THE STATE OF MILITARY HISTORY STUDIES

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STAT
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ARTI CL3 LPPEARF?D
Oll FAGE_12_4L -
WASHItvGTuN QUARTERLY
Winter 1985
The State of MilitaryHistory Studies
Martin van Creveld
The purpose of this article is to present a
brief survey of English literature on military
history published during the last decade or
so to determine whether there are in that
literature any discernible trends and to point
out some problem areas where existing la-
cunae appear particularly glaring and where,
in this author's view, useful opportunities
for future work accordingly exist.
To achieve these aims, the article is di-
vided into four parts. The first will deal with
the state of military history as written for
popular, military, and academic consump-
tion respectively. The second will outline
some of the new themes that have emerged
in this literature. The third will examine the
advantages and disadvantages of some new
methodologies employed, including in par-
ticular quantitative analysis and war-gaming.
Finally, an attempt will be made to draw all
these various threads together, and to present
an outlook for the future.
To start with the good news, military his-
tory is alive and well. As the shelves of
newsstands and the book corners of depart-
ment stores all over the Western world
clearly show, wars continue to make rattling
good history. Fictional, semi-fictional and
even factual accounts of the exploits of past
generals are as popular in our times as they
were in those of Homer; one need only man-
ufacture an illustrated work about Rom-
mel-such as the one by that title by Charles
Douglas Home (London, Weidenfeld and
Nicholson, 1973)-in order to start the
Great War," a title which it took another and
even larger conflict to eradicate.
For reasons that are not far to seek-that
World War 11 was the largest conflict ever
fought and that it is likely to remain so in
the future-the stranglehold in which this
conflict has been keeping military history
since 1945 is extraordinary. Rarely if ever
in history has any single subject been so
much written about and, since this is the age
of the mass media, not merely written about
but filmed, televised, modelled and put into
the form of war games. Such has been the
preoccupation with World War II that. con-
sciously or unconsciously, it has come to be
regarded as the model for future conflict, as
is demonstrated by that extraordinary best
seller, General Sir Hackett's The Third
'World War (London, 1978), which is really
nothing but a rehash of 1939-1945 fought
with superior but basically similar weapons,
compressed into as many weeks as the pre-
vious struggle had years, and ending some-
what implausibly in a limited exchange of
hydrogen bombs followed by the disintegra-
tion of the USSR.
Although excellent studies on World War
II have continued to be produced during the
last decade-witness David Irving's Hitler's
War (London, 1976) and John Erickson's
two volumes on the Eastern Front-in gen-
eral their hold has been weakening. As his-
tory continues its course and new conflicts
break out to make us forget the old, many
of the events of World War II which were,
at one time believed to be of monumental
importance are no longrer perceived as such.
This is reflected in the publishing world. By
the mid-1970s the production of official his-
tories by the leading countries had been
completed or else abandoned. except in the
Federal Republic of Germany which, for
reasons that are only too understandable,
was a latecomer in the field. Moreover, as
this author found out to his cost,2 titles such
as "Japan's Invasion of ...," or "The Cam-
paigns of General von ...," or "The Battle
of 194 ..." (fill in as desired) were losing
their appeal. Increasingly, they are being re-
placed by other, more general works, em-
Comm w
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bracing many different aspects of the war
besides the purely military one. Basil Liddell
Hart's Histor of the Second World War
(London, 1970) has had no successors and,
indeed, there is no reason why it should
have. Instead, we have witnessed the ap-
pearance of such works as P. Calvocoressi
and G. Wint's Total War (London, 1972):
A. Milward's War, Economy and Society
1939-1945 (London, 1977), the title of
which speaks for itself: and R. Overy's The
Air War 1939-1945 (London. 1980) which,
surprisingly enough, represents the first at-
tempt to cover this very important field in a
comprehensive rather than a fragmentary or
an anecdotal manner. To put it all into a
nutshell. World War II at long last is turning
from The War into a war, a development
which, in so far as it may help us regain a
proper perspective. heralds nothing but good
both for those who study past wars and for
those who would plan conflicts of the future.
L Nor is World War II the only subject the
treatment of which is changing. It used to
be that, particularly under the influence of
Liddell Hart (the last edition of whose Strat-
egy, originally written during the late 1920s,
was published in 1967), wars were examined
primarily from a strategic, operational and
tactical point of view. in study after study,
victories were represented as won and de-
feats as suffered mainly because armies were
outflanked or encircled, or because their
communications were cut, or because their
manner of operation was either too concen-
trated or dispersed (sometimes. both)-all of
which terms constituted a convenient short-
hand for understanding. What was often
overlooked was the fact that none of these
terms and relationships made any sense
whatsoever except when seen against the
background of numerous other factors; in
other words, the operations of war do not
exhaust themselves in drawing topological
patterns on a map but consist very much of
supply, intelligence, and command as well.
To start with supply, logistics may be de-
fined as the science of dealing with every-
thing an armed force needs from the moment
it leaves the factory gates (nowadays the
proportion of all supplies that comes from
the fields rather than the factories is negli-
gible) to the time it is distributed. or con-
sumed. or expended. Since armies march on
their stomachs. the subject is obviously vi-
tally important both to the conduct of war
and to its historical interpretation: yet it was
long neglected by military historians who
apparently did not consider it sufficiently
interesting or marketable to merit their at-
tention. One of the first to show the error of
this view, and to call attention away from
strategy towards logistics, was Larry Ad-
dington in his 1971 hook. The Blitzkrieg Era
and the German General Staff 1865-1941,
a work which, though as disjointed as the
title indicates, did point to the role played
by supply and transport in the campaigns
that it covered. In 1975. the Historical Office
of the Italian General Staff published I senv-
izi logistici delle unita italiane al fronte
russo 1941-43. This was followed by the
present author's Supplying War: Logistics
from Wallenstein to Patton (London. 1977)
which represented an attempt to trace the
impact of logistics upon a number of impor-
tant campaigns during the last two centuries
and to draw some general conclusions co-
nerning its development. Since then much-
though not nearly enough-work has been
done to shed additional light on this side of
war: one need only recall Donald Engels'
magnificent Alexander the Great and the Lo-
gistics of the Macedonian Army (Berkeley.
1978) to realize the vital contribution that a
study of logistics can make to the under-
standing of past wars.
The second topic whose place in the lit-
erature has been prominent during the last
decade or so is military intelligence in war.
Intelligence had long been neglected by se-
rious historians who, with some justification,
considered it the domain of mystery writers
and other assorted hacks with the t that,
since the historians knew nothing out t,
they tended to belittle its importance. In this
they were aided by the desire of the intelli-
gence services themselves to conceal their
activities a desire that stemmed part) rom
the nature of their work and partly from a
a.
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desire to enhance its importance still further
by enveloping it in a cloak of secrecy.
During the 1970s all this changed. One
reason was the sudden outbreak of the Oc-
tober 1973 Arab-Israeli War which left peo-
ple all around the world wondering how an
intelligence service that had been regarded
at among the verv best could have been
publication in 1974 of F. W. Winterbotham*s
The Ultra Secret, in which it was revealed
that the British throughout World War 11 had
intercepted, decoded. and read German mil-
itary wireless traffic. Together. these two
events led to an extraordinary outburst of
publications which. collectively, tried to an-
swer the question: how important are intel-
ligence activities in modern war, and to what
extent did the fact that they had now been
brought into the open force a revision in
existing interpretations of historical events?
The following are but a few of the main
publications that formed part of the debate.
David Kahn in The Code Breakers (London,
1974) showed that, during World War II,
almost everybody had been reading at least
some of the messages of almost everybody
else at least some of the time. Ronald Lewin
in his Ultra Goes to War (London, 1978)
provided the best short review of how the
British decoding operation came about, but
remained somewhat puzzled as to why the
Allies, with such excellent information at
their disposal. nevertheless suffered so many
defeats during the early years. Francis H.
Hinslev et al. in British Intelligence in World
War 11 (New York. 1979. two volumes pub-
lished so far) proceeded on a much wider
basis than did Lewin. showing the way Brit-
ish intelligence was organized, the assump-
tions on which it rested. and the manner in
which it operated. J. Dorwart in The Office
of Naval Intelligence,- the Birth of America's
First Intelligence Agency 1865-1918 (An-
napolis. Md., 1979) and W. J. Holmes in
Double Edged Secrets: U.S. Naval Intelli-
gence Operations in the Pacc During
(London. 19 ) an
of Darkness (London. 1979) reviewed some
of the technological aspects of intelligence,
whereas Charles G. Cruickshank in Decep-
tion in World War 11 (London, enlarged edi-
tion. 1981) attempted to show the impor-
tance of his subject without, however,
getting very far beyond what had already
been published. All in all, the spate of books
on intelligence and intelligence-related ac_
tivities. which is only now showing some
signs of abating has added considerably to
our understanding of the subject as such and.
has done much to restore its lost respecta-
bility. It has not, however, forced any very
significant revisions concerning historical
events. and indeed there have been several
publications devoted to explaining why this
has not happened.'
Closely connected with intelligence, but
embracing a considerably wider scope. Ls the
entire problem of command. control. and
communication (sometimes abbreviated as
C') in war. Traditionally historians have
written about the activities of armed forces
and about the qualities of commanders: the
means through which the latter have been
translated into the former have seldom been
subjected to systematic examination, how-
ever. and indeed from reading the pages of
military history one would rarely guess that
coordinating the performance of bodies of
men numbering hundreds of thousands or
even millions presents any problem what-
soever. During the 1970s, the wrong-head-
edness of this view was forcefully brought
up by Edward N. Luttwak in his brilliant
study, The Grand Strategy of the Roman
Empire (Baltimore, Md., 1976), whose
claim that the empire had a coherent strategy
rationally developed by a coherent organi-
nation on the basis of carefully assembled
World War 11 (Annapolis. Md.. 1979) tried
to make out that intelligence had been in-
vented by the U.S. Navy. So did the United
States Air Force. ed., Ultra and the History
of the U:S. Strategic Air Force in Europe
vs. The German Air Force (Frederick. Md..
1980). a carefully researched if somewhat
slanted piece of official history the real pur-
pose of which is to show that, given good
intelligence the bomber can still get
fooled in such a way; the other was the through. R. V. Jones in Most Secret War
78 d A Price in Instruments
information and staff work has been the sub-
ject of an ongoing debate. Unfortunately
much of that debate has taken place on the
pages of learned journals. Good books on
the question of how historical armed forces
were commanded. how they did their staff
work. and how their various components
communicated with each other and coordi-
nated their activities are only now getting
into print.
Finally. a very important theme which has
dominated much of military-historical writ-
ing during pan of the 1970s is the question
of guerrilla warfare. Spurred on by the U.S.
experience in Vietnam-where the most
powerful and technologically advanced mil-
itary machine ever assembled failed to
triumph over a small, backward and eco-
nomically poor people and its armed
forces-and also by the outbreak and spread
of spectacular acts of international terrorism
from 1968 onward, works on the subject
flooded the market. Among the best must be
mentioned John Ellis' A Short Histon? of
Guerrilla Warfare (London, 1975); Walter
Laqueur's Guerrilla (Boston. 1976). which
comes complete with a companion volume
on terrorism and with another consisting of
readings; and Robert Asprey's War in the
Shadows: the Guerrilla in Histon? (Garden
City. N.Y.. 1975). the most massive volume
on the subject. As in the case of intelligence,
however. guerrilla warfare and its compan
ion, terrorism. seem to have lost some of
their appeal since 1980. Interest in their his-
tory was at its peak during the mid-1970s.
but has suffered some decline after the last
colonies in Africa and Asia gained their in-
dependence and after it became clear that
scattered kidnappings. hiiackings and assas-
sinations did not. after all, represent quite
the threat to the world's continued existence
which at first they appeared to do.
The long and the short of it is, military
history during the last decade has been
greatly enriched by the emergence of a va-
riety of new themes which, for one reason
or another, had previously suffered from ne-
glect. Some of these themes. not all of which
could be listed here, originated in historians'
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attempts to break existing deadlocks and find
new explanations: others were the result of
interest in contemporary affairs being pro-
jected backwards, sometimes very far hack
indeed.4 Since it is usually the juxtaposing
of past and present which makes history in
general. and military history in particular,
the fascinating subject that it is, it may be
safely predicted that, in the near future,
problems that are currently being wrestled
with by the military will constitute wide
open fields for successful and remunerative
historical research. Among these problems,
apart from C3, are the impact of modem
technology upon military organization and
performance; the role that women have, can
and may play in their country's defense; and
the question of morale and the willingness
to fight which, in most Western societies,
appears to have undergone a remarkable de-
cline.
During the middle of the nineteenth century.
Friedrich Engels was only one among the
many who tried to grasp the impact of new
breechloading arms on the tactical attack by
calculating what percentage of the men in an
assaulting unit would be hit by what number
of units at what distance and within what
time.' In 1915 the British mathematician F.
W. Lanchester succeeded in formulating a
small number of simple equations which
have been in use ever since and which pur-
ported to express the relative power of dif-
ferent armies as well as the rate at which,
firing at each other, they would be attrited.
While some kind of mathematical instru-
ments for determining range and elevation
for artillery have been in use since the time
whole. We shall therefore limit the discus-
sion in the present section to the work of
one man, Colonel (ret.) Trevor Dupuy, who
to our knowledge has made the only serious
attempt to date to construct and publish ex-
plicit mathematical models which, he
claims, make it possible to understand past
conflicts (or rather, battles) in digital rather
than metaphorical terms.
Dupuy's method, as expounded most fully
in his Numbers. Predictions and War (New
York. 1979), is roughly as follows. First, a
theoretical model of the relative power of
historical weapons. ranging from the javelin
to the one-megaton H bomb, is constructed
by analyzing the casualties it might inflict
on a densely packed formation of men (one
We are living in the age of the computer,
and nowhere is the contribution of the num-
ber crunchers greater than in the military by
and for whom many of the original machines
were developed from World War II onward.'
Indeed, the use of computers with their ex-
traordinary ability to rapidly process vast
quantities of data has led to a revolution in
every aspect of military use; without them
the armed forces of the present, vastly more
complex than those of the past. could hardly
exist. much less engage in active operations
of war.
Whereas computers are relatively new, at-
tempts at quantitative analyses of war and
military affairs are not. Ancient writers on
military history, such as Thucydides, Xen-
ophon. Arrian and Polybios, were usually
quite careful in giving the strength of the
various contingents that made up the armies
they describe. Early in the eighteenth cen-
tury the French military engineer. Sebastien
de Pretre de Vauban, attempted to fix precise
rules as to how many guns had to fire how
much ammunition in order to bring down
what kind of fortress in what length of time.6
of Nicolas Tartaglia in the sixteenth century, man per square meter) occupying a limited
mathematically-based operations research space. Next, the actual relative destructive-
only came into its own during World War ness of these weapons is calculated by di-
II, when it was used to model small-scale viding the result by the average space oc-
engagements between destroyers and sub- cupied by troops in battle during various
marines or aircraft and antiaircraft artillery. periods. Factors such as attack versus de-
Even in 1939-1945, however. this work was fense (of which Dupuy recognized various
still being done by experts whose tools, in. kinds, ranging from hasty all the way to
addition to their own often outstanding heads fortified), terrain, weather, troop quality,
(some of them, such as P. M. H. Blackest, leadership, etc. are then introduced into the
were subsequently awarded the Nobel equation, and each of them is assigned a
Prize), consisted mainly of logarithmic ta- numerical value that is based on trial and
bles and slide rulers, and whose ability to error. These data, which derive from several
process data was, accordingly, quite limited. historical battles and which are juggled
After 1945, all this changed. Increasingly around until they fit the actual outcome. are
powerful computers gradually made it pos- then applied to other battles to see if they,
sible, in principle at any rate, to construct too, can be fitted into the model. The ulti-
mathematical models of entire armed con- mate result of the method, known as Quan-
flicts and to run and rerun those conflicts titative Judgement Model or QJM. is a series
through the machines so as to observe the of equations which, according to Dupuy
effect that changes in various variables- himself, fits the past with reasonable accu-
from the weather to the weapons em- racy and should also be able to predict the
ployed-would have on the outcome. The outcome of future campaigns and battles if
dvance
i
il
bl
foundations for this kind of work were laid
by such men as John Neumann, Norbert
Wiener, and Thomas Schelling, and in both
the U.S.A. and the USSR it has been going
on ever since. However, only a very small
fraction of the millions of games that must
have been played by the experts has ever
been published, and most of those are con-
cerned with small-scale, specialized engage-
ments rather than with armed conflict as a
.
n a
a
e
sufficient data were ava
This is not the proper case to evaluate the
work of Dupuy and his associates. All that
can be said is that it appears to rest on a data
base much larger and more detailed than that
available to any other historian this author
knows of, and that its equations are also
more detailed than any others seen by him.
If his work is defective on both theoretical
and historical grounds-as this author had
dfAttWd
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occasion to find out when he tried to apply plowed by an entire industry whose purpose
it to the Battle of El Alamein. obtaining very is to model past conflicts and enable enthu
different results depending on whether or not siasts to replay them as if they were the
prisoners of war were counted as casual- warlords, or commanders in chief, or gen-
ties-nobody seems to have prnduced any_ erals in charge. Employing methods very
thing hater. All in all, the quantitative study similar to Dupuy's, often based on extremely
of military history is only in its infancy; that painstaking research and going into a level
it deserves to be continued cannot, in this of detail rarely approached by academic his-
writer's view, be doubted at all. torians. the range of these games and their
In any case, Dupuy's work is only the tip varier is truly astonishing. One can have a
of an iceberg. He may be about the only tactical reconstruction of the battle of Nor-
quantitative historian of war whose findings dlingen fought by Gustavus Adolphus in
and methods, whatever their real worth, are 1634, but the same few dollars will also buy
available to the public almost in their raw a full-scale model of the principal belliger-
form. Similar methods, however, underlie ents in World War II, complete with the
another important military-historical phe- various politico-military-industrial-financial
nomenon of the last decade and a half, factors and the relationships among them.
namely the board war game as played by Often accompanied by pamphlets of mathe-
both professionals and amateurs. Once matical rules counting dozens of pages, and
again, such games are not entirely new. Both increasingly relying on computers to make
chess and its less well-known-though the necessary calculations and on data links
equally deserving-Japanese equivalent, to transmit the information from one player
(Go), started out as war games and for a to another, many of these games succeed in
long time reflected the manner in which wars reconstructing the past with a degree of ur-
were actually waged in their respective gency and immediacy that is hardly ever
countries of origin. War games were quite achieved by the printed word alone. Fur-
popular among Prussian and Russian staff thermore, the games. like no other medium,
officers during the early nineteenth century, make it possible for the players to engage in
and if the Austrians refused to learn them as actual competition against an opponent who,
well, this was allegedly because there was as in real war, is to a large extent free to do
no money to be made at them. As is often as he pleases; hence there is also plenty of
the case, when the Prussian-German General room for the elements of chance, uncertainty
Staff rose to world prominence following its and friction that are too often absent from
victories over the Austrians and the French, the pages of military history. The literature
the war game that it used, the so-called that has grown up around this kind of war
Kriegspiel, was endowed with almost myst- game during the last decade is vast: besides
ical qualities: in the eyes of experts and lay- many periodicals (the most important of
men alike, it came to be thought of as one which is Strategy and Tactics) it is only
of the principal secrets behind the staff's necessary to mention Nicholas Palmer's The
excellence. Comprehensive Guide to War-gaming (New
When the German General Staff was York, 1977) and S. P. Glick's and I.
purged in 1945, the Kriegspie! did not die Chartre's "War, Games and Military His-
with it. On the contrary, it was further de- tort'" (Journal of Contemporarty History,
veloped by the addition of operations re- October 1983, pp. 567-82), probably the
search and of computers. Though the exact best analytical treatment of the games and
nature and results of the games that were their value to the study of military history.
being incessantly played at the Pentagon and Nor is it amateurs alone who are trying their
in the Kremlin were not, of course, made hand at reconstructing the past in this way;
public, the methodology on which they rely in only slightly modified form, board war
appears to be remarkably similar to that em- games have been adopted by the military and
are being extensivel\ used for tactical. op-
erational and strategic training.
Unlike some of his colleagues in the social
sciences, the present writer is not a computer
nut. He does not believe that quantitative
history invariably stands for better or even
more accurate history. nor that it is necessary
to jump to attention and salute every time
an equation or graph or table are presented
in evidence. It appears quite clear, however.
that the new methods based on quantitative
analysis on the one hand. and on war-gaming
on the other, do present unique advantages
of their own, and that traditional military
history with its reliance on the printed word,
maps and the occasional picture can only
ignore those advantages at its own cost. if
there is any obvious lacuna in existing mil-
itary historical literature that cries out to be
filled, surely it is the need to integrate these
various approaches and use the methods of
each in order to enrich the others: for it is
by combining existing elements in new ways
that advances in historiography. as in any
other field. are made.
Summing up this paper, it might perhaps
be said that military history has reached the
mid-1980s alive and well, itself no mean
achievement if the sorry state of such dis-
ciplines as psychohistory and international
relations is used as a measuring rod. Not
only has military history retained its attrac-
tiveness as a form of popular entertainment,
but it has also succeeded in recapturing lost
ground among the professionals of war and
among political decision makers who, as re-
cently as fifteen years ago. were on the point
of discarding it altogether if they had not
done so already.s Ridding itself of some long
established traditions and stereotypes, mili-
tary history during the period under discus-
sion has also branched out into numerous
new and promising directions. though much
more remains to be done. Also. some new
approaches and new methodologies made
their appearance, though their integration
with the mainstream of traditional and par-
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ticularly academic military history remains
far from complete at this writing.
All in all, and contrary to the opinion of
some who insist that there is a crisis in mil-
itary historiography. the picture presented is
quite encouraging. This does not mean that
there are no gaps to be filled and weaknesses
to he corrected-on the contrary. it was one
of the declared purposes of the present article
to point out those gaps and those weak-
nesses. Nor if it by any means certain that
the present favorable climate to military his-
tory will necessarily continue, for much of
that climate is the product of factors beyond
the scope of the discipline proper. and those
factors may well change again.
In the near future. much will depend on
the military historians themselves. To sur-
vive they must continue to branch out in new
and relevant directions. adopt new metho-
dologies borrowed from other fields or de-
veloped by themselves, and integrate their
findings into the mainstream of historical
research. Alternatively, they may once again
allow themselves to be imprisoned by ster-
eotypes. old-fashioned thinking and, in the
case of academic military history. sheer big-
otry. Provided military historians can meet
this challenge. however, the present writer
sees no cause for anxiety. and to those who
insist that military history is in a crisis, or
that it stands in need of socializing or that it
has outlived its usefulness, the reply can
only be epure si n7uove.9
Martin van Creveld teaches histor at the
Hebrew University, Jerusalem. Of his
man), publications on military affairs, the
latest is Command in War (Cambridge,
Massachusetts. 1985).
1. Richard Perle, "Technology and the Quiet War,"
Strategic Review, Winter 1983, p. 35.
2. Text of President Ronald Reagan's July 8, 1981
Arms Transfer Policy Directive. The White House,
July 8, 1981.
3. Interview conducted with director of procurement,
Raytheon. Washington, D.C., June 21, 1983.
4. President Reagan's letter to House and Senate lead-
ers transmitting proposed bill to amend the Export
Administration Act, April 4, 1983.
5. "Offset/Coproduction Requirements in the Aero-
space and Electronics Trade," Report of a Survey
of Industry, Department of The Treasury, May 24,
1983, p. 2.
6. "How Defense Will Handle Critical Technology
Exports-and Why," National Security. May 1979,
p. 16.
7. "COCOM Rejects Bid to Ban New Technologies
to Eastern Bloc," Electronic News, May 16. 1983.
8. "An Analysis of Export Control of U.S. Technol-
ogy-A D.O.D. Perspective," Report of the De-
fense Science Board Task Force on Export of U.S.
Technology, February 4. 1976, Washington. D.C.
9. "International Transfer of Technology. Goods, Ser-
vices and Munitions," Department of Defense Di-
rective, January 17, 1984, No. 2040.2, p. 2.
10. Interviews with various government officials and
private contractors conducted in Washington,
D.C., June 1983. Not for attribution.
11. "Standardization of Equipment Within NATO,"
Ninth Report to Congress, January 1983. Caspar
Weinberger, Secretary of Defense.
12. "Congress Draws Itself into Foreign Policy For-
mulation," Clyde Farnsworth, New York Times,
March 25, 1984.
13. "Soviet Acquisition of Western Technology," CIA,
April 1982.
14. "Scientific Communication and National Security,"
National Academy of Sciences (Washington, Na-
tional Academy Press, 1982).
15. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, Depart-
ment of Defense, Technology Control Program Re-
port to the 98th Congress, February 1983-re-
quested funding of $11.6 million and 157 personnel
for technology control programs for fiscal year
1984. In 1983. DOD made a one-time transfer of
$20 million to U.S. Customs Service's Operation
Exodus.
16. Interview with official in the office of the deputy
assistant secretary of defense (international eco-
nomic, trade and security policy). June 20, 1983.
Not for attribution.
17. Joint statement by Secretary Baldridge and Am-
bassador Brock, Spring. 1983. Office of the United
States Trade Representative, Washington, D.C.
(These figures are constantly cited, yet source and
derivation are not.)
18. Comments of a U.S. corporation with extensive
and varied experience in international production.
Internal memo, not for attribution.
19. Report to the House of Representatives Committee
on Armed Services, Special Subcommittee on
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NATO, "Standardization. Interoperability, Readi-
ness," June 22, 1978.
20. Karl Harr, Jr., president of the Aerospace Industries
Association of America. Inc. Letter to Deputy Sec-
retary of Defense Paul Thayer, March 4, 1983.
21. Joseph Gavin, Jr.. president of Grumman Corpo-
ration, in personal correspondence with the author,
April 27, 1983.
22. Export Administration Act: Hearings before the
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Af-
fairs, United States Senate, February 3, 1983, p.
23. Caspar Weinberger, "Department of Defense: The
Technology Transfer Control Program," Report to
the 98th Congress, February 1983, p. 9.
24. Richard Perle, "Technology and the Quiet War,"
Strategic Review, Winter 1983, p. 35.
25. 1 am grateful to Brigadier General H. V. Larson
(USAF-Ret.) for the "bucket" analogy.
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