CHINA'S SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES: LESS PROGRESS THAN MEETS THE EYE1

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93T01142R000100250020-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 12, 2011
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: July 2, 1985
• Content Type: MISC

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(U) CHINA'S SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES: LESS PROGRESS
THAN MEETS THE EYE-1/
Summary
(C) China's special economic zones once again
are drawing fire from orthodox critics of reforms.
Top reformers continue to support the zones but are
echoing some of the charges. They are pressing
zone officials to improve management and to reduce
smuggling and black-market currency exchange,
activities that have flourished in the zones and
surrounding provinces since controls over foreign
trade were relaxed in 1979-80.
(C) Although the special economic zones were
created to give China windows to the West, they
have served the West equally well as windows to
China. In addition to a preview of some individual
reforms considered by the leadership, they provide
an indication of the direction and speed of the
reform program. A strong resurgence of conserva-
tive influence in the leadership probably would
lead to efforts to roll back some of the more con-
troversial aspects of the special zones policy.
(C) Reformers remain committed to using the
zones as an economics laboratory. For example,
(C) Subsequent to the drafting of this paper,
the Chinese press on June 29 quoted Deng
Xiaoping as telling a visiting Algerian delega-
tion that the Shenzhen special economic zone
was a pilot project and that its success
remained to be proved. Mounting criticism of
the special zones, particularly their level of
corruption, may have induced Deng to moderate
his support of the experiment. Deng's comments
may presage a tightening of control over busi-
ness activity in the zones.
SECRET-
Declassify: OADR (multiple sources)
Report 1120-AR
July 2, 1985
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foreign banks in April were authorized to operate branches in the
zones. Obtaining the consensus needed to conduct such experi-
ments, however, continues to be difficult. Implementation of two
other measures poised to go into effect in the Shenzhen zone
bordering Hong Kong--issuing a convertible zone currency and estab-
lishing a customs control line between Shenzhen and the interior--
has been delayed indefinitely.
(C) Visitors to the zones, especially to Shenzhen, report-
edly are struck by the extensive construction under way. Available
evidence suggests that China's leaders, however, are disappointed
with zone results, even though the zones have proved useful for
demonstrating economic reform programs. In particular, the zones
have had little success in attracting technologically advanced
industry. Their development into the foreign exchange profit
centers envisioned by the reformers is proceeding slowly.
(C) Earlier this year the government may have increased the
amount of funds earmarked for infrastructure projects needed to
make the zones more attractive to foreign investors. Competition
for foreign investment has sharpened since other coastal areas
last year were authorized to offer concessions similar to those
available in the special zones. Without improvements in infra-
structure, interest in the zones would likely wither.
Approval of a higher budget allocation for the 25X1
special.zones would indicate that the reform coalition is main-
taining its influence in this area, despite the problems encoun-
tered in developing the zones. But slight changes in policy
emphasis are probable. Stronger efforts will be made to develop
the zones as export bases, and less attention will be directed
toward improving their role as diffusers of advanced technology.
Current debate appears to center on the value of increasing their
orientation toward foreign markets versus the benefits of forging
more internal linkages.
(C) Although it is possible that the introduction of new
policies to enhance the development of China's special economic
zones may stall this year, the prospects for a retreat by the
leadership seem remote in the near term.
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(U) Contents
Page
Summary .................................................. i
Background ............................................... 1
Performance .............................................. 2
Economic Development ................................... 3
Foreign Investment ..................................... 5
Leadership Reaction .................................... 6
Law and Order .......................................... 7
Economic Reform ........................................ 8
Prospects ................................................ 9
Tables
1. Direct Foreign Investment in China ................... I
2. Distribution of Joint Equity Ventures in
China by Type, Year-End 1983 ....................... II
3. Joint Equity Ventures in China by
Location and Type...................,............. 00.0 I I I
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CHINA: Special Economic Areas
MONGOLIA
Beijing,
PAK.'
CHIN A
1; EPA
AN
INDIA
Bay of Bengal
0 500 kilometers
Wuhan,
Shantou
Shenzhen
Zhuhai? Hong Kong
MaCa (ll.K.)
1.1 SOUTH
(Pois)on CHINA
-^ Peninsula SEA
KOREA
CHINA
SEA
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Background
(C) China's State Council, at the reported urging of Deng
Xiaoping, in 1979 authorized the creation of special economic
zones as part of a policy directed at liberalizing the foreign
trade system and opening the economy to the West. Four zones were
established to spur and concentrate foreign investment. The
development of these zones subsequently became well publicized in
the world press--and hotly debated in the ranks of China's leaders
as well as by lower level party cadre. The first major (and
recurring) criticism was the inevitable comparison of the zones
with the old treaty ports.
(C) In some respects the comparison had at least superficial
validity. Two special economic zones--Xiamen and Shantou--were
designated to concentrate on developing export processing indus-
tries and were fashioned after similar zones elsewhere in Asia.
Xiamen and Shantou sought to attract foreign participation--partic-
ularly by Hong Kong and overseas Chinese--in modernizing existing
industry. This program was counter to the deeply ingrained policy
of self-reliance and raised concern over the possibility of
foreign economic exploitation of Chinese labor and resources.
The other two zones--Shenzhen on the border
with Hong Kong and Zhuhai on the border with Macao--were scheduled
for more diversified development. The industrial base in those
areas was meager, and foreign investors were encouraged to set up
new industries. Shenzhen and Zhuhai were to focus on production
for export of electronics equipment, light industrial goods, and
construction materials. At the same time, the program called for
development of tourism, farming, and fishing.
(C) All four zones offered investors low-cost labor, reduced
rents and taxes, and scaled-down or waived customs duties. And
they sought to attract foreign investment in infrastructure
projects as well as in industries that would promote exports and
enhance technological development. Reformers tried to quell crit-
icism of concessions by pointing out that foreign investment was
encouraged only on China's terms, unlike conditions prevailing
when treaty ports were forcibly opened.
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Political considerations figured in the
lead ion to open special economic zones and gave
weight to its defense of the policy. Emigration had been an irri-
tant to the leadership for years. In 1979 the residents of an
entire commune--including cadre--had defected to Hong Kong. Some
officials thought that it was vital to create a prosperous area on
the Hong Kong border if discontent and consequent out-migration
were to be reduced.
(C) A demonstration of tolerance toward capitalist methods
was another objective of the zones, partly pointed at easing
concern in Hong Kong over the city's approaching reabsorption by
China. Shenzhen and Xiamen specifically were directed to increase
contacts with Taiwan.. Chinese officials in 1983 openly invited
Taiwan investors to participate in the special zones on the same
terms offered foreign investors. As recently as last year, Deng
reportedly reaffirmed the objective of increasing contacts with
Taiwan through trade when he held discussions with Fujian province
officials in the Xiamen zone.
(C) Finally, creation of special economic zones provided
the leadership with a laboratory where it could experiment in
vitro with market-oriented economic reforms. Reformers actually
have used the zones more like a zoo and have encouraged (sometimes
directed) unconvinced senior officials to visit and view it for
themselves.
(C) The reformers' strategy has won enough support that last
year 14 coastal cities were authorized to offer foreign investors
a similar set of concessions. A 15th city received approval
earlier this year. More liberal policies also have been applied
to Hainan Island and are being used to entice foreign participa-
tion in developing several large coastal regions.
(C) Officials from interior provinces are lobbying effec-
tively for expansion of their authority to offer investment
concessions. Consequently, as China opens to foreign invest-
ment, much of the "specialness" of the special economic zones is
vanishing. The remaining distinguishing characteristic is an
extraterritorial status, a difference that will remain nominal
until the leadership opens customs control lines between the zones
and the rest of China.
Performance
(C) Development of the special economic zones has picked
up momentum during the past two years, following a slow start.
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Investors initially were enthusiastic but reportedly became
skeptical of their prospects after assessing the physical and
legal infrastructure and encountering a cautious, bureaucratic
attitude on the part of zone officials, according to soundings
taken in the early 1980s by US officials in Hong Kong. By
mid-1982, the leadership had begun to tackle those concerns by
investing in infrastructure projects to improve transport, power
supply, and communications; by fleshing out laws on foreign
investment; and by publishing regulations on the operation of the
zones. Most of the physical improvements were concentrated in
the Shenzhen zone; progress elsewhere was much less apparent.
In 1983-84, Chinese officials redoubled efforts
to make the zones work. Investment in infrastructure increased
significantly in 1983, and a fact-finding visit by Deng to Shenzhen
in early 1984 was followed by further escalation in government
funding for all four zones. Deng's visit allayed concerns that
the experiment would be short-lived, although Deng reportedly was
troubled by slow progress. Up to the time of his visit, stutter-
ing economic performance and continuing opposition by conservative
elements in the leadership reportedly had contributed to uncer-
tainty over future government policy.
(C) Efforts to fill gaps in the legal code in such important
areas as patent law have continued. The absence of guarantees on
patent protection and lack of recourse in cases of patent infringe-
ment have been identified by many potential investors as primary
factors preventing high-tech firms from setting up in China. New
laws covering patents and terms of foreign contracts which come
into effect this year do not answer all of the foreign investors'
questions, but they provide further evidence of the stability of
China's open-door policy.
(C) Economic Development. Statistical evidence on zone
performance is incomplete and imprecise. Yet, available figures
provide a notion of rapid growth. For example, last year the
gross value of industrial and agricultural output (GVIAO) in the
four zones reached 3.3 billion yuan, compared with 2.1 billion
yuan in 1983. The Shenzhen zone alone accounted for 45 percent of
last year's turnover and more than 50 percent of the growth. The
Zhuhai zone, in contrast, accounted for only 12 percent of the
turnover and 16 percent of the growth, even though GVIAO in that
zone more than doubled.
(C) The industrial development of Shenzhen is used by Chinese
officials as a showcase. In 1983, the gross value of industrial
output (GVIO) accounted for almost 84 percent of GVIAO; rapid
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growth last year probably raised the share of industry to about
87-88 percent. Much of this activity, however, reflects the pace
of construction, not increases in production for sale outside the
zone. In 1983, for example, the construction sector accounted for
more than four-fifths of turnover in industry.
(C) This pattern of activity probably is typical of growth
in the other zones as well. Investment in capital construction in
the four zones grew more than 80 percent in 1984. Although the
largest portion was devoted to Shenzhen, it is likely that shares
have remained roughly constant and that one main difference among
the zones is variation in the scale of the building boom.
(C) In terms of ownership, foreign investors in Shenzhen are
cashing in on the building boom but evidently are not contributing
as expected to development of exports:
Percent 1983 GVIO
Chinese enterprises 48
Sino-foreign enterprises and
solely owned foreign firms
of which engaged in:
52
Assembly and processing 15
Other activities 37
(C) Exports from Shenzhen are said to be projected to reach
$5.2 billion in 1990 but despite growth remain a tiny fraction
of that figure, as illustrated in the following tabulation in
(millions of US$):
1980 1981 1982 1983
11.2 10.2 15.0 21.1
This compares with exports from Xiamen worth $120 million in 1983.
(C) Enterprises in Shenzhen engaging in foreign trade suf-
fered a net loss during 1979-81; they turned a small profit in
1982 and earned 6.6 million yuan in 1983. Although profits report-
edly doubled the latter amount in the first half of 1984, earnings
still are not spectacular considering Shenzhen's location and
relatively low labor costs.
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(C) Internal trade with China proper appears to be a more
important component of Shenzhen's sales than exports. In 1982,
Shenzhen sold goods worth 460 million yuan to the rest of China,
purchases amounted to only 125 million yuan. While more current
figures are unavailable, recent comments by Vice Premier Yao Yilin
indicate that about one-third of sales by all four zones are
exports and two-thirds are oriented toward the internal market.
(C) Foreign Investment. The amount of foreign investment in
China is exaggerated by the way the government defines it, and
often it is further inflated in Chinese reporting. Nonetheless,
inclusion in Chinese data of agreements on licensing, processing,
and compensation trade and of the potential value of investment
agreements provides a basis for evaluating the success of the
special zones policy in attracting and concentrating investment.
(C) Data on total direct foreign investment in China
presented in Table 1, appended, are collected mainly from Chinese
sources that sometimes conflict. While the data at best consti-
tute a preliminary estimate, the trends depicted in the table are
indicative--especially the surge in investment since 1982.
Excluding investment in joint oil exploration projects, direct
foreign investment in 1984 increased by about $200 million.
Between one-third and one-half of this amount probably represents
investment in joint equity ventures and cooperative production
agreements. In part, the increase in investment derives from the
improved ability of foreign firms to use joint ventures to pene-
trate the China market. The incentive for joint ventures was
strengthened last year by a decision to allow repatriation of
profits from domestic sales when internal sales of joint-venture
products are deemed in China's interest.
(C) A similar breakdown of investment by type of activity
in special economic zones is not available. Aggregates, however,
have been published. By the end of 1984, pledged foreign invest-
ment in the special economic zones reached about $4 billion,
roughly two-fifths of the 1979-84 total for all of China.
Realized foreign investment in the four zones since 1979 exceeded
$800 million, about one-fifth of the total for China. The lower
"capture" rate in the zones compared with China as a whole prob-
ably reflects greater pressure on zone officials to show results
as well as exaggerated expectations on the part of some foreign
investors.
(C) Shenzhen accounts for nearly 70 percent of realized
foreign investment in special economic zones and about 15 percent
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of total realized foreign investment in China. Nearly three-
fifths of the investment in Shenzhen occurred during 1983-84.
If data for Shenzhen were excluded from investment totals, the
other three special economic zones would account for less than
8 percent of total realized foreign investment.
(C) The poor showing for the other zones suggests that in
general the special zones policy has failed to serve its invest-
ment function. The degree to which China has succeeded in
concentrating foreign investment in the zones seems largely
determined by Shenzhen's proximity to Hong Kong and efforts to
improve facilities in the zone. Concessions were a much less
important factor in determining location of investment, a result
that is consistent with analysis of the effect of tax variations
on industrial location in other parts of the world.
(C) In general, the special zones policy also has failed to
attract technology-intensive industry. By the end of 1983, China
had concluded, by its count, 188 agreements for joint equity
ventures, of which 105 were keyed to the special economic zones.
A sectoral breakdown of these agreements provided by Chinese
sources is presented in Table 2; but these sources do not identify
joint ventures located in the special economic zones.
(C) Some high-technology firms, of course, are located in
the special zones. For example, a microwave communications
equipment plant is in Zhuhai and a number of electronics-related
enterprises are located in Shenzhen. In addition, several manu-
facturing enterprises in Shenzhen incorporate advanced industrial
technology, including computer-controlled production lines.
Compared with other areas in China, however, the special zones
have fared poorly. An examination of 134 joint equity ventures
concluded by mid-1984 suggests that the zones have been relatively
unattractive (see Table 3). An examination of location decisions
by a subset of US and Japanese firms--a category more likely to
promote technology--reinforces this finding.
(C) Two factors that reportedly disadvantage the zones in
competition with other Chinese cities are the shortage of skilled
labor and the lack of supportive industrial development. These
shortcomings will be difficult to eliminate. Information on a
large number of new joint venture agreements that were initialed
in late 1984 has not yet been released, but significant change in
the established pattern is unlikely.
(C) Leadership Reaction. Some senior Chinese officials,
evidently including those in favor of reform, again are growing
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critical of the zones. In a recent interview with foreign
reporters, Vice Premier Yao Yilin, thought not to be one of the
zones' staunchest supporters, aired some general criticisms in an
ostensible defense of zone performance. He noted that the zones
have received construction assistance from the whole nation and
that foreign investment in infrastructure--an original objective--
has not been forthcoming. Yao also took up the issue of buying
and selling foreign currency on black markets, observing that the
problem was particularly serious in the Shenzhen zone and in
Guangdong and Fujian provinces.
(C) Gu Mu, who carries the zone portfolio in the Secre-
tariat, recently gave zone performance a mixed review. In an
interview with a Hong Kong correspondent which was published in
April, he singled out as shortcomings Shenzhen's lack of
competitiveness compared with opportunities for foreign investment
in the recently opened cities and such problems as issuing
excessive credit, a falloff in foreign exchange earnings in the
second half of 1984, and the rampant black market in currency.
(C) Gu Mu highlighted the zones' lack of success in attract-
ing technologically advanced industry and indicated a shift in
priority to put less emphasis on this objective and more on
promoting exports. This redirection of policy likely results from
an early 1985 reassessment of the zones by top leaders. Remarks
by Gu Mu on zone progress that were published in January had given
no hint of pending policy changes of this sort, but the redirection
was clearly evident in late February at a conference he chaired in
Shenzhen.
(C) Premier Zhao Ziyang, who is at the forefront of the
move to open China to foreign investment and a strong proponent
of special economic zones, also is critical of widespread corrup-
tion in the zones and surrounding provinces. In addressing the
1985 National People's Congress, Zhao notably did not pursue the
open-door theme as he did at the congress last year, even though
some new areas will soon be authorized to grant investment
concessions.
Law and Order. The government is moving to
che'uK . Hainan Island was singled out last year for
special attention because of its growing role in smuggling.
Earlier this year, 3,000 untaxed cars imported through Hainan
reportedly were seized in Wuhan. More recently, the government
published laws on foreign exchange controls and is taking steps
to curtail currency black markets, especially in Shenzhen and in
Guangdong province.
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(C) Corruption in the zones for some years has been a
favorite target of conservative critics. Stronger government
action in recent months may be designed to preempt the conserv-
atives and protect zone officials from a shakeup. Inflation in
urban areas and declining foreign exchange reserves also may be
prompting leaders to reimpose control over activities in the zonese
(C) Zone managers nonetheless are under attack, but from
an unexpected direction. A recent article published in a few
influential Chinese newspapers charges the manager of the Shekou
district--Shenzhen's.premier industrial area--with failing to
supervise properly, overstaffing administrative positions, and
permitting officials to enrich themselves. The thrust of the
criticism is that management has not kept up with the pace or kept
faith with the spirit of reform.
(C) Economic Reform. Special economic zones are continuing
to point the way in reform of the economic system. Reform leaders
note improved results in production (from contract labor and piece-
work wages) and in construction (from use of contract bidding) and
tout them as examples of 'Shenzhen speed." Most recently, foreign
banks were authorized to open branches in the special zones,
although the branches are prohibited from dealings with Chinese
individuals and Chinese enterprises. Admitting branches of
foreign banks even with tight restrictions is a major step toward
improving financial services in the zones.
Further development of the zones is being 25X1
frustrated by the delay in enacting two crucial measures: the
issuance of a convertible zone currency, and the establishment of
a customs control line between the zones and the interior. In
part, the delay may reflect ideological opposition from influ-
ential conservatives, such as Chen Yun; practical objections,
however, appear more important. Local officials reportedly fear
that a customs line would harm development of the Shenzhen economy
because of its dependence on trade with the interior. Particu-
larly threatened would be foreign exchange investments by
provinces and enterprises seeking to profit from the Shenzhen
zone's more liberal regulations.
Indecision on the customs line is one factor 25X1
delaying introduction of a currency--once scheduled for the
beginning of 1985--because officials do not want this currency to
go into surreptitious circulation in China. Without a barrier,
the value of Renminbi would fall rapidly relative to the value
of the zone currency unit, and individuals and organizations
could use zone currency to circumvent foreign exchange controls.
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SECRET
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Officials may also have delayed action because they perceive the
recent decline in foreign exchange reserves as a threat to China's
ability to support a zone currency against competition from the
Hong Kong dollar.
(C) Prospects remain good that action will be taken by the
end of 1985 on establishing the customs line at least for the
Shenzhen zone. The zones were intended to provide an area for
freer movement of goods and people. Some reformers argue that the
zones can not develop to their potential and that foreign trade
can not flourish if the customs line is not established.
The need for a zone currency is becoming acute
because businesses in the zones prefer (and sometimes only accept)
Hong Kong dollars and Chinese foreign exchange certificates.
Those paid in Renminbi, especially party cadre, are suffering from
an inflation driven by the inflow of foreign exchange, a situation
which has worsened significantly since first criticized by Gu Mu
nearly two years ago. Strong opposition by conservatives,
however, will likely keep the government from taking this step
until it strengthens its control over corruption and currency
speculations.
Prospects
(C) Major changes in the government's policy toward special
economic zones do not appear imminent, nor likely in the medium
term. The zones' lackluster record in obtaining key objectives,
however, probably has tarnished the credibility of the policy, if
not the policymakers. Reformers are nimbly switching their strat-
egy for China's modernization and are now focusing on upgrading
technology in major industrial centers through licensing agree-
ments and joint ventures.
The orientation of the special zones remains
an unresolved issue. The debate centers on using them strictly as
export centers--cut off from the rest of China--or on using them
to speed development of less developed provinces in the interior.
In recent years, these provinces have invested heavily in the
zones to boost their own foreign exchange earnings. If the prov-
inces prevail or obtain a compromise on this issue, chances are
slim that the zones ever will develop into export/industrial
centers.
(C) Prospects for the zones are only slightly brighter if
the leadership remains firm on the policy of developing export
centers. The push to attract foreign investment in special
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economic zones is certain to encounter stiffening competition from
other areas eager to modernize--especially major coastal cities
and industrial regions--as well as from other export processing
zones in Asia. The special economic zones are likely to record
only modest gains in obtaining technology-enhancing foreign
investment if they continue to lack the added attraction of access
to the China market, which other Chinese cities are able to offer.
(C) While slow progress toward attaining policy objectives
is the most likely outlook for the medium term, it is possible
that the development pace can accelerate and bring about a
substantial rise in zone exports. Success hinges on the zones
acquiring sizable domestic investment in export-oriented industry
along with the needed spending on infrastructure projects.
Plans for three of the zones--Shenzhen, 25X1
Xiamen, and Shantou--include construction of joint-venture oil
refineries by the China Petro-Chemical Corporation and a foreign
partner, according to Petroleum Intelligence Weekly. Shenzhen.
officials already have received government approval for a refinery
and have explored the costs of such a ro'ect 25X1
The 25X1
refinery in Shenzhen initially would process crude oil from Daqing
and Southeast Asia, but is being built in anticipation of process-
ing crude oil from the South China Sea once commercial production
begins in that area.
(C) In the near term, the economics of locating refineries
in the zones appears fragile because of the current oil glut,
existing excess refinery capacity, and the expense of shipping
crude oil for processing. Over the longer term, the key factor is
the development of large commercial oil finds in the South China
Sea. Oil exploration companies operating in that area have
reduced their initially high expectations because of limited
discoveries to date. If oil is found, refineries in the zones
could become the keystone of subsequent development. If the South
China Sea does not become a major producing area, the refineries
in the zones would become another problem for the leadership--
dressing up the landscape, but dragging down performance.
Prepared by William Newcomb, III Approved by Ralph E. Lindstrom
632-0452 632-2186
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UNCLASSIFIED
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Table 1. Direct Foreign Investment in China
(billions of US$)
Pledged
Realized
1979-82
1979-82
annual
annual
average
1983
1984
average
1983
1984
Total
of which:
1.24
1.74
3.3a/
.43
.91
1.34
Joint equity
ventures
Cooperation
.04
.20
1.07
.03
.06
n.a.
agreements
Joint oil
.68
.22
1.48
.13
.24
n.a.
exploration
Compensation
.25
1.04
1
.12
.29
.52
trade
.18
.21
.75a/b/
.09
.20
n.a.
.09
.07
)
.06
.12
n.a.
n.a. = not available
a/ Minimum, estimated by INR.
b/ As of June 1984, joint oil exploration $360 million, compensation
trade (-) $130 million, other $360 million.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23: CIA-RDP93TO1142R000100250020-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23: CIA-RDP93T01142R000100250020-4
UNCLASSIFIED
- II -
Table 2. Distribution of Joint Equity Ventures in China
By Type, Year-End 1983
Total 188
of which:
Petrochemical
Communications
Light Industry
Engineering, Electronics, Metallurgy
Construction
Tourist Services
Agriculture and Fishing
Other
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23: CIA-RDP93T01142R000100250020-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23: CIA-RDP93TO1142R000100250020-4
Table 3. Joint Equity Ventures in China
By Location and Type
A. With Western firms, 134 cases examined
Technology-Intensive-a/
Located in Special
Economic Zones
B. With US and Japanese firms, 73 cases examined.
Technology-Intensive-a/
Located in Special
Economic Zones
The term technology-intensive was broadly defined because
specific contractual details were unavailable.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/23: CIA-RDP93TO1142R000100250020-4