THE CIA TODAY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000402650036-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 8, 2012
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: March 1, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
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=:F` 7 En' - APPEARED
COSMOPOLITAN
March 1985
Can you keep a secret? Okay ... then listen
to what these spies, spooks, agents, moles
are up to in the realm of espionage. Maybe
you, too, will be tempted to flirt with
danger! By James Horwitz
13 ''CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY . . . Where
your career is America's strength . . . Unique overseas
assignments that challenge your every talent ... You will
frequently lino and work in foreign lands and interact with
persons on all levels. You will find yourself in situations
that will test your self-reliance to the utmost; situations that
demand quick thinking to solve problems on the spot. You
can forget about a 9-to-5 routine. You must be adventurous
yet self-disciplined and tough-minded. And your assign-
ments will call on the deepest resources of your intelli-
gence, knowledge, and responsibility ... We will respond
to written enquiries. No phone calls please."
-From the classifieds in the Sunday New York Times
Uncle Casey Wants You
Jumping James Bond! The CIA recruiting spies from the
want ads? The mind reels with images of trench coats, clan-
destine meetings on the rain-slicked back streets of Berlin,
secret passwords, invisible ink-echoes of Mata Hari and all
the espionage novels you've ever read, not to mention visions
of those armies of the night creepy-crawling through the jun-
gles of Southeast Asia and Central America. Cloak-and-dagger
derring-do. Twitchings of paranoia.
But is the spy life really like that-a thriller demimonde of
international intrigue, breathless adventure? Have you ever
wondered what goes on in the whisper world of the CIA? Can
you keep a secret?
Up From a Band of Thugs
"Gentlemen do not read each other's mail," a former Sec-
retary of State was said to have remarked high-mindedly in a
more innocent time. "When the fate of a nation and the lives of
its soldiers are at stake." Allen Welsh Dulles, one of the
founding fathers of the CIA and a fabled spymaster, retorted
years later, "gentlemen do read each other's mail-when they
can get their hands on it."
That, in essence, is what the CIA is all about. And its one
rule of engagement is: Don't get caught! What Rudyard Kip-
ling once called "the great game of spying" has, of course,
always been pretty murky. These days, it is simply more com-
plex and pervasive, if not perverse.
The United States, as a matter of fact, is something of a
latecomer to the great game, never having had an official, gov-
ernment-authorized foreign-intelligence service until, spurred
by the incipient paranoia of the early cold war, the Central
Intelligence Agency was created by the National Security Act
of 1947. Manned in those early years predominantly by gifted
tyros-wealthy and socially prominent Ivy League lawyers,
stockbrokers, academics, and athletes-the young CIA com-
pensated for its amateurism with dedicated patriotism, enthu-
siasm, and some daring. "We were a marvelous band of
thugs," says an ex-Yalie who joined up in the early fifties,
speaking nostalgically of the years he spent as an American
secret agent in the Far East in the guise of an English gentle-
man (complete with monocle and waistcoat) straight out of the
pages of Somerset Maugham or Graham Greene. "In those
days, all you needed were guts, self-discipline, confidence,
and a sense of adventure. It was an exciting life, I'm not sure
the Agency would even accept people like us today. We were
unconventional, not the programmed type."
Indeed, the CIA today not only advertises in the Times but
sets up its recruiting booths at college career fairs right next to
the likes of IBM and General Motors. The Agency of the eight-
ies has become a giant intelligence conglomerate (euphemisti-
cally called The Company by its employees, as if it were just
another multinational corporation) whose extensive interna-
tional operations and activities can only be guessed at. Its
ranks number more than seventeen thousand people (the exact
figure is a secret), and it has a budget (again secret) in the
billions of dollars. With sophisticated high-tech gadgets, spy
satellites whirling through space, and a host of undercover
operatives on the prowl all over the world, the CIA can now
read the opposition gentleman's mail even before it is deliv-
ered. It can count his arsenal and calculate his food produc-
tion, eavesdrop on his phone calls and listen to his pillow talk.
It can see him in the dark. With enough information, its com-
puters and analysts can sometimes deduce what he is going to
do before he does it. And the CIA has been known to send
secret armies under false flags and counterfeit colors to frus-
trate his diplomatic designs and tangle his alliances.
Yet being an organization steeped in secrecy, the CIA nat-
urally doesn't like to admit or even discuss what it does or is
capable of doing. "We're not a James Bond operation," says
an Agency spokesman a bit disingenuously, being careful not
to actually say anything. "There's a lot of misperception of
what we're about. I look at it like any corporation. We're an
elite organization with a vital mission to carry out. We're here
to produce the best intelligence in the world."
Continued
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Only The Shadow Knows
It is no secret that, as Washington monuments go, the head-
quarters of the Central Intelligence Agency, unlike, say, the
Capitol, the White House, or the Watergate Apartments, is not
exactly a tourist attraction. Just a short taxi ride along the
George Washington Parkway, across the Potomac River and
into the trees near Langley, Virginia, America's House of
Spies stands in imposing anonymity on 219 acres of rustic gov-
ernment property. A massive, forbidding structure built of
Lmnesia-gray concrete and marble, sever stories tall and load-
ed with the most advanced communications and security gear.
the forty-six-million-dollar headquarters gives the impression
of being in the middle of nowhere. Outside the entrance stands
a statue of America's first spy hero, Nathan Hale, who was not
very good at the game (he was caught and hanged by the
British), yet left an inspiring patriotic legacy by regretting that
he had but one life to give for his country. On a 'wall in the main
lobby is engraved the CIA's motto borrowed from the Bible:
''Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free-
John VII-XXIII." But with almost no people in view, the still-
ness and eerie silence of the place is palpable, almost lunar,
which only enhances the impenetrable air of mystery that is
intended to surround the Agency's hush-hush world.
Operating in that ambiguous shadowland of riddles buried in
enigmas, the CIA must metaphorically walk an existential
tightrope between the public's right to know about activities
undertaken in its name and our desire not to know too much
for fear of what we might learn. Alas, more often than it would
like, the Agency has found itself smack in the spotlight,
squirming in the public gaze, its cloak flapping open, its dagger
exposed. hidden cards tumbling from its sleeve.
"Your successes are unheralded, your failures trumpeted,"
President John F. Kennedy once remarked, characterizing the
perpetual dilemma of the secret organization. And, to be sure,
the trumpets of CIA failure, scandal, and embarrassment have
ofttimes blown resoundingly while its praises have mostly
been sung only in nods and winks.
in the aftermath of Watergate. the Agency found some of its
dirtiest laundry strung out on the public line, its darkest
secrets emblazoned in the headlines of the daily press, a num-
ber of its ex-employees marched off to jail, its top officials
grilled by congressional committees and grand juries. Charges
ranged from attempted assassination of foreign leaders and the
subversion and overthrow of duly elected governments to spy-
ing on American citizens, tapping their phones, reading their
mail, and carrying out fatal drug experiments on unsuspecting
subjects. Hundreds of hard-core spooks were speedily retired
from duty. Agency morale plummeted in the double crunch of
accusation and alibi. Revelations of two decades of foreign
mischief and domestic mayhem in the name of national secu-
rity shocked, outraged, and bewildered a citizenry brought up
to believe that only the bad guys behaved that way.
The late Senator Frank Church, at the time chairman of the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, labeled the CIA "a
rogue elephant out of control" as the skeletons of conspiracy,
corruption. and cover-up tumbled out of the Agency's closet.
In defense of the CIA and its dubious capers, Richard Helms,
the then director of Central Intelligence who would be con-
victed of perjury for lying to a Senate committee about CIA
involvement in the overthrow of the government of Chile,
could only reply. "The nation must to some degree take it on
faith that we. too. are honorable men."
Under the Reagan administration, the Agency has under-
gone a renaissance if not necessarily a reformation. While the
worst excesses of the sixties and seventies have largely been
eliminated, even now questions persist. Is the CIA performing
its legitimate intelligence function or is it still up to some of its
sneaky old tricks? Is it an instrument of policy or the instigator
of it? What exactly is the role of the Agency in the labyrinth of
world affairs? Does only The Shadow know for sure?
Commenting on the CIA's ingrained penchant for secrecy in
the name of national security and its often disdainful attitude
toward congressional oversight of its covert activities, Califor-
nia Congressman Norman Mineta has remarked, "We are like
mushrooms. They [the Agency] keep us in the dark and feed us
a lot of manure."
The current director of Central Intelligence. William J.
Casey (a millionaire businessman and Reagan's 1980 campaign
manager), favors buccaneer boldness in the espionage game.
with a particular fondness for secret operations. He has the
President's good ear in foreign-policy matters and his confi-
dence in an intimate way that few other CIA heads have ever
had with the man in the Oval Office, who has the ultimate
responsibility of giving the Agency its marching orders. And
the order of the day these days is: Full speed ahead!
The CIA has been engaging in secret operations to prop up
friendly governments or to topple unfriendly tyrants almost
since 4s inception. In those early years, the Agency snatched
Italy back from the grasp of communism and restored the Shah
in Iran. With a bit of moxie and a clandestine radio station, it
stampeded the leftist president of Guatemala out of office and
saved that country for free enterprise and the United Fruit
Company. Less successfully, the CIA tried to poison Nasser
of Egypt and, when that scheme failed, attempted to bribe him
into submission. A three-million-dollar payoff was found to be
ten dollars short on delivery, so the bagman had to make up
the difference out of his own pocket. Nasser took the money
but refused to be bought. Instead, he used the funds to build a
useless tower on the Nile right across from the Hilton Hotel in
Cairo.. And after the Central Intelligence Agency made an
abortive effort to undermine Sukarno, president of Indonesia;
by trying to fake a' pornographic film of him in bed with a
prostitute, it threw money and muscle into a guerrilla war that
eventually toppled him from office.
The CiA's secret army suffered a total fiasco at the Bay of
Pigs in-Cuba, and subsequent attempts to murder Castro (with
isoned cigars, exploding seashells, toxic wet suits, and
Mafia hit men) only made the-Agency look incompetent. In
Vietnam, nearly twenty cloak-and-dagger years of the biggest,
pnost expensive, and deadliest CIA endeavors ever undertaken
Tended ignominiously in those terrible televised scenes of a
'helter-skelter helicopter evacuation from the rooftop of the
Saigon embassy. Yet today, perhaps more than at any time
since Vietnam, the CIA's unofficial presence is leaving big
footprints all over the world.
It has long been an open secret that the CIA has been train-
ing, advising, and paying the bills for the so-called contras
making guerrilla war against Nicaragua. Witness the recent
revelation that the Agency, in defiance of a 1982 law forbid-
ding American personnel from taking part in any effort to over-
throw the Sandinista government, floated a primer ]o the
rebels instructing them in the lethal arts of political assassina-
tion, blackmail, and mob violence. In El Salvador, the CIA
was accused of funneling up to two million dollars into the
election campaign of the eventual victor, Jose. Napoleon
Ootrfinued
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0.
Duarte. Elsewhere, the Agency is sending millions in clandes-
tine support to Islamic guerrillas in Afghanistan, to anti-
Khomeini exiles in Turkey. to assorted bands of jungle fighters
in both Africa and Southeast Asia.
The idea of Central Intelligence making secret war, hiring
mercenary soldiers, running guns. engaging in sabotage is
cause for dispute not only among politicians but within the
CIA itself. "Every President has chosen the option of going to
covert operations at certain times when he feels diplomacy
isn't working but he doesn't want to send in the marines,"
says a former high official in the Agency. "When some of
these actions become public knowledge or go wrong, it leaves
the impression that we're engaged in this sort of thing all over
the world. That's simply not true."
"Ideally, I don't think the CIA should be running secret
military operations at all, even though it seems to be a major
preoccupation of The Company," argues another Agency
retiree, a man who spent twenty-five years in the business, a
number of them doing just that in Southeast Asia. "Sure, it's
exciting to be out in the jungles running military ops with your
own little army of mountain tribesmen or whatever. But in the
end, it's usually poison for The Company, misguided, a huge
waste of money and lives. Our job should be intelligence.
That's what we're supposedly trained for. To get the best intel-
ligence and analyze it honestly and accurately, to understand
what's going on-that's a full-time job."
HUMINT vs. ELINT
Certainly, few would argue that the major role for which the
CIA was created is not war mongering but intelligence gather-
ing, much of which is carried on eight miles high with wizardry
that can practically decipher the headlines of Pravda from out
in the ionosphere, observe the mass movements of entire
armies toward troubled borders, and listen in on the
communications of field marshals and foreign ministers. End-
less amounts of collected information flow into Langley's
computers around the clock, but it provides only part of the
picture. Take the Cuban missile crisis. While CIA spy planes
first detected the presence of what looked like Soviet missile
sites on Fidel's island, it took an agent on the ground in Cuba
who actually saw the missiles rolling past his front door and
got the word back, and another informant within the Soviet
military establishment in Moscow who got his hands on the
actual missile designs, to supply the crucial corroboration.
If anything is axiomatic in the espionage business, it's that
expensive spy satellites may perform inhuman wonders but
only the cleaning lady can tell you what's in the defense min-
ister's wastebasket. No question that the intelligence game is
played most energetically inside foreign countries (not miles
above them), where the CIA, the KGB, Britain's MI-6, the
French SDECE. Israel's MOSSAD, and all the other govern-
ment-sanctioned snoops deploy their operatives, spread mon-
ey around, and play the tricks often the stuff of spy novels.
In these cat-and-mouse capers, anyone with access to infor-
mation the CIA wants to have might make an agent, which, in
the lingo of the trade, generally refers to a foreign national
recruited as a spy, not the full-time intelligence officer (in the
CIA, always an American citizen) posted to that particular
country. "The CIA tried to recruit me." says a young woman
who lives in the Middle East and works in a deluxe hotel.
"They wanted to know if I'd supply them information on peo-
ple who come to the hotel. They talked to me a few times, but
after I told them my husband was American, I never heard
from them again. 1 guess they found someone else. I some-
times wonder who."
In their quest for intelligence from human sources (called
HUMINT, as opposed to ELINT, which stands for intelligence
gathered from gizmos and gadgets), the CIA's station chiefs
and case officers (a.k.a. The Company's overseas branch
managers and traveling salesmen, usually under diplomatic
cover of the American Embassy) are constantly establishing
and coordinating networks of local informants who will do the
actual spying on the opposition. "Recruiting and running
agents requires a lot of time and plodding perseverance," says
an experienced CIA case officer. "There's a lot of pressure on
you, and it can be schizophrenic. You have to tell a lot of
stories to people. Sometimes, an agent won't even know he's
working for us. Some of our operations are very, very secret
and risky. But others might only be liaison with some local
police chief, which doesn't require a great deal of sneaking
around in the night. In the intelligence business, the name of
the game is produce, produce, produce. You're always on the
lookout for people who can supply information."
Recruiting a prospective agent can take months of subtle
probing for the area of vulnerability or mutual interest that will
open the way for the approach, which is the actual offer to spy
for our side. Is the agent-to-be a d sgruntled government offi-
cial ;Can he (or she) get access to the information you want? Is
he eager or reluctant? Can he be sexually compromised? Does
he need money badly? Can he be trusted? Does he trust you?
"Getting an informant to work for you can be like trying to reel
in a troublesome fish," says the CIA officer. "Once you've
hooked him, and that's not always easy, you have to know
when to pull hard on the line and when to ease off."
At first, a simple request for some insignificant inside infor-
mation might be made in exchange for a small sum of money or
a favor. Eventually, a web of complicity is woven around the
informant, until he or she is finally entangled. "In many
cases," says the case officer "it's a dangerous game-very
stressful, particularly on your agent. If an operation is blown,
we're usually asked to leave the country, because we have
diplomatic immunity. The agent, on the other hand, has had it.
So you have to tread very carefully."
Running agents calls for all the specialized tradecraft of espi-
onage-use of secret signs and signals, furtive exchanges in
crowded places, surreptitious midnight meetings in out-of-the-
way safe houses, coded messages left in hollow trees or behind
loose bricks or in flower pots or public toilets. One Russian
who secretly spied for the West (he was eventually caught by
the KGB and shot) used to pass his information wrapped in
candy he would give to the child of a British diplomat.
It has been said that a good spy is a person with a passion for
anonymity. Frequently, however, the full-time intelligence
officers are positively conspicuous. "In Saigon, we all knew
who was CIA," says an American journalist who reported
from Vietnam during the war. "They all drove Ford Pintos,
wore short-sleeved polyester shirts, and carried Samsonite
briefcases. Once, at a party, I saw a couch piled with Samso-
nites and I knew the place was crawling with CIA officers.
Who their spies were among the Vietnamese and the other
foreigners in the country was something else altogether. You
were always wondering whether this or that Vietnamese was
an informant for the Agency or for the Vietcong or both."
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One CIA station chief in Buenos Aires gained a certain noto-
riety when he personally foiled a hijacking attempt. Negotiat-
ing with the culprits in a stifling plane at Buenos Aires airport,
he ordered cold drinks to be delivered to them. The drinks
were spiked, the hijackers all passed out, end of siege. The
cool CIA man was proclaimed a hero. His reward? He even- j
tually became chief of station in Saigon, the last American
spook to hold that thankless post.
As you might expect, especially energetic efforts are made
by American intelligence officers to recruit agents from among
Communist-bloc scientists, scholars, diplomats, and officials.
CIA eyes and ears constantly monitor the comings and goings
at every Soviet embassy and diplomatic mission. The Agency
had pictures of Lee Harvey Oswald entering the Soviet
Embassy in Mexico City weeks before he turned up in Dallas
with his mail-order Mannlicher-Carcano special, but the infor-
mation got lost in the shuffle; conversely, the KGB for years
bugged our embassy in Moscow with a listening device built
into the official U.S. seal.
Much of the CIA's information on Russia comes from defec-
tors among the Soviet hierarchy who bring their secrets out
with them. The most sought-after intelligence coup, however,
is to turn a man still inside the Soviet government or the KGB
who will stay on the job as an agent-in-place (a mole in
leCarr6speak), supplying top-secret information far into the
future. The Agency's first acknowledged mole in Soviet intel-
ligence was a Colonel Pyotr Popov, who originally offered to
spy for the West by dropping a note in a diplomat's car in
Vienna in 1953. He continued to supply Soviet secrets for six
years-until he was caught.
As for the mole of the century, he's widely acknowledged to
have been one the Soviets planted in the West. Called "the spy'
who betrayed a generation," Harold "Kim" Philby was head
of British counterintelligence, based in Washington in the
fifties and in line to become chief of MI-6 (the British Secret
Intelligence Services). When he escaped to Moscow from Bei-
rut in 1963 and it was revealed that he had actually been work-
ing for the Russians for more than twenty years, the interna-
tional intelligence community shuddered. For years afterward,
mole hunting became an obsession within the CIA, causing
suspicion and mistrust. "There was always that question
whether your agent was genuine or a Soviet plant," says a
former spook with knowledge of the devious workings of
counterespionage. "You tended to think the whole world was
run by intelligence agencies and a kind of paralysis of action
set in... Yet as far as anyone knows (or will say), no mole has
ever burrowed into the Central Intelligence Agency.
If the CIA's major successes are against the Soviet Umon,
elsewhere it has suffered conspicuous failures for lack of
agents. The Agency station in Beirut was virtually decimated
when terrorists blew up the U.S. Embassy there. We had no
local informants in Iran at the time of the failed hostage-rescue
operation. And before the fall of the Shah, although there was
a strong CIA presence, everybody was apparently looking in
the wrong direction. "In the past, I think we've spent too
much time tracking the Russians in third-world countries, with
no idea or understanding of what the locals are up to," says a
CIA officer who has served in several African and Middle
Eastern posts. "Not enough of our people speak the languages
of these countries, and they're unable to develop good con-
tacts within the population but outside the ruling power struc-
ture. When the coup comes, we're as surprised as anyone. But
I think that's changing now. At least I hope so."
Of Facts and Fantasies
Continuous collection of every scrap of information you can
get your hands on all over the world is only part of any intel-
ligence agency's work. Just as important (if not more so) is
understanding what it all means. David Atlee Philips, in The
Night Watch, a book about his career as a CIA officer,
describes the job as "not all fun and games.... Laboring to
put together the whole picture in intelligence is like assembling
a jigsaw puzzle from an almost infinite number of tiny pieces
with the hope that enough of the final mosaic will emerge to
mean something."
It is here that the CIA is making perhaps its most significant
strides. Almost half the Agency's personnel and a large part of
its budget are assigned to the Directorate of Intelligence, the
analysis branch where the work is more for patient scholars
than action-hungry spooks. "We hire the best people from '
every academic discipline-historians, linguists, journalists, ,
doctors," says a CIA officer. "We have enough Ph.D.s in our
organization to staff a small university."
It is the responsibility of the Directorate of Intelligence, with
its scholars and computers, to turn out the finished product
from 4hat mass of raw material so that The Company's cus-
tomers-the President, the Pentagon, assorted government
agencies and officials-can formulate foreign policy and con-
duct national-security affairs with a reasonably accurate idea
of what's happening around the globe today and what's likely
to occur in the future. Toward this end, the Agency compiles a
report every morning on the world's hot spots for the eyes
only of the President and a very select few high-ranking insid-
ers. "It's the most exclusive daily newspaper in the world,"
says a man on the delivery list. "The most accurate, too."
The Agency also turns out fifty National Intelligence Esti-
mates a year and prepares hundreds of additional assessments
covering everything from projections of Soviet missile
advancements to prospects for the Sudanese peanut crop.
According to those who have access to these reports, they are
in general more reliable and balanced today than in the past,
particularly during the Vietnam era, when the Agency so often
twisted the data, the better to catch the prevailing political
winds blowing from the White House. Says a former CIA offi-
cer, who remembers those days, "If the facts didn't fit the
preconceived fantasies, the facts had to be changed. When
you've got money and manpower, it's easy to produce good
intelligence ... when you're committed to truth."
Infiltrating The Company of Men
The CIA's recruiting ads are peppered with words like
adventurous and challenge, broadly hinting at excitements not
offered by, say, Mobil Oil. But before rushing out to buy your
trench coat and dark glasses, you should know that the spy life
is not everyone's idea of a good time. And if you want to join
the Agency, you'd better not have any secrets of your own. In
addition to being an American citizen and having a college
degree, every applicant for a career in Central Intelligence
must submit to a complete background check and is required
to pass a lie-detector test (called FLUTTER in the trade).
cow
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Once in the business, secrecy creates its own peculiar bur-
dens. "You can't lead a normal life," says a CIA officer with
two decades' experience. "You can never tell anyone the
truth. Your story keeps changing, and you're always on guard.
You tend to draw back from outside friends and only associate
with Company people. And because you tend to isolate your-
self. it's hard on your family. I wasn't even supposed to tell my
wife what I did for a living. And you're always moving around.
One day you may be on a desk job and the next you're snoop-
in' and poopin' in some jungle. And if you ever want to quit
and get an outside job, you're in real trouble. You can't say
where you've worked for the last twenty years."
While espionage remains, like war and football, largely a
man's game. there are more women in the Agency today than
ever before-as secretaries, analysts, case officers in the field.
"The CIA is now an equal-opportunity employer," says a
longtime intelligence officer, "and The Company would like to
have even more women where the power and action is.
Although we used to be pretty much a men's club, it's con-
ceivable that there'll be a woman director of the CIA sooner
than there'll be a woman President of the U.S."
In Quest of the Ultimate Answer
In the best of all possible worlds, organizations like the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency wouldn't be needed. In the world as it
is, however, the CIA does, indeed, have a vital mission to
perform. But there are special responsibilities that come with
all the secrecy. Knowledge, it has been said, is power. Secret
knowledge, if manipulated and abused, can be power beyond
limits and restraints. The ultimate question has always been:
Who watches the watchers? Ell
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