PROBABLE SHORT-TERM DEVELOPMENTS IN FRENCH POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A002000030001-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 18, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1953
• Content Type: NIE

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ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, ONE
9
07/./=PAAAr-j,
rtc
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
?LT
SECURITY
SECURITY INFORMATIQN
PROBABLE SHORT-TERM DEVELOPMENTS
IN FRENCH POLICY
NIE-63/1
Approved 24 November 1953
Published 1 December 1953
DOCUI1:11:-.N;T NO. 1
NO CHANGE !N CLASS.
DEC LASSnED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 3 29 - ell REVIEWER: ..C.122a,at
The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this
estimate on 24 November 1953. The FBI abstained, the
subject being outside of its jurisdiction.
The following member organizations of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intel-
ligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The
intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
MET
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WARNING
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PROBABLE SHORT-TERM DEVELOPMENTS IN FRENCH POLICY
THE PROBLEM -
To estimate probable French domestic developments and foreign policies over the
next 18 months.'
CONCLUSIONS
1. France, which is overextended in at-
tempting to meet its internal and ex-
ternal commitments, will remain one of
the problem areas of the Western coali-
tion. However, no critical deterioration
of the French situation is likely during
the period of this estimate except pos-
sibly with respect to Indochina. On the
other hand there is virtually no prospect
of an early "revitalization" of France.
Such a revitalization would require fun-
damental changes in French institutions
and attitudes which, if realized, probably
could not become really effective during
the period of this estimate.
2. Right-center governments are still
likely to predominate. The chances for
a left-center government coming to power
are still less than even. In any case no
French government likely to come to
power in the next 18 months will be able
to achieve both economic growth and
financial stability.
3. The next six months or so will prob-
ably be decisive for EDC. We believe that
French failure to ratify EDC within this
'Long-term developments in France are covered
in NIE-63, "France's Probable Future Role in the
Western Security System," 23 January 1953, the
conclusions of which remain largely valid. The
present estimate supplements NIE-63 and con-
centrates on probable short-term domestic and
foreign policy developments, particularly in the
light of developments since the publication of
period would mean the virtual abandon-
ment of the present treaty. However, we
believe that France will ratify EDC with-
in this period if (a) France's remaining
conditions, especially on the Saar, are
largely satisfied; (b) it remains con-
vinced no fruitful discussions with the
Bloc on Germany are likely; and (c) it is
under continued pressure from its allies
to ratify.'
4. However, certain types of allied pres-
sure might delay rather than hasten rati-
fication. For example, although we be-
lieve that any alternative method of
permitting West German rearmament is
more unpalatable to the French than
EDC, if one of these alternatives were for-
mally proposed by the US or the UK, the
2 The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; Department of
the Army, and the Director of Intelligence, US
Air Force, would have this paragraph read as
follows:
"The next six months or so will probably be de-
cisive for EDC. We believe that French failure
to ratify EDC within this period would mean the
virtual abandonment of the present treaty.
Since France is fundamentally opposed to Ger-
man rearmament and is more apprehensive of
the threat of a resurgent Germany than of So-
viet Communist aggression, French ratification
of EDC continues to be conjectural. - Even though
? France's present remaining conditions including
a favorable settlement of the Saar question are
satisfied, French ratification cannot be assured
unless: (a) France is under continued powerful
pressure from her Allies to ratify, and (b) France
is convinced no fruitful discussions with the Bloc
on Germany are likely."
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French might seize upon the allied pro-
posal as a pretext for lengthy discussions
which would further delay West German
rearmament.
5. French ratification of EDC would re-
move the chief obstacle to its implemen-
tation, though France would still seek to
limit any German military buildup and
to prevent the emergence of West Ger-
many as the dominant Western European
power.
6. On the other hand, if France failed to
ratify EDC, it would probably seek to
gloss over failure to ratify by expressing
willingness to discuss West German re-
armament in association with NATO.
Such negotiations would almost certainly
prove long and difficult, with France in-
sisting on detailed safeguards at least as
effective as those contained in EDC, thus
incurring the grave risk inherent in the
prolonged delay in the realization of a
German military contribution to the de-
fense of Western Europe. In these cir-
cumstances, the cohesion and effective-
ness of NATO itself would be endangered.
7. In Indochina, we believe that even if
the Laniel?Navarre Plan is successful the
French do not expect to achieve a com-
plete military victory in Indochina and
probably aim only at improving their
position sufficiently to negotiate a polit-
ical settlement.
8. If no negotiations take place within
the next 18 months, France would prob-
WHAT AILS FRANCE?
2
ably continue its effort in Indochina, pro-
vided that: (a) the US assumed virtually
the total financial burdens of the war;
(b) the planned buildup of Vietnam
forces permitted reduction of French
forces; (c) the Indochina states re-
mained in the French Union; and
(d) France continued to receive US sup-
port for its position in Europe and North
Africa.
9. If the above French conditions were
not largely satisfied France would prob-
ably propose UN intervention or direct
military participation by the US. Fail-
ing in this, France would probably seek
in time to negotiate directly with the
Communists for terms which would per-
mit withdrawal with minimum loss.
10. In contrast, we believe that France is
determined to retain control, by force if
necessary, over French North Africa. It
will probably make some concessions to-
ward local autonomy, but these almost
certainly will not satisfy the local nation-
alists. Nevertheless, French security
capabilities probably will forestall the de-
velopment of any serious threat to French
control during the period of this estimate.
However, widening differences between
France on the one hand, and the North
African Nationalists supported by the
Arab-Asian countries on the other, will
throw increasing strains on US relations
with both sides.
DISCUSSION
to change. In particular, the semiparalysis
which characterizes the present Assembly and
the spiritual malaise which appears to grip the
French people limit the ability of French gov-
ernments to cope with France's internal prob-
lem.
11. France's political and economic weak-
nesses are attributable largely to the rigidity
of political, economic, and social institutions
rooted deeply in the past and highly resistant
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12. France has also been unable to deal effec-
tively with its numerous international prob-
lems. It is overextended in attempting
simultaneously to: (a) maintain domestic eco-
nomic stability and politically tolerable stand-
ards of living; (b) meet its NATO force com-
mitments; (c) maintain at least parity of
strength and influence with West Germany;
(d) continue a major military effort in Indo-
china; and (e) cope with the lesser but grow-
ing problem of North African Nationalist un-
rest. Reluctant to face up to the contraction
of its position as a world power, France is hav-
ing great difficulty in reconciling itself to the
resurgence of West Germany in Europe and in
coping with growing nationalist pressures in
French possessions overseas. France's inter-
nal weaknesses and fear of Germany create
serious obstacles to the growth of Western
unity and strength, and make France vulner-
able to Soviet efforts to divide the NATO allies.
PROBABLE DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS
13. A stronger French government and basic
constitutional, economic, and social reforms
are essential to a revitalization of France. In-
creasing awareness by the French themselves
of these needs was demonstrated during the
ministerial crisis of June 1953.
14. However, the present French Assembly is
so divided, the multiplicity of special interest
groups so great, and underlying social cleav-
ages so numerous, that the chances for a
strong French government or for essential re-
forms during the period of this estimate are
very slight. The inability of conflicting in-
terest groups in the Assembly to reach agree-
ment on increased powers for the executive
makes extensive constitutional revisions un-
likely during this period. The present Assem-
bly is unlikely to produce any government
which would press forward vigorously with
any major reforms. Special interest groups
have such influence both within and outside
the Assembly that even with the grant of de-
cree powers no government could deal effec-
tively with France's domestic problems, as
shown by the current experience of Laniel.
Finally the French people themselves are so
divided that even if new elections were held
during the next 18 months, such elections
would be unlikely to result in more effective
governments than have been possible with the
present Assembly.
15. With France facing continued economic
difficulties, probable further strikes, a presi-
dential election in December, and pressure for
a decision on EDC, further cabinet crises are
likely. Right-center governments are still
likely to predominate during the period of this
estimate. 7.-l'he disintegration of the Gaullist
Party and the willingness of its two successor
groups to participate in the government have
broadened the parliamentary base of right-
center coalitions.
16. We believe that the chances for a left-
center government coming to power are still
less than even. During the ministerial crisis
of June 1953, a shift away from the right-
center orientation of the last several French
cabinets almost occurred when Pierre Mendes-
France, backed primarily by left-center ele-
ments, narrowly failed of investiture. Since
then, the unexpectedly strong worker support
for the August strikes probably strengthened
the left-center parties. Nevertheless, the
right-center parties in the Assembly still hold
the only present non-Communist coalition
majority. A left-center majority could be
achieved only by splitting off elements from
right-center parties, which seems unlikely dur-
ing the period of this estimate. Even if a
left-center government came to power, the
normally right-center majority in the present
Assembly probably would shortly bring about
its downfall. Such a left-center government
might therefore seek to consolidate its
strength by new elections, though it would be
unlikely to secure an effective governing ma-
jority.
17. We do not believe that any government
likely to come to power within the next 18
months will be able to achieve both economic
growth and financial stability. Progress
toward financial stability will probably con-
tinue, but at the expense of economic growth.
Government attempts to induce private in-
vestment in industry by restoring confidence
in the franc will probably be largely unpro-
ductive. In addition, the great need for new
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housing will not be satisfied from either public
or private sources of investment.
18. The present French Government, or any
successor government of the right-center will
probably continue Laniel's current policy of
retrenchment in an effort to stabilize the
franc, to balance the budget, and to restore
France's international solvency. This policy
will result in reduced outlays for defense and
public investment. Laniel has already de-
cided to cut the 1954 military budget to $3,170
million ? $350 million less than probable mili-
tary expenditures in 1953. He also proposes
to eliminate many of the direct appropriations
for industrial modernization and equipment,
originally budgeted at $1 billion for 1953, with
the proviso that they can be reinstated if no
other means of financing can be found.
19. The execution of the "sound money" and
retrenchment policy will continue to be ham-
pered by the determined resistance of pressure
groups on the left and right. Labor will op-
pose cuts in social expenditures and housing.
Not only the Socialists, but also many follow-
ers of the present government coalition are
opposed to a reduction of the public invest-
ment program. Conservative interests will
obstruct tax reforms. Farmers will strongly
resist any substantial curtailment of agricul-
tural subsidies.
20. The economic policies of a left-center gov-
ernment would probably differ only in em-
phasis. Such a government would probably
attempt to follow the general policies advo-
cated by Mendes-France. It would make some
further cutbacks in France's military outlays,
particularly with respect to Indochina, and
give closer attention to France's domestic eco-
nomic problems. Further cutbacks in mili-
tary outlays might permit an upward revision
in the public investment and social security
programs, but not to the extent which would
probably be demanded by the left elements of
the coalition. Moreover, some elements
essential to the coalition would probably suc-
cessfully oppose revision of the tax structure,
major reductions of agricultural subsidies and
other important changes in the economic
structure essential to an effective domestic
program. Thus, a left-center government
would slightly improve the outlook for eco-
nomic growth, though probably at the cost of
postponing still further the balancing of
France's budget and external accounts.
21. The continuing weaknesses of French gov-
ernments will further stimulate the dissatis-
faction of the many Frenchmen desiring
stronger government; consequently there is a
slight chance of a rightist coup, particularly
in the event of intensified social strife. Con-
sidering the present political weakness of the
extreme right, we believe such a coup highly
unlikely during the period of this estimate.
Should such a coup occur, it would probably
be projected more from a military than a
political party base. At the other extreme,
the French Communists will probably con-
tinue "united front" tactics and increase their
strength slightly, but will almost certainly not
be able to gain entry into the government or
stage a successful coup during the next 18
months.
22. The Domestic Outlook. Therefore, we
estimate that there is little likelihood of dras-
tic political or economic change in France over
the period of this estimate at least. On the
one hand, there is little prospect of critical
deterioration of the French internal situation;
on the other, there is virtually no prospect of
early "revitalization" of France. Such a
revitalization would require fundamental
changes in French institutions and attitudes
which, if realized, probably could not become
really effective during the period of this esti-
mate.
23. During the period of this estimate, the
security and usefulness of US military - instal-
lations in France are unlikely to be seriously
affected. However, there are likely to be fur-
ther delays in the negotiation of base rights
and certain other US-French agreements as
well as some further conflict over construction
schedules and requirements. Under a left-
center government, it might be necessary to
work out new agreements or modify present
ones. This would, temporarily at least, in-
crease such delays and conflicts. The French
Communists could, if they chose to risk vio-
lence, carry out substantial acts of sabotage
against US lines of communication, but their
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capability for sabotage Would almost certainly
be reduced to ..minor proportions within a
short period.
PROSPECTS FOR EDC
24. In proposing a European Defense Com-
munity (EDC) in 1950 the French hoped
simultaneously to meet US pressures for Ger-
man rearmament, while maintaining French
control over the extent of this rearmament
and avoiding direct West German entry into
NATO. However, France's continued internal
weakness, the drain of the Indochina war, and
West Germany's rapid revival have increased
French fear of Germany, and have led succes-
sive French governments to delay ratifying
EDC. The French also have seen in such
postponement a lever with which to extract
concessions from France's NATO allies and
West Germany itself. Finally, France desired
to await the results of the West German elec-
tions and to explore the possibility that the
new Soviet regime might shift its attitude
toward German reunification, on the chance
that either of these developments might lead
to the abandonment of EDC without France
being responsible for its failure.
25. Adenauer's overwhelming victory and the
lack of any shift in Soviet policy toward Ger-
many have brought EDC to the fore again in
France. Moreover, many of the "conditions"
France has insisted upon have either been sat-
isfied or are in process of being realized. A
series of French protocols to the treaty
have been agreed to, though not yet officially
accepted. France has received US support for
its policies in North Africa and greatly in-
creased US aid in Indochina. The UK has
agreed to close association with the EDC.
26. However, there remain still further obsta-
cles to French EDC ratification, all of which
in one way or another reflect continued
French apprehensions of West Germany re-
surgence. One has been the widespread hope
in France that international tensions can be
relieved by a four-power conference, thus
avoiding the necessity for German rearma-
ment. Although high French officials have
stated that France would no longer have to
await a great power meeting before deciding
5
on EDC, we believe that should such a con-
ference meet or appear likely, France would
seize upon this excuse to delay ratification.
Moreover, in event of East-West negotiations
on Far East issues, France's desire for a nego-
tiated settlement in Indochina might make it
unwilling to prejudice the success of such
negotiations by simultaneously 'ratifying the
EDC.
27. The French are also apprehensive lest a
rearmed Germany drag EDC into Eastern ad-
Ventures; they particularly fear that West
Germany might ultimately jeopardize the
peace in its efforts to regain territory now
under Soviet control. Therefore, the French
Government may seek a Western security
declaration to the USSR against German
aggression, on the grounds that such a declar-
ation would improve the chances for EDC
ratification. However, any Soviet overtures to
the French seeking common action to prevent
West German rearmament would be unlikely
to deter the French from ratification. Such
tentative approaches as the USSR has already
made have apparently met with no response
from France.
28. Probably the most important French con-
dition to EDC ratification is a satisfactory
solution of the Saar question. The French
regard this issue as a test of German sincerity
in advocating European unity. At a mini-
mum the French will continue to insist on the
political separation of the Saar from Ger-
many, preferably through some form of "Eu-
ropeanization." They also insist that the
Franco-Saar economic union be continued
pending creation of a broader European eco-
nomic union.
29. The chances for agreement on the Saar
have been improved in that the strong post-
electoral domestic position of Adenauer en-
ables him to make greater concessions to the
French. In meeting French demands, he
might even concede that the present Saar
legislature be allowed to continue in office un-
til the Saar accords have been ratified. How-
ever, Adenauer will insist that German-
oriented parties, currently banned in the Saar,
be given full political rights.
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30. French desire for a normalization of the
Saar question, and West German desire for
EDC ratification and full implementation of
the Contractual Accords make both sides
anxious to reach agreement on the Saar issue.
Therefore, despite the differences in the
present positions of the two, we believe that
these desires are so overriding as probably to
produce some acceptable compromise.
31. Ratification of EDC is also partially de-
pendent upon agreement on the European
Political Community (EPC) , which is to have
political supervision over both the Coal-Steel
Authority and the EDC. The French Social-
ists in particular insist that at least broad
agreement be achieved on the EPC prior to
EDC ratification, but the main obstacle to
such agreement is the division in the French
Assembly itself over the extent of the supra-
national powers the EPC should have. The
moderate left seeks relatively broad suprana-
tional powers for the EPC. They believe that
France will thereby be best able to contain a
resurgent West Germany as well as advance
Western European economic and political in-
tegration. The right is largely opposed to
such supranational powers lest France's sov-
ereignty and national interests be progres-
sively undermined.
32. The parliamentary importance to EDC of
the EPC question lies in the fact that present-
ly uncommitted votes from either the mod-
erate left or the right are essential to parlia-
mentary approval of EDC. Some 25-30
percent of the French Assembly ? the "die-
hard" anti-Germans and the Communists ?
will not vote for German rearmament in any
form. Another group, chiefly ex-Gaullists
and other rightists, would probably allow some
form of limited German rearmament but op-
poses EDC as involving the disappearance of
the French national army. On the other
hand, the MRP and most of the Radicals will
probably vote for the treaty. Sizeable num-
bers of Socialists and the bulk of the Inde-
pendent and Peasant Parties are also probably
favorable. There are recent indications that
a large bloc of as yet uncommitted Socialist
votes will swing toward the EDC if their EPC
policies are followed. For domestic political
reasons, however, a right-center government
may prefer to seek its support from the right
wing, including some ex-Gaullists, perhaps by
watering-down the supranational features of
the EDC and EPC at the risk of losing the
uncommitted Socialist vote. Therefore, the
government can probably gain sufficient addi-
tional votes from either left or right by suita-
ble maneuver to assure at least a small ma-
jority in the Assembly for either the present
or a modified EDC. Some further delay may
occur in the Council of the Republic, but we
believe that with Assembly approval the main
obstacle will have been surmounted.
33. The next six months or so will probably
be decisive for EDC. We believe that French
failure to ratify EDC within this period would
mean the virtual abandonment of the present
treaty. However, we believe that France will
ratify EDC within this period if (a) France's
remaining conditions, especially on the Saar,
are largely satisfied; (b) it remains convinced
no fruitful discussions with the Bloc on Ger-
many are likely; and (c) it is under continued
pressure from its allies to ratify.3
34. Effect of External Pressure on French
Ratification. Left to its own devices France
would probably continue to postpone ratifica-
tion. On the other hand, we believe that the
French Assembly would respond affirmatively
to continued diplomatic persuasion by
The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of
the Army, and the Director of Intelligence, US
Air Force, would have this paragraph read as
follows:
"The next six months or so will probably be de-
cisive for EDC. We believe that French failure
to ratify EDC within this period would mean the
virtual abandonment of the present treaty.
Since France is fundamentally opposed to Ger-
man rearmament and is more apprehensive of
the threat of a resurgent Germany than of So-
viet Communist aggression, French ratification of
EDC continues to be- conjectural. Even though
France's present remaining conditions including
a favorable settlement of the Saar question are
satisfied, French ratification cannot be assured
unless: (a) France is under continued powerful
pressure from her Allies to ratify, and (b) France
is convinced no fruitful discussions with the Bloc
on Germany are likely."
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France's NATO allies. However, certain types
of allied pressure might delay rather than
hasten ratification. For example, although
we believe that any alternative method of per-
mitting West German rearmament is more
unpalatable to the French than EDC, if one of
these alternatives were formally proposed by
the US or the UK, the French might seize
upon the allied proposal as a pretext for
lengthy discussions which would further delay
West German rearmament.
35. Effect of French Ratification or non-Rati-
fication. French ratification of EDC would
remove the chief obstacle to its implementa-
tion. However, even if EDC comes into effect,
France will seek, through its influence in this
and other European institutions, to prevent
the emergence of West Germany as the dom-
inant Western European power. Because of
fears of West German expansionism, the
French will almost certainly seek to limit the
pace and extent of any German military build-
up. France will also attempt to postpone
West German admission to NATO. There will
be further tensions in Franco-German rela-
tions even if EDC is ratified.
36. An outright defeat of EDC in the French
Assembly is unlikely, since we do not believe
that the government would bring ratification
to a vote unless it felt assured of an Assembly
majority. Since French failure to ratify EDC
in the next six months or so would probably
mean the virtual abandonment of the present
treaty, we believe that France, fearful of the
impact on US policy toward Western Europe,
would seek to gloss over failure to ratify by
expressing willingness to discuss some form of
West German rearmament in association with
NATO. Such negotiations would almost cer-
tainly prove long and difficult, with France
insisting on detailed safeguards at least as
effective as those contained in EDC, thus in-
curring the grave risk inherent in the pro-
longed delay in the realization of a German
military contribution to the defense of West-
ern Europe and intensifying Franco-American
and Franco-German frictions. In these cir-
cumstances, the cohesion and effectiveness of
NATO itself would-be endangered.
7
PROBABLE FRENCH POLICIES IN
INDOCHINA
37. The gradual deterioration of French will
to continue the Indochina war has been
checked at least temporarily by the Laniel-
Navarre Plan and by the greatly increased US
financial assistance. The French are rein-
forcing their own units, accelerating-the build-
up of Indochinese national armies, and seek-
ing to regain the military and political
initiative. Despite strong parliamentary op-
position, the French are likely to implement
their promises of independence for the three
states, on the basis of voluntary association
With France in the French Union. No French
government could continue the war outside of
this French Union framework.
38. However, the implementation of the
Laniel-Navarre Plan will probably be the last
major French offensive effort in Indochina.
We believe that even if the Laniel-Navarre
Plan is successful, the French do not expect to
achieve a complete military victory in Indo-
china. They probably aim at improving their
position sufficiently to negotiate a settlement
which would eliminate the drain of the Indo-
china war on France, while maintaining non-
Communist governments in the Associated
States and preserving a position for France in
the Far East.
39. In view of its strong desire for a reduction
of its Indochina commitments and for a solu-
tion of the Indochina problem, France will
continue to seek discussion of the Indochina
issue in international conferences and will al-
most certainly favor a conference between the
US, UK, France, the USSR, and Communist
China on Far East issues. We believe that in
such conferences, or in any direct negotiations
with the Viet Minh if necessary to obtain an
agreement, France would press the US to con-
sent to French acceptance of terms which the
' For a more comprehensive statement of the sit-
uation in Indochina see NIE-91, "Probable De-
velopments in Indochina through Mid-1954,"
4 June 1953; and NIE-63. However, these papers
were published before the Laniel-Navarre Plan
developed. The estimates with respect to French
policy in Indochina contained therein are super-
seded by paragraphs 37-41 of this estimate.
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US would regard as weakening the Western
position in Indochina and thus in Southeast
Asia as a whole.
40. If no negotiations take place within the
next 18 months we believe that France will
take measures to reduce its Indochina com-
mitment. However, in spite of the burdens of
the Indochina war, France recognizes that it
derives substantial advantages from its pres-
ence in Indochina and would probably con-
tinue the war in Indochina, provided that: (a)
the US assumed virtually the entire financial
burden of the war; (b) the planned buildup of
Vietnam forces permitted reduction of French
forces; (c) the Indochina states maintained
their association with France in the French
Union; and (d) France continued to receive
US support for its position in Europe and
North Africa.
41. In the event that the above French condi-
tions were not largely satisfied, France would
probably propose UN intervention or direct
military participation by the US. Failing in
this, France would probably seek in time to
negotiate directly with the Communists for
terms which would permit withdrawal with
minimum loss.
PROBABLE FRENCH POLICY IN
NORTH AFRICA 5
42. In French North Africa, on the other
hand, we believe that France is determined to
retain control, by force if necessary, since
France regards this area as the most vital part
A fuller examination of France's North African
policy is contained in NIE-69, "Probable Develop-
ments in North Africa," 12 September 1952.
8
of its overseas empire. France's deposition of
the Sultan of Morocco, its repression of
nationalist elements in Morocco and Tunisia,
and its insistence on measures which enhance
the role of the French "colons" in these areas
indicate France's determination to maintain
its position in North Africa.
43. The deposition of the Sultan has tem-
porarily bolstered French control in Morocco,
but will probably result in driving the nation-
alists to adopt more extreme positions. The
French will probably make some concessions
toward local autonomy in both Tunisia and
Morocco, but these concessions almost cer-
tainly will be neither timely nor compre-
hensive enough to satisfy the nationalists. In
particular, the nationalists will be antagon-
ized by French insistence that the "colons" be
given a disproportionately large influence in
local government. Nevertheless, we believe
that French security capabilities will forestall
the development of any serious threat to
French control during the period of this esti-
mate.
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44. Accordingly, we do not believe that the
security of US bases in French North Africa
will be seriously threatened during this period.
However, widening differences between France
on the one hand and the North African Na-
tionalists supported by the Arab-Asian coun-
tries on the other, confront the US with a
policy dilemma and will throw increasing
strains on US relations with both sides.
French resentment of any US support of the
nationalists will be enhanced by French sus-
picions that the US is seeking to advance
political and commercial ambitions of its own
in North Africa.
90,8011fPf
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