REAGAN'S BAND OF TRUE BELIEVERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000301920012-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: May 10, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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?...
ON PAGE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE
10 May 1987
REAGAN'S BAND
OF TRUE BELIEVERS
y" By Frances Fitzeverald
SOON WE WILL
know more about
the Iran-contra af-
fair. Witnesses be-
fore the special
prosecutor's grand
jury, and before
the Congressional commit-
tees that began hearings last
week, will expose the opera-
tions in much greater detail.
They will delve into the un-
derworld of arms dealers and
financial brokers into which
Lieut. Col. Oliver L. North
and his fellow National Se-
curity Council staff members
descended. They will tell of
Manucher Ghorbanifar, the
main intermediary with the
Iranians and the Schehera-
zade of polygraphs. They will
enumerate the secret arms
deals and try to account for
the millions of dollars gone
astray on their way to the
contras. In the end, we may
discover what the President
and his Director of Central
Intelligence. William J.
A Casey. knew and what they
clisl. But the Tower Commis-
sion report has already
made the style of the opera-
tions quite clear ? and it has
given us important clues to
the central question of how
such a thing could have oc-
curred.
From one perspective, as a
number of commentators
have noted, the affair could
be seen as merely the latest
in a series of attempts by
American Presidents to con-
centrate power in the White
House and to make their for-
eign policy independent of the
Congress and the State De-
partment. (Robert C. McFar-
lane, after all, thought of his
role in the Iran initiative as
analagous to Henry A. Kissin-
ger's in the secret negotia-
tions with Beijing.)
Yet seen from another
angle, the affair belonged to a
pattern quite specific to the
Reagan Administration: It
was not just a matter of the
President's "management
style," or the arrogance of
those whose President had
been re-elected in a landslide.
It was a particular philoso-
phy of government shared by
many Reagan appointees, a
strain of home-grown radi-
calism that has deep roots in
American history and that
carries with it a disrespect
for institutions and rules. The
radical strain had surfaced
repeatedly in the struggles
over domestic policy as well
as in the conduct of foreign
affairs. The Iran-contra af-
fair merely exemplified it at
its most extreme.
In the conclusion of its re-
port, the Tower Commission
denounced all those involved in
the operations for ignoring
"the constraints of orderly
process" and for failing to ad-
dress "significant questions of
law." In tone, these Latinate
phrases suited the commis-
sion's solemn purpose, but con-
trasted sharply with the
events described in its narra-
tive ? for the story is bizarre.
As the Tower report shows,
the atmosphere in the White
House was quite different
from that in the Nixon White
House during the secret
bombing of Cambodia and
the Watergate break-in. In
the first place, Reagan staff
members were extraordi-
narily credulous. Not only did
they believe Ghorbanifar's
stories, but they never even
suspected that Iranian offi-
cials might be manipulating
them, rather than vice versa.
While the Nixon people knew
their actions were illegal and
did their best to conceal
them, Reagan's men hardly
seemed to have asked them-
selves where the statutory
limits were. They believed in I
what they were doing, they
believed in the authority of
the President, and that was
that ? even though what the
President knew or remem-
bered of their doings was often
unclear to them. In general,
they calculated little but felt a
great deal. Vice Adm. John
M. Poindexter once accused
North of "getting emotional
again," but when the contra
operation came to light, he
told Donald T. Regan, the
White House chief of staff,
that he had done nothing
about his suspicion that funds
were being diverted because
he was "so damned mad at
Tip O'Neill."
To read the computer-
transmitted conversations
between North, Poindexter
and McFarlane is to see that
a certain strangeness had
come over the group by 1986.
Those involved were com-
pletely alienated from the
rest of official Washington,
including the rest of the Rea-
gan Administration. Tim
hated "the libs," as they
called the liberal Democrats
A n Congress: they despised
the career C.I.A. and they
suspected all the N.S.C. prin-
cipals who were not involved.
North told the Iranians fan-
tastic stories about the Presi-
dent. In the end, wearing him-
self out, getting only two or
Contin..ad
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three hours' sleep a night,
North began to imagine the
contras would win a great
victory and that the Presi-
dent would go down in history
for ending the Iran-Iraq war.
McFarlane told North that
North should be Secretary of
State ? and later that he
should join him at the Center
for Strategic and Interna-
tional Studies, where the two
would "continue to work the
Iran account as well as to
build other clandestine capa-
bilities so much in demand
here and there."
13 Y 1986, THOSE IN-
volved in the Iran and
contra operations were
behaving rather less like na-
tional-security officials than
like a bunch of Keystone
Cops. But there is a more pre-
cise analogy for what was
happening among them, a
more apt parallel for the
strange behavior of this
small group of Government
officials. The analogy lies,
oddly enough, in the sociology
of contemporary religious
"cults." The so-called cults,
after all, New Age or Chris-
tian, commonly have a char-
ismatic father figure and
enormous assets raised by
contribution (assets that
have a tendency to disap-
pear). And those that are
self-destructing tend to go
through a very particular
form of group dynamics.
In such groups the process
of unraveling begins when
the charismatic father fig-
ure, who once had much con-
tact with his followers, re-
treats within an inner circle
of guardians and goes into si-
lence. What he does (if any-
thing) is known only to a few
intimates; what he knows be-
comes a metaphysical, or at
least an epistemological,
problem. Yet the ordinary
members still believe that
they have ? on some level ?
a direct, personal relation-
ship with the leader.
The problem is that they
have no institutions or rules
governing relations among
themselves; the group is an
anarchy held together by his
charisma. (Thus N.S.0 staff
members put together an ad
hoc group drawn from vari-
ous agencies with a shifting
cast of characters and no
clear lines of authority.)
Since the father figure
refuses to intervene, even the
smallest argument has the
potential to explode and de-
stroy the group. To preserve
itself, the group projects its
hostility onto outsiders, and a
we-they relationship de-
velops in which group mem-
bers come to believe that they
are entirely good ? indeed su-
perior ? beings, while all out-
siders are entirely bad, in-
ferior and untrustworthy. Now
the group cannot accept out-
side advice or criticism; its
members at the same time
lose all normal skepticism
about those who profess to
support their cause ? even
those who look, speak and act
like crooks or con artists.
At some point, the inner cir-
cle, sensing hostility from the
outer members, withdraws
into itself. (North once told
McFarlane that Poindexter's
job was much harder than
his, since "I only had to deal
with our enemies. He has to
deal with the Cabinet") Its
members set themselves
"above" the ordinary mem-
bers and develop secret poli-
cies that are the very oppo-
site of the stated policies of
the group. The more they de-
velop and carry out their poli-
cies, the more they lose touch
with even that reality the or-
dinary members could give
them. Once exposed, their ac-
tivities appear to outsiders as
quite mad ? and possibly
they are criminal. The ordi-
nary members express shock
at the behavior of the inner
circle. But, in fact, all along
they have sensed something
strange going on within it,
and evidence of wrongdoing
? such as a rattlesnake in the
mailbox of an opponent ?
has appeared in more or less
plain sight.
The question is, of course,
how this sort of dynamic
could establish itself at the
center of the United States
Government.
READ THE EIGHTH
Beatitude of Matthew
5," Colonel North told
a reporter through the win-
dow of his truck the day after
1 the Tower Commission re-
I port came out On the evening
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news, Peter Jennings re-
ported that the verse read,
"Blessed are they which are
persecuted for righteousness'
sake: for theirs is the king-
dom of Heaven," adding that
the Tower Commission had
chosen as one epigraph a
quotation from the Roman
satirist Juvenal, "Quis cus-
tocliet ipsos custodes," "Who
shall guard the guardians?"
The juxtaposition of the two
quotations was pure poetry,
for the texts pointed to two
very different views of
human nature. That Chris-
tian and classical texts
should be invoked on either
side of a political conflict in
1987 seems on the face of it
extraordinary; yet the texts
pointed directly to an impor-
tant aspect of the Iran-contra
affair ? to the particular
conflict fought out within the
Reagan Administration.
In the United States, the
secular, Roman tradition is
embodied in the Constitution,
with its checks and balances,
and in the public architecture
of Washington, notably in the
Capitol building. More than in
Europe, where national tradi-
tions predate the Enlighten-
ment, secular rationalism is
the foundation of the state
and the law of the land.
The Judeo-Christian tradi-
tion plays no parallel role in
government, yet one particu-
lar strain of it, evangelical
Protestantism, has pro-
foundly colored American
civic culture. It underlies the
notion of American excep-
tionalism: the idea of Amer-
ica as a redeemer nation, a
people charged with a divine
mission in the world. Beyond
that, it has been the engine
for most social-reform move-
ments on the left and on the
right, and it has sustained the
idealistic, even visionary,
quality in American life.
Abolitionism, civil rights,
women's rights, pacifism and
internationalism have histor-
ically grown out of left-wing
evangelical movements with
their optimistic millenarian-
ism. Social conservatism,
nativism and jingoistic na-
tionalism have grown out of
conservative evangelical
movements and pessimistic
millenarianism. Both millen-
Mal traditions look forward
Continued
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to an end to human history,
an end to politics and govern-
ment. In a sense, the secular
and the religious traditions
cluster about the two names
for the country: "the United
States" being the secular,
constituted Republic, "Amer-
ica" being the organic mythic
or moral land. In the Reagan
Administration, this latter
tradition was strong.
Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.,
in his recent book, "The
Cycles of American History,"
proposes a regular, cyclical
alternation in American life
between periods of concern
for the public interest and
periods where private inter-
ests come to the fore ? the
first bringing government
controls and democratic re-
forms, the second a relaxa-
tion of controls, a greater role
for the market and a retreat
into private life. This alterna-
tion, he maintains, is a natu-
ral, systolic-diastolic move-
ment. While each phase nor-
mally brings a corrective to
the one before, both contain
dangers; for as too much gov-
ernment can stifle and re-
strict, too much "privatiza-
tion" invites corruption, in-
justice, even tyranny. In
Schlesinger's terms, the last
six years represent a right-
ward swing of the pendulum:
a period of lower taxes and
looser regulations, and a
period of some public apathy
about injustice and the prob-
lems of the society.
But there was another ele-
ment in the national mood,
one that was clearly reflected
in the makeup of the Reagan
coalition. Arriving in Wash-
ington in 1981 with the new
President were not just the
genial Republican business-
men that such periods usu-
ally bring in, but a great
many people inflamed with a
passionate desire for reform.
These people believed not
simply that the government
had become too big and too
burdensome, but that it had
become a moral evil infecting
American society. Many be-
lieved the free market would
create the promised land of
milk and honey. Yet outside
the economic domain they be-
lieved fiercely in the impor-
tance of government, not the
government that existed but
the one they themselves
would create: a government
that would bring America
back to morality and make it
a tower of military might ? a
fortress invulnerable. Many
of these people commonly
spoke of "America," and not
of "the United States" and
saw the country as a Babylon
they would remake into a
New Israel.
The "movement conserva-
tives," as these people called
themselves (once the term
"New Right" had aged), were
virtual strangers to Washing-
ton when they arrived in 1981;
yet they had an ideological
lineage as old as any extant
party or movement in the
United States ? their an-
tecedents lying in anti-Ma-
sonry and in a certain nativ-
ist strain of Populism. Even
with all this history behind
them, however, and with all
their nostalgia for an earlier
age, they were not a conser-
vative party in the usual
sense, for, whether Catholics
or Protestants, they were, in-
tellectually speaking, evan-
gelicals.
Theologically, and as a
habit of thought, evangelicals
put the emphasis on direct
experience rather than
knowledge of doctrine or
ritual practice: the individu-
al, once born again, becomes
a regenerate being, free of
the past. Evangelicism is
thus by its nature anti-intel-
lectual, ahistorical and
wholly democratic. It is also
highly individualistic and dis-
posed against institutions. It
focuses on the future and the
quality of will or intention
rather than on the record of
past deeds, good or bad. The
"movement conservatives"
were thus temperamentally
impatient, and, as pessimists
of the right, they looked for-
ward to impending national
destruction if they did not
succeed. What made them
different from previous
right-wing evangelical par-
ties was their numbers, and
the great many activists
brought to Washington on the
Reagan tide.
In the 19th and early 20th
centuries, evangelical move-
ments of the left and the right
had appeared and disap-
peared many times ? but
without the temporal regu-
larity of the Schlesingerian
cycle. They seemed to appear I
in times of profound eco-
nomic change and social dis-
location: in times (and in
places) where the old order
was crumbling, creating un-
certainty, insecurity and the
need for new standards
around which to organize life.
These reform movements
appeared in a more or less
secularized or ecumenical
form in the 1960's ? and then
in the late 1970's. Before 1980,
however, right-wing evangel-
ical movements, important
as they were in the country,
made relatively small in-
roads into national politics. In
part, it was that their largest
constituency ? white South-
ern Baptists ? was politi-
cally immobilized for more
than a century by the issues
of slavery and segregation. In
part, it was that until the late
1950's the economy of the
South was that of an underde-
veloped country compared to
the North. In the 1960's, the
civil-rights movement freed
pastors, such as the Rev.
Jerry Falwell, from their
self-imposed silence. In the
1970's, the movement of new
industries to the South and
Southwest created the Sun-
Belt phenomenon. In this
newly rich region, freed by its
affluence from the Demo-
cratic Party, most voters had
strong roots in conservative
evangelic is m.
As candidate in 1976 and in
1980, Ronald Reagan drew
his strength from the new Re-
publican Party of the Sun
Belt, and as President he
brought a good many of its
leaders to Washington. This
party included both "move-
ment conservatives" and
laissez-faire businessmen,
and the two had a good deal in
common. When it came to the
threat of international Com-
munism or the role of the
Federal Government in do-
mestic affairs, men like
Jesse Helms and Edwin
Meese 3d saw eye to eye. On
these and other issues the
movement conservatives
found a variety of natural
allies in Washington: the
"sagebrush rebels" on Fed-
eral land use; the supply-
siders on taxes; the neocon-
servatives on the Soviet
threat, and conservative
Catholics on abortion and aid
to religious schools. On each
of these issues the movement
conservatives and their tem-
porary allies ? people such
as James G. Watt in the De-
partment of Interior, William
Continuci
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Bennett in the Department of
Education and William Brad-
ford Reynolds in the Justice
Department ? formed as it
were a radical party in con-
tradistinction to the tradi-
tional conservative party of
men like Paul A. Volcker,
George P. Shultz and Wil-
liam E. Brock. Many of them
held high positions in agen-
cies throughout the Govern-
ment ? including those
agencies they most wished to
destroy.
But in matters of domestic
policy, the radicals experi-
enced a good deal of frustra-
tion. There were so many
regulations, so many statutes
on the books, and when they
tried to hack away at them,
they were set upon by public-
interest groups. They could
trim their departments and
deregulate as the conserva- ?
tives saw fit, but, generally,
they could not go further ?
for their strength lay in the
Administration, not on the
Hill: in Congress they lacked
the votes to change the laws
as they wished. In frustra-
tion, some of them took ac-
tions which liberals and con-
servatives construed as law-
breaking. The Environmen-
tal Protection Agency, for
example, suspended most
hazardous-waste regula-
tions; the Justice Depart-
ment ignored or defied civil-
rights legislation; the De-
partment of Health and
Human Services dropped
thousands of people from the
Social Security disability-in-
surance rolls and adopted a
"policy of non-acquiescence"
when the action was judged
illegal. In practice, the
courts found these and a
great many other such radi-
cal actions illegal.
At the same time, and for
reasons not unrelated, an as-
tonishing number of Reagan
appointees had personal colli-
sions with the law or the
Ethics in Government Act.
There was a simple "sleaze
factor" in the Administration
that reflected the general lax-
ity in fiduciary standards
across the land; in addition,
there was sleaze complicated
by ideology. Some of the radi-
cals had, after all, grown up
believing that all government
regulations were unjust re-
strictions on, their personal
freedom; others purely and
simply felt that government
was the enemy. In the E.P.A.
scandals, for example, ideol-
ogy was a factor ? as it
clearly was in the Iran-con-
tra affair.
While the radicals were
constricted in the domestic
arena, they had more room
for maneuver in foreign af-
fairs, where the executive
held greater sway. (Here, as
they saw it, their main im-
pediments were the career
diplomats and the bureau-
crats at the C.I.A.) As it hap-
pened, the primary passion of
many movement conserva-
tives was foreign and mili-
tary policy. This was true
from the beginning ? and
even for many people best
known for raising "the social
issues" and injecting them
into the 1980 campaign. In the
1960's and 1970's, Phyllis
Schlafly, for example, wrote
five books on nuclear strat-
egy with a retired rear admi-
ral ? all designed to show
that Robert S. McNamara,
Paul H. Nitze, Henry Kissin-
ger and their co-conspirators
at the Council on Foreign
Relations were Soviet dupes
plotting the unilateral disar-
mament of the United States.
In truth it was not precisely
foreign policy that interested
such people. In his speeches,
the Reverend Falwell never
used that word at all, but
spoke about Nicaragua and
South Africa under the head-
ing of "defense policy." This
was no idiosyncrasy. In the
international arena, right-
wing evangelicals see politics
not as the collision of differ-
ing self-interests but as the
expression of a transcendent
power struggle between good
and evil. For them, the
enemy is a free agent, not one
caught up in history or con-
fined by geography and local
politics. Thus, on the global
battlefield there can be no
stable balance of power and
no agreement to disagree: the
threat to national security is
everywhere at once.
In foreign policy, the move-
ment conservatives found
that President Reagan spoke
their language. In March
1981, the President described
American aid to El Salvador
as an attempt "to try to halt
the infiltration into the Amer-
icas by terrorists, and by out-
side interference and those
who aren't just aiming at El
Salvador but, I think, are
aiming at the whole of Cen-
tral America and possibly
later South America ? and,
I'm sure, eventually North
America."
Actually, the President was
far more optimistic than
most movement conserva-
tives, but he shared their nos-
talgia for a simpler time and
their notion that international
institutions, such as the
World Bank and the United
Nations, were meaningless,
or even vehicles for some
general conspiracy against
"America." On most foreign-
policy issues the Administra-
tion was divided, as it was in
domestic affairs, between
traditional conservatives and
radicals. The divide was no-
where more explicit than in
nuclear strategy and arms
control. While negotiators ?
including, indeed, Paul Nitze
? labored away at inter-
minable arms talks in Gene-
va, the radicals ? such as
Richard Perle ? blocked all
potential agreements in the
conviction that the Russians
could not be trusted and could
not be dealt with until the
United States had built up a
commanding lead in nuclear
weapons. Surprising every-
one, the President took the
radicals off the hook by
proposing that the Strategic
Defense Initiative would soon
unfurl a vast, invulnerable
umbrella over the country ?
thus rendering the arms
talks moot. Many did not ac-
tually credit his belief in this
form of salvation from nu-
clear war until Reykjavik,
when he toyed with the idea
that the abolition of ballistic
missiles might be just as
good.
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WHEN THE IRAN
initiative came to
light and news re-
ports indicated that some in
the White House had seen it
as a geopolitical gambit and
some as an effort to free the
hostages, it was not hard to
guess where the President
stood. Over the years Ronald
Reagan had made it plain tht
he conceived the world in
terms of individuals. He
ended most speeches with a
story about some one person:
a gallant lad who had saved
someone's life, a Vietnamese
refugee made good, Baby
Doe or a welfare cheat who
bought vodka with food
stamps. As the Tower Com-
mission discovered, the
President, who had spent
some time with the victims of
the T.W.A. hijacking of June
1985, asked his staff almost
every day about the fate of
the hostages and the plans to
get them out. What he
thought about the political
situation in Iran, the Iran-
Iraq war and the problem of
maintaining stability in the
Middle East remains unclear
even now.
As the White House focused
on the hostages, so it focused
on two other categories of in-
dividuals: "the freedom fight-
ers" on one hand and "the ter-
rorists" on the other. For
movement conservatives,
both groups were generic. In
a speech to a group in Nash-
ville in May 1986, Colonel
North (who also ran the coun-
terterrorism unit in the Na-
tional Security Council)
linked both groups with a syl-
logism. The Russians, he
maintained, supported ter-
rorists around the world
(from the I.R.A. to Abu
Nidal); therefore, the United
States had to help "the free-
dom fighters" to "go after
the Soviet model" in Nicara-
gua. Quite possibly North
and his fellow movement
conservatives connected
these two groups in meta-
phorical ways as well. When
they spoke of "freedom fight-
ers," their vision was, as
North put it, "young men and
women who have taken up
the cause of democracy
against a government that is
cruelly repressive."
It was also, perhaps, a vi-
sion of guerrillas, irregulars,
who went into the jungles into
an area of freedom ? free-
dom, that is, from civilization
itself. "The terrorists" did the
same: they were evil, but
they, too, lived beyond the
law fighting governments ?
indeed all civilized institu-
tions. "The terrorists," too,
were free. What was more,
the cause of "the freedom
fighters" and the cause of an-
titerrorism ? like the cause
of the hostages ? permitted
North and his associates to go
beyond "legal constraints"
and institutions into the same
realm of freedom Ram-
boesque derring-do.
In fact, the Rambo story
could stand for both the Iran
arms deal and the contra
operation. Rambo, after all,
bucked the United States
Government to go rescue his
buddies from prison camps
and torturers; the lone war-
rior then came back from the
jungle to take revenge on the
bureaucrats who had so cyni-
cally left American soldiers
to die. The Rambo story is the
same story of justifiable, vio-
lent revenge against evildo-
ers and "the system" that
runs through so many Amer-
ican movies, notably those
starring Charles Bronson
and Clint Eastwood. Rambo,
however, is a narcissistic fan-
tasy figure: a larger-than-life
hunk of gorgeous oiled mus-
cles who performs impossi-
ble feats. But then there
seems to have been some ele-
ment of narcissistic fantasy
at work in both the Iran and
the contra operations. At the
very least there was a certain
solipsism.
THE RAMBO STORY
and religious "cult"
behavior both involve
anarchic freedom from rules
and responsibilities. To use
the cult model to help under-
stand what happened in the
Iran-contra affair is to see
that if those directly in-
volved constituted an inner
circle, then the outer circle
included not just other Ad-
ministration officials but, at
some metaphorical remove,
a large part of the American
public as well. Those who
now feel deluded or lied to
had all the clues they needed.
When he was speaking to us,
the Great Communicator
told us all about his particu-
lar world view. More specifi-
cally, by 1985 the news media
and the intelligence commit-
tees in Congress had all the
information they needed to
start an investigation of
Colonel North's activities on
behalf of the contras. Here
as elsewhere clues to the
dark side of the Reagan Ad-
ministration lay in plain
sight.
Not only Reagan's popu-
larity but the enduring ap-
peal of such movies as
"Rambo" and "Death Wish"
suggest that there is in the
American psyche some deep
sense that civilization is intol-
erably repressive. These
movies offer us fantasies in
which our anarchic urges are
fulfilled and go unpunished,
but the great American
novels show us the reality of
what we are about: the reality
is Gatsby, Huck Finn and
Clyde Griffiths; it is also
Ahab, who creates his own
enemy and pursues him to
the death.
But happily that is not all
there is. The members of the
Tower Commission chose
their language well. Their
Latinate phrases signified
that the Iran-contra affair
should end as a comedy in
the classical tradition: after
a period of mayhem the so-
cial order is duly restored. In
his response to the report,
the President acquiesced,
promising to start a new life
in which he would act respon-
sibly and obey the rules.
After the hearings, the Con-
gress may adopt stricter
legal constraints on the
Presidency ? or take other
measures. But the arrival of
Frank Carlucci and Howard
Baker in the White House
signified that the Romans
had already won.?
Frances FitzGerald is the au-
thor of "Fire in the Lake,"
"AmericcbR evised "a,4 most
recently, 'Cities on the HilL"
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP90-00965R000301920012-7