THE NICARAGUAN EXTERNAL PROPAGANDA APPARATUS: DIMINISHING RETURNS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97R00694R000600520001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 25, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence 125X1
The Nicaraguan External
Propaganda Apparatus:
Diminishing Returns
GI 86-10078
November 1986
copy 253
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Diminishing Returns
Propaganda Apparatus:
The Nicaraguan External
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by
Office of Global Issues, with a
contribution from Office of
Leadership Analysis. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations.F--]
Instability Center, OGI,
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Foreign Subversion and
Reverse Blank Secret
GI 86-10078
November 1986
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The Nicaraguan External
Propaganda Apparatus:
Diminishing Returns
Key Judgments The Sandinista regime has established a substantial and highly active
Information available external propaganda apparatus that has had considerable success in
as of 5 September 1986 generating international support for the Sandinista regime. Dominated by
was used in this report.
the Sandinista National Liberation Front Department of International
Relations (DRI), the apparatus is largely modeled on Cuban propaganda
organizations and includes a news agency, Agencia Nueva Nicaragua
(ANN), and various front and solidarity groups. Nicaragua has used this
apparatus to push its main propaganda themes: the United States is a
military aggressor, the opposition is illegitimate, and the Sandinistas are
committed to political pluralism.
Nicaragua's propaganda effort is aided by
a large amount of Soviet Bloc assistance. Soviet front groups have held
conferences, staged demonstrations, and sent solidarity brigades to Nicara-
gua in support of Sandinista propaganda objectives. Furthermore, ANN
concluded technical accords with Cuban and East European news services
and has an agreement with the Soviet news agency TASS for unlimited ex-
change of information. Moreover, Moscow recently provided Nicaragua
with a satellite ground station that will result in all of Nicaragua's foreign
television, telephone, and telegraph communications passing through the
Soviet Intersputnik communications network, a sure sign that Moscow's
Despite the successes of the Sandinista propaganda program, Nicaragua
has begun experiencing difficulties in maintaining a positive international
image. The increasingly repressive nature of the Sandinista regime,
exemplified by the expulsion of several prominent clerics and the closing of
La Prensa, Nicaragua's only independent newspaper, has resulted in a
waning of support, especially in Western Europe. Nicaragua is also
experiencing financial and management difficulties in its propaganda
agencies that could hamper Managua's ability to disseminate propaganda
abroad. Economic constraints forced ANN to severely cut back its
operations abroad in 1986. In addition, the
Sandinistas are having difficulty funding conferences and other solidarity
activities,
Secret
GI 86-10078
November 1986
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Nicaragua's growing use of disinformation and its efforts to tighten party
control over the propaganda apparatus have stimulated increased support
from West European and Latin American leftist and solidarity groups that
have long supported the Sandinistas. Nonetheless, we believe that such
efforts are unlikely to reverse the overall climate of international opinion.
Although the growing international disenchantment with the Sandinistas
has not translated into support for US policies toward Nicaragua, it has in-
creased criticism of the Managua regime. Moreover, Nicaragua's growing
financial problems are likely to place considerable constraints on the
propaganda apparatus. To overcome these problems, we believe Managua
will be forced to rely more heavily on Moscow and Havana to support the
propaganda effort. In our view, revelation of these growing ties and
continued public exposure of Sandinista domestic repression could further
undermine Nicaraguan propaganda efforts.
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Contents
Key Judgments
Organization and Activities of the Government Propaganda Apparatus
2
The Central Role of the DRI
2
Establishing Its Own Foreign News Service
4
Front Groups and International Cooperation
5
Judging Success and Failure
Appendixes
How It Works: Nicaraguan Propaganda in the Frontline States
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The Nicaraguan External
Propaganda Apparatus:
Diminishing Returns
When the Sandinista National Liberation Front
(FSLN) came to power in 1979, it moved quickly to
establish a substantial external propaganda appara-
tus. Within the FSLN, the Sandinistas established
organizations to oversee both internal and foreign
propaganda. They also quickly asserted control over
the Nicaraguan media by assuming ownership of all
television broadcasting, two daily newspapers, and
most radio stations and by heavy censorship of the
remaining independent media. To augment the regi-
me's international propaganda capabilities, the Sandi-
nistas created a news service
From the beginning, the Bloc countries have played
an important role in the development of Managua's
propaganda effort.'Soviet-controlled front organiza-
tions began aiding the Sandinista cause even before
the new regime assumed control
the World Peace Council was
planning a conference to support the Sandinistas well
before the fall of Somoza. When the regime was
established, Managua quickly linked itself to the Bloc
propaganda network by establishing affiliates of
Soviet-controlled international front groups
? The FSLN Department of International Relations
(DRI), which is responsible for foreign propaganda
and dealings with "progressive" foreigners, was
modeled after the America Department and the
General Department of Foreign Relations of the
? The DRI-controlled Nicaraguan Committee of Soli-
darity with the People (CNSP), which establishes
solidarity groups abroad and maintains ties to na-
tional liberation groups, largely mirrors the func-
tions of the Cuban Institute for Friendship Among
Peoples (ICAP).
? The General Directorate of State Security (DGSE)
of the Ministry of Interior (MINT) has Cuban and
Soviet Bloc advisers positioned within the office of
the director and within all operational sections.
Cubans supervise
DGSE recruitment of foreign journalists as press
placement and propaganda assets.
In the organizations involved in external propaganda,
Cuban influence is particularly evident. For example:
? The FSLN Department of Propaganda and Political
Education, which implements the overall propagan-
da strategy and controls the state media, is modeled
after the Revolutionary Orientation Department of
the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee.
Carlos Fernando Chamorro, director of the depart-
ment and the FSLN newspaper Barricada, has
stated that his objective is to make Barricada more
like Granma, the Cuban Communist Party
newspaper.
Warsaw Pact assistance to the Sandinista propaganda
effort has been substantial. Moscow has provided
Managua with a satellite ground station and broad-
casting facilities as one of its first economic aid
projects in Nicaragua. The $18 million project re-
placed former arrangements with Intelsat and links
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Nicaragua to the Intersputnik communications net-
work operated by the Soviets for Bloc countries.
Hailed by Nicaraguan leaders as an opportunity to
replace completely US broadcasts with more ideologi-
cally sound programming, this project
resulted in all of Nicaragua's foreign
telephone, telegraph, and television communications
now passing through this Soviet network. Moreover,
several Warsaw Pact countries have signed agree-
ments to supply television programs and films to
Nicaragua.
Organization and Activities of the
Government Propaganda Apparatus
To manage and implement Managua's propaganda
policy, the Sandinistas have established an interlock-
ing network of party and government organs typical of
Marxist-Leninist states (figure). The major themes
and overall direction of Sandinista external propagan-
da are set by the FSLN National Directorate, with
the Department of Propaganda and Political Educa-
tion and the DRI assigned major responsibility for
developing specific campaigns. We believe that, with-
in the government, several organs also participate in
the formulation and dissemination of external propa-
ganda: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MINEX),
MINT, and the VDIR. These government bodies,
however, do not formulate propaganda policy inde-
pendent of the party apparatus.
The Central Role of the DRI
The DRI is the most important component of Nicara-
gua's external propaganda activities. It pushes the
regime's propaganda agenda through several channels
in coordination with other elements of the overnment
and party. communi-
cations between the DRI and its foreign contacts are
maintained either directly from Managua, through
Nicaraguan missions abroad, or in some cases
through Cuban-controlled clandestine channels. The
DGSE and VDIR use DRI foreign contacts to set up
support networks for their operations abroad. This
cooperation appears to be so close that it is often
difficult to distinguish between VDIR/DGSE and
DRI operations.
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Structure of the Nicaraguan External Propaganda Apparatus
FSLN 1 Department of
Mass Organizations Propaganda and
Political Education
Department of
International Relations
(DRI)
FSLN
Front Groups
Agencia
Nueva Nicaragua
(ANN)
FSLN Government of
National Directorate ' Nicaragua
Defense and
Security Commission
Ministry Fifth Directorate Ministry of
of Interior of Intelligence Foreign Affairs
(MINT) (VDIR) (MINEX)
I ~I
General Directorate
of State Security
(DGSE)
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UON ci
Sandinista Propaganda and Disinformation Themes
Sandinista propaganda emphasizes three main
themes: the United States is a military aggressor; the
opposition is illegitimate; and the Sandinista regime
is peaceful and democratic. To support these broad
themes, Sandinista media highlight: USfunding of
the insurgents; alleged insurgent atrocities and hu-
man rights violations; presumed linkages of the oppo-
sition to the United States; worldwide solidarity with
the Sandinista regime; and the proposed constitution
as evidence of Nicaraguan democracy.
Although the regime continues to push these themes
overtly, there are signs that the Sandinistas are
increasingly turning to the use of disinformation to
promote these themes:
? In early 1986, Sandinista media began a campaign
to link the Nicaraguan Catholic Church hierarchy
to the insurgents and the United States. The cam-
paign was broadened to include charges that Vati-
can organizations are connected to the CIA.
? On 11 January 1986, the Sandinista media carried
an article that attempted to discredit the opposition
Permanent Commission on Human Rights by link-
ing it to the United States Government.
Establishing Its Own Foreign News Service
Beyond the party and the government, the Sandinistas
have made a considerable investment in developing a
media presence overseas. In 1979 the Sandinistas
created their own news agency, Agencia Nueva Nica-
ragua (ANN). Although ANN for several years main-
tained an appearance of being independent, it recently
To discredit US troop presence in Central America,
in February and March 1986, pro-Sandinista media
in Nicaragua and Honduras carried articles alleg-
ing that US troops in Honduras were guilty of
molesting Honduran children and spreading AIDS
among the population.
? On 13 March 1986, Barricada carried a 12 March
article from a small-circulation Swedish Maoist
party newspaper that alleged that US intelligence
services arranged Swedish Prime Minister Palme's
death.
? A 28 June 1986 El Nuevo Diario article, sourced to
Prensa Latina, carried remarks by the Nicaraguan
Minister of Health who alleged that the United
States may have caused an outbreak of meningitis
in Nicaragua.
became the official press agency of the Nicaraguan
To extend its reach, ANN established a network of
bureaus overseas and pooled its resources with Bloc
and leftist news agencies. By 1985 ANN had 10
foreign bureaus-in New York (UN), Washington,
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Paris, Mexico City, Brussels, Stuttgart, The Hague,
Stockholm, San Jose, and Panama. ANN also joined
a left-leaning pool of "nonaligned" agencies and
formed a consortium with press agencies of the Salva-
doran and Guatemalan insurgents, which operates
from the ANN bureau in Mexico City. ANN con-
cluded technical accords with Cuban and East Euro-
pean news services in 1980 and has an agreement with
TASS for unlimited exchange of information. The
Nicaraguan Journalists Union is allied with Soviet
Bloc journalist associations, and the Sandinista televi-
sion system has ties to the International Radio and
Television Organization, a Soviet-controlled front.
Bloc press services have been very active in replaying
Sandinista propaganda and disinformation. In August
1985, for example, TASS printed an ANN disinfor-
mation piece accusing the CIA of planning the assas-
sination of a Nicaraguan bishop. In a campaign we
believe was directed by Managua, Honduran media
alleged US chemical weapons testing in Honduras last
February, a story that was quickly replayed by Nica-
raguan domestic media, TASS, and Prensa Latina.
Front Groups and International Cooperation
Building international support for the Sandinista re-
gime has been one of Managua's main propaganda
goals. Accordingly, the Sandinistas quickly estab-
lished national affiliates of the major Soviet front
groups, such as the World Peace Council (WPC), the
World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), the
International Organization of Journalists (IOJ), the
International Association of Democratic Lawyers
(IADL), and the World Federation of Democratic
Youth (WFDY). Separate international solidarity
committees and friendship associations also sprang up
in 1979 in an effort to reach a broader audience than
the Soviet-controlled fronts could provide. The Sandi-
nistas, jointly with the Cubans, also created their own
regional front, The Anti-Imperialist Tribunal of Our
America (TANA), as well as affiliates of Latin Amer-
ican regional front groups.
Solidarity Brigades-Nicaragua On $25 a Day
The Sandinista program of hosting solidarity bri-
gades from abroad is a valuable propaganda tool for
the regime. This program helps the regime:
? Indoctrinate brigade members, especially US citi-
zens and West Europeans, in Sandinista propagan-
da themes and encourage them to put pressure on
their governments to support Nicaragua's policies.
? Recruit and exploit assets for propaganda and
solidarity activities abroad.
? Demonstrate to both the Nicaraguan populace and
foreign audiences international support for the San-
dinista regime.
? Free up the Nicaraguan population for military
duty by providing an alternative rural labor force.
The activities of the brigades are coordinated by the
Nicaraguan Committee of Solidarity with the People
(CNSP), aided by Nicaraguan Embassy personnel
abroad. Many of the brigade members are drawn
from foreign Communist or leftist parties, Soviet
front groups, peace groups, and solidarity and friend-
ship groups.
The Sandinistas use various methods to indoctrinate
brigade members and exploit their presence in Nica-
ragua. Sandinista cadres work alongside the interna-
tional brigades to indoctrinate them with Sandinista
propaganda themes.
International brigades have partici-
pated in Nicaraguan-sponsored, anti-US demonstra-
tions in Managua.
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This network of front and solidarity groups plays an
important role in promoting Sandinista propaganda.
front activities in support of Nicaragua have included
a conference on Nicaragua sponsored by the WPC in
Lisbon in 1984, and a solidarity week with Nicaragua
sponsored by the WFTU in July 1985. In December
1985 the WFDY sent an international brigade to
harvest coffee in Nicaragua in support of the "Nica-
ragua Must Survive" campaign. Several leftist West
European peace groups have established a "peace
center" in Managua to monitor alleged US aggression
Nicaraguan solidarity groups overseas also play an
important role in Nicaragua's propaganda apparatus.
These groups coordinate campaigns on a regional
basis and target international organizations in a fash-
ion similar to Soviet-directed front groups. In October
1985, for example, a European Congress of Nicara-
guan Solidarity Committees was held in Lisbon. The
Congress, attended by the Nicaraguan consul general
to Italy, reportedly discussed a plan to exploit the
November European Communities meeting on Cen-
tral America.)
We believe Nicaragua, until very recently, funded at
least part of the activities of solidarity groups.
against Nicaragua.
TANA, founded in Managua in 1981, conducts pro-
paganda activities against US policy toward Latin
America and Nicaragua in particular. TANA publi-
cations describe the organization as being founded by
Nicaragua sympathizers from Cuba, Mexico, Colom-
bia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, and Bolivia,
TANA sponsors show trials of US policy and
publishes a bilingual monthly magazine that features
sensationalist anti-US stories.
In its propaganda campaigns, TANA works closely
with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
groups in Western Europe,
Judging Success and Failure
Nicaragua.
The Sandinista propaganda apparatus has had consid-
erable success in generating international sympathy
and backing, and the recent International Court of
Justice (ICJ) ruling will give it additional ammuni-
tion. Leftist groups, particularly in Western Europe,
continue to stage frequent pro-Nicaraguan demon-
strations, and European media still portray Nicaragua
largely in a sympathetic light. Moreover, economic
aid from Western countries, while decreasing, contin-
ues to flow into Nicaragua. In addition, Norway has
recently opted to send a Peace Corps contingent to
Nevertheless, the regime's recent crackdown on oppo-
sition elements, particularly the closure of La Prensa,
the country's only independent newspaper, and the
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expulsion of several prominent clerics complicate the
ability of the Sandinistas to maintain a positive
international image. Indeed, in Western Europe, early
expressions of both public and government support for
the Sandinistas have waned recently, especially after
the state of emergency in Nicaragua imposed in
Recent Embassy reporting indicates
that the Italian Government and media, while falling
short of endorsing US support of the Nicaraguan
insurgents, now tend to be much quicker to criticize
Managua's harsh domestic actions.
the Socialist International is becoming
the
Nicaraguan-sponsored "Nicaragua Must Survive"
campaign has largely been a failure in West
Germany.
The Sandinistas also are experiencing trouble in
getting their propaganda message across in Latin
America, especially with regard to some Latin
American governments.
bassy reporting indicated that Venezuela had at-
tempted to pressure Managua to sign the latest
Contadora draft treaty and that Venezuelan officials
warned Nicaragua that, if it did not sign the agree-
ment,'Nicaragua would become isolated and lose
much of its support and credibility. Nonetheless,
despite growing disenchantment with the Sandinistas,
most South American democracies will not publicly
support US aid to the Nicaraguan armed opposition
and will continue to refrain from publicly condemning
the regime to avoid antagonizing their domestic left-
ists and to demonstrate independence from the United
States.
Though the Sandinistas still receive considerable sup-
port from leftist constituencies in Latin America,
there are indications that the public may not be as
supportive as in the past. In December 1985 a "peace
march" through Central America, which was orga-
nized by a WPC-affiliated Norwegian peace group
and partly financed by Managua, fell drastically short
of expectations. United States Information Agency
public opinion surveys conducted in Costa Rica and
Honduras in February 1986 revealed an overwhelm-
ingly negative opinion of Nicaragua among the pub-
lic, with the vast majority viewing the Sandinistas as
an increasing military threat.
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To cope with these problems, ANN has recently
become the official press agency of the Government of
Nicaragua. This move will reduce confusion among
diplomatic personnel abroad, who sometimes shunned
ANN because they were unsure how to deal with a
quasi-official entity.
ANN also is currently reorganizing its structure,
funding, and services to make itself more competitive
and economically viable. Other changes include the
reduction of ANN staffs abroad by one-third in 1986;
the merger of the ANN bureau in New York into the
Washington bureau; and the closing of bureaus in
Paris, Brussels, Stockholm, Stuttgart, and The
We doubt that these changes will alleviate ANN's
problems given the poor quality of ANN material and
increasing international criticism of the Sandinista
tion of propaganda abroad.
likely, therefore, to function even less as a news
agency and become simply a conduit for the distribu-
In the near future, the Sandinista regime will be faced
with a major propaganda challenge. Though support
from leftist groups and solidarity committees in both
Western Europe and Latin America is still strong, the
Sandinistas have lost ground both in support from
Western governments and in some areas of public
opinion. The negative fallout from the Sandinista
regime's repressive domestic actions, such as the
expulsion of Bishop Vega and the closing of La
Prensa, has made it increasingly difficult to sustain an
image of political pluralism. Though the growing
disenchantment with the Sandinistas has not translat-
ed into public support for US aid to the Nicaraguan
insurgents, it has increased criticism of the Nicara-
guan regime.
The overall structure of the propaganda establishment
is unlikely to undergo any major restructuring in the
near future, but we believe the FSLN will exert
greater control over all elements of the propaganda
apparatus. The expansion of the number of party
cadre at Nicaraguan missions abroad to ensure the
implementation of foreign policy and propaganda
objectives will, in our view, reduce the role of MINEX
in the propaganda program and lead to stronger
political control of propaganda operations.
After the closings and staff reductions in its foreign
bureaus, ANN will probably depend more heavily on
TASS, Prensa Latina, and leftist sources to provide
material and assist in disseminating stories worldwide.
ANN has already begun attempting to fill these gaps.
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There have been some indications that the
Nicaraguan regime wishes to establish a measure of
independence from Moscow in its propaganda efforts.
the
Sandinistas have for some time been trying to estab-
lish direct linkages to West European leftists and
peace groups without working through Moscow's net-
work of front groups. Nonetheless, we are doubtful
that Managua's propagandists will be able to step out
effectively on their own.
the Soviets have been suspicious and resistant to
Managua's efforts to work directly with European
peace activists. Moreover, we expect Managua's fi-
nancial problems to continue, forcing the Sandinistas
to rely more heavily on Moscow and Havana and
conceding further control over their propaganda effort
to their Bloc allies.
What Lies Ahead
In the upcoming months, we can expect the
Sandinista regime to make an all-out effort to pro-
mote three current propaganda themes: exploiting the
27 June ICJ decision, advertising the draft Nicara-
guan constitution as evidence of Nicaragua's commit-
ment to democracy, and promoting President Ortega's
2 August "Chicago proposal" as evidence of Nicara-
gua's willingness to engage in constructive dialogue.
Nicaragua has so far been successful in gaining
positive international reaction and publicity for these
proposals and will work hard to maintain its propa-
ganda advantage. F_~
Nicaragua welcomed the ICJ decision, which largely
upheld Nicaragua's charges that the United States is
waging a war of aggression against Nicaragua, as an
ideal situation to support its claims of the United
States as a military aggressor and violator of interna-
tional law. Managua used the resulting United
Nations (UN) resolution, sponsored by Nonaligned
Movement caucus in the Security Council, that called
for US compliance with the ICJ ruling to its best
advantage. Following the US veto in the UN Security
Council, Nicaraguan press characterized the United
States as an "international delinquent" and a menace
to the international legal order. President Ortega, in
several press conferences, took the opportunity to
portray Nicaragua as a champion of international
law.
The Sandinistas' energetic promotion of the draft
Nicaraguan constitution has paid off in the large
amount of favorable publicity generated. Trips abroad
by Nicaraguan officials in 1985 to hold "consulta-
tions" on the constitution have provided the Nicara-
guan regime with numerous opportunities to portray
the regime's commitment to political pluralism. As
part of the regime's open town meetings to discuss the 25X1
new constitution, a "National Conference on the
Nicaraguan Constitutional Process" was held in New
York in April and was judged a complete success by
the Nicaraguan Government, according to Embassy
reporting. The constitution has also given the Sandi-
nistas further fuel for anti-US rhetoric. The Soviet
news agency TASS replayed accusations by Nicara-
guan officials that the United States was attempting
to thwart the constitutional drafting process by pres-
suring Nicaraguan opposition parties to boycott the
constitutional debate. The regime has tried to mini-
mize opposition criticism of the constitutional process
by lifting some political restrictions during debates on
the draft. The Nicaraguan Government, in a MINT
press communique, stated that the opposition parties
represented in the National Assembly would be al-
lowed free access to media to discuss the constitution.
In a 2 August speech in Chicago, President Ortega
announced a proposal stating Nicaragua's desire to
conduct negotiations with the United States on a
peace and friendship treaty, begin a dialogue with the
Catholic Church, renew Contadora negotiations, and
create a demilitarized zone in Central America. This
"Chicago proposal" touched off a flurry of diplomatic
and propaganda activity. President Ortega delivered
messages to the governments of Contadora and sup-
port group countries, along with the governments of
other Central American countries. Ortega also sent a
message to Vatican officials to express a willingness to
engage in dialogue on church matters. Vice President
Ramirez traveled to several Latin American countries
where he touted the "Chicago proposal" as a peace
initiative. All of this activity was widely reported by
Nicaraguan and Soviet Bloc press services as a major
diplomatic coup.
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The Sandinista regime will continue to push hard on
these propaganda initiatives in the next several
months, in an effort to recoup some of the support it
lost because of its repressive domestic measures.
Although Nicaragua has acted to put its domestic and
foreign critics on the defensive, we believe the Sandi-
nistas are vulnerable to public diplomacy campaigns
that would expose the Marxist-Leninist nature of the
Sandinista regime:
? Article 169 of the proposed constitution gives the
president broad powers to direct the public adminis-
tration, which appear to include the power to fill all
government ministry positions with FSLN cadres.
? Article 149 grants the National Assembly, con-
trolled by the FSLN, the power to cancel the legal
status of the "entities of a civil or religious charac-
ter," which could empower the suppression of oppo-
sition groups and the church.
? Article 177 names the national military as the
"Sandinista Armed Forces," which clearly shows its
political partisanship and makes it a true "army of
the party."
? Article 214 prohibits the amendment of the consti-
tution regarding the "popular character of the
revolution," a FSLN phrase that is synonymous
with "Sandinista revolution" and serves to impose
the FSLN imprint on the constitution.
In addition, international exposure of Nicaraguan
domestic repression and disregard for basic human
rights could continue to undermine Sandinista diplo-
matic and propaganda initiatives.
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Appendix B
How It Works: Nicaraguan
Propaganda in the
Frontline States
Because of the presence of Nicaraguan resistance
forces in Costa Rica and Honduras, the Sandinista
regime sees these two countries as among its most
important propaganda targets. Aside from the two
main themes pushed by the Sandinistas in these
countries-condemnation of the Nicaraguan armed
opposition and opposition to US policies in Central
America and Nicaragua-the Sandinistas also con-
duct some propaganda campaigns specific to each
country. In Costa Rica, a large part of the propagan-
da effort is aimed at countering what the Sandinistas
see as an anti-Nicaraguan bias in the Costa Rican
media by focusing on general pro-Nicaraguan themes.
In Honduras, the Sandinistas have been conducting
an aggressive campaign against the US military pres-
ence there and have consistently portrayed the
Honduran Government as being totally subservient to
the United States.
The Sandinistas employ a variety of propaganda
methods in each country. Nicaragua makes a consid-
erable effort in Costa Rica to cultivate leftists and
work through them to influence the media, while in
Honduras the emphasis tends to be on cultivating and
manipulating journalists. In both countries, the San-
dinistas. seek to influence student groups. F
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Honduras: Media Manipulation
The Sandinista campaign against the US military
presence in Honduras has been extensive and aggres-
sive. The campaign has consisted of allegations rang-
ing from US chemical weapons testing to US troops
spreading AIDS among the population and molesting
Honduran children. Nicaragua also generates propa-
ganda alleging human rights abuses by the Nicara-
guan armed opposition present in Honduras.F_~
In the next few months, we expect Nicaragua to
conduct a propaganda campaign in support of its case
before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) accus-
ing Costa Rica and Honduras of violating Nicaraguan
sovereignty by allowing the Nicaraguan armed oppo-
sition to operate from their countries. Nicaragua will
continue to rely on leftists and front groups in Costa
Rica and sympathetic journalists in Honduras to aid
in getting their propaganda message across.
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