INDONESIA: IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT UNREST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00310R000300050003-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Indonesia: Implications
Directorate of
Intelligence
of Recent Unrest
Secret-
EA 84-10206
December 1984
Copy 256
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Indonesia: Implications
of Recent Unrest
This paper was prepared by
Office of East Asian Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Southeast Asia Division, OEA,
Secret
EA 84-10206
December 1984
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Indonesia: Implications
of Recent Unrest
Key Judgments Ongoing opposition activity, ranging from antigovernment pamphlets and
Information available speeches to rioting and bombings, reflects not only longstanding social
as 4f 16 November 1984 tensions, but also growing resentment of the Soeharto regime's determined
was used in this report.
efforts to suppress any independent Islamic political voice. The incidents do
not signal a breakdown in the government's authority. Nevertheless, the
bombings represent a clear and troublesome escalation in Indonesian
political violence. They suggest a degree of planning and coordination not
evident in earlier unrest and introduce a new terrorist tactic into opposition
activity.
Indonesian officials are concerned that extremist Muslim groups may
increasingly use such tactics to discredit the government, and they are
ready to counter terrorism with increased authoritarianism and military
force. Tightened security measures, however, have not yet stopped the
unrest and almost certainly will provoke further opposition and violence.
Secret
EA 84-10206
December 1984
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Key Judgments
Soeharto's Perspective
Looking Further Ahead
B. Solidaritas Islam and the Terrorist Threat
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Indonesia: Implications
of Recent Unrest
activity.'
A Violent Turn of Events
There has been an atmosphere of rising tension in
Jakarta since rioting broke out in Tanjungperiuk
(Tanjung Priok), a slum neighborhood in the port L
district, on 12 September. Rioting began after out-
numbered security forces fired on and killed a number
of demonstrators, including a well-known community
leader, in a crowd of 1,500 to 2,000 people marching
on a police station to protest the arrest of four Muslim
activists. Since the riot, there has also been a rash of
bomb threats, fires, and radical Islamic pamphleteer-
ing throughout the predominantly Muslim country.
(See table.
Apparently coordinated bombing attacks on 4 Octo-
ber against two branches of a bank owned by Liem
Soie Liong, a prominent Chinese business associate of
President Soeharto, and another bombing in a major
Chinatown shopping center in Jakarta introduced an
unsettling new element. Although not the first politi-
cal bombings in Indonesia, the careful targeting and
timing of the bombs suggest a degree of planning and
coordination not previously evident in antigovernment
Two additional bombings in mid-October of Chinese-
owned businesses added to official concern over the
possibility of continuing terrorist actions. There have
been reports of other bombings and a series of major
fires of unknown origin. One Jakarta newspaper has
reported over 56 fires since September, of which 15
affected major establishments. Some of these may
have been accidental or may represent a newly fash-
ionable response to labor problems or other disputes.
In addition, however, there has been a spate of
' All three time bombs exploded within about a half hour of each
other and were aimed at Chinese business interests. Two were
detonated in branches of Bank Central Asia, which is owned by
financier Liem Soie Liong, reputedly the wealthiest person in
Indonesia and a close friend of the Soeharto family. Liem has been
prominently mentioned in the anti-Soeharto pamphlets circulating
since before the Tanjung Priok disturbances. The third bomb
exploded outside a store in Jakarta's main Chinatown shopping
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threatening phone calls to Indonesian and foreign
establishments, and even to some parliamentarians
and Muslim scholars.
radical Islamic group calling itself Solidaritas Islam
has been responsible for many of the recent incidents
In the wake of these developments, other occurrences,
such as a fire at a military munitions depot in
suburban Jakarta, have heightened tensions. The
munitions dump fire produced extensive explosions,
numerous fatalities and injuries, and widespread
damage for several square kilometers. Although early
reports indicate the fire was probably accidental,
military authorities are probing whether sabotage was
involved. Widespread rumors that the depot fire is
related to the others have added to a growing sense of
unease among the general public.
The Government's Reaction
Jakarta's reaction to the unrest has been swift and
decisive. Security forces quelled the Tanjung Priok
riot, killing at least two dozen rioters in the process.
Armed Forces Commander Murdani and Jakarta
Garrison Commander Sutrisno personally toured the
riot area, at least in part to demonstrate the govern-
ment's determination to prevent further outbreaks.
Since then, authorities have tightened security meas-
ures at key government installations throughout the
country and cracked down on radical elements.
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12 September
Tanjung Priok riot
A series of clashes between Muslims and local authorities-
stemming from the government's heavyhanded treatment of the
only legal Muslim political party-resulted in a violent confron-
tation and riot with extensive casualties.
4 October
Bombings in Jakarta
Two bombs struck branches of Bank Central Asia, owned by
Liem Soie Liong, a Soeharto associate. The other exploded in
the Chinatown business district.
Bombing of bank in Pontianak, Kalimantan
Barat (West Kalimantan)
Another branch of Bank Central Asia, owned by Liem Soie
Liong.
17 October
Bombing of Super Mie Factory, Jakarta
A Chinese-owned business.
22 October
Fire at Sarinah Department Store, southern
Jakarta
Fire of unknown origin, but may have been accidental. Pribumi
(an ethnic Indonesian) owner with ties to Soeharto's son.
29 October
Fire at Chinatown restaurant and nightclub com-
plex
Unknown origin. Owned by Pribumi associate of Soeharto's son.
Fire and explosions at Marine Ammunition Depot
in Jakarta
Unknown origin, but previous fire occurred in July.
2 November
"Liberty" department store and movie theater
fires in Yogyakarta
Possible bombing by competing Chinese businessmen 24 hours
after grand opening.
5 November
US and Australian Embassies receive threatening
letters from Solidaritas Islam
First threat on US Embassy since spring.
Telephone threat to Ratu Plaza apartment and
shopping complex
Residence of several US Embassy personnel.
8 November
Undetonated bomb discovered at Pertamina
headquarters
Following a telephone threat.
11 November
Fire destroys offices at Kartika Plaza Hotel
Unknown origin. Hotel is controlled by a group of generals
whose ownership is still being challenged by former owners.
13 November
Fire destroys government offices above Sarinah
department store in major tourist area
Unknown origin.
14 November
Bombing hoax at American Express offices in
Arthaloka Building
Followed a telephone threat to office building owned by Ali
Sadikin.
Security forces have also interrogated a number of
members of the dissident Group of 50 Z and arrested
three prominent members-A. M. Fatwa, former
Textiles Minister Sanusi, and retired General Dhar-
sono. The Attorney General initially intended to
prosecute the 24 members of the group who signed a
letter criticizing the government's handling of the riot
'The Group of 50 is a small opposition group made up largely of
prominent retired government, military, and political party officials
who have become disenchanted with the Soeharto regime. To date,
they have been ineffectual and lacked a popular following, but
they seek to ca italize on recent the disturb-
ances to criticize the government.
on 12 September, butt the
government will not take further legal action against
them to avoid public airing of their criticisms of the
regime. General Murdani has publicly warned retired
military officers and government officials that open
criticism of government policy will not be tolerated.
The authorities have been uncharacteristically open
with the media in explaining events surrounding the
Tanjung Priok riot in an effort to allay rumors and
restore calm. Officials continued this policy after the
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Armed Forces Commander Murdani, probably the
second most powerful figure in Indonesia today, views
fundamentalist Muslims and opposition organiza-
tions such as the Group of 50 as the chief rightwing
threats to internal security. In briefing a group of
military officers last August, Murdani claimed these
two elements are coordinating efforts to publish
brochures criticizing the Soeharto regime and to
oppose Pancasila as the state ideology. He character-
ized the Group of 50 as appealing to the intelligentsia
and fundamentalist Muslims as extremists appealing
emotionally to the masses. The events of the past two
months have probably confirmed his views of the
threat these groups pose to the government.
Murdani has stressed the need for an appropriate
strategy in countering subversive activities. To avoid
legitimizing opposition group activity, he has recom-
mended that security forces not openly confront them
as subversive, but infiltrate them to secure document-
ed evidence of criminal activity. Murdani believes
such evidence would enable the government to neu-
tralize the opposition through long prison sentences
for leading opponents of the government.
October bombings, permitting discussion of the causes
of unrest within unofficial guidelines. At the same
time, however, the police have discovered a number of
unexploded bombs, but have strict orders not to
disclose such incidents to the press,
Government officials have sought to play down the
political significance of the incidents and to discredit
radical activists, thus denying the implication that
their actions reflect widespread popular attitudes.
General Murdani, for instance, attributed the Sep-
tember riot to the work of a few irresponsible extrem-
ists who distorted Islam for their own ends. He has
also addressed groups of moderate Muslim scholars to
reassure them that the government believes the riot
and subsequent bombings are the work of a small
number of dissidents outside the mainstream of Mus-
lim orthodoxy. Army Chief of Staff Rudini has tried
to play down the religious aspects of the riot by
suggesting that discredited remnants of the Indone-
sian Communist Party (PKI) may have instigated it.
The East Java military commander similarly dispar-
aged local activists.
Indonesian authorities claim interrogation of several
suspects indicates ideological and financial ties to
Libya or Iran. The Iranian Embassy is known to
cultivate ties with a number of fundamentalist and
youth groups in Java, and Iranian officials have
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distributed pro-Khomeini literature, provided funding
for underground religious publications, and sponsored
unspecified training in Iran for youth leaders. The
Iranian Embassy's unauthorized pamphleteering pro-
voked a formal protest from the Indonesian Foreign
Department in October 1983 and nearly caused the
expulsion of Iran's charge.
Jakarta views the extremist ideologies of Iran and
Libya as dangerous models for Indonesia's own activ-
ist elements. Security officials actively monitor the
activities of students returning from the Middle East
and have confiscated pro-Khomeini literature. Jakar-
ta has also denied the Iranian Ambassador permission
to travel to Yogyakarta for Indonesian language
classes at Gajah Mada University. Although we
believe Tehran and Tripoli will at least explore the
opportunities offered by the recent disturbances, their
influence does not appear to be a major factor in the
events of recent months.
Muslim Resentment
Racial and religious violence is a recurring feature of
the Indonesian political scene. In Tanjung Priok, all
the usual prerequisites to violence were present, al-
though disturbances did not occur until instigators
whipped up the crowds over the government's disre-
gard of Muslim sensitivities.' The slum area of north
Jakarta is a high-crime neighborhood adjacent to a
well-to-do Chinese neighborhood. Many residents em-
igrated from the outer islands, where Islamic funda-
mentalism is strong, and many are unemployed or
threatened with loss of work in the port area.
Popular resentment of financial links between the
government elite and business figures in the ethnic
Chinese minority has strengthened antigovernment
sentiment, in our judgment. Muslim radicals have
capitalized on these attitudes by openly combining
criticism of the government's anti-Islamic policies
with posters showing the regime's ties to the ethnic
' Several reports of desecration of the local mosque, whether true or
not, were widely believed by the Muslim community and clearly
helped stir up the crowd's anger. According to one account, troops
not only wore boots inside the mosque, but also threw water from a
lavatory, containing human excrement, on the mosque floor. Ac-
cording to other reports, troops used water either from a sewer or a
lavatory to remove posters criticizing Soeharto from the walls of the
Chinese. Posters in Tanjung Priok specifically linked
President Soeharto with Chinese financiers and criti-
cized General Murdani, a Christian, as both anti-
Islamic and a protector of Chinese interests.
The current unrest also reflects increasing frustration
by moderate Muslims at the lack of legitimate ave-
nues for political expression. Even though nearly 90
percent of Indonesia's population is Muslim, Soeharto
and the military leadership have prevented Islam
from emerging as a dominant political force. Devout
Muslims resent the regime's determination to impose
the nonsectarian state ideology, Pancasila,' as the
guiding principle for all groups in society. They see
this effort as a move to displace the Koran as their
central guiding principle.
Restrictions on opposition parties and campus politi-
cal activism as well as resentment of the government's
heavyhanded tactics in controlling the Muslim politi-
cal parties have led to growing activism in the
mosques. Although the authorities monitor sermons,
particularly during politically sensitive periods such as
the holy month of Ramadan, the regime in recent
years has counterbalanced its restrictions on political
organizations by permitting freer rein for political
expression by mosque speakers. Furthermore, the
government is reluctant to arrest Muslim preachers
and teachers. Indeed, despite the growing tensions
instigated by a series of fiery speeches by Muslim
activists in Tanjung Priok in early September, securi-
ty officials did not act until a mob attacked a police
station.
Soeharto's Perspective
Having quelled several Muslim rebellions in the past,
the Soeharto government is sensitive to the potential
for Islam to become a significant political force. The
regime will not tolefate the development of an Islamic
' Pancasila is a nebulous ideology incorporating five tenets-belief
in a supreme being, humanitarianism, nationalism, democracy, and
social justice-that was promulgated by Indonesia's first President,
Sukarno. Soeharto has adopted the ideology as a tool for unifying
Indonesia's diverse ethnic and religious groups and claims that
Pancasila does not displace the Koran, but incorporates all religious
faiths, including Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism, and
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political party that does not fully adhere to Pancasila.
Since 1982, the regime has been requiring all mass
organizations-including religious groups and politi-
cal parties-to adopt Pancasila officially as their sole
guiding principle. Soeharto was sufficiently confident
of his control over the Muslim political party-the
Unity Development Party-that he permitted it to
hold its first congress last August, 12 years after it
was formed. In a pro forma exercise manipulated by a
party chairman practically handpicked by Soeharto,
the party accepted Pancasila-but at the cost of
growing disaffection of its membership.
The government's sharp crackdown on dissident
groups and the arrests of prominent members of the
Group of 50 reflect Soeharto's hardline attitude to
challenges to civil authority. The government's reac-
tion to the bombings has been equally stern. Authori-
ties are treating them as issues of national concern
and not simple police matters. General Murdani's
prominent role in media coverage of both the riot and
the bombings indicates Jakarta's determination to use
whatever force is necessary to combat future terrorist
attacks.
Near-Term Implications
The Soeharto regime cannot now back down from its
Pancasila campaign without appearing to surrender
to opposition pressure.
the government will redouble its efforts rather than
grant concessions to Muslim interests, and the intelli-
gence apparatus will probably step up monitoring and
penetration of Muslim, youth, and dissident organiza-
tions. The government may well try to discredit such
groups by using agent provocateurs to create inci-
dents
We have no indication that the regime is seeking
scapegoats for the unrest, but Soeharto might seek to
allay Muslim frustrations by permitting the prosecu-
tion of some blatantly corrupt-but politically incon-
sequential-Chinese businessmen. Chinese financier
Liem Soie Liong, however, will be protected by his
close and longstanding ties to the Soeharto family.
The government might also conduct a show trial of
some members of the Group of 50 or other political
opponents, portraying them as dangerous extremists.
Despite the current sense of unease, the incidents do
not signal a breakdown in the Soeharto government's
authority. Soeharto retains the loyalty of the military,
control of the bureaucracy, and the respect of the
majority of the population, and there is no effective
organized political opposition. More than half of
Indonesia's population has no personal memory of any
other national leader and remains generally support-
ive. Furthermore, security forces are fully capable of
restoring order when violence occurs.
The recent incidents, however, do portend continuing
social unrest and pose problems for the government's
economic planners. The underlying causes of discon-
tent-poverty, anti-Chinese hostility, the lack of an
effective political voice for Muslims and other opposi-
tion groups-could lead to riots at any time. Inci-
dents, even if unrelated to these specific causes, will
undoubtedly occur that will trigger violent outbursts.
Foreign investors are becoming jittery and will un-
doubtedly reassess their investment plans if the vio-
lence continues.
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Looking Further Ahead 25X1
We believe the bombings introduce a disruptive new
phase in Indonesian political life. Some observers
speculate that the bombings might lead to other
terrorist acts such as kidnapings and assassinations. A
heavyhanded government response would probably 25X1
generate increased anti-Soeharto sentiment among
Muslims and other disaffected groups-precisely the
result that, in our judgment, opposition elements seek.
It would nevertheless be characteristic of the Soeharto
government to respond forcefully to terrorist threats
and to maintain its tough stance against potential
opposition groups. 25X1
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We do not know how Indonesian youth, particularly
the large pool of underemployed and disaffected
young people, views recent developments.
students generally re-
main apolitical,
increasing numbers of youth are attending mosques
and becoming active in more radical, mosque-affiliat-
ed study groups. They apparently prefer these groups
to traditional, government-sanctioned Muslim or
youth organizations. They will, in any case, be in-
creasingly receptive to claims by Islamic radicals that
peaceful methods of political opposition do not ade-
quately serve Muslim interests.
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Appendix A
Islam in Indonesia is very diverse, embracing a major-
ity of moderate Muslims and more disparate funda-
mentalist minorities. Islam first arrived in outer island
areas such as Aceh, Sumatera Barat (West Sumatra),
Kalimantan, and Maluku, and in coastal areas of
Java. The smaller groups in the outer islands tended
to convert to stricter forms of orthodox Islam, but, on
the main island of Java, Islam was absorbed into a
traditional body of beliefs that combined Javanese
mysticism with Hindu and Buddhist strains. As a
result, except for pockets of orthodoxy, Indonesian
Islam lacks the more doctrinaire elements of the
Middle Eastern varieties.
As part of a broader nationalist movement, Islam
underwent a domestic revival in the early part of the
20th century when influential educational, philan-
thropic, and political organizations were formed. In-
donesian Muslims, however, have not been able to
translate their numerical dominance-88 percent of
the nearly 160 million population-into political pow-
er since independence. After failing to dominate
Indonesian politics in the 1950s, the fractious Muslim
political parties hoped for a more influential role as a
result of the active role Muslims played in supporting
Soeharto's anti-Communist crusade in the mid-1960s.
Since consolidating his power, however, Soeharto has
steadily diminished the role of the Muslim parties. He
established the ruling party, Golkar, in the early
1970s as the regime's mechanism for maintaining
political control and forced the four legal Muslim
parties to consolidate into one despite their political
emasculation of the Muslim political party-the Uni-
ty Development Party-at its August 1984 congress
angered devout Muslims and has given radicals politi-
cal ammunition. Thus, although some younger intel-
lectuals are trying to unite traditional Muslim groups,
fringe groups have attempted such farfetched actions
as trying to revive the Darul Islam separatist move-
ment, which was crushed in the 1960s, or attempting
to declare an independent Islamic state in Sulawesi
Selatan (South Sulawesi).
The lack of national leaders acceptable to opposing
Muslim factions, historical differences between tradi-
tional and modernizing groups, and a broad national
consensus favoring Soeharto's goals of economic de-
velopment and political stability, however, make an
Islamic political ascendancy highly unlikely for the
near term. Furthermore, we expect the Soeharto
regime-which considers Islamic extremism one of its
greatest internal threats-to continue efforts to stifle
the emergence of any independent Muslim political
voice.
and religious differences.
Most moderate Muslims do not advocate an Islamic
state, preferring a system in which Islamic principles
are incorporated into laws and in which Muslim
leaders play a prominent policymaking role. These
goals, however, conflict with the preference of
Soeharto and his ruling military elite for a nonsectar-
ian state based on traditional Javanese culture. Al-
though most Muslim leaders are resigned to continu-
ing government dominance, the regime's virtual
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Appendix B
Solidaritas Islam and the
Terrorist Threat
The Tanjung Priok riot could well have been a
spontaneous outburst, and some of the fires that have
destroyed major department stores, damaged office
buildings and hotels, and set off explosions at a
military ammunition depot in suburban Jakarta may
have been accidental, but the
bombings of Chinese-owned businesses and some of
the fires clearly were premeditated. There have been
no published reports of terrorist groups claiming
responsibility for any of the incidents.
Indonesian media
com-
plying with a government request not to publicize the
name of a group calling itself Solidaritas Islam, which
security officials suspect of committing a number of
acts of violence. Both the US and Australian Embas-
sies have received threatening letters from this group.
Security officials have been aggressively investigating
opposition political groups and Muslim and youth
organizations since the disturbances began, and have
detained a large number of suspects. Interrogations of
the suspects indicate that many of the incidents,
including the Tanjung Priok riot, have not been
spontaneous, but have been planned and committed
by Solidaritas Islam. The group reportedly draws its
leadership from the more radical elements of the
Indonesian Muslim Students' Association and the
Islamic Students' Association. Its general member-
ship is drawn from a Muslim youth organization
Religion warned the Iranian Ambassador not to inter-
fere in Indonesia's domestic politics. 25X1
There is a strong possibility that Indonesia will be the
scene of continuing terrorist activity. Poverty, racial
hostility, and the lack of a legitimate political voice 25X1
for Indonesia's Muslim majority create a fertile
breeding ground for terrorism in Indonesia. Further-
more, the sheer number of incidents and threats since
September suggests that fires and bombings are now 25X1
fashionable means of challenging the authorities or
settling private disputes. If terrorist acts continue, US
installations and private US businesses may become
more frequent targets. In addition to the Embassy and
other official installations, terrorists could target
many of the US firms that have offices in Jakarta. Oil
company installations, although generally isolated
from urban areas, offer lucrative targets for attack.
disruption.
We cannot yet predict whether the domestic security
situation will deteriorate or if additional US targets
will be singled out. Careful monitoring of potential
terrorist activity will be necessary to determine
whether the current activity represents a temporary
phenomenon or the beginning of a longer term
Indonesian officials have long been more concerned
with internal security than external threats and are
quick to fix blame for any unrest on radical or
extremist groups. They apparently believe Solidaritas
Islam is responsible for many of the recent incidents.
The Indonesians are also suspicious of involvement by
radical Islamic regimes such as Iran and Libya. In the
wake of the recent disturbances, Jakarta's Minister of
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