FIRM SAYS U.S. URGED COVERT PLOTS

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-00965R000302540001-0
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RIPPUB
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K
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3
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 26, 2012
Sequence Number: 
1
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Publication Date: 
April 26, 1987
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OPEN SOURCE
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STAT Declassified in Part - ) ARTICAE ON PAGEAPPir Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/26: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302540001-0 PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER 26 April 1987 Firm says U.S. urged covert plots Khomeini called target of one scheme Richard J. Meadows Peregrine's president 47 By Frank Greve, Matthew Purdy and Mark Fazlollah Inquirer Washington Bureau WASHINGTON ? Pentagon intelli- gence specialists urged a private Texas company to mount several se- cret operations deemed too sensitive for direct U.S. government involve- ment, including the sale of arms for an aborted 1982 plot by Iranian mili- tary officers to assassinate the Aya- tollah Ruhollah Khomeini, accord- ing to founders of the firm. The company officials said in in- terviews that they also received clearance from Pentagon officials for vigilante-style schemes to nab and kill drug smugglers in Peru; Honduras, Belize and the Caribbean. They said they also were encouraged to arm and train Nicaraguan contra rebel forces and elite military com- mando units in El Salvador, Hondu- ras and Peru. "Our job was to do the things that the government could not be seen to be doing," said Gary S. Howard, 40, founder of Pere:rine lnternatiiaj ssociates o lEY "Our deal was t a pnvate sector could handle lots of security missions abroad and American boAXQUIdn't get killed or, if they did, there'd be no fuss." Peregrine's executives say they h? lieve their firm was the model for what became the Reagan administra- tion's broad policy of carrying out politically unacceptable covert oper- ations "off the books," by using pri; vete companies. Congressional inves- tigators say they believe it was this pattern of using retired military per- sonnel in secret contracts that fi- nally exploded in the Iran-contra scandal. No explicit contracts governed the relationship between Peregrine and the Pentagon. Peregrine executives said each side understood it needed the other: the Pentagon needed an independent company to accomplish its policy objectives and Peregrine needed the tacit support of the U.S. government to carry out covert oper- ations abroad. Foreign governments would pay for most operations, possibly using U.S. military aid, according to Pere- grine's plans. In some circumstances. U.S. government agencies, such as the Customs Service, would pay Peregrine. Often, Peregrine operated like a private CIA, offering counterterror- ist and counterinsurgency assistance to foreign countries. For example, in 1982 Peregrine designed a comman- do training program for Honduras that included instruction in urban assault tactics, restraint techniques, interrogation, demolition and sniper marksmanship, according to a pro- spectus of the program. ? Howard and his partner, Ronald R. Tucker, explained their company's history in lengthly interviews. They are the first commando entrepre- neurs to reveal their secret arrange- ments with the government. They said they decided to speak publicly, - in part because they have not been paid $1.2.5 million they said the U.S. Customs Service owes them. Peregrine officials said that few of their projects were carried to com- pletion, but that they met "all the time" in Washington with Pentagon intelligence specialists to discuss missions the government wanted accomplished. Work for the CIA Among those with whom they met were retired Army Lt. Gen. Samuel V. Wilson, a former director of the De- fense Intelligence Agency and cur- rently an adviser to the secretary of defense on ? special operations, and Lt. Col. Wayne E. Long, a senior offi- cer of a top-secret military intelli- gence unit called the Foreign Operations Group. Previously published accounts have identified Long's unit as part of the Army's Intelligence Support Ac- tivity, which is said to work with the CIA to provide intelligence, deep cover and laundered money for se- cret U.S. military missions abroad. "Wilson and Long told us what we could do and what we couldn't do," said Howard, a deputy sheriff in cen- tral Texas since Peregrine folded in 1984. "They'd give us sanction from Mother. We wouldn't do anything without sanction from Mother." Howard defined "sanction from Mother" as "an OK from State, CIA and Defense giving their tacit ap- proval, their assurance that they wouldn't stand in our way." Howard and other participants said active-duty Special Forces per- sonnel on leave, as well as personnel from the elite Army counterterrorist unit called Delta Force, assisted Per- egrine in the plot against the ayatollah. In a brief interview, Long said that he knew Peregrine and some of its officials and that he knew of the firm's efforts to interdict narcotics in Central America. He declined to elaborate on any aspect of his deal- ings with Peregrine without ap- proval from the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency or the Army's deputy chief of staff for intel- ligence. That approval was not given. 'Personal advice' Wilson, in a telephone interview, confirmed that he had met with sev- eral Peregrine officials but mini- mized any role he may have played with the company. He said he gave only "personal advice" to Pere- grine's president. Maj. Philip Soucy, an Army spokes- man, said late last week that a search of Army records for information about Peregrine had been under way for several days and was continuing.. "We haven't found anything yet," he said. Like other international arms deal- ers and go-betweens involved in the Iran-contra affair, Howard and Tuck- er are flamboyant, conspiratorial, colorful and controversial figures. For that reason, multiple confirma- tions of their allegations were sought through Customs documents, State Department records, memos and letters from the company itself. FBI, Customs and military officials also were interviewed. In some cases, however, multiple confirmations were not possible because' the only knowledgeable person Lt. Col. Long, for example ? was unable to speak freely because of the classified nature of his work. , Company employment charts show that Peregrine drew most of its man- power from a pool of retired Special Forces personnel familiar with se- cret military operations, most of them veterans of the elite Delta Force counterterrorist unit. ? Howard, 38, and Tucker, 39; a pair of tobacco-chewing 'West Texas law- men, worked their way into that net- work in 1981. Continued Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/26: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302540001-0 , Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/26: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302540001-0_L Free-lance agents Since 1979, they said, they had worked as free-lance undercover agents for the Customs Service infil- trating illegal international arms deals and passing along information to the Customs officials. As a reward for each success, they received a moiety ? a percentage of the seized property. Backed by about $1,650,000 in com- missions and moieties, most of the money coming from the sale of a seized Boeing 707, Peregrine was in- corporated in 1981 with Howard as chairman and Tucker as secretary- treasurer. They said their intention was to use proceeds from undercover arms deals to ransom a U.S. prisoner of war out of Vietnam, a cause in which they had long been active. But the company's mission changed in December 1981, when two government officials that How- ard and Tucker knew from Customs work introduced them to retired Army Special Forces Maj. Richard J. Meadows, a highly decorated Viet- nam War commando. Meadows, whom they hired as Per- egrine's president, had made News- week's cover after slipping into Tehran in 1980 and, with little more than an Irish brogue as a disguise, provided key on-site intelligence for the Iran hostage rescue raid that failed. State Department records con- firm that Meadows did indeed go to work at Peregrine. Meadows arranged for Howard and Tucker to meet his friend and men- tor, Lt. Gen. Wilson, former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, in a Holiday Inn room in Rosslyn, Va., a Washington suburb. At the meeting. Howard and Tucker said. they told Wilson their plan for get- ting a prisoner out of Vietnam. They said Wilson had other ideas for the fledgling paramilitary company. "Wilson told us our job was to do the things that the government could not be seen to be doing," Tuck-- er recalled. In time, the plans laid out at the Rosslyn meeting crystallized. Pere- grine would become a private arm of Army intelligence, training foreign military groups and developing anti- terrorism plans under Meadows' di- rection, according to Tucker and Howard. The two said they would use Peregrine's manpower to pursue un- dercover arms and narcotics work. Peregrine was modeled on a Lon- don firm that Tucker and Howard had come across in arms deals: Keeni-Meeni Services Ltd. Keeni- Meeni ? a Swahili word describing a snake's movement through grass ? employed retired British Special Air Service commandos in unofficially endorsed operations where an offi- cial British presence would have been embarrassing. If caught, Keeni- Meeni's highly skilled operatives were on their own. "Intelligence people were so ex- cited. There had never been any- thing like that in the United States," Howard said. Of the skilled covert paramilitary operators in the United States, How- ard said: "Peregrine had the cream of the crop." Former National Security Council aide Oliver L. North apparently ad- mired Keeni-Meeni, too; two Keeni- Meeni pilots served 90-day stints with the contra arms airdrop opera- tion exposed in October, according to other participants. In a contra aid organizational sketch found in North's safe, the initials "KMS" ap- pear among the operational elements. Howard and Tucker said they found the government to be an eager partner in their endeavors. Shortly after the Washington or- ganizational meeting, Lt. Col. Long provided a list of countries in which Peregrine could and could not oper- ate, according to Tucker, Howard and other former Peregrine employees. Bolivia was off-limits, they said, because the United States already had covert operations in place there. Belize, Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras; Nicaragua, Morocco, Nigeria, Paraguay, Peru, So- malia and Sudan were encouraged. "Sure, we were used as a cover for the US. government," Tucker said. "We knew Meadows reported to Wil- son and Long. There was no doubt Gary and I were going to be bastard- ized stepchildren, but we didn't mind being manipulated as long as we knew what we were doing." Perigrine's mission was shaped by two retired Army Special Forces ma- jors Meadows hired to help him run the company ? Charles Odorizzi, for- mer director of selection and train- ing for Delta Force, and William Patton, a Latin America specialist. For operations, Peregrine offered Special Forces and Delta personnel $30,000 a year. That compared favor- ably to the CIA's standing nffer Delta Force retiree _s of $21000 for work with Alifiiin?tuiriith- -viist- AM-a:" eregritie used both retired and active duty personnel on leave as what Howard calls "guns" "guys who had no qualms about blowing people away, which is real ftne for protective-type work." No killing was done, Howald said, "but our idea was to be like-Delta and not leave anybody alive. Irwe found communist cadres or terrorist cells in Honduras or wherever, we'd elim- inate them, except for the people we wanted to interrogate or bring back for display." Perhaps the most dramatic mission that Long and Wilson urged Pere- grine to become involved in, accord- ing to Howard and Tucker, was a plot by Iranian military officers to over- throw Khomeini. Certain details of the plot are con- tained in a September 1982 internal Customs Service report on an investi- gation of an illicit arms sale. That record shows that in January 1982 Meadows met in London with an Iranian Air Force major named Ma? soud Yahya. At the meeting, accord- ing to the Customs records, Yahya said he was looking to buy about SIOC million in small arms, explosives. ammunition and bulletproof vests tc be used in a "military coup in Iran.' According to the records, Yahya also sought "to obtain technical ad- vice and assistance from the United States government" for the coup. Yahya's moderate faction intended to kilrthe-ayatollah's palace guard and assassinate Khomeini, then sweep aside his supporters with a force-of 4,000 pro-Western military men, Howard and Tucker said. After utofiting in London with Ye- hya, Mouton went to Washington tc discuss the plot with Long and Wil- son, Peregrine .officials said. "Dick told us they wanted to do it," Howard said. "They (Long and Wilson I wanted to let this one go through, and told us, 'Whatever you need, let' get the money and let's go.'" To finance the plot, Peregrine wee to receive S120 million from Yahya. The money, which Peregrine offi- cials mere told would come from holdings of the late shah of Iran, wat stored in a vault in New York. ' Howard, Tucker, Meadows and eight or nine other men ? including three active-duty military personnel whom Meadows obtained from Fort Bragg ? spent 21 days in April 198: at the Grand Hyatt Hotel in Manhat- tan waiting for the Iranians to arrive with their money, acCording to How- ard and Tucker. Two other Peregrine. executives also said in interviews that astire-duty personnel from Fort Braggspirticipated. In tliecourse of their three-week stay, tpeyt tan up a $77,000 hotel bill One tht-men met a Pan Am stew ardesi Whbm he later married: But Yahy4 neyer showed up. The deal collar Mo precisely, it was interrupted. Whil at the Hyatt, Howard said. Mead4ws received a call from Long urging tbs:t Peregrine help free a Hondtran airliner that had been seized.with 48 aboard in Tegucigalpa by leftist hijackers. Five Peregrine commandos, led by Meadows and Odorizzi, responded immediately, Continua! Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/26: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302540001-0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/26: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302540001-0 Their arrival in Tegucigalpa aboard a chartered Learjet im- pressed Honduran military authort ties. So did Meadows' plan to storm; the hijacked plane. Although the sei- zure eventually was settled by nego- tiation, Peregrine retained a chit of gratitude from the Honduran government. Free training Meadows, Odorizzi and Patton im. mediately. sought to exploit it. They offered free firearms training at a military -range. They proposed to train an elite Honduran military commando unit, called the CORRAs in counterterrorism and counterin- surgency techniques. And they pro- posed : to Honduran Gen. Walter Lopez e plan to interdict drug smug glers ind split their seized property 50-50: Xith the Honduran government. Money'Proved the stumbling block.13dtlf Peregrine Ond Honduran officials figured it would come from U.S. military aid, Instead, the CIA steppe; imand, according to docu- menti used active-duty Special Forced personnel from Fort Bragg, posing as civilians, to train Hondu- ran Mmandos in counterinsur- gency "aechniques, ? Howprd and Tucker say that Mead- ows and Odorizzi offered similar pre* posals:Wherever they could In Latin America. The strongest interest, they said, came from Peru, where'a leftist insurgkncy called the Shining Pat* was ceportedly taking protectiojii Ili money, from rural cocaine growers, Meadotvs and Odorizzi also though they cbtritt supplyt,Pers with/ spa - parts for-Eastern bloc military WO ware, inementos of a dashed flirta4 tion wjth the Soviet-Uniot On Oct. 26, 1982, amid thebtOlituillei Peruvian deal, Meadows quit, for rea4 sons trot remain mysterious.. He tot* subordinates that he walld organize, a new!company within 60 days and find work for themill Latin-America.1 Odoridi resigned days later:But the; new company never mate;tailzed. ? .,.I A memo they left behind says of the Peruvian proposal: "Sky's the Meadocvs in a telephone inter- view, ;tressed that while many of the operattons may have been discussed. "nothing:materialized.- He de- scribed Long as "a friend and ad- viser 074 I would ask every now and ttlpir to sound me out on some- thing atieperhaps assist me in mak- ing cohtacts." He described Gen. Wilson as "the best sounding board in the world. He could say this is good or this is bad and pass information on if needed, or say hold off and back off." One important message to Mead- ows and other Peregrine officials, they said, was that the Reagan ad- ministration, early on, had decided to assign much of the government's covert and clandestine activity to the military, rather than the CIA. ' The Defense Intelligence Agency, for example, which was created in 1961 to-oversee the services' separate military intelligence units, also stepped up its "extraordinary mili- tary attiVities" to include cOunter- terrorism and counterinsurgency. Wilson's observation, according to Howard, was that "The DIA was pick- ing up 90 Jercent of the CIA's work. The MA was going to become the new MIA leave the CIA out there 1 take the public .ticks." Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/26: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302540001-0