LAST WEEK FRED WETTERING SUGGESTED THAT THE CUBAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA IN 1976 BE EXAMINED TO SEE IF THERE WERE ANY PARALLELS TO HAVANA'S RECENT STATEMENTS REGARDING NICARAGUA.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G01126R000100050039-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: March 12, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/21: CIA-RDP89G01126R000100050039-2
Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence
aD I_ C)1 3. 1L ~
R 1985
NOTE FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Last week Fred Wettering suggested
that the Cuban "withdrawal" from Angola
in 1976 be examined to see if there were
any parallels to Havana's recent statements
regarding Nicaragua. In his memorandum to
you of 6 March he noted that ALA had been
tasked to do a short paper on that question.
Attached for your information is the ALA
response.
RobertUl. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Attachment:
As stated
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/21: CIA-RDP89G01126R000100050039-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/21: CIA-RDP89G01126R000100050039-2
Directorate of Intelligence
Office of African and Latin American Analysis
11 March 1985
NOTE FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
Last week Fred Wettering sent a memorandum
to the DCI suggesting that there were some
similarities between the Cuban "withdrawal"
from Angola in 1976 and recent statements by
Havana regarding Nicaragua. He also tasked
ALA to prepare a short paper on the question.
Attached is the memorandum ALA prepared
for the Director and a covering note for your
signature. Copies of the memorandum will also
be sent to the NIO for Africa and the NIO for
Latin America.
Acting Director
Attachment:
As stated
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/21: CIA-RDP89G01126R000100050039-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/21: CIA-RDP89GO1126R000100050039-2
Iq
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/21: CIA-RDP89GO1126R000100050039-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/21: CIA-RDP89GO1126R000100050039-2
Central Intelligence Agency
Watihinton D C 20505
8 March 1985
Cuban Military Personnel Withdrawal Offer
military personnel beginning in May
propaganda ploy intended to support Nicaragua's efforts to
generate diplomatic and domestic pressure on the Reagan
administration. The Castro regime's pledge to recall 100 Cuban
Summary
Havana's current rhetoric about a withdrawal of Cuban
military personnel from Nicaragua is, in our opinion, primarily a
is reminiscent of the statements emanating from Havana in
thespring of1976 when the Cuban troop presence in Angola had
From a Cuban perspective, the situation in early 1976 was
fortuitous. A review of interagency publications covering the
period show that the short term military threat to the MPLA was
down and the government in Luanda appeared secure. Given this
favorable military situation, Castro could shift his attention to
turning around the unfavorable world opinion that Cuban
involvement in Angola had generated. Because the legislative
process that resulted in the Javits-Tunney Amendment and the
Clark Amendment was completed several months earlier (December
1975-January 1976), we have found no evidence that the Cubans
were using promises of withdrawal to influence the legislative
process. Indeed, the Cuban build-up was still underway during
the enactment of these two amendments. It seems instead that the
lesson of these events is that the Cubans will undertake
temporary troop withdrawals to deflect international criticism
only when the battlefield situation permits. Such a condition
did not exist in December 1975-January 1976, but clearly did
This memorandum is for the DCI. It was prepared by
Office of African and Latin American
Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and should be
addressed to Chief, Middle America-Caribbean Division,
Copy in of
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/21: CIA-RDP89GO1126R000100050039-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/21: CIA-RDP89GO1126R000100050039-2
By early 1976, Cuban involvement in Angola entered a new
phase. Not only had the anti-MPLA forces reverted back to
guerrilla tactics but international criticism of Castro's
adventurism was mounting. With the battlefield relatively
secure, Castro in the S rin of 1976 be an a cam ai n o as
Western concerns.
Apparently in early May 1976,
Cuban withdrawal had begun and that by the end of 1977 an
advisory group of about 200 Cubans would remain.
beginning probably in late March or early April 1976, some of the
Cuban troops that had been rushed to Angola in early November
1975 to prevent Agostinho Neto's MPLA from being overrun were
being sent home. Their presence in Angola seemed no longer
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/21: CIA-RDP89GO1126R000100050039-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/21: CIA-RDP89GO1126R000100050039-2
necessary once the crisis precipitated by the invading South
African and Zairian troops was over. Their return in the Spring
gave Castro the opportunity to deflect international criticism of
Cuba's aggressive role in Africa.
By late May, however, it was becoming apparent that the
anti-MPLA forces were shifting to a long-term guerrilla strategy
and Havana began to shift its tactics. For example, Cuban
President Dorticos told the press that Cuba's word for the
pullout must be accepted at face value and said the US would make
a mistake by demanding evidence of the withdrawal. He was quoted
as saying "we shall continue to aid and support all liberation
movements and shall never repent or change our attitude." At a
ceremony on 6 June honoring Interior Ministry personnel (on hand
were over 100 Special Troops sent home from Angola), Fidel Castro
stressed the gradual nature of the pullout and described the
timetable for withdrawal as "the time strictly necessary to
support the Angolan people's defense against any foreign
aggression while the Angolan People's Army is organized, trained,
While Castro was using the issue of withdrawal to its best
advantage, there a ears to have been no attem t to influence US
legislation.
This is not to say that
Havana wouldn't have played this card if it was available.
Indeed, there is ample precedent in other areas of the Cuba-US
relationship to link Cuban propaganda maneuvers to Congressional
activity. In August 1982, for example, Havana used a very
powerful transmitter to broadcast for several hours in the
evening on a Radio Marti-related frequency just a few days before
Congress was scheduled to consider Radio Marti legislation. The
transmission was clearly designed to remind US legislators--as
well as commercial broadcasting executives worried about Cuban
retaliation--what Cuba could do to retaliate in the event Radio
Marti began broadcasts to Cuba. The Castro regime also sent
pamphlets on Jose Marti to selected legislators, describing
Marti's alleged hostility toward the US and implying that the use
Given past experience, we see no reason to treat Cuban
pledges of an intention to withdraw some personnel from Nicaragua
as anything other than a propaganda maneuver. Castro has made
pledges in the past that he has abrogated on whim, justifying his
shifts by claiming that circumstances had changed (as in Angola
subsequent to the April-June pledges) or that the other party
involved in the matter had not kept its part of the bargain (his
excuse in 1981 for training Colombian guerrillas after pledging
not to interfere in Colombia's internal affairs). Neither do we
see evidence that he has changed his traditional stance against
verification. He may well pull out a token group with
appropriate press coverage, but we doubt he will permit a
of his name for the radio bordered on sacrilege.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/21: CIA-RDP89GO1126R000100050039-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/21: CIA-RDP89GO1126R000100050039-2 25X1
mechanism to monitor whether he is covertly increasing the Cuban
military presence. Moreover, he will quickly jettison concerns
over public relations if the threat posed by the Contras places
the survival of the Sandinista regime at risk.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/21: CIA-RDP89GO1126R000100050039-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/21: CIA-RDP89GO1126R000100050039-2 25X1
SUBJECT: Cuban Military Personnel Withdrawal Offer
Distribution:
Original - DCI
2 - DDI
3 - NIO/AF
4 - NIO/LA
5 - D/ALA
6 - C/MCD
7 & 8 - MCD/CU Files
9 - C/AFD
10 - DDI Registry
ALA/MC/CU I(8 March 1985) 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/21: CIA-RDP89GO1126R000100050039-2