INTERNATIONAL ISSUES REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01184R000200700001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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EN\ Directorate of
Intelligence
MASTER F
~Jf FUN
VA a
si4~1i(t< '
Review
International Issues
GI HR 84-002
April 1984
Copy 5 3 9
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International Issues
Review
This publication is produced by the Office of
Global Issues. Some issues contain articles drafted in
other offices. Some articles are preliminary or
speculative in nature, but the contents are formally
coordinated as appropriate with other offices
within CIA. Occasionally an article represents the
views of a single analyst; these items are clearly
designated as noncoordinated views.
Secret
GI HR 84-002
April 1984
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Declining West European
Arms Sales: Implications
for the United States F-
Recession in developed countries and financial difficulties faced by
some LDCs are reducing arms sales by West European arms
manufacturers.
International Narcotics Burmese Communist Party
Poses Major Obstacle
to Narcotics Control
Since the reduction of Chinese support in the mid-1970s, the
Burmese Communist Party has depended on the illicit drug trade to
finance its insurgency. The BCP's increased role in narcotics
trafficking will complicate antinarcotics control efforts)
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iii Secret
GI HR 84-002
April 1984
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Aviation Web
Cuban air service is only a modest source of hard currency for the
Cuban economy but plays an important role in meeting Havana's
political objectives, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbe-
an.
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Declining West European
Arms Sales: Implications
for the United States '
Summary West European arms sales are declining. Recessions in developed countries
and financial difficulties faced by some LDCs are reducing arms pur-
chases. Aggressive US sales in Southwest Asia and the Middle East
following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan also have hurt West European
sales. West European reactions to these unfavorable trends pose serious
implications for the United States.
Declining Sales
West European arms suppliers have been hurt more
than the United States and the Soviet Union by the
sluggish international arms market (figure 1). After
peaking at $15 billion in 1980, West European arms
sales averaged only about $7.5 billion annually in
1981 and 1982 (table).' We believe 1983 figures also
will be in this range. French press sources, for exam-
ple, indicate that Paris expected a sizable sales drop in
1983 with orders in the first half of the year down by
25 percent over the same period in 1982 (figure 2).
Economic problems have caused this decline. Reces-
sion in the developed countries, international financial
problems in many LDCs, and, most importantly, the
decline in oil revenues by Middle Eastern states have
caused defense budgets and arms sales to shrink. For
taken place between the United Kingdom, Italy, and West Germa-
ny as part of the Tornado aircraft program. We have not included
them in this study, but their inclusion would not change the overall
trend on declining West European arms sales, however. To estimate
their value, we assumed a base price of $35 million for the aircraft
in 1978, multiplying this price by the OECD deflators and by
orders placed for the aircraft by the United Kingdom, Italy, and
West Germany between 1978 and 1982~
Figure 1
Arms Sales, 1973-82
0 I 1 I I 80 25X1
1973 75 82
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Arms Sales and Market Shares, 1973-82
Total
Western United Sov
Europe States Uni
iet
on
Others
Billion 1977 US $
1973
24.0
6.0
9.0 7.
0
2.0
1974
30.0
7.5
12.5 7.
5
2.5
1975
33.5
8.5
18.5 4.
5
2.0
1978
26.0
10.0
10.0 3.
0
3.0
1979
31.5
8.5
12.0 8.
0
3.0
1980
46.5
15.0
14.5 14.
0
3.0
1981
29.0
1982
38.0
1973
100
25
38 29
8
1974
100
25
42 25
8
1975
100
25
56 13
6
1976
100
19
57 17
7
1977
100
30
40 23
7
1978
100
38
38 12
12
1979
100
27
38 25
10
1980
100
33
31 30
6
1981
100
21
28 21
30
1982
100
24
43 21
12
example, according to Embassy and
have reduced their
military procurements by as much as 50 percent as a
result of the soft oil market.
Financial difficulties faced by some LDCs are inter-
fering with West European plans to penetrate markets
dominated by the Soviet Union.
predominantly Soviet equipped air forces. Iraq has
also recently signed a new arms contract with Mos-
cow, although it prefers some types of more expensive
potential though less wealthy candidates for Western
penetration, Angola and Mozambique, have made
overtures to Portugal for training and ground forces
equipment but continue to rely on Moscow for grant
military assistance, according to Embassy sources.
US efforts to establish a military presence in South-
west Asia and the Middle East following the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan also have reduced West
European sales opportunities in countries that have
traditionally used West European arms to bolster
their nonaligned image. For example:
stepped-up US training and military assistance have
caused Egyptian military officers to prefer US
equipment, thus limiting their sales opportunities
despite Cairo's professed interest in diversification,
? Saudi military officials have informed British arms
salesmen that West European countries have little
? Morocco has exchanged increased US security as-
sistance for basing rights causing the Mitterrand
government to warn King Hassan about the dangers
of "superpower" involvement in regional disputes.
Similar US efforts in NATO's southern flank have
reduced West European arms sales.
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Figure 2
West European Arms Sales, 1973-82
Note scale change
1977 US $
France
Britain
Switzerland
- Sweden
Million US $
500
Greece
Turkey
West Germany
Italy
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Million US $
Denmark
Finland
Netherlands
Spain
Norway
Portugal
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At the same time, we believe West European arms
manufacturers will continue to replace US compo-
nents in their weapons systems whenever possible in
order to circumvent US export restrictions and in-
crease their freedom to market their products.
Finally, the completion of many defense moderniza-
tion programs in both Europe and the Third World
also contributed to this change in patterns. The last 10
years were marked by an expansion in Third World
arms inventories and a modernization of many West
European defense establishments, but armament cy-
cles now appear to be at a low ebb:
? Many military forces are absorbing equipment re-
cently purchased. Argentina, for example, has re-
ceived the last of its 14 Super Etendards, plans no
additional purchases, and is integrating these air-
craft into its fleet,
? Expensive arms procurements have exhausted funds
for additional purchases. Cost overruns on the Tor-
nado program, for example, forced Britain and
West Germany to make painful cuts in other pro-
grams, according to Embassy reports.
Implications for the United States
One West European reaction to this downturn has
been to place increasing pressure on Washington for
US military contracts, increasing existing tensions
with the United States over transatlantic arms coop-
eration. Recent US restrictions on specialty metals
imports did not seriously affect the already small
West European share of the US domestic arms
market but drew a vociferous response from NATO
Allies. West European governments are also tying the
fate of their arms industries to US plans to improve
the conventional defense of NATO. In bilateral and
multilateral discussions, British, West German, and
Norwegian officials have linked arms cooperation to
the development of emerging technologies, which
many military planners hope will lessen NATO's
dependence on tactical nuclear weapons, according to
Embassy reporting. We expect other NATO Allies to
make this connection in negotiations. As with the
British, they probably will insist upon a division of
labor between US and West European defense indus-
tries as a way of meeting the Soviet military challenge
We also believe, however, that West European aero-
space firms will increasingly turn to US partners for
advanced technology, cost sharing, and assistance in
penetrating the US market. British firms have already
collaborated with US industry in the development of
the Harrier V/STOL attack aircraft and the modifi-
cation of the BAe HAWK trainer for the US Navy.
Other West European firms had bid for the Navy
contract; Dornier teamed up with Aerospatiale to
offer the Alpha Jet through Lockheed. Additional
penetrations of the US market could be achieved if
West European firms were willing to abandon the
prestige and privileges of being the primary contrac-
tor for a weapon system and accept the necessity of a
US partner in order to lessen US domestic political
concerns.
US arms manufacturers also will face increasingly
aggressive marketing efforts from their West Europe-
an counterparts. We expect Washington to receive
more complaints from US arms manufacturers about
"unfair" trading practices-subsidized prices, bribes,
and excessive offset packages-being offered by West
European competitors. Undoubtedly, individual sales
will be lost to West European competitors as a result
of these practices, but we do not envision dramatic
inroads being made into US-dominated markets in
Japan, South Korea, Egypt, Israel, Pakistan, and
Saudi Arabia. West European suppliers should, how-
ever, continue to consolidate their position in Latin
America, taking advantage of marketing opportuni-
ties in Brazil, Argentina, and Chile.
and promoting a "two-way street."
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Moreover, the strong dollar will give West European
financing packages an added attractiveness in the
short term. For example, currency fluctuations in-
creased a $2 million French price advantage over a
US bid for Kuwait communications system to $9
million and helped clinch the deal for the French,
according to Embassy reporting.
Even with reduced sales, the transfer of production
technology to the Third World will accelerate. We do
not believe these transfers will be sufficient to improve
dramatically Third World defense industrial capabili-
ties. They will, however, improve the ability of Third
World military forces to threaten each other, as well
as US forces. US forward deployed naval units and
bases in the Middle East are particularly vulnerable.
Moreover, it is not clear that the West Europeans will
take adequate steps to prevent their most advanced
weapons and production technologies from being
passed to Soviet allies or compromised by Soviet
intelligence collection efforts. For example, Britain
has:
? Offered the rights to license production of the
RB199 engine, which powers the Tornado to Yugo-
slavia, according to press reports.
? Sold highly sophisticated thermal imaging sights to
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International Narcotics
Burmese Communist Party
Poses Major Obstacle
to Narcotics Control
Summary A major obstacle to narcotics control in Burma is that opium production
occurs in rugged territory largely controlled by insurgents, primarily the
Burmese Communist Party (BCP). Over the past two years the BCP has
steadily expanded its role as a major narcotics trafficker in the Golden
Triangle. The party's size, strength, and remote location of its base of
operation present nearly insurmountable problems for the Burmese Gov-
ernment and antinarcotics programs in the region. Accommodations
reached with other trafficking groups for processing and marketing
narcotics probably will enhance the party's ability to control a larger share
of the narcotics market. Involvement of political insurgents in narcotics
trafficking not only complicates Burmese enforcement operations but
limits the Burmese ability to promote economic development in the Shan
State, which might bring hill tribe cultivators into mainstream Burma.
Growing BCP Involvement in
the Narcotics Trade
Since 1982 the BCP has expanded its involvement in
narcotics in the Golden Triangle from supporting
opium cultivation to heroin processing and trafficking.
Initially the extent of BCP involvement in the narcot-
ics trade was limited to brokering opium sales within
its sphere of influence in the Shan State. Through
production in its own base area, purchases from allied
groups, and regulation of opium caravans, according
to US Embassy reports, the party gained control of
over half of the opium flowing through the Golden
Triangle.
Over the past two years as Thai
military actions against the Shan United Army, once
the principal buyer of BCP opium, have disrupted
narcotics trafficking in the Thai-Burmese border
area, the BCP has moved into heroin processing and
trafficking in its own right. The BCP was able to
make this shift in part because, according to US
Embassy sources, chemicals for processing heroin
became available from China as well as India. F_
Forging Alliances
In order to facilitate the BCP move into the narcotics
business, the party has established links to other
Burmese liberation and trafficking groups. Several
accommodating alliances have been formed or firmed
up:
? The Shan United Revolutionary Army (SURA) in
close alignment with the avowedly anti-Communist
3rd Chinese Irregular Force (CIF) has increased its
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Although one of Burma's oldest insurgent groups-
underground since 1948-the BCP did not become a
significant Shan State force until the late 1960s when
China substantially increased its political and mate-
rial support for the party. With the spillover of
China's Cultural Revolution into Burma, the insur-
gents, backed by Chinese troops, opened a front in the
northern Shan State east of the Salween River. The
party established administrative control over much of
the remote territory in northeastern Burma and parts
of the central Shan State, Kachin State, and western
Burma. By 1975 the party had grown large enough to
allow the Chinese troops to withdraw.
The gradual improvement in relations between Ran-
goon and Beijing in the 1970s apparently resulted in a
cutback in Chinese aid to Southeast Asian insurgen-
cies, and the Burmese Communist Party was forced
to look for additional means of support.
According to US Embassy
reporting, however, the BCP has remained dependent
on China as its primary source of military equipment.
dealings with the BCP in order to protect its heroin-
processing interests along the border. Since the
military attacks against the SUA, the SURA has
become a major buyer of BCP opium supplies.
Potential Challenges to the Burmese Government
The BCP is the strongest insurgent force in Burma
with a military strength currently estimated at 15,000
to 20,000 men. In their base areas east of the Salween
River, they operate with the home field advantages of
familiar terrain, languages, and inhabitants, while the
Burmese Army is largely restricted to garrison towns.
The party is slowly expanding its territorial control
through guerrilla operations and occasional large,
setpiece battles against the Burmese Army.
The Burmese Army has had to commit over half of its
military resources to counterinsurgency campaigns to
contain the insurgency.
The Burmese Army's inability to penetrate BCP-
controlled areas or establish a continued presence in
major opium-growing areas apparently has forced
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Rangoon to consider employing surrogate paramili-
tary troops-a tactic widely used by the Burmese
against the Communists in the late 1960s and early
1970s.
Implications for Narcotics Control
The BCP's increased role in all aspects of the drug
trade will make it even more difficult for the Burmese
to establish control over its major poppy-growing
areas. By integrating its operation vertically, the BCP
has consolidated its control over Burma's most pro-
ductive poppyfields and has established working rela-
tionships with other trafficking groups in the region.
Other factors will also complicate any Burmese anti-
narcotics efforts:
? Increased protection of farmers by the BCP from
the Burmese opium eradication effort probably will
increase the costs of carrying out this already
ineffective campaign.
? Crop substitution projects designed to wean
hill tribes away from opium production will not be
able to compete with opium farming particularly
when the price of opium is high as it is now.
According to Embassy reports, opium farmers in
Burma offer wages that are as much as three times
that of minimum wages paid in lowland Burma.
? The more diversified smuggling methods used by
traffickers may be even more difficult to police
inasmuch as they traverse parts of Burma, Thai-
land, and India where there is little government
presence.
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Summary
Communist Activities
Aviation Web
Cuba's Expanding Civil
remain the focus of these efforts.
Cuban civil aviation plays an important role in Havana's contacts with the
rest of the world. Cuban air service helps Havana's political goals by
establishing a presence in countries Cuba deems important, providing
support for Cuban military and economic missions overseas, and conduct-
ing intelligence-related activities. The aviation sector is also a modest-but
potentially important-source of hard currency for the beleaguered Cuban
economy. Havana has managed to develop, largely in the last 10 years, a
thin international network with connections to destinations in the Caribbe-
an, North and South America, Europe, and Africa. These routes are
serviced by a potpourri of about 60 mostly Soviet-built aircraft with
occasional aircraft leased from other countries. In the future Cuba will
continue to push the expansion of its civil aviation links to areas of the
world where it wants to extend its political influence, support its overseas
missions, and earn hard currency. Latin America and the Caribbean will
Cuba's Airlines
Since coming to power in 1959, Castro has slowly
built a small international civil aviation network with
connections to the Caribbean, North and South
America, Europe, and Africa. Cubana, the primary
national carrier, services a number of foreign and
domestic points with both scheduled and nonsched-
uled flights and performs a variety of tasks within
Cuba such as air ambulance service. Aero Caribbean
(also known as Aero Caribe), a government-owned
charter airline, was established in 1982 to tap the
lucrative tourist and air cargo markets in the Caribbe-
an area.
Cubana. In the more than 50 years since its founding,
Cubana has grown from a small domestic carrier to a
modest-size international airline with service to desti-
nations in the Caribbean, North and South America,
Europe, and Africa. Cubana began operations in 1929
as Compania Nacional Cubana de Aviacion Curtiss.
It opened its first international route in 1946 with the
inauguration of service to Miami. Prior to the Castro
takeover, Cubana operated a fleet of 10 mostly US-
built aircraft on routes to Madrid, Lisbon, Mexico
City, New York, and a number of Caribbean points.
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Cuba's civil aviation inventory of passenger and
transport aircraft is a hodgepodge of nearly 60
mostly Soviet-built aircraft of various vintages. Since
the mid-1970s the Cubans have been slowly modern-
izing their fleet. The entire jet inventory of 30 aircraft
has been acquired from the Soviets within the past
eight years. Almost half of these are medium- to
long-range jets four or five medium-range TU-154s
and nine long-range IL-62Ms. The rest of the fleet
consists of about 27 older propeller-driven aircraft.
Of these, the most significant are 18 highly versatile
AN-24 and AN-26 twin turboprops, which have the
range to reach any point in the Caribbean and are
used for both cargo and passenger transport. In
addition, Cuba also has a variety of US-manufac-
tured light aircraft and about 50 AN-2 single engine
biplanes.
Cuba has supplemented their limited aircraft fleet by
leasing Western and Soviet aircraft. These have
included DC-8s from Air Canada and FINNAIR,
Boeing 707s from Yugoslavia, and IL-62Ms from
Aeroflot. State Department reporting indicates that
Havana most recently has been trying to buy or lease
Boeing or McDonnell Douglas aircraft from Nicara-
Published international schedules show that-in spite
of the fact some routes have been dropped-Cubana
in the last five years has managed to add to its route
network. The airline currently operates 22 weekly,
two semimonthly, and two monthly flights to 18
countries over a route network of some 50,000 kilome-
ters (figure 1).
Cubana also frequently employs its aircraft on non-
scheduled charter flights. Because charter flights
usually can be organized on an ad hoc basis without a
formal bilateral air agreement, Cubana's charter net-
work serves a wider variety of destinations than its
scheduled route network (figure 2); nonscheduled Cu-
bana charters last year reached seven more cities than
the scheduled service. These charter flights are aimed
primarily at the tourist market to earn hard currency.
Cubana charter flights to Venezuela illustrate the
wide range of Havana's hard currency earning
schemes.
gua, France, Venezuela, and other countries.
Following the Castro takeover, air transport in Cuba
was nationalized, and Cubana was consolidated with
two smaller airlines as Empresa Consolidada Cubana
de Aviacion. With Cuba's swing into the Communist
sphere, however, international operations were drasti-
cally reduced as countries broke diplomatic relations
with the Castro government. Through the 1960s and
early 1970s, Cubana's international service was limit-
ed to Mexico City, Madrid, Prague, and Moscow.F_
In the mid-1970s, however, Havana began to rebuild
Cubana's international network as many Latin Amer-
ican countries normalized relations with Cuba and
Castro sought political and economic ties with the
non-Communist world. By the late 1970s new routes
linked Havana with numerous destinations in Latin
America and the Caribbean, three in Africa, two in
ernment's latest entry into civil aviation.
official dissatisfaction
with Cubana's failure to tap the tourist and cargo
markets in the Caribbean was a key factor in Aero
Caribbean's creation. The airline's first official flight
in December 1982 was to Cancun, Mexico, to pick up
tourists for Havana. It has since conducted frequent
nonscheduled passenger and cargo service throughout
the Caribbean and last fall inaugurated service to
Western Europe with flights to Milan. It also services
the Middle East, and one in Canada.
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Figure 1
Cubana Airlines: International Scheduled Routes, 1984
All flights from Europe to Cuba
fly vie Gander Newfoandlaad
Mexico,,-
Montreal
HAVANA ;
CaAi g6
, Bridgetown
St. George's Port-of-Spain
tPanamal
?Georgetown ,Paramaribo
Madrid.
Accra
- Scheduled route
- - - - Discontinued route
Boundary represertat on Is
not necessar9ly auth,oriGtiv
(%Maputo
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Figure 2
Cubana Airlines and Aero Caribbean: International Nonscheduled Routesa
All flighty from Europe to Coda
fly via Gander. Newfoundland
dary represenlato
re-Ssa,i Y -11,-:1
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a number of Cuban cities including Cayo Largo del
Sur, Varadero, Santiago de Cuba, Holguin, and Nue-
va Gerona on the Isle of Youth.
Bilateral Civil Aviation Agreements
Cuba's international route network of both scheduled
and nonscheduled flights is based primarily on bilater-
al civil aviation agreements with at least 46 countries
(table). Most of these agreements give Cuba overflight
rights and landing and service privileges, and provide
reciprocal rights in Cuba for each country's national
carrier. Only seven countries-the USSR, Czechoslo-
vakia, East Germany, Spain, Angola, Canada, and
Mexico-take advantage of their reciprocal rights
and fly scheduled routes to Havana. Most agreements
contain a charter clause to facilitate nonscheduled
tourist and cargo flights.
While Havana has generally abided by the terms of
its bilateral civil air treaties it has on several --
Cuban Bilateral Civil Aviation
Agreements, February 1984
USSR
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
East Germany
Hungary
Poland
France
Ireland
Portugal
Africa
Spain
Switzerland
United Kingdom
Angola Guinea
Cape Verde Islands Malagasy Republic
Congo Mozambique
Equatorial Guinea Sierra Leone
Ethiopia Tanzania
Ghana
' Algeria Libya
sions violated the agreements and has forced tempo- Iraq Morocco
rar suspension of service. For example Lebanon Syria
uin 1976 Vene- Asia
zuela suspended Cubana charter flights after several
Cuban attempts to infiltrate unmanifested passengers
hidden aboard Cubana aircraft into Venezuela. The
United States also suspended Cubana overflight
rights for two weeks in early 1983 following unautho-
Laos
Vietnam
Canada
United States
rized diversions near Griffiss Air Force Base, New
York, from the flight route to Montreal.
Barbados
Chile
Grenada a
Guyana
Jamaica
Mexico
Netherlands Antilles
Nicaragua
Panama
Peru
Suriname a
Trinidad and Tobago
Venezuela
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An IL-62M, flagship of the
Cuban fleet.
Military Uses of Civil Aircraft
Flights operating under Cubana and Aero Caribbean
supplement the Cuban Air Force's (DAAFAR) limit-
ed domestic transport capability.' The Air Force
supposedly operates no aircraft larger than an IL-14,
which has a capacity of only 8 metric tons and a range
of just 3,000 kilometers. The DAAFAR fleet is thus
totally inadequate for supporting Castro's foreign
military adventures.
Cubana nonscheduled charter flights have been used
to carry Cuban military personnel to and from Ango-
la.' These special "charters" supplement three sched-
uled flights each month that we believe also support
the Cuban military presence in Africa. During the
first five months of the Cuban airlift to Angola
(September 1975 to January 1976), Cubana aircraft
completed 45 flights between Havana and Luanda,
transporting an estimated 4,500 troops. Subsequent
loss of Barbados and Trinidad as refueling stops led to
Havana's decisions to lease Aeroflot IL-62M long-
range jets and to acquire identical jets for the Cuban
inventory to continue to accomplish this mission. An
average of 20 nonscheduled flights per month were
used in this fashion in 1983.
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Hard Currency Earnings
We believe that Cuba's civil aviation operations are a
modest-but potentially important-source of hard
currency for the country's beleaguered economy.
Many of the scheduled routes established for political
purposes are operated with low load factors and incur
significant losses. According to the American Embas-
sy in Lima, load factors on Cubana flights into and
out of Lima between January 1982 and mid-1983, for
instance, ranged from only 26 percent to 42 percent.
The run to Jamaica is also reported to be a loser, with
load factors of considerably less than 40 percent.' The
nonscheduled tourist charters, however, probably op-
erate profitably because they fly with higher load
factors and are usually ticketed with hard currency
payments. In particular, the charter flights to Can-
cun, Montreal, Bonn, Cologne, and Milan are likely to
attract more tourist traffic by offering special charter
flights and package arrangements, especially in West-
ern Europe. Since 1981, Cubana and two Cuban tour
agencies, CUBATUR and HAVANATUR, have
opened offices in Luxembourg, Frankfurt, and Paris
and signed contracts with European tour firms to
encourage tourist travel to Cuba. In the past year
charter flights have started during the summer season
between Havana and several West European cities,
including London, Frankfurt, Cologne, Bonn, and
Paris. Aero Caribbean has expanded the scope of its
operations to include cargo charters, and it recently
inaugurated service to Western Europe. The Ameri-
can Embassy in Lima reported recently that Cubana
was actively selling discounted tickets between Peru
and Europe as well as improperly ticketing passengers
for debarkation at the technical stop in Panama City.
To conserve the relatively small hard currency earn-
ings from its air operations, the Castro government
has attempted to cut Cubana's overseas operating
expenses.
be significant hard currency earners.
Cuba's desperate need for hard currency to service its
large foreign debt has led the Cuban regime over the
last three years to take a number of steps designed to
improve the profitability of its aviation sector. The
most important move has been an intensive effort to
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Future Directions
Cuba will continue to expand its civil aviation links
into areas of the world where it wants to extend its
political influence, support its overseas military and
civilian missions, and take advantage of the potential
for hard currency earnings. In such cases, nonsched-
uled Cuban air service will precede formal bilateral
air agreements and the inauguration of scheduled
service. Latin America and the Caribbean will remain
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his own in the region.
countries where the Cubans are likely to push for
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new routes include Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia,
Ecuador, and Belize.
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In Europe the most likely candidates for the establish-
ment of scheduled service are West Germany and
Luxembourg because of the potential tourist market
in West Germany and the Benelux countries. Cuba
already has charter arrangements with tour operators
in both countries.
Elsewhere, service is likely to be established to coun-
tries in which there is a current Cuban presence or
with which Cuba already has air agreements. These
would include, among others:
? In Africa: Ethiopia, Algeria, Guinea, Congo, Sierra
Leone, and Equatorial Guinea.
? In the Middle East: Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/08: CIA-RDP85TO1184R000200700001-7