MILITARY THOUGHT : THE ORGANIZATION OF ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE, BY COLONEL V. SAVKO AND COLONEL N. MAKSIMOV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029800160001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: MEMO

50X1-HUM
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The Organization of Antimissile Defense
(According to foreign views) 50X1-HUM
by
Colonel V. Savko
Colonel N. Maksimov
Under modern conditions, a wide variety of means
can be used for the delivery of nuclear strikes against
troops in a theater of military operations and against
the objectives of a country's military potential:
piloted aircraft, ballistic and cruise missiles,
artificial earth satellites and spacecraft. This
variety of attack weapons, which has a great range of
speeds, and flight altitudes and an enormous range of
operation,makes it necessary to examine the question
of cam batting them in a new way.
The ability of modern attack weapons to deliver
strikes. from low levels, from the stratosphere and,
in the near future, from space, has produced a need
for the broadening of the scope of antiair defense.
Antiair defense is developing into antiair and anti-
space defense.
By contrast to the atmosphere,,(vozdushnoye
prostranstvo),which has limits at a certain altitude,
sp ace (kosmicheskoye prostranstvo) is boundless.
The limitless range of modern aerospace attack weapons,
their freedom of maneuver (their strikes can be ex-
pected from any direction) and the possibility of
their combined use both against troops and against
the military objectives of a country, make it necess-
ary to establish a single system for antiair and
antispace defense.
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The tremendous progress in the development of
aerospace attack weapons has made necessary a revision
of views on defense. 50X1-HUM
It is known that during the past few years the
USA has spent about 35 billion dollars on the creation
of a system of antiair defense for the North American
continent. The "Sage" semiautomatic control system
has been set up, depending upon three radar lines
constructed in the northern part of the American con-
tinent and possessing the necessary means of communication
and electronic computers. Active defense has been based
on the employment of antiaircraft missiles and of inter-
ceptor fighters armed with guided "air-to-air" missiles.
The development of strategic missile weapons has
thrown doubt upon the expediency of these huge expendi-
tures. The USA has stopped the development of inter-
ceptor fighters and significantly reduced work on
the creation of new classes of ground-to-air and air-
to-air guided missiles, and has reviewed and reduced
the original plans for the formation of squadrons of
"Bomarc" antiaircraft missiles for the antiair defense
of areas of the country.
At the same time, having proclaimed a doctrine
of "terror" (ustrasheniye), the USA and its NATO
allies had to ensure that there would be no possibility
of the destruction of their own strategic aerospace
weapons, which could occur as a result of the first
enemy strike.
With the appearance of nuclear/missile weapons,
the means of attack immediately and abruptly determined
the means of defense. It has become necessary to create
weapons and systems for defense against ballistic missiles,
and in the near future against space weapons as well.
Passive methods (dispersal:;.,cot.cealment und.ergroun.d of the
launching mounts of ones own missiles, constant retention
in the air of units of ones own bomber aviation) have
not eliminated the need to establish effective systems
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of antimissile defense, despite the complexity of
the problems which this has caused and their
obviously enormous cost.
Work in the field of antimissile defense is
being conducted in the USA, Great Britain, Canada and
other countries. The leading role belongs to the USA.
The Americans have already been working for more
than 10 years on the solution of the problem of anti-
missile defense (protivo-raketnaya oborona-PRO The
best scientific resources and a considerable number
of the largest American industrial companies have been
brought into work in this field.
The detection, recognition, interception and des-
truction of long-range missiles are problems that are
hard to solve, because of the great speeds and altitudes
at which missiles fly, and because of the small dimen-
sions of the target (the nose cone of the missile).
Moreover, the enemy can take various steps to make the
detection and interception of the missile's warhead
difficulty or measures to confuse the PRO system.
Three phases of a missile's flight trajectory
are examined during theoretical investigations into
the possibilities of combat with missiles. The first
is the active phase, during which the engines and the
equipment of the guidance mechanism of the missile
are in operation. The missile moves through this
phase in a comparatively short time, not more than
2 to 3 minutes.
The second is the middle or free-flight phase.
The beginning of this phase of the trajectory is
marked by the point in space at which the missile
engines are cut off and its nose cone is released
automatically. From this moment the nose cone of the
missile moves along the trajectory of a freely thrown
body (in the first approach to an ellipse).
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The third phase is the final phase, during which
the nose cone of the missile enters the dense layers
of the atmosphere. Its duration is determined by
the altitude of the active layer of the atmosphere,
which is about 100 km. Methods for combatting missiles
arO being worked out in the USA in accordance with
these features of the flight of missiles. 50X1-HUM
The detection of missiles in flight. Timely
detection of missiles in flight is one of the most
important elements in a PRO system. For warning
of a surprise attack using missiles, means for the
early detection of the latter were required first
of all. Using the newest achievements in the field
of electronics, the Americans devised powerful radar
sets with a range of operation of several thousand
kilometers.
The increase in the range of operation of radar
sets was achieved by increasing the power of the
transmitters and the sensitivity of the receivers, by
setting up improved antennas, and by using the technical
and scientific achievements attained in the field of
radar in the last few years. Great successes were
achieved in this respect, thanks Particuxlarly. tp the
application of methods of a new science - the theory
of information.
Experimental models of the American PRO radar
sets had a power of from 2 megawatts (the AN/FPS-17
set) to 10 megawatts (the AN/FPS-35 set). The
vacuum t u b e s which are being developed at present
allow the power of the transmitters to be increased
to 20 to 50 megawatts. Thanks to the use of mole-
cular amplifiers, the sensitivity of the receivers
is increased tenfold and a hundredfold . This also
permitted an increase in the range of action of the
sets.
The use of huge directional antennas and of
new methods for the separation of reflected signals
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made it possible to increase the range of action of
a set without significantly increasing its power,
bpth by concentrating the energy emitted in the required
direction and by improving conditions for the recep"
tion by the antenna of reflected signals. Based on
the use of new antenna devices, the AN/FPS-49 and
AN/FPS-50 radar sets were devised in the USA, with a
range of action of up to 5400 km against a target as
small as that which is represented by the nose cone
of an intercontinental ballistic missile. 50X1-HUM
Besides such sets, whose range of operation is
still limited by the zone of line-of-sight. (zona
pryamoy Yidimosti) the possibility of using "Tepee"
sets employing the back-scatter probing
(vozvratno-naklonnoye zondirovaniye) method. In
principle, this method permits the detection of missiles
while they are still in the active phase of their
trajectory. But such sets can only determine the
azimuth and, with little accuracy, the distance to
the target. It is therefore proposed to use the
"Tepee" set to supplement detection systems using
AN/FPS-49 and AN/FPS-50 sets.
As well as radar sets, infrared equipment may
be used to detect missiles. By locating such
equipment on the ground it is very hard to provide
the great range required. When it is located in
space the situation changes fundamentally. First of
all, the great obstacle of atmospheric absorption of
the infrared radiation disappears. Secondly, the
missile can be detected in the active phase of its
trajectory, when it is a powerful source of infrared
radiation.
Already in 1957 experiments were conducted in
Canada which showed the possibility of detecting
missiles with infrared equipment, at a range of up
to 1600 km. In 1958 the Americans were able to track
the flight of the third Soviet artificial earth satellite,
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flying at an altitude of about 400 km above the earth,
with an infrared tracking device of the firm "Aerojet".
Later, models of infrared devices with even greater
ranges of operation were produced, FOr example the
range of operation of a multipurpose gyroscopic
head, built by the "Martin" firm in 1959, is estimated
as several thousand kilometers when the launch of a mis-
sile.is detected from space'and several hundred kilometers
when using the h e a d to aim ,satl-
lites. 50X1-HUM
In this way, thanks to the enormous progress in the
field of radio-electronics the problem of detecting
missiles in flight is being successfully resolved.
Recognition of missiles. In the development of a
system of antimissile defense, a great deal of attention
is .d.evoted to solution of the problem of recognition of
the missile's nose cone from among the various types
of interference and of dummy targets.
There are many methods which make it possible to
hamper the destruction of the missile in flight and
to disorganize the PRO system. These methods include:
covering the missile nose cones with a protective
layer which sharply reduces the reflection of electro-
magnetic energy;--the use of dummy targets which camou-
f:lag;e the flight of the actual nose cone;--the use
of active jamming of the radar sets of the antinta.Solle.+
defense system.
One of the simplest ways of creating dummy targets
is to break up the missile airframe as soon as the nose
cone is separated in the middle section of its flight
trajectory. All of this presents complex problems for
the PRO in finding methods of combatting equipipent which
createsradio-electronic interference and in developing
methods of identifying targets, i.e.,of determining their
true nature. The general p problem of recognition of
dummy targets 1i Fie mi'dd a base of a " trajectory .l as
not ye-t been ai-olved by the Americans, even theoretically.
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One opportunity for recognition occurs during the
flight of the nose cone and of its accompanying complex
of dummy targets in the final phase of the trajectory--
in the atmosphere. During reentry into the atmosphere
the movements of the dummy targets and of the missile
warhead change in different ways, their infrared radi-
ation varies in intensity and spectral characteristics,
and other phenomena appear which simplify the solution
of the problem of recognition. 50X1-HUM
By studying the nature of changes in speed it is
possible to distinguish the missile nose cone from the
dummy targets. The missile warhead will brake more
slowly than the dummy targets and will have a higher
speed. However, since it passes through the dense
layers of the atmosphere in a very short period of
time (10 to 12 seconds) this method of recognition is
not acceptable. Recognition of a target by this method
will occur too late and the defense system will have no
time to destroy the nose cone which has been picked out.
During entry into ,the atmosphere both the nose
cone and the dummy targets accompan3tng it heat up and
give off infrared rays, a shock wave builds up in front
of them,and an ionized gaseous trail behind them.
However, the use of these phenomena for recognition of
the nose cone is unacceptable for the same reason.
The most effective method for recognition, used
by the Americans in the "Nike-Zeus" system, consists
of the use of special radar sets with very high dis.
crimination, capable of receiving data on the whole
group of targets during flight while it is still in
the middle phase of its trajectory. The signal reflect-
ed from a flying object makes it possible to obtain
some idea of the change in its reflecting surface during
flight, of its dimensions, and even of its shape.
If signals from flying nose cones and from
various dummy targets are studied in advance, the
knowledge of their signatures" can be used to solve
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the problems of recognition. 50X1-HUM
In order to put this method to practical use, the
Americans registered the signals reflected from the
nose cones of their own missiles while these were being
tested at firing ranges. Signals from the nose cones
of Soviet missi les launched into the central part
of the Pacific Ocean were also registered. In 1961
launchings of "Titan" missiles with devices for the,
creation of interference and o:f.- ftm y.::tzr.gets --began.
A recognition radar set is used in conjunction
with an electronic computer, into whose memory are
fed the characteristiotsignals which correspond to the
flight of actual nose cones. This same machine receives
data on the signals of all objectives observed from
the recognition set. Comparison of these data in the
machine permits recognition of the missile nose cone
in a group of dummy targets.
Means of detection and recognition. At the present
time the basic means f or the detection of missiles in
flight are ground radar posts with u]-tra-long-range
detection sets, which make up the ballistic missile Early
W'arning System.
The BMEWS system includes three radar posts located
in Thule (Greenland), Clear (Alaska), and Fylingdales
Moor (Britain). The range of operation of the radar
sets installed at these posts exceeds 5000. km.
In addition to the detection of missiles in flight,
the BMEWS system permits the approximate determination
of the probable objective of an attack. The performance
of the second task is simplified by the fact that,
after the engines stop working, the warhead of a missile
f.ol_l.o'w,s- a ballistic trajectory, to determine which it
is enough to make several fixes and to determine the
impact point of the missile by extrapolation of the
trajectory.
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The total warning time--i.e., the time from the moment the
alarm is given until the missiles strike their targets--provided
by the BMEWS system is from 15 to 17 minutes.
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The shortcomings of the BMEWS are that it does not cover
all the probable missile launching areas and that it can be
neutralized with the aid of special equipment or disorganized
by the creation of dummy targets. In addition, the system is
expensive, cumbersome, stationary, and could be destroyed before
missiles are launched against objectives on the territory of
the USA.
The realistic way toward an increase in warning time lies
in the use of special earth satellites with infrared or radar
equipment which permit detection of missiles in the active
phase of their trajectory.
Satellites with infrared equipment for the detection of
missile,; launchings are being developed in the USA under the
"Midas" project. As is known, in October 1961, the "Midas-4"
satellite recorded the launch of an American "Titan" ballistic
missile from Cape Canaveral. The satellite passed over Florida
at an altitude of more than 3000 km. The launching was detected
within 90 seconds of the launch of the missile, but the
detection signal was transmitted within 90 minutes, when the
satellite passed over California, where there is a station for
the reception of signals from such satellites.
In the experimental satellites, detection signals are to
be recorded, together with time details, and transmitted to
the earth on the commands of the tracking stations which have
so far been built. In a future satellite operational system,
the signals must be transmitted immediately as the launchings
are detected. A network of interconnected earth satellites
will be used for this purpose.
Besides detecting launchings of missiles, "Midas" satellites
can probably determine, at least approximately,
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the direction of their flight, in order to provide plots
for the sets of the BMEWS system.
An operational system of "Midas" satellites should
be set up by the Americans before 1965.
Satellites with radar sets are still in the stage
of scientific and experimental developments and their
establishment, probably as multipurpose spacecraft,,is
possible after 1965. Thus, one of the projects, pro-
posed by the."Ryan" firm, envisages the creation of
a s-pac a -system' o,.f,_. early warning with satellites,
on which a whole system o; radar sets for the detection
and tracking of the ballistic missiles and spacecraft
of the enemy is installed.
The employment of artificial reconnaissance satel-
lites in a PRO system increases the possibility of
detecting missiles. With the help of satellites a
missile can be detected within 1 to 2 minutes of its
launch.
Interception and destruction of missiles.. The
task of intercepting and destroying missiles consists
of preventing them from exploding in the area of de-
fendecl objectives . The interception and destruction of
a missile is considered most effective during the active
phase of its flight trajectory (during the acceleration
stage), when the missile presents a large target and
is flying at a comparatively low speed. Interception
during the middle phase of the trajectory may lead to
the destruction of the missile at a great distance
from the defended objective. However.in both the first
and second cases means of interception with a great
range of operation and highly accurate guidance are
required. The development of such means involves
great technical difficulties. In the USA means for
intercepting the nose cone of a missile in the final
phase of its trajectory, when it enters the atmosphere,
have been brought, in practice, to the stage of flight
tests. Interception at this phase of the trajectory
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permits the use of weapons with a comparatively short
range of operation.
Because of their great approach speeds, the inter-
ception of missiles is only considered possible on
collision or collision-intersection courses. A nuclear
warhead is used to destroy the nose cone of the missile.
Taking into consideration the comparatively small
radius of destruction of even a nuclear warhead when it
explodes outside the dense layers of the atmosphere,
other probable methods of destruction are being studied
in the USA. Special project"Gli'par" was devoted to this
question, having as its goal the study of the possibilities
of destroying missiles or of rendering them harmless,
including those which, at today's level of technology,
appear highly probiematical, but which may prove effective
in the future, when. our knowledge of these questions
has increased considerably.
The "Glipar" project studied the possibility of
destroying missile nose cones with small fragments or
particles of hard substances, with gases, plasmas,
electrical charges, radiation and with the action of
various fields. The use of hard particles, which,
when they hit a nose cone which is moving at high speed,
may inflict considerable damage upon it, proved to be
the most effective means.
One of the experiments to study the impacts of hard
bodies, flying at great speeds was conducted in 1961 in
the ballistics laboratory at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds,
and in this metal balls 7 mm in diameter brought about
the almost complete destruction of the wall of a 105 mm
artillery, shell.
Evidently in connection with this, the Advanced
Research Projects Agency of the U. S. Defense Department
advertised for bids for the development of a PRO system
(Project ARPAT) in which the warhead of a missile would be
destroyed with "shrapnel" shells when it enters the atmosphere.
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As for the other methods of destruction studied, their
realization at the existing level of technology was found
to be in practice impossible, although research in this
direction is still continuing. As an example, one can
mention the method based on the use of so-called "lasers"
--powerful sources of monochromatic infrared or ligrr
radiation. Such lasers already make it possible to obtain
a narrow beam of radiation which has an impulse power of
tens of megawatts, although it is true that this is of
very short duration, measured in microseconds.
The use of similar means from the ground is hardly
possible, even taking into account their future development
and a future manifold increase in the energy of their
destructive impulse. The basic obstacle here is the absorp-
tion of energy by the atmosphere. This obstacle can only
be overcome by installing improved lasers on spacecraft with
a high coefficient of effectiveness and great power. While
impulses of modern lasers can lead to the heating of material
to a surface temperature of several thousand degrees, in
the future one can foresee the possibility of burning through
the structure of the nose cone of a missile or satellite,
which can prevent the explosion of the missile's charge or
can lead to its destruction during reentry into the atmosphere.
Means for the interception and destruction of missiles
in the active and middle phases of their flight trajectory
are in the stage of theoretical development. Earth satellites
are considered the most promising means for the performance
of these tasks.
The development of a space antimissile system is being
conducted in the USA under the "Bambi" program. Such a
system could provide defense on a global scale, but requires
the use of several thousand satellites. In order to bring
this system into use it is necessary to reduce significantly
the cost of orbiting a kilogram of payload and to bring
this down to several dollars or, at the most, tens of dollars.
The destruction of missiles can be carried out by homing
satellites (the RBS project) or by satellites armed with hom-
ing antimissile
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missiles of the "space-to-space" class (the SPAD project).
Both these projects are still in the initial
stage of development. In both cases an infrared guidance
system is considered to be the most suitable for homing.
Besides automatic interceptor-satellites, for anti-
missile and antispace defense, it is also proposed to
use piloted interceptor-satellites with a man on board.
For the present the development of such satellites is being
pioneered by some American firms.
In the USA it is considered possible to create PRO
space weapons in 1966-1967.
For the interception and destruction of missiles in
the final phase of their trajectory (during reentry into the
atmosphere), the Americans, starting in 1955, have developed
several PRO systems. The "Nike-Zeus" system, which,permits
the interception and destruction of missiles at altitudes
of up to 150 km and at ranges of up to 320 km, has received
the greatest development.
Up to the present day, experimental models of the radar
set for this system, of the electronic computer and of
experimental models of the "Nike-Zeus" antimissile missiles
have been constructed.
Although the "Nike-Zeus" PRO system has been under
development for many years, and although some of its elements
could be put into mass production, adoption of the system
as armament is being delayed. In the U.S. Defense Depart-
ment there are doubts of the reliability and effectiveness
of the system, particularly in its ability to distinguish
missile nose cones fromdummy targets.
Moreover, the cost of setting up such a system, even
for the defense of only the most important cities and
objectives on United States territory, is calculated in
billions of dollars (according to some data it may reach
4 to15 billion dollars).
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Taking these circumstances into consideration, the
U.S. Defense Department and the President of the USA
have reacted to the proposals of the army to begin pro-
duction of the components of the system before the comple-
tion of its comprehensive tests, including firings against
"Atlas" type combat missiles, with a certain caution.
Flight tests of the experimental model of the missile
began in 1959 at the White Sands f,rovipg grouud.The second
step in the tests, including the launching of a complete
three-stage missile with a guidance system, but without a
nuclear warhead, is being completed at present at Point
Mugu on the west coast of the USA (the state of California).
The third step, during which live firings of "Nike-Zeus"
missiles will be carried out against "Jupiter" and "Atlas"
missiles, is planned for the middle of 1962. The "Atlas"
missiles will be launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base
and the "Nike-Zeus" missiles from Kwajalein Island in the
Marshall Islands in the Pacific Ocean. A complete complex
of components for the system is being built on this island,
including underground launching mounts for the missiles,
for radar sets (target acquisition, target recognition, and
tracking of the target and of the missile) and the necessary
computers, launching and auxiliary equipment.
After the speech of the Minister of Defense of the
USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade R. Ya. Malinovskiy,
who reported to the XXIi Congress of the CPSU on the success-
ful solution in the USSR of the problem of destroying miss-
siles in flight, the American command decided to speed up
the tests and the begi ing of, production of the components
of the "Nike-Zeus" system. The time limits for conducting
live firings of "Atlas" intercpntinental ballistic missiles
for interception by "Nike-Zeus missiles are connected with
the decision of the President of the USA on the resumption
of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere. The first tests,
with the detonation. of nuclear warheads on "Nike-Zeus"
missiles with a yield of from 2 to 5 thousand tons are
planned for the end of December 1961 or January 1962. The
first firings against "Atlas" missiles, in which both the
"Nike-Zeus" missile and the target missile will be fitted
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with nuclear warheads, are planned for February 1962.
Without waiting for the conclusion of the tests, the Defense
Department and the President of the USA decided to ask for
appropriations to begin production of components of the
"Nike-Zeus" system in 1962. It is planned to arm the first
PRO batteries with them in 1963.
The organization and conduct of PRO. All means of
antimissile defense will be subordinate to the Air Defense
Command of the USA. It ~s planned to use the units and
subunits of the PRO in the first place for coverage of
missile bases and strategic aviation bases. The use of the
"Nike-Zeus'system in combat is carried out in approximately
the following manner. A target (missile), crossing the
fan-like beam of a BMEWS system radar set, reflects electro-
magnetic energy which is picked up by the receiving apparatus
of the set.
Information on the target, contained in the reflected
signal, enters the target selection system and is then
transformed into numerical form and fed into a computer.
The selection device enables the missile to be picked
out among the numerous reflections which result from atmo-
spheric phenomena, the Northern Lights, meteorites, arti-
ficial satellites, etc.
The computer calculates the approximate trajectory
of the missile's flight and determines the objective which
is probably under attack for target acquisition by subse-
quent elements of the defense system. In addition, the
computer formulates a message on the detected target,
which is fed into the communications line in numerical
(coded) form, and arrives at the US Continental Air
Defense Control Center. The report shows the calculated
trajectory and the probable impact point of the missile.
A special warning system has been set up to transmit
data on the appearance of missiles. At each post of the
BMEWS system there are data units (datchik) and means of
communication which provide instantaneous transmission of data.
I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP80T00246A029800160001-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP80T00246A029800160001-4
In the antiair defense control center the message
which has been received is decoded and evaluated and
the data received are compared with information which has
arrived from other sources.
In accordance with the in dicati'on s received from
BMEWS posts or at the command of the antiair defense
control center, the antimissile subunits are put in a
state of combat readiness.
The "Nike-Zeus" system consists of a series of de-
fensive centers, which provide protection for particular'
objectives with the aid of several batteries of antimissile
missiles. The fire of these batteries is controlled from
the defense center, which has an acquisition radar set and
a computer for processing both the data arriving from BMEWS
posts and thosefrom this set...
The acquisition set has an operating range of about
1600 km and carries out a repeat (poivtornyy) detection of
the missiles approaching the defense objective. For this
it is necessary for the nose cone of the approaching missile
to be in motion within the operating sector of the set for
about 20 seconds. Information on the targets goes from
this set to the computer of the defense center and is used
for target acquisition and for the distribution of targets
among the antimissile missile batteries.
The battery is the basic subunit of the system. It
has a target recognition set, a target tracking set and
several sets for tracking the antimissile missiles. Ap-
parently a battery will consist of 24 antimissile missiles
with the necessary launching and auxiliary equipment. All
the equipment of a battery is stationary.
The target recognition set picks out the missile nose
cone from among the dummy targets. Recognition of the
target is based on a comparison of the signal characteris-
tics reflected from the target; with the known characteris-
tics of various objects which have been fed into the memory
of the computer. As a result of such a comparison;, the
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29800160001-4
data on the real target are singled out by the exclusion of
false information: Approximately 30 seconds is taken for
target recognition, after which the missile nose cone is
taken over by the target tracking set.
When the target is being tracked, its trajectory is.
defined with greater p recis'iom. and the requisite data
are fed into the device for controlling the launch and
guidance of the antimissile missiles. The guidance com-
puter calculates the flight trajectory of the antimissile
missile and determines the point at which it will meet the
target. At the necessary moment the command for the launch
is given and this ignites the engine of the first stage of
the antimissile missile.
After the missile is launched, data on the flight of
the target and of the missile continue to be continuously
fed into the computer of the tracking system, and on the
basis of these, commands are evolved for the guidance of
the antimissile missile to its target. This device is a
digital computer capable of performing 200,000 arithmetical.
operations per'second.
The intercept. computer also determines the moment
for the detonation of the antimissile missile and generates
the command for the explosion,which is then transmitted to
the missile by the set which is tracking it.
It is considered that about 100 seconds are needed to
prepare the antimissile missile for launching, to launch it,
and for it to enter ;the interception area. To carry out
the series of operations in intercepting and destroying a
missile warhead with a speed of 8 km/sec., approximately
2 min. and 40 sec,.are.taken by the "Nike-Zeus" system.
During this time the missile warhead will travel approxi-
mately 1300 km. The interception and destruction of the
missile warhead is effected in the final phase of the
trajectory at an altitude of about 150 km.
From all that has been said one can conclude that so
far the USA does not have an organized PRO system or
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29800160001-4
effective means for combatting missiles. Many problems
connected with recognition, interception, and
destruction of the missile in flight still must be
settled.
The establishment of antimissile defense involves
huge expenditures of materiel which can only be afforded
by states with a developed industrial-economic base
and a large network of scientific-research institutions.
The widest development of work on antimissile defense
has therefore been achieved only by the USA. Meanwhile,
in connection with the great expenditure on these tasks
and the difficulty of resolving the technical problems of
antimissile defense, some American military specialists
are calling for the development, above all, of
strategic attack weapons -- long- and intermediate-
range missiles, strategic aviation and an atomic
fleet -- as a means of "deterrence".
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29800160001-4