THE SENATE SHOULD DEBATE WHETHER TO ABROGATE THE ABM TREATY, INSTEAD OF DEBATING INTERPRETATIONS OF U.S. UNILATERAL ABM COMPLIANCE POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP94B00280R000700020007-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 10, 2011
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: April 8, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/10: CIA-RDP94B0028OR000700020007-3
S;t~36 CONGRESSIONAL itBCC D ?- SENATE April $, 1987
Mr. President, the -needs of the
homeless are inmredbte. The legiats-
tion being considered today provides
or acoordinated. Federal effort to ad-
dress this emergency.
States, local governments, and pri-
vatte vdluntary and charitable orgatrai-
rations have been unable to meet ail
of the basic hum needs of our Na-
tion's 'homeless. The Federal 'Govern-
ment must take a greater role In pro-
viding assistance to protect and Jm-
prose the lives and safety of m411Iests
of suffering homeless. A serious legis-
lative response to hornlessness in our
country Is both desperately needed
and long overdue. I urge my colleagues
bo?support this legisn.
Mr. HEINZ. Time iegislation before
us authorizes regisnsl;Aaiff for the Us-
tdonal Council in each of the atasidard
I deral regions. Tb ey are to support
regional efforts on behalf of the
homeless, share information. and co-
ordinate homeless assistance. I ap-
plaud the chairman for this provision.
My concern, and that .of n nny service-
providers, is that FEMA boards and
nonprofits will have to answer to the
regional staff, that we are placing an
additional layer of approval on exist-
ing programs. My understanding is
that the regional staff do not have an
approval role, but are to.provide assist-
ance and guidance. Is my understand-
ing correct?
Mr. GLENN. The Senator is correct.
While we envision an active role for
the Council staff, coordinating the
many local and regional efforts on
behalf of the homeless, they are not to
play an administrative role. I do not
envision an additional layer of bu-
reaucracy for homeless programs.
Mr. HEINZ. I thank the Senator for
his statement, and congratulate him
on the splendid work this legislation
represents.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, there will
be no more rollcall votes today.
MORNING BUSINESS
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that there now be
a period not to extend beyond 6:15
p.m. today during which Senators may
transact morning business and during
which Senators be permitted to speak
for not to exceed 5 minutes each.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is
there objection? Without objection, It
is so ordered.
Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from North Carolina.
THS SENATE SHOULD DEBATE
WHETHER TO ABROGATE THE
ABM TREATY, INSTEAD OF DE-
BATING INTERPRETATIONS OF
US. UNILATERAL ABM COMPLI-
ANaCE POLICY
SUMMARY
Mr. HELMS. Mr.. President, the
Senate has been debating the line
legal and technical paints of an 18-
year-old,treaty negotiating record =W
a 15-year-old :ratification :hearing
record on the SALT I alma-Ballistic
Missile Treaty. This is a very esoteric
and highly complex debate, ,and unfor-
tunately, it is also distracting the
Senate from the real issue. The Senate
needs to wake up and smell the
coffee-America is is gravest mortal
danger and we should abrogate the
ABM Treaty. The pout is, Mr. Presi-
dent, that the ARM Treaty is imped-
ing curability to defend our supreme
national, Interests. Instead of debating
fine legal. and technical points of our
ABM 1re4y compliance .policy, we
ld be corned with a -h
h
print nadioarwdde ABII defense,
and they will have an operational na-
tionwide'AIM defense whin a year
or even less. While the Western de-
mocracies complacently debate ABM
compliance policy interpretations and
are foolishly preoccupied with negoti-
ating for a new INF Treaty, the 'Sovi-
ets are always carefully calculating
the correlation of forces. "Me chilling
impact of this new information is that
the Soviets will soon be able to use
their overwhelming strategic offensive
first strike capability, combined with
their emerging monopoly on nation-
wide ARM defense, for nuclear black-
s
ou
mail.
more momentous debate over the very Let us not forget, Mr. President,
core of our national necnrtty. The that Adolf Hitler similarly boasted in
Senate should be debating instead why private in the mid-1930's of his arms
we are u ally re anion develop-
men control treaty violations. at the cacao
our vi testing,
ital s strategic g, tan.and dearlyefense time .that he pushed his aggressive am-
oul
the face of now obvious Soviet .ABM bitions to the point of global war.
Treaty break out. Soviet Leader Gorbachev already :has
debate. we are allowing the Soviets to
lock in the final one-sided prohibition
on the United States SDL This one-
sided prohibition is all the Soviets
need to obtain overall offensive and
defensive strategic supremacy for all
time, to obtain the capacity for nucle-
ar blackmail and world domination
that comes with such military suprem-
acy. In fact, even the broad interpreta-
tion will not .allow the United States
actually to deploy SDL But deploy-
ment is the name of the game. Near-
term deployment of SDI is absolutely
essential to American national securi-
ty. Thus there is a head-on collision
between the ARM Treaty and Ameri-
can supreme national security inter-
ests.
In due course,. 1 will review of the
basis for what is really the secondary
issue, namely that of the legally cor-
rect, broad interpretation. But first I
must repeat that debating U.S. unilat-
eral ARM Treaty compliance is TL
relevant debate, distracting us the real debate. The real debate
should be over whether to abrogate
the ABM Treaty as a proportionate re-
sponse to Soviet ABM Treaty break
out. Indeed, Secretary of Defense
Weinberger has declared that nothing
could be more dangerous to Western
security than the Soviet deployment
of a nationwide ABM defense, a de-
ployment that would amount to break
out.
Mr. President, the American people
should be provided with some very
frightening, newly declassified infor-
mation. The public should now be
aware that the CIA has evidence that
the Soviets have actually privately ad-
mitted and boasted to themselves that
their Krasnoyarsk radar violates the
ABM Treaty. Even more significant is
the fact that the Reagan administra-
tion now believes that the Soviets are
working on an integrated plan for a
nationwide AIIM -defense.
Indeed, the Soviets already have es-
tablished the prohibited base ,for is
domination that would have made
Hitler very envious indeed. The bite
Soviet Leader Brezhnev prophetically
stated in 1973 that by 1985 the corre-
lation of forces would have shifted so
decisively in Soviet favor that the
Soviet Union -would be able to exert its
will in any region of the world it
wanted. Mr. President, that is exactly
where the Soviets are today.
Mr. President, our distinguished col-
league, Senator NUNN, has focused our
attention on the issue of American
unilateral disarmament. This issue has
distracted us from the fundamental
threat. But he has done one construc-
tive service to the Senate, and I con-
gratulate him for this service. Senator
NUNN has focused our attention upon
the nearly 20-year history of the
SALT process. There is much in this
history that the Senate needs to be re-
minded of, because in my opinion, the
SALT process has definitely under-
mined American national security in-
terests because it has failed to achieve
the two fundamental American obJec-
tives for SALT-prohibition of offen-
sive first strike and nationwide ABM
defenses for both nations. These two
United States fundamental objectives
were completely thwarted by the Sovi-
ets. Indeed, the Soviets have now
achieved a monopoly in both the key
capabilities that the United States in-
tended to prohibit. As Senator NUNN
suggested, let us carefully scrutinize
the history of the SALT process.
Many colleagues will be astonished by
what we will find.
Mr. President. there is strong, con-
verging evidence from many sources
that the Soviets deceived the United
States on the key issues in the negoti-
ations leading up to the 1972 SALT I
ARM Treaty and Interim Agreement.
The Soviets likewise deceived the
United States on the key issues in the
negotiations leading up to the 1979
SALT II Treaty. 'There is additionally
sttunig evidence that the Soviets in-
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/10: CIA-RDP94B0028OR000700020007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/10: CIA-RDP94B0028OR000700020007-3
April 8, 1987
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 4837
tended to violate these treaties from
the very moment of their signature.
In late May 1972, the evidence of
Soviet SALT I negotiating deception
and their intention to violate was sup-
pressed within the United States Intel-
ligence community, was withheld from
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and from
Congress. There is authoritative testi-
mony to the Senate on this suppres-
sion, and on the meaning of the intelli-
)pence suppressed. The Senate may
thus have been misled by the execu-
tive branch on all the key issues of the
SALT I agreements. Therefore, the
Senate may have approved the SALT I
agreements without full knowledge of
the situation.
Mr. President, this evidence was sup-
pressed. Indeed, it follows from this
suppressed evidence of Soviet decep-
tive negotiating and violation inten-
tions at the beginning of the 20-year
SALT process, that the entire SALT
process itself has been conducted on
false assumptions about Soviet reci-
procity from the very start in 1967.
Early this year, the Senate voted 93
to 2 that Soviet violations of existing
arms control treaties are an important
obstacle to the advice and consent of
two-thirds of the Senate for ratifica-
tion of any new treaties. President
Reagan recently reported to Congress
that:
A number of activities involving SALT II
constituted violations of the core or central
provisions of the Treaty frequently cited by
the proponents of SALT II as the primary
reason for supporting the agreement.
If Soviet violations of central provi-
sions of existing treaties are so impor-
tant that they might prejudice the
Senate against voting for ratification
of new treaties, then it may also be
true that the Soviet violations of exist-
ing treaties themselves constitute an
important obstacle to continued
United States unilateral compliance
with those violated treaties. As Presi-
dent Reagan told Congress for the
first time on March 10, 1987:
It was, however, the continuing pattern of
noncompliant Soviet behavior that I out-
lined above that was the primary reason
why I decided, on May 27, 1986. to end U.S.
observance of the provisions of the SALT I
Interim Agreement and SALT II.
If Soviet violations of the central
provisions of both the SALT I Interim
Agreement and the SALT II Treaty
were serious enough to fintilly cause
the President to abrogate these agree-
ments, albeit only long after both had
expired, perhaps the President and
the Senate will also decide to abrogate
the SALT I ABM Treaty for the same
primary reason. After all, Soviet ABM
Treaty break out violations are even
more fllgrant, and are much more
dangerous to American national secu-
rity.
THE SOVIET BROAD INTERPRETATION IS CORRECT
FOR BOTH SIDES
The Reagan administration's legally
correct, broad interpretation of the
ABM Treaty has easily survived the
attacks of the "Blame America First"
bloc in Congress. The broad interpre-
tation is the Soviet interpretation, be-
cause the Soviets clearly and repeated-
ly refused to agree to the narrow in-
terpretation, and Soviet spokesman
have clearly stated since 1972 that the
broad interpretation was their view. I
find it difficult to disagree with the
Soviets, because the broad interpreta-
tion is the correct one. Of course, the
broad interpretation suits Soviet inter-
ests, because the Soviets are probably
ahead of the United States in develop-
ing and testing SDI-type, space-based
ABM defenses, while claiming to be
complying with the ABM Treaty.
Moreover, the Soviets proposed a
draft space treaty containing the
narrow interpretation to the United
States in March, 1985. This Soviet pro-
posal tried to ban the development
and testing of space-based ABM de-
fenses. This Soviet proposal therefore
assumed that development and testing
of space-based ABM's were not already
banned' by the ABM Treaty. This is
precisely the broad interpretation of
the ABM Treaty, and this Soviet pro-
posal itself confirms that the Soviets
had always embraced the broad inter-
pretation. The Soviets clearly thought
that development and testing of exotic
spaced-based ABM's was not banned
by the ABM Treaty. Their proposal
was obviously intended to stop U.S.
strategic defense initiative research
and development and testing dead in
its tracks. Their proposal conclusively
indicated that they believed that the
broad interpretation was the correct
interpretation, and so they wanted to
Induce the United States into agreeing
to being constrained by the narrow in-
terpretation.
Judge Sofaer had reportedly stated
that after his extensive research into
the SALT I negotiating history, he
was forced to conclude that the Sovi-
ets had deceived the United States ne-
gotiators into believing that they had
somehow achieved a mutual ban on
development and testing of ABM's
based on new physical principles,
when in fact the United States nego-
tiators had achieved no such result.
Judge Sofaer has thus stumbled upon
another significant but long unknown
case of Soviet SALT I negotiating de-
ception.
CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF SOVIET NtE,GOTIATING
DECEPTION IN SALT I
Mr. President, on March 2687, in
the joint Senate Foreign Relations
Committee and Judiciary Committee
Hearings on the ABM Treaty interpre-
tation, I asked Assistant Defense Sec-
retary Richard Perle an important
question. I asked: "Does the SALT I
Interim Agreement negotiating record
indicate that the Soviet SALT negotia-
tors deceived the United States on the
issue of whether heavy ICBM's were
prohibited from replacing light
ICBM's?"
Richard Perle answered:
Yes, Senator. I believe this is not only the
most dramatic instance of Soviet deception,
but the one that carried the gravest conse-
quences. It was one of the most important
provisions of the Interim Agreement, that
launchers for light missiles could not be
converted into launchers for heavy missiles.
We were unable in the negotiations to get
the Soviets to agree to a definition of the
terms heavy and light. There were limita-
tions in the treaty (sic) on the extent to
which the silos in which missiles were based
could be enlarged. At the time, the Soviets
had a new missile, vastly more effective and
substantially larger than the light missiles,
the launchers for which could not be con-
verted to launchers for heavy missiles.
I believe they concealed the testing of
that missile until after the Interim Agree-
ment was signed, and we subsequently, to
our dismay. discovered that the light SS-l is
were replaced by SS-19 missiles that, by the
understanding conveyed to the Senate of
the United States would surely have consti-
tuted heavy ICBMs. I know that this was a
particular concern because that conversion
meant a sixfold increase in the number of
Soviet warheads and a very substantial in-
crease in the throw-weight of that ballistic
missile force.
In addition to the evidence in t4
SALT I diplomatic negotiating record
indicating Soviet deception, there is
important, dramatic, intelligence evi-
dence indicating Soviet deception on
the SS-19 heavy ICBM.
This evidence is the best and most
authoritative evidence of the inten-
tions of the Soviet leadership regard-
ing negotiations and compliance in the
entire 20 year SALT process.
This evidence was acquired in 1972.
The story has already been published
in many places, including at least
three times in the CONGRESSIONAL
RECORD. One example is William
Beecher's article in the Boston Globe
of October 10, 1976, entitled "United
States May Reply to Soviet Rays."
There are several other unclassified
descriptions of this evidence. William
Safire wrote about it in the New York
Times article of August 6, 1981, enti-
tled "Deception Managers." It was de-
scribed in detail in the Heritage Foun-
dation 1980 book, "Mandate for Lead-
ership." And it was referred to in Ad-
miral Zumwalt's testimony to the
Senate Defense Appropriations Sub-
committee on March 28, 1984, and in
Air Force magazine of December 1978,
January 1979, and March 1979.
CIA has cleared several articles and
books containing this information for
publication.
Most recently, Assistant Defense
Secretary Richard Perle mentioned
this evidence in testimony to the joint
hearing of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee and Judiciary Com-
mittee on March 26, 1987. Here is the
way these pieces of unclassified infor-
mation on this "most dramatic" evi-
dence of Soviet deception in SALT
seems to fit together:
William Safire wrote:
The first Inkling of [Soviet SALT I negoti-
ating deception] came to us in May, 1972.
via "Gamma Gupy," our tuning in to limou-
sine telephone conversations between [the
late Soviet General Secretary] Leonid
Brezhnev, [the former Foreign MIEtbter]
Andrei Gromyko. and Soviet missile .rla I-
ers at the Moscow [SALT I] SullMiit Obll'
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/10: CIA-RDP94B0028OR000700020007-3 i