NICARAGUA DENIES SCUTTLING TALKS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000302620005-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2012
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: February 26, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified
in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302620005-7
26 Febru. 1985 .
Nicaragua Denies
Scuttling Talks
By Roy Gutman
Newsday Washington Bureau
Washington ? Nicaragua's negotiator in talks with the
United States yesterday disputed assertions by Secretary of
State George Shultz and the State Department that Nicaraguan
intransigence prompted Shultz to suspend the talks last month.
Victor Hugo Tinoco, vice minister of foreign affairs for Nica-
ragua, said in an interview that he had offered at the final
meeting, which opened Dec. 11, to discuss all security issues
that Washington saw as roadblocks to a regional peace settle-
ment.
Tinoco is spending this week in Washington seeing congres-
sional leaders in the midst of a debate over whether to resume
covert aid to rebels opposing Nicaragua's Sandinista govern-
ment. Democrats and Republicans alike have raised questions
about the reasons for suspending the U.S.-Nicaragua talks in
Manzanillo, Mexico, and the issue may have a bearing on the
Vote, expected this spring.
Shultz told Congress last week that "we put the Manzanillo
talks in abeyance because no progress was being made." And
the State Department charged in a new "resource book" that
Nicaragua had "consistently refused to consider any substan-
tive changes to this draft agreement." The reference was to the
regional peace settlement proposed by the four-nation Conta-
dora group in September to which the United States and its
Central American allies have taken exception.
But Tinoco, in his first public remarks since the suspension,
appeared to contradict Shultz and the State Department.
"We were ready to discuss those matters that were a prob-
lem, that the United States didn't like, didn't accept in Conta-
dora, in the context of Manzanillo, and in the context of defining
an understanding leading to normalization between the United
States and Nicaragua," Tinoco said.
Nicaraguan sources said Harry Shlaudeman, U.S. special
ambassador at the Manzanillo talks, seemed to respond posi-
tively to the Tinoco offer. They quoted him as saying: "Okay,
that is interesting. It is a new approach, something different.
We will discuss this, and at the next meeting, we will answer
this proposal." The meeting was set for the second half ofJanu-
ary but for reasons that remain unclear, it never took place.
Shlaudeman would not comment on the talks, which have
been kept under tight wraps. But a senior official close to the
U.S. negotiating team said Tinoco's offer was to explore, not
discuss, changes in the September document. "He left out a
rather important part, namely that they would not accept any
changes. . . This meant the end of Contadora. They were sub-
stituting a bilateral agreement for Contadora," this U.S. official
said.
U.S. officials have acknowledged that the four Contadora
countries ? Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela ? saw
the matter the other way around, namely that progress at Man-
zanillo would enhance, not detract from, their diplomacy. Jan. 8,
they publicly urged the United States and Nicaragua to redou-
ble their efforts to resolve the dispute in Manzanillo. Ten days
later, Washington called off the Manzanillo talks. In mid-Febru-
ary, Contadora's own efforts broke down.
In the "resource book" on the Contadora process issued by its
office of public diplomacy last week, the State Department listed
nine issues that now divide Nicaragua and the three U.S. allies
in the region ? Costa Rica, Honduras and El Salvador. They
relate mainly to technical aspects of a regional security agree-
ment, such as when it would come into effect, the timetable for
talks on withdrawal of foreign advisers and dismantling of for-
eign bases and who would verify compliance.
A Nicaraguan source said yesterday Nicaragua was willing
to discuss all nine issues. "We were accepting what they pro-
posed ? to discuss those aspects of the act that they didn't like;
the difference was that we accepted it in the framework of nor-
malizing relations," he said.
NEWSDAY, TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 1985
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302620005-7
STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302620005-7
11 It.CLI. CIS U.C10 i_yipuldv
NEWSDAY, THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 1985
By Roy Gutman
Newsday Washington Bureau
Washington ?The top U.S. military
official in Latin America said yester-
day diet the lieagan administration
was wrong in telling Congress that the
goal of the U.S.-backed Nicaraguan in-
surgency was to interdict the flow of
arms from Nicaragua to El Salvador.
Gen. Paul Gorman, who will retire
at the end of this week u head of the
U.S. Southern Command in Panama,
said interdiction was never the goal
and had not taken place.
"I think that we as a government
were probably wrong in using the
word interdiction with this body be-
cause interdiction to me as a military
man implies some sort of physical es-
toppel or blocking. That hasn't hap-
pened," Gorman told the Senate
Armed Services Committee.
Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), the rank-
ing Democrat on the committee, said
this was a "very key" remark and that
the program "never should have been
described as an interdiction." Gorman
interrupted him with a "yes, sir."
Gorman, a four-star general, has
been increasingly criticized in Con-
gress as one of the prime movers re-
sponsible for expanding the U.S. mili-
tary presence in Central America.
"Among our shortcomings is that we
have not articulated well what we are
doing," Gorman told the committee. He
said he doubted the U.S.-backed rebels
could overthrow the Sandinista gov-
ernment in the foreseeable future. He
also said he supported a diplomatic so-
lution to differences with Nicaragua
mediated by the four Latin American
countries of the "Contadora" group ?
Mexico, Colombia, Panama and Ven-
. . . ..
etude ? and that the administration
should "examine any kind of proposal"
Nicaragua puts forward. He also said
he was "gravely concerned" about cor-
ruption and political violence in Mexi-
co, adding that the Soviets had gained
"obviously a great deal of influence"
there.
Gorman's remarks about interdic-
tion gave new weight to repeated criti-
cism that Congress was not fully
briefed about the 'aims of the covert
program when congressional support
was requested in 1981.
In his first major speech on Cen-
tral America in April, 1983, Presi-
dent Ronald Reagan said the pur-
pose of the U.S.-backed campaign
against Nicaragua, "in conformity
with American and international
law, is to prevent the flpw of arms
to El Salvador, Honsluras, qqatema; , , , , ?7-Coptmne4 on ,Paga,
la and Costa Rica," Congress au
pended funding last spring due pa
ly to doubts about this explanatio
and the administration has soug
, have both houses of Congress Ii
the suspension.
? Gorman argued that Congre
should continue to fund the rebels
cause their presence has forced Ni
ragua to divert its funds and attenti
to the insurgency at relatively low co
to the United States, and because t
United States should support "(re
dom fighters" who seek democrac
But his expressions of strong dou
that, the rebels could overthrow t
Sandinista government raised ne
questions about the Reagan admint
tration's goals.
"I don't see any immediate prove
that these guys in blue suits in
General Disputes U. S. Aim in Nicaragu
?Continued from Page 5
hills are going to march into Mana-
gua," Gorman said. He added that the
resistance movement ? which he esti-
mated numbers up to 16,000 armed
men ? would have "another year or
more of slogging to go before that was
ever in prospect." He said there were
"a lot of problems associated with it."
Only last week, Reagan urged Con-
gress to support more funding for the
"freedom fighters." He said his goal
was to "remove" the Sandinista gov-
ernment "in the sense of its present
structure, in which it is a Communist,
totalitarian state, and it is not a gov-
ernment chosen by the people."
Gorman said Reagan's views reflect-
ed those of many leaders in the region
Ui who felt they "cannot live with a
Marxist-Leninist garrison state." But
he told the committee that he thought.
the only answer to the dispute with
Nicaragua "lies in some kind of pres-
sures and diplomacy."
Sen. Carl, Levin (D-Mich..1 aaked. ?
Gorman if the United States was aid-
ing the rebels in any way. The general
I replied: "I know of no way that the
United States government or any of its
arms or agencies or appurtenances are
aiding the struggle. . I am confident
given my own sources that if that were
going on I would know about it." Levin
told him: "That's good enough for me."
Shultz, Democrats Clash
Washington (AP) ? Secretary of
State George Shultz faced accusations plied to Rep. Ted Weiss (D-N.Y.): "It
yesterday of "red-baiting" by Demo- the ultimate pervemon to say that
cratic House members who said the attack on the tactics in Nicaragua
administration is distorting events in comparable to Sen. McCarthy."
Central America. The emotional exchange with We
The secretary found himself in the began after Shultz ? question
midst of an explosive confrontation be- about worldwide efforts to cut off the
fore a House Foreign Affairs subcom- flow of illegal drugs by the State De-
mittee hearing where his statements partment ? said Nicaragua and Cuba
on Nicaragua and Cuba were corn- are raising money by directly or indi-
pared with the tactics of Sen. Joseph rectly supporting the illegal drug
McCarthy during the .1950s. He re- . trade in Central America.
Ortega Offers Two Steps for Peace
Managua, Nicaragua (AP) ? Presi- peace proposals the government said tadora countries ? Mexico, Colombia,
dent Daniel Ortega offered last night on Tuesday ? it was preparing to an- Panama and Venezuela ? "and that
to have about 100 Cuban military ad- nounce. He said the offer was "moti- the North American government will
visers withdrawn from Nicaragua and vated by the seriousness of the region- return to the Manzanillo talks." He re-
to declare an "indefinite moratorium" al situation which requires of the gov- ferred to talks with Nicaragua that the
on acquiring new weapons systems. ernmenta involved a responsible, ma- United States broke off in January.
Ortega speaking to reporters at the ture and flexible attitude, [which) fa
presidential office, said the systems vors easing of tension . . ." San Salvador (UPI) ? A delegation
included "interception aircraft." Ortega said he was confident Central of U.S. Catholic bishops arrived yester-
- The offer, included in a six-page doc- American,. governments would .sign. a .day from Managua to explore prospects
ument read 6 Ortega, is part of nuct.i.paaceogroetraent.drawauglottiwilbno bfacAttaliagait Zuiyear-old civil war.
I
? . w.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302620005-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25 :.CIA:.RDP90-00965R000302620005-7
Policy on Nicaragua Hits Roadblocks
By Roy Gutman
Newsday Washington Bureau
Washington ? President Ronald Reagan stood
before ? joint session of Congress Wednesday and
urged Americana "not to break faith with those
who are risking their lives on every continent,
from Afghanistan to Nicaragua, to defy Soviet-
supported aggression." He called it "essential" to
continue covert aid to the "freedom fighters" in
Nicaragua.
The next day, Reagan's national security advis-
er, Robert McFarlane, conceded that covert aid has
lout the support of Congress. He told reporters the
administration would listen to our Congress and
see if we can't forge a means that can be supported
by all of the American people."
The gap between presidential rhetoric and con-
gressional reality is only part of the challenge facing
the administration. Besides the extremely difficult
political problem at home, there is a diplomatic hur-
dle, chiefly how to persuade Honduras to continue
tolerating the presence of the rebels, especially if
Congress cuts the funds. There is the military hur-
dle of preventing a reversal of recent advances by
the rebels during the current Nicaraguan army of-
fensive. And finally, there is a bureaucratic hurdle:
how much energy his top aides will want to invest in
what appears to be a losing battle.
More than just a program is at stake. Talks with
high U.S. officials in Washington and in U.S. embas-
sies in Central America indicate that the entire U.S.
policy toward Nicaragua, which seeks to destabilize
and change that government, will unravel if Con-
gress votes down covert aid once again.
Last September, Congress appropriated $14 mil-
lion but required Reagan to win approval in both
Houses after March 1 to obtain the funds. The ad-
ministration wants the funds but has not decided
when and how to seek them. There is no indication
another funding method can be found.
Meanwhile, Nicaragua has begun revealing a
three-fold strategy combining political, diplomatic
and military actions to defeat the Reagan adminis-
tration's aims. U.S. aides say it appears to be a co-
herent and coordinated approach and, given the
disarray in the U.S. government, has a reasonable
chance of success.
Insight into the current political battle in Wash-
ington can be gained by looking at recent military
developments on the ground in Nicaragua. In the
past six months, the anti-Sandinista rebels, particu-
larly those based in Honduras, have made remark-
able advanbes and now operate in mostly
unpopulated mountainous areas as much as 100
miles south of the Honduras-Nicaragua border.
"They may have been getting too fat in Honduras.
The heaviest fighting appears to have occurred after
Congress cut off the funds," one U.S. official said.
What made the difference was that the rebels
began operating in small units and developed an
ability to maneuver and pick sites for combat. Nica-
raguan sources concede that the rebels have become
a more serious security threat in this time. They
ANALYSIS
estimate there are 10,000 altogether, 6,000 of
whom are on the "northern front" supplied from
Honduras and incorporated in the FDN ? the
Nicaraguan Democratic Forces. Of these, 6,000
are currently inside Nicaragua. A new tactic has
been to attack electricity pylons and power plants
and to disrupt the coffee harvest. Food is not a
problem in the highlands, but ammunition is. A
Miami Herald reporter who visited a rebel base
camp near the Honduran border said supplies
were down to less than a week.
Nicaragua has responded by developing irregu-
lar warfare battalions. Despite the presence of many
Cuban and Soviet military advisers, the Nicaraguan
military has chosen the U.S. Army Rangers as its
model in developing these battalions, which consist
of small lightly armed mobile units taught to sus-
tain themselves as they hunt guerrillas, sources
said. One U.S. official compares them to the long-
range reconnaissance patrols (LRRPS) the United
States used in Vietnam.
Thus, as a U.S. source sums up, "both sides have
gotten better." Late last year, Nicaragua obtained
Hind-24 helicopter gunships, which the Soviet
Union has used with devastating effect against reb-
els in Afghanistan. But Nicaraguan pilots are still
undergoing additional training, and the Hi-24's will
not be used until tactics are practiced and perfected.
Soviet tactics call for the use of two or three at a
time, called in by ground spotters.
Three elements of Nicaragua's strategy have
emerged. One is a broad army offensive involving its
irregular warfare units and in late January, even
the use of tanks. For most of 1984, the army was
engaged in preventing the rebels from launching a
concerted offensive. Since December, the army has
been on an offensive. Lest week, the army claimed to
inflict 200 casualties on the rebels in January. (The
FDN claimed three time. that number of army casu-
alties).
A second element has been to demoralize and
split the rebels. The first action of the newly elected
national assembly was to approve a general amnes-
ty for all rebels. The government has also dusted off
plans to grant autonomy to the Miskito, Sumu and
Rama Indians on the Atlantic Coast. An American
traveler who visited the Atlantic coast 10 days ago
reported that the amnesty had provoked wide dis-
cussion by Nicaraguan Indians who had taken ref-
uge in Honduras.
The third element has been a diplomatic offen-
sive. Honduras received Jose Leon Talavera, a vice
Foreign Minister, on Jan. 22-23, the highest rank-
ing visitor from Managua in three years, ostensibly
to discuss the amnesty. Talavera asked the Hondur-
ans to encourage the rebels to return home, a senti-
ment with which the Honduran military leadership
increasingly concurs. Any Nicaraguan gain on this
diplomatic front is a Reagan administration loss. On
another front, while the United States suspended
direct talks with Managua in mid-January for rea-
sons that are still not clear, Nicaragua's newly elect-
ed President Daniel Ortega Saavedra has said he is
eager to achieve a negotiated solution.
But it is the vote in Congress that most preoccu-
pies the Nicaraguan leadership ? the American as
well. By one administration head count, only 10 to
15 votes have to be switched to win in the Democrat-.
ic House. But this ignores the fact that the Intel-
ligence Committees in both chambers are on
record as opposing any revival of covert aid.
While Sen. David Durenberger (R-Minn), the Sen-
ate Intelligence chair, suggests overt funding, the
head of the Foreign Relations Commitee, Richard
Lugar (R-Ind), cautions that this comes close to a
declaration of war against Nicaragua, which few
Americans want.
Administration officials say there really aren't
any viable alternatives to covert aid. An economic
squeeze on Nicaragua would hurt the man-in-the
street and the pro-American private sector more
than the government.
The advice of those who want to avoid a signal
defeat in Congress is to delay a vote, possibly indefi-
nitely. The long-term impact of such a move on the
morale of the rebels and on Honduras' willingness to
host the rebels will not be positive.
Then there is a bureaucratic hurdle to success in
the policy: the relatively passive attitude that Secre-
tary of State George Shultz has adopted on the issue,
? high U.S. officials say. Shultz is spending most of his
time trying to work out positions for forthcoming
arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. He
apparently is not inclined to inspire any changes in
Nicaragua policy at this time. In addition, the U.S.-
backed rebellion has all along been under the control
of CIA Director William Casey. So Shultz and his
assistant for Latin America, Langhorne Motley, have
defended it publicly, but it is not their program.
A sense of resignation and that events should be
allowed to take their course is apparent in talks with
officials who have to think through the aims of U.S.
security policy in Latin America. Central America
has been a back burner issue since the November
presidential election, and it is still unclear how far
and how fast the administration will move it forward.
A State Department official involved in planning
policy said the administration seemed determined to
defend its policy which it believes has prevented the
Sandinistas from consolidating their leftist revolu-
tion. "There is not much readiness here to accept a
need for a major revision of policy. What we're doing
is what we can do. It is working. Therefore it should
not be abandoned," he said.
Dr. Fred Ikle, the Undersecretary for Policy at
the Defense Department, commented that economic
sanctions rarely work. As for other possibilities: I'm
not going to speculate about all the alternatives at
this point. It's not the right time to do it in public. I
don't want to talk about it now."
Roy Gutman recently returned from a visit to
Nicaragua and other Central America coun-
tries.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302620005-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302620005-7
U. S. Policy,Squeezes Honduras
Role in Nicaragua conflict threatens nation's stability
By Roy Gutman
-Newsday Washington Bureau
Washington ? After three years of using Hondu-
ras as the staging ground in the covert war to desta-
bilize Nicaragua, the Reagan administration is
putting pressure on its ally that officials say could
destabilize Honduras' fledgling democracy.
? At issue is whether Honduras should continue
to provide safe haven and supply routes for the
10,000 or more anti-Sandinista rebels at ? time
when the U.S. Congress has refused further covert
aid.
Honduran military leaders say they want to kick
the rebels out. But in Jan. 30-31 talks in Teguci-
galpa on security issues, the United States implicit-
ly conditioned increased military and economic aid
on Honduran willingness to maintain support facili-
ties for the rebels, said U.S. and Honduran officials
In Tegucigalpa. The two sides are deadlocked on a
key issue, reopening the U.S.-built regional military
training center in Honduras to soldiers from El Sal-
vador, officials said yesterday. ?
These are but the latest jarring notes between
countries that only a year ago were in close har-
mony. In the past six months, Honduras has begun
distancing itself from U.S. policy, taking a first cau-
tious step toward an accommodation with neighbor-
ing Nicaragua and growing warier of the
U.S.-backed military build-up in El Salvador.
Both the United States and Honduras are preoc-
cupied by the anti-Sandinista contras, particularly
since Congress' vote in September to suspend until
next month further covert aid to the rebels, who now
are mostly in Nicaragua but still depend on Hondu-
ras for refuge and supplies.
The Reagan administration views the rebels as
the most important element in its policy of pressures
against Nicaragua. But many U.S. observers mini-
mize the contras' long-range prospects of success, de-
spite their recent advances.
Honduras sees the contras as a threat to its secu-
rity. The rebels, if they ignore an amnesty offer and
press their fight, could provoke a Nicaraguan mili-
tary strike inside Honduras. Moreover, should the
Nicaraguan army drive the contras out, Honduras
could inherit thousands of armed men and camp fol-
lowers responsible neither to Honduras nor to the
United States.
"We're in a fix, and it's an election year here,"
Col. Cesar Elvir Sierra, the Honduran armed forces
spokesman, told Newsday.
The speed and extent of the shift in attitude by
the Honduran military leaders and the civilian gov-
ernment, which was elected three years ago after
years of military rule, have taken U.S. officials by
surprise.
Shortly before the start of a secret visit last
month by Robert McFarlane, the White House na-
tional security adviser, and Gen. Paul Gorman, com-
mander of the U.S. Southern Command in Panama,
the Hondurans decided to receives top Nicaraguan
for the first time in three years. The Hondurans did
not tell McFarlane of their decision.
In addition, U.S. officials said McFarlane walked
out of a dinner with Honduran leaders after they
repeated a demand for a written U.S. security guar-
- -
antee, which would supplement the multilateral Rio
pact of 1949, in exchange for continued assistance to
the U.S.-backed contras, which McFarlane was
reeking. McFarlane rejected the request.
The Hondurans responded by dropping the bi-
lateral talks to a technical-level meeting, in which
they raised such complaints as U.S. troops' failure to
dig enough wells during joint maneuvers, U.S. aides
said. "It left us with a feeling they had not complete-
ly understood why he was there," an aide said this
week.
The visit the following week by Jose Leon Tala-
vera, the Nicaraguan vice minister of foreign af-
fairs, was only the latest of a series of developments
in Honduras that have caught the U.S. embassy by
surprise. In past years, U.S. Ambassador John Ne-
groponte and his staff seemed to know everything
going on in the military and diplomatic areas and to
exert great influence as decisions were made. But
the U.S. envoy and his staff increasingly seem to be
spectators, getting their news of Honduran positions
from the Honduran and international press. For ex-
ample, when Air Force General Walter Lopez Reyes,
Honduras' armed forces commander, decided that he
wanted ? revision of the 1954 treaty of military De-
sistance, he revealed it through leaks to foreign re-
porters. ,
Many State Department officials dismiss the
Honduran attitude as a bargaining stance. But the
handling of McFarlane's visit suggests other factors
at work, factors that may bear on U.S. ability to
continue its approach on Central America. Newsday
?Continued on Page 25
Honduras Wary on Nicaragua Role
?Continued from Page 4
Interviews in Tegucigalpa and Washington revealed
that differences now extend across a range of issues,
including
? The value of joint U.S.-Honduran military ex-
ercises, including "Big Pine III" next week in which
the United States is to stage ? mock Nicaraguan
invasion of Honduras, complete with captured Sovi-
et tanks supplied by the United States. Honduran
officials view a conventional invasion as unlikely
and questioned McFarlane on the benefits from
these maneuvers.
? The amount of U.S. aid. Honduran officials
say making their country secure through military
aid and making its showcase for U.S.-style capital-
ism through economic aid would be cheaper and
wiser than building pressures against Nicaragua
that might lead to U.S. intervention.
? The real long-term threat. Hondurans say it
would not come from Nicaragua, but from land-poor
El Salvador. Honduras has five times the land and
only three-quarters the population of El Salvador,
which in 1969 invaded Honduras.
? The meaning of developments in Nicaragua.
While President Ronald Reagan denounced Novem-
ber's elections in Managua as a sham, a Honduran
military spokesman said he would not dismiss them.
"Honduras is a sleeping nation that woke up. It
found out that it was in a nightmare. Its dreams
were a lot easier than what it woke up to." The
speaker, an official of the Honduran Foreign Minis-
try, said he was giving his personal opinion. But he
summed up the views of military officials and politi-
cians of the major parties in Honduras.
"In the past, we had very great confidence in the
United States," the official said. "Now we don't. The
United States has to defend its own interests. If its
interests are the same as Honduras', it was good
luck. If not, it is very bad luck."
The chill began April 1 when the Honduran mili-
tary ? to the surprise of Negroponte and Gorman ?
ousted Army Gen. Gustavo Alvarez Martinez, a vi-
gorous anticommunist who his colleagues said was
too closely identified with the contras, the Central
Intelligence Agency, Gorman and Negroponte. He
was replaced as armed forces commander by Lopez,
who has made it clear he wants to expel the rebels.
In urging Honduras to tolerate the contras, the
United States is offering a further expansion of aid
beyond the $88 million in military aid and $142 mil-
lion in economic aid requested of Congress this week
in the 1986 budget. Honduras wants to get about as
much aid as El Salvador is budgeted for, $132 mil-
lion in military aid and $351 million in economic
aid.
A U.S. official said bilateral talks with the Hon-
durans were "plagued with difficulties." Issues in-
clude the establishment of a permanent military
training center where forces from El Salvador and
other countries could be given U.S. instruction, the
Honduran stand on the contras, and the level of aid.
One impact of U.S. pressures on Honduras is to
raise the prospect of a military coup. Politicians of
the major opposition parties openly have warned
that President Roberto Suez) Cordoba, the only top
official still closely aligned with U.S. policy, wants
to maintain his grip on power by extending his term
or getting his hand-picked successor elected. Should
either happen, they say, a coup might be possible.
In terms of future developments, one of the most
intriguing areas of U.S.-Honduran difference in-
volves perspectives on Nicaragua. This came to the
fore at the time of McFarlane's visit.
The national security adviser arrived in Hondu-
ras on Friday, Jan. 18, on the final stop of a five-
nation Central American tour to reassure U.S.
friends in the area of the administration's steadfast-
ness despite battles with Congress and the replace-
ment of key personnel identified with a hard line on
Nicaragua, among them Gorman, United Nations
ambassador 4eane Kirkpatrick and Negroponte.
But it appears that McFarlane brought the
wrong message to the Hondurans, who are express-
ing fears more about the threats from the rebels and
El Salvador than from Nicaragua. And as he stepped
off Gen. German's personal aircraft, McFarlane was
unaware that the Hondurans had already inched to-
ward a high-level dialogue with Nicaragua by
agreeing to receive Talavera, the foreign affairs vice
minister and the highest-level Nicaraguan visitor in
three years.
The Talavera visit was arranged in record time
that Friday morning, according to officials of both
aides. Nicaraguan ambassador Danilo Abud tele-
phoned the Foreign Ministry in mid-morning. An
hour later, he got his answer. an unqualified yes.
Throughout the McFarlane talks, the Hondurans
never hinted that they were expecting the Nicara-
guan. Negroponte was informed only "casually" on
the eve of Talavera's two-day visit, aides said.
Ostensibly he arrived to discuss an amnesty law
the newly elected Nicaraguan assembly was about
to approve. The amnesty, while rejected as meaning-
less by the State Department, has generated wide
interest in Central America. "The Sandinistas are
saying something interesting," military spokesman
Elvir said. " . . . We have a saying. 'For the enemy
who deserts, there is a silver bridge.' This is the
silver bridge."
However meaningful it may prove, the gesture
opened doors in Honduras. Talavera suggested that
the amnesty would work better if Honduras encour-
aged the rebels to leave the country. In addition, he
repeated an offer for a bilateral accord. And he also
held out the prospect that Nicaragua might back
Honduras when the World Court meets to delineate
a lingering border dispute with El Salvador ? but
not if Honduras remains the contras' ban.
Increasingly, the view heard from officials in Te-
gucigalpa is that Honduras must find a way to coex-
ist with Nicaragua, even if its pro-Marxist
leadership is not the Honduran preference. "Maybe
we need a change of conception. We used to know
who our friends and our enemies were," said the
Foreign Ministry official, who did not want to be
identified by name. He went on: "Nicaragua will al-
ways be our neighbor unless we pick up Honduras
and put it in the Pacific ? let's say at the latitude of
Hawaii for good measure. What Hondurans want is
to live with a bit of tranquility."
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302620005-7