NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY SATURDAY 22 OCTOBER 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000500020015-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: October 22, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85T01094R000500020015-4
Director of
Central
Intelligence
-25X1
25X1
National Intelligence Daily
Saturday
22 October 1983
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85T01094R000500020015-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500020015-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500020015-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500020015-4
Contents
Grenada: Confused Situation .................................................. 1
Saudi Arabia-Iraq: Renewed Interest in Pipeline .................. 3
Argentina: Moratorium on Debt Payments ............................
Japan: Economic Stimulus Package ......................................
USSR-Eastern Europe: Problems in CEMA Persist ..............
Spain: Backlash Against Terrorists ........................................
Philippines: Austerity Prompts Protests ................................
Chile: Possible Economic Policy Changes ..............................
West Germany-USSR: Reaction to Soviet Threat on INF ......
West Germany: Timetable for Bundestag Debate on INF ......
USSR: Levying Blame for Arctic Disaster ................................ 11
South Africa: Violence Increasing in Ciskei ............................ 12
Special Analysis
Israel: New Government's Economic Troubles ...................... 14
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500020015-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500020015-4
Too Secret
Conflicting accounts about who is in charge indicate that the
power struggle is not over.
Former Deputy Prime Minister Coard has been killed, according
to unconfirmed reports;
The US Embassy in Barbados says a US citizen-reportedly a
friend of slain Prime Minister Bishop-has been arrested, but there
are no other indications that Americans on the island are in danger.
An unconfirmed press report stated yesterday that independent
journalist Alister Hughes had been killed. Hughes, a Grenadian, had
been arrested the day before.
Austin has expressed a desire to have "good relations" with the
US, according to the US Embassy in Trinidad and Tobago. He
reportedly told a US citizen there on Thursday that he wanted to meet
with a US representative.
The Caribbean Community has called an emergency meeting for
today to consider sanctions against Grenada. Jamaica and Trinidad
and Tobago already have announced they will break diplomatic
relations, and Barbados, St. Lucia, and Antigua plan to boycott
Grenada at regional meetings. St. Vincent has called for an immediate
end to martial law in Grenada, and St. Christopher-Nevis said it would
support direct US involvement if necessary.
The Cuban official statement on Thursday described the
Grenadian situation as an internal matter and stated that the Cuban
Embassy there was to refrain from involvement.
Havana also claimed that differences within the Grenadian
leadership were primarily caused by personality conflicts. Cuba called
on the "international progressive movement" not to condemn the
new regime prematurely, and stressed the need to avoid giving the
West an opportunity to reverse the Grenadian revolution. Havana also
expressed a willingness to contin7 its n mi nd technical
assistance programs in Grenada.
Top Secret
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500020015-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85T01094R000500020015-4
Top Secret
new regime prematurely, and stressed the need to avoid giving the
West an opportunity to reverse the Grenadian revolution. Havana also
expressed a willingness to contin econo and technical
assistance programs in Grenada.
Comment: Austin's reported demarche to the US probably was
designed to forestall hostile action by Washington. The ruling military
council's concern over US intentions also is reflected by repeated
announcements a radio that no US citizens have been
harmed.
If Coard has been killed, Austin and Cornwall probably are the
major contenders for power. Little information on their backgrounds
is available, but neither man has a reputation as an ideologue or a
strong intellectual. Even if Coard is out of the way, the 16-man military
council prolpabiv will h V11 difficulty consolidating its position in the
short term.
room for maintaining relations with the new military regime.
recent developments-especially Bishop's death-but cleariv leaves
Cuba is now searching for ways to justify a continuing role in
Grenada. Havana's official statement reflects its embarrassment over
barring a major ideological reversal by the Grenadians.
support Bishop. Cuba probably will support the new govern
The statement, moreover, seems aimed at minimizing regional
leftist-and possible private Cuban-criticism of Havana's failure to
Top Secret
25X1
25X1
2 22 October 1983
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85T01094R000500020015-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11
Sudan
Top Secret
Syria
Yanbd
al Bahr
(estimate)
Saudi
Arabia
line Pipeline 1.85
Petra
22 October 1983
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11
Major Existing and Proposed Middle East Oil Pipelines
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Iraq-Tur n._._.
Tripoli,
Lebanon
Mediterranean BEIRqJ
Sea Sidon
Tel Aviv-Yafo'
*MAN
an
illyn Sukhnah Su Mad Pipeline ,1~6
7 T/;--
Egypt
Soviet Union
*RIYADH
Existing oil pipeline
Proposed oil pipeline*
0.7 Pipeline capacity (million b/d)
udiiiiii. Oil terminal
Alignments of proposed pipelines are
shown for display purposes only. Actual
routes are not currently known.
0 300
Kilometers
Persian
Gulf
7s`
MANAMA
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85T01094R000500020015-4
SAUDI ARABIA-IRAQ: Renewed Interest in Pipeline
Riyadh may bow to Baghdad's pressure for access to an oil
pipeline across Saudi Arabia because of Iraq's mounting financial
difficulties and the poor prospects for reopening the pipeline across
Syria soon
The US Embassy in London reports that Foreign Minister Saud
told Prime Minister Thatcher this week that negotiations between the
Gulf Cooperation Council and Damascus to reopen the Iraqi-Syrian
pipeline had "totally failed." Iraq is dependent e through D7
Turkey to export 800,000 barrels per day.
Saud says Iraq and Saudi Arabia are now working to link Iraq to
the Saudi pipeline that extends to the Red Sea. He estimated
construction would take about 12 months.
Comment: The question of financing the new link-which would
be considerably cheaper than constructing a separate line from Iraq
to the Red Sea-still has to be addressed. The Saudis have never
been enthusiastic supporters of an Iraqi pipeline crossing their
territory. They withdrew financial assistance for such a line proposed
in 1981, effectively killing that project.
Iraq has to increase oil exports substantially if it is to solve its
economic dilemma. The pipeline, however, would not provide
immediate relief. If other financial aid is not forthcoming, Baghdad
may be compelled to step up the war with Iran in order to bring
Tehran to the negotiating table or secure the support of Western
powers to mediate a peace.
Top Secret
25X1
2Jn i
3 22 October 1983
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85T01094R000500020015-4
 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500020015-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500020015-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500020015-4
Top Secret
ARGENTINA: Moratorium on Debt Payments
Argentina is being forced into a de facto payments moratorium,
which will cause severe economic problems for the new government.
President Bignone, under pressure from nationalist elements, this
week told the international banks that debt negotiations were
suspended until a civilian government can participate. A government
is to be elected on 30 October, but it will not be installed until the end
According to
the US Embassy, recent increases in public sector wages and the
prices of state-supplied goods will put Araentina even more out of
compliance with its IMF a reement.
Comment: With Argentina unable to service its debts, a
payments waiver is increasingly likely. The moratorium will result in
the cessation of trade credits and any new foreign lending to the
private sector. The reduction in imports and business investment will
quickly be felt in higher prices-inflation already is at an annual rate
of 925 percent-and a slowdown in economic activity.
Negotiations over the financial impasse probably will be even
more difficult with the new civilian government. It will have difficulty
imposing the austerity measures likely to be required by bankers for a
resumption of financial assistance. The new economic team would
have to live with election campaign pledges to obtain more favorable
terms than those that were offered to the Bignone regime.
Top Secret
25X1
25X1
5 22 October 1983
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500020015-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85T01094R000500020015-4
Top Secret
JAPAN: Economic Stimulus Package
The cabinet yesterday approved an economic progr desioned
to dampen foreign criticism of its growing trade surplus.7
Highlights of the plan include a 0.5-percentage-point cut in the
discount rate, reduced tariffs on 44 industrial items, slightly lower
personal income taxes, and introduction of low-interest-rate loans for
import financing. Some measures that had been under consideration,
including an investment tax credit for small businesses, were dropped
from the package for budgetary reasons or because of public
opposition. The cut in the discount rate will take effect today.
Comment: The package will do almost nothing to restrain the
growth of the current account surplus in 1983, and it will have only a
limited impact in 1984. The tariff reductions and the bulk of the tax
cuts will not take effect until next April.
The cut in the discount rate may have an adverse effect on
Japan's trading partners. As more capital flows out of Japan in search
of higher interest rates overseas, the yen will decline, strengthening
Japan's export competitiveness
Tokyo probably views the package mainly as a means of
demonstrating good will to Washington before the President's visit
and of diverting public attention from the bribery verdict against
former Prime Minister Tanaka.
Top Secret
6 22 October 1983
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85T01094R000500020015-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85T01094R000500020015-4
Top Secret
The meeting this week of Premiers from CEMA countries
apparently failed to resolve any major issues, but it may have set the
stage for the long-delayed CEMA summit.
Soviet Premier Tikhonov warned of the dangers of trading with
the West and urged closer economic cooperation in CEMA. He made
clear that Moscow expects its partners to accept a greater economic
burden and warned that the USSR would not continue to subsidize
the other CEMA members by allowing them to run large trade deficits.
Tikhonov was vague about maintaining deliveries of Soviet energy
and other raw materials. He stressed that future exports of these
commodities to the East European countries would depend on the
quantity and quality of goods those states provided the USSR
Most of the speakers echoed Tikhonov's call for closer
cooperation, but some familiar problems were raised:
- Hungarian Premier Lazar called for expanded trade with
the West and increased prices for agricultural products, a
major category of Hungarian exports to the USSR.
- Bulgarian Premier Filipov also argued for higher food
prices and for guaranteed deliveries of Soviet energy and
other raw materials in exchange for help with Soviet
energy projects.
- The Romanians repeated their request for more favorable
treatment in obtaining energy supplies.
Comment: Although some speakers indicated that final
preparations for a CEMA summit are under way, a firm date
apparently has not been set. The East Europeans evidently remain
unconvinced of the benefits of greater CEMA integration, and they
probably will resist Moscow's pressure to reduce economic relations
with the West.
Top Secret
25X1
7 22 October 1983
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85T01094R000500020015-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500020015-4
SPAIN: Backlash Against Terrorists
Top Secret
The recent kidnaping and killing of Army Captain Alberto Martin
by Basque terrorists has provoked a nationwide reaction that is likely
to strengthen the government's hand in combating terrorism.
Martin is the first military officer to have died while being held
hostage and brings the number of victims of Basque terrorism to over
30 for this year. His murder was the most recent of four, one of which
occurred in southern Spain, far from ETA's normal area of operation.
The government has expressed indignation over the brutality of
the killing and has stated its determination to remain firm in the
struggle against terrorism. Virtually all of the political parties have
expressed outrage, and many plan to continue public marches over
the weekend to demonstrate national unity against terrorism.
The tension in the armed forces has been tempered by the efforts
that the government made to secure Martin's release.
Comment: The murder has caused a new sense of alarm, and it
may prompt demands that the government adopt a more stringent
counterterrorist program. Its willingness and ability to do so, however,
will depend in part on the attitude of the Basque regional government.
So far, the regional government has been reluctant to cooperate with
The military, although angry and frustrated, is unlikely at this
point to challenge the government. Repeated attacks by the ETA,
however, could eventually to move against
the government.
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500020015-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500020015-4
PHILIPPINES: Austerity Prompts Protests
Opposition rallies in Manila yesterday had an anti-American tone
as demonstrators accused the US, along with the IMF and
multinational corporations, of responsibility for the country's current
economic difficulties. A leftwing labor union alliance, the May 1st
Organization, called for a 50-percent wage hike to compensate for the
21-percent devaluation of the peso earlier this month. Earlier this
week the devaluation and wage disputes prompted another group of
workers to stage a brief takeover of the Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company and disrupt international communications.
Comment: Economic problems will increasingly become the
focus of opposition. rallies and will strengthen radical elements
seeking to blame the US and the IMF for recently announced austerity
measures. The "Justice for Aquino, Justice for All" group, which
sponsored the rally yesterday, is heavily penetrated by front groups of
the Communist Party. Domestic price increases related to the
devaluation and reductions of government subsidies for a range of
goods and services will hurt urban labor the most. They will facilitate
recruitment efforts by Communist labor front groups.
CHILE: Possible Economic Policy Changes
Political maneuvering over economic policy is likely to result in the
replacement of Finance Minister Caceres and new policies aimed at
stimulating the economy. US Embassy and press reporting indicate
that Caceres only narrowly escaped being fired on 14 October and
that his tenure is ex ected to be short.
Comment: Most Chileans would welcome a rapid reactivation of
the economy. Growth-oriented policies, however, probably would
have to be financed by issuing currency. Over the longer term, they
would accelerate inflation, reduce purchasing power, and endanger
IMF agreements and the commercial bank credits necessary to avert
a foreign financing crisis.
Top Secret
9 22 October 1983
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500020015-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500020015-4
WEST GERMANY-USSR: Reaction to Soviet Threat on INF
The West German Government has expressed no concern about
the Soviet-East German communique claiming that West German INF
deployments would violate the treaties of Moscow and Berlin that
normalized Bonn's relations with the East. The communique was
issued on Tuesday, following Foreign Minister Gromyko's talks in East
Berlin on Eastern countermeasures to Western INF deployments. It
reiterates threats to curtail cooperation between East and West
Germany, but it avoids any direct threat to the status of Berlin.
Comment: The communique clearly tries to increase concern in
the West German Government about the stability of relations with
East Germany. The Soviets have always taken care, however, to
counter suggestions that they would undermine the Quadripartite
Agreement, which guarantees the status quo in Berlin. Moscow is
aware that threats against the Agreement probably would rally public
support to the West German Government and undercut the Social
Democratic Part ' opposition to NATO's deployment plans
WEST GERMANY: Timetable for Bundestag Debate on INF
The West German press reports the opposition Social Democrats
are demanding that the debate in the Bundestag on INF be two and
one-half days long, ending on 23 November. The government, which
continues to insist the debate will begin and end on 21 November, has
complete control over the timetable for the debate. It has stated that
no Pershing missiles or component parts can arrive in West Germany
Comment: Chancellor Kohl probably will weigh the
disadvantages of irritating Washington with an additional delay in
equipment deliveries against the domestic political need of avoiding
the impression that the Bundestag has not thoroughly considered the
issue. As a result, he could accept a compromise proposal extending
Top Secret
25X1
25X1
10 22 October 1983
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500020015-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85T01094R000500020015-4
Top Secret
USSR: Levying Blame for Arctic Disaster
An article in Pravda yesterday criticized government
bureaucracies for the disaster that has left some 35 ships icebound in
the Arctic seas. It indicated that at least 30 of the ships have been
damaged, eight of which ,are completely immobilized and may soon
sink because of ice pressure on their hulls. The article blamed several
ministries for inefficient operation and the poor condition of the port
facilities and fleet. Soviet TV has uncharacteristically shown footage
of the stranded ships and efforts to rescue them.
Comment: The disaster may affect Politburo member Aliyev, who
has overseen the transport sector for nearly a year. He headed an
earlier investigation of a major accident on the Volga River, which
censured some officials for lax safety practices. Any investigation also
might touch party secretary Dolgikh. He is closely linked with the
major mining facility in Siberia, where shipment problems apparently
delayed some of the vessels that are now caught in the ice.
Top Secret
11 22 October 1983
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85T01094R000500020015-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500020015-4
Top Secret
Botswana
*WINDHOEK
South
Atlantic
Ocean
C KEI C
HOMELAND
Mdenfsane
c East London
C*MBAB~NE
Swaziland
25X1
22 October 1983
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500020015-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500020015-4
Top Secret
SOUTH AFRICA: Violence Increasing in Ciskei
The US Embassy reports that Pretoria is concerned that riots in
the black homeland of Ciskei will interrupt major transportation
routes and spread to the large industrial centers of Port Elizabeth and
East London. Press reports state more than 90 people have died
since early September in clashes with the Ciskei police in Mdantsane,
the second-largest black township in South Africa.
Comment: Ciskei was granted "independence" by Pretoria in
1981, and civil disorders have been steadily increasing since a coup
attempt there failed this summer. Although the South African
Government has not previously intervened directly in the internal
affairs of the "independent" homelands, Pretoria probably will
reinforce the overburdened Ciskei security forces with paramilitary
units. This assistance to the Ciskei authorities however, may not be
Ton Secret
12 22 October 1983
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500020015-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85T01094R000500020015-4
Top Secret
Special Analysis
ISRAEL: New Government's Economic Troubles
The government of Prime Minister Shamir, in its first two weeks in
office, has weathered the furor created by the leak in the Israeli press
of Finance Minister Aridor's plan to make the US dollar legal tender in
Israel and by his subsequent resignation. Aridor's replacement,
Finance Minister Cohen-Orgad, will have difficulty restoring public
confidence and securing support for his publicly stated goal of
reducing personal consumption. The Israelis are likely to ask the US
for increased financial support.
A spate of press reports appeared before Prime Minister Shamir
even took office, claiming that Israel's credit rating in international
financial markets had dropped and that foreign exchange reserves
had declined. The reports prompted the public to buy US dollars in
anticipation of a devaluation. Many Israelis sold stocks, particularly
bank stocks, for shekels to purchase dollars, causina a stoc'k market
crash and forcing the stock market's closure.
Shamir, in presenting his cabinet to the Knesset for approval on
10 October, said that the government would reduce public and
private consumption and cut subsidies. The government's first act
was announcement of an 18.6-percent devaluation of the shekel and
a 50-percent increase in the price of most government-controlled
commodities, including bread and milk. Although these moves will
result in a new record for the inflation rate, Aridor announced his
intention to reduce cost-of-living adjustments.
Aridor, however, was forced to resign a few days later. Opposition
in the cabinet to his "dollarization" plan centered on the greater
economic dependence on the US it would entail. The press leak
caused another flight from the shekel, and the government delayed
collection of value-added taxes because many, firms that hart put their
excess cash in stocks are unable to sell them.
Banking sources of the US Embassy report that sale of dollars
roughly balanced purchases on Tuesday, probably because Israelis
are running out of shekels. Individuals and businesses have had to
cash in dollars and other foreign currency to obtain shekels to meet
their day-to-day expenditures. Nevertheless, the black-arkpt
exchange rate still exceeds the official rate by 5 percent.
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85T01094R000500020015-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500020015-4
Top Secret
The Tel Aviv Stock Exchange opened on Thursday for bond
trading only, and stock trading is scheduled to resume on Monday.
Officials of the government, commercial banks, and the stock
exchange are trying to work out a bank stock, guarantee program to
prevent another massive sale of bank stocks.
Difficult Issues for Cohen-Orgad
Even if resumption of trade on the stock exchange goes smoothly,
Cohen-Orgad will still face major problems. Inflation probably will
reach 160 percent this year as a result of th v I tion and the rise
in prices resulting from subsidy cuts.
Unless the pervasive price-wage indexation system is modified,
however, much of the impact on domestic demand will be mitigated in
January. At that time, wages and pensions will be adjusted for
inflation
Despite Cohen-Orgad's show of determination to reduce the
cost-of-living adjustment, he will face stiff opposition from Histadrut,
the large trade union organization. The US Embassy reports that
Histadrut is unwilling to negotiate reductions in real wages or changes
in the cost-of-living adjustment formula. Officials of the organization
believe that the two-hour strike last Sunday by 70 percent of the labor
force gives them a mandate to defend real wages.
Cohen-Orgad's austerity efforts also will be opposed from within
the ruling coalition, particularly if the budgets for defense and Jewish
settlements in the occupied territories escape cuts. Members of
TAMI, a small coalition party with a low-income constituency, are
likely to oppose reductions in social welfare spending and subsidies.
Other members of the coalition probably would oppose reductions in
traditional public services, such as health care and education.
Even if the government does try to introduce new austerity
measures, the effort is likely to be short lived. It does not have the
political will to stick with such a program for the two to three years
that would be required to make it work. Without an austerity program,
inflation and balance-of-payments problems will continue to increase.
Political Implications
The limited public acceptance of the need for belt-tightening that
existed a few weeks ago appears to have been destroyed by the
alarm about Aridor's plan to link the Israeli economy to the US dollar.
Too Secret
14 22 October 1983
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500020015-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500020015-4
Top Secret
Israelis are looking for a period of stability and a continuation of the
rising standard of living that they have enjoyed in recent years. They
probably will oppose any proposals that threaten these, including
lower subsidies reduced public services, or lower cost-of-living
adjustments.
Rising unemployment, which would result if the new Finance
Minister is able to carry out the austerity policies he advocates, would
be dangerous for the government. Cohen-Orgad probably would have
to retreat if the unemployment rate rises above 5 percent.
The political fallout from higher inflation will be minimal as long as
the cost-of-living formula is not altered. The devaluation presumably
will increase exports, giving the government more time to deal with
the balance-of-payments problem
The government will look for the easiest way to deal with the
economic situation. It may ask the US again for increased aid on
better terms or for generous debt relief, or both. More US assistance
would allow the Israelis to postpone dealing with the balance-of-
payments problem and provide some of the additional foreign
exchange that would be required for expansionary policies to deal
with rising unemployment.
Top Secret
15 22 October 1983
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500020015-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP85TO1094R000500020015-4
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11. CIA-RDP85T01094R000500020015-4