REQUESTS FOR GENERAL COUNSEL GUIDANCE FROM FEBRUARY 1974 TO PRESENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00823R000300040001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 182
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 29, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 4, 1976
• Content Type: MF

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4 May 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Security (PFM)
SUBJECT Requests for General Counsel Guidance
from February 1974 to present
REFERENCE Memorandum from Chief, Policy and Plans
Group, dated 27 April 1976, Same Subject
1. The submission of Office of Security requests
to the Office of General Counsel for guidance concerning
the legality of our activities and the Office of General
Counsel responses thereto from February 1974 to'the present
are attached.
2. The information is organized in chronological
order with responses attached to the queries, and is
placed in four major categories. The first category is,
Firearms, the second is Investigations, the third is
Polygraph and the fourth is Miscellaneous.
Attachment
STAT
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 IVO Al
TSP
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S P- ,Yo-7.e, 27 April 1976
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ie o lcy an lans Group
SUBJECT : Requests for General Counsel Guidance
legality or propriety of specific OS activities. ,he
1. In the course of its inspection of the Office
of Security currently underway, the Office of the
Inspector General has expressed an interest in how
often the Office of Security has sought guidance from-
the Office of General Counsel with respect to the
- r irs7e-s
have leviepon OGC as well as the OGC
2. It would be appreciated if you would research
this topic not only from the standpoint of those re-
quests originated by PPG and filed in OS Registry, but
also anything falling into this area initiated by other
components of the Office, especially the PSI Directorate.
3. Our deadline to complete this project is close
of business 30 April.
G'e, 1 : 44 a 6 ~ /5'74/
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22 August 1974
I'4E iORA,'3Dt 1 FOR; General Counsel
SUBJECT : Firearms Authority of Central
Intelligence Agency
REFERENCES A. 50 U.S.C.A. 403f. Sec. 5
(attached)
B. Headquarters Regulation
b (1) and b. (3)
(attached)
C. Memorandum from Assistan General
Counsel Idated-
24 June
(attached)
D. Public Law 90-331, Section 2 and
Section 3056 of Title 18-of the
United States Code
(attached)
E. Memorandum from Secretary of
Treasury, George P. Shultz,
dated 27 November 1972
(attached)
1. The general authorities set forth in the public law
establishing the Central Intelligence Agency (Reference A),,
re f lect that Agency employees may "carry firearm when _
engaged in transportation of confidential documents and
materials affecting the national defense and security." Agency
internal regulations (Reference B) further clarify this au-
thority, establish specific guidelines regarding circumstances
under which a firearm may be issued and delineate rules for
employee training and weapon accountability. A 1969 me_n-oran-
durn (Reference C) from the General Counsel to the Director of
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Ioyees to carry
Security, affirms the authority of Agency erm
weapons when engaged in sensitive courier operations and.
definitively outlines the limitations and responsibilities
imposed on such persons.
2. In addition to the clearly authorized armed escort
of extremely sensitive documents and materials., the Office of
Security has traditionally extended the use of armed personnel
to three other specific activities: physical protection of-.
the Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DCI
Security Staff ; 25X1A
human repositories of a tremendous volume of highly classified
i for .t ^z:. --?t ths- oar time, there is considerable evidence
to suggest that the threat of assassination, kidnapping or
3.. In justification of its policy of providing armed
agents for the physical protection of the DCI and DDCI, the .
Office of Security has applied the rationale that they are
physical harassment of the Director and Deputy Director is a
very real one.
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5. `In the light of recent developments, the Office of
Security has examined many of its activities with a view
toward determining their propriety and strict legality.
Accordingly, as in actual practice most of the domestic use
of firearms by Agency personnel falls to employees of the
Office of Security, you are requested to provide a profes-
sional opinion as to whether or not representatives of this
Of ice are acting within the scope or their official and
legal authority when they carry firearms to protect the
2.5X1.
Public Law 90-331, Section 2 (Reference D). to the protective
activities of employees of this Office.
.6. Consistent with your answers to the above questions,
you are also requested to clarify the status as to personal -
legal and financial culpability of a properly trained employee
who is directed to carry a weapon in connection with his
official assignment and who, acting in a reasonable and prudent
ictarsaer in response zv a re T. ar ap~-~arenz zrtreat? czscnarges
such firearm causing injury, death or property damage.
7. For your information, recent research has developed.
that the oft quoted memorandum (Reference E) from Secretary
of the Treasury, Shultz to all Cabinet Officers which im-plies
that each Department has the authority to establish its own
protective force, has no basis in statute law or'fox;tal-
executive order. Rather it apparently resulted from a
conversation between President Nixon and John Dean wherein
Dean was charged with taking the necessary steps to implement
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generated by Dean.
such a program. However, it has been deter ?ned that
Dean's subsequent conversation with Secretory Shult: (which
precipitated Reference E) was the only follow-up action
Charles W. Kane
Director of Security
Atta
Distribution
Moe- --Ori.i~ AddresTsee,--
1 - D/ Sec
1 -- DD/PTOS
1 - DD/PSI
1 - C/PhySD
I tf
DCI Sec Stf .6 Aug 74
-. 4-
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30JAI1
NE4O ,e1'3LU24 FOR: General Counsel
SUBJECT
yirear='Authority of Central
Intelligence Agency
1. Reference is made to my nemorandus of 22 August -1974
uher-ain ' -request your opinion regarding, the f .rearas
authority of the Central; Intelligence Agency as it. relates
to f.rear being carried by Office of Security personnel.:
2. This Office realizes the volume of requests. that- are
currently being levied on your Office, however, your opinion
on-this particular question is needed and your early responses
would be -appreciated.
Charles
Director. of Security ;:
STATI NTL
STATINTL
ep (29 JANUARY 'l975)
s r3 u Ion;
?Orig & 1 -'Adse
1 - D/Security
1 - DD
a--I''- OS egistry..
I DD/PfiM Chrono
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cu A~
OGC 75-0685
25 February 1975
OGp 25X1
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tour teen other comparable statutes located in the United
MEMORANDUM FOR: Charles W. Kane, Director of Security
SUBJECT: Firearms Authority of Central Intelligence Agency
1. You have requested the opinion of this Office as to the legality of a
number of current practices of the Office of Security involving the use of _
firearms and as to the liability of an employee who discharges a firearm
causing injury, death or property damage. The practices about which you
make inquiry are the use of armed personnel for the physical protection of
the Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, 25X1A
order ot presentation.
personnel in the agency concerned to simply "carry firearms" or to "carry
firearms in the discharge of their official duties." More restrictive terms
are found in the case of the Departments of Defense and State. Certain
civilians in the Department of Defense may carry firearms while assigned
investigative duties or such other duties as the Secretary of Defense may
prescribe. Designated security officers of the Department of State are
authorized to carry firearms for the purpose of protecting heads of foreign
states and other distinguished visitors to the United States, the Secretary
and Under Secretary of State, and representatives of governments attendin
international conferences, and also for performing special missions
States Code, twelve are phrased in broad terms, authorizing certain
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instances to deal expansively and in certain related instances to deal
restrictively, it must be assumed that the limits set out in the restrictive
cases are intended by design and are not the result of inadvertence.
4. The CIA relationship with the Secret Service arising under Public
Law 90-331 is governed by the terms of the agreement between the Secret
Service and the CIA signed in October and. November 1971. Under the terms
of that agreement, CIA officers and employees would only be detailed to
augment the capacity of the Secret Service to perform its protective duties
if, and when, requested by the Director of the Secret Service. However,
as an ongoing service in aid of the Secret Service protective function, CIA
is committed to furnish information that comes into its possession pertaining
to individuals or groups that may prove a threat to the persons the Service
protects. It should be noted that the undertaking to furnish information
pertains only to the Agency's statutory responsibilities in the field of
foreign intelligence. The agreement thus comports with the policy set out
in HN 125 April 1974) wherein it is stated that it is unnecessary to
review as a questionable activity agreements to furnish assistance to
Government components in the form of passage of information concerning
foreign phenomena.
CONFIDr.- 11! "IN L
OGC
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5. Your final inquiry concerns the liability of an employee who causes
injury, death or property damage through the discharge of a firearm while
he is acting within the scope of his employment. The key to answering this
question is determining whether or not the employee actually is acting within
the scope of his employment. There are cases where the individual is not
acting within the scope of his employment when he causes personal injury
or property damage and in these cases the individual alone is liable. The
case of an individual making use of a Government-issued firearm during
off-duty hours for strictly private pursuits is clearly a case of acting outside
the scope of his employment. However, it is possible that behavior on the
part of an employee that is completely at variance with the terms of his
employment may be determined to be outside the scope of his employment
even though the actions giving rise to injury or damage take place during
the time and at the location where he is to be on duty. Just how complete
a departure from the line of duty must take place before it may be determined
that an employee is acting outside the scope of his employment is difficult
to define in advance or without reference to a particular fact situation. It is
sufficient to say that whether or not an employee was acting within the scope
of his employment is often itself the subject of litigation in a tort action and
that, if the individual is determined to have acted outside the scope of his.
employment, he alone, and not the Government, is liable.
6. However, when the individual is acting within the scope of his
employment, the United States is also liable in the same manner as a private
party under like circumstances. (28 U . S . C . 2674) A point to be borne in
mind is that the individual is liable and remains so even though the United
States is also liable. The common law rule that an agent, or employee, is
liable for his own tort even though the principal, or master, is also liable
remains in effect unless the law has been modified by statute. Such a statute
does exist in the case of personal injury or property damage resulting from
the operation of a motor vehicle while the employee was acting within the
scope of his Government employment. In such a case, suit against the United
States is an exclusive remedy and no civil action may be brought against the
employee or his estate. (28 U .S .C . 2679) However, when an employee is
acting within the scope of his employment and causes personal injury or
property damage in a situation not involving the operation of a motor vehicle,
he and the Government are liable. Normally, however, in such cases suit
is brought against the Government alone or against the Government and .
employee as co-defendants. If judgment is returned against the employee
and the Government jointly, it is to be expected that the Government alone
would pay the judgment in full. It has been the policy of Government not to
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CO F!DE ILALt.(
penalize an employee for his negligence other than through whatever disci-
plinary or personnel action the individual agency may take on its mvn initiative.
Judgment in an action against the Government alone or against the Government
and employee jointly, acts as a complete bar to any subsequent action against
the employee alone. (28 U .S .C . 2676) As a practical matter, then, it can be
said that when an individual commits a tort while acting within the scope of
his employment as a Government employee, it is to be expected that the burden
of defense will fall most heavily on the Government, that, if there is a judgment
in favor of the plaintiff, it will be paid in full by the Government, and that the
judgment itself will act as a bar against further action against the employee
alone.
NTI L
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V of ?y raph to '00a-SO
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OS/PSI/SSD/IB:lw (31 May 1974)
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FOREIGN OPERATIONS AND GOVERNMENT INFORMA,.T~ON SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
'S June 1974
Testimony of Harold L. Brownman, Deputy Director for Manage-
ment and Services, Central Intelligence 'Agency
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee.
The Central Intelligence Agency is happy to be of all
possible assistance to the Committee and its staff concern-
ing the CIA's use of the polygraph. This opening statement
has been prepared with that thought in mind. However, we.
believe that an executive session of the Committee for the
ensuing question period will permit us to more freely re-
spond since we may have to touch upon classified matters
in satisfaction of your questions. May we request, Mr.
Chairman, that the question and answer period of this
hearing be held in executive session.
The CIA.is familiar with the recommendations of this
Committee which were made in its Tenth Report, including
the recommendation that an interagency committee be
established to study problems posed by the Federal Govern-
ment's use of polygraphs and to work out solutions to those
problems. ,
In the years 1964 to the present, the CIA has attempted.
to comply with your recommendations and with the spirit of
the recommendations made by the interagency committee.
The CIA, as an Agency with an intelligence mission, uses
the polygraph in its applicant security screening program.
All positions in the Agency are sensitive within the criteria
established in Executive Order 10450. All full-time,
permanent employees of the Agency possess Top Secret
clearances.
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The Director of Central Intelligence has put out a
Directive governing our use of the polygraph. Under the
terms of this Directive, a copy of which has been pro-
vided the Committee,
The Director of Security is responsible for
the supervision and training of polygraph exam-
iners and for'the conduct of the polygraph
program of the CIA. He is charged by the DCI
with the responsibility of insuring.that the
highest standards of operating procedures and
equipment capability are established.
The polygraph is used in the CIA as an aid
to investigation for determining the security
eligibility of persons for employment by or
assignment to the Agency; staff-like access to
sensitive Agency installations; utilization in
operational situations; or continued access to
classified information where implications of a
security nature or investigative information
require clarifying security interviews.
The polygraph is not used on official or
administrative matters involving possible
malfeasance, or for the sole purpose of
determining violations of the criminal laws
of any country.
If a polygraph examination involved a ques-
tion pertaining to the violation of a criminal
law, the individual would be informed of his
privilege against self-incrimination and his
right to consult with legal counsel or other
professional assistance prior to the examina-
tion. Notification of such rights would be
formally recorded.
Each applicant for employment is notified, at
the time he is given application forms, of the
intent to use a polygraph examination in the
course of his employment processing. A copy of
this form has been provided to this Committee.
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Ile is told, before testing, the general content
of all questions which he will be asked. The ques-
tions, since they are couched in broad terms, are
discussed carefully with the applicant and the
examiner works with the applicant to tailor the
question to his/her age, sex and background.' All
the testing procedures are explained.
Before a person undergoes a polygraph examina-
tion, his consent is obtained in writing.
If an applicant asks, he is told if the
polygraph examination-is being monitored-or
recorded.
Before an applicant is polygraphed, he has
been interviewed by representatives of the office
of Personnel and. Office of Medical Services. .A
security field investigation has also been
initiated. Guidance from the Office of Personnel
and the Medical Staff is routinely provided to
the Office of Security if any information has
been developed as a result of their screening
procedures that might preclude the advisability
of conducting a polygraph interview.
The Director of Security is responsible for
establishment'of adequate safeguards designed
to prevent unwarranted invasion of privacy.
All questions must have specific relevance to
the person being polygraphed, and to the purpose
of that particular test.
Examinerts instructions have been prepared
in sensitive question areas to ensure that persons
undergoing polygraph interrogation are not sub-
jected to questioning about irrelevant, unwarranted
or trivial matters. The interview is not used to
probe a person's thoughts about conduct which has
no security implications; e.g., religious beliefs,.
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practices, and affiliations; opinions 'Tegarding
racial matters; political activities or organi-
zational affiliations of a nonsubversive nature;
and personal views concerning proposed or exist-
ing legislation.
The Director of Security maintains separate
files for information obtained during polygraph
examinations. By separate we mean separate from
Security files as well as separate from Personnel
files and, of course, we do not put any polygraph
derived information on computers or in computer
data banks. Polygraph information is released
only to appropriate Agency officials when it has
a direct bearing on a decision to be-made. by
that official.
Polygraphed acquired information can only be,
released outside the Agency after a determination
has been made, which is approved by the Director
or Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, that
such a release is necessary in the interest of
national security.
I feel it would be appropriate here to make three basic.
points..
The polygraph examiner makes no recommendation
as to the security suitability or status of the
person tested.
The polygraph report is evaluated as but one
element of the total investigative record.
At no time is security action taken solely
on the basis of the polygraph charts.
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Moving from procedures into the research area, you
recall that one of this Committeets primary recommendations
was that a program of research on polygraph be undertaken
to investigate the validity and reliability of the procedure..
We are conducting such a program.
. Reliability; defined as consistency of interpretation
of polygraph charts, has been looked at by means-of exam-
iner agreement studies. Agreement figures from our studies
are comparable to figures from similar studies of other
groups interpreting data germane to their specialties.
On the other hand, validity--or the degree to.which
polygraph charts-measure what they purport to measure--has
been a more difficult issue to evaluate. Satisfactory in-
dependent criteria for validating real life conditions are.
scarce, and the differences in polygraph subject attitudes
between real life and laboratory conditions have prevented
much headway through laboratory experiments. The data so
far available have not been disappointing, but they are
limited, and we still lack an appropriate scientific base
for any conclusions.
We also investigated validity in the sense of utility--
the degree to which the polygraph program does what it is
intended to do. As you can see from this chart, in each
year since 1964 a significant number of security dis-
approvals of applicants who were processed to the point
of the polygraph interview has been due to the polygraph
.portion of our security processing.
Alternative sensors have been evaluated--for example,
a more sophisticated electrodermal sensor; impedance rather
than mechanical sensors; electromyography;-electroencephalo-
graphy; microvibration; electrooculography; pulse-wave
velocity; and cardiotachometry. We can generally state
that while many of these alternatives show some promise,-
they have not shown sufficient practical promise to cause
us to modify our present instrumentation. This does not
close the door on new parameter research: This is a
continuing process.
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We have shifted to a different model of polygraph
instrument than the one we were using at the time of the
last hearing, and we feel it is mechanically superior:
We are continuing to evaluate new instrumentation as it
becomes commercially available, and we are continuing our
own search for improved instrumentation.
We have developed a computer system which was utilized
heavily in the previously mentioned studies of reliability
and of mathematical modelling of examiner performance. We
were also, naturally, interested in determining the computer
system's practical utility as an additional parameter to
actual polygraph operations. Utilizing all that was learned
during the evolution of our experimental arrangement, we
have full specifications for constructing a dedicated com-
puter system to assist the examiner in chart interpretation.
We are now in the process of evaluating the cost-effectiveness
of the. dedicated computer system.
Preliminary efforts have been undertaken in the field
of countermeasures to polygraphy. We have plans fora long-
range systematic program studying the possibilities in this
field, but of course results are not yet available on these
studies.
Voice analysis has drawn our attention. We have been
interested in this field for several years, and have been
monitoring research in this area conducted by other institu-
tions. We do not believe that research to date has been
exhaustive or conclusive and, accordingly, we are planning
our own analysis of its possibilities. This project is
still in its developmental state.
In conclusion, it should be made clear that we feel
this Committee, in looking into polygraph procedures,. has
performed a very useful function. It has stimulated much
needed research by our Agency and has made us take a
careful look at our procedures. And now, Mr. Chairman,
may we request executive session for the question and
answer period.
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6
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24JUL1974
E:O?,.MDUM FO's; General Counsel
TE OUCH Deputy Director for : anagem t
and Services
SUBJECT t Monitoring and Recording of
Polygraph Tests
1. The Agency uses polygraph testing as a routine
procedure in applicant processing and may ask eployees
to participate in polygraph testing from time to time.
2. Some of these polygraph tests are tape recorded.
and all of them are monitored, oa a spot-check basis,
without knowledge of the person interviewed. We have
be--
4-for--jrl by your of?ice that this practice is not
in keeping with a 4 September 1973 letter fro the
Attorney General which requires consent of an individual
before private conversations can be monitored or recorded.
Also, CIA has been asked recently by the House Subcom=ittoe
on Government Operations and Information why it did not
routinely inform individuals that the polygraph interview
may be monitored and recorded.
3. In satisfaction of both of these issues, the
Office of Security proposes modification of its polygraph.
agreements as shown on the attached copies. Your con-
currence is requested.
Charles W. Kane
Director of Security
Atts
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 0 A ut is 1474
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POLYGRAPH AGREEMENT
an applicant for
employment with the Central Intelligence Agency, understand that
the Agency uses Polygraph testing as a routine procedure and that
every employee of the Agency will be requested to participate in.
Polygraph tests from time to time. Having been informed of my
rights under the Constitution, I agree, of my own free will and with-
out any compulsion, duress, or promise of reward or immunity, to
an interview with officials of the Central Intelligence Agency, during
which I will participate in Polygraph tests, and I consent to the
'monitoring'and recording of these tests for the purpose of accuracy.
I have read the foregoing and fully understand its import.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I place my signature below, this
day of 19 .
The above was read and signed in my presence this day of
19 .
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POLYGRAPH AGREEMENT
I, , an employee of the
Central Intelligence Agency, understand that the Agency uses Poly-
graph testing as a routine procedure and that every employee of the
Agency will be requested to participate in Polygraph tests from time
to time. Having been informed of my rights under the Constitution,
I agree, of my own free will and without any compulsion, duress, or
promise of reward or immunity, to an interview with officials of the
Central Intelligence Agency, during which I will participate in Poly-
graph tests, and I consent to the monitoring and recording of
these tests for the purpose of accuracy. _
I have read the foregoing and fully understand its import.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I place my signature below, this
day of 19 .
The above was read and signed in my presence this day of
19 .
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" 4 f7" 374
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA : Deputy. Director for Management-
and Services
Deputy Director. for Science
and Technology
Director of Medical Services
General Counsel
Legislative Counsel
FROM : Director of Security
SUBJECT : Release of Material on the Agencyts
Use of Polygraph to the House
Committee on Government Operations
1, ' Action Requested : It is requested that you
approve the attac e unclassified responses to questions
asked of the Agency following the 5 June 1974 testimony
on polygraph before the Foreign Operations and Government
Information Subcommittee, House Government Operations
Committee.
2. ' Basic Data:
a, On 5 June 1974 Mr. Harold L. Brownman,
Deputy Director for Management and Services,
testified before the Foreign Operations and
Government Information Subcommittee on the
use of polygraph within CIA. The Agency
received follow-up questions during the
month 'of July.
b,' We have drafted the attached material
for your consideration and propose its use as
the required response,
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3. Staff Position: We believe this material is
responsive to the Committee's request. It was coordinated
with the Director of Medical Services and the Office of
Research and Development, DD/S&T.
4. Recommendation: In view of the above, it is
recommende t at you approve the use of the attached
material as the Agency's response to the July questions
of the Subcommittee.
ar es IV. Kane
Director of Security
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QUESTIONS FOR THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
1. what is the nature of research by CIA into the subject
of polygraph testing and have inquiries been made to
DOD to ensure that there is no duplication of that,
department's research effor t?
2. What are the results of the research already performed,
and what research is currently under.itia_y or planned for
early performance?
3. Are there any peculiar training requirements for CIA
polygraph examiners that require an in-house training
program, separate from those of the FBI or the Army?
4. Are individuals who undergo polygraph tests tolci of*
the results of those tests and of the conclusions of
the examiner?
5. Why is the individual undergoing the polygraph test
told, only if he inquires, whether or not the examination
is being monitored or recorded?
6. In fiscal year 1974 has information from or the results
of CIA.-administered polygraph tests been made known to
other Federal agencies or offices in the Executive
Branch? Under what circumstances?
7. Is it a requirement, prior to an individual. being given
a polygraph test, that he be examined by a physician and
by a psychiatrist or psychologist? Are such examinations
more than an interview?
S. 11.ould you recom;send such prerequisite examinations be
adopted Government-wide, by all agencies administering
polygraph tests?
9. To what extent are full and free discussions by CIA
personnel with the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board inhibited by the fact that neither the
members of that board nor its Executive Secretary nor
any of the Board's employees must take and pass a
polygraph test as a condition of appointment or enployi;tent?
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Questions for the CIA
IG.
nthy is it necessary for CIA to use polygraphs for pro-
cr.mloyi:;cnt screening ,when the' State and Defense Dc-
part,ments and the FBI do not believe it is necessary
for their many sensitive jobs?
Il- The top two officials of CIA. are not required to
under, go polygraph testing yet all other CIA official s
and employees are. What possible justification could
there be for testing 'all the Indians but not the two,
biggest Chiefs?
12. What arc your views on the advantages that could accrue
i --I- f-. c ne%nci I- -;I +.. r--
ani
a
i
eav es ~ ?
v t .
~
ng
were to be assigned to one agency
consolidated
t a
,
a
ne
or two locations, and standardized as to length, course-
content, and examining techniques?
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1. The CIA's polygraph research effort was comprised
of an internal data collection program and an external
experimental program. The internal program's goals
were: (a.) to develop a technology to objectively
measure 'and. classify the polygraph signals and-
4tk
(b) to assess the utility, reliability and validity
of the polygraph to. the Agency in its security
practices for employment screening. The external program
examined: (a) new sensors; (b) alternate modes of
question presentation and/or subject response; and
(c) various analytic techniques for chart interpretation.
The external studies also addressed the issues of
reliability and validity.
The external research effort was coordinated with
DOD through attendance at meetings of the Joint
Services'Group established by the DOD to monitor
research. Though the data base of the internal research
program was not shared with the DOD members, they
were kept apprised of technical developments and
problems.-
2. Though Agency sponsorship of the external research
effort was often classified, the work itself was
not'and the bulk of it has been placed in the
public domain through reports in professional and
scientific journals. The decision to publish 'or
not was 'left to. the principal investigators who conducted
the'studies.- By and large, the studies demonstrated
that:, (a.) there is a rational and scientific
basis for polygraph; (b) the polygraph'is an effective
detector of'stress (though clearly not infallible);
and (c.) while several new sensors showed promise,
none was sufficiently so to warrant changes.
The results of the internal research program are
based on data pertaining to Agency operations and
they therefore have not been disseminated to DOD elements
generally. NSA has been briefed on the internal program.
The current research effort will examine techniques
to identify attempted countermeasures. This program was
only recently undertaken and there are no results thus far.
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 3.
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This question must be answered in three parts.
(A) There are no peculiar training requirements
that require an in-house training program
separate from those of the FBI or the Army
when training is considered to be limited
to familiarization.with the mechanical
aspects of instrumentation, instrument
operation and chart interpretation.
(B) For our needs, the training of an individual
must be integrated into a closely supervised,
carefully progressive on-the-job program
before a determination can be made that he is
qualified. We can only do this in-house.
(C) There are also peculiar training requirements
which indicate the advisability of a CIA
in-house training program when the full
scope of application of the polygraph
program in CIA is considered. CIA
polygraph officers are also intelligence
officers and they are required to support
the clandestine foreign intelligence
operations of the Agency by testing foreign
agent assets. This concept is worked
into-the training program, from the very
outset of training, as an integral part
of the procedure. Interview formats, test
construction, and recommended procedures
for the varied situations involved in agent
testing are assembled from training
materials and charts derived from actual
agent interviews. Ethnic and cultural
considerations are woven into the training
program from its inception so that CIA
examiners are offered a totality of
preparation for all ranges of possible
work experience. Further, CIA polygraph
officers are provided courses in intelligence
trade craft, operational procedures, and
counterintelligence activities. It has
been CIA experience that non-CIA polygraph
training has not served to satisfy the
overall needs of the CIA polygraph program,
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4. No,
5. The polygraph interview situation itself serves
as a disturbing stimulus to many people and the
additional apprehension which may accompany the
knowledge that they are being recorded or
monitored is counter productive to the efforts.
of the polygraph examiner to put the individual
at ease. For this reason only, the information
is not volunteered by the polygraph examiner to
each individual. The individual is told
truthfully whether or not the interview is being
monitored or recorded whenever the question
is asked.
Following discussions with the Subcommittee on
this issue, the Agency has initiated a procedure
whereby each applicant will be informed in
writing prior to polygraph interview that the
polygraph test may be monitored and recorded
for purposes of accuracy, We plan on including
a statement to this effect in the polygraph
agreement which is provided to each applicant
before the test. A copy of the modified
polygraph agreement is attached. This proposal
has now been presented to our Office of General
Counsel for coordination,
6. CIA releases information derived from polygraph
tests only on request of federal employers. In
fiscal year 1974, CIA disseminated information
resulting from CIA polygraph tests in 7 cases.
In each case, the individual involved was employed
or assigned in a civilian or military capacity
to a federal department or agency involved in
sensitive intelligence affairs or requiring
sensitive information in the national interest.
Authorization to release this information was
obtained in each case from the Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence. Subsequent to the
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authorization, information was passed verbally
through established security channels for
investigative lead processing only. The receiving
department,or agency. was then to conduct-its
own independent-investigation to substantiate
the lead provided by CIA.
7. This question must'-be answered in two parts.
(A) The procedure followed by CIA in processing
an applicant :for employment has been
structured so that physical examinations
and psychiatric screenings are performed.
prior to the polygraph interview..
(B.) The examinations are more than interviews.
The examinations are good physical examinations'
which assist in the determination whether or
not the applicant is physically fit for that
category of duty for which he is contemplated.
Applicants-are also psychiatrically screened.
Where a mental problem is indicated, a full-
fledged evaluation is made..
8. Although-the CIA orders its processing so that
all candidates for employment are, first given medical
examinations and'screened psychiatrically and believes
this is a 'sound procedure, the 'CIA .refrains from - _
commenting on procedures of.other government agencies
in administeiing polygraph :tests and from recommending
a course of action-to be adopted government wide.
9. Full and free discussions by. CIA personnel with the
PFIAB are not in any way. inhibited by. '.the fact that
associated personnel are not polygraphed as a
condition of employment or appointment.:
10. The CIA respectfully refrains.-from comment on the
applicant processing procedures of the Department of State,
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the Defense Department and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. The CIA has found the use of the
polygraph to be a positive assistance in
employment screening and personnel investigation.
The loss of the polygraph program would have a
negative and undesirable effect on the continued
secure operations of the Agency.
11. There are only two positions in CIA filled by the
President by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate. These appointees are subject to
whatever screening procedures may be prescribed by
the President, or suggested by Congress and approved
by the President. Therefore, it does not seem
appropriate that CIA require additional screening
procedures, such as the polygraph test, for these
appointees.
12. There are some advantages that could accrue if
responsibility for polygraph examiner training
were to be consolidated and standardized. Among
these are:
Selection of best training personnel available.
Establishment of criteria for examiner
qualifications..
A better overview of government's polygraph
requirements and applications.
A potential for contact with commercial efforts
on polygraph research, developments and
application.
A pooling of experience.
A focal point for-government sponsored polygraph
research, development and application.
A possible financial advantage.
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.A consolidated school would, of necessity, be-
limited to presenting a general curriculum of"poly--
graph training not designed to accommodate special
requirements unique to a specific government agency.
As explained in our response to Question 3, a
general curriculum divorced from our particular needs
and separated from our on-the-job capabilities would
be inefficient and time-wasting.
As to disadvantages:
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 Approved -
POLYGRAPH AGREEMENT
an applicant for
employment with the' Central Intelligence Agency, understand that
the Agency uses Polygraph testing as a routine procedure and that
every employee of the Agency will be. requested to participate in
Polygraph tests from time to time. Having been informed of my
rights under the Constitution, I agree, of my own free will and with-
but any compulsion, duress, or promise of reward or immunity, to
an interview with officials of the Central Intelligence Agency, during
which I will participate in Polygraph. tests, and I consent to the
monitoring'and'recording of these tests for the purpose of accuracy.
I have read the foregoing and fully understand its import. _
IN TVITNESS WHEREOF, I place my signature below, this
day of 19
The above was read and signed in my presence this day of
19
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 POLYGRAPH AGREEMENT
I, ' an employee of the
Central Intelligence Agency, understand that the Agency uses Poly-
promise of reward or immunity, to an interview with officials of the
I agree, of my own free will and without any compulsion, duress, or
to time Having been informed of my rights under the Constitution,
Agency will be requested to participate in Polygraph tests from time
graph testing as a routine procedure and that every employee of the
Central Intelligence Agency, during which I will participate in Poly
these tests for the?purpose of accuracy.
I have read the foregoing and fully understand its import.
graph tests, and I consent to the monitoring and recording of
day of I9 ?
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I place my signature below, this
The above was read and signed in my presence this day of
X9 -
? Signature r ; i = =E .
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r. ~ ri2g
?'" 1139
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OCC 74-1408
22 August 1974
MEMORY 'NTDU,.1 FOR: Director of Security
SUBJECT Proposed Revision of Poly graph Questions
1. The proposed revision of polygraph questions has been reviewed
by this Office. as requested. It is understood that the intent of the revision
is to broaden the definition of the type: of organization and activities partici-
pation in which is of interest to this Agency.
2. To the extent that some of the questions seem to emphasize interest
in more association with the proscribed group, they do not confirm to the spirit
of Executive Order 11785 (Tab A) nor with Civil Service Commission Bulletin
731-1 and attachment (Tab B). These directives make it clear that mere member--
ship in a subversive organization is not a proper test of employee suitablli_t.~,y.
'Flie important factor is membership with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of
the C}rgenization and with pecific intent to carry out its unlawful purpose.
3. Proposed question c makes mere membership in a Communist
organization the subject of the inquiry. This is in conflict with Section 2
Of the attached Executive Order, which states that the listing of subversive
organizations is abolished and shall not be used for any purpose.
`i. Proposed question 6 ensh::'1;;es wilt by association. The inquirjr,
should he Cli.rected at an intent to carry out an unlawful purpose.
5. These, considerations warrant furl e2' revision or add tion to the
set of polygvaph questions. If assistance in drafting questions would be useful,
please contact this Office again.
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 . r}
.SECRET'
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M N U1i FOR: Deputy Director for Admdaiitr atioa
THROB nxal Gasei
FROM Direptorl. of Security
SUWEQ Stzada?d. Ageaxcy Age Policy . f
volunteer to tae a polygraph examihation and-be cleared for
Top Secret, . Historically this has happened in every case.
X11 female applicants 19 or over a routinely polygrapl ed
dting their entrant. *m duty processing.,-.
The current policy.-far iali2; under 19 years of ag*
is that a redicael approval must be obtained before polygraph..
however, it is pointed out that the Office of Sc;curit)r .soi.i.cyr
Is that no one is pelygraphed? until -affter a me iical approval
is given to insure there are no problems la this area prior
to conducting such tests.
Girls whz~ are- -113- years of age, but not l9*. ._.
3.
10A
Foss o a acail, etc. Howev+r, no questions concerning
ho sexual activity are asked.
y
natters such as ctanneetion with foreitn inatelli.gence, comes=
4
Appli t Polygraphs -
I. Action Ra- u sted: It is requested that you approve
Office or Security pa cy that all applicants will be
routinely afforded a polygraph axaminatioa at age 1S.
2. 'a a : Currently female applicants under
181 -years oxage are cleated through Secret only and they
are not polygraphed. Upon entering on duty, they are given
,
a brief security terriew which covers important securit
QS 4 2107
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3. Staff Position: Since 18 years is now generally
considere to be the age of adulthood for most purposes,
it is felt Agency policy should recognize this fact and
require polygraphs of all applicants who are at least 18
years of age, regardless. of sex..
4. Recommendation: It-is recommended that you approve
the following taro e ements.concerning Agency polygraph policy:
a. All applicants who are 18 years of age will
be afforded a polygraph examination on a routine'basis
following a medical approval..
b. The policy of not polygraphing any applicant
under age 18 shall continue. Applicants under age 18
will be afforded a security.. interview which will cover
the important security concerns. Upon reaching age 18
these individuals will be afforded a polygraph interview.
CONCURRENCE:
15 o n Warner
~Gener l Counsel
DISAPPROV9
Distribution:
Original - Return to OS
2.- DD/A
1 - General Counsel
Charles W. Kane
Director ofSecurity.
9 OC-1974
24 October 1974
Date.
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MEMORANDUM FOR: I)irector.of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT Reactivation of the CIA Reinvestigation
Polygraph Program
1. This memorandum is for information only.
2. The CIA Reinvestigation Polygraph Program was
inaugurated in 1957 and it developed into a significant
Polygraph Program until 1966 when it was suspended. The
suspension came about as other more critical demands were
being made on CIA polygraph resources which resulted in
mannower.being dedicated STATINTL
3. Conditions have stabilized and it is now possible
to"resume the Reinvestigation Polygraph Program on an
Agency-wide basis. The intent of this-Program is to focus
on repolygraphing two categories of personnel: 1) all
CIA employees currently undergoing background investigation
4. To insure that this Program is administered in a
fair and equitable manner, grade or position will have no
bearing on any aspect of the Program. All CIA personnel
i e sceue ora
reinvestigation polygraph examination.
OS 59573
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A V
 lY yL `3. ..., .~ .. , 1 , ;
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5. Apropos to your approval on 12 March 197S for
reactivating the polygraph portion of the Reinvestigation
Program the Office'of Security has resumed the Program
for its personnel and approximately 200 staff employees
have been successfully and'favorably repolygraphed. This
has proven to-be a sound and beneficial security program
and I have asked' the 'Office of Security to. reinitiate the
Repolygraph Program on an Agency-wide basis in the immediate
future.
1,51
John F. Blake-
Deputy Director
for
Administration
Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Adse
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - D/DCI/NIO
1 D/D.CI/IC
I - DDS FAT
1 - DD/Q-
1 - DD/ I.
1 - General Counsel
1 - Inspector'General
2 - DD/A
1 - D/Security
1 - D/Security
1 - OS Registry
1 - C/SSD
1
STATINTL OS/PSI/SSD/I pd (21 November 1975)
Retyped: jm r 1975)
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7 January 1976
f. OR.ANDUM FOR: Office of General Counsel
SUBJECT Department of Defense
Polygraph Policy
1. Reference is made to the conversation of this data
STATINTL
between F- I of
this Office.
2. This will confirm our verbal request of this date
that your office review Department of Defense Directive
95210.43 dated 6 October 1975 to ascertain if the previous
procedure for requesting an appropriate exemption from the
U. S. Civil Service Commission to permit this office to ad-
minister polygraph examinations for Department of Defense
military and civilian personnel detailed to this Agency is
still necessary and/or appropriate. In this'connection, a
copy of the above cited DoDD and copies of previous correspon-
dence between your office and the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense are attached.
3. In the event that you find it necessary to request
an exemption, it is understood that your office will initiate
s ame.
4. Please contact I.Tr. of this STATINTL
office in the event thac nave any ues ions concerning
STATOTHR the foregoing o
STATIN L
0,/,2.76
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MEMORANDUM. FOR THB. RECORD, :
SUBJECT:: Repolygraph Program:-..Miranda Rights :....
program.
'Associate General Counsel, to discuss the
the Miranda Rights - doctrine to the Agency's repolygraph
Messrsb_ John Warner,*.' General Counsel; and STATINTL
On 30: December 1975,'-,at my uesi, .
-2. After 'briefly discussing the: repolygraph prograr.:
and..the three categories of cases which we: could conceivrt--
'ably.-expect as a result of the program,: specific-circum-
stances under which Miranda-Rights would be explained to
employees- were pursued.' The, three categories. of cases: are
as follows:
a. Cases. In, which there .is no prior knowledge = =,
that" an -employee has engaged in. any uniawfui~ or , ..
improper conduct;
4 b. Cases in which the individual, is in a. ..R
limited category.?of.individuals-concerning whom -..
there is some- prior. knowledge that one or more of .:.:=
them may have been involved in' an illegal' or .=:Y.
improper act; -and-
c.? Cases: in:: which 'specific allegations ; have
3. There was much disciissioii -concerning the: legal
requirements for.an explanation of the:.Miranda Rights
be given to employees: in category c. Some doubt was regis-
tered as to the need-in category b, and'it was unanimous
that Miranda Rights were not required. iri category"a. How-:
ever,,-in order to treat all employees of the Agency exactly
the same with reference to the repolygraph program, 'I pro-
posed that the full Miranda Rights be explained to each
employee may. have been. involved in illegal; or im-
.proper activities.
been received by the Office of Security, that' Orr }
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individual prior to repolygraph. After an explanation. of.
the Miranda Rights,-the employee would be asked to sign
the current polygraph agreement, Form 1139. It was further
proposed that a recording be made of the Miranda Rights
discussion and retained only if the polygraph interview
surfaced information concerning illegal or improper activ-
ities. In those cases where the polygraph interview was.-
entirely favorable the tape would be immediately erased.
4. Mr. Warner agreed to the above procedure. He
advised further that this procedure would fulfill both the
legal requirement and the desire of the DCI that every
employee be fully informed of his rights under the Constitu-
tion.
S. I asked Mr. Warner for his opinion concerning the
propriety of continuing an interview to its logical conclu-
sion in the event information concerning illegal or improper
activity is disclosed in category a and b cases. I pointed
out that his recent memorandum to the Attorney General
implied immediate notification of the Department of Justice
when information was obtained concerning an illegal act by
an Agency employee. As a result of this letter it is unclear
when the notification of the Department of Justice must take
place. I noted further that common sense seemed to dictate
a continuation of the interview until a normal break brought
on by fatigue or failure of further cooperation of the inter-
viewee. To do otherwise would jeopardize our chances to
obtain essential information, especially in counterintelligence
cases. It appeared to me that the appropriate steps would be.
notification of Department of Justice or FBI and elements of
the Agency, such as Office of General Counsel and Inspector
General, at the conclusion of the initial interview. A decision
would then be made regarding subsequent interviews, by whom. the
interviews would be conducted, and further processing of the
case. It is clearly understood that in category c cases, the
Department of Justice and/or FBI would be informed prior to
interview.
6. Mr. Warner concurred in the proposal that the initial
polygraph interview be carried on to its logical conclusion
where information concerning illegal or improper activity is
developed and that notification of the FBI or Department of
Justice would be made subsequent to the initial interview in
category a and b cases.
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7. Mr. Warner suggested that the Office of Security
prepare a memorandum setting forth the conclusions reached
during our conversation and requesting concurrence by the
Office of General Counsel. This memorandum would then pro-
vide a record which would reflect agreed upon procedures
between the Office of Security and the Office of General
Counsel with reference to the Miranda Rights and notification
of the Department of Justice in connection with the repoly-
graph program.
Robert W. Gam ino..
Director of Security
Distribution:
Orig. - DD/PSI
1 - Chrono
1 - D/Security
GAMBINO:rjw (31 Dec 75)
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POLYGRAPH AGREEMENT
an employee of the
Central Intelligence Agency, understand that the Agency uses Poly-
graph testing as a routine procedure and that every employee of the
Agency will be requested to participate in Polygraph tests from time
to time. Having been informed of my rights under the Constitution,
I agree, of my own free will and without any compulsion, duress, or
promise of reward or immunity, to an interview with officials of the
Central Intelligence Agency, during which I will participate in Poly-
graph tests. I consent to the monitoring and recording of these tests
for the purpose of accuracy.
I have read the foregoing and fully understand its import.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I place my signature below, this
day of 19
Signature
The above was read and signed in my presence this day of
19
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MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel
: Deputy Director for Adn.inistration
SUBJECT Reinvestigation Polygraph
1: This memorandum is to confirm courses of action
which we discussed during the conference held in the office
of the Deputy General Counsel on 9 December 1975. The
problem discussed was the manner in which the Office of
Security would conduct reinvestigation polygraph interviews
of employees when derogatory information is uncovered.
Specifically, two different instances were discussed:
Situation a: Instances where allegations have been
received by the Of ce of Security which cast suspicion
upon an employee that he or she may have secret associations
with foreign intelligence or may have made serious
unauthorized disclosures of classified information, both
of which instances could involve violations of law.
Proposed Procedure: Under this circumstance, the
Office of Security understands that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation would be notified before any polygraph is
undertaken. Subsequent polygraph would be conducted in
coordination with the Federal Bureau of Investigation to
resolve the allegations.
Situation b: The other instance is where there is
no prior knowledge that an employee has any secret foreign
intelligence connections or has made a serious unauthorized
disclosure of classified information.
Proposed Procedure: If, during the pre-polygraph
interview or during the polygraph examination itself, an
employee reveals information concerning the above which may
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!`'
involve violations of law, the examiner will continue the
interview to obtain sufficient information to determine
generally what occurred. He will then advise Chief, Inter-
rogation Branch, who in turn will immediately notify senior
officers in the Office of Security. At this point appro-
priate action will be initiated to inform the Department of
Justice.
2. I am attaching a copy of our Polygraph. Agreement
Form 1139 and a sample copy of the dialogue used.by
polygraph examiners in briefing subjects prior to the
polygraph test.
3. 1 would appreciate your review and concurrence
with the proposed procedures listed above.
John S. Warner
General Counsel
Distribution:
Orig. -
Return
to OS via DD/A
2 -
General
Counsel
2 -
DD/A
Director of Security
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a ? - - -. - = G., :" tai J !tea'
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}lonora le ]3clla. S. Abziig, Chairwoman
Subco; Cit.? ttee or. Government Information and
Individual Rights
Co n.nittee on Covernnient Operations
l'Iousc of 1-1cpresentativcs
Wasaiinrrton, D. C. 20515
Dear 11M(2-a*ne Cl?airwworian:
5 FE B 1375 .
This is ir_ -epIy to your letter of 29 January 1970 submitting
a copy of tl:e report of the Committee on Government O.pperations,
Boise Report 94-795. entitled ':The Use of Polygraph ..nd Si rsilar-
.Dev ces b j Fec:e ral Agenciesr'and requesting certain comments
-concerning the = gency's continued use of the polygraph.
OLC 76-0273/a I
If legislaL on v as enacterl to prohibit the use of the polygr::pti
by all go-v- crnreL t agencies for all purposes as rcco:nm.; n lcc? on page
46 of the report, it wculd seriously impair the Director of Central
!!?' pl w l.i jcr'is t '.3i1 V .si.Vw j'?i:g with his s .+ stcitL t0r 7C $j}b`? .il) l .. 1?i? =ii:k'
tlie,: 3? atirnal Sec-&:rit Act of 1947. 1 refer to Section 102(d) (3) of the
lick Kvhicl,_ rakes the fir ector responsible for the protection 01
xnte1.ligence so _:rces and methods frcin ,authorized disclos jr_ . An
effective persons-nel security prograin is vital to assure this protection.
co2Z':13l rcted all o` her security screening and been 2?2`CVisi :t?:' 11 Y approved.
on this basis. . tho t the polygraph progr?1~, disc ify'i.g inior-
Inat?on on. ! :hose cases would have rem in.id u` l-rlo :n.. I.: addition, it is
reasonable to p".esume that the prog2-a:e a. significant i t:tc]:rent to
erne oyine.n.t. and !or operational purposes. As statistics illustrate,
during the peHcd 1963 through mxd-1974, of those applicants for_
ernploymeTit r &e ted on security grounds, over. 60 percent. were
?ejccted on ."he basis of information developed principal:y or solely
durs"Jg p^iy 3'2i:.- interviews. in a sa ipling of recent :-_cords,
ebon.t halms of ti.- applicants who had been disapproved cii t--.e basi-
of in-forr:a=tiori dG-~-elope.d during polygraph interviews l=::d ,sIready
The i oh oh =s an integral and essential part of security
processing to elt--r.e mine the security eligibility of persons for Agcncy
appiicaticn for ez oioyment by unsuitable candidates, arc_ more
in, orfantly, penetration attempts by foreign intelUgcnct: services.
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~~y ?. ti 1
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The utility oCCIA's polygraph program is not solely a function
of its part in contributing information leading to the rejection of
unsuitable candidates. The preponderance of poly graph, interview
reports are favorable. Most of these favorable reports constitute
useful and comforting confirmation of other screening procedures; the
remainder represent favorable resolutions of allegations or suspicions
which otherwise could result in injustices or in unnecessary defensive
measures.
The Central Intelligence Agency has consistently urged con-
tinuance of its polygraph program in its reports to congressional
committees on proposed legislation and hearings concerning the poly-
graph. We note in the Dissenting Views of your report, en page 566,
that on 25 :.!arch 1975, based on the hearings held in 19741, that the
Subcommittee initially approved a recommendation which would have
prohibited the use of the polygraph in all but cases involving national
security and for law enforce:rent purposes provided fifth amenchnent
rights under the Constitution were not violated. This concern for
national security was recognized by former Senator Sain Ervin, a
strong advocate of individual rights, though he otherwise objected
to the use of the polygraph. In his proposed legislation to protect the
personal privacy of gcivernment employees, introduced during several
Congresses prior to his retirement from public office, Senator E:-vin
ex3~pressly excepted the CIA and the National Security Agency from
the provision barring the use of the polygraph in Government. Senator
Ervin's last bill was S. 1688, Senate Report 93-724, which passed the
Senate 7 March 1974.
The CIA is cognizant of the danger of abuse inherent in the
use of any instrument used to aid in.distinguishing truths from untruths..
Consequently, we have adopted strict procedures to prevent abuses and
to protect those taking the examination. These include:
--notification to each applicant for employment at the tirne-
he is given an application form of the intent to use P. polygraph
examination in the course of his employment proces_in_ ;
--coordination tix4th the Office of Personnel and 1F.' Office
of Medical Services to determine if a polygraph inte:r'riew is
advisable;
--advance written consent of the applicant;
--notification of the privilege zaaainst self-i;tcrimirnation
on questions pertaining to violations of criminal ktty:
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ApproMfkYl A ' Mi OP162 -- limifng questions to those exclusively related to
security issues;
--informing the applicant that the examination may be
monitored and possibly recorded to let him know there are.
no hidden procedures;
--random monitoring by a specialized supervisor to
insure that no improper questions are asked;
--mainte-n :.ce of polygraph records in separate files with
very strict need-to-know rules governing access;
--prohibition of release of polygraph-acquired information
outside the Agency without my approval or that of the Deputy
Director and only if such a release is necessary in the interest
of national security;
--the polygraph examiner makes no recommendation as to
the security suitability of the person tested; and .
--evaluation of the polygraph report is but one element in
the Total personnel security screening program.
With respect to reliability, defined in accordance with scientific
convention as the consistency of the interpretations of the polygraph
charts, agreement studies were conducted as part of an Agency research-
program which was initiated partially in response to the hearings held
by the Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee
in the early 1960's. Numerical results of these studies are complex and
would require extensive explanation, but comparisons may be usefu .
Comparable studies of similar professional groups are scarce but two
were found, involving cardiologists evaluating EKG charrt:: for cardiac
pathology and psychologists evaluating ?..IMPI test results for psycho-
pathology. The CIA polygraphers' chart interpretations Z=.wcere as good
as or better'than these two groups.
Finally, the selection of polygraph officers is exb-en-* ly discz=imi-
nating as to their qualifications, intelligence, integrity, aria high
character. They are given a rigorous training program which is a
continuing process to keep them abreast of developments ir. their pro-
fessional field. CIA has maintained a vigorous reseitrch ef:ort inquiring
into new techniques and equipment to insure that the highest standards.
are maintained.
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? In viev,~tL j ny statutory responsibility to protect intelli geilcesources
and metl, :;3s' nd the proven reliability of ;he polygraph and. the safeguards
i,njij.s t (ilizatioi , I must disagree with the recommendation of the Committee:.
'
tihis Agency's personnel security startclards must be maintained at the
highest levels. Termination of the Agency's poly graph program would
increase its vulnerability to hostile penetration and would seriously
impact on the Agency's effectiveness in carrying out its foreign intelli-
.gence collection mission.
Sincerely,
/s/ Geor a
k Distribution:
Crig. Add1 essee
1 - I
1 - DDCI
I - DDA
I - ER
? I - ' 0LC/Sub j .
1 - OL
STATOTHR ? ?0LC/PLC/d1w
I
Bush
George Bush
- Director
20 Feb. '1976)
cc:
Chairman, House Government Operations Committee
0}, r n
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General
al Counsel
UNCLASSIFIED ED CONFIDENTIAL
O.
2 7 Use previous editions
1-67 J!
a I, ?.,: F?N f'~'L?? Wu t~ r?u crv-mot wc.~~ci .....
TOP AND BOTTOM
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SEC;; ET
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
1
DDM&S
2
3
4
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks:
Harold: You asked me recently about a
definitive statement of what constitutes
monitoring of telephones. Attached is an
internal OGC memorandum on this subject.
A copy has also gone to the Office of Security,
which is currently working on the proposed
Telephone Monitoring Devices.
F
ohn S. Warner
cc: D/Security U
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME. ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
SECRET
?STATINTL
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OGC 74-0472
26 March 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Warner
SUBJECT: Restrictions on Use of Telephone Recording
Devices
1. A Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
regulation (47 C. F. R. 64. 501) prohibits a telephone company
from using any recording device to monitor telephone conversa-
tions unless the parties to the conversation are given proper
notice that the conversation is being recorded. Such notice is
required to be given by the use of an automatic tone warning
device--the so-called "beep tone"--which is repeated at regular
intervals during the course of the conversation. It is also
mandatory that no recording device shall be used unless it can be
physically connected to and disconnected from the telephone line
or switched on and off.
2. To comply with the above regulation, telephone com-
panies have inserted a similar limitation in their tariff schedules,
which are filed with the Federal Communications Commission in
accordance with 47 U. S. C. A. 203.
3. It seems clear that the burden of meeting the "beep
tone" requirement is on t e to ep one companie tars hex than arx
the users;" which creates a rather difficult enforcement prablem
for 'Eh s reason. If the "beep tone" requirement s'vi"olateu; a
tel.epForie company can be fined up to $500 for each day of the
violation. 47 U. S. C. A. 502. However,- the telephone company's
only recourse against thesubscxiher tvho Yialates the T'bezpnrje"
requirement is to remove the telephone. In practice, the likeli-
hood that a telephone company will take such action against
subscribers is very slight. As it was pointed out in OGG 74-0428
dated 8 March 1974, telephone company es are too concerned with
First Amendment and monopoly problems since the subscriber has
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11Z&JS. D. Ohio, 1972), aff"d, 475 F. 2d 740 (1973).
6. With regard to the use of a microphone or an amplifier
to monitor conversations, it also has been held that no interception
occurs when a person places a microphone or a radio transmitter
in such a position as to record a telephone conversation, since
such listening in in no manner interferes with the transmission of
the conversation over the telephone wires. Irvine v. California,
347 U. S. 128 (1954), Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505
(1961), United States v. Borgese, 235 F. Supp. 286 (1964). More-
over, it is certain that a telephone company cannot be held
responsible for recordings by these devices since the telephone
system is not used. When one looks to the essential purpose of
the FCC regulation, however, which is to protect the privacy of
telephone communications, attempts to make distinctions between
mechanical devices attached to telephones and mechanical devices
not attached to telephones is meaningless, if the end result is the
same.
no alternative to their service. Thus, a subscriber who
records a conversation without the "beep tone" runs very
little risk. It remains, nonetheless, a violation of the tariff
schedules filed by telephone companies with the FCC to
record a telephone conversation without the use of the "beep
tone. ""
4. Another means of recording telephone conversations
is the so-called induction method where a tape recorder is
attached to an- induction coil placed against a previously installed
telephone. This method also violates the_FCC_ regulation,unle.ss
a "beep tone" is used.
605 which prohibits the interception and publication of telephone
and radio communications without the consent of the parties to
the conversation. Likewise, there is no violation of the pro-
315'-D.C. Pa., 1965). Thus, there is no violation of 47 U. S. C. A.
5. In any event, it has been held that no interception
occurs when one party to a telephone conversation simply
records it for his own use. Parkhurst v. Kling, 24-9-F. Supp.
scription against the wiretapping contained in the Omnibus Crime
Act of 1968 (18 U. S. C. A. 2511, et seg. ), since no "interception"
takes place when one party to a conversation records it for his
awn-arse.--Sn~iith v:~in`cinn`a~i Post and Times Star, 553 F. Supp.
ifte
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7. The Office of Security Duty Office has five tape
recorders installed in telephones for the primary purpose of
recording conversations involving serious threats to Agency.
installations, senior Agency officials, and national figures.
These recorders are, in fact, also used to record any conversa-
tion duty officers think is too complicated to record accurately
without the aid of a tape. Attached is a memorandum issued by
the Office of Security establishing certain procedures for use
of these tape recorders.
8. 1 discussed the above procedure with Mr. Hilbert
Schlossberg of the General Counsel's Office at FCC, who
advised me that police departments, fire departments, and the
like, also record conversations involving threats, safety and
related topics. These organizations usually have an agreement
with the local telephone company permitting recordation. of the
conversations without the "beep tone" or any other notice. If
the Agency wants to be absolutely safe in this area, we can
attempt to reach a similar agreement with C&P. Whether we
decide to do so, however, is a matter of policy.
Distribution:
Original - COMMUNICATIONS (OGC 74-0428 filed in Equipment
1 - JGB Signer
1 - Chrono
A - DDM&S
1 - D/Security
Supplies)
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REFERENCE : HN
IEMORA'`DUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration
FROM Director of Security
SUBJECT . Assistance to the Department of Commerce
1. Action Requested: This memorandum contains a
recommendation for your approval.
2. Basic Data: This Office has, in the past, provided
Denied Area Briefings to Department of Commerce employees
traveling to the Soviet Union or Bloc countries.. These.
briefings were directed primarily to employees holding com-
par;t ented clearances.
The Security Office of the Department of Commerce
has not., come to this Agency with a :quest for assistance
in establishing a briefing-debriefing program with special
emphasis on Soviet.and Soviet Bloc travel.
This Agency will derive the following benefits,
once a professional capability within the Department of
Commerce has been established:
a. Department of Commerce representatives
can brief their employees who hold Agency
compartmented clearances and report the fact
to this Office rather than requesting our
people to come over and do t1:.e briefing.
b. Once a debriefing program is established,
we are hopeful of getting feedback from them
concerning any incidents occurring to employees
holding cormpartmen ted clearances. We do not
get this feedback now.
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CSC
Our involvement would amount to about sixteen
man-hours spent initially by the Chief, External Activities
Branch, Office of Security, and one other employee of that
Branch - a GS-14 and GS-13 respectively. We cannot fore-
cast the followup man--hours requirement but do not foresee
any great burden.
3. Recommendation: Your approval to provide this type
of training is requested.
/S /
Charles I. Kane
Director of Security
Distribution:
Original - Return to OS
2 DD/A
2 - IG
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 f1L 1,,T ( r
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::e, ty re? -cor r ?siax~ i g Malt
Director of Secr i *'Y.
S 4~.c of vecu i y As5S5tkuco to the
. _ -
epartmxft of , $ricuitute
$
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C !:'?' a