THE NEW SOUTH ASIAN STALEMATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000120017-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 25, 2006
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: October 2, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
Secret
MEMORANDUM
The New South Asian Stalemate
NCIA n
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PC!JMENT J~~COY
RLE DO NOT DESTROY
Secret
2 October 1972
Copy No.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
MEMORANDUM
Recent developments in the subcontinent, though
not spectacular, are of importance for the area's
future. This memorandum brings up to date the judg-
ments of the Estimate on Pakistan of Last April, and
is designed as an interim assessment pending NIEs
on Bangladesh (Late 1972) and India (early 1973).
This memorandum was prepared by the office of
National Estimates and discussed with other
components of the CIA, who are in general
agreement with its judgments.
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The July 1972 Simla Agreement seemed to resolve
some of the lesser Indo-Pakistani disputes and to give
hope for eventual settlement of the major ones. But
events since then have clouded the picture and have led
to an impasse. Bhutto's domestic political position has
been weakened, and he has felt himself forced to adopt
a less conciliatory, but more popular, stance towards
India and Bangladesh. The Indians and the Pakistanis
have so far not been able to follow through on agreements
made at Simla respecting a new Kashmir Cease Fire Line
and the return of their armed forces to the international
frontier. The South Asian powers are also stalemated
over how to bring about mutual Pakistan-Bangladesh recog-
nition and negotiations, with the two countries obdurate
in their respective demands. China's veto of Bangladesh's
admission to the UN was welcomed
by Pakistan. This called into question Bhutto's promise
at Simla to resolve all area disputes bilaterally and
without recourse to support by outside powers.
Though this stalemate could continue for a con-
siderable time, the odds appear tc favor movement sooner
or later leading either to a more hostile, tense situation,
or to something closer to a detente. India, winner of
the war and holding most of the high cards, has reacted
fairly and calmly to developments so far, and has not tried
to generate a crisis atmosphere. But it continues to
hold 90,000 Pakistani POWs, and it is finding them both
a poor bargaining chip and a growing economic and inter-
national liability. If New Delhi turns some of the POWs
over to Bangladesh for trial as war criminals, it would
probably so anger Pakistan as to rule out further Simlas
for some time. If it returns all the POWs to Pakistan,
Dacca will be gravely embittered. In any event, further
negotiations between Mujib, Mrs. Gandhi, and Bhutto are
likely. While it would be in the interests of all three
to find ways to peace, rational self-interest has fre-
quently been the victim of antagonism and irredentism
in South Asia.
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The SiniZa Agreement
1. Bhutto and Mrs. Gandhi signed the Simla Agree-
ment on 3 July 1972. Their summit meeting, preceded by
postponements, was marked by disagreements, near break-
downs, and finally an accord of sorts. But important
provisos of the agreement have not been carried out on
schedule, and both the letter and the spirit of Simla
are in danger of demise. These difficulties have not,
however, lad to any sharp rise in tensions in the area.
Rather, they reflect internal problems of the countries.
Both Pakistan and Bangladesh are experiencing serious
troubles at home, and India is hardly *ithout difficulties
of its own. Overall, the atmosphere on the subcontinent
remains unmartial and a sense of international crisis is
absent.
2. The Simla Agreement contains a mix of ambitious
but ambiguous general provisions, along with some specific
but more modest ones. Modest at any rate in relation to
the immediate Indo-Pakistani issues in urgent need of
resolution, particularly the repatriation of over 90,000
Pakistani prisoners of war and some kind of accommodation
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on the 25-year old Kashmir dispute. Rather than addressing
these major questions, the Simla accord treats some lesser
ones. It provides that the two sides recognize a new
Kashmir Cease Fire Line, now called at Indian insistence
a "Line of Control.'.', using positions held on 17 December
1971 (when hostilities ended). In terms of territory,
the changes will not make a great deal of difference,
though India will get several strategically valuable new
positions, particularly some mountain passes. South of
this line, the two sides agreed to return their forces
to the pre-war international frontier. This would be
clearly to Pakistan's advantage, as it would give-up
less than 100 square miles of territory and get more than
5000 back, enabling it to resettle some million or so
refugees who had fled the area.
3. This specific Indian concession was matched by
a quite general Pakistani one. The two powers -- besides
promising to settle their disputes peacefully -- agreed
to do so only on a bilateral basis. This is a point
of great importance to New Delhi;, since if fulfilled
literally by both powers, this commitment would guarantee
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India's predominance in the area; in the future, neither
India nor Pakistan would look to any outsider, be it the
UN, the US, China or the USSR,for support in their rival-
ries. Pakistan has never been able, on its own, to pose
a balance to Indian power; it had done so in the past only
with assistance first from the US and then from China.
But so far Pakistan's commitment bilateralism has
been less than total -- though Bhutto cannot be judged
solely responsjble for the chain of adverse developments
which have occurred since July 3.
4. Neither Bhutto nor Mrs. Gandhi made any written
promises at Simla with respect to Bangladesh, though it
is reasonable to assume that they reached some kind of
understanding there. At any rate, it then seemed likely
that Pakistan and Bangladesh would soon establish diplo-
matic relations, and themselves begin negotiations on the
host of issues outstanding between these two former
components of a united country. According to most scenarios,
recognition would have been preceded by a face-to-face
meeting between Bhutto and Muj ib in which the former would
make one last (and knowingly futile) effort to bring the
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Bengalis back into Pakistan. With formal relations then
established and face saved all around, Bhutto, Mnjib,
and Mrs. Gandhi would begin to hammer out final settle-
ments on such issues as restoring diplomatic, economic,
and commercial relations, return of the POWs,and settle-
ment of territorial disputes including Kashmir.
After Simla: Bhuto vs. Mujib
5. 't hasn't worked out that way -- at least not
yet. The above scenario seemed to be taken pretty much
for granted by both Indians and Pakistanis immediately
after Simla, and Bhutto himself' apparently believed he
had P commitment from Mujib himself along these lines.
But this understanding, if it existed, was reached in
January 1972 when Bhutto released Mujib from prison and
allowed him to leave the country. This was before Mujib
had learned of the full extent of West Pakistan's
atrocities inflicted on Bengal.
6. Since his return to Dacca, Mujib has stated
publicly that he would meet Bhutto only after the latter
had formally recognized Bangladesh. Though this would
merely acknowledge reality, it would be seen in Pakistan
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v.uv.d%.J.:. j.
as a humiliating loss of face. It would weaken the posi-
tion of any but the most solidly entrenched leader (which
Bhutto is not). This would be especially so were Mujib
then to try several hundred Pakistanis now in Indian POW
camps for war crimes.
Such trials would set off very strong reactions
there and could seriously, perhaps fatally threaten any
hope of area-wide detente. Perhaps Bhutto was led to
believe that Mrs. Gandhi would use her substantial in-
fluence on Mujib to bring a moderation of his stance.
(This is only surmise but it is consistent with what
we presently know,.)
7. Whatever the case, the uncompromising Mujib,
himself a graduate of 12 years in prison for refusing
to come to terms with central Pakistani authorities,
has refused to budge. Bhutto has tried to approach him
through several third party intermediaries, and even
phoned Mujib directly when the latter was in a London
hospital. All these efforts failed; the Bengalee leader
insists on formal recognition by Pakistan first. He also
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continues to state he will go ahead with war crimes trials;
New Delhi, though it has not yet turned any Pakistani POWs
over to the Bengalees, still insists that the POWs can-
not be returned to Pakistan without Mujib's consent.
8. In the period since Simla, Bhutto has seen a
serious weakening of his position at home. Major rioting
racked Sind province in July. Begun over a dispute as
to which should be the official provincial language, the
turmoil was furthered and exploited by his opponents as
proof that Bhutto's star was in the descent. This, along
with much bickering in his party, alleged plotting by
:,pposition leaders (and possibly by army officers), con-
tinued labor unrest and industrial stagnation, made any
easing of Pakistan's posture towards Bangladesh (or India)
a risky business.
The legal basis for this claim is the fact that
West Pakistani forces in Bengal surrendered to an
alleged Indian-BengaZee joint command, though mi2.i-
tary operations were totally in Indian hands.
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or&.i.L~ 1
9. But Bhutto discovered an arrow or two in his
quiver, which he began to use -- despite previous com-
mitments to bilateralism. On 25 August, China vetoed
Bangladesh's application for entry into the UN, citing
among other charges Dacca's (and New Delhi's) failure to
obey UN resolutions and the Geneva Convention with respect
to return of prisoners of war.
Continued close Chinese-
Pakistani ties have been regularly and openly emphasized
by Bhutto. He has also sought good relations with the US
and other Western powers -- seeking, so far, economic
assistance, but probably not ruling out attempts to get
military aid in the future.
10. Along with this, Bhutto has clamped new re-
strictions on the 200,000 or so Bengalees still living
in Pakistan -- and particularly the 30,000 or so trained
civil servants and military men that Mujib very much wants
back. These, in effect, have b'come Pakistan's counter-
hostages against possible mistreatment of the POI'ds still
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in Indian hands. Both Islamabad and New Delhi have con-
tributed to the many difficulties in demarcating the
new Kashmir Line of Control. This demarcation and the
mutual withdrawal to the old international frontier were
supposed to have been completed, first by 4 September,
then by 15 September, Both deadlines have passed and
there is no sign of imminent achievement.
11. Though Bhutto alone did not bring on this new
impasse (all parties have been doing some stalling and
bargaining),. some of it does stern from his fear of further
eroding his precarious domestic position by appearing
to be soft or over-conciliatory to the traditional enemy.
In like manner, he has continued both to maintain and to
re-equip Pakistan's large and burdensomely expensive armed
forces, despite the fact that the latter could now fight
only a rear guard defensive action against the Indians in
another war, with poor prospects for success. No matter
that Pakistan's long-term interests would be served by
avoiding an arms race and by international conciliation;
Bhutto's aim is survival and he is unwilling to risk his
tenure for the purpose of an unpopular policy. In short,
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at least for the moment, a hard line looks politically
profitable for Bhutto, a soft line disadvantageous.
After Simla: Mrs. Gandhi's Response
12. India's answers to all this have been interesting.
Traditional hard lining xenophobes have responded predic-
tably to this latest example of Pakistani "perfidy". But
Mrs. Gandhi's reaction has been generally bland. The
Chinese veto brought forth strong Indian denunciations
of Peking, but,
New Delhi mostly confined itself to sorrowful regrets.
Bhutto's obduracy has been more deplored than condemned.
New Delhi has ordered postponement of withdrawal to the
international frontier until the new Kashmir Line of
Control is agreed on, but has done little else. Rather,
there is some reason to believe that the Indians are
seeking to get Mujib to moderate his stubborn stance;
at least they are not turning any POWs over to him, or
showing signs that they intend to do so any time soon.
Overall, Mrs. Gandhi appears to believe that a compara-
tively muted stalemate is preferable to new area tensions.
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13. There are a number of reasons for India's
current police. Since acquiring promises of Soviet
support against a possible Chinese military threat,
and then defeating and breaking up Pakistan, India has
been in the South Asian catbird seat.
India not merely feels no
threat from Pakistan but also holds nearly all the high
cards in any ultimate negotiations with it. Beyond this,
while hardly enamoured of Bhutto, the Indian government
probably sees him as preferable to virtually any alterna-
tive, be it civil strife spilling over the Indian border,
or a new hard nosed military regime making -- however
unrealistically -- a war of revenge its ultimate aim.
Bhutto after all is the democratically elected leader of
Pakistan, a dedicated socialist, and has shown con-
siderable realism (as at Simla) in trying to find a
new relationship with India.
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14. But while not wishing to make life too difficult
for Bhutto, the Indians must also be careful not to sacri-
fice unduly the interests of Bangladesh. Not surprisingly,
this incredibly poor, overpopulated, and war-ravaged
country is not finding that independence solves all
problems. The price of rice, the principal food, has
shot up dramatically; many in the new administration have
proved corrupt, inept, or both. Though Mujib clearly
remains the dominant figure in Bangladesh, 'the honeymoon
is ending and he is now being openly criticized; his
ruling party, the Awami League, and his ally, India,
are becoming the objects of public denunciation. A re-
versal of his position on trying Pakistani war criminals
would be an extremely unpopular move. In these circum-
stances the Indians are not applying much pressure on
the stubborn Muji.b to get him to sacrifice his stance
with respect to dealing with the Pakistanis.
15. Further, India itself faces a number of domes-
tic problems which now often take priority over regional
or international, ones. The country got a bad scare in
July, when a monsoon failure and an ensuing major food
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crisis seemed in the offing. Subsequent heavy rains have
alleviated the situation somewhat, but food production
Will still probably decline this year. There is enough
grain in storage to prevent major disaster, but the hard
pressed consumer is already paying much higher prices for
food, and the entire economy will suffer from the ex-
pected shortfalls.
16. Though Mrs. Gandhi still remains very much in
charge, even she is coming under fire for not fulfilling
her campaign pledge to '!eliminate poverty". Her populist
measures and procedures have slowed the activities of
India's major private entrepreneurs and helped reduce the
overall rate of industrial expansion, without significantly
redistributing income or raising the living standards
for the many. Sniping and rivalries in her ruling Congress
Party have increased noticeably. For all this, Mrs.
Gandhi's position is measurably stronger than that of
either Bhutto or Mujib. She could, if she chose, break
the present South Asian stalemate with roves favoring one
or another of her neighbors. Whether she will do so is
another matter.
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The Outlook
17. It is conceivable that factors of inertia,
the delicacy required for renewed initiatives, and the
interlocking nature of the problems will combine to
perpetuate the present impasse for a considerable time.
But sooner or later there is likely to be some movement
culminating either in a more hostile and tense situation,
or in something more nearly approaching a tripartite
detente. Assuming that Bhutto, the most vulnerable of
the three, is not overthrown, the odds appear still to
favor implementation of the Simla accords. The nego-
tiations on the Kashmir Line of Control continue and
still have a respectable chance for success. If achieved,
withdrawal to the old international frontiers south of
that new line would then become automatic. This in turn
would generate pressures for a new summit meeting, which
might be able to begin resolution of other issues.
18. Whether or not the Line of Control is agreed
on, another factor may eventually lead India to do some-
thing which could break the stalemate. This is the
question of the disposition of the 90,000 Pakistani P019s
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(70,000 military and 20,000 civilian) who have been in
Indian hands since December 1971. Clearly they can
hardly be held indefinitely. Indeed, they have become
something of an embarrassment if not an outright liability
to New Delhi. The Indians originally felt the POWs
would be their strongest single bargaining chip in
future negotiations with Islamabad. That judgment,
based on the initial shock and grief that swept Pakistan
when it first heard of their capture, has turned out
to be wrong. The Pakistanis have adjusted quite well
to the situation. They are probably grateful that the
Indians and not they must feed and house this large
group. With plenty of surplus manpower, Pakistan has
suffered little loss of military capability as a result
pf these soldiers' detention.
19. New Delhi on the other hand is becoming some-
wh.t sensitive to the charge (made by the Chinese in the
UN among others) that it is violating the Geneva Con-
vention in continuing to hold these people long after
the war has ended, and is converting them into hostages
for outright political blackmail. Concerned that their
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continued incarceration may become an international cause
ceZebre (great care has been taken to afford the POWs
good treatment), yet reluctant to let them go without
getting Pakistani concessions or Bengalee satisfaction
in return, the Indians find themselves in a dilemma.
Hanging on to them becomes increasingly difficult,
morally and financially. But returning them all to
Pakistan would embitter Dacca; turning even the patently
guilty over to the-Bengalis would set off an explosion
in Islamabad.
20. Whatever it does, India's position in South
Asia today is so strong that no matter what happens in
its dealings with Pakistan and Bangladesh, it is in no
danger of facing any kind of effective military challenge
from them.
(This could change, say, were Moscow
to abandon its strong support (political, military, and
to some extent r,con.omic) of New Delhi. But this does
not now appear in the cards. If anything, the Soviets
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are increasing their backing of the Indians both in
furthering trade and economic relations, and in con-
tinuing military aid programs.
21. India's position would also erode were it to
suffer major serious domestic troubles as a result of
weakening of its economy or its political system, Its
domestic problems are many and potentially grave:
massive poverty, overpopulation, archaic traditions,
regional and linguistic rivalries, a potential foT ppli-
ticaL immobilism, vuirierability to famine and economic
stagnation, among others. The loss of some US financial
aid and the prospect for declines in overall Western net
aid levels do not make the economic picture any brighter.
Even so, the South Asian giant continues to show con-
siderable resilience; for all its many undoubted troubles,
it is likely to muddle along for some time. Indeed,
at least in the next few years, many of the above cited
difficulties will probably be seen in more serious form
in either Pakistan or Bangladesh than in India. To some
extent this very Indian primacy has probably muted the
martial overtones seen in previous Indo-Pakistani disputes.
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22. But this does not mean that Pakistan will
inevitably recognize India's primacy and adjust its
foreign and military policies accordingly -- though
it may indeed do so. As Bhutto has seen, there is
still a very considerable-degree of irredentism and anti-
Indian sentiment in Pakistan, perhaps enough to block any
accommodation which could be labeled a surrender, say
on such an emotionally charged issue as Kashmir. Bhutto
may calculate that Mrs. Gandhi would be very reluctant
to initiate a war with Pakistan in order to impose her
will. This could be the case even though the disparity
in strength between the antagonists became fully apparent
to the leaders of each side.
23. Even with these many problems and obstacles,
there is still hope that further developments will bring
an an easing of the situation. The flexibility or
inflexibility of Mrs. Gandhi, Bhutto, and Mujib in their
dealings with each other over the next year or so can-
not be forecast with confidence as yet. A continued
cold war between India and Bangladesh on one side, and
Pakistan on the other, is conceivable. So too is a
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lessening of tensions. The factors leading to one or
the other outcome -- or something in between -- are too
,:pny and varied to permit confident predictions. It
would be in the rational self-interest of all concerned
to find ways to peace and-mutual cooperation. But
rational self-interest in the subcontinent has often
been sacrificed before in the name of communal antagonism,
territorial disputes, and memories of past injustices.
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