SOUTH KOREA: CHUN S GROWING POLITICAL CONFIDENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00553R000200040003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 19, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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South Korea:
Chun's Growing
Political Confidence
EA 83-10091
June 1983
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South Korea:
Chun's Growing
Political Confidence
This paper was prepared b
Office of
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East Asian Analysis. It was coordinated with the
National Intelligence Council.
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Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Northeast Asia Division, OEA,
Secret
EA 83-10091
June 1983
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South Korea:
Chun's Growing
Political Confidence
Key Judgments After Gen. Chun Doo Hwan and his military backers seized power in the
Information available unsettled period following the assassination of President Park Chung Hee
as of 16 May 1983 in late 1979, they established an ambitious set of goals for South Korea.
was used in this report.
Foremost among these were to restore general political stability and to send
a clear signal to North Korea that any intervention in the South would be
resisted forcefully. Chun and his group also sought to revitalize the South
Korean economy, enhance the country's international prestige, and restruc-
ture South Korea's social and political institutions-ostensibly to end the
corrupt practices of the Park era.
In the three years since Chun took power, he has made substantial
progress:
? With the weight of the Army and the security services behind him he has
been able to impose a return of general stability.
? The economy has rebounded, with annual GNP growth rates in the 5- to
6-percent range.
? Chun has recorded an impressive series of accomplishments in the
international arena, including strengthening ties with the United States
and Japan and having Seoul named as the site of the 1988 Summer
Olympics.
Chun is not a charismatic or even a popular leader. Nonetheless, he has
earned at least the grudging respect of most Koreans, particularly for his
economic and international achievements. These successes in turn have
given him the confidence in recent months to undertake a series of
liberalization gestures, which have undercut his opponents but in no way
diminished his basic control.
Popular doubts remain about his ultimate political intentions and Chun
probably recognizes this. In our view, most Koreans still rank improvement
in their living standards over the development of a more open political
system, but the desire for an orderly leadership succession has probably
grown since the transition from Park to Chun. Somewhat defensively,
Chun continues to insist periodically-both in public and private-that he
will step down as promised at the end of his term in 1988.
The succession question will define to a large extent Korean politics in the
mid-to-late 1980s. Chun continues to cultivate his primary base of support
in the military, but at the same time he has put some distance between
himself and the Army and has begun to develop an alternative civilian
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EA 83-10091
June 1983
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political power base. Chun seems to be moving toward a greater reliance on
his Democratic Justice Party as a vehicle for mobilizing support. In our
judgment, Chun's need to strengthen links with labor and the emerging
middle class and to cope with the 1985 National Assembly elections
requires that he develop an effective party organization. He will certainly
need such an organization if he is to train a successor and mobilize the
grassroots strength needed to effect the country's first peaceful transfer of
power.
Should Chun fail to manage the succession issue to the satisfaction of both
the Army and the public, there is a high risk the Army would again
intervene in the political process-following the precedents set by both
Chun and Park Chung Hee before him.
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Secret
South Korea:
Chun's Growing
Political Confidence
The Presidency: A Sense of Assurance
President Chun Doo Hwan is showing greater confi-
dence after nearly three years in the Blue House.'
This newfound assurance contrasts with his perform-
ance of even a year ago, when he seemed to stumble
from one political difficulty to another. At that time
Chun's slowness to grasp the political implications of
his problems led to questions about his leadership
ability. Multiple Cabinet shuffles that took place
during mid-1982 to defuse political controversy only
added to the appearance of a government in disarray.
Throughout this period of vulnerability, Chun re-
tained the support of the Army and the general
public, in our view only because they saw his ouster
and the prolonged chaos that would ensue as an
unacceptable alternative. By contrast, the second half
of 1982 was relatively free of political misfortune or
self-inflicted wounds.'
In our view, South Korea's greatest success story, the
continuing series of economic achievements, has
helped boost Chun's confidence. By any reasonable
standard, 1982 was a good year for the average
Korean. The Korean consumer last year had to cope
with only a modest 5-percent inflation rate; wages
showed about 8-percent real growth after declining in
both 1980 and 1981. Economic growth was respect-
able at about 5.5 percent. The outlook for 1983 is
good-and better if there is an upturn in the devel-
oped countries.
Chun's growing sense of ease is reflected in his
management of foreign affairs. His compromise last
December in lengthy aid negotiations with Tokyo
ended a troubled period in the bilateral relationship
stemming largely from Chun's inexperience during
his early days in the Blue House. Japanese Prime
Minister Nakasone's trip to Seoul in January marked
the beginning of a more open dialogue with this
important neighbor. Chun's willingness to explore the
possibility of nonofficial ties with Communist coun-
tries and to probe creative cross-recognition formulas
to lessen tension on the Korean Peninsula are steps
beyond his early style of "visit" diplomacy.
people
Modest Political Initiatives ... Perhaps the best
barometer of Chun's growing confidence in office,
however, is to be found in his recent domestic political
initiatives:
? In December 1982 he released Kim Dae Jung and
others closely associated with opposition to Chun
when he consolidated power in 1980.
? In January 1983 he promised to review the cases of
over 500 people banned from political activity in
late 1980.
? Last February he lifted the ban on 250 of these
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These modest steps have brought Chun immediate
political benefits. By allowing Kim to leave prison and
go to the United States, for example, Chun was able
to write him off as an important figure in the domestic
dissident movement while reaping the benefits of this
human rights gesture in bilateral relations with the
United States, Japan, and Western Europe.
Chun's willingness to ease the ban on political activity
is also a measure of his confidence, but, as in leniency
toward Kim, he has risked little so far. The 250 people
chosen were precisely the least likely to challenge the
government. Meanwhile, he has kept most of the
regime's harshest critics under the ban, unable to act
politically. His public pledge last January to review
their cases does not constitute a promise to act soon,
A good indication of his
continued confidence will be whether he lifts the ban
in time to allow these opponents to position themselves
for the Assembly campaign
... But Basic Controls Remain. Despite his growing
sense of assurance, Chun has made no attempt to
modify fundamental restraints on political activity.
These include:
? A stiff law against assembly and demonstrations for
"political purposes."
? Press censorship, whereby the Ministry of Culture
and Information and the Agency for National Secu-
rity Planning (NSP) direct editors to avoid sensitive
political subjects.
? Three security and intelligence services-the civil-
ian NSP, the Korean National Police (KNP), and
the military Defense Security Command (DSC)-
that report on threats to government control.
In our view, Chun regards these as keys to national
stability and is unlikely to modify them substantially.
Chun's opponents among students, Christian activists,
and intellectuals are the strongest sources of pressure
to modify these controls, although we believe there is
latent desire for a more open political system, particu-
larly among the growing, educated middle class. Chun
may calculate that his acts of clemency are enough to
address such aspirations, at least for the moment.
Certainly most Koreans seem preoccupied more with
improving their economic lot than with making efforts
to bring about a more open political system. Percep-
tions of the North Korean threat also act as a
deterrent to political experimentation and reinforce a
preference for stability. We believe, however, that
since the chaos of 1979-80 the public has begun to
recognize the need for an orderly process for the
transition of political power. Chun's repeated prom-
ises to step aside after his term ends in 1988 suggest
he too recognizes this desire.
Blue House Dynamics. Chun appears in stronger
command of the decisionmaking process than he was
a year ago. He himself moved into the vacuum
created last December when he dismissed two former
Army aides, Her Hwa Pyung and Hur Sam Soo, who
had accompanied him to the Blue House and who had
wielded considerable authority. As senior secretary
for political affairs, Her Hwa Pyung in particular had
had wide latitude in managing Blue House relations
with the Army, the intelligence services, the Cabinet,
and the ruling party. Many in those circles were
convinced that Her was building his own power base
by maneuvering fellow graduates of Korean Military
Academy (KMA) class 17 into positions of influence.
His ability to control the flow of people and paper
through Chun's office helped isolate the President and
was particularly evident in poor Blue House manage-
ment of political problems last summer.
tial individuals, including members of Chun's core
group-senior Army officers who had helped Chun
gain power during 1979-80. These individuals made
common cause to convince the President that his aide
was a liability.
Chun was unhappy with Her's manage-
ment of Blue House relations with the ruling Demo-
cratic Justice Party (DJP) and the National
Assembly. Her's departure with his colleague Hur
Sam Soo coincided with Chun's decision to free Kim
Dae Jung
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Secret
Chun has acted to prevent another powerful senior
political secretary from emerging by breaking up
Her's old fiefdom and picking less of a "take charge"
replacement. The current incumbent's role is limited
to that of working on a Blue House weak spot-
liaison with the Assembly and the ruling DJP. In
filling the job, Chun reached back again into his
military past and appointed Chong Soon Duk, a
fellow KMA graduate (class 16) and retired brigadier
general who had served under the President in the
Special Forces in the mid-1970s. Despite this special
link to the President
We believe he is
unlikely to emerge as a powerful influence in his own
right.
We believe Chun runs risks in concentrating decision-
making even more in his own hands. His greater
accessibility to people since Her's departure may
diminish this problem, but in our view he needs to
delegate more authority. Her's presence-if nothing
else-served as a lightning rod for Chun, and with his
departure the President is more vulnerable to criti-
cism of policy decisions.
At least in the short term, Her's departure may have
strengthened government management of unexpected
crises. The authorities moved swiftly this spring to
arrest a policeman who was accused of torturing to
death a businessman suspected in a land swindle case.
The government's prompt response served to contain
public outrage and disarm critics who, as recently as
last summer, had assailed a hesitant and uncertain
administration.
Role of the Cabinet and the Intelligence Agencies.
Her's departure has not significantly enhanced the
supporting roles played by the Cabinet or the intelli-
gence agencies. Prime Minister Kim Sang Hyup, a
widely respected academic administrator, is not a
political infighter. He and his Cabinet of professionals
drawn from the bureaucracy, academia, and the
military have not carved out a strong collective role.
The two ministers who do have an important role in
domestic affairs are the strongly ideological Minister
of Education Rhee Kyu Ho and Minister of Home
Affairs Roh Tae Woo.
Rhee is a controversial figure whose educational
reforms, particularly stiffer academic standards, have
forced all but the most hardcore dissident students to
eschew. politics for academics. A former university
professor, Rhee has an impact that extends beyond
college campuses, but he lacks a political base. He is a
staunch nationalist who believes the building of the
nation is the goal to which all else must be subordinat-
ed. His well-argued, though harsh, verbal sallies
against political activism have led US officials to
characterize him as the government's leading ideo-
logue.
Minister Roh-a member of Chun's core group who
is widely viewed in Korea as a possible successor to
the President-is the strongest political figure in the
Cabinet. He assumed the home affairs portfolio at a
moment of government vulnerability, shortly after a
shooting rampage by a police officer shocked the
nation in April 1982
Roh, who has
responsibility for the police, stood to lose the most
from the police torture affair this spring and may be
responsible for the government's effective response. So
far, he has been able to resist the usual pressure that
political controversy generates on "responsible" offi-
cials to resign. Nonetheless, the episode is a mark
against him, and in our view he is exceedingly vulner-
able to developments over which he has formal re-
sponsibility but little control. Moreover, the reported
involvement of Roh's son in questionable financial
transactions is another problem that could haunt him
in the future.
Chun continues to manipulate the three intelligence
and security organizations-the DSC, NSP, and
KNP-so that no single one is consistently dominant.,
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The DSC may have a slight edge. Chun's experience
as DSC commander in the late 1970s and his own
close association with the current commander,
Lt. Gen. Park Joon Byung, mean that the DSC is well
positioned to influence him. It is also the only service
that reports on military dissent, and we believe Chun
is especially inclined to factor in DSC judgments on
the military in his decisionmaking.
NSP fortunes have never fully recovered from the
events of October 1979 when then KCIA Director
Kim Jae Kyu killed President Park. Chun himself
directed the agency briefly during 1980, but the
directors since then have had little political clout. The
current incumbent, Lho Shinyong, is a career Foreign
Service officer who is not particularly close to Chun.
Chun has appointed a retired Army general to the
NSP's number-two position, but this does not appear
to have greatly enhanced the agency's role. The
general, Park Se Chik, has a complex relationship
with the President. Chun retired him from active duty
on corruption charges in 1980, but the move was
widely viewed more as an effort to eliminate a
potential rival than to clean up the Army. Park
behaved meekly during retirement and pressure from
Park's Army supporters may have prompted Chun to
rehabilitate him last November. Given this back-
ground, we believe Chun is especially sensitive to any
sign that Park might be using the NSP to advance
himself politically
Police fortunes seem at a low ebb with this spring's
torture case. The KNP's top leadership has been
reshuffled, but Minister of Home Affairs Roh, in our
view, will continue to see that police judgments go
into Chun's decisionmaking.
Keeping the Army on Board
Chun rose to power through the Army, and military
backing, above all, keeps him in power. Since he has
been in office, however, Chun's relationship with the
Army has undergone a subtle shift. Chun has moved
beyond a first-among-equals relationship with Army
leaders and now relates to them more as a senior to
his juniors. The passage of time is partly responsible
for this change, but Chun has helped the process
along by bringing younger, loyal officers to the fore.
In our view, the threat from North Korea, the engine
that drives the South Korean military establishment,
is at the heart of the Army's backing of Chun. We
believe there is widely shared agreement that Chun
pursues the right mix of defense policies, from setting
priorities in the military budget to managing the
critical security relationship with the United States.
The web of personal ties between Chun and the
officer corps is also important. It was especially so in
December 1979 when Chun seized control of the
Army in a headquarters coup. At the time the core
group-largely classmates of Chun's from the elite
KMA-threw their support to him when he moved
against the Army Chief of Staff. Their backing was
especially critical when Chun consolidated power
during 1980-81. Initially, he nurtured their support by
giving them prestigious, powerful commands and pro-
motions
In the past two years, he has co-opted several of them
into his government. Only three generals from the
core group remain on active duty today: Chief of Staff
of the Army, Gen. Hwang Yung Si; Commander of
the 3rd Army, Lt. Gen. Chung Ho Yong; and Direc-
tor of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. Gen. Choi
Song Taek (see table). The retired members for the
most part hold prominent government positions, and
the President relies on their advice; last December he
dismissed his two unpopular aides at the urging of
some members of the group.
The Army leadership emerging to replace the core
group owes its position almost entirely to Chun. And
since gaining control of the Army, Chun has made
loyalty to him a key criterion to advancement
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South Korea: The Core Group Today
Rob Tae Woo (KMA 11) a Minister of Home Affairs
Kim Bok Dong (KMA 11) President, Korean Mining
Promotion Board
Cha Kyu Hon (KMA 8) Member, National Security
Council
Yoo Hak Seong (non-KMA) Resigned from NSP
Active
Hwang Yung Si (KMA 10) Army Chief of Staff
Chung Ho Yong (KMA 11) Commanding General, 3rd Army
Choi Song Taek (KMA 11) Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency
a Korean Military Academy class; President Chun is a class 11
graduate.
supporters command the key military units that con-
trol the security of Seoul. Most were only a few
classes behind Chun in the KMA; many are natives of
his home province of North Kyongsang. In some cases
their Army careers have intersected with his. F_
Chain-of-command and patron-client relationships in
the Army ensure that loyalty to Chun seeps into the
junior ranks of the officer corps as well. This is
particularly important as a younger generation of
officers moves up in the service. A recently commis-
sioned KMA graduate, unlike his elders, may have no
personal bonds of loyalty to Chun, but he would to his
immediate commanding officer, and so on up the line.
Chun has also dangled the prospect of lucrative or
prestigious retirement positions in business or govern-
ment as another means of ensuring officer support.
Recent business conditions and reduced government
payrolls, however, have limited the number of posi-
tions available.
~lonetheless, former
Army officers are prominent in the Cabinet, diplo-
matic service, government departments, provincial
offices, ruling party, and private business.
Monitoring Dissent. Chun monitors developments
within the Army through the Defense Security Com-
mand, the military intelligence and security organiza-
tion that he led when he emerged on the national
scene in 1979. As under his predecessor, Park Chung
Hee, DSC personnel are assigned throughout the
Army to report on current attitudes, morale, and
potential threats to the President's control. DSC
surveillance itself generates a certain amount of mut-
ed resentment within the officer corps
Chun's efforts to create a stronger, leaner Army- 25X1
what he calls sharpening the blade rather than polish-
ing the handle-has also caused problems. Ministry of
National Defense plans to reduce officer slots have
hurt morale.
There have been fewer reported criticisms of Chun
within the Army in recent months than in 1981-82.
We believe Army alarm at his leadership may have
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crested last summer when his mismanagement of a
financial scandal affecting his in-laws provoked par-
ticularly strong dissatisfaction. In contrast, Chun's
self-styled national reconciliation initiative last De-
cember-allowing Kim Dae Jung to leave prison for
the United States and releasing other opponents
imprisoned during the height of Army confrontations
with dissidents in 1980-has not provoked a signifi-
government but little else. Lacking the numbers to set
the legislative agenda, the opposition can only contin-
ue to harass.
The government sees benefits in allowing the opposi-
tion to criticize its policies, but the Blue House has
been careful to set the boundaries.
cant outcry.
By and large, the "discipline of the service" probably
keeps most Army complaints in check. In our view,
the military regards fewer promotion opportunities,
the dominance of KMA officers, and the growing
success of KMA class 16 and 17 graduates as facts of
life for the services, not burning issues that of them-
selves could prompt an officer or group of officers to
mount a challenge to the President
A Base in Civilian Politics
Civilian politics in the National Assembly have grown
feisty under Chun, but they have little actual influ-
ence on national policy. Setting the agenda for debate
is Chun's Democratic Justice Party, which-more
because of inherent advantages accruing to a ruling
party than to its own expertise-is able to manage the
proceedings fairly well. The two major opposition
parties, the Democratic Korea Party (DKP) and the
Korea National Party, together with a few other
opposition groupings of little influence, control just
over two-fifths of assembly seats. The incidental
business they manage to inject into Assembly deliber-
ations occasionally allows them to embarrass the
Where it counts, however, the government will contin-
ue to work through the DJP to thwart the opposition's
modest political agenda-unshackling controls on the
press and political activity, allowing greater local
autonomy, and other limited demands-through
promises of study but with little action.
seats in the 276-seat Assembly
The DJP: Learning the Ropes. The DJP is Chun's
base in civilian politics. It exists in part because he
needed his own organization to run the legislature.
Within a matter of months in 1980 he assembled
several trusted Army associates who set up a party
that won the Assembly elections in March 1981.
Chun remains party president, and these same asso-
ciates are still the party's leading lights: Secretary
General Kwon Ik Hyun, Floor Leader Lee Jong
Chan, and former Secretary General Kwon Jong Dal
(see figure 1). In addition to Army alumni, the DJP
fielded a willing pool of acceptable politicians from
the Park era. In the 1981 elections it garnered 36
percent of the popular vote, which-via a weighted
proportional representation system'-gave it 151
The DJP has set a membership goal of 1 million-or
5 percent of all qualified voters-by next year. As it
expands its membership, it will be working to
strengthen links with labor and the emerging middle
class and to establish a strong grassroots organization
that will enable it to monitor public opinion and keep
the government informed about public attitudes to-
ward contentious issues. Its training programs are
formidable; each week the party churns out hundreds
of members newly versed in the slogans of Chun's
' The system allocates 61 additional seats to the party that leads in
the popular vote, with 24 and seven seats, respectively, given to the
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South Korea: Leaders of the Democratic Justice Party
Chun Doo Hwan President of the 5th Republic and concurrently party president ... KMA 11
graduate... retired from the Army to assume presidency in 1980.
Secretary General... shares Chun's credentials as KMA 11 graduate from
Kyongsang provinces ... forced to retire from Army in 1973 over scandal
involving Chun's patron Yoon Pil Yong ... Chun narrowly avoided same
fate ... held prominent business and government positions before helping to
found DJP and securing a National Assembly seat.
Former Secretary General, now Chairman of the National Assembly Home
Affairs Committee... KMA 16 graduate, also from Kyongsang... served
with Chun in Defense Security Command in the late 1970s ... retired from
I. forced to resign post in mid-1982
because involvement on fringes a financial scandal ... active in
international parliamentary affairs.
Chairman of the National Assembly Steering Committee and DJP floor
leader... from respectedfam' connec-
tions ... KMA 16 graduate . .
. retired from the Army in 1980 to help found DJP ... is
widely respected on both sides of National Assembly aisle for his fairness
... bright and ambitious.
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"New Era." And, as befits a ruling party in South
Korea, the DJP draws financial support from big
business in addition to the government subsidies all
parties receive. By all accounts it is swimming in
funds
The DJP is still trying to establish its role and
responsibilities as a "democratic" party that is being
constructed from the top down. During its early days,
the party's leaders belabored the theme that it was the
source of power, the "leading force in state affairs."
This claim became increasingly hollow as it became
clear that the opposition parties had more policy ideas
than the ruling party. The original proposal to end the
nighttime curfew was an opposition party idea, but
once it caught Chun's eye the DJP made frantic
efforts to call it its own.' The resignation.of the party's
first Secretary General, Kwon Jong Dal, because of
his association on the fringes of the financial scandal
last summer, led the party to soft-pedal its claim of
being the "leading force" in favor of a "partnership"
with the government.
Unexpected Exercises in Democracy? The DJP so far
has been a good errand boy for the executive in the
National Assembly, although sometimes the govern-
ment makes it difficult for the party to perform even
that function. Last fall the government introduced a
reform requiring all bank deposits to bear their
owner's "real name," as opposed to the still-common
practice of registering accounts under pseudonyms as
a tax dodge. In this instance, wealthy business con-
tributors to the DJP balked at the prospect of having
all of their assets identified and taxed. After intense
lobbying and daily reversals of position, the DJP led a
painful, public evisceration of the original bill. The
government tried to make the best of this obvious
setback by portraying it as an exercise in democracy.
The truth lay in poor Blue House groundwork for the
bill before it was introduced onto the floor of the
National Assembly.
The same was true for the euphemistically named
"Resources Management Bill," whereby the govern-
ment sought authority to draw on manpower and
resources under less than clearly defined "emergen-
cy" conditions. The ensuing opposition and press furor
passage of the national budget in early December-
complete with a $135 million cut from what was
proposed originally-was a "show of democracy" that
was carefully orchestrated by the Blue House.
DJP handling of the real name and emergency mobili-
zation bills seem unintentional exercises, if not in
democratic politics then at least in the politics of
accommodation, something that is often missing in
Korea's confrontational political culture. While the
government will probably try to avoid such loss of
control in the future, it may still have learned that
responsible give and take is possible and does not
necessarily lead to unacceptable outcomes. The epi-
sodes did prompt some rethinking on the part of the
administration, including a proposal to smoke out
potential problems by holding public hearings on
selected legislation. It also led the government to
acknowledge recently that it needed to improve its
coordination with the DJP.
1985 and Beyond. The Blue House and the party are
beginning to look ahead to the 1985 Assembly elec-
tions. To a certain extent staffing changes in the wake
of Secretary Her's departure from the Blue House
reflect a concern about better coordination with the
DJP. Just as Blue House Secretary Chong's previous
experience as a DJP assemblyman should enhance
presidential dealings with the DJP, so should the
recent appointment of former Blue House Secretary
Lee Ha Woo to act as secretary to Assembly Speaker
Of course the DJP and Chun will exercise all the
inherent advantages of incumbency to retain control
of the Assembly in the 1985 contest. Building on its
1981 experience, the party will try to field candidates
in all the country's electoral districts and work to take
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at least one seat per district. Still, the battle for the
popular vote could be a greater challenge than it was
in 1981 should the past tendency of large, growing
urban areas to vote for the opposition parties hold
true. As in 1978, when the Assembly and not the
presidency was at stake, voters could be tempted to
cast "protest" ballots. If Chun proceeds with his
reported intention to lift the ban on the remaining
politicians in time for the election, the campaign could
be a lively one, but we believe Chun's basic control of
the political process will allow him and his party to
control the campaign to their advantage.
The Stake. In a sense the 1985 contest will be a dress
rehearsal for the presidential election in late 1987 or
early 1988. According to the current Constitution,
Chun is barred from succeeding himself, and he has
repeatedly pledged to step down when his term ends in
March 1988. Even if Chun proceeds with his intention
to step aside, however, we expect he will seek to exert
a strong influence in the selections of a new presiden-
tial electoral college and-in turn-the election of a
chosen successor. The party's ability to secure votes in
1985 will have a strong im act on the way Chun
approaches the succession.
In our view, the DJP over the 1985-87 period is a
likely training ground for a successor should Chun
proceed with his intention to step aside. Although we
lack evidence of Chun's thinking on this score, we
believe one plausible scenario would be for him to
select a former Army officer and put him through
civilian political paces as part of the DJP team during
the next National Assembly term. Minister of Home
Affairs Roh is a possible choice, although in our view
less likely as time goes on and pressure grows from
younger Army officers to select from their ranks. A
successor might be drawn from among the party's
leaders. In any event, we believe Chun's annointed
successor would have to develop some popular appeal
to mobilize votes for the electoral college-in addition
to securing strong support from the Army.
This scenario would be a happy compromise between
Chun's-and the Army's-need to ensure an accept-
able presidential choice on the one hand and the
public's desire for an orderly succession ratified
through defined electoral procedures on the other.
Unfortunately, modern Korea's confrontational histo-
ry has witnessed no peaceful leadership transition.
The only South Korean precedent for grooming a
successor-when Park Chung Hee appeared to be
giving the nod to his associate Kim Chong Pil in the
late 1960s-ended with Park concluding Kim was
developing too much power, moving him aside, and
consolidating his own power even more.
Chun's critics, and even politically attuned Koreans
who have accepted Chun during his current term, see
more pessimistic scenarios. Memories of Park Chung
Hee's constitutional revisions in the early 1970s are
still too fresh for many Koreans to ignore. In fact, 25X1
rumors of constitutional revision to extend Chun's
tenure are already heard in Seoul, despite persistent
government denials-or perhaps because of them.
Skeptics point to Chun's tight grasp on power and his
obvious enjoyment of the perquisites of office. And
they adduce other factors peculiar to Korea in the 25X1
mid-to-late 1980s that could work against a peaceful
transfer:
? The uncertainties of an ongoing, or soon to develop,
leadership transition in North Korea might afford
Chun justification to stay on for national security
reasons.
? The 1988 Summer Olympics-a real coup for South
Korea, scheduled just months after Chun is current-
ly required to step aside-could also prompt him to
prolong his tenure.
In our view, it is too early to call the succession issue.
Chun's actions to date suggest he recognizes the
problem and wants to strengthen his political base in
an effort to address it. At the same time, these steps
limit him to no particular course of action. His moves
over the next two years will help answer the succes- 25X1
sion question, an issue that will define Korean politics
to a large extent in the mid-to-late 1980s
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