MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): PROTECTION OF TROOPS FROM WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000100660001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 2, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 17, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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Intelligence Information Special Report
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Protection of Troops
from Weapons of ss Destruction
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DATE 17 June 1974
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The Protection of Troops from Weapons of Mass Destruction
General-Mayor A. Ovchinnikov, Colonel B. Vashchenko and
Colonel Ye. Kiselev
Analysis of the capabilities of the belligerents to use nuclear
weapons in modern offensive operations shows that even a single delivery of
a massive nuclear strike can result in huge losses of personnel and combat
equipment. In a short time, not only individual large units, but entire
groupings of troops can lose their combat effectiveness. Hence, the
attention given to the research and development of the most effective
organization and methods of implementing measures for protection from
weapons of mass destruction is understandable.
In this article we would like to examine some of the conclusions and
recommendations in regard to protecting the troops and installations of the
front rear services. These conclusions and recommendations are based on
the experience of command-staff and special exercises and have also been
expressed by generals and officers of the Belorussian Military District at
a military-scientific conference.
One of the important aspects of this problem, in our view, is planning
and organizing protection from weapons of mass destruction, as well as
monitoring its implementation.
We know that the planning and direction of protection from weapons of
mass-destruction currently involves all the chiefs of the arms of troops
and services and their units. Research has shown that by solving the
problem in this way we cannot succeed in implementing all the measures for
protection from weapons of mass destruction completely and with sufficient
effectiveness, and it is difficult-to m4a t9_r-their___fulfilment. The
attempt to have the fulfilment-of-tasks for rotectionfrom weapons of mass
destruction_oordinated bT the erations directorate of_ the front staff
did not.-_produre _the desired results
sawn y~an experiments front
command-staff exercise in our ourdistrict. Obviously it is again necessary to
review the proposal to concentrate the direction of the organization and
implementation of protective measures in a specially created single organ
in the front (army, large unit) staff, which may be in the form of a direc-
torate epartment, section). Opinions regarding the composition of these
control organs, their tasks, functions, and responsibilities already have
been stated repeatedly in the pages of the military press, including the
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Collection of Articles of the Journal "Milita Thought". Therefore, we
consider it necessary to add only the following.
Organizing the above directorate (department, section) in formations
and large units hardly calls for a major reconstruction of the org_ gan;za-
tional st__ructure of thP_F;Pi~ ('n and as--a-whole. Its creation generally
may be based on the existing personnel, especially in respect to staffing
it with specialists. The operating principle of this protection direc-
torate may be approximately the following. The chief of the directorate,
together with the basic complement of the forecasting department, must work
at the control center (the _ control center . _i n-_our_ distr-ict means. the
directing__group at thecommand post), and jointly with the chief of the
operations directorate, under the direction of the chief of staff, to
evaluate the situation and draw up proposals regarding measures for
protection, the restoration of combat effectiveness, and the elimination of
the aftereffects of an enemy attack with weapons of mass destruction. The
remaining personnel of the protection directorate, who will be involved in
collecting the necessary information, allocating tasks to special units and
subunits, and in monitoring the radiation exposure of personnel, may be
located near the command post. The chief of the directorate must
reliable selective circuit communicationss_ wit. al~ihe_ chies _nf. the arms
of troops and services of the Field Command.
The experience of exercises also showed that the most efficient and
coordinated use of all forces and means assigned to implement protective
measures and to monitor their fulfilment, may be achieved only if there is
a single plan for protection from weapons of mass destruction which is
worked out and, after coordination with the chiefs of the arms of troops
and services, is presented to the formation commander (commander) by the
chief of the protection directorate we are proposing.
True, the preparation of a single plan requires a great deal of time
(15 to 20 hours in a front), but this time can be reduced, particularly by
excluding measures whi are reflected in the operations plan and in the
plans for the combat use of arms of troops and services. It is desirable
that this document reflect only the most important measures for protection
from weapons of mass destruction which concern formations (large units) as
a whole. This refers in particular to organizing reconnaissance, re-
establishing troop combat effectiveness, and eliminating the aftereffects
of the enemy use of weapons of mass destruction.
One of the most complex problems in organizing protection from weapons
of mass destruction is forecasting the radiation, chemical and bacterio-
logical situation. Timely forecasting requires a well-t oug t-out sys*pm
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of collecting data and information on the enemy use of means of mass
destruction. 50X1-HUM
In our opinion, such a system must be centralized on a formation and
large unit scale and implemented by a side communications net created
especiall for this. It includes the control centers, front and army
analytical eva cation stations, radiation and chemical observation posts,
meteorological posts, nuclear-burst-fixing posts, and road commandant
service posts, as well as the non-T/0 analytical evaluation groups of the
divisions and rear area control posts of the front and armies.
Practical exercises have shown that the non-T/O groups (stations) do
not fully ensure the rapid preparation of data for the commander (chief),
reciprocal information with subordinate and adjacent elements, or reports
to the higher staff. This is explained by the fact that the officers
staffing these groups are poorly qualified for forecasting problems,
and often they are diverted to carrying out their own functional
responsibilities.
To increase the working efficiency of the system of collecting and
processing data on the nuclear, chemical and bacteriological situation, in
our view, it is desirable to include analytical evaluation groups in the
T/0 of the directorates of divisions and of the army rear area, and an
analytical evaluation station in the directorate of the district rear
services. Based on the volume of tasks being performed and on the
experience of many exercises, the optimum composition of an analytical
evaluation group may be four to six men (two officers and two to four
sergeants and enlisted men). The group must have radio communications with
the chiefs of the regimental chemical services and with the army analytical
evaluation station.
The organization of an effective system of collecting data and
information on the enemy use of the means of mass destruction and of
forecasting the radiation, chemical, and bacteriological situation makes
stringent demands on staff working methodology.
Obviously the work should be organized so that collecting situation
data, estimating it, making a decision, allocating tasks and reporting
information to the higher staff are done at the same time. All the
information on the nuclear strikes and on chemical and bacteriological
contamination must arrive simultaneously at the command post, the control
center and the analytical evaluation station, where they are consolidated
and reported to the troop commander for making a decision. At the same
time, the analytical evaluation station informs the troops on the usf50X1-H U M
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means of mass destruction which directly affect the fulfilment of combat
tasks by the appropriate large units (formations).
Determining the ground zero of nuclear bursts remains a complex
problem. The experience of exercises showed tat the air defense troops
still cannot fulfil these tasks completely. For technical reasons not all
radar stations are capable of providing detailed data for determining the
parameters of nuclear bursts. The lack of direct communications between
the front and army radar stations and the analytical evaluation station
does not ensure rapid collection of fix data, and as a result the meaning
of forecasting is largely lost.
We think that a front, until special radiotechnical systems are
brought into the armament, should have a radar station system specially
intended for fixing nuclear bursts, and linked directly with the analytical
evaluation station. According to our calculations, this requires five or
six radar centers with P-30, P-35 and P-40 radar sets (two sets in each
center) or else an additional one or two companies in a radiotechnical
regiment or separate radiotechnical battalion. They may operate as
required for purposes of reconnaissance and warning of the air enemy. The
second way to resolve this problem is to put into practice the proposal of
specialists from the Academy i/n M. V. Frunze regarding additional
inclusion in each radar company of a PRV-10 (PRV-11) mobile height-finding
radar, a P-12 radar and an R-118 radio set with a crew and specialist to
work on the remote circular scanning indicator.
Chemical reconnaissance posts, whose locations are fixed on a geodetic
basis, may be used successfully to determine the ground zero of nuclear
bursts, and the special-purpose theodolites of meteorological posts of the
meteorological battery which permit fixing at any vertical angle, may be
used for measuring. Supplying all the posts with these or similar
instruments even now can, to a considerable extent, facilitate resolving
the problem of fixing the ground zero of nuclear bursts.
Calculations derived during the experimental front command-staff
exercise showed that a front can ensure the conduct-of radiation, chemical.
and bacteriological reconnaissance with its available forces and means only
in support of the main grouping of troops. Especially great difficulties
are encountered in organizing reconnaissance in front large units and
units, and also in rear organs and installations, which total up to 400-500
elements. Because of this, increasing reconnaissance capabilities
continues to be a highly urgent task. 50X1-HUM
Usually two basic ways of fulfilling this task currently are cited:
the first is to increase the organic reconnaissance subunits; and, the
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second is to give the main reconnaissancce functions directly to the
subunits, units and installations, and provide them with the appropriate
automatic reconnaissance equipment for this. In other words, it is a
question of making radiation, chemical and bacteriological reconnaissance
massive.
We think the main factor in solving this problem now is the maximum
introduction into the troops of the technical means for conducting
reconnaissance. This requires that all tanks and armored personnel
carriers (infantry combat vehicles) be provided with means for conducting
chemical and bacteriological as well as radiation reconnaissance. It is
desirable to install this equipment on certain combat and transport
vehicles of the units and subunits of all arms of troops, special purpose
troops, and the rear services.
The broad scale of radioactive contamination and the necessity of
reducing the time spent conducting reconnaissance considerably heightens
the role of aerial radiation reconnaissance. However, as it was
established in exercises, the minimum time required for aerial recon-
naissance of troop concentration areas or routes is still quite
considerable. Moreover, due to insufficient forces and means a front and
army can carry out all the tasks of aerial radiation and chemical
reconnaissance only by repeated sorties. Consequently, counting the
preparation of a repeat sortie, several hours will be required to fulfil
them. In the process the helicopter crews may receive radiation doses of
up to 30 roentgens.
For purposes of reducing reconnaissance time, as well as maintaining
the combat effectiveness of the flight crews, it is desirable for a front
to have an aviation group (nine MI-4 and nine YAK-12), an army an avia' t
squadron (one or two flights of helicopters and a flight of aircraft), and
a division to have a flight of helicopters. It is advisable to equip the
helicopters with highly effective dosimetric equipment, improve their
defensive stability against radioactive emissions, and have radio sets
ensuring the transmission of data a distance of 200 to 300 kilometers.
Still unresolved are all the problems in respect to organizing and
conducting bacteriological reconnaissance. The forces and means available
to the front are not yet able to complete the necessary volume of
laboratory research. The time required to complete this work still is very
great. An experimental tactical-specialist exercise on protection from
bacteriological weapons showed that the chemical and radiation observation
posts and reconnaissance patrols are capable only of approximately 50X1-HUM
establishing that bacteriological weapons are being used. The chemical
reconnaissance equipment available to subunits does not permit selecting
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second is to give the main reconnai sancce functions directly to the
subunits, units and installations, d provide them with the appropriate
automatic reconnaissance equipment or this. In other words, it is a
question of making radiation chemi al and bacteriological reconnaissance
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We think the main factor in sdlving this problem now is the maximum
introduction into the troops of th technical means for conducting
reconnaissance. This requires tha all tanks and armored personnel
carriers (infantry combat vehicle be provided with means for conducting
chemical and bacteriological as w 11 as radiation reconnaissance. It is
desirable to install this equipme t on certain combat and transport
vehicles of the units and subunits~of all arms of troops, special purpose
The broad scale of radioactiv contamination and the necessity of
reducing the time spent conducting econnaissance considerably heightens
the role of aerial radiation reconnaissance. However, as it was
established in exercises, the minim Um time required for aerial recon-
naissance of troop concentration areas or routes is still quite
considerable. Moreover, due to insufficient forces and means a front and
army can carry out all the tasks of aerial radiation and chemical
reconnaissance only by repeated sort es. Consequently, counting the
preparation of a repeat sortie, several hours will be required to fulfil
them. In the process the helicopter; crews may receive radiation doses of
up to 30 roentgens.
For purposes of reducing reconnaissance time, as well as maintaining
the combat effectiveness of t flight,crews, it is desirable for a front
to have an aviation group (ni a MI-4 aid nine YAK-12), an army an aviation
squadron (one or two flights f helicopters and a flight of aircraft), and
a division to have a flight f helicopters. It is advisable to equip the
helicopters with highly effe tive dosimetric equipment, improve their
defensive stability against /radioactive emissions, and have radio sets
ensuring the transmission o~ data a distance of 200 to 300 kilometers.
I
Still unresolved are ail the problems in respect to organizing and
conducting bacteriological reconnaissance. The forces and means available
to the front are not yet a e to complete the necessary volume of
laboratory research. The time required to complete this work still is very
great. An experimental tactical-specialist exercise on protection from
bacteriological weapons showed that the chemical and radiation observa*;rn
posts and .reconnaissance patrols are capable only of approximately 50X1-HUM
establishing that bacteriological weapons are being used. The chemical
reconnaissance equipment available to subunit$ does not permit selecting
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samples from objects in the environment--water, air, etc.--for indications
of bacteriological weapons. Under these conditions the commanding officers
and staffs cannot determine the system of restrictive measures, the method
of decontaminating the centers of contamination, and medical and
prophylactic procedures in a timely manner.
In order to improve the entire system of bacteriological reconnais-
sance, chemical and medical units and subunits have to be equipped with
special automatic means of indicating bacteriological weapons, and medical
assistants or hygiene instructors, who would examine the problems of
bacteriological reconnaissance, should be included in the personnel
authorization of chemical subunits; the medical-antiepidemic platoons of
the medical battalions should be supplied with electric thermostats, since
the existing kerosene ones do not allow cultivating microorganisms while
moving. We also should think about concentrating the command of chemical
and bacteriological reconnaissance in the hands of the chief of the
chemical service (chief of the protection directorate, should one be
created).
One of the most effective methods of protecting rear troops and
installations from weapons of mass destruction is their appropriate
disposition on the terrain with regard for their protective
characteristics.
The dimensions of troop location areas are determined by instructions
and regulations. However, sometimes opinions are expressed regarding the
need to enlarge them. Calculations and research have shown that proposals
like these, however appealing they may be, cannot be adopted, since a
further enlargement of the dimensions of these areas may result in
violating the integrity of the organizational T/0 structure or corres-
ponding elements of the operational disposition of the troops, which would
complicate control or the fulfilment of allocated tasks. Nor is there
unlimited territory in which to accommodate rear services troops and
installations.
To deceive the enemy regarding the actual disposition of troops in
concentration areas, and to reduce the probability of their destruction by
his nuclear strikes, broader and more frequent antinuclear moves obviously
should be made, especially within divisional areas.. A division must change
its area of concentration in full complement, in our view, only when the "
enemy delivers ground nuclear strikes or when strong irradiation threatens
the personnel. The experience of exercises shows that a battalion requires
30 to 50 minutes to change its location area, a regiment one and one-hr'-"
to two hours, and a division up to six to eight hours. 50X1-HUM
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Reducing troop losses and maintaining their combat effectiveness are
greatly aided by carrying out engineer measures. However, the engineer
preparation of troop location areas still t Ices a very great amount of
time. The preparation of covered trenches for all the personnel and of
emplacements for all the tanks and artillery of a tank division (motorized
rifle division) requires at least five or six hours. We cannot count on
increasing engineer units and su units to reduce this time. Therefore, we
should find a solution to these problems through equipping combat and
transport vehicles with light and sufficiently effective means, either
detachable or built-in. For digging-in the vehicles to which this
equipment cannot be adapted, it is desirable to provide tractor trucks with
engineer attachments on the basis of one prime mover for 10 to 20 vehicles.
For work at control posts we should make wider use of transportable,
quickly emplaced and extracted sets of covered-type structures of
industrial manufacture.
The question of water supply deserves special attention in solving the
problem of troop protie ion. This is explained by the high probability of
contamination of water sources and the increased troop and rear area
requirements for water. To satisfy the needs of the front medical
installations alone requires at least 8 to 10 thousand cubic meters of
water per day. The water supply capabilities of front engineer units total
only 1,500 to 2,000 cubic meters. Hence the conclusion that it is
necessary to increase the productivity of the existing means of field water
supply and the number of special water tank trucks out of those calculated
to provide the units and large units with a daily water supply. To supply
water to rear area units and installations, each hospital base has to have
a water supply company, and each front base a water supply platoon.
The problem of finding the forces and means required to eliminate the
aftereffects of an enemy attack with means of mass estructi,on imme lately
at the centers of destruction requires a theoretical base and a practical
solution. ere currently are several recommendations on these questions.
For example, for the rapid elimination of the aftereffects of enemy use of
weapons of mass destruction, it has been proposed that special organic
protection subunits be created, from the regiment to the front; or that
units, large units and operational formations have non-T/p"c detachments for
eliminating aftereffects organized and trained in advance to perform
special work in the centers of destruction. The opinion also has been
expressed that no organic or non-T/0 special detachments should be created,
but that all the tasks for the elimination of aftereffects must be carried
out directly by the troops. Of course, the troops must know how to
eliminate the aftereffects of enemy strikes. However, specially trained
subunits and units are needed to perform those purely specific tasks 50X1-HUM
connected with eliminating aftereffects.
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At command-staff and field exercises in our district, aftereffects
were eliminated by the troops themselves and by specially organized non-T/0
detachments created in formations, large units and units. The experience
demonstrated that the various small subunits that make up the non-T/O
divisional and regimental detachments for the elimination of aftereffects,
should be combined into a single organ and given special training even in
peacetime. At the onset of combat actions they should be concentrated near
the command post between the first and second echelons, since it is
extremely difficult to assemble subunits of these detachments as needed
during combat actions. Of course, this disposition of detachments results
in separating considerable forces and means from their units and prevents
them from being used in their primary function, but in the meantime we do
not see another alternative. It would be desirable, if economic
capabilities permit, to create organic protection units against the means
of mass destruction in a front and army. This would prevent separating
subunits from their units and-forming them into non-T/O detachments.
In modern operations the scale of troop contamination by toxic and
radioactive substances, and also bacteriological means, may reach a
considerable magnitude. For example, in the UZ_PRmaneuvers' after a
massive nuclear strike was delivered against the "Eastern" troops, up to
twenty thousand men, about five thousand pieces of heavy combat equipment
and up to five hundred tons of food supplies required complete special
treatment. The chemical troops of the front were faced with complex tasks
which they could not carry out fully.
Essential defects also were revealed in the technical equipping of
the chemical defense subunits and units. As is known, the DDA-53 vehicles
possess low capacity for complete personal cleansing treatment of
personnel. Clothing disintegrates and boots warp from the effects of high
temperature when they are used to decontaminate_personnel. Special-purpose
r
f ont an army units Piave a moat-6o__capabi ; y for performing cnrnniQte
personnel cleansing treatment through the fumigation and decontamination of
clothing; and their capabilities-for performing complete special treatment
of organic equipment with DK-4 decontamination units is only 30 percent,
since these units are not installed on many special vehicles.
To improve special treatment it is desirable, in ou view, to
manufacture onboard DK-4 sets for tanks. With this in offset on each
tank, all the tanks of a division can be treated in one and one-half to two
hours. The chemical defense platoon of a rocket brigade should include a
cleansing treatment section consisting of two DDA-2. A chemical defense
battalion in an army (including air army) and in a front must consist of
four companies, which should be able to treat three regiments and 50X1-HUM
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divisional units at once, and an aviation division should have a chemical
defense company.
Even now, in order to reduce the special treatment time, we can make
wide use of the equipment already in the armament which has the necessary
devices. Thus, in aviation it is desirable to use spray wash vehicles and
TM-59 thermal machines with devices for feeding water into the stream of
gas discharged from the jet duct of aircraft engines; in the air defense
troops, various other devices; on self-propelled missile launchers and
missile guidance stations, two or three nozzle tanks and two nozzles with
brushes and 14 to 15-meter hoses; on the washdown/neutralizing vehicle, a
tank and set of hoses like the ARS-12D-type spray tanker and a shower
device like the DDA-53 shower unit; on an air servicing vehicle, a set
(four or five pieces) of slotted nozzles with extension lines for using
compressed air. It also is necessary to take into account that the
technical equipment of some surface-to-air missile systems has a large
number of hollow structures which can be used to carry supplies of
decontaminant solutions, for example in the beam and boom of transport-
loader vehicles, and in the outrigger mount of a vehicle crane.
We cannot dwell at length on the questions of organizing the
protection of the rear from weapons of mass destruction within the bounds
of one article. This problem requires special research. Further study of
the organization of the defense of rear troops and installations from
weapons of mass destruction, and verification of troop conclusions and
recommendations through exercises, undoubtedly will be conducive to
increasing the protection of armed forces personnel and equipment.
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