MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): THE EMPLOYMENT OF NAVAL FORCES AT THE BEGINNING OF A WAR

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 18, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT 13EREPRODUCED
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
18 April 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Employment of
Naval Forces at the Beginning of a War
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special
Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the
SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of
Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article is
concerned primarily with US carrier and antisubmarine forces
in the initial period of a war. Both conventional and
nuclear environments are considered. The authors stress the
roles of naval aviation and long-range aviation in combat
with hostile naval forces, particularly strike carriers and
surface vessels hampering antisubmarine operations. This
article appeared in Issue 1 (83) for 1968.
2. Because the source of this report is extremely
sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-
to-know basis within recipie
Deputy Director f rations
o Ope
FIRDB-312/01562-74
N lson
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The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence)
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Director of Strategic Research
Director of Weapons Intelligence
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T CR
COUNTRY USSR
DATE OF
INFO. Early 1968
Intelligence Information Special Report
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FIRDB-312/01562-74
DATE 18 Apri 1 1974
SUBJECT
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Employment of Naval
Forces at the Beginning of a War
SOURCES Documentary
u~mmary :
Tie following report is a translation from Russian of an
article which appeared in Issue 1 (83) for 1968 of the SECRET USSR
Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the
Journal "Military Thought". The authors of this article are Captain
First Rank N. Vyunenko and Rear Admiral of the Reserve D. Tuz. This
article is concerned primarily with US carrier and antisubmarine
forces in the initial period of a war. Both conventional and
nuclear environments are considered. The authors stress the roles
of naval aviation and long-range aviation in combat with hostile
naval forces, particularly strike carriers and surface vessels
hampering antisubmarine operations. End of Summary
Comment:
Capt. Vyunenko and Admiral Tuz co-authored two articles, one
discussing supplying ships at sea, Tyl I Snabzheniye, Issue No. 7,
1967 and the other about ships which travel on air cushion, Morskoy
Sbornik, No. 10, 1966. Capt. Vyunenko has written many articles on
naval technological subjects, the most recent appearing in Morsky
Sbornik, No. 11, 1973. Military Thought has been published by the
USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions in the past--TOP SECRET,
SECRET, and RESTRICTED. There is no information as to whether or
not the TOP SECRET version continues to be published. The SECRET
version is published three times annually and is distributed down to
the level of division commander.
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The Employment of Naval Forces at the
Beginning of a War
by
Captain First Rank N. Vyunenko and
Rear Admiral of the Reserve D. Tuz
Regardless of how a world war begins--with the use of
nuclear weapons or without--all forces and means of armed
combat may be brought into action at any moment by a
prearranged signal.
Since the use of various forces and means in a war
begun with nuclear weapons has been elucidated in the press
in some detail, we shall examine here the principles of the
use of the navy in a war begun without nuclear weapons.
First of all, we should note that in the past the main
naval forces of our probable enemies on the eves of wars
were located, as a rule, at bases or in areas that lay
adjacent to them and, consequently, were separated by broad
expanses of neutral waters. This created the conditions for
a surprise attack and the delivery of the first, extren'ely
powerful strike against the enemy main forces for the
purpose of weakening him as much as possible at the start of
a war, or at least depriving him of the initiative in
operations at sea. History shows that surprise attacks of
this kind have often been successful.*
but now the conditions for surprise launching of
military operations at sea by the delivery of an unexpected
strike against enemy naval forces have changed substan-
tially. Missile/nuclear weapons have forced the navies of
all the leading naval powers not only to switch to dispersed
basing of their forces, but also continually to keep the
greatest possible part of them at sea. Thus, the coastal
areas have now lost their former significance as centers of
* For example, the surprise attack by the Japanese against
the main forces of the American Pacific Fleet at Pearl
harbor.
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the main operations of navies which take surprise actions at
the beginning of a war.
On the other hand, surprise strikes with non-nuclear
means against enemy groupings dispersed in seas and oceans,
or in extensive basing areas, cannot radically alter the
balance of forces in a short interval of time.
But this does not mean that the element of surprise in
operations at the start of a war against the main enemy
naval strike groupings has lost its significance at the
present time. On the contrary, it has become a necessary
condition for the attainment of goals, especially in view of
the fact that ship strike groupings of opposing navies that
are deployed in seas and remain at full combat readiness
try, as a rule, to maintain constant mutual contact, in
order to be able, at the right moment, to deliver-an
immediate preemptive strike and seize the initiative.
We must also bear in mind that the military-geographic
conditions of seas and oceans are favorable to the probable
enemy in the use of missile weapons from submarines against
the territory of the Soviet Union and make it possible for
him to organize mobile basing of forces. Incidentally,
considerable efforts in this area have been expended by the
American and British navies in the postwar years.
To support missile/nuclear strikes against objectives
on our territory, the Americans have created cosmic radio-
electronic and hydroacoustical navigational systems which
make it possible to launch Polaris missiles with sufficient
accuracy from almost any area of the World Ocean. There-
fore, possible launch site areas for submarines are limited
only by the zone from which missiles can reach designated
targets.
However, in a war begun with non-nuclear weapons these
very important enemy groupings, with more than one-third of
all strategic missiles concentrated in them, turn into
passive waiting forces, unable to make immediate use of
their powerful long-range weapons. Moreover, by remaining
in the zone of operations of the antisubmarine forces of the
other side, they require additional defense or protection
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from strikes and attacks. Consequently, nuclear missile
submarines are becoming the most im ortant objective that
its naval forces must defend, requiring the,wallQCation or
this purpose of large groupings that cannot in effect be
use to fulfil tasks of an offensive nature.
The role of carrier strike large units in a war begun
with non-nuclear weapons should be assessed in a complet le y
different manner. They will be the principal and most
universal part of enemy naval strike fQX9?,-a-It is not
impossible that in this case all or almost all strike
aircraft carriers* will turn out to be in the first
/ strategic echelon, which in itself will predetermine their
role as primary objectives of strikes for our navy and 50X1-HUM
long-range aviation.
The most important component part of the navy of our
probable enemy, and which is also constantly deployed in
seas and oceans, are the special antisubmarine foxces__that
are combined into indepgndgnt l formations.
recent years, the Americans can use as a strategic reserve
weapons. Judging from the experience gained in exercises of
than 1300 aircraft, including 700 able to carry nuclear
continually have 15 strike aircraft carriers carrying more
* Over the next 10 to 15 years the American navy plans to
up to eight strike aircraft carriers, including four in the
Atlantic Ocean and four in the Pacific, not counting seven
aircraft carriers operating in the first strategic echelon.
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in the period of military operations without the use of
nuclear weapons it is difficult for submarines to overcome.
upon receipt of orders, to deliver a devastating strike
a a nst them. In this process, part of our forces are set
aside rort"he destruction of enema strike groupincys in the
first minutes and_iours o Vtie war, regardless of whether
-
and keep t em within range o our weapons, so as o be able,
strike groupings, carry out continual observation of them
The early deployment and constant maintenance of combat
readiness by the probable enemy of his nuclear strike
groupings directly in the areas where he will use his
weapons, has made it necessary for our fleets to carry out
constant combat service in oceans and seas. In practice,
our naval forces, located in the deloyment areas of enemy
It should be noted that the appearance of Soviet ships
on combat service in the Mediterranean Sea, the North
Atlantic, and the Philippine Sea at first only caused
confusion among the Americans. Subsequently they often made
attempts at direct countermeasures in the form of systematic
buzzing of ships by aircraft and helicopters at low alti-
tudes, cutting across their course while at a dangerously
close distance, and various kinds of provocation including
even collisions of ships, as happened in 1966 and 1967 in
he-Far East. T _
nuc ear weapons are use
or not.
Such actions by the probable enemy have other purposes
as well: the use of systematic provocations to continually
harass sur ace ships and submarines, which can gradually
take the form of a local conflict capable of developing into
the beginning of a war.
Should war begin without the use of nuclear means, the
enemy can use against our navy, including those forces of
ours on combat service, only a part of his forces, denloye&L_
in the areas of combat operations, and then only those which
are universal. that is, capable of using both nuclear and
non-nuclear weapons.- Such forces will be mainly nuclear
submarines with conventional torpedoes, carrier strike large
units, shore-based aviation, and surface ship groupings of
various composition. As for nuclear submarines armed with
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ballistic missiles, their use in combat against our navy is
unlikely; their main function is the destruction by nuc ear
strikes of objectives on land, including naval bases.
Another very important factor in naval operations in a
war begun without nuclear weapons will be the fact that each-..
/Ir side will try to weaken as much as possible those enemy
forces carrying nuclear weapons, especially strategic ones.
From the point of view of the area encompassed, armed
combat at sea without the use of nuclear weapons will not
differ essentially from operations using nuclear weapons.
But the results of armed clashes that develop in the broad
expanses o Tit ee ocean will turn out to be many times less
than with the use of nuclear means. And this is due not
only to the fact that the casualty-producing factors of
nuclear means are much greater than those of conventional
weapons, but also that a considerable part of the strike
forces will be held in reserve, remaining in readiness for
the employment of nuclear means. Other forces will not be
able to make full use of their combat capabilities, since
part of their strike power will be held in reserve in the
form of nuclear munitions ready for use.
Thus, forces on combat service will be able to wage
battle successfully only against individual enemy groupings.
But this battle can develop into protracted armed clashes
between ship groupings of one side and naval forces of the
other that are dispersed over considerable areas.
Under these conditions an important role in the battle
will be played by surface vessels with missile, and anti-
submarine armament. Their capabilities for fulfilling their
tasks will be directly related to the power of their anti-
aircraft armament, and also to how quickly they are able to
receive support from other naval forces. We should not for-
get that surface vessels, like submarines that are observing50x1-HUM
enemy ship groupings__in_peacetime, are tno themselves
gets of observation, by the enemy. And if their task is
to destroy enemy ships , i, nediate.ly upon the start of war,
then the enemy ships may have the same--task. In other
words, ships on combat service are in a constant duel-type
situation. The winner of the duel will be the one who first
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manages to release his missiles, repulse strikes by the
enemy, and maintain his combat effectiveness. Thus, the
timely support of ships in combat with enemy ships and
aircraft is of special significance in achieving victory.
As in the last war, the most effective support force is
shore-based aviation. The time spent in deploying aviation
is much less than that required to deploy submarine and
surface naval forces, and the ability of aviation to des,roy__
surface targets, especially aircraft carriers is well
known. T ere ore, in a -war begun witioutwnuclear weapons
the readiness requirements of naval strike aviation for the'
delivery of the first strike against enemy ships remain the
same as in operations usi _n?Elear ap
Surface vessels may also serve as support forces for
ships on combat service, but only if they have time during
the period of threat to concentrate in strike groupings in
immediate proximity to the areas of armed encounters.
The operations of support forces on combat service,
especially naval missile-carrying forces, and also
long-range aviation, must be directed against those enemy
groupings that are preventing our antisubmarin 'forces from
waging combat against enemy submarines. ,vt ng~._capab e of
waging direct combat against enemy submarine missile
carriers must be dis atched into the areas of their combat
patrol in order to destroy these extremely_im ortant nuclear
means o .t e...enem . For ese same purposes % is essential
Yo Testroy shore nayi_ ationa systems . and communications
centers which sup ort_te Op Pgatinnq pf_ enemy . mi as ] P
submarines. To do this, extensive use must be made of
diversionary. amphibious and airbornee andi fQ ces, landed
secretly and by surprise from submarines and from aircraft
(and in the future, also from air-cushion ships, especially
ro rface effects vehicles); and-use should also be made
of submarines with cruise missiles, units of naval missile-
carrying and long-range aviation. By joint efforts they ca
destroy or seize such other important objectives as the
early-warning stations of anti-missile defense, reference
stations of navigational systems, and communications
centers; and they can capture individual.. islands. an_ whi-ch._.-
enemy antisubmarine lines defend, or islands on which it is
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advantageous for us to organize supply points for
submarines.
The need to concentrate basic naval efforts in combat
against nuclear submarine missile carriers arises not only
because they represent the main nuclear threat from naval
axes, but also because combat against them can be waged on
the whole only by naval forces, which destroy them mainly in
the areas of combat patrol and on the approaches to them.
Only a minority of missile submarines (10 to 30 percent),
and with a lower level of combat readiness besides, can be
destroyed at their bases, where it is possible to use other
forces for this purpose as well.
justified.
The laying of antisubmarine mine barriers on the
approaches to enemy submarine base locations a so seems
Aircraft carriers also carry a large number of
l
nuc
ear
munitions. But successful combat against them can be waged
if we include (besides naval forces) long-range aviation and
the forces and means of antiaircraft defense.
Operations to destroy enemy carrier strike large units
must be conducted with maximum effort,_andno less
energetically than_.~wY~~a wea ons Even the
temporary incapacitation of aircraft carriers will
subs antra y improve tFie situation for our nav y. is is
especially important for open ocean areas. where carrier
aviation is one of the principal enemies of the surface
missile ships and antisubmarine forces of our navy, as well,,
as the most important force in combat against our sub-
marines. The destruction or incapacitation of aircraft
carriers, moreover, will also substantially influence the
operations of troops in the entire theater. Combat against
carrier strike forces will also be a most important task of
combat service forces. It requires the broadest possible-
use of naval miss ile-carr_ying__and long-rang-e_a~,ation
Therefore, it is advisable for aircraft to have the
capability for carrying not only missile weapons with
conventional charges, but also torpedoes, bombs, and mines
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A maximum effort will also be required for combat
against enemy antisubmarine forces,, since its purpose will,,
be to frustrate his operations in protecting submarine
missile carriers and, at the same time, to support the
operations of our submarines when entering the areas of
combat patrol and when situated in waiting areas and at
launching sites.
Simultaneously with the development of active offensive
operations in oceans, naval forces will have to fulfil a
number of tasks of providing cover from the sea for group-
ings of troops participating in a strategic operation in the
theater of combat operations, conducting amphibious
landings, and waging combat on sea and ocean 1' e_s of
communications in order to break up enemy trop movements.
Thus, we may say the following about the particular
conditions under which the navy will fulfil its tasks in a
war begun without nuclear weapons.
The main nuclear forces of navies--submarine missile
carriers--change from strike forces to reserve forces, which
are compelled to remain close to the areas of their launch-
ing sites in anticipation of the use of nuclear weapons.
Here there arises the complex but extremely important
task of protecting submarine miss* arriers- At the .same
time, the most intense antisubmarine operations must be V
conducted to destroy enemy submarine missile carriers
deployed in areas of combat patrol, as well as those located
at bases and in transit at sea. 5OX1-HUM%
All naval forces must be constantly ready to switch
over immediately to the unlimited use of nuclear weapons.
Therefore, being deployed at sea and being on combat duty at
their base locations, they must have on board full supplies
of nuclear means. This situation limits tQ____ce fa?n extent __
the possibility of using naval forces_durin_g thegnon-nuclear
period. The basic tasks of the n_avy_ wi
l_ha_y_Qg
fulfilled by_a sinificantly smaller. compgmerA.
which will require comparatively more time and effort for
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submarines to hit of y L
groupings ground forces or naval f
excep ion might be ballistic missiles with megaton charges,
intended for the destruction of strategic ground objectives.
Ballistic missiles with charges of lesser yield used b
weapons used in armed combat at sea can include practically
all atomic weapons of ships and aircraft. The only possibl
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But all this will be justified as long as the bellig-
erent sides do not switch to tactical nuclear.eapons
which, it is assumed, can be used for the attainment of
limited goals in theaters of military operations.
It is our distinct impression that tactical nuclear
orces
located at their bases, and to destroy airfields and base j
locations of enemy naval forces, can be considered in every
way to be tactical nuclear weapons.
primarily in the fact that submarines with ballistic
missiles will be in an even more disadvantageous position
than during the period of non-nuclear operations. Enemy
antisubmarine forces in combat with these submarines, once
they have been given freedom of action, will not' experience
av l;m't t __
n
g
me
combat at sea change substantially. This will be reflect5OX1-HUM
significance and role of the main nuclear groupin
s in ar
d
a ion
will not be limited in their capability to hit with nuclear
means both operational-tactical targets on land, as well as
all naval and air targets without exception He th
g
r
egic shore installations .are nOt._...
ossible. At the-same time, owever, submarines, surface
vessels, and missile-carrying and antisubmarine avi t'
rom e act that
naval opera ions during the period of limited use of huc_l_ear
t ,....... ..
weapons a
ainst st
a etween navies will in effect be
equiva e~nt Tto the conduct of mbat operations with
unlimited use of nuclear means, with certain condition
pecu iar o is situation These stem f.,_. thf
Therefore, the transition to tactical nuclear weapons
in armed comb t b _
nc
u ing nuclear, whose function, as has been
stated, falls ~w thin: the Cate orgy of tactical weapon As a
result, the effectiveness of their actions will greatly
increase, while submarine missile carriers, lacking the
opportunity to use their principal weapon--ballistic
missiles--and forced to remain in areas of combat patrol,
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can use-on ydefensive weapons, and then only against enemy
surface ships and submarines.
Antisubmarine aviation, in this case as well, remains
practically invulnerable to the defensive means of missile
submarines.
It should be noted that these conditions will apply in
equal measure both to our submarines and to enemy submarines
which will also be located in the patrol areas. In the
process, each side will try to keep these very important
groupings of strategic nuclear forces at full combat
readiness for the immediate use of missiles in the event
that military operations using tactical nuclear weapons
should develop into a general nuclear war. In practice this
will mean that both belligerent s ?dpi,~al.l.,trX,,_to_.make^_
maximum use of their antisubmarine_ for,CeQ?;k __
destroy enemy submarines and create the greatest possjbjQ,__
obstacles to the ooeratTnnc ; -I
This fierce battle, embr
underwater,surface anda~air~g three spheres ofaction--
p r'-will probably take the form of
re ea a arme encounters between naval forces of various compositions ep1oyed in submarine patrol areas and on the
a proaches to them. It is not impossible that~for the
attainment ~of goals in this battle each side will ~t-
a considerable part of the strike forces of its navy _to
destroy both the missile submarines and.the_antisubmarine
forces of tY e enemy,
Under these conditions, we can expect from our probable
enemies an increase in activity on the part of his carrier
strike large units in combat with our navy and in support of
his ground forces in the theaters of military operations. 50X1-HUM
The effectiveness of operations of deck aviation in this
case will greatly increase. And this will increase the
significance of combat with carrier strike large units. In
turn, the vulnerability of carrier strike large units will
greatly facilitate combat against them.
It should also be borne in mind that the use of
tactical nuclear _Wp
.a e
?~ .. f
qci l
i
tateS t
hle l>> f; ? ment
,
-
,
d
,
of the tasks of destroying naval bases, systems of_.
long-range detection of missiles and submarines, and
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communications and observation centers; and, at the same
time, it makes the defense of our own systems of observation
and control more complex.
The role of navies in strategic operations in theaters
of military op rations will increase sharply. The main task
of navies will continue to be combat against enemy nava].
strike forces, primarily against the nuclear strike
group[ii s o -his forces.The significance of the mobile
rear services of the navy will increase to an even greater
degree, especially the means of the seagoing rear services
intended for the restoration of combat effectiveness of
various forces and means that have used up their weapons or
exhausted their autonomy.
Thus, both in a war begun without nuclear weapons, and
in one conducted with the limited use of tactical nuclear is
weapons, naval operations will be carried out under specific
conditions significantly different from those of a general
nuclear war; and this must be taken fully into considera-
tion when planning and organizing combat operations, and
also when carrying out combat service in peacetime.
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