VN-PRC-USSR-KAMPUCHEA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00100R000100030007-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2001
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: April 9, 1979
• Content Type: NOTES

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 S E C R E T.
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DCI Notes
9 Apr 79
I. Retrospective on Chinese performance
Whether mil performance was restrained entirely because of
limited objectives or because ineffectiveness also - unclear
Even casualty ,igures,.v ry uncertain but-,does appear
Signalled intent - especially their limited political objectives
So doing skillfully controlled their risks
were sizeadke vninese ~psses
Pr3~bAbly prepared
very meaningful manner in fulfilling commitment to VN; & in
fact backed down before PRC challenge
r+2C` Especially in ASEAN created impression Sov not respond in
o-accept
Worthwhile from PRC viewpoint prima ily because of i pact on i
of UDR as Asian power, . j/ft/do 4. ao G
Chinese must view as net plus - primary objective
4. Secondary objective was to rescue beleaguered Kampuchea
Succeeded in short term at least
30,000 VN troops withdrawn
5. Two downside impacts:
a. Impression of an aggressive PRC embedded in some areas where
counts - most particularly Japan \ Z
0
Must spill over to ASEAN also
Though Thais seem to be accommodating PRC very well
..:_b. Sov-VN response
Can PRC "win" over long run
II. Focus on Kampuchea
1. Most likely way for Sov/VN to attempt recoup from this setback
would be to complete conquest of Kampuchea
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 S E C R E T,
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Paradox:
(Kam-VN Mil.
Forces Map)
VN continued movement of forces to north -
100-150,000 in Hanoi - border area now vice
70,000 in Dec.
Including 3 div. units from Kampuchea
But continued mobilization-
Econ cost noted in PDB
Whether can hold out until rainy season -
May? - June/July
Unclear what PoT Pot's status is -
VN effort clearly aimed at sealing border
How resolute will Kriangsak be?
Didn't give much in Moscow
e. If VN really are successful - i.e. not stamp out guerrillas
but turn into running sore that doesn't hobble rice planting
economy in countryside & control of urban areas -
-Rules out compromise solution
-Replaces challenge of 25 Dec. before PRC
If is reasonably decisive resolution in Kampuchea in favor of VN
(Mil. Forces Along
Sino-VN Border Map)
-Impact on PRC-VN talks adversely
-Could tempt PRC apply new pressures
Renewed hostilities not out of?
Still retain 400,000 troops
Apparently wanted to suck VN main force units into
battle
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S E C R E T
 S E C R E T
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Only got a few
Now have rare
Expensive in losses
Would blame outbreak on VN
3. If stand off in Kampuchea - will make talks more meaningful
Seems clear everyone thinking of some compromise formula in
Kampuchea
Coalition gov't acceptable to both - or continue struggle
in new way
Sihanouk's name always crops up
Have to separate from Beijing somehow
Have get Sihanouk to play -
Certainly not with Pol Pot
Another option - build on KCP
But Pol Pot is the most effective leader
Besides no practical way to get Pol Pot to step aside -
If do, danger will be VN conquest.
Looks like prolonged negotiation
Lots maneuvering behind scenes
Militarily in Kampuchea
Pol Kamp, Hanoi, Beijing
III. Key factor will be direction of Sov-VN relationship
1. Chinese policy seems to be to drive VN into greater dependence on
Sovs
Economic disruption
Mil. needs - e.g. airlift
PRC apparently believe/hope that such dependence will lead to
tensions & resentments that will turn VN onto more balanced
course between PRC & USSR
One hand - Sovs probably more wary of becoming too identified
with Hanoi's interests as did publicly with treaty Friendship
last Nov. -
& then having their promises called in highly risky
circumstance
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Even preliminary entry into Cam Rahn Bay is having
perception impact in Far East
Sovs never been delicate in such dealings - & Sovs
recognize VN tough ally deal with
IV. Soviet dilemmas
1. Little choice other support VN - problem of how to contain the
commitment to reasonable bounds where reputation not at stake
beyond ability control events
Natural avenue is to strengthen position vis-a-vis Beijing
independently of VN - i.e. Sino-Soviet border
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SECRET
25X1D
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5. Fortunately both read other's signals properly - questions now:
-How much more confidence does Deng feel -
More or less cautionary as goes forward
-How concerned are Sovs at recouping any loss of image?
-How much were Sovs. persuaded that PRC was supported by US -
& hence is there a permanent chance in balanced power in
Both sides have more forces in position
Both have: larger commitment
Can negotiation substitute for tension & hostilities?
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SECRET
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Indochina
A. China/Vietnam
1. Chinese attack into Vietnam which began 17 February cul-
minated with fall of Lang Son on 2 March; on 5 March Chi-
nese forces ordered to pull back into their own territory.
-- Attack was of major proportions; build-up involved
element of as many as 10 armies totalling over 400,000
men, with 2 additional armies in reserve. Chinese
air strength also built up to 600-700 aircraft
-- Perhaps 130,000 men actually took part in fighting
inside Vietnam (approx. 12 divisions) with remainder
just across border
-- Magnitude of Chinese effort evident from fact that
until 24 December only forces Chinese had along VN
border were numerically small local units.
-- We estimate Vietnamese initially had 40-50,000 men
along border, but VN forces were augmented as fighting
progressed.
2. Size and nature of Chinese build-up and political signals
from Chinese sources on need to "punish" Vietnam convinced
us beforehand that attack was likely, and we issued warning
memorandum on 14 February.
3. Chinese had several objectives in mind:
As just noted, ostensible purpose was to "punish" VN
for alleged "provocations" along Sino-VN border (in-
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-- However, more fundamental (but unstated) purpose was
to demonstrate to Vietnamese that China would not
permit them to intrude with impunity into areas of
SEA of vital concern to China, e.g., Kampuchea. In
wake of VN invasion of Kampuchea, China wanted to
show it was not a "paper tiger".
-- China's offensive also intended to show USSR that it
cannot get away with using Vietnamese as Soviet sur-
rogates in SEA in way that Cubans have been employed
in Africa and Middle East.
-- Some Chinese sources said, too, in a wider context
China wanted to make point to the US that the way to
respond to Soviet "hegemonism" and activities of
Soviet-backed Cubans is not to be passive but to
react with force.
-- At same time, Chinese did not desire a prolonged
conflict. At beginning of attack they said fighting
was to be limited both in extent and duration, and
that Chinese forces would be withdrawn since Vietnam
had been taught a lesson.
? We foresaw Chinese goals might indeed be limited
and speculated in 14 Feb warning memo that
fighting might not last beyond several weeks,
and would not extend to attacks on Hanoi.
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? Chinese clearly were considering international
opinion - with Vietnam widely blamed for in-
vading and occupying Kampuchea, they did not
wish to be put in same position.
? They also wished to keep scale of hostilities
below threshhold which would compel Soviets to
intervene in support of Vietnam.
4. Invasion began at dawn on
17th and Chinese attacked virtu-
ally every town, village, and military Position along
entire 1300 km frontier.
Most assaults by battalions or regiments.
One or more divisions attacked at Lao Cai, Cao Bang,
Dong Dang, Mong Cai.
-- Tanks and artillery provided fire support to in-
fantry.
Chinese began by seizing a narrow 5 to 10 km strip,
but expanded this once VN border defenses overcome.
-- Deepest incursions in Lao Cai, Cao Bang, and Dong
Dang-- Lang Son areas.
- As much as 25 kilometers deep from Lao Cai
- At least 25 kilometers in Lang Son area
- Up to 50 kilometers deep in Cao Bang sector
5. Initial major Chinese military objective was destruction
of Vietnamese provincial forces defending border region.
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-- Seven or 8 such divisions, 40-50,000 men, were posted
to defend Lao Cai, Cao Bang, Dong Dang-Lang Son, and
Mong Cai.
6. Second major objective was to inflict significant casual-
ties defending Hanoi were initially not committed, but
later some elements were sent into combat.
7. Third major objective was to ease pressure on Kampuchean
resistance by forcing Hanoi to recall some combat forces
from that region.
-- This purpose also accomplished to some extent.
8. Lang Son became major set-piece battle following Chinese
capture of Dong Dang.
-- VN moved infantry, tanks, APC's, artillery northwards
partly from main force units near Hanoi, but, also
from elsewhere in Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea.
-- VN sent considerable number of aircraft north (F-S's,
MIG-19s, A-37s, C-130 cargo aircraft, helicopter
gunships and transports). However, air power not
used by either side except for reconnaissance.
-- Vietnamese main forces alerted throughout Vietnam
and nation-wide mobilization order issued.
-- Accordingly, Chinese capture of Lang Son and defeat
of VN main force units was, in fact, a significant
victory even if in scale it was less than Chinese
had hoped.
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- Seven or 8 such divisions, 40-50,000 men, A,:-.-!re posted
to defend Lao Cai, Cao Bang, Long Dang-Lang Son, and
'Jong Cai.
6. Second major objective was to inflict significant casual-
ties. Units defending Hanoi were initially not committed,
but later some elements were sent into combat.
7. Third major objective was to ease pressure on Karapuchean
resistance by forcing Hanoi to recall some combat forces
.from that region.
-- This purpose also accomplished to some extent.
8. Lang Son became major set-piece battle following Chinese
capture of Dong Dang.
-- VN.moved infantry, tanks, APC's, artillery northwards;
partly from main force units near Hanoi, but, also
from elsewhere in Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea.
-- VN sent considerable number of aircraft north (F-5's,
1.1IG-19s, A-37s, C-130 cargo aircraft, helicopter
gunships and transports.) However, air power not
used by either side except for reconnaissance.
-- Vietnamese main forces alerted throughout Vietnam
and nation-wide mobilization order issued.
-- Accordingly, Chinese capture of Lang Son and defeat
of VN main force units was, in fact, a significant
victory even if in scale i
had hoped.
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Kampuchea. As many as 30,000 troops moved from
Kampuchea; 2 divisions from Laos.
? Removal of troops from Kampuchea (which continues
despite Chinese withdrawal) should considerably
improve prospects of Kampuchean resistance.
? Draw-down of VN forces in Laos has created con-
cern in Hanoi (and among Soviets as well) that
China may now attempt to support anti-government
elements in Laos.
-- Contrary to situation prior to VN invasion of Kampuchea,
Vietnamese now must be prepared for Chinese attack
at any time, and must maintain large numbers of main
force troops along Sino-VN border against this con-
tingency.
-- In sum, Vietnam now stretched thin militarily, aware
that it cannot afford to ignore threat of Chinese
attack in any further moves it makes in SEA despite
Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with the Soviets,
and confronted with heightened domestic economic and
political difficulties.
11. Advantages not wholly to Chinese, however, since Soviet
role in VN enhanced as a result of the fighting.
-- VN now receiving additional quantities of Soviet
military aid, including MIG-21s and SA-3s.
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-- Soviets may have gained access for their naval
vessels to VN ports. Soviet naval ships are now
at Danang, and have called at Ho Chi Minh City and
Haiphong. No such visits occurred prior to Chinese
attack. Soviet transport aircraft also providing
VN with internal airlift.
-- In event of renewed fighting, Soviets may feel com-
pelled to react more forcefully than in this instance.
-- Vietnamese will nevertheless probably try to keep
Soviet role from becoming too great, e.g., by holding
back on granting full base rights for Soviet air and
naval units.
B. Kampucheans continue stiff resistance in countryside
1. Fighting throughout the country, particularly in the SW.
2. VN re-supply effort hampered -- roads trenched, bridges
destroyed.
3. Quick VN thrust took major towns and roads but did not
destroy Kampuchean forces. Pol Pot believed operating
near Battambang.
4. Sixteen of 31 VN combat divisions initially tied down.
-- VN involvement may have reached to as many as
19 divisions.
-- However, Hanoi now withdrawing equipment (artillery,
comma gear, anti-tank weapons) supplies, and main
force units (infantry, engineers).
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-- Difficulties thereby increased for VN forces re-
maining in Kampuchea.
-- Kampuchean forces may even be regrouping into
division-size combat units.
5. Chinese apparently managing to get supplies to Kampucheans
via Thailand. Kampucheans also appear to have cached
ample supplies of food, weapons, and ammunition.
6. If Kampuchean resistance can hold out until rainy season
arrives in May-June, odds favoring Vietnamese will be con-
siderably reduced and prospects improved for establishment
of viable anti-VN political structure.
-- However, Pol Pot regime resented by Kampuchean people,
who apparently support him either because they hate
the Vietnamese more or because they fear reprisals
if they cooperate with VN.
7. Sihanouk in Peking, where Chinese may use him to head a'
new "coalition government" more acceptable to Kampuchean
and world opinion than Pol Pot.
-- Problem for Chinese is that Sihanouk refusing to
work with Pol Pot.
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1. Soviets watched with concern:
2
3. Soviet officials warned in non-specific terms of possible
Soviet retaliation if Chinese went "too far."
-- However, Moscow careful not to commit itself in
advance to any course of action.
-- Recent speeches by senior Soviet leaders including
Brezhnev have not gone beyond demanding that Chinese
withdraw from VN; Brezhnev suggested that early con-
clusion of SALT agreement with US outweighed con-
siderations favoring Soviet intervention at least
under present circumstances.
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-- Soviets now congratulating themselves for their
"statesmanship" in not being sucked into direct
involvement by the Chinese.
4. Soviet Options
-- Consultations (under November 78 Treaty). Chief
of Soviet Foreign Ministry SEA Division visited
Hanoi recently to discuss "problems of common
concern".
-- Naval show of force in Vietnam area; presence at
Haiphong, Cam Ranh Bay, or Danang.
- Five or six ships called at Danang in week be-
ginning 4 March. Possible Haiphong also port
of call. (Naval vessels never visited Vietnam
before.)
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-- Military pressure against or across Soviet border
with China.
6. Balance in North favors Soviets who could move with little
or no. warning.
-- Soviets
-- Chinese
-- Soviets
-- Chinese
-- Soviets
-- Chinese
44 divisions (500,000 men).
98 divisions (1,700,000 men).
12,000 tanks.
4,500 tanks.
2.250 aircraft.
2,700 aircraft, but less capable.
7. Soviet reaction related nature and severity of Chinese move
against VN.
Clearly wished to avoid protracted ground engage-
ment in China.
-- However, Chinese saw some risk of Soviet attack,
sent some reinforcements north and moved back civilian
population in NE as well as NW. Chinese probably
watching unusual Soviet local movements adjacent to
NE China very closely.
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