MEMORANDUM ARGENTINA: THE CONTINUING POLITICAL CRISIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000120037-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 25, 2006
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: February 23, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

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Secret
MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
Argentina: The Continuing Political Crisis
CIA
DeCUMZNT SfRVIE~S G~R;~;f
FILE COPY
fifi N07 il[emnv
Secret
23 February 1973
Copy No.
110
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5EURE; l'
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
23 February 1973
ARGENTINA: THE CONTINUING POLITICAL CRISIS
The first round of Argentina's general election -- designed
to close out seven years of direct military rule and over 40 years
of political and institutional crisis -- is but two weeks away
(11 March), It seems likely, though far from certain, that the
balloting will take place as scheduled and that no presidential
candidate will obtain the requisite majority. One cannot be as
confident, however, that the second round (scheduled for April)
will take place peacefully and that the final results will be
honored. Most military officers appear witting to support the
electoral process, and most politicians seem more open than in
the past to compromising their differences. But President Alejandro
Lanusse, the principal architect of the military's effort at normal-
ization, now is set against moving forward to civilian rule unless
the military can impose guarantees for their continued control in
key policy areas. The staunch anti-government line and strong cam-
paign showing so far by Peron 's handpicked candidate, Hector Campora,
are the main cause of the last-minute alarm by General Lanusse and
some of his senior colleagues.
One thing then can be said with confidence at this juncture:
Argentina's longstanding political crisis will merely enter a new
phase during 1973. At best the election process will prove to be
a small (albeit important) step forward towards normalization. At
worst, a bloody step backward.
This memorandum has been discussed with other Offices in CIA,
but has not been formally coordinated.
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Even if an elected government takes office in May and the
various military and poZii ieaZ power brokers sort out their new
roles fairly amicably, the political truce could in time come
unstuck over such potentially divisive issues as the control of
terrorism or the making of economic policy. An important mile-
stone would be passed if the guvc.nvnent survived its four-year
term of office. There would then be a good prospect that the
next election would feature a generation of leaders unencumbered
by the battles and scars of the Peron era.
if, in contrast, the transition to civilian government is
aborted by the military, there would be a considerable prospect
of major popular disorders and a break in the unity of the Armed
Forces. The military would be able to restore order, but the
bitterness sown would work against a .resumption of stable rule.
No matter who succeeds Lanusse as President, the current
cordial relations between Argentina and the US are likely to be-
come somewhat more difficult. In any protracted national crisis,
US interests in Argentina would very likely become the target of
anti-military forces seeking to rally popular support to their
cause.
Setting the Stage: Lanusse vs. Peron
1. Late last month General Lanusse spoke bluntly to his
fellow senior officers on the status of his two-year labor to phase
out military rule: "With less than fifty days before the elections,
I must admit that the country's political situation and its probable
evolution are confusing to me and present a series of unknowns
which constitute ... a reason for deep concern." Lanusse's essential
goal had been to arrange the transition to elected government in
a manner that precluded any "leap into a void." He wanted a
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government characterized not only by the Legitimacy of a popular
mandate but also by a seriousness of purpose that gave promise of
eventual rel'--ef from Argentina's long bout with political abnor-
mality and l.ustitutional crisis.*
La'vvr-lse usually traces the origin of the institutional crisis
to '"he military's 1930 coup against an elected middle class
government affZzcted with a senile president and the pressures
from a world-wide depression. At that point Argentina was
reknowned fora stable canatitutioral system and an economy
that compared favorably with such second.-ranking ~:ations as
Canada. For most of the succeeding years the military has
felt iv necessary either to run or closely monitor the govern-
mcont. And the economy has grown only fitfully and slowly.
;military coup in 1943 opened the way for a decade of
'1olitica-Z domination by Colonel (later General) Juan Perlin.
.y the time the military threw Perlin out of office, in 1055,
he had built a solid working class constituency that has per--
sisted as the single largest political force i:: the country.
The Peronists were barred from i+unning candidates in the
only two subsequent presidential elections. In time the
military cast out of office both presidents -- Dr. Frondizi
in 1962 and Dr. ilZia in 1096.
After the 1966 coup the military establishment decided to
rule directly for as long as necessary to reconstitute the
nation with economic vigor, social peace, and political
maturity. Among other problems, the military lacked the
requisite unity. Lanusse, as Commander in Chief of the Army,
forced the first two military presidents out of office:
General Onganta in 1970 and General Levingston in 1971. At
that juncture Lanusse took over the presidency with the
pledge of a return to civilian rule.
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2. Lanusse at one point had planned to orchestrate an.orderly
transition to civilian rule through a broadly-based coalition, the
so-called Grand National Accord. The coalition was to include the
left-of-center Radical Party, the second largest organization-after
the Peronists, as well as various center-right (i,.e., conservative)
national and provincial parties. It was also to include-the bulk of
the Peronists, presumably under the leadership of the moderates con-
centrated in organized labor. Lanusse thus hoped to avoid-the frac-
tiouisness and excessive partisanship that had characterized Argentine
politics in past decades, and to assure instead an effective -govern-
mental majority. The participating groups would be confident that
their basi.c interests would not be tread upon; compromise and.con-
sen;us would be promoted in the name of the national interest; and
the military would be able to police the course of policy without too
heavy or obvious a inn. Ideally then, Lanusse's labors would .p-:omote
the reintegration of a good part of the Peronist movement into Argen-
tine electoral politics on terms acceptable to the basically anti-
Peronist Armed Forces.*
The returns from Argentina's last election, in 1963, underscore
Lanusse's concern about political diffusion. President Illia was
elected with but 26 percent of the vote. And 85 politicaI artier
were represented in Congress.
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3. The electoraL outcome Lanusse and his military colleagues
sought most to avoid was a. government dominated directly or in-
directly by Juan Per6n. They feared such a government would be
partisan and vindictive in character, working at once to polarize
society and to challenge the moral authority and influence.of.the
Armed Forces. In.short, while most military leaders shared.Lanusse's
conviction that the time had come for them to relinquish direct re-
sponsibility for running the government, few if any were prepared to
return their country's destiny to Perbn's hands.
4. The Lanusse government worked hard, throughout 1971 and
1972, to capitalize on the growing national sentiment for. easing the
bitter antagonisms of the past in order to release the country from
its treadmill of political fragility and fitful econ.o,nic growth.
One means by which the government sought to overcome political par-
ticularization was through the requirement of an absolute.majority
for the presidency. To minimize political polarization, moreover,
Lanusse personally courted the more pragmatic Peronist leaders,. hoping
they would participate in the Grand National Accord, with or without
Perbn's blessing. In particular he eased the chronic strains-between
the military gover,,...~;nt and, organized labor (led by moderate Peronists)
through a policy of generous wage increases.
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5. At the same time, Lanusse schemed to undercut the. remark-
able hold that Per6n. still, retained on his movement despite his
advanced age (77) and long exile (17 years). He removed. some of
the harassments (e.g., criminal charges) that Perlin regularly used
to excuse his reluctance to return to Argentina. Lay:usse even gave
up his own ambitions to be elected president in order to eliminate
Peron from eligibility; i.e., by requiring that all candidates be
resident in the country. and free of national office by 25.August
1972. Per6n declined this direct challenge to return on Lanusse's
terms. And when the Old Man finally acceded to the pressure of his
Argentine advisers and did return ( in November), a surprised.
Lanusse played his cards as best he could to strip him of his repu-
tation as superman and to force him to play the game as just another
politician.
6. At first reading it appeared that Lanusse's gamble in
calling Per6n's bluff would pay handsome dividends in terms of a
sensible electoral solution. The years had indeed robbed Per6n
of much of his charisma, and his followers -- old and young -- of
most of their fervor. There were no mass uprisings. No giant
rallies. But time had not stripped Peron of his political guile.
And while the populace was too sophisticated to receive -him as
savior, large numbers were still willing to follow his lead.
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7. As a consequence, during his 29-day stay in Argentina,
Perlin was able to organize his own anti-government coalition the so-called Justicialist Liberation Front -- which joined-to-
gether the various Peronist factions and several independent groups
(e.g., former President Frondizi's personal political vehicle).
Then Perlin was able to force through the presidential nomination
of his most loyal and dependent lieutenant, H6ctor Compora.. When
some leaders of the Front, both Peronist and non-Peronist, balked
at Per6n's imposition of Compora's candidacy and of a campaign
strategy of open confrontation with the military government, the
rank and file repudiated the protestants and forced most of them
to recant. The Peronists proceeded to wage a vigorous campaign,
rallying the old faithful under the slogan "Campora to the govern-
ment means Perlin to power." The Front's outspoken criticism of
the military regime has attracted support as well f :gym the large
floating "anti" vote. In.particular, the Peronists' rhetorical
support of revolutionary violence as a justifiable response to
government oppression has gained adherents among students and
young professionals.
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Pre-Election Tensions: General Lanusse vs General Lopez Aufranc?
8. As matters now stand, if the March election takes place and
the returns are counted fairly honestly, Campora would almost cer-
tainly command a plurality and would have a small chance of gaining
a majority. Although there has been no national election for 10
years, and there are no reliable polls on which to base an estimate,
it seems likely that his vote would fall somewhere in the range of.
35 to 45 percent. The Radicals, behind veteran leader Ricardo Balbin,
would come in second,..with some 20 to 30 percent of the vote. The
rest of the vote would be split among seven other candidates; this
would include four competing center-right candidates, testimony to
Lanusse's inability thus far to arrange even small accords. Thus,
if no electoral coalition were worked out in advance, a second round
would feature a runoff between Campora and Balbion. Each would be per-
mitted to form an electoral alliance with any other candidate re-
ceiving at least 15 percent of the vote on the first round. It is
difficult tc anticipate which of the minor candidates would qualify.
But it would seem that Francisco Manrique, a conservative former
general who served in Lanusse's government but is running against
the latter's express wishes, and Oscar Alende, a moderate leftist
with Communist backing, have the best chance. In contrast, retired
General Ezequiel Martinez, Lanusse's hand-picked choice to serve
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as vice-presidential anchor for a coalition ticket on the second
round, has so far generated almost no voter enthusiasm.
9. These then are the prospective electoral developments
that worry President Lanusse. On the one hand the Peronists seem
to be gathering strength, confidence, and combativeness: They have
an outside chance for a first round victory; heading them off in the
second round would be a.delicate and difficult task. On the other
hand, Lanusse's personal instrument for influencing the new govern-
ment, i.e., General Martinez as vice president, faces voter repudia-
tion. As a consequence of such a prognosis, Lanusse, over the past
several weeks, has been exercising his influence -- as Presi-
dent and as Army Commander -- to bring about a cancellation or at
least a change in the ground rules for the March election. He is
being strongly resisted in this by Army Chief of Staff Alcides
Lopez Aufranc, by most other senior Army generals, and by the Air
Force and Navy Commanders. They profess that it is too late for
such a move, that not only the integrity but also the unity of the
Armed Forces would suffer irreparably. Some are also motivated by
personal and prcfessional animus towards Lanusse or by a feeling
that Lanusse's ambitions to retain the presidency are clouding his
judgment. There apparently has been some talk of removing Lanusse
from power if he proves to be an irreconcilable obstacle to holding
elections.
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10. Lanusse feels he knows what is best for Argentina and its
Armed Forces - - that however much he and his colleagues may long. for
the end of military rule, they must not risk the return to power of
a ruthless and vengeful Peron. His views already are shared by a
number of important troop commanders. He still hopes that either
anti-military campaign rhetoric or incidents of violence staged by
Peronist and other extremists will swing full military support to
his anti-election position. In the name of restraining the Peronists,
but also in hopes of. provoking them, Lanusse has taken steps to bar
Peron from returning to Argentina during the campaign and has brought
legal charges that threaten to ban the Peronist ticket from the ballot
for alleged violations of electoral regulations. He has also pub-
lished a declaration of principles, which he insists are to be im-
posed unilaterally by the Armed Forces on the next government. These
include complete independence for the services to choose their own
commanders, the seating of the three commanders as cabinet officers,
the retention by the. military institution of a continuing responsi-
bility to preserve democracy and the independence of the judiciary,
and a ban on presidential amnesty for convicted terrorists.
11. So far Campora has resisted Lanusse's bait, though he. (as
well as Balbin) has repudiated the declaration of principles. The
Peronists are aware of the Lanusse - Lopez Aufranc split and are
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trying to outflank the President by seeking assurances from the
generals still dedicated to.elections, and by issuing pledges to
share governmental power with the Radicals and other non-Peronist
groups. Peron meanwhile is giving off mixed signals re conciliat-
ing or antagonizing the military, revealing in the process his
ambiguous feelings cn whether it is in his own best interest for
the elections to proceed.
Immediate Prospects: Living with Confusion and Unknowns*
12. The next several months -- indeed the next couple of
weeks -- are replete, in Lanusse's terms, with confusion and un-
knowns. There are, as we have indicated, certain underlying
positive factors at work. Most senior officers are convinced
that it no longer is good for their country or the military in-
stitution to continue with direct rule. Their animosity against
Peron and against politicians generally has been eroded by the
,passage of time and by the failures and frustrations of their
seven-year tour of office. Besides, they are aware that the
country is fed up with military rule, and they fear that a can-
cellation of the elections at this late date would provoke large-
scale popular disorders.
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13. Similarly, the politicians, or at least most of them,
are not as unyielding in their commitment to either the Peronist
or the anti-Peronist persuasion. There has been much talk and
even some action in recognition of the virtue of compromise, con-
ciliation, and consensus. Most notably, the Peronists and the
Radicals, the major contenders, are pledged to some form of post-
election cooperation. These trends reflect the deep pain over
the political and economic weaknesses that have chained Argentina
to decades of mediocrity. This pain is made harder to bear by the
evidence that archrival Brazil is progressing relentlessly towards
assumption of a role as regional leader and potential world power.
14. All well and good. But against such trends stand two
stubborn and power-conscious adversaries. Neither appears willing
to compromise further or to accept defeat gracefully. And it is
more than Lanusse and Peron. The election process itself has
brought out the distrust of old enemies imbedded in many of the
men in the middle, both soldiers and politicians.
15. We think it likely that the force of momentum and of
the general trends will prevail for the first round of the elec-
tion. It will probably take place on schedule; the Peronists
will be permitted to participate and they will gain the plurality.
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This will merely serve as a prelude to two months of tension,
threats, and hard bargaining, as the political and military power
brokers face up first to the final electoral. round (April) and
then to the actual transfer of power (25 May). Much will. depend
on how large a vote Campora commands in March and on the attitude
the Peronists take towards dealing with the military. It may be
at this point that a broad. coalition is constructed that joins the
Peronists, the Radicals, and the conservatives with military bless-
ing. (Ironically, Lanusse may have to be removed from office to
make his original plan work.) The Peronists instead could decide to
stand alone while the military help the Radicals erect an anti-
Peronist coalition. In accord with one or another of these scen-
arios, the second round could go off peacefully and the new
government could take office on 25 May. 'T'here might even be an
extended honeymoon period for the new government, as the I'croni sts,
Radicals, conservatives. and military cooperate to sort: out their
roles, either before or inncdiately after the transfer of power.
16. But there also will be an ever-present prospect that the
process will be aborted or stillborn. On the one side, the military
and diehard anti-Pcro~iist politicians could be the spoiler:; on the
other side, Pcrnn, Percmist extremists, or cynical politicians =Y
cause the collapse -- to avoid facing till to del"cat.
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.;orncr implicationo
17. One can say with confidence that Argentina's prolonged
institutional cri.si.s will, merely enter a new phase during 1973.
All. factors and pitfalls cons.idered, there wo-11d seem to be at
least an even chance that a civil inn governs nt wi 11. take office
in May and survive the year. Indeed, the various power brokers
may sort out their roles sensibly enough for the govcnuncnt to
pay more attention to milking policy than to retaining power.
But. this step forward w'Ulld only cncc~trngc a rt'surgenCe of po-
litical ccmpetit.ion. Two problem areas in particular stand out
as important trial!; to test the soundness of nny dccl.aratiorl of
p ul iti.c.11 pence: Terrorism and I:(-onr_amiC:,.
18. 11)c vc jth: Who tradr c.~cllr:ivcll it1 politic l tinlrr,e.,
are a: fa~_t ionali.. d c1: ilr it eldcr? ti~ irti for c;'lztr'cal of tl
E.?~ertb r~rrt tl)r< h i'1! t t it 1 :. l1 ri ar't' n1T1!1t a
t ?:. Z Ie rori t
urr 1r~1;.1tt~'J:. ~?1i1: pr tCli:ic?ri'- r?: ad1';1rlc'iIli: .-Iri.t lY::=1i+iC=1I
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tcv- t:tills.rl. 'i:l: th' tE`YYik: :'t' ldill -c al
~ to rcr c ti:t it w.'.
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activities strike among national leader:; will probably touch
off periodic spasm's of political di.visivenoss.
N. Over the past :evera1 years, active and retired military
officer.; have been a principal, target of the terrorist:;. About a
:core, including one IO lix'r president. of the republic , have been
of their diversity in v.icWlo.int, it is most
tail ikely that all of the terrori:;t organizations will. call n tnice
in honor of the ret'irn of civilian yom-nnx:nt. Bain will keep
:1(-t iv(, in hope..; of forcing a col lap:;e of the electoral experiment
and :;pe(Nling the evenUi;il revcrlut ion; otlx'r:;, to force the re-
lca:.c of their comrade:; frrrn pri::on." '17 military are just a5
1 ihcl~ to on tough ant i-t(1x)1 icics, nclt. link;
+ir~il of, cni ;titiitionaI );ti:iralitre'. tlurini-: peric(l. of tcnl:;ion and
ll:r nilit try a r ;il';co likely to in i?.t that there be
no ;;;-nr .tv fear Cc iivir.trd trrioi is-t:;. 71ie Pcroai ;t: Wcxilcl proh-
:xl`l1'