SOVIET BLOC CAPABILITIES, THROUGH MID-1953

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• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 12, 1952
• Content Type: NIE

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_ ...rail 1 i IFNI.
. T4004Eeittr ASSISTANT DIRECTORONE
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,
SECURITY INFORMATION
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
SOVIET BLOC CAPABILITIES, ? THROUGH MID-1953
NIE ? 64 (Part I)
Published 12 November 1952
r?i r'
L.)
DOCUMENT NO
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CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS SO
NEXT REVIEW DATE. /QV
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DATE: _ REVIEWER: 006514
The following member organizations of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intelli-
gence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The
Intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff.
All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee
concurred in this estimate on 30 October 1952.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
_ 41,Pa-SE?TRET
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TABLE Or CONTENTS, NIE-64 (PART I)
Page
THE PROBLEM
1
CONCLUSIONS
1
DISCUSSION
2
FACTORS AFFECTING BLOC CAPABILITIES
2
BLOC MILITARY STRENGTH
3
BLOC MILITARY CAPABILITIES
4
ELEMENTS OF BLOC POLITICAL WARFARE STRENGTH
6
BLOC POLITICAL WARFARE CAPABILITIES
6
CONFIDENTIAL
25X1
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LUIN IAN IJAL
SOVIET BLOC CAPABILITIES, THROUGH MID-1953
THE PROBLEM
To estimate Soviet Bloc 1 capabilities for political and military warfare, through
mid-1953.
CONCLUSIONS
1. The Bloc continues to possess a sig-
nificant quantitative superiority over the
Western Powers in forces in being and
in conventional ground and air arma-
ment.
2. The Soviet economy is much better
prepared now to support a major war
effort than it was in 1940.
3. The principal emphasis of the recent
Bloc military program has apparently
been upon enlarging the atomic stock-
pile and upon improving Bloc defenses,
particularly against air attack. We be-
lieve that this emphasis will continue
throughout the period of this estimate.
We also believe that the Bloc military
forces will not increase greatly in size,
although they will improve in combat
effectiveness.
4. It is unlikely that the USSR will be
able to develop and produce a thermo-
nuclear weapon by mid-1953.
5. The Soviet forces now stationed in
Eastern Europe are in an advanced state
The Soviet Bloc consists of the USSR, the Euro-
pean Satellites, Communist China, Outer Mon-
golia, North Korea, and Viet Minh. The Kremlin
also controls the international Communist move-
ment outside the Bloc countries.
of readiness for war and can attack with
little or no warning.
6. We estimate that the Bloc has the
capability to undertake concurrent large-
scale operations in continental Europe,
the Middle East, and mainland Asia.
The Bloc could rapidly reinforce with
Chinese Communist and Soviet forces
the Communist forces now in Korea, and
at the same time undertake an invasion
of Japan by Soviet forces.
7. The USSR has the capability of un-
dertaking sustained air offensives against
the UK, most of continental Europe,
most of the Middle East, and Japan, with
the intensity of individual offensives
varying according to the number of
offensives undertaken simultaneously.
It is also capable of undertaking the
delivery of its full stockpile of atomic
weapons against targets in these areas
and against targets in the US and its
overseas bases.
8. The Bloc air defense organization has
the capability for vigorous opposition to
an air offensive against the principal So-
viet centers. However, despite marked
improvements in the Bloc air defense
system (especially in the USSR, Eastern
1
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Germany, Poland, and Manchuria), de-
ficiencies will remain throughout the
period of this estimate.
9. The USSR has the capability to un-
dertake offensive submarine patrols and
mining operations along most of the
world's strategically vital sea_ lanes.
The USSR has the capability to under-
take short-haul amphibious operations
in the seas adjacent to its own coasts.
10. The Communists almost certainly
will not be capable of overthrowing any
non-Communist government either by
constitutional process or by revolution,
except possibly in Iran.
11. Bloc capabilities for political warfare
will continue to constitute a serious
danger for the non-Communist world
throughout the period of this estimate.
The Communist Parties in the non-
Communist world ? with an estimated
membership of 3,750,000 ? are tightly
organized for action and form a world-
wide network under Kremlin direction.
Through this organization, the Kremlin
is able to conduct undermining attacks
on established regimes, to exploit na-
tional rivalries, to utilize minority groups
and political factions, and to capitalize '
on economic, political, and military diffi-
culties. The organizational effective-
ness of the Parties makes them far more
formidable than their numerical size
alone indicates.
DISCUSSION
Factors Affecting Bloc Capabilities
12. The Soviet regime is securely entrenched
in power, and there is no apparent prospect
of its control being threatened or shaken.
13. Soviet control over the Satellites will al-
most certainly remain virtually complete. It
ensures the subservience and reliability of the
governments, and continued economic and
military contributions to the USSR from the
Satellite area.
14. The Chinese Communist regime has firm
control over mainland China, and there is
little likelihood of its control being threat-
ened or shaken by dothestic forces within the
period of this estimate. We believe that
Communist China accepts Moscow leadership
in the international Communist movement
but retains some capability for independent
action and a capability to exert influence
upon the shaping of Communist policy in the
Far East. The character of the current
Sino-Soviet relationships will probably re-
main relatively constant throughout \ the
period of this estimate.
15. The USSR is engaged in a large-scale re-
search and development program. This in-
cludes both pure and applied research, with
an emphasis upon applied research in fields
of military application, especially atomic
energy, electronics, jet aircraft, guided mis-
siles, and submarines. In all of these fields,
Soviet scientists and technicians have dem-
onstrated a high level of proficiency.
16. The gross national product of the Bloc
has been increasing in the past few years.
Any calculation of its magnitude is neces-
sarily subject to considerable error, and no
meaningful comparison can be made with
prewar years for the Bloc as a whole. How-
ever, we estimate that the Bloc's national
product in 1951 was roughly 15 percent
higher than in 1949.
a. The economy of the USSR had recov-
ered its prewar level of total production by
1948 and had surpassed that level by an esti-
mated 20 ? 30 percent in 1951. We estimate
that the Soviet national product is increas-
ing at an annual rate of 6 to 7 percent.
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b. The combined production of the Satel-
lites constitutes approximately one-quarter of
the Bloc's national product. We believe that
the Satellite national product has increased
since 1949, but we are unable to estimate the
amount of the increase.
c. The national product of Communist
China is extremely difficult to estimate, but we
believe that it represents less than 15 percent
of the Bloc total. Communist China's na-
tional product is probably increasing at an
annual rate of 3 to 5 percent, but its output
of capital goods will continue to be a very
small part of the Bloc total.
17. The output of the Soviet economy does
not approach that of the US economy, nor
does the output of the Bloc economy as a
whole compare with that of the NATO
states. USSR gross national product in
1951 was about one-quarter that of the US,
and the combined gross national product of
the entire Bloc was about 30 percent that of
the NATO countries.
18. However, comparisons in terms of total
output of all types of goods and services are
misleading as indications of relative capacity
to produce military equipment in peacetime.
The traditional living standards and the con-
trols prevailing within the Bloc enable the
Bloc states to assign a much smaller propor-
tion of total output to civilian consumption,
particularly of scarce materials and goods,
than is feasible in Western countries. More-
over, these living standards and controls also
enable the Bloc to assign a higher proportion
of its military outlay to production of actual
military end-items than is feasible in the
West.
19. Since the end of World War II, the Bloc
as a whole has devoted a much larger pro-
portion of its gross national product to mili-
tary purposes than the West. We believe
that the USSR now devotes about one-fifth
of its national product to military expendi-
tures. We estimate that the quantity of re-
sources which the USSR will devote to mili-
tary production in 1952 will equal the amount
assigned in 1944.
20. The Soviet economy is much better pre-
pared now to support a major war effort than
3
it was in 1940. Under continued cold war
conditions, the Bloc clearly has the capability
of expanding its industrial base and of in-
creasing military production. The Soviet
economy is organized with a view to possible
hostilities in the near future as well as in
the more remote future. These two objec-
tives compete to some extent in the alloca-
tion of resources.
21. The Kremlin places a high priority upon
stockpiling reserves, not only of military end-
items but of food, capital equipment, and ma-
terials needed for maintaining the economy
under wartime conditions or other emer-
gencies.
22. The Bloc could increase its exports to
the non-Communist world within the period
of this estimate. We estimate that even a
slight increase of trade with the non-Com-
munist world would constitute an important
political warfare weapon.
Bloc Military Strength
23. The Bloc continues to possess a signifi-
cant quantitative superiority over the West-
ern Powers in forces in being and in conven-
tional ground and air armament. We esti-
mate that the Bloc armed forces 2 now have:
a. Approximately 8,750,000 men, of which
about 4,450,000 are Soviet; 1,550,000 Satel-
lite; 2,350,000 Chinese Communist; 290,000
North Korean; and 130,000 Viet Minh. (For
more complete information on the number of
regular forces and of security forces main-
tained by each Bloc state, see Appendix B.)
b. An actual strength of approximately
21,000 aircraft, including about 6,700 jet
fighters and 900 piston medium bombers; an
authorized strength of about 25,000 air-
craft, including about 8,400 jet fighters and
1,150 piston medium bombers.
c. A total of at least 164 major surface
vessels and 361 submarines, including 103
long-range types.
d. A stockpile of 50 atomic weapons (30 ?
100 kiloton yield). (This estimate applies to
2 For comment on the nature of the evidence
available for estimates of Bloc armed force
strength, see note at the end of this estimate.
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mid-1952, not the date of publication for this
report. The actual figure may be from half
to twice as many as this estimate.)
e. Large stocks of conventional weapons
and equipment.
24. We estimate that the Bloc armed forces
by mid-1953 will probably have:
a. Approximately 9,000,000 men, of which
about 4,500,000 will be Soviet; 1,750,000 Satel-
lite; 2,350,000 Chinese Communist; 290,000
North Korean; and 130,000 Viet Minh.
(For more complete information on the
number of regular forces and of security
forces which we estimate will probably be
maintained by each Bloc state, see Appendix
B.)
b. An authorized strength of over 25,000
aircraft, including about 10,150 jet fighters,
1,200 medium piston bombers, and possibly a
few jet medium bombers. 3
c. A total of approximately 205 major sur-
face vessels and 408 submarines, of which
122 will be long-range types.
d. A stockpile of 100 atomic weapons
(30 ? 100 kiloton yield). (The actual figure
may be from half to twice as many as this
estimate.)
25. It is unlikely that the USSR will be able
to develop and produce a thermonuclear
weapon by mid-1953.
26. The over-all effectiveness of Bloc ground,
naval, and air forces will increase by mid-
1953 because of progressive modernization
and standardization of weapons and equip-
ment, the intensive training program, the
growth of the Soviet atomic stockpile, and
the increased combat efficiency of the Satel-
lite armies.
27. The armed forces of the USSR and Com-
munist China have remained relatively con-
stant in size throughout the past two years,
while those of the Satellites have grown rap-
idly. Recent Bloc military effort has ap-
parently placed principal emphasis upon
3 The estimate on jet medium bomber production
is based upon the Soviet technical capability to
develop and produce such aircraft. There is no
intelligence available to indicate that such air-
craft' are now in production.
4
enlarging the atomic stockpile and upon im-
proving Bloc defenses, particularly against
air attack. The Bloc has also emphasized
improvement of the quality of existing units
and developing and marshaling the military
strength of the Satellites.
28. The USSR maintains a large air defense
system which not only includes the forces
assigned to the Soviet air defense organiza-
tion (PVO?Strany) but also has available to
it the active air defense resources of the
Army, tactical air forces, and Navy not other-
wise committed, as well as the passive de-
fense resources of the police and civilian
organizations. The European Satellite and
Communist Chinese air defenses add to and
are integrated with the Soviet system.
Despite significant improvements in the air
defense system, there will probably continue
to be insufficient numbers of trained and
experienced pilots and operators, modern
radar, heavy AA guns, and fighters designed
specifically for all-weather interception to
provide defense for all important areas. We
estimate that by mid-1953 the numerical
strength of the air defense forces will not
change, although the effectiveness of the air
defenses will improve through re-equipment
and training.
Bloc Military Capabilities
29. We estimate that the Bloc has the capa-
bility to undertake concurrent large-scale
operations in continental Europe, the Middle
East, and mainland Asia. The Bloc could
rapidly reinforce with Chinese Communist
and Soviet forces the Communist forces now
in Korea, and at the same time undertake an
invasion of Japan by Soviet forces.
30. The Soviet forces now stationed in East-
ern Europe are in an advanced state of readi-
ness for war and can attack with little or no
warning. However, the Bloc forces in East-
ern Europe would almost certainly require
substantial reinforcements in Soviet ground
and air forces before they could sustain ma-
jor offensive operations.
31. The USSR has the capability of under-
taking sustained air offensives against the
UK, most of continental Europe, most of the
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Middle East, and Japan, with the intensity
of individual offensives varying according to
the number of offensives undertaken simul-
taneously. It is also capable of undertaking
the delivery of its full stockpile of atomic
weapons against targets in these areas and
against targets in the US and its overseas
bases.
32. The Bloc air defense organization has the
capability for vigorous opposition to an air
offensive against the principal Soviet centers..
However, despite marked improvements in
the Bloc air defense system (especially in the
USSR, Eastern Germany, Poland, and Man-
churia), deficiencies will remain throughout
the period of this estimate.
33. The Bloc has the capability to launch
short-haul amphibious and airborne opera-
tions in the Baltic and Black Seas, along the
northern coast of Norway, and in the north-
ern Japan Sea, and to launch limited am-
phibious and airborne operations against
Western Alaska.
34. The Soviet submarine force has the capa-
bility to undertake offensive patrols and
mining operations along most of the world's
strategically vital sea lanes and, possibly,
simultaneously to launch guided missile at-
tacks against targets on both the Atlantic
and Pacific seaboards of the US. The Soviet
Navy, including its air arm, has the capa-
bility to lay extensive mine fields to protect
Soviet, Satellite, and Chinese Communist har-
bors and sea routes, to mine the waters and
harbors of the Baltic, Black, North, and Japan
Seas, and to harass sea routes in these areas.
35. The Chinese Communist and North Ko-
rean capabilities in Korea have increased
substantially since the beginning of the
armistice negotiations. If the present scale
of operations continues, we believe that these
capabilities will gradually improve during the
period of this estimate. Communist ground
forces in Korea have a high offensive poten-
tial and are capable of launching a major
attack with little warning.4
For more complete information on this subject,
see NIE-55/1: "Communist Capabilities and
Probable Courses of Action in Korea" (30 July
1952).
5
36. Since the beginning of the Korean war,
the Communist Air Force in China, which is
believed to be made up of Chinese Commu-
nist, North Korean, and Soviet elements, has
been built to an impressive size. The jet
fighter units in the Korea-Manchuria-North
China area are believed to be progressively
improving. However, the capabilities of the
CAF in China are, and will remain during
the period of this estimate, largely limited
to the air defense of North China, Manchuria,
and North Korea under conditions of good
visibility and to limited attacks against UN
forces in Korea and adjacent waters. We
believe the CAF in China will continue to
expand gradually during the period of this
estimate but will remain entirely dependent
upon the USSR for aircraft and equipment,
spare parts, and technical supervision, and
almost entirely dependent upon the USSR for
aviation fuels and lubricants. Unless some
type of light jet bombardment aircraft is in-
troduced, the offensive capabilities of this air
force will remain extremely limited. Rede-
ployment from the Manchuria area would be
necessary for sustained air operations against
Taiwan and Southeast Asia.
37. During the period of this estimate, So-
viet and/or Chinese Communist forces in
Asia will almost certainly continue to have
the capability of conducting the following
operations concurrently:
a. Overrunning Hong Kong, Macao, Indo-
china, Burma, and Thailand if opposed only
by the forces concurrently in these areas.5
b. Rapidly reinforcing with Chinese Com-
munist and Soviet forces the Communist-
forces now in Korea, and at the same time of
undertaking an invasion of Japan by Soviet
forces.
c. Attacking Western shipping in the
Pacific by submarines and mines and by con-
ducting air attacks and surface raids against
Western bases and ? shipping in the western
and northern Pacific.
5 A Chinese Communist invasion of Taiwan would
almost certainly fail if US naval and air forces
remain available to defend Taiwan.
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Elements of Bloc Political
Warfare Strength
38. Political warfare plays an unusually im-
portant role for Communists, who consider
military warfare only an extension of political
warfare in their persistent campaign to un-
dermine the strength of the non-Communist
world. Bloc political warfare techniques in-
clude political and economic pressure, diplo-
matic action in the UN and elsewhere, propa-
ganda and front activities, the action of Com-
munist Parties and Communist Party con-
trolled trade unions outside the Bloc, sabo-
tage, exploitation of subversive and revolu-
tionary movements and of civil wars, and
psychological warfare.
39. The principal sources of strength upon
which Bloc political warfare capabilities are
based consist of the Bloc's military capabili-
ties; the size, power, and *centralized leader-
ship of the Bloc; Communist doctrine; and
the Communist international movement.
40. We estimate that there are now 20,000,000
Communist Party members in the world,
organized into 72 national parties. Most
Party members live within the Bloc, but
about 3,750,000 are scattered throughout the
non-Communist world. These figures do not
include the membership of the front organi-
zations, trade unions, etc., which the national
Communist Parties influence or control.
The discipline and fervor of the Parties make
them far more effective than their size alone
indicates.
41. To serve the interests of the Bloc, the
national Communist Parties in non-Commu-
nist countries seek to exploit economic, so-
cial, and nationalist grievances, to infiltrate
government agencies and institutions, to pro-
vide espionage agents and saboteurs, to dis-
seminate Bloc propaganda, to mobilize mass
support for Bloc policies, to create pressure
groups to influence local policy to the advan-
tage of the Bloc, and to infiltrate and control
trade unions and national labor organiza-
tions. They have shown particular skill in
creating and controlling front organizations.
6
Bloc Political Warfare Capabilities
42. Bloc political warfare capabilities will
!continue to constitute a serious danger
throughout the period of this estimate. The
Communists and their allies will retain the
capability to conduct undermining attacks on
established regimes, to exploit national rival-
ries, to utilize minority groups and splinter
political parties, and to capitalize upon eco-
nomic, political, and military difficulties.
43. We estimate that during the period of
this estimate the Bloc will not have the capa-
bility of establishing a Communist govern-
ment through constitutional process or by
revolution, except possibly in Iran.
44. Throughout Western Europe, the Commu-
nist Parties since 1946 have suffered severe
losses both in membership and prestige.
However, the hard core of the Party has been
preserved everywhere, and in most countries
the Party continues to influence large num-
bers of non-Communists.
45. The capability of Western European Com-
munists to conduct strikes for political pur-
poses has been sharply reduced. Neverthe-
less, the Communists retain limited capabili-
ties to interfere with defense production.
46. In the event of general war, the Commu-
nist Parties would constitute a threat in West-
ern Europe, especially in France and Italy,
where large Communist Parties and Commu-
nist trade union strength are reinforced by
well-trained Communist quasi-military or-
ganizations. Communist capabilities for
espionage, industrial sabotage, terrorism, and
attacks against transportation and communi-
cations facilities and military installations
would be substantial.
47. We believe that Bloc political warfare
capabilities in the Middle East and Africa will
remain low throughout the period of this
estimate, except in Iran. The Bloc has taken
little positive action in this area, and most of
the existing Communist Parties have been
forced underground. However, continued
deterioration of the Western position would
increase the vulnerability of the area to Bloc
political warfare.
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48. The Bloc agent in Iran, the Tudeh Party,
with an estimated strength of 15,000 mem-
bers and 30,000 fellow travellers, has demon-
strated great cohesion and considerable or-
ganized strength during the recent political
crisis. It has achieved some limited penetra-
tion of the Iranian armed forces and a some-
what greater penetration of the bureaucracy.
While the odds now are against the Tudeh's
gaining control of Iran during the period of
this estimate, these odds may shift rapidly,
particularly if the National Front is split as
a result of the rivalry among its leaders.
49. Communism does not now pose a major
immediate threat to India, although the In-
dian Communist Party and allied parties re-
ceived 6 million votes (of 102 million) in the
1952 elections. The India Communist Party
still has only about 50,000 members, but it
has small vocal groups in several state legis-
latures and the national legislature. We be-
lieve that there is very little likelihood that
the Indian Communists can make sufficient
progress within the period of this estimate
seriously to contest the dominant position of
the Congress Party. If the Communist Party
should again emphasize the role of violence,
its popular support would probably diminish
and the government would almost certainly
revive its earlier repressive measures.
50. Although the Japanese Communist Party
now has only about 100,000 members (about
half of whom are underground) , it is well-
organized and well-disciplined, and has sig-
nificant capabilities for espionage and sabo-
tage. Communist influence in Japanese labor
organizations, various front organizations,
7
and among students and the intellectuals
provides the Party with important instru-
ments for disseminating propaganda and for
exploiting economic unrest and resentment
against the US. However, the Party lacks
the capability for seizing control of the gov-
ernment during the period of this estimate,
and almost certainly will be unable signifi-
cantly to impair Japanese cooperation with
the West.
51. Bloc political warfare capabilities vary
throughout Southeast Asia. They are great-
est in Indochina. The Viet Minh is a pow-
erful instrument of terror and control, and
it retains considerable nationalist appeal.
The Viet Minh forces, with Communist Chi-
nese advice and military assistance, maintain
heavy military pressure upon the French and
the Associated States. We believe that the
Viet Minh will retain these capabilities
throughout the period of this estimate.
52. We estimate that during the period of
this estimate the Communists will not be able
to establish a Communist government any-
where in Latin America either by constitu-
tional process or by revolution. In Guate-
mala, the only country in Latin America
where Communists have power within the
government, they are likely to maintain and
may even increase their influence. In all
major Latin American countries, the Com-
munists will retain a substantial capability
for sabotage, for spreading Bloc propaganda,
and for stimulating anti-American sentiment
in nationalist, intellectual, and organized
labor groups.
TOP SECRET
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? CONFIDENTIAL
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