MEMORANDUM MARTIAL LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES: THE ROAD AHEAD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000120029-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2006
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: November 29, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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Secret
MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
Martial Law in the Philippines: The Road Ahead
CIA
DOCUMENT SERVICES RAWCN
FILE COP"Y
00 NOT DESTROY
Secret
29 November 1972
Copy No.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
29 November 1972
MEMORANDUM*
SUBJECT: Martial Law in the Philippines: The Road Ahead
The Philippines has often been described as the showcase
of democracy in Asia. The first Asian colony to gain independ-
ence after World War II, it has had uninterrupted representa-
tive government since 1946, maintained even through the Huk
rebellion of the 1950's. Now the tradition has been shattered
by President Marcos' use of the military to rule under martial
Law, and with amazingly Little domestic reaction. He has been
able t:) blunt opposition to his drive to stay in power by claim-
ing that he is acting against those who would subvert Philippine
democracy and by making broad promises of reform. Even with
extraordinary powers, however, Marcos may not be able, or willing,
to challenge the entrenched -Interest groups which have long con-
trolled political and economic Life in the country, and instead
may have simply set in ti,ain a trend toward authoritarianism and
increasing political instaelity -- perhaps on the Latin American
pattern.
But for the moment at Least, Marcos does have a chance to
deliver on his promise to shift the country in a new direction
toward economic development and social change that will benefit
the mass of the population so Long ignored. This Memorandum
explores the problems that he faces in this task.
This Memorandum was prepared by the Office of National
Estimates and coordinated within CIA.
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I. BACKGROUND*
1. President Marcos' declaration of martial law or
22 September was prompted by a mixture of motives, but `:one
evidence indicates that it basically reflected his over-
whelming determination to stay in power at any cost. he
President's move followed a series of incidents -- sor.e
real, some obviously staged by the government -- whic..i, had
created a growing atmosphere of uncertainty and fear of
subversion. The army's interception of a seaborne arms
shipment to the New People's Army (NPA) guerrillas ~n July
was heralded by Marcos as "proof" that the threat posed by
the communists was growing and that foreign communist powers
were directly involved.
Then came martial law.
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2. Marcos had been considering martial law for some-
time, along with a number of less drastic options to retain
power. The other possibilities included: delaying the
November 1973 presidential elections to coincide with those
of the legislature in 1975; running Mrs. Marcos or some other
protege as a surrogate candidate; or, adopting a parliamen-
tary form of government in which Marcos could be prime minis-
ter. But each of these options had risks. A surrogate
president might not remain malleable. And while Marcos' con-
trol of the Constitutional Convention assured its adoption of
the requisite amendments for synchronization of elections or
parliamentary rule, his growing unpopularity left their sub-
sequent passage in the required national referendum highly
questionable.
3. Apart from his obvious political self-interest,
Marcos -- and more certainly the military leadership -- may
have become genuinely concerned over socio-political trends
in the Philippines. He may have sensed growing public disgust
with the endemic crime and corruption which seemed to defy
solution under the Philippine's traditional system of govern-
mcnt dominated by competing business oligarchs. While Marcos
had reaped his share of spoil's tinder this system, he may have
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calculated that only drastic social and economic reform, would
reverse a steadily deteriorating situation which threatened
to increase public support for radical political elements.
Indeed, although the communists do not now seriously threaten
the Philippine government, they nonetheless have made signifi-
cant gains in recent years, both in numbers and in broadening
their geographic base. Finally, Marcos probably decided that
only by undertaking dramatic action and attempting to produce
spectacular changes could he hope to restore his own popular
standing sufficiently to risk any type of popular vote.
II. THE SHORT-TERM OUTLOOK
4. Marcos faces no immediate challenge to martial law
and should enjoy relatively clear sailing for the next few
months at least. The technocrats in the government and the
senior military leadership obviously share his belief that the
situation called for drastic measures. The powerful oligarchic
families are maintaining a discreet silence. The public has
reacted calmly, apparently grateful for the suppression of crime
and gangsterism, though somewhat cynical about Marcos' true
motives and his ability to effect fundamental reforms. For the
moment, however, most everyone seems willing at least to wait
and see what Marcos can do..
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5. Marcos' political opposition is demoralized and
disorganized, obviously caught off guard by the abruptness
of his move and the arrests that quickly followed. The
major spokesmen of the Liberal Party are in jail, and the
remaining Liberal members in Congress and the Constitutional
Convention have been thoroughly cowed. The urban radical
leftist groups have been constrained by the closure of the
universities and tight police surveillance. The NPA no doubt
will gain new recruits from those fleeing martial law, but
since they are unprepared for either rural or urban warfare,
the threat posed by the communists is not likely to increase
significantly in the next few months. Indeed, the most seri-
ous immediate challenge to the Marcos government's security
measures under martial law is not from the left, but from the
Muslim minority in the southern islands of Mindanao and Sulu.
Despite the government's rather cautious approach to the
Muslims, clashes have already erupted, and the potential for
further bloodshed remains high,
6. President Marcos' immediate objectives are to con-
solidate his control of the government and to establish con-
stitutional authority for his continuing rule beyond 1973.
He has set in ,notion a basic restructuring of the constitution
that will give him unchallenged authority for an unlimited
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period. Under considerable pressure from the palace, the
Constitutional Convention is about to approve a draft con-
stitution that would establish a transitional parliamentary
government immediately after ratification. Marcos would
serve as both interim president and prime minister, with
the Congress and those members of the Constitutional Conven-
tion who voted favorably forming a National Assembly. Elec-
tions would have to be called by him and thus could he post-
poned indefinitely.
7. Although the change'to a parliamentary system and
Marcos' blatent rigging of the transitional government to
stay in power may cause some voter resentment, he should be
able to get the new constitution through the national plebis-
cite, now tentatively scheduled for January. With his total
control of the media, he can maintain the impression of change
25X1
and progress, while his opponents have little opportunity --
or the courage -- to work against him.
8. In sum then, Marcos seems to have easily weathered
the first round following his declaration of martial law, and
he seems well on the way to extending his constitutional
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authority to rule for an extended period. Much visible
activity in attacking the country's many problems has al-
ready been started. For example, in a deluge of directives
and decrees, Marcos has unveiled an ambitious program of
streamlining government administration, reducing corruption,
widely extending land reform and cracking down on crime and
violence. Initial steps have been taken to reorganize
government departments and reduce the civil service. The
government has announced purges of corrupt officials in the
civil service, police and courts. Whether or not this will
in fact pay off in improved efficiency and integrity remains
to be seen, but Marcos is creating the impression of change,
and this is probably enough to get him through the next six
months, at least.
III. LONGER TERM PROSPECTS
Socio-economic and political prob7emo
9. Over the longer run, however, Marcos' ability to
hold on to power will become more problematic. If his pro-
jected reforms develop and sustain a reasonable momentum, he
may be able to create a climate of political stability and
bureaucratic efficiency sufficiently attractive to the oligarchy,
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the business community and - if coupled with some socio-
economic improvements
to the general populace to maintain
tolerance of his authority for an indefinite period.* In
turn, progress in these areas would serve to reduce the risk
of disaffection within the military establishment -- a key
factor in Marcos' future prospects.
10. Marcos, however, must be careful to tread a careful
line -- accomplishing enough to prevent the reemergence of
cynicism and serious disi'.lusionment on the part of the
populace as a whole without appearing to threaten the vested
interests of the wealthy. As long as the oligarchs feel that
Marcos' "New Society" is benefiting them at least as much as
the poorer classes, they probably would be loathe to take the
risks inherent in challenging Marcos' domination.
11. Politically, Marcos may attempt -- as he has hinted --
to create a broad-based political coalition, perhaps integrating
support from the military, his Naeionalista colleagues and other
* Within the past few years, there has been increasing pres-
sure for basic reforms., especial7u from the small but
growing urban middle class often encouraged by reform-
minded elements within the Catholic Church. Reformist poli-
tics has drawn support from moderate student and labor
organizations -- as well as the radical groups -- and in-
creasingly from urban workers stung by sharp inflation.
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political figures anxious to share political power. Although
he has not shown his hand fully, he seems to be moving toward
eliminating the present system of political parties altogether
and replacing it with a new party or national front. Several
Congressmen from both parties have already been asked to sign
statements revoking their party affiliations. The Liberals do
not seem prepared to fight very hard for survival. The arrest
of their more vigorous figures has intimidated those remaining,
and the choice of retaining some political role under another
banner may prove more alluring than political isolation.
12. Marcos' current programs appear to hold out something
for everyone. The oligarchy should be pleased with a number of
measures designed to prime the economy, such as tax incentives
and infrastructure improvements. There is already evidence of
revived business confidence. The decision by the US to go ahead
with flood rehabilitation aid will help provide funds for in-
frastructure reconstruction in Central Luzon. The urban middle
and lower classes are offered the benefits of improved law and
ordn,r, and price and rent controls, and for the peasants, Marcos
has promised land reform,
13. Land reform is a priority area, one that highlights
the severe economic imbalance in the Philippines and one that
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in the past has received more political promises and less
performance than any major area. Marcos has recently committed
his personal prestige to an ambitious program, which nonethe-
less holds out some promise of success. He once again has pro-
claimed his intent to carry out land reform, and he has special-
ly singled out all rice and corn producing areas as the first
target. His plan calls for the eventual transfer of lands to
the tenant farmers working them and proposes a system of
subsidized farmers' cooperatives to underpin the program.
14. By concentrating on the rice and corn areas, Marcos
may avoid antagonizing the powerful sugar barons, the bulk of
the landed oligarchs. Nonetheless, there could be serious
stumbling blocks to even modest success. In the past, land
reform efforts have failed largely because of a lack of com-
mitment by the government bureaucracy, political indifference
to related social and economic reforms, and the failure by the
congress to vote the necessary funds. Without easy credit
available for mortgage payments, seeds, fertilizer and machin-
ery, the small farmer often found himself simply shifting from
the relatively greater security of his tenancy to increasing
indebtedness and eventual loss of his land.
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15. Martial law has eliminated the problem of a re-
calcitrant congress, but Marcos is still confronted with
the problem of obtaining the revenues to finance land reform
which, if actually carried out on the scale proposed, would
require large sums of money. Although streamlining the
bureaucracy may produce some increase in government revenues,
the still limited financial resources of the country, coupled
with the demands of other government programs, indicate that
the land reform program will probably depend on substantial
foreign aid. The program's success cannot be guaranteed by
foreign aid, however, but will hinge more on the establishment
of effective implementing agencies. The Philippines does not
lack technical and managerial talent. The problem will be
one of organization and continuing governmental interest.
Landlord opposition could also be a continuing barrier, al-
though one objective of the program is to redirect more of the
landlords' managerial and capital resources into commerce and
industry -- which would serve as well to help invigorate the
commercial/industrial sector of the economy.
16. The tasks facing Marcos are obviously formidable.
It seems unrealistic to expect Marcos to carry through fully
the sort of basic socio-economic revolution that is required
to reform the traditional system of semi-feudal land tenure,
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political bossism and corruption. Scattered reports of a
resurgence of urban crime and policemen back on the take may
already foreshadow more serious backsliding. There is also
he danger that, when the dust from all the official pronounce-
ments settles, very little will have really changed. If so,
as the lack of substance to the government's reform measures
becomes more apparent, political opposition to Marcos' rule is
likely to grow substantially.
17. One focal point of protest against Marcos might be
the students, particularly now that the universities are re-
opened. With the declaration of martial law, Marcos moved
swiftly and successfully to foreclose the possibility of the
student and urban leftists mounting a challenge to him. He
closed the universities and clamped a lid on all media channels.
With their normal avenues of protest closed, the radical groups
were in disarray. Those leaders who survived the initial police
dragnets went underground or fled the cities to join the NPA.
They are only now beginning to reappear on the scene.
18.' If the military or police were forced to deal harshly
with youthful protestors, it might evoke serious resentment
toward the government, not only among the public at large, but
possibly among the younger members of the armed forces. Just
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how much sympathy student dissidents could count on would
depend in large part on the government's performance in
general. Student protest coupled with an absence of substan-
tive reforms could,well create a more receptive climate for
more general radical protest. As a result, Marcos might feel
compelled to rely even more on strong arm tactics, setting in
train a spiralling pattern of repression and mounting dissent.
19. The swiftness and ease with which Marcos implemented
martial law caught the communists off guard. Like Marcos'
other putative opponents, the communists were not prepared to
do much of anything against the imposition of martial law.
Nonetheless, as'they recover from the initial shock of martial
law, the communists undoubtedly will begin to organize at least
some open opposition to the government. There may be some
increase in NPA activity in the countryside, and the urban com-
munists might attempt some terrorist spectaculars. But the
communists in and of themselves are unlikely to become a serious
threat to the Marcos government in the foreseeable future, al-
though they may be able to develop the strength and organization
to exploit a more broadly based opposition should it develop.
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Poasible Military Interuention
20. If political unrest forced Marcos' to become even
more authoritarian -- and, for example, if the military had
to assume a ,more active and visible role in day-to-day admin-
istration -- this could in turn stimulate further opposition,
perhaps in time severely straining the military's ability to
maintain order. The Philippine army is limited in numbers
and resources and spread thinly throughout the country. The
Philippine Constabulary, which is primarily responsible for
internal security, is slightly larger than the army,F__~
Moreover, in some
areas, the private armies of local political figures out-
number the government troops. And despite the large number
of private weapons reported surrendered to the government,
the majority of illegal weapons are almost certainly still in
circulation.
21. At the same time, the government could find itself
faced with.the prospect of a growing Muslim insurgency in
Mindanao where there already have been serious clashes. Most
of the Muslim population views martial law as another attempt
to expand Christian influence into traditional Muslim areas,
as well as blatant land-grabbing. The Filipinos have never
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come to terms with their Muslim minority, and it is unlikely
that they will find a, solution to this persistent and largely
intractable problem, Should the army get tied down in a
brushfire war in the south, and be faced simultaneously with
increased pressures from urban radicals and the NPA, the
chances of the situation getting out of hand would increase
significantly.
22. If unrest began to develop and Marcos appeared to
be losing the initiative, political rivals would undoubtedly
begin to maneuver against him. No one individual stands out
now as a likely rallying point for an anti-Marcos movement.
If the wealthy oligarch families joined forces against Marcos,
however, they could pose a formidable problem for him. The
oligarchy wield considerable political and economic power.
For example, they can use their financial assets to promote
demonstrations or organize strikes against Marcos.
23. But any really effective challenge to Marcos over
the next few years would probably need strong support from
within the military. Working against such a move is the strong
personal loyalty that the bulk of the senior officers apparent-
ly still feel toward Marcos -- both because of his own out-
standing war record, but m.,r.; because of the regional ties
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between him and the increasing number of IZocano officers
in the higher ranks.*
24. Still, despite the military's historical respect
of civilian constitutional authority, a trend has been started
toward greater military involvement in the political life of
the nation that will be difficult to reverse and that may in
fact, accelerate in the months ahead. For example, should
Marcos be assassinated
an ever present danger in the
in and assume full control and would be unlikely to relinquish
control except to an individual in whom they had confidence.
Philippines the military almost certainly would step
25. But overtime conditions might develop in which
important elements of the military might also be tempted to
move against Marcos. There probably would be strong resistance
to a complete removal of civilian government and the constitu-
tional framework which provides a sense of legality and a pro-
mise of the reinstitution of representative government. If he
Marcos has taken care to fill top military assignments
with officers personally ZoyaZ to him, including a few
of his own relatives and a large number of fellow IZocanos.
More than 70 percent of the military leadership is IZocano,
but this situation is not entirely of Marcos' doing. His-
toricaZZy, IZocanos have risen to Zeadershi in man 25X1
11! ine endeavors,
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stumbles badly, the military in the first instance might be
persuade-' to back a challenger from the oligarchy, or if
there is an obvious absence of reform or economic progress
or the security situation began to deteriorate seriously,
the military might well conclude that it was better abl' to
provide honest, efficient government than the discredited
civilian politicians. Secretary of Defense Ponce Enrile has
already publically speculated that the present government's
failure would inevitably be followed by a military takeover.
Simply dumping Marcos, however, would not check a situation
that was slipping badly. Once popular unrest has begun to
seriously percolate, it could launch the Philippines into a
long period of instability marked by political and military
jockeying, urban protest and increasing activity in the
countryside by both communists and Muslim separwtists.
26. All things considered we believe that Marcos has
a fairly good chance of establishing himself in a reasonably
solid position, keeping the opposition off balance or tied
to his own coattails and forestalling a serious surge of popular
resentment with enough evidence of stability and progress. The
odds for failure go up as time passes, however. Marcos has com-
mitted himself to a basic restructuring of the Filipino way
of doing things. In effect, he has mounted the tiger of reform;
it remains to be seen if he successfully rides it.
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lmplicatione of Martial Law for the US
27. Marcos has already approached the US for increased
aid both for his projected projected program of economic develop-
ment and. to strengthen the armed forces. The US 9_s suspected
in many quarters of having been privy to and tacitly supporting
Marcos' power play. Substantially increased aid, particularly
in the military field, would strengthen these suspicions, but
failure to provide at least economic assistance could seriously
undermine any chance of real economic progress and fuel serious
resentment against the US.
28. The US has a substantial stake in the Philippines --
both in terms of investment and security. US private investment
there now totals nearly $1 billion. With the termination of the
Laurel-Langley agreement in July, 1974, however, US investors
will lose their privileged position of the past and face an
increasingly "protectionist" climate. The problems of adjusting
existing investments are complex and must still be worked out
with the Philippine government.
29. US base rights are an equally sensitive area. The
geographic location of the Philippines gives particular stra-
tegic importance to US naval and air bases there. Sustaining
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operations in the South China Sea, Indian Ocean and Southeast
Asia without supporting bases as accessible as those in the
Philippines would be difficult. And even if other bases could
be established, the cost of relocating those facilities would
be exceedingly high.
30. The imposition of martial law and the probable
extension of Marcos' hold on power has strengthened his hand
in dealing with the US on both the economic and base issues.
He has already indicated that he co lid be helpful in settling
several of the investment problems by decree. On the other
hand, the Philippine government is not likely to change the
increasingly nationalistic stance on economic ties with the
United States which has been developing over the past few years.
The new constitution reflects this new attitude toward foreign
investment and a determination to restrict foreign ownership
of the country's resources and business. With future trade
and investment relations as well as future US base rights re-
quiring clarification in the near future, Marcos probably cal-
culates that he can play to nationalist sentiments and still
be successful in pressuring the US for additional aid, which
already amounts to roughly $100 million (economic and military)
annually. The implications for the US in such a dual track are
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apparent, On the one hand, substantial US aid and support
will probably be required if Marcos is to make a go of his
ambitious reform measures, but such support will tend to
identify the US with Marcos and his success or failure.
On the other hand, the US will also be a potential villian
in the piece. Marcos is quite capable of playing on nationa-
list and anti-US sentiments should it suit his purposes,
especially if he stumbled badly.
31. There is probably little the US can do to avoid
this dilemma. Of course, if Marcos receives US support and
is successful, nothing untoward is likely to happen to disrupt
US-Philippine relations, though some increase in Filipino
nationalism is likely in any event. Even if Marcos should fall
by the wayside, any likely successor would almost certainly
initially try to mai:stain a working relationship with the US
in order to obtain financial and other support. In such cir-
cumstances, the US would be in a stronger position if it had
viable ties with the key elements of Philippine society, par-
ticularly the military who are likely to play a larger role in
any future government than they have in the past. But should
the US become completely identified with Marcos and there ensued
a prolonged period of turmoil and chaos, the stage would be set
for a much more radical turn in Filipino politics with the like-
lihood of increased resentment toward the US,
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