GOLDEN TRIANGLE: INCREASED MILITARY ACTIONS AGAINST NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00283R000200060006-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: October 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of -
Intelligence
8 U ~- W CY a
MK 0l
Golden Triangle:
Increased Military Actions
Against Narcotics Traffickers
An Intelligence Assessment
Seer
et
GI 83-10248
October 1983
Copy 315
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Intelligence
Golden Triangle:
Increased Military Actions
Against Narcotics Traffickers
Branch, OGI,
International Security Issues Division, Office of
Global Issues. Comments and queries are welcome
and may be directed to the Chief, Strategic Narcotics
This paper was prepared by
Secret
GI 83-10248
October 1983
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Golden Triangle:
Increased Military Actions
Against Narcotics Traffickers
Key Judgments The Governments of Thailand and Burma have independently stepped up
Information available their antinarcotics efforts in the Thai-Burmese border area, the center of
as of 30 September 1983 narcotics trafficking in the Golden Triangle (Thailand, Burma, and Laos).
was used in this report.
Fighting along the border has forced traffickers to move deeper into
Burma, relocate refineries, and abandon or modify previously used smug-
gling methods. More importantly, these efforts have signaled narcotics
traffickers that they can no longer operate freely in the border area.
The fighting has not affected Golden Triangle opium production, however.
The principal growing areas are well removed from the Thai-Burmese
border and in the case of Burma are mostly outside government control.
We estimate fro US Embassy reports that the 25X1
opium output for 1983 is between 615 and 665 metric tons, more than
enough to service regional users and to maintain sufficient stocks for
export:
? Opium production in Burma largely determines the amount of opium
available for export from the Golden Triangle. Good weather and
continued widespread cultivation produced an estimated 550 to 600 tons.
? Thailand's opium output has fallen by approximately 30 percent to about
35 tons, the result of poor weather and reduced planting prompted by low
prices and the threat of crop eradication.
? Opium production in Laos, also affected by poor weather, did not exceed
Traffickers have altered patterns of operations to market their surplus
production and to avoid the risks entailed in operating along the Thai-
Burmese border. For example, Burma and India are increasingly used as
transit countries for export of heroin to the West, and traffickers have
shifted some of their heroin-refining operations to the Thai-Malaysian
border area. The Shan United Army, the primary target of Thailand's
military campaign, is still the dominant trafficking organization in the
Golden Triangle but has formed alliances with other groups to market their
products more aggressively abroad. Other groups-in particular the Bur-
mese Communist Party-have become directly involved in the production
of heroin.
iii Secret
GI 83-10248
October 1983
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Such developments can be viewed as a measure of the effectiveness of
antinarcotics efforts in the area, but they also further complicate interdic-
tion efforts for both the Thai and Burmese Governments. For that reason
and because we believe the European market is already saturated with
heroin from Southwest Asia, we expect that increased amounts of Golden
Triangle heroin will be shipped to the United States. Indeed, US Drug
Enforcement Administration seizures indicate that this has already begun.
During the first half of 1983 seizures of Southeast Asian heroin nearly
quadrupled, compared with the same period in 1982. Golden Triangle
heroin currently accounts for almost one-fourth of the heroin imported to
the United States, up from 14 percent in 1982.
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Secret
Golden Triangle:
Increased Military Actions
Against Narcotics Traffickers
Increased Thai and Burmese military actions since
January 1982 have disrupted narcotics trafficking
along the Thai-Burmese border. Trafficking groups,
particularly the Shan United Army (SUA), can no
longer operate freely in the border area and, accord-
ing to US Embassy reports, have been hit hard
financially. Although traffickers have been forced to
shift operations, the region's capability to supply large
quantities of narcotics to regional and international
markets has not been permanently affected. This
assessment examines enforcement actions taken by
regional governments against Golden Triangle narcot-
ics traffickers, estimates opium production in 1983,
and assesses the outlook for trafficking in Southeast
Asia.
The rugged area along the Thai-Burmese border is
the center of narcotics trafficking and heroin process-
ing in Southeast Asia. Various ethnic-based insurgent
and warlord groups move opium grown largely in
northern Burma to clandestine heroin laboratories at
the border, where most of the heroin exported from
the Golden Triangle is produced. The border area is
ideally suited to narcotics trafficking:
? Opium supplies are readily available from hill-tribe
cultivators who normally produce 500 to 600 tons of
opium annually.
? A good transportation system through Thailand
facilitates access to the chemicals needed to process
opium as well as to both regional and international
markets for processed narcotics.
? The rugged terrain along the border is difficult to
police and provides sanctuary for traffickers against
government attacks.
from the hill tribes who do. Chinese own the refineries
that convert the opium to heroin and, to a limited
degree, are engaged in smuggling and distributing
opium products from wholesale points to consuming
centers. They are supported by government officials,
who are highly paid to provide police, military, and
political protection. The SUA and the Chinese Irregu-
lar Force (CIF), two groups that have historically
controlled a major share of the traffic within the
Golden Triangle, are both controlled by ethnic Chi-
nese. Burmese Communists have been increasingly
involved in Golden Triangle narcotics in recent years,
and, according to US Embassy sources, they too are
controlled by ethnic Chinese. 25X1
Antinarcotics Operations 25X1
The major narcotics trafficking organizations have
been effectively harassed by the Thai and Burmese
Armies since January 1982. Military operations have
been aimed at traffickers' armed positions, heroin
refineries, opium caravans, transshipment/storage
sites, and trafficking routes. All of the military activi-
ty has occurred along the Thai-Burmese border, with
several cross-border incursions by both the Thai and
Burmese. These incursions have penetrated as far as
5 to 6 kilometers and apparently with tacit approval of
both governments.. Despite the common narcotics
problem, there have been no joint Thai-Burmese
military efforts against narcotics traffickers nor, given
the historical animosities between the Thai and Bur-
mese, is there likely to be.
Thai Military Actions
Recent operations by the Thai follow several years of
tolerance of narcotics trafficking along the Thai-
Burmese border. Thai governments in the past fo-
cused their antinarcotics efforts on urban enforcement
25X1
Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia have a long tradi-
tion as narcotics smugglers and are the dominant
processors and traffickers of opium produced in the
area. They do not grow opium, but they help collect it
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Secret
Golden Triangle Narcotics Trafficking Groups
? The Shan United Army (SUA) purports to fight for
independence of the Shan State in Burma but is
principally a narcotics trafficking group. Formed
from remnants of the Loi Maw KKY (Home Guard
Militias) that were commissioned by the Burmese
Government to fight Communist insurgents but
were disbanded in 1971, the SUA by 1978 was the
most important trafficking organization in the
Thai-Burmese border area. By 1981, according to
US Embassy sources, it controlled 70 percent of the
narcotics processing and trafficking in the Golden
Triangle.
? The 3rd and 5th Chinese Irregular Force (CIF) are
remnants of Chinese Kuomintang divisions that
retreated into Burma in 1949-50. They have no
discernible political goals but, in the tradition of
Chinese warlords, have sought to develop zones
that are autonomous of either Rangoon or Bang-
kok. They are heavily involved in opium trafficking
and narcotics refining, in addition to a wide range
of other illicit smuggling activities.
? The Burmese Communist Party (BCP), one of Bur-
ma's oldest insurgent groups, operates in the north-
ern Shan State with an army estimated at 10,000 to
12,000 men. A reduction in Chinese support to the
BCP in the late 1970s prompted the BCP to move
deeper into the narcotics business to finance opera-
tions. The BCP,has recently become involved in
heroin processing.
? The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) is an ethnic-
based insurgent group operating throughout the
Kachin State and in the northern Shan State,
purportedly to achieve autonomy for the Kachin
ethnic areas within the Burmese Union. The KIA
has formally cooperated with the BCP since 1982.
This group gets some support from the BCP but has
increasingly turned to smuggling and narcotics
trafficking.
? The Shan State Army (SSA) is an ethnic-based
insurgent group (primarily Shan) in the northern
Shan State. The SSA was formed by dissident
university students from Rangoon and Mandalay
and was once known as the Shan State Independ-
ence Army. The organization aims to achieve full
independence for the Shan State with guarantees
for the rights of all ethnic groups. Two distinct
military commands (SSA/North and SSA/South)
are engaged in narcotics trafficking.
? The Shan United Revolutionary Army (SURA) is a
splinter group of the Shan State Army. It claims to
seek autonomy for the Shan State but engages
primarily in smuggling, narcotics trafficking, and
refining.
? The Shan State Volunteer Force (SSVF), headed by
Lo Hsing-han, once the "Opium King of the Golden
Triangle, " has been authorized by Rangoon as a
people's militia unit to fight insurgent forces oper-
ating in the Shan State. Reportedly, Lo has re-
turned to narcotics trafficking.
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1982
January
Ban Hin Taek, Thailand
May
Ban Lao Liu, Thailand
June
Doi Lang, Thai-Burmese
border
July
Doi Lang/Doi Sam Sao,
Thai-Burmese border
September
Doi Lang, Thai-Burmese
border
October
Doi Lang/Soi Sam Sao,
Thai-Burmese border
November
Lao Lo Chai, Thai-Burmese
border
November
Ban Muang Na, Thai-Bur-
mese border
December
Doi Lang, Thai-Burmese
border
1983
January
Ban Muang Na, Thai-
Burmese border
March
Man Thong Mountain,
Burma
April
San Klang, Burma
June
Anaka Kho, Burma
August
Huai Yuak, Burma
August
Mong Yawn,
Burma
Thai military units destroyed second SUA headquar-
ters, several SUA positions, and a refinery inside
Burma.
Thai units attacked SUA military positions, destroyed a
refinery, and captured equipment.
Thai units overran SUA military positions, destroyed
refineries, and captured supplies and equipment.
Thai units destroyed two refineries and disrupted SUA
supply routes.
Thai units destroyed a refinery and military positions
and captured chemicals and equipment.
Burmese units attacked a SURA camp inside Thailand.
Thai units destroyed refineries, a major chemical stor-
age site, and SUA military positions.
Thai units destroyed refinery of the 3rd CIF/SURA.
Thai units destroyed SUA refinery and military
positions.
Thai.units destroyed refineries and military positions
and captured some chemicals.
Thai units overran SUA positions and captured a large
refinery, some narcotics, and chemicals.
Thai units destroyed three refineries and SUA military
positions.
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Figure 1
Targets of Thai and Burmese Military Operations
Refinery
Destroyed refinery
25X1
ei
uak
DoiySan G`hu
Muang Fang.
gbNa Fang
Burma
San KI
Man Tho
Mountain f
an Hin
Taek
area of
main map
Thailan
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it Shan United Army
(SUA) base
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ACCT CL
and relied on the Border Patrol police to interdict
traffickers in the border area. The SUA and CIF
operations in Thailand apparently were tolerated be-
cause the groups provided a buffer against Commu-
Within the past few years, however, publicity detail-
ing the extent of SUA trafficking operations and the
location of its headquarters at Ban Hin Taek, Thai-
land, have reflected negatively on the government's
commitment to narcotics control. Consequently, in
January 1982 the Thai Army moved against the SUA
headquarters in a US-supported effort to drive the
SUA out of Thailand and to curb narcotics trafficking
in the region. After the attack against Ban Hin Taek,
the SUA fled into Burma but returned to Thailand
within a few weeks, building a new headquarters only
4 to 5 kilometers away from Ban Hin Taek. The
rapidity with which the SUA attempted to reestablish
itself inside Thailand apparently convinced Thai au-
thorities of the need to regain control of its northern
border. The Thai responded with a second military
action in May that' dislodged the SUA from Thailand.
Although SUA families and dependents were allowed
to remain in Thailand, according to US Embassy
sources, the continued Thai Army presence in the
border area has kept the SUA from infiltrating back
across the border. Other military actions to date:
? Pushed the SUA farther into Burma and restricted
its ability to operate freely in the border area.
? Forced the SUA to relocate to Doi Lang when
special Thai military units-the Tahan Phran irreg-
ulars-shut down the Lao Lo Chai refinery com-
plex.
? Interdicted long-established routes for narcotics and
chemicals, destroyed a number of refineries, and
forced other refineries to close-at least temporarily
disrupting narcotics production.
? Destroyed major chemical storage sites inside Bur-
ma, causing the loss of 780 kilograms of acetic
anhydride-the principal chemical used in making
heroin. The amount destroyed in one operation was
roughly equivalent to one year's supply for an
average refinery.
With the SUA pushed well into Burma, the Thai
Government moved against other narcotics traffickers
in the border area and continued its assault against
SUA refineries:
? During a January 1983 military operation in the
Ban Muang Na area, three traffickers from the 3rd
CIF were captured, confirming CIF involvement in
narcotics trafficking along the border. In the past,
the CIF had been careful to mask its narcotics
activities, operating out of Chinese resettlement
villages in Thailand to avoid the attention of the
Thai Government.
? In June 1983 Thai forces captured the SUA's most
productive refinery at Anaka Kho, Burma, and a
major storage and transshipment site in the Lao Lo
Chai area. Both of these areas had been hit during
previous Thai operations.
? In August 1983, despite heavy rainstorms, the Thai
Government launched two major attacks against
SUA refineries and a large narcotics caravan be-
longing to the SUA.
Burmese Military Operations
Burma, whose narcotics control program is deeply
intertwined with its counterinsurgency program, has
mounted military operations against heroin refineries
and narcotics traffickers since 1975. In June 1982 the
Burmese Army attacked the Doi Lang area, then the
second most important refinery complex along the
Thai-Burmese border. According to US Embassy
reporting, refineries operated by the CIF, the Shan
United Revolutionary Army (SURA), independent
operators, and smaller trafficking groups were de-
stroyed, and these groups were forced to vacate the
area. The target of the Burmese attack was the A Bi
group, which is closely aligned with the Burmese
Communist Party. In November 1982 the Burmese
Army conducted a cross-border raid against SURA
positions 5 kilometers inside Thailand near Ban
Muang Na. The area was used as a transshipment
point for supplies and chemicals destined for the CIF-
SURA refineries.in the Piang Luang area.
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In their most recent operation in April 1983, the
Burmese Army, approximately 1,500 strong, attacked
and overran six heroin refineries in the San Klang
area in Burma. According to US Embassy reporting,
the traffickers were warned well in advance of the
impending attack and removed most of the narcotics.
The element of surprise was lost in this operation
because of corrupt local officials and low-level mili-
tary personnel and because of logistic problems in the
mountainous terrain. Although this raid, like other
operations, was limited to specific targets along the
border, it appears that the fear of additional attacks
has caused many traffickers to cease their refining
activities temporarily.
Other Antinarcotics Efforts by Thailand and Burma
Both the Thai and Burmese Governments also try to
control opium production through nonmilitary pro-
grams. Such programs, some of which are longstand-
ing, have had only limited success and have been
overshadowed by the military activity. Thai crop
substitution efforts, for example, have been pursued
for more than 15 years, originating with the King's
project in Chiang Mai Province. US- and UN-backed
programs have been in place for about 10 years.
Although there has been some success in promoting
alternate crops such as coffee, potatoes, and red
beans, such crops are financially attractive only when
opium prices are severely depressed.
the Prem government
attempted crop eradication during the 1981/82 crop
year in areas designated as opium-free zones, all of
which were in Chiang Mai Province.
some farmers were deterred from planting poppy in
1983, and, in our view, failure to continue the eradica-
tion program will reinforce growers' skepticism con-
cerning the Thai Government's resolve to enforce its
1979 ban on poppy cultivation.
the estimated poppy-growing area in Burma and
would produce approximately 40 to 50 tons of opium
annually. According to the US Embassy in Rangoon,
opium eradication is carried out by the Army and
local village militia forces in relatively secure areas
near military bases or People's Police Force camps.
The high cost of maintaining field-destruction teams
and their relative ineffectiveness against poppy culti-
vation have spurred the Burmese Government to
develop plans for aerial herbicide eradication of opi-.
um poppies, although none of these plans has as yet
been implemented. Other Burmese programs-some
supported by the United Nations Fund for Drug
Abuse Control-include addict rehabilitation and
crop substitution.
Laotian Antinarcotics Efforts
Laos has taken no military action against narcotics
traffickers and does not have an antinarcotics pro-
gram. The Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR)
maintains that it has a policy of discouraging opium
use. Eventually, it would like to replace the opium
cultivation with other crops; but for now, because of
political and economic reasons, it must tolerate, if not
encourage, opium production. The government earns
export revenues and reduces the risk of insurgency by
purchasing opium from hill tribes for subsequent
trade with Communist countries. According to an
official five-year export plan for 1981-85, the LPDR
intends to ship 5 tons of opium per year to Soviet-
allied countries.
some of these supplies have been directed into Thai-
well for strict drug enforcement.
land and Burma by corrupt Laotian officials to obtain
the higher black-market prices available in those
countries. The Lao National Police and the Customs
Service have the responsibility for narcotics enforce-
ment, but the political realities of Laos do not augur
Although Thai and Burmese military actions have
disrupted Golden Triangle narcotics trafficking, there
appears to have been little effect on opium output.
The Burmese have attempted to eradicate poppy
manually since 1975. The Burmese poppy crop de-
struction program appears to have leveled off during
the past few years to an annual rate of about-4,000
hectares. This area is equivalent to about 7 percent of
r
25X1
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?7CCI Vt
Most of the fighting occurred away from key poppy-
growing areas.
an massy
reports, we estimate that opium production in the
Golden Triangle this year reached between 615 and
665 tons, a 5-percent decrease from the 700 tons we
estimate were harvested in 1982. Despite this de-
cline-occasioned by shortfalls in the Thai and Lao-
tian crops-current production combined with stocks
from earlier bumper crops has kept Southeast Asia an
important source of opium for both local and interna-
tional markets.
Burma-Key Producer
Opium production for 1983 in Burma is estimated at
about 550 to 600 tons. In a US-supported effort to
survey the opium crop, the Burmese Air Force ac-
quired aerial photography of some 540 square kilome-
ters of some of the poppy-producing areas in the
northern Shan State.
stantiates reports that there has been some expansion
in the total area under cultivation in Burma; but the
new poppyfields were in generally less productive
areas, which tended to lower the average opium gum
yield. The major areas of production span a region
that encompasses most of the Shan plateau, from the
eastern Kachin State along the Chinese border south
nearly 960 kilometers into the Kayah State, with the
most intensive area of cultivation east of the Salween
River and north of Keng-Tung. Much of this area
remains beyond central government control and is
immune to antinarcotics measures.
hill tribe cultivators in these areas are
encouraged and even coerced into growing opium
poppies by insurgent groups and other opium buyers
who contract for the harvest well in advance of actual
planting.
Thailand-Reduced Production
Opium production in Thailand for 1983 declined to an
estimated 35 tons-according to US Embassy report-
ing-from an estimated 57 tons in 1982.
tion was in Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai Provinces.
We believe the year's downturn in Thailand's produc-
25X1
2525X1
? A lack of rainfall during the critical growing period;
yields averaged about 6 kilograms per hectare-
about 40 percent of opium yields in a normal crop
season.
? Low opium prices resulting from large opium har-
vests during the past three seasons that have
prompted some farmers to try alternate crops. Be-
fore the 1983 growing season, raw opium prices
ranged between $41 and $54 per kilogram, com-
pared with $60 per kilogram in 1982, $136 per
kilogram in 1981, and $420 per kilogram in 1980.
? The destruction by the Thai Government during
1982 of small amounts of opium poppies in areas
designated as opium-free zones. According to US
Embassy reports, some cultivators returned to legiti- 25X1
mate crops. 2525X1
Laos
Opium production for 1983 in Laos is estimated at 30
tons 25X1
25X1
the greatest concentration of poppy culti- 25X1
vation is in central northern Laos-particularly in the
Phongsali and Louangphrabang Provinces-with less-
er concentrations in the Louang Namtha and Ou-
domxai Provinces. Approximately 5,000 hectares of 25X1
opium poppy are estimated to have been planted in
northern Laos during the 1983 season. We believe the
same poor weather conditions that damaged the pop-
py, crop in Thailand existed in Laos, resulting in the
drop in production from last year's 50 tons.
Traffickers Adjust
25X1
25X1
The trafficking groups have been quick to adjust to
the military operations along the Thai-Burmese bor-
der. The Shan United Army and the Chinese Irregu- 25X1
lar Force continue to dominate narcotics trafficking in 25X1
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Figure 2
Poppy Cultivation in the Golden Triangle
KayE
Stat
Bay
of
Bengal
Less intensive
cultivation
-?- Internal administrative
boundary _
Lai Chau
PhBnasali It_ i Vietnam
Louang 7
Namtha*
Louang ng
Namth.
sang
Rai ,=^.?^9
Thailand
Boundary ,presents t ion is not
necessari authoritative. Names
in Vietnam are shown without
diacritical marks.
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Figure 3
Principal Narcotics Smuggling Routes in Southeast Asia
to Euro
via Ing,
V p_a
Wei hailand
-Bangkok/
Andaman
S_la.ay0100
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Gulf of
Tonkin
utnam
Paracel
Islands
Spratly
Islands.
to Australia'`
and New Zealand
Brunei
(U.K.L
Indonesia
Java Sea
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the Golden Triangle. Although the operations intimi-
dated some of the smaller groups and numerous
independents, these groups have formed alliances with
both the SUA and CIF to counter interdiction efforts
and to reduce their losses. According to US Embassy
reporting, the SUA also reached an accommodation
with the 5th CIF on the use of CIF bases as transship-
ment points for supplies and chemicals. Similar
cooperation agreements exist between the 3rd CIF
and the SURA and other trafficking groups, assuring
access to opium supplies and security of smuggling
routes.
The Burmese Communist Party (BCP) has expanded
its role in Golden Triangle narcotics activities. Before
1982 the BCP limited its operation to growing and
selling opium to the SUA and other trafficking groups
and protecting, for a fee, caravans carrying opium
purchased in Communist-controlled areas in Burma.
Now
the BCP also operates a heroin refinery in
northeastern Burma.
the BCP has reached an agreement wit the
Kachin Independence Army (KIA) to establish nar-
cotics routes to northeast India. Reportedly, it also
entered into an arrangement with notorious narcotics
trafficker Lo Hsing-han that calls for Lo to supply the
BCP with chemicals from India and to establish
contacts with Thai-based international narcotics deal-
ers, who refuse to deal directly with the Communists.
The number of facilities processing narcotics in the
Golden Triangle fluctuated in 1982 and early 1983 as
operators were forced to close, at least temporarily,
because of.Burmese and Thai raids. Refinery facilities
along the border are generally small in scale and do
not produce significant quantities of narcotics. As a
group, however, their production is still considerable.
Although total output is difficult to assess, on the
whole there appears to be no significant long-term
decrease in opium-refining capacity:
? Traffickers still move raw opium to border refineries
despite the military operations. According to US
Embassy reports, SUA caravans delivered 3.8 tons
of opium to border storage sites during January
1983 and the equivalent of another 3 tons to a
border location in August 1983.
? Most of the refineries closed down during military
operations last year are reportedly back in operation
in more protected areas deeper inside Burma. The
mobility and rudimentary apparatus of heroin refin-
eries allows them to be reestablished within weeks.
? Thai enforcement activities against chemical suppli-
ers in Bangkok and against major shipping points
created a shortage of chemicals at border refineries
during early 1982.' Chemicals are now supplied by
dealers in India and China,
In March 1983 Burmese officials seized
nearly 100 gallons of acetic anhydride from an
Indian/Burmese organization.
? Military pressure against heroin refineries along the
Thai-Burmese border has apparently caused a shift
in some heroin-processing operations to laboratories
along the Thai-Malaysian border, according to US
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) sources.
In addition, traffickers are actively seeking alternative
routes to market their products. Although the major
share of processed narcotics for world markets still
transit Thailand, an increasing amount is being
moved through Burma. Only a small portion is re-
tained in Burma to meet the expanding domestic drug
market; the larger portion is smuggled out along the
largely unpoliced Tenasserim coast to Malaysia or
south through Rangoon and other Burmese cities into
India and Bangladesh for shipment to the West. In
either case, the successful operation of many traffick-
ers depends on the corruption of government officials.
Police, military, and other government officers have
reportedly been involved in the narcotics traffic; some
have been active in the transport of narcotics, and
others have accepted bribes for allowing safe passage
through police checkpoints.
The border raids of the Governments of Thailand and
Burma have successfully disrupted narcotics traffick-
ing-at least for a time. The resiliency of the traffick-
ers, however, has given rise to problems that may
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Corruption in Burma
Corruption among low- and middle-level government,
police, and military personnel is endemic in the
Golden Triangle countries. In Burma it is part of a
well-entrenched system of symbiotic relationships
between local business people and traffickers and
Burmese Government and military officials. The
system extends into legitimate business interests,
such as customs, government contracts, and the flow
of consumer goods.
During the past eight months,
numerous high-level Burmese Gov-
ernment officials facilitate large-scale international
narcotics trafficking. The activity centers in the Min-
istry of Home and Religious Affairs, which is respon-
sible for the government's narcotics-suppression pro-
grams. The Military Intelligence Service (MIS) and
the Department of Defense Intelligence Service
(DDSI) have been implicated among the key drug
trafficking agents in Burma. They arrange transfers
of money, sell drugs seized in government antinarco-
tics campaigns, and issue passports to trafficking
financiers and couriers. Their positions allow them to
arrange illegal transactions with ease.
Ne Win's once heir apparent Brig. Gen. Tin 0 was
removed from office because of his involvement in
corruption and his blatant attempt to expand his
political power base. Until May 1983 Tin 0 was the
further complicate interdiction efforts of both
governments:
? During 1982,1 Ithe
BCP moved directly into heroin processing and
trafficking. The. BCP has successfully resisted gov-
ernment forces for some time, and it is likely that
the trafficking efforts will proceed largely
unchecked.
? The more diversified smuggling networks used by
traffickers may be even more difficult to police,
inasmuch as they traverse areas in Burma, Thai-
land, and Malaysia, where there is little government
presence.
Burma Socialist Program Party's (BSPP) joint Gen-
eral Secretary-number three in the party as well as
the third-ranking member of the Central Executive
Committee and popularly thought of as the second
most powerful man in Burma.
Ne Win accused Tin 0 specifically of
nepotism, ostentatious displays of wealth and power,
and protecting the corrupt activities of former Minis-
ter of Home and Religious Affairs Bo Ni. In fact, a
Ne Win-directed investigation appears to link Tin 0
with Bo Ni's illegal smuggling and narcotics traffick-
ing activity.
Bo Ni was the key person in charge of drug enforce-
ment/antidrug abuse in Burma and was in charge of
the People's Police Force.
o Ni was a sharehold-
er in a major narcotics syndicate responsible for
trafficking narcotics and other black-market activi-
ties. Bo Ni on several occasions used his influence to
delay trials or to have arrested traffickers released
and to obtain illegal passports.
numerous Burmese military/intelligence per-
sonnel were involved in the syndicate, from tactical
commanders in the north to drivers, military intelli-
gence officers, pilots, and the like. Indeed, the entire
operation within Burma was reportedly conducted
either exclusively by or with the assistance of Bur-
mese Government personnel.
? Trafficking operations may become even more wide-
spread. Although Laos does not currently figure
heavily in Golden Triangle trafficking, Shan United
Army overtures to Laotian traffickers have been
reported by US Embassy sources during the past
year. There are as yet no known heroin refineries on
the Laotian side of the border, but refineries could
be easily established there and narcotics smuggled
into Thailand or Burma.at almost any point along
the Mekong River.
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Figure 4
Heroin Market in the United States,
by Area of Origin
Southwest Asia
(Golden Crescent)
Southeast Asia
(Golden Triangle)
I I I I I
79 80 81 82 83a
8 January through June.
Faced with competing economic, political, and securi-
ty demands, it is unlikely that the Governments of
Thailand, Burma, or Laos will bring to bear the will
and resources necessary to control the narcotics trade
in the near future:
? In Burma, it is not likely that the government will
gain control of the opium-producing areas, most of
which are largely controlled by insurgents.. Nor does
the government have the economic resources to
mount the kind of crop eradication program needed
to eliminate illicit opium production. Moreover,
there is conclusive evidence that high-level govern-
ment and military officials, including some officials
directly responsible for government narcotics-sup-
pression programs, have profited from protecting
drug traffickers, raising major doubts about the
effectiveness of any Burmese Government program.
? The Thai Government will probably continue to
harass narcotics traffickers along the Thai-Burmese
border. It will move more slowly, however, on
eradicating opium poppy and instituting financial
laws that would slow the flow of the millions of drug
dollars that are funneled into Thailand.
? Given the current economic and political situation
in Laos, we do not foresee any improvement in the
Laotian narcotics situation. Laos may even play an
increasingly important role in the Southeast Asian
opium trade if the border area is denied to traffick-
ers.
In any event, the United States will probably be the
focus of Southeast Asian traffickers as the European
market is already saturated with heroin from South-
west Asia. Indeed, evidence is already accumulating
in that regard. Seizures of Golden Triangle heroin in
the United States for the first six months of 1983
equaled 100 kilograms, 370 percent more than for the
same period in 1982. According to DEA, Golden
Triangle heroin accounts for 22 percent of the heroin
imported into'the United States, up from 14 percent
in 1982.
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