COLOMBIA: CRISIS ON THE DRUG FRONT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00283R000500040006-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Colombia: Crisis,
on the Drug Front
GI 84-10055
IA 84-10030
March 1984
463
 I I
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Colombia: Crisis
on the Drug Front
25X1
Strategic Narcotics Branch, International Security
25X1
Issues Division, Office of Global Issues, ands
25X1
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Strategic Narcotics Branch,
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Secret
G184-10055
IA 84-10030
March 1984
 I1 I
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Colombia: Crisis
on the Drug Front
Key Judgments US drug control policy in Latin America may suffer a serious setback
Information available because of the deteriorating narcotics situation in Colombia:
as of 16 March 1984 - It
was used in this report.
? The marijuana crop in 1983 was about 60 percent larger than the
previous year's drought-affected crop, and prospects for the 1984 harvest
are now good. Colombia supplies 70 to 80 percent of the marijuana
imported annually into the United States.
? Coca cultivation has increased dramatically since 1980. Colombia grew
enough coca last year to produce some 10 metric tons of cocaine
hydrochloride-roughly 20 percent of the cocaine consumed annually in
the United States. We project that by 1986 Colombia will be able Ito pro-
duce between 30 and 40 tons of cocaine from domestically cultivated
coca leaf.
? Some Colombian traffickers maintain an extensive trafficking infra-
structure to market these products as well as the cocaine from Bolivia
Colombian trafficking syndicates have recently increased efforts to
influence Colombian politics and to use the media to foster a better
public image. Their structure and the secretive, closed manner in which
they operate-usually relying on trusted family members-continue to
frustrate efforts by drug enforcement agencies to penetrate these organi-
zations and to halt their illicit activities.
? Government plans and initiatives often either do not have the backing of
President Betancur or because of a lack of resources are not equal to the
Prospects for a comprehensive drug control program are bleak. President
Betancur's awareness of the domestic political sensitivities involved lin an
antinarcotics effort and his foreign policy-designed in part to demonstrate
his independence from the United States-are both limiting factors.! We do
not believe Betancur will discontinue any existing drug control efforts, but,
without his staunch support, national programs-such as a widespread
aerial herbicidal spray campaign-needed to counter the continued pro-
duction of marijuana and the rapid increase in coca output will face an up-
iii Secret
GI 84-10055
IA 84-10030
March 1984
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Figure 1
Marijuana Cultivation
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Colombia: Crisis
on the Drug Front
Colombia plays a key role in the US antinarcotics
policy in Latin America. Colombia is the center for
the processing and trafficking of cocaine grown in
Bolivia and Peru, as well as in Colombia, and provides
a major share of the marijuana imported into the
United States. Several trends point to a deterioration
of the narcotics situation in Colombia. Despite US
initiatives and some Colombian antinarcotics efforts,
marijuana and cocaine production is flourishing, the
drug production and trafficking infrastructure contin-
ues to develop and expand, domestic drug abuse is
growing, and some traffickers are becoming bolder in
their attempt to gain legitimacy. This paper examines
the current drug situation in Colombia, the govern-
ment's response, the constraints to a comprehensive
national drug control program, and a set of events
that serve as key indicators to a change in the
Drug Cultivation
Colombia remains the primary source of US imports
of marijuana and cocaine. Some 70 to 80 percent of
the marijuana imported into the United States is
grown in Colombia, according to estimates by the US
National Narcotics Intelligence Consumer Commit-
tee (NNICC). Colombian traffickers have long over-
seen the cocaine trade, refining coca leaf grown in
Peru and Bolivia and smuggling the cocaine into the
United States. Increasingly, however, coca is being
' Colombian traffickers are known principally for their involvement
in the marijuana and cocaine trade; however, since 1977 there have
been several unconfirmed reports and persistent rumors of illicit
opium poppy cultivation in Colombia. US Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) sources have reported the existence of opium
poppy cultivation in the Departments of Valle de Cauca (1977),
Boyaca (1979), and Vichada (1982 and 1983). Investigations by
DEA personnel have turned up no evidence of opium poppy
cultivation in these areas, and DEA suspects that the informants
probably sighted a nontoxic green vine that resembles opium poppy.
Marijuana. Marijuana production in Colombia in-
creased dramatically last year, up almost 60 percent
over output in 1982-when drought affected the
crop-and somewhat higher than the estimated aver-
age annual production during 1979-811 25X1
Colombia's Magdalena, Cesar, and La Gua- 25X1
jira Departments-located in the northeast along the
Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta and Serrania de Perija
mountains-revealed an increase in the area for the
fall harvest (figure 1). Between 80 and 90 percent of
Colombian marijuana is grown in this area, and the
fall harvest has recently accounted for some two-
thirds of the annual crop. Of the 13,500 metric tons of
marijuana we estimate were harvested in 1983, we
expect some 11,000 tons will be shipped to the United 25X1
States.l
Coca. Coca cultivation in Colombia has nearly tripled
in recent years-from approximately 5,000 hectares 25X1
in 1980 to some 15,600 hectares in 1983 (figure 2).
We estimate Colombian-cultivated coca plants yield-
ed some 4,600 tons of coca leaf in 1983-enough to
produce roughly 10 tons of cocaine, 20 percent of the
cocaine consumed annually in the United States. This
increase in coca cultivation has occurred primarily in
southeastern Colombia. Coca is also grown in, the
southwestern departments of Cauca, Narino, and
Putamayo, which presently account for less than 15
percent, roughly 2,000 hectares, of Colombian coca
hectarage. 0 25X1
Outlook for Production. Although it is still too early
in the crop season to forecast production of marijuana
or coca for 1984, we see no evidence as yet that 25X1
production will drop below the 1983 level. Two mari-
juana crops are normally harvested, one in the period
March-April and one in August-September. Weather
has been good for the spring-harvested crop, and at
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Figure 2
Coca Cultivation
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least average yields can be expected. Coca is harvest-
ed three or four times a year. Coca yields are affected
less by weather and more by the maturity of the plant,
with maximum yields reached when plants are four to
eight years old. Satellite imagery will be used later in
the crop season to measure more precisely the area of
marijuana and coca harvested and to estimate likely
Beyond 1984 production potential-especially for
coca-is much greater. As recently planted coca fields
in southeastern Colombia mature, yields will rise. We
estimate that by 1986 this region-with no increase in
the number of coca fields-will be able to grow
enough coca leaf to produce between 30 and 40 tons
of cocaine hydrochloride annually. Should increased
international demand for Colombian cocaine prompt
further expansion of the cultivated area, production
would of course be greater.
Traff icking
Colombian drug traffickers have already developed an
infrastructure that would accommodate an expansion
in activities. Extensive clandestine facilities have been
established in remote areas of southeastern and north-
ern Colombia to support the illegal cultivation, proc-
essing, and transshipment of cocaine. and marijuana.
Marijuana Trafficking. After harvesting, the mari-
juana is dried and the leaves stripped from the plant
and pressed into bales. The bales, which each weigh
about 20 to 25 kilograms, are wrapped in a variety of
materials-including paper, plastic, and burlap-de-
pending on how the marijuana will be exported. For
example, bales shipped from Colombia to the United
States by air may be wrapped in paper and/or burlap,
whereas bales that will be airdropped into the open
sea for subsequent pickup by boats are wrapped in
several layers of waterproof materials. After packag-
ing, the marijuana is moved by mule train from the
growing areas to collection points, where it is trans.'
ferred to trucks and transported to clandestine air-
have at their disposal more than 195 airstrips-160 of
which are not registered with the Colombian Govern-
ment-on the Peninsula de la Guajira and in the area
surrounding the marijuana-growing areas in the Sier-
ra Nevada de Santa Marta (figure 7, foldout).`A total
of 74 of the unregistered airstrips are on the Peninsula
de la Guajira,-the primary staging area for US-bound
marijuana shipments, and 47 of these have been
constructed since 1975, when marijuana cultivation
began to increase significantly in this region. All of
the unregistered airstrips have graded earth or, unim-
proved surfaces; they vary in length from 235 to 2,435
meters. Although the registration of an airstrip with
the government does not preclude its use for illicit
purposes, we believe that an unregistered airstrip is
more likely to be used for illicit purposes than one that
is registered.0
Traffickers on the Peninsula de Is Guajira also have
access to more than 100 coastal locations that~can be
used for loading drugs-averaging 11.5 tons per
ship-onto US-bound vessels (figures 7 and 3)i' Drug-
related transfer operations are usually conducted un-
der the cover of darkness, using small motorboats to
shuttle marijuana to ships that usually stay 10 to 20
kilometers offshore to avoid detection (figure 4).C
Cocaine Trafficking. After harvesting, coca leaves
are taken to nearby laboratories where chemical
processing reduces their weight and volume. In most
cases these laboratories are open-sided thatch or tar-
paper-roofed shelters with rudimentary equipment,
located in or near the coca fields, although some
laboratories destroyed by DEA and Colombian Na-
tional Police units have been concealed as far as 1.5
kilometers from the coca fields. Recently large lab-
oratories made of sheet metal have been observed in
several clusters of coca fields along the Rio Vaupes
and at a sophisticated cocaine-processing facility
seized by the Colombia National Police along'the Rio
i
Transportation in the jungle of southeastern Colom-
bia is generally limited to the major rivers and their
navigable tributaries or to air travel. DEA reports
that drug traffickers usually rely on small motorized
canoes to ferry supplies such as gasoline, sodium
25X1 I
25X1
 bicarbonate, and sulfuric acid to their coca fields and length from 250 to 1,500 meters. Medium-sized, twin-
processing facilities. These boats also are used to engine aircraft can operate on these runways. In
transport coca products upstream to the west, where addition to the 78 unregistered airstrips that the drug
they are then shipped out of the region via land traffickers have hacked out of the jungle, traffickers
routes.) also use registered airstrips such as those in Mira-
Traffickers operating in the remote areas of south-
eastern Colombia also use aircraft to provide fast,
not registered with the Colombian Government (fig-
ures 5 and 6). The 78 unregistered airstrips have
unimproved or graded earth runways that vary in
Trafficking organizations are well entrenched. Most
traffickers probably began as smugglers who saw the
lucrative narcotics trade as a natural extension of
 Figure 5
Airstrips and Coca Cultivation
1
Amazonas
- Airstrip registered with the
Colombian Government
f Unregistered airstrip
Coca cultivation
-- Departmento- level boundary
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Figure 6. Cocaine base laborator and airstrt in southeastern
Colombia, August 1983.
their already profitable illegal activities. Moreover,
several Colombian insurgent/terrorist groups appar-
ently have entered the drug business-at least to a
limited degree-further complicating any government
Traditional Colombian Traffickers
Colombian traffickers recently have sought to expand
their illicit activity and consolidate their position and
increase their influence in Colombia. According to
US Embassy reports, some traffickers have been
openly using the large sums of money available to
them to attempt to infiltrate established political
parties, secure public office, block drug control legis-
lation and programs, and in general create a favorable
climate for their activities. The traffickers' astute and
aggressive use of the Colombian media-to portray
themselves as heroes taking on the giant fromlthe
north-not only has won them some popular support
but at times has put the government on the defensive.
During the past year, for example, traffickers mount-
ed a well-orchestrated propaganda campaign that
helped scuttle the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty
and block the extradition of two Colombian drug
traffickers to the United States.I
According to DEA, many of the Colombian drug-
trafficking organizations are secretive, closed,lself-
perpetuating criminal enterprises with vast financial
 resources at their disposal. Motivated by power and
profit, the more sophisticated and professional syndi-
cates operate in much the same way as large multina-
tional corporations-with compartmentalized func-
tions such as finance, banking, legal defense,
transportation, and logistics, as well as import-export
and retail departments. Some organizations are drug
specific, others handle a variety of drugs, and still
others smuggle all types of contraband such as electri-
Many organizations rely on trusted family members
to carry out operations, a major obstacle to any effort
by drug enforcement authorities to penetrate these
illicit trafficking operations. A typical example of a
traditional Colombian trafficking organization is the
Manuel Garces Gonzalez family, identified by Co-
lombian police in February 1982 as one of the most
active narcotics-trafficking networks in Colombia.
The Gonzalez group operates out of Medellin. Family
members act as foreign representatives to oversee the
export of at least 200 kilograms of cocaine a month to
the United States and Europe. Other drug-trafficking
families identified by the Colombian Police and DEA
include those headed by Bernardo Londono Quintero,
Fabio Ochoa Restrepo, Joaquin and Jaime Builes,
Carlos Lehder Rivas, Gomez Van Grieken, and Fer-
Nontraditional Traffickers
Several Colombian insurgent/terrorist groups appar-
ently are also involved in the illicit drug trade.
Although the activities of such groups do not rival
those of the traditional trafficking families, their
involvement in drug trafficking is a matter of some
concern to military and police officials, who fear that
the insurgents are using drug traffickers and their
The National Liberation Army (ELN,), The ELN is a
small Castroite Marxist-Leninist organization estab-
lished in 1963 that operates throughout Colombia.
According to unconfirmed Embassy reports, ELN
members have been involved in extorting money from
The Popular Liberation Army (EPL Founded in
1967, the group was originally associated with the
now defunct pro-Beijing Colombian Communist
Party/Marxist-Leninist (PCC/ML). The EPL is ac-
tive in Colombia's Cordoba Department and in the
Gulfo de Uraba region. Colombian authorities have
told US officials that they suspect that the EPL gets
some of its weapons from drug traffickers operating in
the Gulf of Uraba region and that some EPL mem-
bers may be engaged in marijuana cultivation and
The Colombian 19th of April Movement (M-19), The
M-19, a leftist terrorist group that rose to prominence
in 1974, successfully used the drug-smuggling appara-
tus of Jaime Guillot Lara to bring a large shipment of
weapons into Colombia in October 1981. According to.
US Embassy reporting, it has extorted money from 25X1
also indicate that one of the FARC's fronts in south-
east Colombia was organized expressly for the control
of coca production, with the aim of using the profits
from the trade to support other FARC units. Embassy
officers also suspect the FARC is responsible for two
attacks in 1983 on National Police antinarcotics
patrols, one in the'San Jose del Guaviare region and
the other in an area of heavy coca cultivation along 25X1
the Rio Vaupes between Calamar and Caruru.
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC). The largest and most formidable Marxist-
Leninist insurgent group in Colombia, the FARC
entered the drug business about 1977, at first exacting
fees from traffickers for use of FARC-controlled
territory. It soon began to tax coca production in its
strongholds and, according to US Embassy reports,
has even established production quotas for growers
and wage guidelines for workers. Embassy reports
Government reaction to the narcotics situation sug-
gests an increasing recognition of the problem, but
prospects for a comprehensive antinarcotics program
remain remote. Since August 1983, several Colombi-
an officials have initiated and supported a number of
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drug-related measures, prompted-we believe-by an
increased awareness of the growing domestic drug
abuse problem, reaction to the public flaunting by
some drug traffickers of their illicitly acquired wealth,
and increasing concern over the blatant efforts of
some traffickers to participate actively in the Colom-
bian political process. The actions taken include:
? Congressional hearings last August on the influence
of drug money in Colombian politics, which brought
unexpected national attention to the growing infil-
tration of drug traffickers into the Colombian politi-
cal system.
Participation of several government ministers in a
Bogota drug abuse awareness conference sponsored
by the United States last September. Breaking with
tradition, these ministers acknowledged publicly
that Colombia has a drug abuse problem. At the
time, the US Embassy in Bogota believed the
conference contributed materially to a more favor-
able climate for US drug control initiatives.
? An announcement at the conference by the Minister
of Health of plans for a national drug abuse aware-
ness and prevention campaign to be headed by the
wife of Colombian President Betancur.
? A speech in September by the mayor of Bogota
outlining a proposed antidrug campaign that would
feature a crackdown on street sales of cocaine-laced
marijuana cigarettes, called bazucas, to juveniles.
? Bogota's decision to send an eight-man technical
team to Mexico and the United States in late
September to study the use of herbicides in control-
ling marijuana and coca cultivation and the subse-
quent decision to implement a test spray program.
? The destruction of a large-scale cocaine- hydrochlo-
ride-processing facility along the Rio Taurare in
Caqueta Department by Colombian National Po-
lice. The operation, which resulted in the seizure of
an estimated 8,500 kilograms of cocaine hydrochlo-
ride, also included the arrest of more than 40
persons, the seizure of seven aircraft, and the de-
struction of 10 laboratories.
? Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla's plans,
according to the US Embassy, to publicly idebtify
trafficking organizations, discredit drug traffickers
through media campaigns, cancel the pilot licenses
of traffickers, disable unauthorized landing strips,
issue arrest warrants for major drug traffickers, and
investigate drug-related corruption of the judiciary.
? The creation of a bilateral enforcement working
group with Venezuela that in February culminated
in an agreement reaffirming the two countries'
commitment to joint cooperation in controlling drug
trafficking, guerrilla operations, and kidnaping 25X1
along their common border.
Despite these statements and plans, both existing and
proposed drug control programs in Colombia face
constraints-recently enumerated by the US Embas-
sy in Bogota-that will allow drug traffickers to
continue to operate with relative impunity:
? Social. A longstanding public attitude of ambiva-
lence toward drug issues makes it difficult for the
Colombian Government to obtain cooperation or stir
up enthusiasm for drug control programs. any
Colombians simply do not view marijuana orkoca
cultivation as a criminal activity, and some continue
to believe that drug trafficking actually generates
significant employment and wealth for the country.
? Economic. High unemployment in both rural and
urban areas assures traffickers-who pay higher
wages (US $7.50 per day) than can be earned in
legitimate agriculture ($3.00 per day) or in menial
city jobs-an abundant and cheap supply of labor.
Moreover, complicated and increasingly restrictive
government import controls have contributed to the
continued traffic in contraband of all kinds.
? Political. Government decisions on drug control will
continue to be influenced in the coming months by
competition among government agencies for scarce
resources; political expediency; intimidation by traf-
fickers; widespread corruption; inadequate drug
laws; ineffective legal, penal, and judicial systems;
and a lack of effective political and military control
over some drug cultivation zones.
 ? Geographic. Colombia's proximity to the United
States and its long unpatrolled coastlines bordering
two oceans ideally suit it for illegal drug-trafficking
operations. Moreover, Colombia's mountainous
northern departments and the vast tropical rain
forest of the southeastern departments are physical-
ly and climatically well suited to marijuana and
coca cultivation, but not conducive to enforcement
We believe the development of an effective Colombi-
an antinarcotics program also has been constrained by
a lack of strong presidential support and leadership.
Betancur has given the narcotics problem little atten-
tion. He avoided drug issues during his campaign and
has since shown little interest in formulating a coordi-
nated drug policy, being preoccupied instead with
Third World politics, Colombia's troubled economy,
and the persistent indigenous terrorist and insurgent
In addition, Betancur's Hispanic nationalism has re-
sulted in the implementation of a new foreign policy
that constrains development of a Colombian antinar-
cotics policy.' More oriented toward the Third World
and designed both to demonstrate Colombia's inde-
pendence from the United States and to propel the
country to the forefront of Latin America's diplomat-
ic ranks, this policy has already contributed to two
setbacks for US drug control efforts in Colombia:
? The Foreign Relations Committee of the Colombian
House of Representatives-echoing and probably
influenced by Betancur's views-voted to postpone
indefinitely debate on the US-Colombian Mutual
Legal Assistance Treaty, according to foreign press
reports, on the grounds that certain articles are
unconstitutional and should be renegotiated.
? President Betancur decided not to sign the final
papers for the extradition of any Colombians to the
United States. Betancur apparently shares the views
of some of his closest advisers that the Extradition
The lack of a strong government program to counter
the activities of well-organized trafficking groups-
already a problem-may reach crisis proportions if
drug production increases according to our expecta-
tions. We will continue to monitor crop production
prospects, and there are a number of indicators that
bear watching to detect further changes in Colombian
attitudes toward drug control. The clearest of these
involve decisions that will be made at the highest level
of government:
The decision by President Betancur on the extradi-
tion to the United States of major Colombian
narcotics trafficker Carlos Lehder Rivas. Betancur's
refusal to approve the extradition of two other
Colombian traffickers to the United States on na-
tionalistic grounds and his recent talks with US
officials on the status and implementation of the
Extradition Treaty, however, do not augur well for
Lehder's extradition to the United States.
? Decisions by the Colombian Government on wheth-
er or not to resurrect the Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaty that is designed to facilitate US investigation
of illegal drug-related financial transactions and
A second set of indicators that reflect further changes
in attitudes at the ministerial level include both
domestic and foreign policy actions. On the domestic
scene:
? The extent of the Government of Colombia's multi-
media campaigns and sponsorship of city and de-
partmental drug abuse conferences.
? The probable resignation-partly out of frustra-
tion-of Minister of Justice Rodrigo Bonilla Lara,
who is the principal advocate in the Colombian
Government for drug control and who supports US
policies in this area.
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? Completion of a herbicidal spray testing program
begun in February 1984 and the implementation of
a herbicidal spray campaign against marijuana and
coca plants by June 1984.
? A high-level executive decision to commit the Co-
lombian military to any antinarcotics efforts.
? The extent of Colombian Government enforcement
of drug laws, as measured by National Police
Extent and status of Colombian efforts to imple-
ment regional initiatives in drug control, such as the
resolutions adopted at the South American Narcot-
ics Accord Conference in November 1983 and, more
specifically, the ongoing dialogue between Colombi-
an and Venezuelan officials over increased coopera-
tion in border control matters.
? Colombian Government reactions to US legislation
curtailing US foreign aid to drug source countries
that do not demonstrate verifiable progress in crop
reduction.
The level of cooperation between Colombian Gov-
ernment personnel and Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration and State Department narcotics officers
especially in the wake of US seizures of a Colombi-
an ship (Ciudad de Popayan) and aircraft (Avianca)
This second set of domestic and foreign policy indica-
tors is not as likely as the first to provide an unambig-
uous signal of the direction of change in Colombian
narcotics policy but may help predict additional deci-
 Riohacha.e0 f?
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Figure 7
Airstrips and Coastal Transshipment Sites
Cuban
Airstrip registered with
the Colombian Government
Unregistered airstrip
Coastal transshipment site
monitored by the US
Coast Guard
Departamento boundary
0 10 20 30 00 50 Kilometers
i If
0 10 20 30 40 SOW..
Golfo
de
Venezuela
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