party, the Catholic
Church, and businessmen to strengthen political institutions by
clarifying the succession mechanism. Although a succession
amendment was ratified by plebiscite the following January,
Marcos subsequently moved to ensure that the language of the
amendment remained vague, thus leaving the way open for his
loyalists to manipulate the process.3 He also appointed a
longtime associate and intimate of Imelda Marcos as Speaker of
the National Assembly--who would act as interim president after
Marcos's death or incapacitation--furthering-the prospect that
the succession mechanism will be subverted.
Many economic reforms have been short-circuited, according
to the alternative hypothesis. Under strong pressure from
independent businessmen and international financial institutions
such as the World Bank, Marcos earlier this year claimed to have
dismantled the monopolies that two of his closest associates--
Eduardo Cojuangco and Roberto Benedicto--maintain in the
country's largest agricultural industries, coconuts and sugar,
respectively. Subsequent decrees issued by Marcos camouflage his
associates' continued control over these industries, according to
the US Embassy.
Although Marcos allowed legal proceedings to be instituted
against Ver and 25 others implicated in the assassination of
3Philippine legal experts, for example, believe that the
Constitution contains conflicting language on the succession that
could be interpreted to give concurrent presidential powers to
the Speaker and the Prime Minister.
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Benigno Aquino,
e has influenced the process in favor of the
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defendants Since
Ver's removaiticism oo ~is ea ers ip in the form of calls
for military reform by middle level and junior officers has
become increasingly vocal. Marcos, however, has refused to
permit Acting Chief of Staff Ramos to press ahead with senior
level personnel changes that would alleviate much of this
frustration and indeed has even expressed his intention to
reinstate Ver after he is cleared by the court.
Several other examples provide- reasons to expect little of
Marcos in the future for advocates of the alternative view. He
has been made aware by several of his closest advisers of the
ruling party's poor prospects in local elections next year,,
increasing domestic criticism of the agricultural monopolies, the
critical threat posed by the rapidly expanding Communist
insurgency, and widespread frustration within the officer corps
concerning the military's lack of professionalism and combat
effectiveness. But Marcos appears to believe that he can manage
with tactical diversions. Although such an approach has
succeeded in muting his opposition in the past, the current
situation requires substantial policy changes.
. Finally, any government that legally succeeds Marcos will be
more willing to press ahead with political, military, and
.economic change, if for no other reason than because it will lack
Marcos's monopoly on power and thus will be more likely to bend
to pressure for reform. The initial legitimacy and popular
support that such a government may enjoy also would provide it
greater leverage among competing interests as it attempts to
build its own political consensus. On balance, therefore, the
chances for political, economic, and military reform will be
better under a successor government than under Marcos, according
to the alternative hypothesis.
Signposts To Watch
While it may be premature to reach a final verdict on
whether or not Marcos can be part of the solution, at this point
the burden of proof must rest on those who argue that he can. In
this respect, we think that Marcos's performance over the coming
year in a number of key policy areas will conclusively settle the
question. If Marcos is to be "part of the solution," he will
have to take positive action on many, if not most, of the
following issues.
Developing an Integrated Civil/Military Counterinsurgency
Strategy. Major reforms are required in both the military and
civilian sectors in order to improve the counterinsurgency
effort. Most observers believe that improving the military's
human rights record--by imposing stronger discipline and more
severe penalties for abuses--is central to this effort. Military
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discipline, morale, and effectiveness would also benefit from
moves to improve pay and benefits, give free rein to the military
reform movement, and deploy additional forces from Manila to
combat areas. It is crucial that the counterinsurgency effort be
bolstered by progress in logistics, communications, and
training.
In all likelihood, far-reaching reforms can only be achieved
if Marcos replaces many senior officers--most of whom are Marcos
loyalists--with more competent, honest, professionally trained
officers. -Not only would. such officers be more likely to improve
the performance of their commands, but their appointments would
help break down current practices of promotions--typically based
on family ties and personal loyalties--that have eroded morale
among all levels of the Philippine armed forces.
The civil side is equally important to the military in
halting the momentum and eradicating the conditions feeding the
insurgency. Appropriate yardsticks in this area include progress
at improving government services and upgrading infrastructure.
The first step in this process could be to require "absentee"
local officials to return to their municipalities, reestablish an
effective system of local justice and, at a minimum, reduce the
widespread local graft which now results in public funds--slated
for public works such as road and school repairs--enriching
public officials and other local power brokers.
Complying with the IMF Economic Recovery Program. The IMF
program is designed to substantially improve the balance of
payments, reduce reliance on foreign borrowing, improve the
government's finances, trim inflation, and restore confidence in
the Philippine economy. Compliance with the program requires
meeting monetary targets, floating the exchange rate, lowering
tariffs, widening the tax base, and cutting government
expenditures. Floating the exchange rate is particularly crucial
to stimulating exports by correcting the overvalued peso.
Although Manila failed to meet monetary targets set by the IMF
earlier this year, it has met the targets set for 31 May and has
taken steps to lower tariffs and float the exchange rate.
Further reforms are needed i-n the financial sector, where
the IMF suggests merging and- consolidating weak private banks,
limiting lending by government-owned financial institutions and
relinquishing some of their functions to the private sector--
moves that would'strengthen the financial sector and restore
public confidence in the banking system. The financial sector
has been undercapitalized and recently plagued by failing private
banks and deteriorating loan portfolios in the large government-
controlled institutions. An increase in nonperforming loans,
large deposit withdrawals, and high interest rates have so
weakened private banks that in 1984 the Central Bank had to
provide emergency loans to 10 percent of the banks. At the same
time, government-controlled financial institutions--especially
the Philippine National Bank and Development Bank of the
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Philippines--have expanded their lending dramatically to
accommodate the government's acquisition of financially
distressed firms, many of which were owned by Marcos's political
allies. As a result, almost two-thirds of the Development Bank's
assets are nonperforming and the IMF estimates that this year the
three largest government financial institutions will show a
combined loss equal to about 2 percent of GNP.
Agricultural Reform. The battle to undercut the insurgency
by improving long-term economic prospects requires revitalizing
the agricultural sector, which provides a livelihood for more
than two-thirds of the population. Manila's pricing and exchange
rate policies have long favored urban consumers over farmers; as
a result, farmers real income fell 50 percent between 1977 and
1981 and have not improved since. Reversing this trend requires
decontrolling agricultural input prices and the prices paid to
farmers for their crops. Exchange rate management is especially
important, since an artificially strong peso undermines
exporters. is a leading foreign exchange
earner. 25X1
The dismantling of the coconut and sugar monopolies is also
crucial to improving long-term prospects. US Embassy reports
suggest that the coconut monopoly--comprising marketing, milling,
exporting, and banking institutions controlled by Marcos's long-
time political ally Eduardo Cojuangco--is partly responsible for
nearly halving coconut farmers' income between 1979 and 1983.
USAID studies conclude, moreover, that basic marketing and
pricing reforms could boost coconut farmers' incomes by about
one-third. In the sugar industry, Marcos associate Roberto
Benedicto has exploited his control of the sugar marketing
authority to extend his personal sugar empire into milling, farm
equipment, transportation, and banking. Philippine economists
estimate that, since 1977, Benedicto's manipulations of the sugar
industry cut revenues Daid to local sugar producers by 2 billion
We believe that a comprehensive approach to agricultural
policy reform would improve agricultural output and rural
incomes;. allowing the rural economy to grow by over 4 percent
annually. Rice and corn production, for example, will receive a
boost from steps Manila has taken recently to deregulate prices
of selected agricultural products. The IMF and World Bank are
pressing for further policy reforms'which ensure that marketing
agencies are audited, monopoly interests within a sector are
reduced, and price competition is increased. If. Manila postpones
these policy reforms, we estimate that the rural economy will
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grow by only 1.5 percent annually--less- than the growth of the
rural population. 25X1
NAMFREL as Sole Election Watchdog. Accrediting NAMFREL
would substantially limit election fraud and lend credibility to
the upcoming local and presidential elections. As such, it would
help to secure the next government by validating its popular
mandate. Another option open to Marcos, however, would be either
to replace NAMFREL with a more sympathetic group or to authorize
such a group to "balance" NAMFREL's activities. Because of
NAMFREL's good reputation, we believe either of these moves would
leave Marcos ulnerab 'despread criticism both at home and
abroad.
A key element may be NAMFREL's own political conduct in. the
months ahead. NAMFREL is the bipartisan outgrowth of the post
Aquino assassination political fervor and has been guided by the
"core group" of moderates led by former University of the
Philippines President Emanuel Soriano. The same group is-
responsible for considerable opposition political activity,
however -- especially Corey Aquino's Convenor Group. Thus its
claim to nonpartisanship is not assured, particularly in the eyes
of Marcos. NAMFREL could leave Marcos little choice but to
sanction a rival if its opposition profile remains high.
Appointing Nonpartisan Members to the COMELEC Board. Marcos
has five vacancies to fill on the Commission on Elections, which
oversees implementation of the election code and provides the
official post-election tallies. In the past, Marcos has used the
commission to manipulate election results. Sufficient movement
on this issue would be the appointment of two additional
opposition representatives. This would ensure that the
opposition has a voice on each of the COMELEC's three panels.
Marcos recently appointed a longtime supporter as the
commission's chairman. Three appointments made last year consist
of one Marcos loyalist, one independent, and one representative
from the opposition. Resolution of this issue will matter less
Calling Early Presidential Elections or Postponing Local
Elections. An early presidential election would subject Marcos
to popular review. Moreover, a clean presidential election would
strengthen political institutions and improve popular morale. It
would, however, leave moderate opposition parties far less time
to build grassroots organizations and raise funds. Postponing
local elections would deny moderates an early chance at
establishing their political credentials.
Relinquishing the Authoritarian Powers Granted Marcos Under
Amendment Six. These powers, pushed through a national
plebiscite in 1981, allow Marcos to retain many of the powers he
enjoyed during the martial law period. They include the ability
to suspend the writ of habeas corpus for all crimes against
national security, issue any order deemed necessary to meet a
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crisis, including powers of preventive detention, shut down the
media, transfer cases from civilian courts to military tribunals
established during martial law, and control industrial labor
relations. Abolishing Amendment Six would remove one of the
prime sources of criticism leveled against the Marcos
government. It would also signal a dramatic concession to
political moderates and thus a defeat for the Communists in their
propaganda war with the government.
Marcos's Perspective
How fast and how far Marcos will be willing to move ahead on
these matters during the next several years is a matter of often
heated debate among analysts. As in the past, we believe Marcos
will concede less to his foreign and domestic critics on reform
than they ask. The critical issue will be whether the
concessions he does make will be sufficient to address the
problems of the insurgency and overall stability. To better
understand how Marcos will approach reform, we have examined what
we believe are the ingredients of his thinking on the matter. p
Marcos's political needs will require at least the
appearance of progress on counterinsurgency issues, since the
insurgency is now publicly recognized as a problem nationwide.
Marcos will resist changes at the senior military level because
he believes he needs a loyal military to aid the ruling party's
chances in both the 1986 and 1987 elections. He will continue to
be sensitive, moreover, to perceived pressure from abroad on
matters concerning military leadership. This includes what he
views as foreign intervention on the question of the
reinstatement of General Ver and the.removal of other senior
military officers. Marcos clearly fears that capitulation would
be a signal of weakness to his political adversaries.
On the other hand, there are undoubtedly competent, well
motivated officers at the senior level who would pose no threat
to Marcos as successors to Ver and Ramos. For example, the
commanding generals of all four Regional Unified Commands on
Mindanao are decribed as "neutral" on the Ver-Ramos issue by
General Ramas, the commander of the Army. Although the
appointment of a neutral to Chief of Staff would not completely
satisfy either the reformists or the Ver loyalists within the
armed forces, it would serve to mute the loudest criticism from
both camps. Marcos, moreover, would still maintain final
decisionmaking power, since such an appointee would lack an
independent power base.
As for the reform movement itself, although addressing the
concerns of the officers involved in the movement would pay
dividends to Marcos--both in terms of improving the effectiveness
of the armed forces and quelling a potential threat to his rule--
it would shake-up the traditional system of loyalties upon which
he has based his power. This would presumably undercut Marcos's
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ability to use the military to his advantage in upcoming
elections.
On the economic front, Marcos's preoccupation with domestic
politics suggests the government will move slowly to implement
the IMF recovery program. Budget cuts in favored programs and
ministries and the abolition of tax exemptions that benefit his
allies will impose direct political costs. Strengthening
government banks by imposing lending limits may also be resisted
because of the threat such limits would pose to influential
political associates seeking financial bailouts. In addition,
floating the exchange rate--one remedy suggested to address the
overvalued peso--will probably be resisted because it will
rekindle inflation.
Moving ahead with the agricultural reform agenda of the
World Bank and IMF would undermine the existing structure of
Marcos's political support, and it is thus no coincidence that
agricultural reform is the longstanding contest of wills between
Marcos and his creditors that it is. In the 1984 local
elections, for example, Benedicto is generally credited with
delivering five out of the seven seats from Negros Occidental to
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Marcos will also have to weigh the costs of facing harsh
criticism if he does not accredit NAMFREL as an election watchdog
against the risks that vigorous election monitoring will
seriously undercut his party's success at the polls. At the same
time, he knows that a strong showing by his party in the local
elections is critical for his chances in presidential elections;
local officials often play an important role in national
elections because of their influence over the local police and
military forces, ability to hand out political favors. and role
as conduits of funds to party supporters.
As with the NAMFREL issue, Marcos will confront the dilemma
of choosing between domestic and international pressure for 'a
balanced COMELEC or a commission stacked in the ruling party's
favor. According to a government spokesman, NAMFREL has
submitted a list of potential candidates for COMELEC to Marcos--
some of whom are believed to be mutually acceptable.
If Marcos believes he can manage the elections in his favor,
he may call early elections to capitalize on his improved health
and the continuing disarray within opposition ranks. He faces a
considerable risk, however, because he will be less able to
control events than in previous elections. In fact, recent
reporting suggests that Marcos currently favors the idea of
deferring local elections until 1987--concurrent with the
presidential poll.
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On the face of it, Marcos. would appear to have little to
lose by the loss of his Amendment Six powers as long as the KBL
dominates the National Assembly. But in actuality, we believe
the President would be most reluctant to surrender what he
considers an insurance policy in maintaining authority. He has
used its various powers--including the power to legislate by
decree--against the opposition as well as in cases where his own
party looked set to move against him. Moreover, his ability to
invoke emergency powers gives Marcos an edge for the eventuality
that the dnmestic political situation moves beyond his control.
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Typescript: Perspectives On The Philippines'
Original--OEA/SEA/IB
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1--OEA/CH (4G32)
1-- NIC/Analytical Group (7E47)
1--E::::::--C/DO/PPS (3D01)
1--OEA/Research Dir-ector (4G48)
1-- ANIO/Economic (7E48)
1--Senior Review Panel (5G00)
Outside:
State:
1--Honorable Paul Wolfowitz
1--John Monjo
1--John Maisto
1--Thomas Hubbard
1--Lt. Gen John T. Chain, Jr., USAF
1--Rod Huff
1--Robert Dean
1--Weaver Gim
1--Alan Kitchens
1--Bob Carroll
1--Corazon Foley
1--Morton Abramowitz
1--William J. Newcomb
1--William D. Howells
1--Robert DuBose
Treasury:
1--Douglas P. Mulholland
1--Bill McFadden
1--Bill Quinn
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/17: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000201720001-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/17: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000201720001-4
1--Gaston Sigur
1--Richard Childress
1--David Laux
1--James Kelly
1--Richard Armitage
1--James Martin
1--James Smith
1--Don Eirich
1--Brigadier General Philip Drew
1--Brigadier General Larry Dillingham
1--John Finney
Office of the Vice President:
1--Don Gregg
Commerce:
1 --Robert Severance
1--Byron Jackson
1--William Brown
Federal Reserve Board:
1--Robert Emery
Army:
Navy:
Navy Annex:
1--Brig. Gen.. L. W. Smith, USMC
1--Tim Wright
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/17: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000201720001-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/17: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000201720001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/17: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000201720001-4