THE UNDERCOVER SPY WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-01208R000100030012-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2011
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: November 1, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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ARTICLE APn
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INTERNATIONAL COMBAT ARMS
November 1985
The international intelligence operating
techniques of the CIA and the KGB
leave many experts wondering,
who really is winning?
By Gregg Lightbody
E spionage is a battle in which almost
every country in the world takes
part ... whether they admit to it or
not! Its history dates back to biblical times
in Egypt and the 6th century B.C. in Chi-
na. Though many nations declare espio-
nage an illegal activity, most of them have
government bureaus that engage in this un-
dercover war. Whether they're called intel-
ligence organizations, the security service,
military, intelligence, committee for state
security or the secret state police, they of-
ten have the same intelligence gathering
duties. Israel has their Mossad organiza-
tion, France has the Second Bureau and
the SDECE, Bulgaria has the Dajnavna Si-
gurnost and Britain has the SIS and M16.
The two largest combatants in this clandes-
tine warfare are, not suprisingly, the Soviet.,
Union's KGB and the United States' CIA.
The roots of the Central Intelligence
Agency go back to 1942, founded during
World War II when President Roosevelt
established the Office of Strategic Services
(OSS) to collect and analyze strategic war-
time intelligence information required by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. After the war, in
1945, President Truman closed the bureau
on the grounds that intelligence operations
had no place in peacetime. This peacetime
euphoria, however, was very short-lived.
Congress became alarmed by the escalating
cold war campaign of espionage, subver-
sion and hostility directed from the Krem-
lin. So, in 1947, Congress passed the Na-
tional Security Act, which established the
CIA under the authority of the National
Security Council (NSC). The CIA has little
domestic involvement (with the exception
of directives from the NSC regarding mat-
ters of national security), leaving counter-
espionage duties in the United States up to
the FBI.
Today, the CIA headquarters building is
located in Langley, Virginia. The current
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) is
William Casey, a member of the 1943 war-
time staff of William Donovan, founder of
the OSS. While the DCI is head of the
CIA, he is also the leader of the larger U.S.
Intelligence Community. This community
is made up of 11 separate executive branch
agencies and organizations that conduct a
variety of intelligence activities and include
Department of Defense elements such as
the National Security Agency (NSA) and
other groups such as the State and Treas-
ury Departments.
Current CIA organizational charts list
five deputy directors; four of them repre-
sent a major arm of the CIA: operations,
science and technology, adminstration, and
intelligence. The operations arm collects
foreign intelligence largely through secret
means and carries out counterintelligence
abroad. Science and technology collects
and processes information gathered by
technical collecting systems,and is in
charge of developing more advanced equip-
ment to improve the process. The adminis-
tration arm handles the daily administra-
tion and security of the organization. The
intelligence branch is the largest of the four
arms and is the Director's principal adviser
on the production of national and interna-
tional intelligence. Offices in this branch
research and analyze major geographical
areas of the world. No accurate figure per-
taining to the CIA's budget or number of
agents is available to the public.
Unlike the decentralized intelligence
community of the U.S., the Soviet Union's
intelligence organization is almost com-
pletely centralized in the Komitet Gosu-
darstvennoe Bezopasnosti (KGB) or Com-
mittee for State Security. The KGB in-
vades every aspect of Soviet life, with ex-
pansive powers both at home and abroad.
There are KGB officers in the armed serv-
ices as well as the rival Soviet military in-
telligence service Glavnoye Razvedyvatel-
noye Upravleniye (GRU).
Unlike the U.S. effort, Soviet intelligence
forces have been viable since Czarist police
sentenced internal dissidents to Siberian la-
bor camps. The Soviets, though, have de-
vised a policy to change the name of their
security organization when the old name
begins to connotate too sinister an image.
Since the 1917 Bolshevik revolution, the
original CHEKA (Extraordinary Commis-
sion for Combating Counterrevolution and
Espionage) organization was used as a
weapon against Russian people and non-
communist nations under the euphemisms
GPU (1922-23), OGPU (1923-34), NKVD
(1934-46), MVD (1946-54) and, finally, the
KGB (1954-present).
The KGB headquarters is located in
Moscow's Dzerzhinsky Square, about two
blocks from the Kremlin. The rear of the
building houses the Lubyanka Prison for
political prisoners, made infamous as the a~,+!(
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capital's extermination center during Sta-
lin's ruthless regime. The KGB's foreign
operations division is housed off the 12-
lane Moscow Ring Road, while another
administration building is located in Ma-
chovaya Ulitza. Commanding the KGB is
Viktor Chebrikov, an ex-army general who
succeeded Yuri Andropov to the top KGB
job and a recently elected member of the
ruling Soviet Politburo.
The KGB is divided into four chief
directorates, nine independent directorates
and six independent departments. While
most of the KGB's duties deal with inter-
nal Soviet security in one form or another
(three of the four chief directorates deal
with internal security, border security and
political, religious and ethnic dissent), the
First Chief Directorate is responsible for
most of its foreign operations and overseas
espionage. Infiltration of Soviet spies into
Western and third world countries is divid-
ed into 10 departments that are responsible
for certain geographic areas. Other depart-
ments in the First Directorate are more
blocks from the Kremlin. The Department A, or Disinformation Service, is charged
with the responsibility for spreading Soviet propaganda, half-truths and lies.
Our nation's capital-Washington, D.C.-is a hot-bed for ongoing Soviet KGB espio-
nage. These special antennae atop the Russian Embassy in Washington are not there
tO receive their favorite TV shows, but are used to transmit back to Russia!
specialized to support the aims of the
KGB; these are Dept. A (the disinforma-
tion service that's charged with spreading
propaganda and mistruths) and Dept. V
(often called the Executive Action depart-
ment), where assassins and saboteurs re-
ceive specialized training. Estimates of the
KGB's budget and agent strength are al-
most as difficult to ascertain as the CIA's.
The KGB, however, is thought to have an
overall strength approaching half a million
people, which is several times the size of all
U.S. intelligence agencies.
TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES
Ensuing current operations of any intel-
ligence organization is like pulling teeth.
Nobody really wants to get specific about
what they do. There's a lot they don't want
to talk about for fear of jeopardizing agents
or specific operations. Tight operational se-
curity is based on a "need-to-know" princi-
ple. Some methods, though, are basic.
The majority of intelligence gathering
operations (some 80 percent) is available
from open sources. The KGB's greatest as-
set in the U.S. is our nation's accessible so-
ciety. We are so accessible, in fact, that the
Soviets can glean upwards of 90 percent of
their intelligence from nonclassified docu-
ments, technical publications, educational
seminars and industrial trade shows. Some
publications are so valuable in analysis and
technical military programs that they are
flown immediately to Moscow and are
even translated en route!
The remaining 10 to 20 percent of infor-
mation necessary for the operation of an
intelligence agency is obtained through
clandestine espionage activities. The man-
ner in which secret information is obtained
and the extent of these practices runs the
gamut from payoffs, sexual exploitation,
blackmail and violence, to technological
eavesdropping and everything in between.
Both sides actively seek to plant agents
and operatives inside one another's spy
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The Undercover SPY War
services and political machines. The vigor
and methods used to obtain espionage
goals depend mostly on what will achieve
desired aims and how badly either opera-
tion wants them. The KGB's advantage
here is that they don't have to answer to
the citizenry, nor do they have to face limi-
tations from Congressional committees as
the CIA does.
Both sides claim successes in the espio-
nage game, but both have also suffered de-
feats. In the U.S. we hear mostly about the
defeats of our bureau because they make
the biggest headlines. The successes may
not even be known to the public, depend-
ing on their proximity and sensitivity to
foreign governments. In this undercover
world of spy vs. spy, few can say which
side is coming out on top.
Internally, the KGB61as an extremely
free hand to deal with dissenters from the
Soviet system. In Stalin's time, they would
be shot. Today, the KGB may hold a mock
state trial, which will either rule the defen-
dant guilty and sentence him to a concen-
tration camp, or find him insane and ship
him off to a mental institution. In these in-
stitutions, "patients" are treated for para-
noid and schizophrenic delusions of re-
forming society.
For visitors to the Soviet Union, the
need for cautious behavior cannot be over-
emphasized. KGB officials begin to keep
track of 'your travels and itinerary long be-
fore a foreigner is allowed into the country.
The day a visa application for travel to the
U.S.S.R. is received by Soviet officials, the
investigation begins. The visa application
may be accompanied by a report from the
KGB Residency. in the country where it is
submitted and referred to an evaluating of-
ficer in the 7th (tourist) department of the
Second Chief Directorate. Files are
checked and any information the KGB has
on the applicant is routed through appro-
priate departments. For instance, the Sci-
entific and Technical Directorate is briefed
about visits by scientists, the Industrial Se-
curity Directorate about visits by business-
men and the Disinformation department
may be alerted about journalists.
If a visa is granted, the KGB may decide
to influence, attempt to recruit the traveler
as an agent or merely watch him. Surveil-
lance of visitors is facilitated by the imposi-
tion of an extremely strict itinerary, where
significant deviations are prohibited. Asso-
ciating with Soviet citizens will be ar-
ranged by the KGB, so encounters with
common citizens are unlikely.
If the KGB has more than a routine in-
terest in a foreigner, the surveillance is
much more thorough. A photograph is se-
cretly taken at the point of entry, and the
picture precedes the visitor by wire photo
Today, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is headquartered in a heavily
guarded facility in Langley, Virginia. No exact count of agents is ever made public!
wherever he goes. Restaurants, hotels and
meeting places are alerted to keep an eye
on the subject. Along with the standard
microphones planted in the hotel room,
they may install daytime and infrared cam-
eras to record his actions in the dark. Paint
and powdered tracing chemicals (invisible
to the eye) may be introduced to the visi-
tor's clothes and pockets to mark letters
which the post office can detect.
In recruitment operations, the KGB will
try to involve the foreigner in activities ille-
Mr. William Casey is the current Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence (DCI) and is
head of the entire intelligence community.
gal to the state such as black market mon-
ey trading, correspondence smuggling,
professional or personal favors, heterosex-
ual or homosexual blackmail or other em-
barrassing circumstances. The subject is
then convinced that the only way he can
extricate himself is by cooperating with the
Soviet authorities. They may then opt to
dismiss his indiscretions. The foreigner
may be held incommunicado while special-
ists extract technical details of the subject's
work and/or extort pledges to become a
spy for them in the future.
Suspect foreigners are subject to hun-
dreds of ploys such as being drugged while
their accommodations or person are
searched. One textbook incident involved a
married American politician who was
drugged. When he regained consciousness,
the American was confronted by an agent
with compromising photos of him and an
unidentified woman engaged in sex. He
was told to cooperate or his political career
would be ruined with the released photos.
Outside the Soviet Union, the KGB can-
not afford to be so blatant in a suspicious
world. The old notion of awkward spies
with thick accents in trenchcoats and ill-
fitting suits no longer applies. Many Sovi-
ets are in foreign countries under the guise
of diplomatic status. KGB and GRU per-
sonnel account for up to 90 percent of em-
bassy officials. Their cover is their diplo-
matic standing. Should they be caught at
the business of espionage, they routinely
claim diplomatic immunity and usually
leave the country, declared persona non
grata by the host nation. It's a two way
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National
Intelligence
Council
General
Counsel
Inspector
General
Office of
Legislative
Liaison
Director of Central Intelligence Command Responsibilities
Public Affair s
Office
Equal
Employment
Opportunity
DEPUTY DIRECTOR
for
OPERATIONS
DEPUTY DIRECTOR
for
SCIENCE &
TECHNOLOGY
Office of Research
& Development
Office of Development
& Engineering
Foreign Broadcast
Information Service
Office of
SIGINT Operations
The
Intelligence
Community
Office of
Technical Service
4 National Photographic
Interpretation Center
DIRECTOR
INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY
STAFF
DEPUTY DIRECTOR
for
INTELLIGENCE
Office of
Soviet Analysis
Office of
European Analysis
ffice of New Eastern &
South Asian Analysis
Office of
East Asian Analysis
Office of African b
Latin American Anal sis
Department of Defense Elements
Departmental Intelligence Elements (Other than DOD)
Independent Agency
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DDCI
Office of Scientific
and Weapons Rewarch
Office of
Imagery Analysis
Office of Current
Production and
Analytic Support
Office of
Central Reference
DEPUTY DIRECTOR
for
ADMINISTRATION
street, since Moscow may retaliate by de-
porting a U.S. diplomat as well.
Many agents aren't Russian at all, but
legal citizens of the country in which they
serve. This allows the agent broader access
to classified and sensitive material. Their
introduction into the world of espionage
may be forced and cajoled through similar
methods of sexual blackmail as previously
described, or it could be the result of an in-
dividual choice, as was true of ex-TRW
employee Christopher Boyce, former Nor-
throp engineer Thomas Cavanagh, or the
latest headline grabber-the "all in the
family" spy case of John Walker.
In the Boyce case, Boyce contacted the
Soviet Embassy in Mexico City with the
aid of a drug dealing friend. Through some
convoluted sense of morality and, adven-
ture, Boyce sought to aid the Soviets with
satellite research information. In the
Cavanagh case, the Northrop employee
tried to contact the Soviets' San Francisco
Consulate, willing to sell U.S. research and
technological plans for the "Stealth"
bomber for $25,000. Cavanagh was appre-
hended immediately because of the FBI's
contact program of Soviet and Soviet bloc
facilities surveillance. Boyce continued his
espionage activities for quite some time due
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The Undercover SPY War
One of the latest Soviet espionage success stories centers around "all in the family" John Walker
spy case that may have very seriously damaged and compromised U.S. Navy submarine detection oper-
ations and possibly brought about radical changes in the way Soviet subs operate on a mission.
to a lack of aerospace company security
and the inherent wariness of his drug
smuggling comrade.
In KGB-inspired espionage cases, the
methods of recruiting an indigenous agent
are often limited in creativity exploiting ba-
sic human weaknesses of sexual desire, re-
venge, adventure-most commonly money,
as we see in the Walker case. The KGB
regularly haunts bars near military instal-
lations and facilities and approaches people
in susceptible positions. Over a short time,
they will prey on the vascillating feelings of
the informer. Easily obtained credit infor-
mation will give the recruiter a list of
overextended and debt-ridden prospects.
They are then approached with financial
offers in return for information.
One transaction of seemingly worthless
nonclassified material may seem like a
harmless act to the would-be traitor. That
first transaction, however, is secretly pho-
tographed and can subsequently be used
for blackmail purposes.
Similarly, a darker side of these relation-
ships exists as well. A former Hughes engi-
neer, entrapped with large sums of money
by Polish agents, said he was shown photo-
graphs of his ex-wife and son. Another
agent informed him that "our security de-
pends on each other and that if anybody
got out of line (he'd) take care of them." In
addition to these engineer spies are pene-
trative moles-clerks, runners, secretaries-
who may work for an organization for
years without detection. Rather than work-
ing from the outside to obtain secrets, they
are accepted members of the team, con-
stantly exporting secrets.
Why a person would turn to espionage
is open to psychological questioning. Once
they've consented to spy, though, many are
consoled with the supportive rationale that
they are valuable public servants who
should be praised for helping both sides
avoid surprises and helping to deter war.
The ideological motives applied to this are
designed to give the informant moral
strength to continue the "noble" work of
selling out his country.
More sophisticated methods of espio-
nage will never completely replace the tra-
ditional spy, but state-of-the-art practices
can only improve with technological ad-
vances. With the growth of complex elec-
tronic eavesdropping -methods, the KGB
can monitor telephone conversations di-
aled from specific phone numbers in a
building and other "over-the-air" unse-
cured communications. One look on the
top of the new Soviet Embassy complex in
Washington, D.C., shows a vast array of
sophisticated antennae trained on nearby
communications facilities.
Their new facility is 350 feet above sea
level with a commanding view of the entire
Washington area and a clear line of sight
to the State Department, the White House,
the Pentagon. Commerce Department and
a number of important foreign compounds,
including the British, West German and
French Embassies. Even the CIA head-
quarters in Langley is partially in electron-
ic view along with key microwave relay
towers for telephone and data-transmission
communications from Washington to other
cities on the East Coast.
The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have both in-
vested billions of dollars to try and inter-
cept the communications of the other.
Much of this, is done from reconnaissance
satellites which hover over a country in a
stationary orbit position. Reports of being
able to read license plates of arriving and
departing vehicles may or may not be exag-
gerated at this time, but these satellites are
only the first salvos in the growing com-
plexity of electronic visual and communi-
cation eavesdropping.
Despite the cautions of outdoor dis-
course to avoid eavesdropping methods,
conversations of persons walking may still
be subject to electronic surveillance
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through the use of long-distance video
cameras, lenses and "long-throw" listening
devices.
Gathering communications signals is
such a valuable part of intelligence gather-
ing that KGB collection vehicles (in the
guise of fishing trawlers) dog most U.S. na-
val exercises to monitor radio communica-
tions and any relayed test data. They also
appear at coincidental times and places in
world ports.
Once stolen secrets or materials are in
the hands of the spy, clandestine methods
are used to relay the information to the
right people for transportation to appropri-
ate headquarters. Elaborate hand-to-hand
relays between five or six persons in a
Sophisticated methods of spying will never replace the
traditional "cloak and dagger" technique, but new com-
plex seeing devices and listening equipment, etc., are mak-
ing it even easier for the KGB to spy on U.S. interests.
crowded meeting place may be used when
surveillance is suspected. Often, though, a
dead drop or "post box" hiding place is
used to exchange information or orders.
Getting the information out of the coun-
try presents another problem. If the mate-
rial is a written message. it can be encoded
into ciphers, other elaborate codes or a
telephone screech. (An ordinary tape-re-
corded message can be sped up so that it
sounds like a high-pitched whine. The
sender plays the tape in the background as
he carries on an ordinary telephone con-
versation. A tape recorder on the other end
records it at the same speed it was trans-
mitted and then slows it down in order to
decipher the message.)
working with information gathered from a variety of sources. including spy satel-
lite photos such as this one showing missiles in Cuba in 1962, the CIA strives to keep
tabs on what the "other" side is doing that could affect our nation's security.
Diplomatic pouches, secret compart-
ments, secret inks, microfilm and micro-
dots are also used to smuggle out valuable
information. Microfilm fits nicely at the
bottom of a pack of cigarettes. The immu-
nity of diplomatic baggage has even been
used to smuggle out people (double agents
who refuse to return to the motherland).
Large steamer trunks so marked have been
found to contain bound people.
One of the most frustrating forms of es-
pionage that has surfaced during the last
decade is the export of embargoed. techno-
logically advanced machinery and scientif-
ic secrets. Export inspections have been
beefed up recently, but there are many vul-
turesque businessmen who don't hesitate to
make fast money by shipping advanced
technology with misleading manifest labels
to hostile countries by a network of phoney
front organizations. Top-secret computers
and electronic equipment capable of mili-
tary use are leaking into the hands of the
Soviets at an ever increasing rate. Lenin's
quote about hanging the West with the
very rope they've sold the U.S.S.R. is no
laughing matter.
Of all the KGB organizations designed
to secure information and enforce control,
none is more sinister and vicious than their
Executive Action Department within the
First Directorate. Disbanded and re-
grouped many times under a variety of
names, including Dept. V, Dept. 13 and
SMERSH (an acronym for the Russian
phrase meaning "death to spies"), they are
responsible.for the "wet (bloody) affairs"
of the KGB's organization. Assassins are
trained at a spy school off of Metrostroev-
skaya Street in Moscow and are later trans-
ferred to a country farm at Kuchino, just
outside Moscow.
Here, training is specialized in the use of
poisons and drugs which will give the im-
pression of death by natural causes.
SMERSH is credited with several well-
known assassinations. including Leon.
Trotsky's death by an ice ax to the head
and the prussiate acid (a salt of hydrocyan-
ic acid) deaths of Ukranian nationalists
Lev Rebet and Stefan Bandera. In 1978,
Bulgarian Georgi Markov was assassinated
on a London street by a puncturing um-
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The Undercover SPY War
brella tipped with a tiny metal ball. The Objective
latinu
d i
idi
ll
p
m an
r
um ba
measured 1.52
mm in diameter. Two pin-tip holes sealed
with wax released the toxic content, ricin
(one of the five most toxic substances in the
world), once the ball was under Markov's
skin. He died within four days. This divi-
sion is also thought to have worked with
the Dajnavna Sigurnost (Bulgarian Secret
Police) in masterminding the shooting of
the Pope in 1981.
CIA OPERATIONS
Naivete was the reason the OSS was dis-
banded after WWII. The belief that our ad-
versaries would "play by the rules" was as-
saulted in the two years before the NSA
was established and the CIA was created
in 1947. By the mid-'50s, American foreign
policy and CIA intelligence operations be-
came increasingly global. The unrest that
the U.S.S.R. was rousing, the rising tide of
revolutionary and "liberation" actions,
Mideast tensions, trouble in the Indochina
states, events in the Congo and Castro's
revolutionary plans for Latin America all
required day-to-day intelligence coverage
of behind-the-scenes activities of both
friendly and unfriendly governments.
Reporting on many CIA operations is
speculative. Those that fail get a lot of me-
dia attention, and those that succeed are
often handled so gracefully that they may
never be known. While CIA tactics are
similar to the KGB's and espionage max-
ims worldwide, the CIA has no depart-
ment for assassinations that compares to
Dept. V of the KGB's First Directorate.
Covert action operations intended to influ-
ence foreign regimes, however, are not lim-
ited to either side. In addition to its infor-
mation gathering missions, the CIA's
duties have expanded under the Reagan
Administration to combat the Soviet theft
of U.S. technology, international terrorism
and drug trafficking.
The CIA has done a lot to combat.the
Soviets' primary means of gaining U.S.
technology by establishing a Technology
Transfer Assessment Center that analyzes
what Moscow's tech needs are and how
they may attempt to get them. The Soviets
have saved billions of dollars in research
and development monitoring Western tech-
nological developments and then stealing
them. Moves have been made to better co-
ordinate the FBI's counterintelligence or-
ganization with the CIA and the U.S. Cus-
toms Service in an effort to plug the legal
and illegal export of high-tech equipment.
International terrorist organizations are
receiving more scrutiny from the CIA than
ever before. There is movement toward
creating an interpol-type data base with
friendly countries to form an anti-terrorist
information network to combat suspected
terrorists. Special units of skilled agents are
Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE)
? Demonstrate Exoatmospheric
Homing & NNK
Stage
Separation
set up and ready to perform worldwide on
short notice in support of local authorities,
should an incident occur.
It has been known for a long time that
the illegal drug market has helped finance
communist guerrilla action worldwide. In-
formation garnered by the CIA on narcot-
ics industry methods of laundering drug
money overseas and estimating the size of
marijuana and opium crops through the
use of surveillance satellites is beginning to
pay off. The hefty 580 billion-a-year nar-
cotics trade is starting to feel pressure from
the combined efforts of the CIA, Drug En-
forcement Agency (DEA), Customs De-
partment and the State Department. Infor-
mation leading to the arrest of the Chief
Minister and other cabinet officials of the
Caribbean island colonies of Turks and
Caicos Islands came from DEA and CIA
cooperation. CIA activities along the Bur-
ma-Thailand border, the "golden triangle"
of opium; production, are helping to stem
the flow of illegal drugs from that area.
Internally, the CIA's position is that
they have no domestic involvement and
One area in which the
KGB is expending a lot
of effort is in the a-
rena of the Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI)
or "Star Wars." ICA
was told by one spokes-
man for the Pentagon
that it is the "Soviet
spy's 0 t target." Pro-
grams such as the Hom-
ing Overlay Experiment,
where the "net" war-
head (left) actually
intercepted a missile
in space (above right),
is of great interest!
leave counterintelligence up to the FBI.
It's the FBI's responsibility to follow the
affairs of visiting Soviets and diplomats of
other countries. The CIA, however, is au-
thorized by the charter of the NSC to fol-
low internal directives to provide for na-
tional security.
The CIA is also alerted to the visa appli-
cations of visiting foreigners. Before the
1984 Los Angeles Olympics, a number of
foreign "trainers" traveling with their
teams to the summer games received
healthy skepticism from the agency. Some
were refused entry into the U.S. due to
their questionable backgrounds.
Because of the U.S.S.R.'s closed society,
where public information is not printed in
volumes as it is in the West, more emphasis
is given to espionage activities and the
placement and recruitment of informants
and agents. The CIA has been fortunate in
the area of recruiting dissenters from the
Soviet system. An increasing number of
valuable defectors have provided insight
into the operations of the KGB, Eastern
European countries and the Kremlin.
b&W
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e.
Indoctrinated agents of both countries
have occasionally chosen to split ranks and
break with their espionage systems to join
the other side-and it's not always money
that entices them to defect. It's more than
interesting to record, though, that the CIA
is the winner more often than the KGB in
this defection game.
All kinds of conclusions can be drawn
from this proportion, but time and again,
defecting Soviet agents cite a hypocritical
attitude in high communist authorities and
a brutal disregard for the dignities of hu-
man existence. These denunciations are so
strong that they imply a hatred of the sys-
tem from which they come.
It's safe to say that neither side will ever
really "win" this undercover war of spy vs.
spy. Information objectives are short-lived
victories that may or may not lead to stra-
tegic and tactical victories. While each side
practices their own brand of warfare, with
differing moral standards, the goal is the
same: learn as much as you can about the
other side, anticipate their moves and
counter without blowing your cover. N
One of the premiere informants in the
Western world was GRU Colonel Oleg
Penkovskiy, who gave valuable informa-
tion on the operations of the Kremlin dur-
ing the threatened Berlin showdown of
1961 and the Cuban missile threat of 1962.
Penkovskiy and more recent informants
such as U.N. Diplomat Arkady Shevchen-
ko were neither paid agents nor ordinary
defectors. They were two intelligent and
high-ranking officials who detested the
way their government did business. They
sought to alter the balance of that system
as best they could.
The CIA is back on its feet again, revi-
talized after embarrassing revelations and
excesses in the 1970s and short-sighted cut-
backs under previous White House ad-
ministrations. The clearest sign of the
CIA's revitalization is its progress in pro-
viding National Intelligence Estimates
(NIEs) for analyzing world issues. These
estimates have become more accurate and
are completed for congressional and ad-
ministration review more rapidly than be-
fore. They also give more credence to con-
flicting opinions within the agency.
Among the most controversial, and
sometimes crucial operations of the CIA,
are covert actions designed to affect the af-
fairs of foreign governments. Assistance
for guns and ammunition in Afghanistan
continues, as does open assistance to the
Contras of Central America. Many agency
employees may not advocate covert opera-
tions of this sort, but there must be an al-
ternative course of action between a faulty
democracy and calling out the Marines.
IS EITHER SIDE WINNING?
The spooky world of the CIA & KGB is
interfused with, shadowy agents, lies, dou-
ble agents and dirty tricks. Agents on both
sides are sworn to do what is necessary to
ensure their country's success, as under-
handed or illegal as their methods may be.
Atomic weapons, lasers, particle beams, communications satellites or any new
system that the U.S. military is developing is going to remain a prime target
for the KGB and any "traitorous" spies they can enlist. Needless to say, the teeth
are being put back into the CIA in order to combat this ever-growing problem.
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