ANGOLA AT A CRITICAL JUNCTURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00317R000200100001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 4, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Angola at a Critical Juncture
ALA 84-10091
September 1984
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Angola at a Critical Juncture
This paper was prepared b~
with the Directorate of Operations.
American Analysis, with a contribution by
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Africa Division, ALA,
Secret
ALA 84-10091
September 1984
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Angola at a Critical Juncture
Key Judgments Over the past year, the beleaguered Angolan Government has simulta-
Information available neously pursued a major diplomatic dialogue with the South Africans and
as of 29 August 1984 the West and prepared for a massive offensive against National Union for
was used in this report.
Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) that could begin soon. Both ele-
ments of this two-track effort are designed, in our judgment, to provide
badly needed relief on four key fronts:
? The escalating UNITA insurgency.
? South African military pressure.
? A costly Communist military presence that is both indispensable and
threatening to Angolan sovereignty.
? A devastated economy that cannot improve so long as the first three
problems remain unresolved.
The diplomatic offensive, which has produced an agreement by the South
Africans to depart southern Angola, has eased some of the pressure on the
Marxist regime in Luanda. Movement on negotiations has faltered in recent
weeks because of the 'tough conditions posed by South Africa and the
unyielding refusal of the South-West Africa People's Organization
(SWAPO) to compromise on the issue of a military standdown.
Preparations have apparently been under way for at least a year for a major
military effort against Jonas Savimbi's UNITA forces.
Angola, after serious military setbacks in 1983, sent envoys
to Moscow and Havana to obtain-apparently successfully-a significant
increase in military assistance. Subsequently, the Soviets have provided
Angola an array of new hardware, including MIG-23 and SU-22 advanced
fighter aircraft, MI-24 armed helicopters, and new antiaircraft systems.
Cuba has, we believe, augmented its forces in Angola with about 5,000
men-raising its total military contingent to as many as 35,000 troops. The
Angolans have also reinforced garrisons and built up regional airfields in
UNITA-threatened areas throughout Angola.
Luanda plans to use its new
muscle in a major offensive against UNITA. We believe that Cuban ground
troops will augment Angolan forces as necessary and will play an active role
in flying fighter aircraft. Improvements to regional airfields throughout
Angola since August 1983 and dispersal of fighter aircraft and helicopters-
which in Angola are primarily Cuban piloted-indicate the Cuban air
operations will be more extensive than before. The offensive appears de-
signed to cut off UNITA's supply lines to the north, to ease the pressure in
areas threatened by the insurgents in central Angola, and to attack
Savimbi's base near the Namibian border in southeastern Angola.
Secret
ALA 84-10091
September 1984
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Secret
the Angolan
leadership is increasingly confident of its military capabilities and that some
leaders in Luanda believe the offensive will inflict a damaging blow to
UNITA, compelling Savimbi to negotiate on near-surrender terms. More-
over, if the negotiation track with Pretoria leads to Namibian independence,
these leaders apparently believe that South Africa's will and ability to
continue to support Savimbi will be weakened, thus making UNITA an even
more manageable problem.
Luanda has apparently obtained grudging support from the Soviets and
Cubans for their diplomatic efforts. Senior Angolan officials have discussed
their plans with Cuban President Castro, who appears willing to go along.
We have less evidence of the Soviet attitude, but limited diplomatic report-
ing indicates they also, in the wake of a decisive campaign against UNITA,
may go along with a Cuban troop withdrawal in exchange for Namibian
independence.
The results of the offensive, however, will probably be more modest than the
Angolans expect. The critical factor may be the Cuban role. If the Cubans
take on a major ground combat role-which we doubt because of the
domestic impact of increased casualties-the prospects for success will
increase significantly. With heavy backup help on the ground and a major
role in air combat, Havana could ensure that the operation netted some
credible results.
If the results prove credible, but not decisive, we believe Luanda-probably
with tepid support from Cuba and the Soviets-might still be willing to
accept a Cuban troop withdrawal in exchange for Pretoria's agreement to
implement UN Resolution 435. Under these circumstances, Luanda may
also decide to open negotiations with a less-than-defeated Savimbi, some-
thing black nationalists within the regime have long sought.
Luanda's two-pronged strategy carries obvious risks. SWAPO, for example,
continues to balk on the issue of a cease-fire with South Africa. Moreover, a
successful Angolan offensive against UNITA would sharpen the debate in
Pretoria over the wisdom of South Africa's accommodation with Angola and
could lead Pretoria to intensify its support for Savimbi's guerrillas.
Should the offensive become an unqualified failure, President dos Santos's
credibility at home and with his Soviet and Cuban backers would be
damaged. In such a case, the diplomatic offensive could stall as well, leaving
Angolan Government officials fearful of allowing the Cubans to depart after
UNITA had just taken Luanda's best shot.
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secret
Major Policy Shift
Luanda's Diplomatic Offensive
Military Offensive Against UNITA
2
If the Offensive Sputters
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Figure 1
Angolan Government Offensive
Congo
BRAZZAVILLE
LUNDA
NORTE
South
Atlantic
Ocean
BENGO
Lobito
Benguela;i
BENGU LA
4 Ac- 1--i"
Mo