TERRORISM REVIEW
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP84-00893R000100030001-4
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
26
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
April 5, 2010
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
November 12, 1982
Content Type:
REPORT
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Attachment | Size |
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Body:
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Directorate of
Review
MASTER FILE COPY
60 NOT GIVE OUT
OR MARK ON
Terrorism
Secret
G1 TR 82-003
12 November 1982
336
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Secret
Terrorism
Review F
iii Overview
(OGI)
Escalation of Anti-US Terrorist Attacks in West Germany
(OGI)
3 Turkish Attempts To Counter Armenian Terrorism
(OGI)
5 Direct and Indirect Results of the Naples Raid
(OGI)
7 Euronean Community: French International Terrorism Initiative Fails
(EURA)
9 Syria: State-Supported Terrorism
(OGI)
NESA)
(NESA)
dy: The Montoneros of Argentina
J_' "ALA)
25X1
25X1
_25X1 -
25X
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Research
Director, Instability and Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues, telephone
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Secret
Terrorism
ReviewF-
In contrast to the image they have projected publicly, the Israelis apparently
learned little new about international terrorism from their invasion of Lebanon,
Tel Aviv has described information obtained in Lebanon as disappointing. 25X1
Captured Palestinians were low-ranking troops with scant knowledge of interna-
tional terrorist activities. Non-Palestinian prisoners were volunteers from the Near
East, Africa, and South Asia. Those Europeans detained by the Israelis had no 25X1
connections to terrorism. We believe that most international terrorists with
which in itself probably set the stage for increased levels of terrorism.
25X1
The outcome of the invasion appears strikingly at odds with Israeli public
statements that the operation dealt a severe blow to international terrorism. We
have recorded high levels of international terrorism since the Israeli invasion of
Lebanon in early June, much of it undertaken by radical non-Palestinian terrorists
in sympathy with Palestinians. Although the operation disrupted the PLO
leadership and that of groups affiliated with the PLO, these organizations had
refrained from international terrorism on Arafat's instructions since the mid-1970s
in the interest of pursuing the diplomatic line. 25X1
radical, non-PLO 25X1
Palestinian groups as Black June and 15 May have become more dangerous and
active since the invasion. They are not subject to PLO discipline, and the events in
Lebanon have given them added incentive to conduct operations. We suspect
radical leaders believe terrorist operations will appeal to a large body of
Palestinians who want to avenge the Israeli invasion and retaliate against
moderate Arab states that failed to assist the Palestinians and against the United
States for supporting Israel. We believe patron states-Syria, in particular-will
use radical Palestinian terrorists as surrogates against Arab and PLO opponentsr_~
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Escalation of Anti-US
Terrorist Attacks
in West Germany
the recent wave
of anti-US bombings in the Frankfurt area is aimed at
lowering the morale of US military personnel and
dependents and forcing the US military to resemble
an "occupation army," protected by barbed wire and
armed guards
Although attacks against US interests have occurred
regularly for almost two years in various parts of
West Germany, since the beginning of October a new
pattern-firebombings and explosive attacks at US
military housing complexes in the Frankfurt area
(Land Hesse)-has begun to emerge. Red Army
Faction (RAF) sympathizer groups claimed responsi-
bility for the three firebombings in the area during
October, but the explosive attacks remain unclaimed.
There have been 27 terrorist attacks against US
personnel and installations in Land Hesse since early
1981. German authorities report that RAF sympa-
thizers claimed responsibility for 11, while the Revo-
lutionary Cells (RZ) claimed five.
The bombings early in October 1982 prompted the
recent meetings in Land Hesse between West German
and US security officials on enhanced security pre-
cautions. Although Frankfurt police implemented
these measures in the US military area, they antici-
pated that the terrorists would take note and either
wait for a relaxation of security or attack elsewhere.
They chose the latter course. Within days, still un-
identified terrorists staged the most damaging bomb
attack of this autumn, at a US housing area in
Giessen, 40 miles north of Frankfurt. The explosion,
which occurred during the early morning hours of
31 October, totally destroyed, or badly damaged, 20
vehicles; previous attacks at other US military areas
had not destroyed more than four vehicles at a time.
25X1
four groups were involved in the attacks this fall: the
RAF and its sympathizers; the RZ and its sympathiz-
ers; small groups imitating the RZ; and a remnant of
the neo-Nazi Wehrsportgruppe Hoffmann.F25X1
=consideration of the last group is speculative25X1
based on the similarity of techniques used in recent
bombings with those used in Lebanon, where some of
the group trained. 25X1
The escalation of incidents is reminiscent of the eight-
to 10-month period preceding the 1981 attacks at
Ramstein and the attack against General Kroesen in
Heidelberg; during that time, a wide variety of at-
tacks against military trains, military installations,
and US consulates, schools, and houses occurred. 25X1
Although these attacks caused extensive damage in
many cases, they resulted in no injury to personnel. It
is now possible that, after a period of harassment by
the RZ, RAF sympathizers, or other groups, the RAF
hardcore will attempt a major bombing or another
assassination. Such an attempt would be more likely
before winter hampers preattack preparations.
25X1
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25X1
Turkish Attempts To Counter
25X1
Armenian Terrorism)
25X1
25X1
Turkey's mounting frustration over Armenian terror-
ism-increased by the 27 August assassination of the
Turkish military attache in Ottawa-has led to inten-
sified diplomatic efforts to obtain international assist-
ance. Ankara has approached the United States,
NATO, and West European countries to request
analysis of projected targets, improved information
sharing, and increased physical protection for Turkish
support for Turkey's position have largely failed
appear to condone Armenian terrorist actions further
convince Turkey of European support for Armenian
claims to a homeland. Ankara's attempts to under-
score the plight of the Turkish victims and generate
A joint US- 25X1
urkish s group was recently or~to discuss joint
cooperation efforts, and the anticipated passage of
legislation to fund the protection of foreign consular
personnel in the United States may also ease Turkish
pressure. Similar security improvements for Turkish
diplomatic facilities are in progress throughout most
of Western Europe)
25X1
diplomatic facilities.
We believe Turkish Government frustration has been
deepened by what it views as unsympathetic public
reactions in NATO countries to Armenian attacks.
Ankara views media campaigns in Europe explaining
the massacre of 1.5 million Armenians in 1915 as
attempts by European countries holding jailed Arme-
nian terrorists to preclude threatened Armenian re-
taliation. West European government policies that
Domestic political considerations may play a role in
publicizing efforts to counter Armenian terrorism,
including the creation of the hit squads. Antiterrorism
is a popular political issue, and given the 7 November
referendum on the new Turkish constitution, the 25X1
government is trying to maintain a tough image on
Armenian terrorism. President Evren's public state-
ments on 29 August 1982 concerning Turkey's deter-
mination to halt Armenian terrorism by whatever
means necessary are probably best seen in this light.
25X1
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Direct and Indirect Results
of the Naples Raidl
Italian authorities and US officials in Italy believe
that while a series of police successes have left the
Red Brigades (BR) in disarray, BR hit-and-run at-
tacks are becoming increasingly dangerous.
of involvement in several assassinations.
The recent counterterrorist successes began in Naples
during the first week of October. In raids against
seven Red Brigades safehouses, Italian police arrested
11 persons suspected of membership in the Naples
column. Information provided by those arrested led
within days to the most significant arrest-Vittorio
Bolognesi, head of the Naples column, and suspected
The same raids resulted in the recapture of the
weapons that the Red Brigades seized last summer at
Italian military depots. These weapons (a mortar, a
bazooka, three machineguns, four Garand rifles, and
ammunition) were cached near the NATO base at
Bagnoli. The location led to press speculation that the
NATO base was to be a target of the Naples Briga-
Members of the Naples column who remained at
large lost no time in attempting to repair the losses of
these raids, seen as significantly damaging to the 25X1
organization. The Italian press, in fact, described
counterterrorist success in Naples as the most signifi-
cant since the rescue of US Brigadier General Dozier
and the related arrests of several hundred Brigadists.
Within five days of the arrest of Bolognesi, police ir25X1
Turin arrested a much-wanted terrorist suspect, Na
talia Ligas, often described as the most dangerous
In a demonstration of the staying power of the
Brigades, four members robbed a bank in Turin.
Although the proceeds of the robbery amounted to
only $7,000, the incident shocked local authorities
25X1
25X1
because the city had been free of BR violence for 25X1
almost three years. More significant was the brutal
Brigades' behavior, which many observers viewed as
unprecedented. The terrorists shot two bank guards in
cold blood as they were lying face down on the floor
with the customers and employees. They also left
behind documents containing strong denunciations o25X1
Natalia Ligas as a traitor, a counterrevolutionary,
and an "infiltrator of the executive of the revolution-
ary movement." A banner thrown over one of the
guards carried the slogan: "The Peci Campaign Con-
tinues." 25X1
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Secret
These actions, in our view, suggest that the Red
Brigades, although suffering personnel losses, retain
their resilience and ability to regroup. Their numeri-
cal strength in Naples is difficult to assess because
columns described by the Italian authorities as "deci-
mated" have subsequently conducted attacks. We do
not believe that police failure to find written evidence
in the Naples safehouse of plans to attack US person-
nel or installations indicates such plans do not exist.
Nor does the loss of the weapons cache necessarily
inhibit the Brigades; these weapons did not constitute
a large arsenal, and weapons are readily available in
Italy. We believe BR operations in Naples cannot be
discounted in the near future, and Turin also appears
Some changes in the behavior of Red Brigades terror-
ists, as shown in the Turin bank, represent revival of
old patterns. Brigadists have killed many Italian
officials in cold blood as symbols of power structures.
The reference to the Peci campaign is a revenge
theme-the revelations of Patrizio Peci, the first
repentant terrorist whose information caused serious
damage to the organization, also set an example for 25X1
the numerous repentant terrorists arrested during and
after the Dozier case.
The
mistrust engendered by the cooperation of so many
penitents with the police appears to be having an
adverse effect on an already weakened organization.
25X1
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European Community:
French International Terrorism
Initiative Fails
At the 25 October meeting of the Justice Ministers of
the European Community, French Minister Robert
Badinter proposed the establishment of an EC-wide
tribunal for trying terrorist and other crimes. Despite
several months of official West European consider-
ation of possible new legal measures to combat inter-
national terrorism, the French proposal proved unac-
ceptable to most member states.
Badinter's proposal stemmed directly from President
Mitterrand's brief reference to the possible creation of
a European tribunal for "blood crimes" during his
televised interview on French counterterrorism policy
last August. Badinter characterized the proposal as a
substitution for the 1979 Dublin Agreement, which
defines how the Council of Europe's Strasbourg Con-
vention on the Suppression of Terrorism would be
applied within the Community.' France refuses to rat-
ify either the convention or the agreement, arguing
that provisions for compulsory prosecution violate
national sovereignty. Because the agreement cannot
enter into effect until ratified by all EC members,
none of the other members is inclined to ratify as long
as France refuses.
The recent French proposal provided a way to try
terrorists or other criminals wanted in another EC
country who cannot be extradited-for either legal or
political reasons-from the country in which they
have taken refuge. In particular, a supranational body
could help France finesse the problems that its liberal
political asylum policy poses to extradition.
' Among EC countries, only Denmark, the United Kingdom, and
West Germany have ratified the Strasbourg Convention, which
provides that signatories must either prosecute or extradite terror-
ists wanted in another signatory state. The Dublin Agreement
narrowed the convention to reflect Irish reservations regarding
extradition.
Most of the EC ministers expressed strong reserva-
tions about the French proposal and are unlikely to
adopt it in its present form. Some delegations were
sharply critical of what they viewed as French efforts
to undermine the legitimacy of the Dublin Agree-
ment. Indeed, the Belgian, Italian, and UK ministers
countered by calling for prompt ratification of the
agreement. Belgian Justice Minister Gol added that
the French initiative would take years to implement
while Western Europe currently faces an unparalleled
terrorist threat.
The French probably knew that their proposal would
not be accepted, but tabled it to help satisfy their
domestic need to appear tough on terrorism. In the
wake of an unprecedented number of terrorist attacks
in France, the government is attempting to enhance
and better coordinate its counterterrorist effort. Three
recent resolutions in the European Parliament calling
for stronger action against terrorism appear to have
added impetus to this latest French move. In the
absence of an antiterrorism convention that takes into
account specific French legal and political reserva-
tions about extradition, political asylum, and sover-
eignty, however, France is likely to remain out of step
with West European legal efforts to cooperate against
international terrorism.
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Syria:
State-Supported Terrorism
Syria continues to be a significant supporter of inter-
national terrorism. Several factors have encouraged
Damascus to view terrorism as a legitimate instru-
ment of government policy, particularly concerns for
ensuring regime stability and promoting Syrian influ-
ence in the Middle East.
in response to increasing
pressures by antiregime groups during the past year,
the Assad government decided to increase substantial-
ly activities directed against opponents in Europe and
the Middle East. The Muslim Brotherhood (MB),
which is the best organized and most serious threat to
Assad's secular Alawite regime, has been significantly
hurt by recent Syrian operations. Following a devas-
tating car bombing in Damascus in November 1981-
considered to be an MB operation by the Syrian
Government-and an attempted general uprising in
Syria's relative isolation within the Arab world has
reinforced the view in Damascus that certain Arab
states are conspiring with anti-Assad elements and
has resulted in destabilization activities directed at
neighboring countries. Amman's encouragement of
MB activities may have motivated the Syrian bomb-
ing of a Christian-owned grocery in Amman in Janu-
25X1
25X1
Friction between Syria and conservative Arab states
over the provision of financial assistance to Damascus
as provided for by the Baghdad agreement also has
lead to terrorist plotting against neighboring regimes,
The Israeli invasion of Lebanon provided the most
recent catalyst for Syrian terrorist activities against
neighboring governments in the
weeks leading up to the first presidential election in 25X1
September, Damascus launched a campaign of kid-
napings and attempted assassinations against Leba-25X1
nese Parliament members in an effort to discourage
the selection of Bashir Jumayyil.
the Middle East problem.
Syria continues to support several international ter- 25X1
rorist organizations. In the Middle East, such contacts
provide Damascus with a mechanism for maintaining
a degree of influence in the region. Syria believes that
this influence is essential to ensuring that moderate
Arabs and Palestinian leaders will be forced to conr;A-
er Damascus's interests in any peaceful resolution 25X1
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Syrian-Sponsored Terrorism
Attempted bombing of anti-Assad newspaper in Syrian intelligence officer under diplomatic cover.
Paris.
Bombing of Christian-owned grocery store Syrian intelligence officer under diplomatic cover.
in Amman.
Arrest of three-man assassination squad in Syrian operative.
Stuttgart, West Germany.
Arrest of terrorist with orders to bomb sites in Saiqa.
West Berlin to discourage FRG from accepting
Palestinian refugees.
Threats published in Lebanese newspaper against Probably Syrian operatives.
West German Government if Stuttgart terrorists
not released.
Bombing of anti-Assad newspaper in Paris. Syrian intelligence officer under diplomatic cover
accused and expelled from France.
Bombing of unspecified target in Amman. Syrian operatives utilizing diplomatic cover to
import bomb components.
Interception by Turkish authorities of Syrian officials utilizing diplomatic pouch en
illegal weapons shipment onboard route to Syrian Consulate in Istanbul.
flight from Damascus.
Intimidation of Lebanese Parliament members in Syrian military/ intelligence operatives.
attempt to influence Lebanese presidential
election.
Bombing of Islamic Center connected with the Probably Syrian operatives.
Muslim Brotherhood in Amman.
Attempted bombing, date unknown, of bus Probably Syrian operatives.
belonging to Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan.
Syria has strengthened support for radical Pales-
tinian groups such as the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine, the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine-General Command, and the
Black June Organization, which share Syria's rejec-
tionist and anti-Fatah outlook. Damascus provides the
hardline groups with sanctuary, training facilities,
and equipment and encourages activities against tar-
gets in Israel and the Occupied Territories. In addi-
tion, Syria also encourages activities abroad to under-
mine politically PLO Chairman Arafat, who has
directed Palestinian groups to cease international
terrorist activities. The Black June Organization, for
example, was responsible for a number of operations
in Europe, including the attempted assassination in
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Secret
June of the Israeli Ambassador in London. Saiqa,
another hardline group, apparently dispatched an
agent who was arrested in West Berlin in March
before he could carry out bombings intended to
discourage the granting of asylum to military-age
Palestinian refugees.
We believe that Syria will continue to support inter-
national terrorism and will not hesitate to initiate
attacks against oppositionist elements both within
Syria and abroad. The likelihood of such attacks will
depend on the degree of threat a group poses. Al-
though Muslim Brotherhood activity has apparently
declined following significant losses in 1982, addition-
al international attacks against that organization can-
not be ruled out.
The aftermath of the war in Lebanon presents Da-
mascus with opportunities to strengthen its influence
with radical Palestinian groups and perhaps with the
tuary bordering Israel has encouraged the
immigration of fighters-particularly members of
radical groups-from the countries to which they had
been dispersed. This migration provides Damascus an
opportunity to control the groups' communications,
movements, and logistics.
25X1
25X1
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Secret
India: Sikh Terrorism
As New Delhi prepares to host the Asian Games this
month and the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) sum-
mit in March, Indian security and Home Ministry
officials are under heavy pressure from Prime Minis-
ter Gandhi to curb growing violence by Sikh extrem-
ists and to control escalating agitation by moderate
Sikhs for an enlarged and semiautonomous Punjab
stated
A small number of Sikh extremists-followers of sect
leader Bhindranwale.and members of the banned Dal
Khalsa organization, which is modeled on the PLO-
have been responsible for assassinations, bombings,
and hijackings in India during the past two years.
Members of Bhindranwale's sect have attacked rival
Sikh sects as well as non-Sikh government officials
and carried out an abortive hijacking of an Indian
aircraft last August. Sikh terrorism increased in 1981
after Gandhi's Congress(I) Party came to power in
Punjab State, where Sikhs constitute a slight major-
ity. the Dal Khalsa
makes up only about 200 members and is linked with
and possibly funded by Sikh separatist leaders based
in the United States, Britain, and Canada.
Until recently Gandhi downplayed the scope of Sikh
separatism, but New Delhi's announcement in July
that.it would put down firmly the separatist "Khalis-
tan" movement acknowledges the growing challenge
that its proponents pose to internal security. The
visibility of Sikh separatist leaders based abroad-
such as J. S. Chauhan in Britain and G. S. Dhillon in
the United States-has increased Gandhi's fear of
foreign support for attempts to destabilize her govern-
ment. New Delhi banned the Dal Khalsa, refused
Dhillon entry into India last spring, and two months
ago arrested thousands of officers of the moderate
Sikh Akali Dal Party after the party initiated agita-
tions in support of Bhindranwale's "anti repression"
campaign.
Government measures to crack down on violence so
far have broadened Sikh support for the more radical
groups. Recent efforts by authorities to curtail terror-
ist activities have been thwarted by the widely dis-
persed caches of arms, the apparent absence of central
direction, the flow of funds and weapons from abroad,
and the sympathy of nonmilitant Sikhs for their
militant coreligionists. A recent escalation of demands
by heretofore moderate Sikh leaders resulting in
25,000 arrests and at least 24 deaths in the past three
months complicated New Delhi's attempts to isolate
Sikh separatists from the Sikh majority. US Embassy
sources note that leaders of the Sikh Akali Dal Party,
while condemning terrorist acts, have actually moved
closer to the militant position of Bhindranwale. Akali
leaders have called for a Sikh "holy war" to begin
4 November in support of their demands for semiau-
tonomy in the Punjab. 25X1
Despite the massive security precautions planned by
Indian authorities for the Asian Games this month25X1
and the NAM summit in March, we anticipate
terrorist violence by Sikh activists in New Delhi as
well as in Punjab. Gandhi plans to divert large 25X1
numbers of police, paramilitary, and military forces to
the capital on those occasions because security offi-
cials expect Sikh militants to increase their activities,
which are fueled by money and arms from abroad.
The militants are unlikely, in our judgment, to miss
an opportunity to embarrass Gandhi by demonstrat-
ing before an international audience their continued
ability to threaten internal security.
9 September 1981
Bhindranwale is implicated in assassination of politi-
cian, editor, and proponent of Hindu causes in
Punjab.
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29 September 1981
Five Dal Khalsa Sikh youths hijack an Indian Air-
lines domestic flight to Lahore, Pakistan.
6 October 1981
Sikh extremists shoot a Punjabi government official
and his brother, the latter suffering fatal wounds.
21 December 1981
Critic of Sikh extremist leader Chauhan is assassi-
nated by Dal Khalsa members.
22 May 1982
Followers of Bhindranwale kill three members of a
rival Sikh sect.
4 August 1982
Sikh protesting Hindu-Sikh conflict is foiled in at-
tempt to hijack domestic Indian flight.
20 August 1982
Sikh follower of Bhindranwale demanding release of
Sikh "political prisoners" is shot dead in attempt to
hijack domestic Indian flight.
21 August 1982
Attempt to assassinate Chief Minister of Pun.ab is
attributed to followers of Bhindranwale
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The Sadat Assassination
and Islamic Extremism in Egypt'
The Islamic extremists responsible for the assassina-
tion of President Sadat on 6 October 1981 and those
responsible for the subsequent violence in Asyut were
loosely affiliated with an umbrella organization called
al-Jihad al-Jadid (The New Holy War). Organized in
late 1980, the group recruited members from a num-
ber of radical Islamic groups that had become active
in the mid-1970s.
Al-Jihad al-Jadid did not possess a well-developed
ideology. Like mainstream fundamentalist move-
ments, it was founded on the concept of rebuilding the
social order on the basis of Islam. Unlike the main-
stream fundamentalists, the extremists advocated the
use of violence, if necessary, to construct a truly
Islamic society.
The organizers and perpetrators of the plot on
6 October did not have a well-organized plan for
seizing power. Sadat's assassination was the principal
aim, but only a few members of the organization were
aware of this objective. Some of the assassins appar-
ently hoped to eliminate as many members of the
government hierarchy as possible, although this objec-
tive was secondary to that of killing Sadat. There was
an attempt to coordinate with other elements of the
organization to seize key government installations in
Cairo and Upper Egypt. Some of the conspirators
hoped to trigger a series of internal upheavals that
would lead to a "popular revolution" and set the stage
for the eventual establishment of an Islamic state.
This aspect of the operation was so poorly executed as
to cast doubt on the seriousness of the conspirators'
intent to pursue this objective.
The Egyptian Government has vigorously attempted
to root out supporters of al-Jihad. Judging from past
experience, however, it is highly probable that mem-
bers of the various Jihad cells remain undergrour25X1
together with members of other extremist groups.
In our judgment, Islamic extremists pose a threat to
the lives of prominent Egyptians, can cause trouble
for the Mubarak regime, and compound the danger
facing the government from the Islamic fundamental-
ist movement in general. Although the al-Jihad orga-
nization may have been crushed, new extremist
groups probably will continue to arise as long as
Egypt's widespread social and economic problems
persist. Moreover, Egypt's Islamic extremists are like-
ly to become more sophisticated as they draw on
lessons learned from the events of October 1981 F_
i
Secret
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Secret
Group Study:
The Montoneros of Argentina
25X1
25X1
The Montoneros, among Latin America's most effec-
tive terrorists before being violently suppressed in the
late 1970s, are preparing to become more active.
25X1
Background
The Montoneros emerged in 1970 as the militant left
wing of the umbrella Peronist movement under the
leadership of then-exiled dictator Juan Peron. At
Peron's bidding, they sought to undermine the incum-
bent military regime by raiding military barracks,
robbing banks, and kidnaping both wealthy Argen-
tines and foreigners in and around Buenos Aires. By
1973, however, the Montoneros were growing increas-
ingly radical, calling for a "popular war" against the
upper classes, and expanding operations into rural
areas.
they numbered some 2,500 combatants and 11,000
sympathizers. After Peron assumed the presidency in
late 1973, he attempted to negotiate a halt to the
terrorism, but the Montoneros refused to come to
terms. By 1974 the split was complete, and the
Peronist regime became the guerrilla's target. The
Peronist government outlawed the Montoneros in
mid-1975, and security forces moved against them.
After ousting the Peronist regime in 1976, the armed
forces had free rein against the Montoneros. Within
three years the Army and intelligence services-
employing torture, illegal detentions, and widespread
dragnets-succeeded in forcing most of its members
into inactivity or exile.
by early 1977 combatants had already been
reduced to about 300, and most of the leaders were
captured, killed, or had fled the country. Any serious
threat to the regime was eliminated, although sporad-
ic attacks-including several sensational kidnapings
and bombings-continued until 1979. By the end of
that year, Montonero activists in Argentina were
estimated at 2001 Their
activities were confined to distributing leaflets, paint-
ing slogans on buildings in downtown Buenos Aires,
and interrupting normal radio and television broad-
casting with propaganda speeches.
Argentina have maintained close contact with their25X1
network abroad, estimated in 1979
to number some25X1
200. a exiles sought refuge in Latin America and 25X1
the Mexican Government and leftist parties 25X1
in Western Europe have backed the Montonero prop25X1
aganda campaigns, providing Mario Firmenich-a
founder and leader of the Montoneros 25X1
with forums for antiregime speeches and 25X1
funds for printing and travel.
25X1
1
25X1
The favorable operationa25X1
unmate presuma y accounts for the decisionE::::::-25Xl
to base the Montoneros' 25X1
political arm in Mexico City. 1 :1 25X1
By 1980, the Montoneros, under Firmenich, divided25X1
into two groups-the clandestine operation in Argen-
tina and the more oven movement abroad.) 25X1
to separate militant from political action reflects 25X1
ideological rifts within the movement. Veterans of the
struggle, including Firmenich, were uncertain whet]25X1
er to continue armed confrontation, to build a popular
base to support a potential political party, or to move
forward on both fronts. In an effort to identify the
organization with a legitimate party, Firmenich has
renamed the Montoneros the Peronist Montonero
Movement.
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the Castro regime also provided financial sup-
25X1
several bombings in downtown Buenos Aires, accord- 25X1
ing to US officials there.
25X1
port, at least until September 1982, and safeguarded
funds acquired by the Montoneros through their
e The willingness of outsiders to back a renewed
to return to Argentina to join the struggle against the 25X1
British and form a legitimate political party. The
ruling junta refused.
Prospects
The ability of the Montoneros over the next six to 18
months to capitalize on current conditions in Argenti-
na and their enhanced military training and experi-
ence will be constrained by:
Montoneros and the Transition
The uncertain political and economic situation in
Argentina following the Falkland Islands defeat has
improved the potential operational climate for the
terrorists, who retain a capability to carry out attacks,
should they decide to do so.
as of late 1981 about 60 members
The Montoneros also appear to be stepping up their
political activity. During the Falklands crisis, Firmen-
ich publicly appealed to regime leaders to allow him
Lack of public support. We judge that labor and
political leaders currently believe their interests lay
in assisting the regime through the transition proc-
ess and not in backing or condoning violence that
might delay elections. Potential student support is
also uncertain.
Ideological rifts within the Montonero movement.
We believe the lack of consensus on renewing
violence could force Firmenich to focus on political
action, at least until the effects of economic deterio-
ration and the struggle within the military become 25X1
more apparent.
outside Argentina; exiles in Havana take the lead in
weapons and logistics, intelligence, and counterintelli-
gence, while those in Mexico focus on political action.
Inside Argentina, the Montoneros apparently are
preparing to resume operations, anticipating the re-
turn of some overseas cadre. Caches of arms, includ-
ing automatic weapons, grenades, and other explo-
sives, have been uncovered as recently as January
1982, according to press and US Embassy reporting.
In April, Montoneros may have been involved in
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
We judge that Cuba is
withholding support to avoid alienating Buenos 25X1
Aires at a time when diplomatic relations are
improving as a result of Havana's aid during the
Falklands. Moreover, the Cubans probably want the
Montoneros to continue to concentrate on assisting
insurgents in Central America rather than in Ar-
gentina. We believe Castro is unlikely to change his
position any time soon.
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We believe that, if the security forces are impaired
significantly by continuing divisions within the mili-
tary and if economic deterioration sparks serious
social unrest, militants could be emboldened to renew
terrorist activities. Without significant external sup-
port, however, we judge they would be unlikely to
mount more than sporadic attacks against the govern-
ment
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Total, 645
Of which: US targets, 335
Category of
International
Terrorist Incidents,
1982, by Month
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Secret
Chronology
Late September 1982 Libya
Qadhafi is reportedly activating plans to silence the Libyan opposition movement
through assassinations of exiled dissidents. Qadhafi
has recently dispatched to Europe young Revolutionary Committee personnel 25X1
under student cover to carry out the threatened attacks. Unspecified Western
nationals, whom Libyan officials believe are cooperating with the dissidents, also
are targeted. 25X1
21 October 1982 Greece
A previously unknown Greek anarchist organization "Autonomy" claims credit for
an incendiary bomb placed in the Hellenic American Union cafeteria in Athens.
Autonomy also claims a bomb has been placed in the US Embassy, but no device is
discovered. Leaflets left near the Hellenic American Union indicate the group
intends to attack US interests in Greece because of the government's failure to
abolish US bases and withdraw from NATO. 25X1
22 October 1982 United States
The FBI arrests five Armenian terrorists who are members of the Justice
Commandos for the Armenian Genocide (JCAG). They are charged with conspira-
cy by the Philadelphia office of Turkish Consul General Kanat Arbay. One
terrorist is arrested in Boston after a flight from Los Angeles on which he allegedly
diplomats in the United States this year in Boston and Los Angeles.
carried the explosives for the operation, and the other four are arrested in
California. JCAG has been responsible for the two assassinations of Turkish
Spain
In Agorta, ETA/M (Fatherland and Liberty/Military) terrorists kill a business-
man. Although no claim for responsibility is received, the distinctive 9-mm
parabellum ammunition links ETA/M to this attack. 25X1
In Bilbao, ETA/M is credited with a bombing attack on a shopping center in the
Basque region.
25X1
ETA/M is believed responsible for three bank bombings in Vergara and Mondra-
gon, in a continuing campaign against banks refusing to pay "revolutionary taxes."
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26 October 1982 Spain
In Gijon (northeastern Spain), the First of October Antifascist Resistance Group
(GRAPO) is believed responsible for two minor bombings. Two other bombs of
unspecified origin are deactivated in Barcelona and Seville.
27 October 1982 Portugal
Four explosive devices are detonated in and around Lisbon. No group is claiming
responsibility for the attacks, which caused no injuries and only minor property
damage
Northern Ireland
Three members of the Ulster Constabulary Force are killed when a remote-
controlled bomb explodes outside Belfast. The IRA claims credit for the attack.
Sectarian violence has increased dramatically following the 20 October elections in
which five Sinn Fein members were elected to the local assembly.
28 October 1982 Portugal
The Lisbon offices of the Center Democratic Party (CDS) are bombed. Responsi-
bility for the attack is attributed to the extreme rightwing organization Command
for the Defense of Western Civilization, inactive since 1976. The tense political sit-
uation among the coalition parties and recent inflammatory attacks against the
CDS may have triggered the attack. 25X1
In Sesimbra, police uncover a suspected Popular Forces of 25 April (FP-25)
weapons cache. A safehouse address is discovered among documents abandoned by
seven individuals attempting to burglarize a factory containing large sums of cash.
Additional evidence found in the safehouse indicates FP-25 contact with the
Spanish Basque terrorist group ETA and possible training in Spain.
Spain
ETA/M is believed responsible for the bombing in Derio (near Bilbao), which
slightly injured two explosives experts.
Italy
Carabinieri in Milan arrest Susanna Ronconi, one of Italy's most wanted
terrorists. Initially a member of the Red Brigades, Ronconi is currently a member
of Prima Linea; some observers of the Italian terrorist scene believe she was one of
the founders. Wanted for at least three murders, she was arrested in December
1980 but broke out of Rovigo prison in January 1982 with three other prisoners.
25X1
30 October 1982 Northern Ireland
In Belfast, suspected IRA terrorists ambush an armored police vehicle with an
RPG-7. Vehicle is damaged but no fatalities occur.
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31 October 1982 Spain
A booby-trapped car explodes near an electrical power substation in Vitoria,
northern Spain, killing one police officer and injuring five. No one is claiming
responsibility for the attack, but we suspect ETA/M because of its previous
attacks against utility companies in northern Spain. 25X1
West Germany
A car bomb is detonated at the US military housing complex in Giessen and
destroys or seriously damages about 20 vehicles and two apartment houses. The
force of the explosion fuses two of the cars. No personal injuries occur; the
explosion took place at 0326 hours. No group is claiming responsibility. The attack
results in more extensive damage to US property than any similar recent attacks in
West Germany. (See article on p. 1) 25X1
3 November 1982 Spain
In Madrid, ETA/M gunmen claim credit for killing the commander of Spain's
most powerful military unit, Maj. Gen. Victor Lago Roman, in an early morning
ambush. One other person is wounded in the attack, which involved the use of
9-mm parabellum bullets, an ETA/M trademark. 25X1
West Germany
In Frankfurt, police arrest a Turk identified as Mush Cedar Celebi in connection
with the attempted assassination of the Pope. Celebi is believed by German
authorities to be one of six suspects involved in planning the papal attack.
In Cologne, nine members of the extreme leftist Turkish organization Dev Sol 25X1
(Revolutionary Left) occupy the Turkish Consulate and hold 13 hostages for 16
hours before surrendering to German police. The militants, who initially demand-
ed the release of Kurdish prisoners jailed in Turkey, claim to be protesting the
Turkish military government's "fascist" constitution, which is the main issue in
the 7 November Turkish elections.
4 November 1982 Honduras
Three bombs explode in Tegucigalpa damaging two Honduran subsidiaries of the
US company United Brands. The third explodes near the Agrarian Reform
Ministry and damages the building. There are no injuries and no group claims
credit. We believe this is part of the campaign by extreme Honduran leftists-with
support from the Salvadoran insurgents-to put pressure on US-Honduran
security ties.
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5 November 1982 Netherlands
In Amsterdam, 10 Dev Sol (Revolutionary Left) members briefly occupy the
Turkish National Travel Agency to protest the Turkish military government.
Dutch police storm building and end the siege. No injuries are reported.
Spain
ETA/M is suspected of bombing an Army barracks and a government office in the
Basque Province of Guipuzcoa. Both buildings are heavily damaged, but no
injuries are reported 25X1
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Secret
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Secret
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