IMPROVING THE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000404030007-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2010
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: June 1, 1980
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

'STAT-
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ARTICLE APP ARED FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL
ON PAGE JUNE 1980
linproving t
Intelligence Syste
The Iranian crisis raises anew the
issue of US intelligence cap-
abilities, or rather the lack of them.
The failure of US diplomatic and
intelligence reporting to alert the
White House and State Department
to the strength and dynamism of
the Islamic revolutionary move-
ment, the inability of the shah's
vast panoply of modern armament
and repressive police apparatus to
contain it, and the likelihood of a
violent reaction in Iran to admit-
tance of the shah to the United
States, are only the latest-miscalcu-
lations in the collection and evalua-
tion of political intelligence.
Whether US political intelligence
and reporting is as feeble as both its
critics and supporters, for different
reasons, say is a matter of debate.
What is clear is that the conditions
of the next decade would make
overhaul of the system imperative
in any case. This will not take place
so long as the formula for its re-
newal includes the same ingre-
dients that precipitated the failures
of the past.
Unfortunately, blind repetition
of old policies seems to be the
course advocated by the CIA's
congressional supporters and the
increasingly vocal lobby of retired
intelligence professionals. In recent
articles, and in congressional tes-
timony on the proposed CIA
"charter," they put exclusive
blame on the post-Watergate,
post-Vietnam climate of national
guilt and self-exposure, coupled
with savage media criticism and
crippling legislation, for disas-
trously weakening US intelligence
capabilities. Their remedy is to re-
move lep-islative restrictions and e6
STAT
CHARLES MAECHLING, JR.
back to the good old days.
The current proposals would, if
implemented, indeed rebuild the
US intelligence system, but not in a
way calculated to purge it of its
weaknesses and improve its per-
formance. Nona -of the pending
proposals would terminate the
dangerous connection between in-
telligence collection and covert
operations-a union of missions
and a scrambling of techniques so
dissimilar and incompatible that
uniting them within the same CIA
directorate has periodically com-
promised the functions of both.
Each of them in one way or another
perpetuates centralized control by
the CIA over the analysis of in-
telligence information and the pro-
duction of intelligence estimates by
a specialized corps of academ-
ically-oriented career analysts. Nor
would the proposed reforms have
any impact on the present self-
limiting, security-conscious pattern
of intelligence gathering which in
the political field excludes or
downgrades information from the
most crucial sectors of the develop-
ing world-labor, youth, in-
tellectuals, the press and the work-
ing clergy.
The debate over the future of the
CIA has already been muddied by
diversionary currents. Outside the
intelligence community public dis-
cussion has been monopolized by
legislators and lawyers whose prin-
cipal focus has been on forging a
complex network of restrictions
and chains of accountability, a
negative approach at best. Within
the intelligence community, a
lobby of retired professionals has
drowned out the voices of the
foreign policy makers who actually
use the intelligence product. Some
of the arguments mask a power
struggle over the proper role and
power base of the director of cen-
tral intelligence-whether or not he
should continue also to head the
CIA. Throughout, the level of the
debate has been degraded by the
demagogic tactic of CIA supporters
in and out of government in accus-
ing critics of seeking to dismantle
the whole US intelligence estab-
lishment, when in fact the occa-
sional target is covert opera-
tions-which are not intelligence
operations at all!
B asic to an effective national se-
curity establishment should be
a covert operations capability that
is separate and distinct from the in-
telligence system. Within the CIA
this demarcation has always
existed in the form of separate di-
rectorates of intelligence and oper-
ations (formerly plans). But the os-
tensible separation applies to in-
telligence evaluation and analysis
only-secret intelligence collection
is the responsibility of the opera-
tions directorate, a combination
unknown in other western coun-
tries. (Great Britain's foreign in-
telligence and counter-espionage
organizations [MI-6 and MI-5] have
never been organizationally linked
to clandestine warfare organiza-
tions like the special operations
executive [SOEJ and the special air
services [SAS] unit.)
Indeed, much of the.present con-
fusion is a legacy of the CIA's war-
time origins in - the Office of
Strategic Services (OSS), which in
the beginning was not so much an
intelligence organization as a clan-
destine warfare organization re-
cruited and trained for paramilitary
operations behind enemy lines.
What should have been two sepa-
rate, small, tightly-controlled and
totally separate agencies grew into
a single monstrous bureaucracy
created in a wartime image and
staffed by OSS carryovers, many
of whom, whatever their talents as
underground fighters, were poorly
attuned to peacetime intelligence
work, or indeed to civilian life in
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~..~ atuluai uival inuly in is Ur uestaruirzatlon and in
Intelligence operations are so proved to be a two-edged sword. creating "factions" favorable to
markedly different from covert op- This history of CIA covert opera- their interests in other Greek city
erations that the distinction de- tions is an albatross around the states. Louis XIV kept King
serves further elaboration. In- neck of every legitimate business Charles II on his payroll, and tried
telligence collection is informa- and government enterprise over- to foment internal rebellion in Brit-
tion-gathering focused on particu- seas. It is the covert action side of ain on behalf of the exiled Stuart
lar operational or policy needs. It the CIA, not the intelligence side, pretenders. During the first phase
involves a longterm, laborious, whose highly publicized interven- of the wars against Napoleon,
multifacted process of acquiring tions in Cuba, Iran, Guatemala and William Pitt almost bankrupted the
facts and data from a wide variety Chile, to name only a few, have so British treasury with overt and
of sources and subjecting this dramatized the name of the CIA covert subsidies to the German
heterogeneous material to painstak- abroad that its own intelligence op- principalities. A classic example of
ing evaluation, cross-checking, and erations have been crippled and US covert action in modern times was
analysis. The analytical process is foreign policy in the Third World the despatch of Lenin in a sealed
(or ought to be) a compound of sci- train from Switzerland to Russia by
entific investigation and art, com- the German general staff in 1918. A
bining a multitude of special tech- "Howard Hunt more recent example was the clan-
nical and analytical skills with area adjusting his red wig in destine mission sent by Britain and
knowledge and a high degree of . the United States to Yugoslavia in
empathy with the personal and col- the White House March 1940, which resulted in a
lective motivations of others. If de- basement, the rogue fake coup that sent the regent,
partments and agencies like state, Prince Paul, into exile and swung
commerce, defense and treasury operation conducted by Yugoslavia into a posture of resis-
did a satisfactory job of reporting Cuban mercenaries in tance against the transit of Hitler's
on foriegn areas it has been esti- forces to attack Greece.
mated that only 10 percent or less the Watergate and The differences between tradi-
of the information collected from bizarre assassination tional covert action as practiced by
open societies, and 20 percent or the European monarchies and the
less from closed societies, need schemes were fully to covert operations of the United
come from clandestine sources. As be expected." States after World War II are
it is, according to 1976 congres- largely one of scale-but that is the
sional testimony from the CIA, vital difference! Once escalated to
about 30 percent of significant in- exposed to compromise and vilifi- global dimensions and institu-
formation comes from clandestine cation. Sooner or later the role of tionalized in a large bureaucracy
sources. the United States in supporting a the very term covert. action be-
Covert action is utterly different. despotic ruler or overthrowing a le- comes a misnomer. If a secret in-
It should not be confused with gally constituted regime either pre- telligence operation is blown, the
paramilitary operations like the cipitates a violent reaction or opens cell can be sealed off and a new
abortive hostage rescue mission, the United States to perennial start made with only minor damage
though sometimes forming part of charges of conspiracy and corrup- to the whole apparatus. A blown
them. Its object is to change the tion, in many cases wildly exagger- covert operation may compromise
policy of foreign governments, ated. the whole spectrum of foreign rela-
perhaps even to influence whole Moreover, entrusting under- tions for an indefinite period.
societies. Unlike intelligence ground operations to a bureaucracy By their nature, covert opera-
gathering, which is quiet; dis- with a vested interest in "success" tions in peacetime are so tricky, so
persed, and equipped with built-in regardless of cost, diminishes per- liable to exposure or backfire, that
mechanisms and checking devices sonal responsibility for the to bring them off with even a re-
to correct error or repair breaks in methods employed or the character mote chance of long-term secrecy
the system, covert action is usually of local allies. The United States requires delicate- handling of the
a risky gamble in which victories not only becomes identified with highest order. In earlier times, the
may be more apparent than real, foreign secret police forces, but chosen instruments of such opera-
and exposure can spell political tarnished with their atrocities. Any tions have been agents uncon-
disaster. Even the more benign as- civilized nation that presumes to nected with government, recruited
pects of covert action, such as sub- establish collaborative arrange- on the basis of special qualifica-
sidizing friendly political parties to ments with the thoroughly vicious tions for that operation alone. The
offset political expenditures by the security establishments of certain practice of entrusting politically
other side-as in Italy in the late nations of Latin America bears a sensitive secret missions to all-
'40s-need to be handled with heavy responsibility for the train of purpose bureaucrats, with no par-
maximum discretion or they can be mutilated corpses left in their titular cultural or ethnic affinity
counterproductive. wake. with the area involved, 'supervised
As practiced in the past, the Nevertheless, covert action has by even more unqualified
more sinister aspects of the CIA been part of the arsenal of weapons superiors, is absurd on its face.
covert operations-destabilization, of the sovereign state since the The Achilles' heel of all covert
bribery of foreign leaders, support days of the Trojan horse. The operations is their personnel. When
of foreign secret police organiza- Athenians were adept both in the kept in tight military harness in
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wartime their abilities can be
turned to good account. Unfortu-
nately, dedication to a lifetime of
clandestine activity produces a
conspiratorial mentality that, if not
criminal in nature, is uncom-
fortably well-adapted to leading an
underground life that is illegal in
most foreign countries. What
emerges from recent literature, not
to mention the personal experience
of many Foreign Service officers, is
an unacceptably high proportion of
covert action operatives who are
alcoholic, violent, and inhabitants
of a paranoiac dream-world. How-
ard Hunt adjusting his red wig in
the White House basement, the
rogue operation conducted by
Cuban mercenaries in the Water-
gate and bizarre assassination
schemes were fully to be expected.
Equally embarrassing have been
the revelations of ex-CIA agents
about every major covert operation
from Iran in 1953 to Angola in 1975.
Sensationalized to generate
maximum sales appeal, they depict
a pack of exuberant amateurs play-
ing lethal games along the fringes of
US foreign policy.
In White House Years (p. 658)
Henry Kissinger notes that the na-
tional temperament and tradition is
unsuited to covert operations. This
view may be too pessimistic. Nev-
ertheless, a media-saturated con-
stitutional democracy like the
United States should be wary of in-
stitutionalizing a foreign policy tool
that is alien to its values, incompat-
ible with domestic political condi-
tions and, in the long run, more
likely to harm the wielder than the
adversary.
T he problems of the intelligence
system proper are quite differ-
ent. The claim that recent lapses
like the failure of the CIA to predict
the collapse of the shah or the
takeover of the US embassy in
Tehran are attributable to self-
destruction of the system in the
post-Watergate climate ignores
similar failures in the days when
CIA effectiveness was supposedly
at its peak. In any case the recent
wave of CIA dismissals was largely
confined to covert action person-
nel: the intelligence directorate still
has the largest collection of politi-
cal and economic analysts in the
business-1700 political analysts
alone. Moreover, the total US in-
telligence capability includes the
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attache networK of the i)etense in-
telligence Agency; the political and
economic reporting functions of
US embassies and consular posts
overseas; the satellite surveillance
system; and the code-breaking and
telemetering functions of the Na-
tional Security Agency-a formid-
able collection of assets with a
budget of nearly $5 billion and per-
sonnel approaching 30,000.
In February of 1978, well before
the fall of the shah, the White
House signified its dissatisfaction
with the poor quality of CIA and
'State Department political and in-
telligence coverage of the Iranian
revolution in a letter from the pres-
ident's national security adviser, to
the director of central intelligence.
In mid-August of 1978, the CIA
produced its notorious 23-page as-
sessment of Iran that included such
sentences as "Iran is not in a revo-
lutionary or even pre-revolutionary
situation" and "there is dissatisfac-
tion with the shah's tight control of
the political process, but this does
not threaten the government." On
November 11, 1978, President Car-
ter sent Secretary of State Vance,
CIA Director Stansfield Turner,
and Brzezinski a three-sentence
handwritten memorandum bluntly
stating: "I am not satisfied with the
quality of political intelligence."
The roots of US intelligence
weakness are too deeply embedded
to be eradicated by cosmetic or-
ganizational change. Well-adapted
to assessing developments and
framing scenarios for the advanced
societies of the West, the average
American political analyst is ill-
prepared to appreciate the self-
abnegation and dynamism of non-
Western religions and ideologies,
not to mention the charisma of
primitive political personalities. He
is equally ill-equipped to under-
stand the private financial motiva-
tions that lurk behind public
rhetoric the world over. At both
ends of the spectrum a wide range
of indicators is closed to him.
As civil servants with a social
science background, the majority
of intelligence analysts have a sub-
conscious antipathy to the emo-
tional and irrational factors that
dominate mass movements. As a
result they tend to downgrade polit-
ical fervor and ideological convic-
tion as factors to be reckoned with.
Nothing is more pathetic than the
perennia- oeiusion or American dip-
lomats and intelligence experts that
sooner or later in the course of a
raging revolution such "rational"
goals as political democracy, eco-
nomic development and improved
living standards will reassert them-
selves. Another delusion is that the
leaders of mass movements can be
brought to heel by attachment of
national assets or economic sanc-
tions.
The empty abstractions that
analysts use exemplify their flight
from the passions that bring mobs
out into the streets. Anodyne terms
like "power centers," "repres-
sion," "Tafety valves," and "or-
chestrated demonstrations" and
the fatuous "responsible ele-
ments" comfortably insulate both
writer and reader from the harsh
realities of Third World conditions,
including the corruption, brutality
and social injustice that fuel revolu-
tionary movements. There can be
no real knowledge of other
societies without some degree of
empathy. Neither the policy-
making bureaucrat nor the analyst
can accept that once a regime tor-
tures and kills students and non-
violent political activists the rela-
tives of the victims will never rest
until they have obtained retribu-
tion, regardless of the material cost
to themselves or their country.
The insulated, suburban values
of the intelligence specialist extend
to his sources. The predisposition
of American officals overseas to
restrict their social contacts to the
local "establishment" is well
known. They even confine their
journalistic contacts to Americans,
despite the foreign language
illiteracy and cultural insularity of
American media personnel that
make them useless as evaluators
and give them little entree to inside
sources. Intelligence professionals
often compound this disability by
cultivating only the power struc-
ture of the moment and confining
their underground contacts to those
approved by the security services
of the host country. This erects a
wall of mistrust between US in-
telligence services and the radical
and Marxist groups that form the
core of political dissidence-and
the future leadership-in most of
the Third World. The scanty con-
tacts of US intelligence with the
students and clergy of Iran are now
a painful reality. The same holds
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C
true in South Korea where em-
bassy contacts with disaffected
students and city dwellers are-min-
imal and the strongest official links
are with the Korean army.
At the other end of the scale the
civil service intelligence profes-
sional is such an innocent about
private financial- motivation that he
makes no attempt to penetrate the
world of exchange speculation,
capital movements, currency
transactions, insider stock trading,
and contract kickbacks, which are
often crucial indicators of political
allegiance and impending change.
The details of these transactions
are not as systematically recorded
in foreign countries as they are here
but, since business deals cannot be
consummated without some form
of paperwork, there are always dis-
affected sources to reveal them.
Intelligence professionals pro-
fess to adhere to a cult of scientific
objectivity which is supposed to
render their cerebrations immune
to irrational hunch or diversionary
emotion. In fact, most of them are
quite unconscious of the extent to
which cultural biases distort their
reasoning. As authorities like Karl
Popper (The Logic of Scientific
Discovery) and Thomas Kuhn (The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions)
repeatedly point out, fields of in-
quiry are always structured: the as-
sumptions of the investigator in
selecting his data and assigning it
weight predetermine his conclu-
sions. Whenever the intelligence
analyst unconsciously allows his
cultural biases or the policy prefer-
ences of his superiors to exclude or
downgrade unpalatable realities, he
builds what William James called
"a closed and completed system of
truth in which "phenomena un-
classifiable within the system
are . . . . paradoxical absurdities
and must be held untrue."
Ideally, the US intelligence
analyst should feel as remote from
his-country's policies as a gnome of
Zurich. To be of optimum use to
the policy-maker, assessments
should be denationalized and
value-free, avoiding like the plague
the sin of ethnocentrism approach-
ing the problem from the.
standpoint of US interests and
exaggerating the role of one's own
nation in its interaction with others.
If as an experiment President Car-
ter were to scrap for one week the
political intelligence served up by
the State Department and the CIA
in favor of the reports of the inter-
national banking community he
would obtain a better picture of the
prospects for his battered foreign
policy than he does today.
The worst feature of the present
system is the pressure for confor-
mity and the absence of any institu-
tional means of correcting error.
Once "facts" are arranged in
symmetrical patterns they become
difficult to challenge. The location
"To the extent that
clandestine sources are
relied on, the material
should be processed as
rapidly as possible
since in an age of mass
effects most sensitive
information usually has
the value life of a fruit
fly."
of a national foreign assessment
center within the CIA, and the re-
quirement for a consensus on im-
portant strategic and political is-
sues, stifles dissent, eliminates
competition, and makes the esti-
mate system a captive of its own
weaknesses. During the period
1975-78 the policy of detente put a
premium on an optimistic evalua-
tion of the US nuclear deterrent
and corresponding depreciation of
Soviet nuclear capabilities. There
was no way for dissenting agency
voices to register their alarm over
the massive build-up of Soviet
strategic missiles except by intro-
ducing hedges and qualifiers into
the consolidated estimates. Simi-
larly, dissenting viewpoints as to
the durability of the shah were
submerged in qualifiers or rele-
gated to footnotes.
The lesson of World War II is al-
ready forgotten. The insistence of
Hitler on centralized analysis and
streamlined consensus was the
greatest infirmity of an otherwise
excellent German intelligence
system-in contrast to the decen-
tralized, less orderly, structure of
the British and American in-
telligence services, which pro-
duced competing estimates of
greater coverage. As General
Daniel Graham pointed out in a re-
cent symposium, whenever the
conventional wisdom of the
analysts becomes congealed as of-
ficial doctrine, failure is inevitable.
W 1~ W hat are the solutions for our
intelligence dilemma? The
United States cannot retreat from
its vital interests, which owing to
energy dependency and a network
of shaky alliances still extend
around the globe in both directions.
The president needs a limited
covert action capability, and the'
government the best political in-
telligence it can obtain. New depar-
tures will not, however, be easy so
long as intelligence is treated as an
arcane field for specialists.
As a first step, the present covert
action organization should be
pruned of its older personnel, re-
moved from the CIA, and trans-
ferred to the executive offices of
the president. It should be named
the special operations branch of the
National Security Council, and
gradually reconstituted along dif-
ferent lines and under different
leadership.
Under the new concept, the spe-
cial operations branch would be
basically a high-level planning
staff, housed in the NSC structure
because of its proximity to the pres-
ident and high-level inter-
departmental policy formation, and
to keep covert action missions
under tight control. Covert opera-
ions themselves would no longer be
entrusted to a large, autonomous
corps of CIA bureaucrats. Except
for a small permanent core of
specialists, routine political action
programs, such as subsidizing
foreign organizations Or channeling
arms to guerrilla movements,
would be entrusted to specially
trained personnel seconded from
the various departments and agen-
cies of the national security estab-
lishment-state, defense, CIA, the
International Communications
Agency, AID, and even treasury.
Sensitive, high-level covert mis-
sions would henceforth be en-
trusted to hand-picked government
personnel and civilians. with legiti-
mate credentials appropriate for
the mission in question.
The objective would-be to create
a small, highly secret capability to
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execute a limited range of missions
not overtly performable by any
other part of the national security
establishment. A' covert action of-
fice of this kind would, by its secret
and high-level character, be more
responsible and self-limiting than
the present massive, though com-
partmentalized, bureaucracy. As-!
signments would be entrusted to!
qualified persons with well-
established covers, not to a corps;
of easily-identified, multi-purpose;
clandestine operations. Because of
their reliance on non-government
personnel, the projects of the spe-
cial operations branch would have
to be kept under the strictest sec-
recy. Project clearances and re-
ports should be restricted to two
congressional committees, with se-
vere legal penalties prescribed for
unauthorized disclosure. There
should be no repetition of the in-
credible public exposure of the
methods, equipment and use of
local agents that emanated from
Pentagon briefings immediately
after the Iranian rescue debacle.
Improvement in the coverage
and product of the US intelligence
system would require quite a dif-'
ferent approach. The ideal solu-
tion-admittedly not achievable-
would be to take the bureaucratic
components responsible for politi-
cal and economic estimates out of
the system completely and unite'
them in a new and completely auton-
omous organization, staffed by a
diversified, international corps of
political and economic specialists,
charged with preparing reports and
estimates for the national security
establishment similar to what The
Economist Intelligence Unit, or the
Petroleum Intelligence Weekly,
furnishes to private subscribers. A
more achievable goal would be
gradually to contract and diversify
the intelligence side of CIA, by
rotating personnel-bringing more
in from the field, giving two four-
year assignments to area specialists
from other agencies and univer-
sities under the Intergovernmental
Personnel Act, and recruiting from
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a broader spectrum of business'';
journalism and the professions than
is now the case. In the case of esti-
mates involving remote areas and
unfamiliar non-western cultures,
the analytical process should be
farmed out to business or academic
specialists, or at least subjected to
a rigorous critique by such
specialists before taking final form.
On crucial. questions, other de-
partments and agencies with exper-
tise or special insights should be
encouraged to submit competing
estimates or given the opportunity
to file informed and well-sub-
stantiated dissents.
The collection process should be
broadened. All countries should be
regarded as being in a permanent
state of societal evolution. Their
social, economic and political
structures, as well as the forces op-
posed to them, should be viewed in
a detached and impersonal way as
transitory phenomena. Contact
should be made with levels of the
private business and financial sec-
tors not heretofore systematically
covered. An even greater effort
should be made to develop sympa-
thetic contacts in youth and student
circles, and with dissident groups.
There should be no hesitation
about obtaining information from
any source, domestic or foreign. To
the extent that clandestine sources
are relied on, the material should
be processed as rapidly as possible
since in an age of mass effects most
sensitive information usually has
the value life of a fruit fly. Classifi-
cation of political and economic in-
telligence should be corre-
spondingly downgraded for rapid
handling.
In the analytical process, the ob-
jective would be to transform in-
telligence estimates into products
that the policy-maker can actually
use, instead of being scanned for
trends and then discarded. Lan-
guage and syntax should be pruned
of jargon and abstractions. Esti-
mates should be oriented to foreign
actions and capabilities, not
speculative intangibles, and sub-
stantiated by supporting evidence.
Neatly packaged conclusions
aimed at giving the policy-maker a
comfortable sense of control over
events should be avoided. Above
art, estimates should keep events in
their proper cultural and historical
perspective, free alike from policy
bias and the hysteria of the mo-
ment.
One other organizational change
should be considered. If the direc-
tor of central intelligence were lib-
erated from his dual role as head of
the CIA, and moved to the White
House as supreme chief of all in-
telligence activities, it would have
the beneficial effect of giving the
State Department's bureau of in-
telligence and research, and the
Defense Intelligence Agency equal
bureaucratic status with the CIA,
thereby enhancing diversity of ap-
proach, and stimulating competi-
tion in the preparation of estimates.
Of itself, this would not work any
fundamental change in the mind-set
of intelligence professionals, but
might at least free the system from
the straitjacket of consensus.
As regards the recent debate in
Congress over the CIA "charter"
the emphasis has been misplaced.
Clearly, the Hughes-Ryan amend-
ment should be repealed and con-
gressional oversight of covert op-
erations limited to two committees.
But the objective should be to as-
sure presidential accountability,
not more agency accountability to
Congress. The law should require
prior disclosure of the full details of
prospective covert operations to
the president, and disclosure to
Congress made under controlled
conditions well after the fact. It
should be made statutorily impos-
sible for the chief executive or na-
tional security adviser to escape re-
sponsibility for the consequences
of their blunders by pleading ignor-
ance of the details of covert opera-
tions that backfire.
Beyond this there is little that or-
ganizational change or legislation
can do. There is no way of mandat-
ing improved performance or better
judgment by enacting laws or draft-
ing regulations. Any more congres-
sional oversight would only multi-
ply the chances of ignorant or
malicious interference in a sorely
beset system whose ills are internal
and not susceptible to legislative
remedy. The responsibility is the
president's and he should not be
permitted to evade' it. -~ ,
Charles Atoechlin5'. Jr., a Washington I
lawyer, was director for internal defense
and staff director al' the special croup
(counter-insurgency) in the Kennedy and
Johnson adrninistratiorrs.
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