OBSERVATIONS IN GDYNIA HARBOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000500270039-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 12, 2006
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: September 22, 1998
• Content Type: REPORT

Secret
O. N. E.
MEMORANDUM
HE ul I
DO NOT
DESTROY
Approved For Release 2007/08/05: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500270039-6
OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
War Clouds Over the Horn of Africa
CIA
~j+llSd n / w,y?
Secret
20 April 1973
Copy No. 68
Approved For Release 2007/08/05: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500270039-6
 Approved For Release 2007/08/05: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500270039-6
Approved For Release 2007/08/05: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500270039-6
 Approved For Release 2007/08/05: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500270039-6
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
20 April 1973
WAR CLOUDS OVER THE HORN OF AFRICA
The chances of an armed conflict between Ethiopia
and Somalia -- often the subject of rumor and specuZavion
are greater now than at any time in the past decade. Both
sides have moved troops to the tong and ill-defined border
and tensions are high. Neither Haile Selassie nor SomaZi
President Siad appears to desire an escalation of the dis-
pute but local commanders are less constrained and in the
charged atmosphere a small incident could touch off actions
which would be hard to stop or reverse. Though the ZocaZe
is the remote wasteland of the Ogaden, and the forces in-
volved are smaZZ, there are military and diplomatic interests
of the US and the USSR in the background, and strong over-
tones of the Arab-Israeli quarrel. Hence, a conflict in
this part of Africa would have fairly wide repercussions.
This i,:_mnorandum explores possible developments and in the
concluding paragraphs assesses implications for US policy.
This memorandum was produced in the Office of National Estimates
and coordinated with appropriate offices within CIA
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/08/05: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500270039-6
 Approved For Release 2007/08/05: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500270039-6
SECRET
The Emerging Crisis*
1. The dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia is funda-
mental and probably irreconcilable. At issue is control over
the Ogaden, a large desert triangle in southern Ethiopia,
flanked on two sides by Somali territory and inhabited almost
entirely by Somali nomads. The Somali Government is committed
to the political unification of all Somali lands and peoples
and this commitment is accepted by most Somalis as an article
of faith. As for Ethiopia, its national pride is at stake --
the Ogaden is part of the heritage of the revered Emperor
Menelik. There is also a lively concern that if one portion of
the multinational empire is lost, other peoples and provinces
would break away. The discovery a few months ago of exploitable
deposits of natural gas (and possibly petroleum) in the Ogaden
introduces a strong economic factor. No Ethiopian Government
could afford to cede the Ogaden, and no Somali Government could
yield its irredentist claim.
2. Both sides assert that their military actions in the
Ogaden are defensive in nature. The Ethiopians moved troop rein-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/08/05: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500270039-6
 Approved For Release 2007/08/05: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500270039-6
SECRET
forcements to the Ogaden in February a;1.'March because they
feared that recent large military shiprients from the USSR to
Somalia were providing Mogadiscio with enough materiel to
seize the Ogaden. Officials in Addi,!', Ababa were also
disturbed by the increasing assertivaness of Somali territorial
claims, and by Somali efforts to' ~!r:fage the support of other
African governments on the issue of the Ogaden. The movement
of Somali reinforcements to the f,cntier followed closely after
the Ethiopian deployments.
3. At this point each side. probably has fielded about as
large a force as can be sustained in the border areas (about
12,000 Ethiopians and 9,000 Somalis). Both armies are equipped
with weapons mainly of Korean vintage and are mechanized
after a fashion. Neither for~..,-,) has the capability for swift,
massive strikes or for sustained offensive drives. Each side
has severe logistical probleaas, which cannot be resolved in the
short run. If a shooting war broke out, it would be a confused,
disorganized struggle with scenes reminiscent of Beau Geste
or Lawrence of Arabia. Most informed opinion expects the
Ethiopians to do better than the Somalis, but it would hardly
be a conventional conflict.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/08/05: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500270039-6
 Approved For Release 2007/08/05: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500270039-6
SECRET
Prospects for Ethiopian Action
4. If Haile Selassie has his way, there will be no
Ethiopian offensive military activity, at least not before
the May meeting of the OAU. Tho aged Emperor has for long set
his sights on the QAU's 10th anniversary celebration as one
of his last hurrahs. It is to be the African social event of
the year, or perhaps the decade, with virtually all Heads of State
present. Haile Selassie's vanity has grown with age -- he
treasures his peacemaker image and also has lingering aspira-
tions for a Nobel Peace Prize.
5. Some, perhaps many, of the Ethiopian military leaders
see the situation quite differently. All are conscious of the
Emperor's advanced age (nearly 81) and the precarious health
of the Crown Prince, now recuperating slowly from a stroke. The
chances of a smooth transfer of power at the Emperor's death
have been reduced by the Crown Prince's illness and probable
residual disabilities. Many in the Ethiopian military believe
that if the succession led to trouble and confusion in Ethiopia,
the Somalis would try to seize the Ogaden. Hence, they see
persuasive reasons for taking advantage of the assemblage
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/08/05: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500270039-6
 Approved For Release 2007/08/05: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500270039-6
SECRET
of larger than normal Ethiopian forces in the Ogaden to
crush the Somali army before more Soviet arms arrive and
before the succession issue arises.
6. Ethiopian field commanders in the Ogaden are not
likely to defy the orders of the Emperor by overtly invading
Somalia. But the normal patrolling activities of both armies
along the unmarked border are bound to produce further surprise
encounters and perhaps some exchange of fire. If local commanders
overreact, the situation could quickly get out of control or
beyond the damping capabilities of the Emperor (or Siad).
Moreover, some Ethiopian forward units have Israeli advisors
who are skilled in desert warfare, and practitioners of deterrent
and pre-emptive tactics. The chances of an escalating conflict
will rise as time goes by, and as tempers fray in the harsh
environment of the Ogaden.
Prospects for Somali Action
7. Somali commanders are conscious of their military
inferiority in the border area, and are somewhat intimidated
by the boldness of the Ethiopian deployments. Many Somalis
view the Ethiopia;; moves into the Ogaden as part of a secret
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/08/05: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500270039-6
 Approved For Release 2007/08/05: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500270039-6
SECRET
agreement with Israel and the US to crush Somalia. A good
number of Somalis also believe that war with their larger
neighbor is inevitable.
8. There are compelling reasons for the Somalis to take
a cautious stance in the present crisis, aside from the military
disadvantage. Over the past year greater amounts of Soviet
hardware has been flowing into Somalia, mostly trucks, personnel
carriers, artillery, and small arms, but also some anti-aircraft
weapons and IL-28 light bombers. The Somalis have not absorbed
all of this materiel or learned to use it effectively. They are
just not ready for a major move against Ethiopia. Also there
is widespread popular dissatisfaction among Somalis with the
military government and with the Soviets, and some indication
that morale is sagging in parts of the army. The regime would
be unlikely to take aggressive action unless it felt that only
a do-or-die military effort would keep it in office. Neither
the regime nor the situation appear to be that desperate.
9. The Somalis still have hopes of gaining the Ogaden by
0
non-military means. They expect to gather support at the May
meeting of the OAU for their concept of self-determination, and
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/08/05: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500270039-6
 Approved For Release 2007/08/05: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500270039-6
SECRET
believe that this idea will prove more appealing to fellow
Africans than the rigid OAU dictum against changing African
boundaries. They will argue that the border with Ethiopia
has never been sanctioned by any international agreement, and
is therefore different from other border problems. If this
fails, Siad may even ask Haile Selassie once again to cede the
Ogaden. Another scheme is to seek mediation of the dispute
by some prestigious African ruler. None of these are likely
to get very far, but the Somalis have been encouraged by Moslem
Africans to make the most of the QAU meeting.
10. The Somalis have another option -? the instigation
of guerrilla warfare in the Ogaden. About 175 Somali youths
have returned from training in North Korea and are instructing
and organizing other ethnic Somalis in camps along the border.
From the Somali point of view, unleashing of the guerrillas
would be a shade less risky than army probes into Ethiopia,
and would offer the advantages of distracting the Ethiopian
army and providing some publicity on the "oppressed Somalis"
in the Ogaden. The event would be portrayed as an uprising
of Ogaden natives, and Mogadiscio would probably not acknow-
ledge its sponsorship. A development of this sort is more
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/08/05: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500270039-6
 Approved For Release 2007/08/05: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500270039-6
SECRET
likely than a conventional attack across the border. It
could be launched at any time, and if publicity is a major
objective, a good time for it would be a week or so before
the OAU meeting.
options for the USSR and the US
11. The Soviets, in their role as the suppliers of
military goods and the advisors to the Somali armed forces,
have some capability to curb the Somalis but no influence in
Ethiopia.* They are, indeed, urging the Somalis to take a
peaceful course at this time. It would be in the Soviet
interest to avoid a conflict in the Horn in which their client
stood a good chance of being beaten. The Russians evidently
are interested in retaining a favored position in Somalia.
They have built their on naval communications facility and
are working on an airfield near Berbera. This northern Somali
port is used regularly by Soviet naval combatants. Although
these are not large or expensive projects, they are important
for supporting Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean, and
for handling Soviet transport aircraft flights to Somalia. The
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/08/05: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500270039-6
 Approved For Release 2007/08/05: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500270039-6
SECRET
quid pro quo for the Russian use of facilities in Somalia is
the provision of military goods and training of the Somali
armed fortes. Hence, it is unlikely that the Soviets will re-
duce or cut off the arms flow, or diminish their military advisory
presence.
12. The Somalis appear to view the Soviet rights and
facilities as hostages to continued arms provision, and are
-confident that the Soviet interest in preserving the new bases
is substantial enough to keep the arrangement going. Hence, this
Somali Government is likely to be only moderately swayed by Soviet
pressures in the direction of caution. To the extent that the
Somalis are cautious, it is because they see their own interests
best served by such a course. If Soviet arms deliveries continue
for the next year or two at the present rate, the Somalis may
come to believe that they have the offensive capability to make
an effort to seize the disputed lands. Whenever the Somali
Government decides the time is ripe for a grab at the Ogaden,
it seems likely to act according to its own calculations, regardless
of Soviet advice.
13. The US may be in a better position to influence the
course of events in the Horn than is the USSR. Military aid from
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/08/05: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500270039-6
 Approved For Release 2007/08/05: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500270039-6
SECRET
the US to Ethiopia 25X1
normally ranges from
$10 to 15 million a year, sufficient to provide modest supplies
for the Ethiopian armed forces, but not enough to make these
forces a first class establishment. Ethiopia is too poor to
purchase large amounts of arms elsewhere. Even the deployment
and maintenance of forces now in the Ogaden is a considerable
additional strain on Ethiopian finances. In any protracted
struggle with Somalia the Ethiopians would require greatly
increased outside aid.
14. Haile Selassie is convinced that Soviet arms shipments
to Somalia have upset the balance of military power in the Horn,
and is anxious to come to Washington to make the case for more
aid. His advisors are drawing up a shopping list which amounts
to some $122 million in new aid, and are producing other requests
which would bring the sum up to $200 million. Ethiopians normally
exaggerate the scope of foreign threats and of their own needs.
They have not yet allocated larger sums from their own treasury
to the military, nor have they adopted an austerity policy at
home. They do not really expect to get anything like $200 million
from the US, but they want some increment in aid, and are nervous
about US willingness to back them in a crunch with Somalia.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/08/05: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500270039-6
 Approved For Release 2007/08/05: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500270039-6
SECRET
15. The US response to Ethiopia could have a major bear-
ing on events in the Horn of Africa. If only a small amount of
additional aid is provided, it would have some dampening effect
on the ardor of the Ethiopian military, and the chances of
Ethiopian offensive actions against Somalia would be reduced.
Tensions would still be high, and the basic issue 3f the Ogaden
would remain. Ethiopian field commanders might take aggressive
actions on their own which would have the effect of escalating
the conflict regardless of policies favored in Washington or
Addis Ababa.
16. If the Ethiopians regard the Washington response as
disappointing, they would have stronger doubt about their re-
lationship with the US, and would explore other sources for arms.
They would probably look first to France or the UK for some mili-
tary items, and would try for grants or long-term credits. They
might even explore the possibility of Chinese aid. The Soviets
have often offered military aid to Ethiopia, and have suggested
generous terms, but only on the basis of the expulsion of the
US Haile Selassie and most of the military leader-
ship do not trust the Russians or the Chinese, and would be unlikely
to put fate of their country into such hands. Therefore, the
prospects for arms from other sources are dim. The Ethiopians
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/08/05: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500270039-6
 Approved For Release 2007/08/05: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500270039-6
SECRET
would probably conclude that they had no alternative to their
close relationship with the US, but they would be resentful
and angry about it. It is very hard to estimate how the
Ethiopians would deal with the border problem in these
circumstances.
17. If the Ethiopians were to receive a more generous
grant from the US, they might interpret this as acquiescence
in a more assertive policy towards Somalia, despite any
accompanying warnings by US officials. If the Ethiopians were
to become embroiled in a shooting war with Somalia, by accident
or design, the chances are that they would rout Somali forces,
but not try to assert control over the country. This would
bring down the current Somali Government, but there is no
guarantee that the successors would be more favorable to the
West or that they would close down the Soviet bases. Some
collection of Somali army officers would probably patch
together a new government, which might or might not continue
the arrangement with the Soviets. The new government would
seek to rearm via Moscow or any other available source and would
seek revenge at an opportune time, such as an Ethiopian succession
crisis.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/08/05: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500270039-6